STUDY GUIDE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
AGENDUM: R EVISING C OMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN UN C HARTER
USE OF F ORCE R EGIME .
“Do not feel taken aback because you feel that this is too much for you to understand. It’s simple if
you open Google and are determined to make notes about any terminology or anything that is new
to you. The whole concept might be new to you, but if you fail to go through this with determination
or at least read the relevant documents, you might be failing the whole concept of the MUN. I hope
you can fit in the shoes of the government/country/organization allotted to you and win this.
Honestly, it is easy.
!
We will first try to understand the agendum, then understand things about the committee, give
you some important documents to read for the agenda and later give you a letter from us. We
also have a section post that to give you a fair idea about how to start researching and
understanding things in a specific order.”
F OR YOUR C ONVENIENCE , THE A GENDA G UIDE HAS BEEN DIVIDED
INTO 5 PARTS NAMELY A, B, C, D & E. P LEASE
NOTE , THE FOLLOWING CONTENT IS PROVIDED BY THE
E XECUTIVE B OARD
AND NOT
THE SECRETARIAT .
INDEX
PART A
AGENDA INTRODUCTION AND
DESCRIPTION
PART B
QUESTIONS FOR BETTER
UNDERSTANDING
PART C
IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS AND
TERMINOLOGIES
PART D
LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
PART E
PART E.I. BEST PRACTICES TO
UNDERTAKE TO BE A BETTER DELEGATE
PART E.II. CREDIBLE & PERSUASIVE
PROOFS
PART E.III. About the Committee – The
Security Council
PART A
PART A.I. INTRODUCTION
Before we move to the introduction of the problem, let us first understand the places/
scenarios we have complications in. This Background Guide will give you a fair idea of the
terminologies (Use of Force, UN Charter etc.), introduce you to the new ones and also give
you a brief history as to why they exist; how they came into existence and their relevance to
the agendum at hand. Let us first consider the United Nations Charter: Simply put, The UN Charter is a multilateral
treaty that serves as the United Nations’ Organization's constitution. Every body/agency within the framework of the United Nations and members of the UNO
have to abide by the laws given in the Charter. Use of Force: The concept of use of force is an elaborate and complex one, once we start
analyzing it on a legal level since it keeps on changing form. The perceptions of member
states, as to what constitutes “force” changes dynamically. For almost all countries, an infringement upon sovereignty of a nation by means of an
attack (armed, usually) constitutes Use of Force (U.o.F). However, due to the changing
dynamics and/or advent of technology, newer kinds of conflicts have been witnessed which
are not addressed in the traditional forms of law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ ) gave its ruling on the Nicaragua vs. The United
States, where he Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its
obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not
to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956."
This, in fact stated that US was found to use force against another state. However, the above-described part of the summary of the ruling of the ICJ in the particular
case sets an example about traditional ways of Use of Force, some conflicts do not
essentially fall in the mandate of existing legal structures. Given the advent of the Arab Spring making people in the Middle East determine their own
political freedom and free themselves from the long reigns of dictatorships, the concept of
Self Determination has taken form in almost every part of the world. The concept of Self
Determination is a heated topic when it comes to Kashmir and even Israel-Palestine, for
reference sake. Newer kinds of conflicts have been witnessed in this millennium.
Syria has been a victim of terrorism followed by a plea of its peoples for a democratic form
of government. The conflicts have evolved and humanitarian interventions have become
the recent favorite tool of the member states of the United Nations. Some member states
keep it under the banner of Responsibility to Protect while others choosing it to call it a
Universal War on Terror.
However, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Laws of War) and other relevant conventions
and treaties do govern some aspects of the abovementioned evolution of conflicts, a newer
form of warfare has not seen the light of ethics or laws with respect to it. This kind of war is
also described as the basis of modern warfare; Cyber Warfare. There exists, no multilateral
agreement (internationally) that can call a cyber attack on one nation state by another as
Use of Force, even though a cyber attack can comprimise with the defense structure and
secrets of a state. Hence it is upon the state to view an attack as an act of agression and
leaves it upon subjectibvity to the international community. The UN Charter outrightly prohibits Use of Force in its Article 2(4) except in times of Self
Defense (Artcile 51 of the UN Charter). However, nations have evolved their legal capacities
to include Anticipatory Self Defence, Reactive Self Defense, Interceptive Self Defence etc to
justify their actions to neutralize a threat (or whatever a country sees as a threat). We shall discuss these complications in detail in the following sections. We may also
understand how laws are made and how can they can advance to suit the needs of the
present world setting.
PART A.II. U NDERSTANDING I NTERNATIONAL L AW
The body of law that governs the legal relations between or among states or nations can be
termed as International Law.
To qualify as a subject under the traditional definition of international law, a state had to be
sovereign: It needed a territory, a population, a government, and the ability to engage in
diplomatic or foreign relations. 1
A more contemporary definition expands the traditional notions of international law to conf
er rights and obligations on
intergovernmental international organizations and even on individuals. UNO, for example, is an international
1
In accordance with the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of a State.
organization that has the capacity to engage in treaty relations governed by and binding un
der international law with states
and other international organizations. Individual responsibility under international law is par
ticularly significant in the contextof prosecuting war criminals and the development of inter
national Human Rights.
International law is also defined as
the law applicable to the relations between nations and, to an extent, their internal
conduct insofar as the subject of rules of international law. It also applies to other bodies
that have international personality.The rules of law are found in treaties, conventions, rules
of international customary law, and general principles of lawrecognized by civilized nations.
