Using Human and Organizational Factors to Handle the Risk of Major Accidents in Integrated Operations
Siri Andersen
RIO book, Chapter 3
Presented by: Farzad Farid
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
PK8200, Spring 2013
Framework
 Identifying the human and organizational factors
 associated with introduction of Integrated Operations
 in the oil and gas industry in Norway
 that can increase the risk of major accidents.
 Based on interview with industry professionals.
 4 field studies.
 Resulting in generic factors.
OIL FIELD
 Compared and contrasted to the available literature.
 Incorporation of these factors into safety methods.
 Diagnostic checklist ‐> drilling and well operations.
HOPEN
ISLAND
2
Introduction
Hypothesis
 Premise of the study: Introduction of IO into a company can provoke significant changes in operational concepts with an impact on human and organizational factors. Some of these factors may significantly increase the risk of major accidents.
 Focus is on negative impact of IO on safety, although there are also benefits (chapter 2).
Research Method
OIL FIELD
 IO is a relatively new concept => limited opportunity to study actual accidents
 Interview with industry professionals combined with theoretical as HOPEN
well as empirical studies of the human and organizational factors ISLAND
on IO (Grøtan and Albrechtsen 2008, OLF 2007, Ringstad and Andersen 2006, Skjerve et al. 2008, Tveiten 3
et al. 2008).
A Glance at Integrated Operations
OIL FIELD
HOPEN
ISLAND
4
Picture taken from webpage of the SFI: Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry hosted by NTNU: http://www.iocenter.no
Human and Organizational Factors in General
Organizational Factors
 Strategies and decision process.
 Formal aspects: strategies, goals, division of work, distribution of authority.
 Informal aspects: culture and power.
 Internal processes e.g. communication.
Human Factors
OIL FIELD
 Operator’s interaction with the system.
 Information presentation, workplace design, social impacts, etc.
 Inter‐human relations.
HOPEN
ISLAND
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE FACTORS IS NOT ALWAYS SO EASY.
5
Field Studies
 A total of 37 interviews were conducted in 4 investigations:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Looked at changes that had resulted from introduction of IO. 9 interviews with HSE, technical safety, maintenance and operation personnel.
Looked at application of risk analysis methods in the oil industry and the changes incurred as a result of the introduction of IO. 8 interviews with risk analysis personnel: operators, consultants and drilling contractor.
5 accident perspectives were taken from Haukebø (2008), were modified and investigated wrt the impact of IO on major accidents. 7 interviews with personnel from operators, a vendor and a regulatory organization.
Investigated the perception of risk and risk management in IO among personnel from various expert groups. 13 interviews with industry people, consultants and research organizations.
Results were compiled, analyzed and categorized.
6
Human and Organizational Factors
Findings of the study
 Onshore and offshore staff lack of competence and awareness (human)
 Inadequate work arrangements and complex collaboration processes (organizational)
 Insufficient means of communication and lack of information
(mix of both)
 Poor inter‐human relations (mix of both)
7
Onshore and offshore staff lack of competence and awareness
 e.g. Lack of offshore competence could impair decision‐making, safety levels and the ability to carry out repairs.  Weekends and nights?  Different work context (shift, surroundings, etc.). 8
 Onshore personnel receive 2nd hand information.
Inadequate work arrangements and complex collaboration processes
 Lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities for decision making and execution of 9
work: e.g. IO organization is different from the emergency preparedness team, so in case of an accident the interface make case problems.
 Onshore people have remote access and control over offshore systems. Who is in charge?
Insufficient means of communication and lack of information
 Insufficient transfer of necessary data (offshore to onshore for instance)
 Inconsistency between different disciplines (data format)
 Lack of capacity in communication channels.
 Face‐to‐face communication is replaced by communication lines.
10
Poor inter‐human relations
 Mistrust and lack of collegial relationships.
 Goal conflict due to different prioritization of productivity, efficiency and safety.
11
Limitations and premises of the Study
 More participants from the industry than consultants, regulators and researchers.
 Most participants from the industry were onshore personnel: staff or middle managers.  Some participants has rotation between onshore and offshore, but offshore personnel who did not have a specific planning or management role were not interviewed.
 Strong interconnection of the factors: they are not independent.
 Relationship between factors is not given.
 The given factors are generic, so they should be adapted to the scope of each project and the actual IO solution.
12
Validation against other studies
5 previous pieces of work based on similar methodology (interviews). 2 of them cover all. No fundamentally new factor.
 The work by Grøtan and Alberchtsen (2008):
Generally in good agreement.
II. They also discussed the potential negative impacts of these factors when they combine.
III. Complementary factor: communication and information difficulties (when not face‐to‐face but through an ICT network).  The work by Skjerve et al. (2008):
I.
Generally in good agreement.
II. Complementary factors: 1. Poor maintenance due to the long‐
term outsourcing of maintenance activities. 2. Tension between decision making parties. 3. Increased automation of normal operations.
I.
13
Incorporation of these factors into safety methods
 Existing safety methods (e.g. Norsok S‐002‐2004) focus on the offshore organization.  In IO, traditional offshore functions are spread across geographical, organizational and company borders.  Therefore, analyses must be modified to include relevant control and collaboration centers both offshore and onshore, and in operator and vendor organizations.
14
Incorporation of these factors into safety methods
Extension of human factors safety methods
 Situation awareness assessment methods: e.g. new technology
 Team performance analysis methods: team training, etc.
A stronger focus in the oil and gas industry may be placed on such methods to mitigate the impact of the factors outlined earlier.
Extension of organizational development methods
 Some sort of organizational change is necessary to incorporate IO.
 There are various methods of organizational safety assessment that can be used, e.g. OD methods based on action research.
Implementation of factors in design and operative risk analyses
 No influence on DSHA’s as they will be considered in an analysis of events related to current DSHA’s.
 These factors should be used in the procesess that precede DSHAs and in event management, e.g. QRA.
 There are efforts such as BORA, IRISK and WPAM but they are not aaplied to a great extent in the oil and gas industry (Andersen and Mostue 2012).
15
Diagnostic checklist made for drilling and well operations
A series of questions were prepared based on the generic factors and were adapted to the specific IO and company in question
Conclusions were:
 The checklist was capable of characterizing the state of the implementation of the IO.
 Flaws in the implementation, in terms of human and organizational factors, were revealed.
 The checklist should be tailored to the needs of the company: large variations in IO solutions in different companies.
 Automation in this case was not an issue because it is still very little used in drilling solutions.
16
Thank you!
17