Henry A. Kissinger, Opposing Allende and Preventing his Consolidating Power, 1970
President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor (later Secretary of State), Henry Kissinger,
was instrumental in developing U.S. foreign policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This
memo was written in the days following Salvador Allende’s inauguration as President of Chile.
Kissinger and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had tried and failed to stop Allende from
assuming office
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
This meeting will consider the question of what strategy we should adopt to deal with an Allende
Government in Chile.
A. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The election of Allende as President of Chile poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in
this hemisphere. Your decision as to what to do about it may be the most historic and difficult foreign
affairs decision you will have to make this year, for what happens in Chile over the next six to twelve
months will have ramifications that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations. They will have an effect
on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the developing world; on what our future position will
be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including our relations with the USSR, They will
even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is.
Allende is a tough, dedicated Marxist. He comes to power with a profound anti-US bias. The Communist
and Socialist parties form the core of the political coalition that is his power base. Everyone agrees that
Allende will purposefully seek:
– to establish a socialist, Marxist state in Chile;
– to eliminate US influence from Chile and the hemisphere;
– to establish close relations and linkages with the USSR, Cuba and other Socialist countries.
The consolidation of Allende in power in Chile, therefore, would pose some very serious threats to our
interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them
elsewhere in the world:
– US investments (totaling some one billion dollars) may be lost, at least in part; Chile may default on
debts (about $1.5 billion) owed the US Government and private US banks…
– Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the inter American system, a source of
disruption in the hemisphere, and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America.
– It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power
dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban
presence and activity in the region.
– The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on – and
even precedent value for – other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar
phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it.
While events in Chile pose these potentially very adverse consequences for us, they are taking a form
which makes them extremely difficult for us to deal with or offset, and which in fact poses some very
painful dilemmas for us:
a. Allende was elected legally, the first Marxist government ever to come to power by free elections. He
has legitimacy in the eyes of Chileans and most of the world; there is nothing we can do to deny him that
legitimacy or claim he does not have it.
b. We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election; you are firmly
on record for non-intervention in the internal affairs of this hemisphere and of accepting nations “as they
are.” It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate those principles, and
Latin Americans and others in the world will view our policy as a test of the credibility of our rhetoric.
On the other hand, our failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin America and in
Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long
considered our sphere of influence.
c. Allende’s government is likely to move along lines that will make it very difficult to marshal
international or hemisphere censure of him—he is most likely to appear as an “independent” socialist
country rather than a Soviet satellite or “Communist government.”
Yet a Titoist government in Latin America would be far more dangerous to us than it is in Europe,
precisely because it can move against our policies and interests more easily and ambiguously and because
its “model” effect can be insidious.
Allende starts with some significant weaknesses in his position:
– There are tensions in his supporting coalition.
– There is strong if diffuse resistance in Chilean society to moving to a Marxist or totalitarian state.
– There is suspicion of Allende in the military.
– There are serious economic problems and constraints.
To meet this situation, Allende’s immediate “game plan” is clearly to avoid pressure and coalescing of
opposition prematurely, and to keep his opponents within Chile fragmented so that he can neutralize them
one by one as he is able. To this end, he will seek to:
– be internationally respectable;
– move cautiously and pragmatically;
– avoid immediate confrontations with us; and
– move slowly in formalizing relations with Cuba and other Socialist countries.
There is disagreement among the agencies as to precisely how successful Allende will be in overcoming
his problems and weaknesses, or how inevitable it really is that he will follow the course described or that
the threats noted will materialize.
But the weight of the assessments is that Allende and the forces that have come to power with him do have
the skill, the means and the capacity to maintain and consolidate themselves in power, provided they can
play things their way. Logic would certainly argue that he will have the motivation to pursue purposefully
aims he has after all held for some 25 years. Since he has an admittedly profound anti-US and anti-
capitalist bias, his policies are bound to constitute serious problems for us if he has any degree of ability
to implement them.
B.
THE BASIC ISSUE
What all of this boils down to is a fundamental dilemma and issue:
a. Do we wait and try to protect our interests in the context of dealing with Allende because:
– we believe we cannot do anything about him anyway;
– he may not develop into the threat we fear or may mellow in time;
– we do not want to risk turning nationalism against us and damaging our image, credibility and position
in the world;
AND thereby risk letting Allende consolidate himself and his ties with Cuba and the USSR, so that a year
or two from now when he has established his base he can move more strongly against us, and then we
really will be unable to do anything about it or reverse the process. Allende would in effect use us to gain
legitimacy and then turn on us on some economic issue and thereby caste us in the role of “Yankee
imperialist” on an issue of his choice.
OR
b. Do we decide to do something to prevent him from consolidating himself now when we know he is
weaker than he will ever be and when he obviously fears our pressure and hostility, because:
– we can be reasonably sure he is dedicated to opposing us;
– he will be able to consolidate himself and then be able to counter us in increasingly intense ways; and
– to the extent he consolidates himself and links to the USSR and Cuba the trend of events and dynamics
will be irreversible.
AND thereby risk:
– giving him the nationalistic issue as a weapon to entrench himself;
– damaging our credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world as interventionist;
– turning nationalism and latent fear of US domination in the rest of Latin America into violent and
intense opposition to us; and
– perhaps failing to prevent his consolidation anyway.