Subsidiary means for the determination of rules are judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most qualified publicists of the various nations. Its status as a binding form of ‘real law’
is still debated as a matter oflegal theory. The active role of the United Nations (UN) in the
second half of the last century and the work of theInternational Court of Justice provide the
traditional look of a legal system. International law has expanded both in terms of the
number of participants and subject matter. Traditionally, the rules of warfare and
diplomatic relations formed substantive
international law, but it now covers wider aspects ofinternational relations including, most f
amously, peacekeeping. Its
perpetual weakness is that it can often be interpreted as the law of the strongest.2
PART A.III USE OF FORCE REGIME
Cornerstone to the prohibition of the resort to war - nowadays a principle of international
law - is the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War or Kellogg Briand Pact (1928). This
treaty entered into force at 24 July 1929 and is still in force and widely accepted. Although
the League of Nations system did not prohibit war or the Use of Force but restricted it to
tolerable levels, article 2(4) of the UN-Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
In case of aggression by one nation-State against another, the United Nations Security
Council is authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to allow member states to take all
necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. Some examples of Use of
Force short of war: economic sanctions, boycott, pacific blockade, embargo, retorsion and
2
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/UN+Charter+and+United+Nations
reprisals.3
Historical Development The Hague Peace Conferences
The medieval theory of a just war (bellum justum) developed by theologians tried to
establish barriers to war but was never effective in practice. The lack of agreement on what
may be a just cause to wage war led to the interpretation of war as a trial of ordeal and later
to the theoretical variation that recourse to war could be just for either side. With the loss of
the common religious ground of these theories. international legal scholars could not find
any legal restrictions to war (jus ad bellum). Warfare was regarded as being part of
sovereignty, leaving the legal society with a situation where minor inflictions on the rights of
other states called for justification while the worst interference was beyond legal reasoning.
At the end of the nineteenth century. not least in a spirit of humanism first steps were taken
to change the attitude towards the unrestricted resort to war While the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 concentrated on the rules of warfare (jus in bello) in general.
the Hague Convention III of 1907 relating to the opening of hostilities drew up some formal
rules for the start of wars. In the small sector of the recovery of contractual debts. the Hague
Convention II (Drago Porter Convention) even erected a substantive ban on recourse to
armed force on the condition of the debtor state's obligation to accept and submit to an
arbitrational settlement Restrictions similar to the formal approach towards the resort to
war were agreed on in the Bryan Treaties concluded from 1913 onwards between the United
States and several over states. Hostilities were allowed only after recourse to a conciliation
commission and its final report was to be delivered within one year.
The League of Nations Covenant
In response to the experiences of World War I, the League of Nations Covenant of 1919 was
the first attempt to create a collective security system whose main task was to ensure
peace (Article 11). It elaborated on the formal approach of restrictions on the resort to war.
Members of the League of Nations were first and foremost obliged to submit a dispute to
inquiry, arbitration, or to the Council of the League. Any war had to be postponed until three
months after the arbitrators' award or the Council's report and it was definitely prohibited in
the case of a state complying with these statements
3
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/research-guides/war-and-peace/use-of-force
(Articles 13, 15). A violation of these rules could lead to coercive measures of the League
(Article 16). However, in practice the League, of which the United States never was a member
and the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan were for only a short time, failed to achieve
its ambitious objectives.
The Briand—Kellogg Pact
The Briand—Kellogg Pact of 1928 outlawed for the first time the notion of a right to wage
war. The contracting parties condemned recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another (Article 1). Since most states of the world joined the pact and the remaining states
of South America agreed on similar restrictions in the Saavedra Lamas Treaty of 1933, for
the first time a worldwide ban on war was achieved, subject only to the right of self-defense
by tacit agreement of the contracting parties. In 1939, Germany relied unlawfully on this
exception to camouflage its aggression at the beginning of World War II. Unfortunately, the
Briand—Kellogg Pact lacked any further sanctions than the deprivation of a state's rights
under the pact. Moreover. its wording was restricted to wars. States such as Japan in the
1930s tried to circumvent the pact by not declaring an armed conflict to be a war.
The Charter of the United Nations
After World War 11, with the creation of the United Nations Organization (U.N.), member
states attempted anew to prevent war by a system of collective security and to avoid old
deficiencies. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter establishes a ban on "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N." The approach comprises not only war
but also measures short of war and has been confirmed by several international treaties
since. With nearly all states having become U.N. members, the prohibition on the use of
force nowadays must be regarded as a general rule of international law, although still
subject to the expressed right of self-defence. The general prohibition is secured by the
possibility of coercive measures by the U.N. (Article 39) and the obligation to resort to
peaceful means for the settlement of disputes (Article 33). Although the experience of the
holocaust could have given rise to another class of exceptions to the prohibition of the use
of force, the wording of the U.N. Charter clearly stands in the tradition of the Westphalian
Peace Treaty, blind to a state's domestic affairs. This is underlined by Article 2(7), subjecting
the U.N. to the principle of non-intervention.
Defining the Prohibition of the Use of Force by the General Assembly
The onset of decolonization at the end of the 1950s led to a change in the tasks and
structure with which the U.N. was entrusted. A majority of states, mainly composed of
developing countries, tied progressively to develop international law through the General
Assembly (GA) by implementing substantial ideals of justice into the notion of peace
instead of relying on a definition by the mere absence of force. For instance, the GA adopted
the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (A/
RES/1514 (XV) of 1960) and the "Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination" (A/RES/1904 (XVIII) of 1963) with the aim inter alin of qualifying racial
discrimination and colonialism as violations of the prohibition of the use of force. In
justifying armed countermeasures, this substantive approach gave rise to a revival of the
idea of a just war.
In other resolutions, the G.A. tried to interpret aspects of the prohibition of the use of force
on a more abstract level. Of specific importance are the "Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence
and Sovereignty" (A/RES/2131 (30C) of 1965), the "Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations" (A/RES/2625 (XXV) of 1970), both of which have been
adopted by consent, and the so-called "Definition of Aggression" (A/RES/3314 of 1974).
Although in legal doctrine and according to the U.N. Charter, G.A. resolutions are clearly of a
non-binding character, unlike S.C. resolutions, practice shows them to be more persuasive
than mere political statements. In its advisory opinion on the threat and use of nuclear
weapons of 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in correspondence with the
prevailing view in legal writings noted that G.A. resolutions may sometimes have
normative value. In certain circumstances they can provide evidence of a rule of
international customary law or the emergence of an opinio juris. The elaborate analysis of a
GA resolution requires a look at its content and the condition of its adoption. Furthermore,
opinio juris has to exist as to its normative character. These prerequisites are largely fulfilled
by the Friendly Relations Declaration, but to a lesser degree by the Definition of Aggression.
Development of a Legal Framework
In the 1980s, the G.A. adopted several resolutions in order to foster the acceptance of the
prohibition of the use of force, including the "Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement
of Disputes" (A/RES/37/10 of 1982), the "Declaration on the Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force in International
Relations" (AIRES/ 42/22 of 1987), and the "Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of
Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the
Role of the U.N. in this Field" (AIRES/ 43/51 of 1988). An increase in the capacity of the U.N.
for peacemaking and peacekeeping was called for by the statement of the S.C. summit in
1992 and the millennium summit in 2000.
On the regional level, the general prohibition of the use of force has been confirmed in a
number of treaties. including the Charter of the Organization of American States of1967, the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975, the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe of 1990, and the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to
Germany (also called the 2+4 Treaty) 1990.
Enforcing International Law by the Use of Force
Strengthening human rights and the rights of minorities in the last decades of the twentieth
century has enlarged the common ground of the global community, thus reducing the
potential for international disputes. At the same time, this has become a basis for the use of
force by the SC. in order to enforce its resolutions, not only to basis for the use of force by
the S.C. in order to enforce its resolutions, not only to preserve international peace. In the
1990s, the S.C. authorized on several occasions the use of force by member states, not only
in cases of self-defence but also of the protection of the rights and lives of the people of
other states or even, as in the case of Haiti, to implement a government democratically
elected. In 2000, in his millennium report the Secretary General of the U.N. demanded the
threat of conflict be tackled by "protecting the vulnerable" (e.g. in the cases of mass murder
by armed intervention authorized by the S.C.). But if the S.C. is not able to adopt the
measures required, the question arises whether states may act without authorization by the
S.C. The Kosovo war of ten NATO states against Yugoslavia in 1999 because of alleged
severe violations of human rights and rights of the Kosovo minority is an example of states
waging war outside the formal U.N. system in pursuit of similar objectives. Thus, today the
legal community faces the reincarnation of the idea of a just war in form of operations
primarily aimed at the enforcement of international law. The current period of international
law may be described as jus contra bellum (laws against the waging of war) only with
respect to the aim of a belligerent changing of national boundaries4
PART A. IV. COMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS The complications within the Use of Force Regime arise from the prohibition on Use of force
and “indirect” use of force. It is well known that the question of the indirect use of force/
irregular attacks did not merit any significant attention of the drafters of the U.N Charter.
This is a prominent reason as to why there is an asynchronism between the existing legal
regime and the world to which it is supposed to be applicable.
Although the wording of the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter seems quite clear on first glance, its scope and content has neither in state
practice nor in scientific writings yet been defined beyond doubt. First, this is because the
prohibition is part of a system of provisions concerning peacemaking and peacekeeping,
such as Articles 39, 51, and 53 of the U.N. Charter, which rely on different wordings: “threat to
the peace,” “act of aggression,” or “armed attack.” Second, this system lays down
4
http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c14/e1-36-01-02.pdf
restrictions on the right of self-defense that have triggered controversy not only about the
scope of that right but also about the notion of “force.” The interpretation may rely on the
judgments of the ICJ and on the binding resolutions of the S.C., such as S/RES/678 of 1991
and S/RES/686 of 1991 (Iraq), S/RES/748 of 1992 (Libya), and S/RES/807 of 1993 (Croatia).
Reference to the resolutions of the G.A. is only persuasive under certain circumstances.
The prevailing view restricts the prohibition to the use of military armed force. In respect to
former provisions banning war, the scope has been significantly broadened. Thus, its
application remains unaffected by the dispute on the prerequisites of “war.” It comprises the
use of any weapons by a state directed against another state. The Charter does not give
any hint of a prerequisite of a certain level of armed force, thus even minor violations of
boundaries are forbidden.
Developing countries and the former socialist countries especially have tried to extend the
notion of force even to political and economical coercion, arguing that its effects may be
equal to military force. Although the wording of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is open to
such an interpretation, it must clearly be rejected. In other provisions the Charter uses the
word “force” only in connection with military force. Moreover, at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945 a proposal of Brazil to extend the scope of the prohibition to economic
coercion was explicitly rejected. In accordance with this opinion, while interpreting the
fundamental Charter principles the Friendly Relations Declaration deals solely with military
force in respect to Article 2(4) while submitting political and economic coercion to the
principle of non-intervention. Under the latter, non-military coercion is not generally banned
but has to be proportionate. Thus, the ICJ was correct in not applying the prohibition of use
of force to economic measures taken by the United States against Nicaragua in its decision
of 1986.