C. OUR CHOICES
There are deep and fundamental differences among the agencies on this basic issue. They manifest
themselves in essentially three possible approaches:
1. The Modus Vivendi Strategy:
This school of thought, which is essentially State’s position, argues that we really do not have the
capability of preventing Allende from consolidating himself or forcing his failure; that the main course of
events in Chile will be determined primarily by the Allende government and its reactions to the internal
situation; and that the best thing we can do in these circumstances is maintain our relationship and our
presence in Chile so that over the long haul we may be able to foster and influencing domestic trends
favorable to our interests. In this view actions to exert pressure on Allende or to isolate Chile will not
only be ineffective, but will only accelerate adverse developments in Chile and limit our capacity to have
any influence on the long-range trend.
In this view the risks that Allende will consolidate himself and the long-range consequences therefrom are
less dangerous to us than the immediate probable reaction to attempts to oppose Allende. Its perception of
Allende’s long-term development is essentially optimistic and benign· Implicit is the argument that it is
not certain he can overcome his internal weaknesses, that he may pragmatically limit this opposition to us,
and that if he turns into another Tito that would not be bad since we deal with other governments of this
kind anyway.
2. The Hostile Approach:
DOD, CIA and some State people, on the other hand, argue that it is patent that Allende is our enemy, that
he will move counter to us just as soon and as strongly as he feels he can; and that when his hostility is
manifest to us it will be because he has consolidated his power and then it really will be too late to do
very much – the process is irreversible. In this view, therefore, we should try to prevent him from
consolidating now when he is at his weakest.
Implicit in this school of thought is the assumption that we can affect events, and that the risks of stirring
up criticism to our position elsewhere are less dangerous to us than the long-term consolidation of a
Marxist government in Chile.
Within this approach there are in turn two schools of thought:
a. Overt Hostility.
This view argues that we should not delay putting pressure on Allende and therefore should not wait to
react to his moves with counter-punches. It considers the dangers of making our hostility public or of
initiating the fight less important than making unambiguously clear what our position is and where we
stand. It assumes that Allende does not really need our hostility to help consolidate himself, because if he
did he would confront us now. Instead he appears to fear our hostility.
This approach therefore would call for (1) initiating punitive measures, such as terminating aid or
economic embargo; (2) making every effort to rally international support of this position; and (3)
declaring and publicizing our concern and hostility.
b. Non-overt Pressure, Cold, Correct Approach.
This approach concurs in the view that pressure should be placed on Allende now and that we should
oppose him. But it argues that how we package that pressure and opposition is crucial and may make the
difference between effectiveness and ineffectiveness. It argues that an image of the US initiating punitive
measures will permit Allende to marshal domestic support and international sympathy on the one hand,
and make it difficult for us to obtain international cooperation on the other. It further argues that it is the
effect of pressure not the posture of hostility that hurts Allende; the latter gives him tactical opportunities
to blunt the impact of our opposition.
Implicit in this approach is the judgment that how unambiguous our public position is and making a
public record are all less important in the long run than maximizing our pressure and minimizing risks to
our position in the rest of the world.
This approach therefore calls for essentially the same range of pressures as the previous one, but would
use them quietly and covertly; on the surface our posture would be correct, but cold. Any public
manifestation or statement of hostility would be geared to his actions to avoid giving him the advantage
of arguing he is the aggrieved party.
D. ASSESSMENTS
As noted, the basic issue is whether we are to wait and try to adjust or act now to oppose.
The great weakness in the modus vivendi approach is that:
– it gives Allende the strategic initiative;
– it plays into his game plan and almost insures that he will consolidate himself;
– if he does consolidate himself, he will have even more freedom to act against us after a period of our
acceptance of him than if we had opposed him all along;
– there are no apparent reasons or available intelligence to justify a benign or optimistic view of an
Allende regime over the long term. In fact, as noted, an “independent” rational socialist state linked to
Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime.
There is nothing in this strategy that promises to deter or prevent adverse anti-U. S. actions when and if
Chile wants to pursue them – and there are far more compelling reasons to believe that he will when he
feels he is established than that he will not.
The main question with the hostile approach is whether we can effectively prevent Allende from
consolidating his power. There is at least some prospect that we can. But the argument can be made that
even if we did not succeed – provided we did not damage ourselves too severely in the process – we could
hardly be worse off than letting him entrench himself; that there is in fact some virtue in posturing
ourselves in a position of opposition as a means of at least containing him and improving our chance of
inducing others to help us contain him later if we have to.
In my judgment the dangers of doing nothing are greater than the risks we run in trying to do something,
especially since we have flexibility in tailoring our efforts to minimize those risks.
I recommend, therefore that you make a decision that we will oppose Allende as strongly as we can and
do all we can to keep him from consolidating power, taking care to package those efforts in a style that
gives us the appearance of reacting to his moves.
E. THE NSC MEETING
Contrary to your usual practice of not making a decision at NSC meetings, it is essential that you make it
crystal clear where you stand on this issue at today’s meeting. If all concerned do not understand that you
want Allende opposed as strongly as we can, the result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi
approach. This is primarily a question of priorities and nuance. The emphasis resulting from today’s
meeting must be on opposing Allende and preventing his consolidating power and not on minimizing
risks…
“Henry A. Kissinger, Memorandum for the President [Nixon], Subject, NSC Meeting –November 6 –
Chile,” November 5, 1970, from the National Security Archive (nsarchive.gwu.edu).