It is uncontested that the wording of Article 2(4) comprises the indirect use of force
regardless whether the direct force is actually applied by regular troops of another state or
by unofficial bands organized in a military manner (e.g. mercenaries or insurgents). While it
is common ground that the acts carried out directly towards the other state have to amount
to the use or threat of force (i.e. incursions into foreign territory or cross- border shooting), it
remains controversial which activities may qualify for an indirect use of such force. In this
respect, the Friendly Relations Declaration mentions the organizing of irregular forces or
armed bands, encouraging their organization, instigating, assisting, or participating in acts
of civil strife or terrorist acts or acquiescing in such organized activities. In the Nicaragua
judgment, the ICJ stated that not every act of assistance might qualify for an indirect use of
force, holding the arming and training of “contras” by the United States to be a violation of
the prohibition but rejecting the mere supply of funds to them.
Under the prevailing view, clearly all non-military effects on another state, such as
environmental pollution, remain outside the scope of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. But
some commentators question such a finding in cases in which the effects of the use of
mere physical force equal military measures (e.g. the expulsion of population or the
diversion of a river by an upstream state). Although in any case these situations are
governed by the principle of non-intervention, the application of the prohibition of the use
of force is promoted if the effects equal an armed attack, allowing for the right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
SELF DEFENSE AND USE OF FORCE
(Kindly read Article 51 of the U.N. Charter)
The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force against another state except
where the Security Council has authorised the use of force to maintain or restore
international peace and security; and where a state is exercising its inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter5.
Article 51 preserves the right to use force in self-defence “if an armed attack occurs”, until
the Council has taken the necessary measures. On one view, the right is confined to
circumstances in which an actual armed attack has commenced.6 But the view that states
have a right to act in self-defence in order to avert the threat of an imminent attack - often
referred to as ‘anticipatory self-defence’7 - is widely, though not universally, accepted.8 It is
unrealistic in practice to suppose that self-defence must in all cases await an actual attack.
The difference between these two schools of thought should not be overstated: many of
those in the first school take the view that an attack has commenced when there are active
5
The question whether there is also a right to take action in exceptional circumstances of
humanitarian emergency, or to protect fundamental rights, is not dealt with here; nothing in this
paper can be regarded as prejudicing the question one way or the other. Although Article 51 mentions
the right of collective self-defence, this study deals only with individual self-defence.
6
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressly left open the issue of the lawfulness of a
response to the threat of an imminent armed attack in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, at para. 194). When
the question of the existence of an armed attack featured in the Court’s overall reasoning on the law of
self-defence, it appeared before the treatment of the principles of necessity and proportionality. The
same framework was followed by the Court some 17 years later in the Oil Platforms Case (Case
Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, 2003 ICJ Rep.) where it
first investigated the existence of an armed attack (paras. 61 to 64 and 72) before it turned to the
application of the principles of necessity and proportionality (paras. 73 and 74).
7
For the purposes of this document the term ‘anticipatory ‘ self-defence is preferred over ‘preemptive’ self-defence, although the latter is also in current use, for example in the report of the United
Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: ‘A More Secure
World:Our Shared Responsibility’ para.189.
8
The United Nations Secretary-General’s response “In Larger Freedom” to the high-level panel
report mentioned above states: “Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the
inherent right of sovereign states to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long
recognised that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened” (at para.
124). In the resolution adopting the World Summit Outcome the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that
“the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international
peace and security” and reaffirmed “the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to
maintain and restore internaitonal peace and security” but did not comment on the meaning of Article
51.
preparations at an advanced stage, if there is the requisite intent and capability; and many
of those in the other school require not dissimilar conditions before force in self-defence
may lawfully be used in respect of an imminent attack. Further, those who deny the right of
anticipatory self-defence may accept that a completed attack is sufficient to trigger a right
to respond in anticipation of another attack 9.
The requirements set out in the Caroline case10 must be met in relation to a threatened
attack. A threatened attack must be ‘imminent’ and this requirement rules out any claim to
use force to prevent a threat emerging11. Force may be used in self-defence only when it is
necessary to do so, and the force used must be proportionate. he inherent right of self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
“if an armed attack occurs” forms an exception to the general prohibition against the use of
force under Article 2(4).
For the purpose of Article 51, an armed attack includes not only an attack against the
territory of the State, including its airspace and territorial sea, but also attacks directed
against emanations of the State, such as its armed forces or embassies abroad. An armed
attack may also include, in certain circumstances, attacks against private citizens abroad or
civil ships and airliners.12 An ‘armed attack’ therefore is an intentional intervention in or
against another state without that state’s consent or subsequent acquiescence, which is not
legally justified.
An armed attack means any use of armed force, and does not need to cross some threshold
9
As in the Caroline incident, and in the case of the intervention in Afganistan in 2001, which was
categorised by the US and the UK as the exercise of the right of anticipatory self-defence (see UN Doc.
S/2001/946 and UN Doc. S/2001/947).
10
The exchange between the US and the UK agreed that there be “a necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation” and the use of
force, “justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it”.
11
See commentary for section 4, below.
12
This study does not, however, deal with the rescue of citizens abroad, which raises different
issues.
of intensity.13 Any requirement that a use of force must attain a certain gravity and that
frontier incidents, for example, are excluded is relevant only in so far as the minor nature of
an attack is prima facie evidence of absence of intention to attack or honest mistake. It
may also be relevant to the issues of necessity and proportionality. In the case of attacks
by non-State actors, however, different considerations may come into play.
There is no reason to limit a state’s right to protect itself to an attack by another state. The
right of self-defence is a right to use force to avert an attack. The source of the attack,
whether a state or a non-state actor, is irrelevant to the existence of the right. The ICJ Wall
Advisory Opinion should not be read as suggesting that the use of force in self-defence is
not permissible unless the armed attack is by a state.14 There is nothing in the text of Article
51 to demand, or even to suggest, such a limitation. 15
This conclusion is supported by reference to the Caroline case; the criteria in Caroline were
enunciated in the context of a marauding armed band, not orthodox state-to-state conflict.
State practice in this field, including the recent practice of the Security Council, gives no
support to the restriction of self-defence to action against armed attacks imputable to a
state; indeed there is state practice the other way. The action against Al Qaeda in
13
There are statements by the International Court of Justice which suggest that there may be
instances of the use of force which are not of sufficient gravity as to scale and effect to constitute an
armed attack for the purpose of self-defence. (Nicaragua case, note 2, at paras.191 and 195 and Oil
Platforms Case,supra note 2, at paras. 51, 63-64 and 72.
But these statements are not generally accepted.
14
Note 11 above, at para. 139: “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.” But the
European Union statement made upon the adoption of General Assembly resolution ES-10/18
(concerning the Wall Advisory Opinion) suggests that EU member states and the other states
associated with the statement would not accept the possible implication of the Opinion that self-defence
is not available unless the armed attack is by a state. “The European Union will not conceal the fact that reservations exist on
certain paragraphs of the Court’s advisory opinion .We recognise Israel’s security concerns and its right to act in selfdefence.” The matter came up again in a recent case in the ICJ; the Court stated that in the absence of
attribution of the armed force to a State there is no right of self-defence against that State. (Case
concerning Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda)(Merits, 2005 ICJ Rep., at paras. 146,147)). In line with the Wall Advisory Opinion this should
not be read as prohibiting action in self-defence against non-state actors as such.
15
While certain writers have argued that Article 51 concerns only responses to aggression
against another state, their argument based on the French text is not persuasive. True, the French text
of Article 51 uses the term aggression armée, and aggression is also the term used in Article 39, but the
French Government accepted during the debates on the definition of aggression that aggression in
Article 39 was not the same concept as aggression armée in Article 51; further, the English, Chinese
and Spanish texts of the Charter use different terms for Articles 39 and 51.
Afghanistan in October 2001 (which was widely supported by states) was action in selfdefence of anticipated imminent terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda, not from the Taliban. It
was necessary to attack certain elements of the Taliban, in order to pre-empt attacks from
Al Qaeda. Security Council resolutions 1368(2001) and 1373(2001) support the view that selfdefence is available to avert large-scale terrorist attacks such as those on New York and
Washington on 11 September 2001.16 So too do the invocations by NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation) and the OAS (Organisation of American States) of their respective
mutual defence obligations.
The right of states to defend themselves against ongoing attacks, even by private groups of
non-state actors, is not generally questioned. What is questioned is the right to take
action against the state that is the presumed source of such attacks, since it must be
conceded that an attack against a non-state actor within a state will inevitably
constitute the use of force on the territorial state. It may be that the state is not
responsible for the acts of the terrorists, but it is responsible for any failure to take
reasonable steps to prevent the use of its territory as a base for attacks on other states. Its
inability to discharge the duty does not relieve it of the duty. But the right to use force in
self-defence is an inherent right and is not dependent upon any prior breach of international
law by the state in the territory of which defensive force is used.
The criterion of necessity is fundamental to the law of self-defence 17. Force in self-defence
may be used only when it is necessary to end or avert an attack. Thus, all peaceful means
of ending or averting the attack must have been exhausted or be unavailable. As such there
should be no practical non-military alternative to the proposed course of action that would
be likely to be effective in averting the threat or bringing an end to an attack. Necessity is a
16
It should however be noted that Security Council resolution 1368(2001) does not settle the
matter entirely, as in that case there was already significant evidence of a degree of responsibility of a
state (Afghanistan) for the continuing ability of the terrorists to carry out attacks.
17
The criterion of ‘necessity’ if force is legally to be used in self-defence can be traced back to the
language of the Caroline formula:
“[i]t will be for … [Her Majesty’s] Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation” and the action must not be
“unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”
The ICJ held in the Nicaragua case (above note 2) that “the specific rule whereby self-defence
would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to
it” was “a rule well established under customary international law”, and re-affirmed this in its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996 ICJ Rep. 226)
threshold, and the criterion of imminence can be seen to be an aspect of it, inasmuch as it
requires that there be no time to pursue non-forcible measures with a reasonable chance of
averting or stopping the attack.
Necessity is also a limit to the use of force in self-defence in that it restricts the response
to the elimination of the attack and is thus linked to the criterion of proportionality. The
defensive measure must be limited to what is necessary to avert the on-going attack or
bring it to an end.
CHANGING FACE OF WARFARE In 2012, journalist David Sanger reported that the United States, in conjunction with Israel,
had unleashed a massive virus into the computer system of the Iranian nuclear reactor at
Natanz, where the Iranians were engaged in enriching uranium for use in nuclear weaponry.
Operation "Olympic Games" was conceived as an alternative to a kinetic attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities. It was the first major offensive use of America's cyberwar capacity, but it
was seen as justified because of the importance of preempting Iran's development of
nuclear weapons. The so-called "Stuxnet" virus successfully wreaked havoc with Iran's
nuclear capabilities, damaging critical infrastructure and spreading massive confusion
among Iranian scientists and engineers. The damage was comparable to a direct physical
attack on Natanz, though perhaps even more debilitating, given the difficulties of
attribution and the extremely covert nature of the attack. Operation Olympic Games issued
in a new era in national defense. As former CIA Chief Michael Hayden reportedly remarked,
"This is the first attack of a major nature in which a cyber attack was used to effect physical
destruction." He likened the transformation in warfare to that which occurred in 1945 with
the release of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The computer infrastructure of North Korea
sustained serious damage, just two days after President Obama warned that the United
States would not accept North Korea's threats to attack the infrastructure of Sony pictures
unless they cancelled plans to make the movie The Interview, intended to portray a CIA plot
to kill North Korean President Kim Jong-Un. Sony capitulated and cancelled the movie
premiere, much to the consternation of the U.S. government.
The revisionary effect of technological change has conspired with dramatic changes in the
basic structure of war, particularly since the United States engaged al-Qaeda in the wake of
9/11. The most significant shift in the demographics of war is the influx of civilians into
battle. The US is increasingly drawn into conflict with ideologically driven populations,
organized into powerful civilian militias, in lieu of governmental forces carrying out a
concerted state policy of old. With this crucial shift in the landscape of war, the formerly
bright-line distinction between state and non-state actors has been eclipsed, and with it the
boundary distinction between combatants and civilians. However, we cannot satisfy the
requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), in particular the crucial principle of
distinction, without being able reliably to identify who is a legitimate target. In this way,
changes in modern warfare have been attended by a breakdown of the traditional
foundation on which adherence to the rule of law in war depends. There is a ripple effect:
the widespread entry of civilians into the theater of war results in a corresponding
disintegration of the boundary between military jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the
jurisdiction of law enforcement, on the other. Historically, the distinction between the
civilian and combatant populations was a sharp one. The uniform was the most visible
means of marking that distinction, but even without uniforms there would have been little
doubt about who was military and who civilian. In addition, the civilian population was kept
physically separate from war by the fact that the fighting took place on a battlefield, the
boundaries of which were fairly clear. In modern conflicts, the historical distinction of roles is
no longer applicable, as the enemy consists in non-state actors who blend nearly seamlessly
into the civilian population. This is facilitated by the fact that there is no longer a distinct
battlefield in war. Military operations now take place anywhere and everywhere. We might
indeed say that modern war is characterized by a loss of location and the abolition of the
traditional locus of battle, and with the advent of cyberwar we have that process brought to
an extreme: cyber represents the complete loss of the physical battlefield. The advent of
war in cyberspace is the culmination of that ebbing of historical boundaries around the
concept of war.
CONCLUSION & CONTROVERSIES (IMPORTANT)
•The first point of controversy begins herein with regard to the scope of the term force. The
present position predominantly favors interpreting force as meaning military force. Whether
non-military dimensions of the term force should have equal weight or not is the major
controversy here (the cyber domain adding another veneer to an already complex debate).
•The second point of dissension is whether Article 2(4) is an absolute prohibition on the use
of force or whether it can be interpreted in a manner that allows for the use of force in
pursuit of aims consistent with the purposes of the U.N. There are 6 such aims (each with
varying degrees of consensus on them): a. Rescue of nationals b. Force in pursuit of self determination c. Force in pursuit of democracy d. Humanitarian Intervention & R2P e. Invitation by another ‘State’ into a Civil War f. The Uniting for Peace Initiative •Third, the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N Charter is ambiguous on 3 different counts: a. Consensus on the scope of the term self defence has been fragmented and episodic at
best. Different nations have taken varying positions on the same ranging from reactive self
defense to interceptive self-defense to pre-emptive self-defense and anticipatory selfdefense. A clear position needs to be adopted. b. The meaning of the term :armed attack (which is required for the right of self defence to
be activated) is not settled. There exists a gravity threshold & scale & effects test.
Consensus has to be forged on these tests while also working on clarifying the accumulation
of events doctrine as well. c. It is settled law that non-state actors are capable of causing armed attacks as well. What
needs consensus is the level of state involvement required (if it is required at all) for nonstate actors to be considered capable of launching armed attacks. • Fourth, clarity is required on whether a right to self defence exists against the use of force
that falls below the level of an armed attack. If not, then a position needs to be taken on the
legitimate recourses available to a state. Answering this issue will also necessitate the
adoption of a clear stand as to whether Article 51 is an exhaustive statement of the right to
self-defence or whether there is a wider customary law right to self-defence which goes
beyond the right to respond to an armed attack Other themes existing both as part of each
of these themes and independently of the same include collective self-defence and
enforcement action taken by non U.N.S.C multilateral groupings (whether they be ‘coalitions
of the willing’ or regional organizations) which will have to be addressed as well.
PART B QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER
The following questions have been given only for understanding purposes and give a
direction to the committee and your thought process. However, if you as , a delegate feel
that there is more scope to the agendum than the mentioned questions, feel free to bring
them up in committee. We shall highly encourage you to do so.
1. What is the traditional Use of Force Regime and how has it changed historically?
2. What is nexus between Self Determination and Use of Force?
3. How does Responsibility to Protect as a principle affect the Use of Force Regime?
4. How can we address the ambiguity with respect to the Self Defence and Use of
Force?
5. “The right of states to defend themselves against ongoing attacks, even by private
groups of non-state actors, is not generally questioned. What is questioned is the
right to take action against the state that is the presumed source of such attacks,
since it must be conceded that an attack against a non-state actor within a state will
inevitably constitute the use of force on the territorial state.”
How can we answer this question?
6. The scope of the terminology: Force and how does it include the cyber tangent to it?
Is its usage purely military or non military , as well?
7. Is Art.2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, a complete prohibition on use of force
with respect to Self Determination and intervention?
PART C PART C.I. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS Following is the list of documents that need to be perused by all delegates before they come
to the council, without which you may find yourself standing on shore, while the council will
sail away. Please understand that you need to know the following aspects regarding each of
the mentioned documents:
•
The reason why this document exists (for e.g. the Geneva Conventions were enacted
to lay down the rules of war and for the treatment of all parties concerned in the
wars.)
•
The nature of the document and the force it carries, i.e. whether it is a treaty, a
convention, a doctrine, or a universally accepted custom or norm.
•
The areas where the document can be applied or has jurisdiction on (for e.g.
international humanitarian law applies only to situations of armed conflict, whereas
the human rights laws applies at all times of war and peace alike.)
•
The contents of the document at hand. You need not memorize any articles or rules
of any convention or treaty, but should know what the document has to say in
various situations that may arise in the council.
The delegates must have the understanding of the following:
1. UN Charter -The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 at San
Francisco by the nations represented at the United Nations Conference on
International Organisation, most of them earlier allies in the Second World War. The
allies began being referred to as the 'United Nations' towards the end of that war. The
Charter came into force on October 24 1945. Since that time all members joining have
had to declare themselves bound by both documents - though practice has
demonstrated on too many occasions that that declaration has not been taken too
seriously. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ http://research.un.org/en/docs/charter
2. Geneva Conventions - The Geneva Conventions comprise four treaties, and three
additional protocols, that establish the standards of international law for the
humanitarian treatment of war. The singular term Geneva Convention usually
denotes the agreements of 1949, negotiated in the aftermath of the Second World
War (1939–45), which updated the terms of the first three treaties (1864, 1906, 1929),
and added a fourth treaty. The Geneva Conventions extensively defined the basic,
wartime rights of prisoners (civil and military); established protections for the
wounded; and established protections for the civilians in and around a war-zone.
Moreover, the Geneva Convention also defines the rights and protections afforded to
non-combatants, yet, because the Geneva Conventions are about people in war, the
articles do not address warfare proper — the use of weapons of war — which is the
subject of the Hague Conventions (First Hague Conference, 1899; Second Hague
conference 1907), and the bio–chemical warfare Geneva Protocol (Protocol Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, 1925). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions 3. Customary International Law / Customary International Humanitarian Law Customary international law consists of rules that come from "a general practice
accepted as law" and exist independent of treaty law. Customary IHL is of crucial
importance in today’s armed conflicts because it fills gaps left by treaty law and so
strengthens the protection offered to victims.
a. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law b. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/Home c. http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law
4. The concept of ‘jus cogens’ or peremptory norms.
5. International Law Commission (ILC)
The International law Commission was established by the General Assembly, in 1947,
to undertake the mandate of the Assembly, under article 13 (1) (a) of the Charter of the
United Nations to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ...
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification".
http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml
http://legal.un.org/ilc/ Draft Articles of ILC
Draft articles are prepared by the ILC on the request of the General assembly, a single
government or a UN agency. These draft articles are the codification of proposals
which can be adopted as laws after the opinions of all members ( governments/
countries) of the General Assembly are taken into consideration.
6. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT):
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is a treaty concerning
the international law on treaties between states. It was adopted on 22 May 1969 and
opened for signature on 23 May 1969. The Convention entered into force on 27
January 1980. The VCLT was drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of
the United Nations, which began work on the Convention in 1949. http://www.oas.org/
legal/english/docs/Vienna%20Convention%20Treaties.html
KINDLY NOTE: This list is non exhaustive and delegates should research about anything
that comes their way during reading.
PART C.II. IMPORTANT TERMINOLOGIES
1. International Humanitarian Law: International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the laws of war and the law of
armed conflict, is the legal framework applicable to situations of armed conflict and
occupation. As a set of rules and principles it aims, for humanitarian reasons, to
limit the effects of armed conflict.
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law are two different things.
2. Armed Conflict: There is no clear definition of an armed conflict , however rules and provisions in the
IHL (International Humanitarian Law) provide with means to determine an
“International Armed Conflict” and “Non-International Armed Conflict”, which give us
a fair idea of “Armed Conflict” and its distinguishing from less serious forms of
violence, such as internal disturbances and tensions, riots or acts of banditry. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf
However, references for definition can be found in Jurisprudence The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proposed a general definition of
international armed conflict. In the Tadic case, the Tribunal stated that "an armed
conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States". 18 This
definition has been adopted by other international bodies since then.
Since that wasn’t always enough, the ILC (as explained above) presented in its draft
articles for Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties and gave explicit definition to
18
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para. 70
Armed Conflict in Article 2(b) as ““armed conflict” means a situation in which there is
resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed force between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups.”
3. Treaty (Plural: Treaties) : According to the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties , a 'treaty' means an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation. YOU MUST : Take the initiative of understanding concepts of : Self Determination, Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention, Principle of distinction in laws of war, Principle of non-intervention,
legality of sovereignty, Uniting for Peace (G.A. Resolution),
Responsibility to Protect,
Non State Actors.
KINDLY NOTE: This list is non exhaustive and delegates should research about anything
that comes their way during reading. Also, the definitions are based on various principles,
treaties and other sources of law and are provided only to acquaint you with the
concepts. You may or may not want to quote the definitions as per your country’s
perspective
PART D
LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
Dear Delegates,
It is an honor to be serving as a part of the Executive Board at the Jadavpur University MUN
2017, United Nations Security Council. Please consider that this guide, as the name suggests, is merely to provide you with the
background of the agenda and cannot serve as the credible source of information. Your real
research lies beyond this guide and we hope to see some strong content and debate come
our way. The agenda at hand is vast and complex, and a successful discussion on it would entail the
collective participation of all of you. It shall be your prerogative to decide the direction in
which you want to take this committee. The nature of the committee and the topic under discussion, which is, “Revising
complications arising within and from UN Charter Use of force regime” requires that we first
understand the basic terminologies that are used. Since, we would be talking about treaties
and agreements, anyone acquainted with law and legal studies might feel like having an
upper hand, however that is not necessarily the case. The background guide is designed to
help everyone to understand the basic things about the agenda and we strongly
recommend that you research on various things on your own.
If you are doing an MUN for the very first time, we expect you to read the UNA-USA rules of
procedure (www.unausa.org) or watch videos online on youtube about conduct at MUNs. Rest,
the same aspect for research applies to you too. Do not feel taken aback on the research,
foreign policy and other details of the allotted country. Take the initiative to research
properly. However, this guide might mention words and phrases like “rogue”, “Cold war”,
“Third world countries”, “superpower nations”, the committee and you as a delegate shall
refrain from using such terminology.
While it is a clear agenda, it still is open to interpretations and there shall be no direction of
debate that shall be provided by the Executive Board during the committee. Delegates are
required to direct the council at all stages, unless stagnation occurs. The agenda or an MUN
is a beautiful experience and is not as difficult as it may seem. We hope to see a great level
of effort and enthusiasm from you all, so that we all can take back a great experience. This Background has been created a month prior to the conference and it is in best interest
to stick to Reuters/CNN/BBC/UN News and documents to find more after you have
researched. Do research the updated information on various news agencies.
Happy Researching.
Regards,
Angad Singh Madan
President
[email protected]
Ishaan Singh
Vice President
[email protected]
PART E
PART E.I :
B EST P RACTICES F OR R ESEARCH BEFORE AN MUN.
(You can take these best practices into account, not only for the UNSC at JUMUN but for other
MUNs as well.)
• Read the Agenda Guide, least 20 days prior to the conference and make a note of
everything that needs to be understood. Do read the Background guide.
In case of a crisis situation always read and look for the analysis and plausible
rationale on the updates that may be issued a week before the MUN.
• Google/Search everything and find relating documents (UN, News articles, Scholarly
articles) for whatever was not really understood.
• After wholly understanding (subject to how in depth you wish to go for the research),
try understanding your allotted country’s perspective on the agenda.
• Make the stance in accordance with the country’s perspective on the agenda which
shall also define your foreign policy (history, past actions etc.)
• Understand the cues and hints that are given minutely in the Background Guide that
may come handy while presentation of contentions in committee.
• Take a good look at the mandate of council as to what you can discuss and what you
can do in this council. This point is placed here, just because your knowledge base
shouldn’t be limited to the mandate of the council. Know everything, speak whatever
the mandate allows.
• Follow the links given alongside and understand why they were given. Read the
footnotes and the links and hyperlinked text.
• Predict the kind of discussions and on what subtopics can they take place, thereby
analyzing the subtopic research you have done and prepare yourself accordingly.
Make a word/pages document and put your arguments there for better presentation
in council.
• Ask the Executive Board your doubts, if you have any, least 10 days before the
conference by means of the given email ID and make sure to not disclose your
allotted country, until you want to understand the policy of your country.
• Download the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
additional protocols there to and other relative treaties and documents given.
• Ask questions regarding procedure to speak something etc., if you have any, ON the
day of the conference.
PART E.II : N AT U R E
OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE
Documents from the following sources will be considered as credible proof for any
allegations made in committee or statements that require verification:
•
Reuters: Appropriate Documents and articles from the Reuters News agency will be
used to corroborate or refute controversial statements made in committee.
•
UN Document: Documents by all UN agencies will be considered as sufficient proof.
Reports from all UN bodies including treaty-based bodies will also be accepted.
•
Government Reports: Government Reports of a given country used to corroborate an
allegation on the same aforementioned country will be accepted as proof.
Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch or newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India, etc. be accepted as credible proof;
but may be used for better understanding of any issue and even be brought up in debate, if
the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a government or a
delegate (who is a representative of a government, usually).
PART E.III : A B O U T
THE
COMMITTEE - THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under
the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.
The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or
act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and
recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security
Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
The Security Council also recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the
Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the United Nations. And, together
with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.
F UNCTIONS
AND
P OWERS
Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:
•
to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations;
•
to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
•
to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
•
to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
•
to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to
recommend what action should be taken;
•
to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the
use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
•
to take military action against an aggressor;
•
to recommend the admission of new Members;
•
to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas";
•
to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the SecretaryGeneral and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International
Court of Justice.
Maintaining Peace and Security
When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first
action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means.
The Council may:
•
set forth principles for such an agreement;
•
undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
•
dispatch a mission;
•
appoint special envoys; or
•
request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement
of the dispute.
When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an end
as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:
•
issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
•
dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate
opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.
Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:
•
economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel
bans;
•
severance of diplomatic relations;
•
blockade;
•
or even collective military action.
A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices
condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures
taken on other parts of the population and economy.
Organization
The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster,
London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It also travelled to many cities, holding
sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in Geneva,
Switzerland, in 1990.
A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters so
that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises.