2
John Rawls: The Right and
the Good Contrasted *
5.
C L A S S I C A L UTILITARIANISM
• . . The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it
does n o t m a t t e r , e x c e p t indirectly, h o w this sum of satisfactions is
distributed a m o n g individuals any m o r e than it matters, except
indirectly, h o w o n e m a n distributes his satisfactions over time. The
correct d i s t r i b u t i o n in either case is that which yields the maximum
fulfillment. Society m u s t allocate its means of satisfaction whatever
these a r e , rights a n d d u tie s, opportunities and privileges, and
various forms of w e a l t h , so as to achieve this m a x i m u m if it can.
But in itself n o d i s t r i b u t i o n of satisfaction is better than another
except t h a t the m o r e e q u a l distribution is to be preferred to break
ties. It is tru e t h a t certain c o m m o n sense precepts of justice,
particularly t h o s e w h i c h c o n c e rn the protection of liberties and
rights, o r w h i c h e x p r e s s the claims of desert, seem to contradict this
c o n te n tio n . But from a utilitarian s t a n d p o i n t the explanation of
these p re c e p ts a n d of their seemingly stringent character is that they
are those p r e c e p t s w h i c h experience s h o w s should be strictly
respected a n d d e p a r t e d from only u n d e r exceptional circumstances
if the s u m of a d v a n t a g e s is t o be m a x i m i z e d . Yet, as with all other
precepts, t h o s e of justice are derivative from the one end of
attaining t h e g r e a t e s t b a l a n c e of satisfaction. Thus there is no
reason in principle w h y the greater gains of some should not
c o m p e n s a t e for t h e lesser losses of o t h e r s ; or more importantly,
why t h e violation of t h e liberty of a few might not be m a d e right by
the greater g o o d s h a r e d by m a n y . It simply happens that under
most c o n d i t i o n s , at least in a reasonably advanced stage of
civilization, t h e g r e a t e s t s u m of advantages is n o t attained in this
1
2
'Reprinted by permission of the publishers from A THEORY OF JUSTICE
Y John Rawls, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press
™rvam
University Press, copyright © 1971 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College. Also in Great Britain by permission of Oxford University Press.
b
o f
38
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
way. N o d o u b t the strictness of c o m m o n sense precepts of justice
has a certain usefulness in limiting men's propensities t o injustice
and to socially injurious actions, b u t the utilitarian believes th a t to
affirm this strictness as a first principle of m o r a ls is a m i s t a k e . For
just as it is rational for one m a n to maximize the fulfillment of his
system of desires, it is right for a society t o m a x i m i z e t h e net
balance of satisfaction taken over all of its m e m b e r s .
The most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism
(although not, of course, the only w ay of d o in g so) is to a d o p t for
society as a whole the principle of rational choice for o n e m a n .
Once this is recognized, the place of the impartial s p e c ta to r a n d the
emphasis on sympathy in the history of utilitarian t h o u g h t is readily
understood. For it is by the conception of the impartial spectator
and the use of sympathetic identification in guiding o u r im agination
that the principle for one man is applied to society. It is this
spectator w h o is conceived as carrying o u t t h e required o rg a n iz a ­
tion of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire;
it is by this construction that many persons are fused i n t o o n e .
Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and i m a g i n a t i o n , the
impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual w h o identi­
fies with and experiences the desires of o t h e r s as if these desires
were his o w n . In this way he ascertains the intensity of these desires
and assigns t h e m their a p p ro p ria te weight in the o n e system of
desire the satisfaction of which the ideal legislator th e n tries t o
maximize by adjusting the rules of the social system. O n this
conception of society separate individuals are t h o u g h t of as so
many different lines along which rights a n d duties are to be
assigned and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in a c c o r d a n c e
with rules so as to give the greatest fulfillment of w a n t s . T h e n a t u r e
of the decision made by the ideal legislator is n o t , therefore,
materially different from that of a n entrepreneur deciding h o w t o
maximize his profit by p r o d u c i n g this or that c o m m o d i t y , o r t h a t of
a consumer deciding h o w to maximize his satisfaction by the
purchase of this or th a t collection of goods. In each case there is a
single person w h o se system of desires determines the best allocation
of limited means. T h e correct decision is essentially a question of
efficient administration. This view of social co­operation is the
consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for o n e
m a n , and then, to m a k e this extension work, conflating all p e r s o n s
into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial s y m p a t h e t i c
spectator. Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction
between persons.
John
6.
SOME
Raivls
RELATED
39
CONTRASTS
It has seemed to m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s , and it appears to be supported
by the convictions of c o m m o n sense, that w e distinguish as a matter
of principle b e t w e e n t h e claims of liberty and right on the one hand
and the desirability of increasing aggregate social welfare on the
other; a n d t h a t w e give a certain priority, if not absolute weight,
to the former. E a c h m e m b e r of society is thought to have an
inviolability f o u n d e d o n justice or, as some say, on natural right,
which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. Justice
denies t h a t t h e loss of freedom for some is m a d e right by a greater
good s h a r e d by o t h e r s . T h e reasoning which balances the gains and
losses of different p e r s o n s as if they were one person is excluded.
Therefore in a just society t h e basic liberties are taken for granted
and the rights secured by justice are n o t subject to political
bargaining o r to t h e calculus of social interests.
Justice as fairness a t t e m p t s t o account for these common sense
convictions c o n c e r n i n g the priority of justice by showing that they
are the c o n s e q u e n c e of principles which w o u l d be chosen in the
original p o s i t i o n . T h e s e j u d g e m e n t s reflect the rational preferences
and the initial e q u a l i t y of the contracting parties. Although the
utilitarian recognizes t h a t , strictly speaking, his doctrine conflicts
with these s e n t i m e n t s of justice, he maintains that c o m m o n sense
precepts of justice a n d n o t i o n s of natural right have but a
s u b o r d i n a t e validity as s e c o n d a r y rules; they arise from the fact that
under t h e c o n d i t i o n s of civilized society there is great social utility
in following t h e m for t h e m o s t p a r t a n d in permitting violations
only u n d e r e x c e p t i o n a l circumstances. Even the excessive zeal with
which w e a r e a p t t o affirm these precepts and to appeal to these
rights is itself g r a n t e d a certain usefulness, since it counterbalances
a n a t u r a l h u m a n t e n d e n c y t o violate t h e m in ways n o t sanctioned
by utility. O n c e w e u n d e r s t a n d this, the a p p a r e n t disparity between
the utilitarian p r i n c i p l e a n d the strength of these persuasions or
justice is n o lo n g e r a philosophical difficulty. Thus while the
c o n tra c t d o c t r i n e accepts o u r convictions a b o u t the priority or
justice as o n t h e w h o l e s o u n d , utilitarianism seeks t o account tor
them as a socially useful illusion.
,
A s e c o n d c o n t r a s t is t h a t w hereas the utilitarian extends to
40
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
society the principle of choice for o n e m a n , justice as fairness, being
a contract view, assumes t h a t the principles of social choice, a n d so
the principles of justice, are themselves the object of an original
agreement. There is n o reason t o suppose t h a t t h e principles which
should regulate an association of m e n is simply an extension of the
principle of choice for one m a n . O n the c o n t r a r y : if w e a s s u m e t h a t
the correct regulative principle for anything d e p e n d s on t h e n a t u r e
of that thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons w i t h se p a ra te
systems of ends is an essential feature of h u m a n societies, w e sh o u ld
not expect the principles of social choice to be utilitarian. T o be
sure, it has not been shown by anything said so far th a t the parties in
the original position w ould n o t choose the principle of utility t o
define the terms of social co­operation. This is a difficult question
which 1 shall examine later on. It is perfectly possible, from all t h a t
one k n o w s at this point, t h a t some form of the principle of utility
would be a d o p te d , a n d therefore th a t c o n tra c t theory leads
eventually to a deeper and m o r e r o u n d a b o u t justification of
utilitarianism. In fact a derivation of this k i n d is s o m e t i m e s
suggested by Bentham and E d g e w o r t h , although it is n o t developed
by them in any systematic w a y a n d to my k n o w l e d g e it is n o t found
in Sidgwick. For the present I shall simply asssume that t h e p e r s o n s
in the original position would reject the utility principle a n d t h a t
they w o u l d a d o p t instead, for the kinds of reasons previously
sketched, the t w o principles of justice already m e n t i o n e d . In any
case, from the standpoint of contract theory o n e c a n n o t arrive at a
principle of social choice merely by e x te n d in g t h e principle of
rational prudence to the system of desires constructed by the
impartial spectator. T o do this is n o t to ta k e seriously the plurality
and distinctness of individuals, nor to recognize as t h e basis of
justice th a t to which m e n w o u l d consent. H e r e w e m a y n o t e a
curious anomaly. It is customary to think of utilitarianism as
individualistic, and certainly there are good reasons for t h i s . T h e
utilitarians were strong defenders of liberty and freedom of
thought, and they held t h a t the good of society is constituted by t h e
advantages enjoyed by individuals. Yet utilitarianism is n o t indi­
vidualistic, at least w h e n arrived a t by the m o r e n a t u r a l c o u r s e of
reflection, in that, by conflating all systems of desires, it applies t o
society the principle of choice for one m a n . A n d t h u s w e see t h a t t h e
second contrast is related to the first, since it is this conflation, a n d
the principle based u p o n it, which subjects the rights secured by
justice to the calculus of social interests.
3
T h e last contrast th a t I shall m ention n o w is t h a t utilitarianism is
a ideological theory whereas justice as fairness is not. By definition,
John
Rawls
41
then, the latter is a d e o n t o l o g i c a l theory, o n e that either does not
specify t h e g o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y from the right, o r does n o t interpret
the right as m a x i m i z i n g the good. (It should be noted that
deontological theories are defined as non­teleological ones, not
as views t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e Tightness of institutions and acts
independently from their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth
our a t t e n t i o n t a k e c o n s e q u e n c e s into account in judging Tightness.
One which did n o t w o u l d simply be irrational, crazy.) Justice as
fairness is a d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y in the second way. For if it is
assumed t h a t the p e r s o n s in t h e original position would choose a
principle of equal liberty a n d restrict e c o n o m ic and social inequali­
ties to those in e v e r y o n e 's interests, there is n o reason to think that
just institutions will m a x i m i z e the g o o d . (Here I suppose with
utilitarianism t h a t t h e g o o d is defined as the satisfaction of rational
desire.) Of c o u r s e , it is n o t impossible th a t the most good is
produced b u t it w o u l d be a coincidence. T h e question of attaining
the greatest net b a l a n c e of satisfaction never arises in justice as
fairness; this m a x i m u m principle is n o t used at all.
T h e r e is a further p o i n t in this connection. In utilitarianism the
satisfaction of a n y desire h a s s o m e value in itself which must be
taken i n t o a c c o u n t in deciding w h a t is right. In calculating the
greatest b a la n c e of satisfaction it does n o t m atter, except indirectly,
what the desires are f o r . W e are to a rra n g e institutions so as to
obtain t h e greatest s u m of satisfactions; w e ask n o questions about
their source o r q u a l i t y b u t only h o w their satisfaction would affect
the total of well­being. Social welfare depends directly and solely
upon the levels of satisfaction o r dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus
if men t a k e a certain p l e a s u r e in discriminating against one another,
in subjecting o t h e r s t o a lesser liberty as a m e a n s of enhancing their
self­respect, t h e n t h e satisfaction of these desires must be weighed
in o u r d e lib e ra tio n s a c c o r d i n g t o their intensity, or whatever, along
with o t h e r desires. If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to
suppress t h e m , it is b e c a u s e they tend to be socially destructive and
a greater welfare c a n be achieved in o t h e r w ays.
4
In justice as fairness, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , persons accept in
advance a p rin c ip le of equal liberty and they do this without a
knowledge of their m o r e p a r t i c u l a r ends. They implicitly agree,
therefore, to c o n f o r m their c o n c e p t i o n s of their good to w h a t the
principles of justice r e q u i r e , o r at least n o t t o press claims which
directly violate t h e m . A n individual w h o finds that he enjoys seeing
others in p o sitio n s of lesser liberty u n d e r s t a n d s that he has n o claim
whatever to this e n j o y m e n t . T h e pleasure he takes in o t h e r s
deprivations is w r o n g in itself: it is a satisfaction which requires the
42
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
violation of a principle to which he w o u l d agree in the original
position. The principles of right, and so of justice, p u t limits on
which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions o n w h a t are
reasonable conceptions of one's good. In d r a w i n g u p plans a n d in
deciding on aspirations men are to ta k e these c o n s t r a i n t s into
account. Hence in justice as fairness one does n o t ta k e men s
propensities and inclinations as given, w h a t e v e r they are, a n d then
seek the best way to fulfill t h e m . R a t h e r , their desires and
aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice
which specify the boundaries that men's systems of e n d s must
respect. We can express this by saying th a t in justice as fairness the
concept of right is prior to th a t of the g o o d . A just social system
defines the scope within which develop their aims, a n d it provides a
framework of rights and opportunities and the m e a n s of satisfac­
tion within and by the use of which these e n d s m a y be equitably
pursued. The priority of justice is accounted for, in p a r t , by holding
that the interests requiring the violation of justice h a v e n o value.
Having n o merit in the first place, they c a n n o t override its claims.
This priority of the right over the g o o d in justice as fairness turns
out to be a central feature of the conception. It imposes certain
criteria on the design of the basic structure as a w h o l e ; these
arrangements must not tend to generate propensities and attitudes
contrary to the t w o principles of justice (that is, to certain principles
which are given from the first a definite content) a n d th e y must
ensure that just institutions are stable. T h u s certain initial b o u n d s
are placed upon what is good and w h a t forms of c h a r a c te r are
morally worthy, and so upon w h a t kinds of p e r s o n s m e n should
be. N o w any theory of justice will set u p s o m e limits of this
kind, namely, those that are required if its first principles are t o
be satisfied given the circumstances. Utilitarianism excludes those
desires and propensities which if encouraged or p e r m i t t e d w o u l d , in
view of the situation, lead to a lesser net balance of satisfaction. But
this restriction is largely formal, and in the absence of fairly detailed
knowledge of the circumstances it does n o t give m u c h indication of
what these desires and propensities are. This is n o t , by itself, an
objection to utilitarianism. It is simply a feature of utilitarian
doctrine that it relies very heavily u p o n the n a t u r a l facts and
contingencies of h u m a n life in determining w h a t forms of m o ra l
character are to be encouraged in a just society. T h e m o r a l ideal of
justice as fairness is more deeply e m b e d d e d in t h e first principles of
the ethical theory. This is characteristic of n a tu ra l rights views (the
contractarian tradition) in comparison with the t h e o r y of utility,
in setttng forth these contrasts between justice as fairness and
John Rawls
43
utilitarianism, 1 h a v e h a d in m i n d only the classical doctrine. This is
the view of B e n t h a m a n d Sidgwick and of the utilitarian economists
E d g e w o r t h a n d Pigou. T h e kind of utilitarianism espoused by
H u m e w o u l d n o t serve my p u r p o s e ; indeed, it is not strictly
speaking utilitarian. In his w e ll­ k n o w n a rg u m e n ts against Locke's
c o n tra c t t h e o r y , for e x a m p l e , H u m e maintains th a t the principles of
fidelity a n d allegiance b o t h have the same foundation in utility, and
therefore t h a t n o t h i n g is gained from basing political obligation on
an original c o n t r a c t . Locke's doctrine represents, for H u m e , an
unnecessary shuffle: o n e might as well appeal directly to utility.
But all H u m e seems to m e a n by utility is the general interests and
necessities of society. T h e principles of fidelity and allegiance derive
from utility in the sense t h a t the m a i n t e n a n c e of the social order is
impossible unless these principles are generally respected. But then
H u m e assum es t h a t each m a n stands to gain, as judged by his long­
term a d v a n t a g e , w h e n law and g o v e r n m e n t conform to the precepts
founded o n utility. N o m e n t i o n is m a d e of the gains of some
o u t w e i g h i n g the d i s a d v a n t a g e s of others. For H u m e , then, utility
seems t o be identical with s o m e form of the c o m m o n good;
institutions satisfy its d e m a n d s w h e n they are to everyone's
interests, at least in t h e long r u n . N o w if this interpretation of
H u m e is correct, there is offhand n o conflict with the priority of
justice a n d n o incompatibility w ith Locke's contract doctrine. For
the role of equal rights in Locke is precisely to ensure th a t the only
permissible d e p a r t u r e s from the state of n a t u r e are those which
respect these rights a n d serve the c o m m o n interest. It is clear that all
the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s form the state of n a t u r e which Locke approves
of satisfy this c o n d i t i o n a n d are such th a t rational men concerned
t o a d v a n c e their e n d s could consent to them in a state of equality.
H u m e n o w h e r e disputes the propriety of these constraints. His
critique of L ocke's c o n t r a c t doctrine never denies, or even seems to
recognize, its f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t e n t i o n .
T h e m e r i t of t h e classical view as formulated by Bentham,
E d g e w o r t h , a n d Sidgwick is t h a t it clearly recognizes w h a t is at
stake, n a m e l y , the relative priority of the principles of justice and of
the rights derived f r o m these principles. The question is whether the
i m p o s i t i o n of d is a d v a n ta g e s o n a few can be outweighed by a
greater s u m of a d v a n t a g e s enjoyed by o t h e r s ; o r w hether the weight
of justice requires a n equal liberty for all a n d permits only those
e c o n o m i c a n d social inequalities which are to each person's
interests. Implicit in t h e contrasts between classical utilitarianism
a n d justice as fairness is a difference in the underlying conceptions
of society. In t h e o n e w e t h i n k of a well­ordered society as a scheme
6
44
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
of co­operation for reciprocal a d v a n ta g e regulated by principles
which persons would choose in an initial situation t h a t is fair, in the
other as the efficient administration of social resources t o m a x im iz e
the satisfaction of the system of desire constructed by the impartial
spectator from the many individual systems of desires accepted as
given. The comparison with classical utilitarianism in its m o r e
natural derivation brings o u t this contrast.
48.
LEGITIMATE
MORAL
EXPECTATIONS
AND
DESERT
There is a tendency for c o m m o n sense to s u p p o s e t h a t i n c o m e a n d
wealth, and the good things in life generally, sh o u ld be distributed
according to moral desert. Justice is happiness a c c o r d i n g t o virtue.
While it is recognized that this ideal can never be fully carried
out, it is the appropriate conception of distributive justice, at least
as a prima facie principle, and society should try t o realize it as
circumstances p e r m it. N o w justice as fairness rejects this c o n c e p ­
tion. Such a principle would not be chosen in the original position.
There seems t o be n o way of defining the requisite criterion in t h a t
situation. Moreover, the notion of distribution a c c o r d i n g to virtue
fails to distinguish between m o ra l desert a n d legitimate expecta­
tions. Thus it is true that as persons and g r o u p s t a k e p a r t in just
arrangements, they acquire claims o n one a n o t h e r defined by the
publicly recognized rules. Having done various things e n c o u r a g e d
by the existing arrangements, they n o w have certain rights, a n d
just distributive shares h o n o u r these claims. A just schem e, then,
answers to what men are entitled t o ; it satisfies their legitimate
expectations as founded upon social institutions. But w h a t they are
entitled to is not proportional to n o r d e p e n d e n t u p o n their intrinsic
worth. The principles of justice th a t regulate t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a n d
specify the duties and obligations of individuals do n o t m e n t i o n
moral desert, and there is n o tendency for distributive shares to
correspond to it.
7
This contention is borne o u t by the p re c e d in g a c c o u n t of
common sense precepts and their role in p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice.
For example, in determining wages a competitive e c o n o m y gives
weight to the precept of contribution. But as w e h a v e seen, the
extent of one's contribution (estimated by one's m a r g in a l p r o d u c ­
tivity) depends upon supply and d e m a n d . Surely a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l
worth does n o t vary according t o h o w m a n y offer similar skills, o r
happen to w a n t w h a t he can p r o d u c e . N o o n e supposes t h a t w h e n
John
Rawls
45
s o m e o n e ' s abilities are less in d e m a n d or have deteriorated (as in
the case of singers) his m o r a l deservingness undergoes a similar
shift. All of this is perfectly o b v io u s and has long been agreed t o . It
simply reflects the fact n o t e d before th a t is o n e of the fixed points
of o u r m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s th a t n o one deserves his place in the
d is tr ib u tio n of n a t u r a l assets a n y m o r e t h a n he deserves his initial
sta rtin g place in society.
M o r e o v e r , n o n e of the precepts of justice aims at r e w a r d i n g
virtue. T h e p r e m i u m s e a rn e d by scarce n a tu ra l talents, for exam ple,
are to cover the costs of training a n d to e n c o u r a g e the efforts
of learning, as well as to direct ability to w h e r e it best furthers the
c o m m o n interest. T h e distributive shares th a t result d o n o t
correlate w ith m o r a l w o r t h , since the initial e n d o w m e n t of n a tu ra l
assets a n d the contingencies of their g r o w t h a n d n u r t u r e in early life
are a r b i t r a r y from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h e precept w h i c h seems
intuitively t o c o m e closest to r e w a r d i n g m o r a l desert is th a t of
d is tib u tio n according to effort, or p e r h a p s better, conscientious
effort. O n c e again, how ever, it seems clear t h a t the effort a person
is willing t o m a k e is influenced by his n a t u r a l abilities a n d skills a n d
the alternatives o p e n t o him. T h e better e n d o w e d are m o r e likely,
o t h e r things e q u a l , t o strive conscientiously, a n d there seems to be
n o w a y t o d i s c o u n t for their greater g o o d fortune. T h e idea of
r e w a r d i n g desert is im practicable. A n d certainly to the extent th a t
the p re c e p t of need is em phasized, m o ra l w o r t h is ignored. N o r
d o e s t h e basic structure tend to balance the precepts of justice so as
t o achieve the requisite c o r r e s p o n d e n c e behind the scenes. It is
regulated by the t w o principles of justice w h i c h define o t h e r aims
entirely.
T h e s a m e conclusion may be reached in a n o t h e r way. In the
p re c e d in g r e m a r k s the n o t i o n of m o r a l w o r t h as distinct from a
p e r s o n ' s claims based u p o n his legitimate expectations has n o t
been explained. S u p p o s e , then, that w e define this notion and
s h o w t h a t it h a s n o correlation with distributive shares. W e have
only t o consider a well­ordered society, t h a t is, a society in which
institutions are just a n d this fact is publicly recognized. Its m e m b e r s
also h a v e a s t r o n g sense of justice, an effective desire t o comply
w ith the existing rules a n d to give o n e a n o t h e r th a t t o which they
a r e entitled. In this case w e m a y assume t h a t everyone is of equal
m o r a l w o r t h . W e h a v e n o w defined this n o t i o n in term s of the sense
of justice, the desire t o act in a c c o rd a n c e w i t h the principles t h a t
w o u l d be chosen in the original position. But it is evident t h a t
u n d e r s t o o d in this w a y , the equal m o ra l w o r t h of persons does n o t
entail t h a t distributive shares are equal. Each is to receive w h a t the
8
9
46
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
principles of justice say he is entitled t o , and these d o n o t require
equality.
The essential point is th a t the concept of m o ra l w o r t h does not
provide a first principle of distributive justice. T h is is because it
cannot be introduced until after the principles of justice and of
natural duty and obligation have been a c k n o w l e d g e d . O n c e these
principles are on h a n d , moral w o r t h can be defined as having a
sense of justice; and as I shall discuss later, the virtues can be
characterized as desires o r tendencies to act u p o n the c o r r e s p o n d in g
principles. T h u s the concept of m o ra l w o r t h is s e c o n d a r y to those
of right and justice, and it plays n o role in the s u b s t a n t i v e definition
of distributive shares. T h e case is a n a l o g o u s to the relation between
the substantive rules of property and the law of r o b b e r y and theft.
These offences and the demerits they entail p r e s u p p o s e the institu­
tion of property which is established for prior and independent
social ends. For a society to organize itself with the aim of
rewarding moral desert as a first principle w o u l d be like having the
institution of property in order to punish thieves. T h e criterion to
each according to his virtue w ould not, then, be chosen in the
original position. Since the parties desire to a d v a n c e their con­
ceptions of the good, they have n o reason for a r r a n g i n g their
institutions so that distributive shares are d e t e r m i n e d by moral
desert, even if they could find an a n te c e d e n t s t a n d a r d for its
definition.
In a well­ordered society individuals a c q u ire claims t o a share of
the social product by doing certain things e n c o u r a g e d by the
existing arrangements. T h e legitimate e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t arise are
the other side, so to speak, of the principle of fairness a n d the
natural duty of justice. For in the w a y t h a t o n e h a s a d u t y to uphold
just arrangements, and an obligation t o d o o n e ' s p a r t w h e n o n e has
accepted a position in them, so a p e r s o n w h o h a s c o m p lie d w i t h the
scheme and done his share has a right to be t r e a t e d accordingly by
others. They are b o u n d to meet his legitimate e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h u s
when just economic arrangements exist, t h e claims of individuals
are properly settled by reference t o the rules a n d p re c e p ts (with
their respective weights) which these practices t a k e as relevant. As
we have seen, it is incorrect to say th a t just distributive shares
reward individuals according to their m o r a l w o r t h . But w h a t we
can say is that, in the traditional p h r a s e , a just s c h e m e gives each
person his due: that is, it allots to each w h a t h e is entitled to as
aenned by the scheme itself. The principles of justice for institutions
and individuals establish that doing this is fair.
w "
s
h
o
u
l
d
b
e
noted that even t h o u g h a p e r s o n ' s claims are
John Rawls
47
regulated by the existing rules, we can still m a k e a distinction
betw een being entitled to som ething and deserving it in a familar
a l t h o u g h n o n ­ m o r a l s e n s e . T o illustrate, after a game o n e often
says t h a t the losing side deserved to win. H e r e one does n o t mean
t h a t the victors are n o t entitled to claim the c h a m p i o n s h i p , or
w h a te v e r spoils go t o the winner. O n e m e a n s instead that the losing
team displayed to a higher degree the skills and qualities th a t the
g a m e calls forth, a n d the exercise of which gives the sport its
appeal. Therefore the losers truly deserved to win but lost o u t as a
result of b a d luck, o r from other contingencies that caused the
contest to miscarry. Similarly even the best e c o n o m i c arrangem ents
will n o t a lw a y s lead to the m o r e preferred o u tc o m e s . T h e claims
t h a t individuals actually acquire inevitably deviate m o r e o r less
widely from those t h a t the scheme is designed to allow for. Some
p e r s o n s in favoured positions, for exam ple, may n o t have to a
higher degree t h a n o t h e r s the desired qualities and abilities. All this
is evident e n o u g h . Its bearing here is th a t although w e can indeed
distinguish between the claims t h a t existing a r r a n g e m e n t s require
us to h o n o u r , given w h a t individuals have d o n e and h o w things
have t u r n e d out, a n d the claims that w o u l d have resulted under
m o r e ideal circumstances, none of this implies that distributive
shares s h o u l d be in a c c o r d a n c e with m o r a l w o r t h . Even w h e n
things h a p p e n in the best w a y , there is still no tendency for
distribution and virtue to coincide.
N o d o u b t s o m e m a y still c o n t e n d that distributive shares should
m a t c h m o r a l w o r t h at least to the extent th a t this is feasible. They
m a y believe th a t unless those w h o are better off have superior
m o r a l c h a r a c te r , their having greater a d v a n ta g e s is an affront t o
o u r sense of justice. N o w this o p in io n may arise from thinking of
distributive justice as s o m e h o w the opposite of retributive justice. It
is true t h a t in a re a so n a b ly well­ordered society those w h o are
p u n i s h e d for violating just laws have norm ally d o n e som ething
w r o n g . T h is is because the p u r p o s e of the criminal law is t o uphold
basic n a t u r a l duties, those which forbid us to injure o t h e r persons
in their life a n d limb, or to deprive t h e m of their liberty and
p r o p e r t y , a n d p u n i s h m e n t s are to serve this end. They are n o t
simply a scheme of taxes and b u r d e n s designed to p u t a price on
certain forms of c o n d u c t a n d in this w a y t o guide men's c o n d u c t for
m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e . It w o u l d be far better if the acts proscribed
by penal statutes w e r e never d o n e . T h u s a propensity to c o m m i t
such acts is a m a r k of bad character, a n d in a just society legal
p u n i s h m e n t s will only fall u p o n those w h o display these faults.
It is clear t h a t the distribution of e c o n o m i c a n d social advantages
10
1 1
48
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
is entirely different. These a r r a n g e m e n t s are n o t the converse, so to
speak, of the criminal law, so t h a t just as the o n e punishes certain
offences, the other rewards moral w o r t h . T h e function of unequal
distributive shares is to cover the costs of training a n d e d u c a t i o n , to
attract individuals to places and associations w h e r e they are m o s t
needed from a social point to view, and so o n . A s s u m i n g th a t
everyone accepts the propriety of self­ or g r o u p ­ i n t e r e s t e d motiva­
tion duly regulated by a sense of justice, each decides to d o those
things that best accord with his a im s. V a r ia tio n s in wages and
income and the perquisites of position are simply t o influence these
choices so that the end result accords with efficiency a n d justice. In
a well­ordered society there w ould be n o need for the penal law
except insofar as the assurance p r o b l e m m a d e it necessary. The
question of criminal justice belongs for the m o s t p a r t t o partial
compliance theory, whereas the a c c o u n t of distributive shares
belongs to strict compliance theory a n d so t o the c o n s id e r a tio n of
the ideal scheme. T o think of distributive a n d retributive justice as
converses of one another is completely misleading a n d suggests a
different justification for distributive shares t h a n the o n e they in
fact have.
1 2
68.
SEVERAL CONTRASTS
AND THE
BETWEEN
THE
RIGHT
GOOD
In order to bring out the structural features of the c o n t r a c t view, 1
shall now mention several contrasts between the concepts of the
right and the good. Since these concepts enable us to explain m o ra l
worth, they are the tw o fundamental concepts of the t h e o r y . T h e
structure of an ethical doctrine depends u p o n h o w it relates these
two notions and defines their differences. T h e distinctive features of
justice as fairness can be sh o w n by n o tin g these p o i n t s .
One difference is that whereas the principles of justice (and the
principles of right generally) are those t h a t w o u l d be chosen in the
original position, the principles of rational choice a n d the criteria
of deliberative rationality are n o t chosen at all. T h e first t a s k in
the theory of justice is to define the initial situation so th a t the
principles that result express the correct c o n c e p t i o n of justice from
a philosophical point of view. T h is m e a n s t h a t the typical features
of this situation should represent reasonable c o n s t r a i n t s o n argu­
ments for accepting principles and t h a t t h e principles a g r e e d t o
should match our considered convictions of justice in reflective
equilibrium. N o w , the analogous p r o b l e m for the theory of the
John
Rawls
49
g o o d d o e s n o t arise. T h e r e is, to begin w ith, n o necessity for an
a g r e e m e n t u p o n the principles of rational choice. Since each person
is free to plan his life as he pleases (so long as is intentions are
consistent w ith the principles of justice), unanimity concerning the
s t a n d a r d s of rationality is n o t required. All the theory of justice
assumes is t h a t , in t h e thin account of the g o o d , the evident criteria
of r a t i o n a l choice are sufficient to explain the preference for the
p r i m a r y g o o d s , a n d th a t such variations as exist in conceptions of
rationality d o n o t affect the principles of justice adopted in the
original position.
Nevertheless, 1 have assumed that h u m a n beings d o recognize
certain principles a n d t h a t these s t a n d a r d s may be taken by
e n u m e r a t i o n to replace the n o t i o n of rationality. W e can, if we
wish, allow certain v a ria tio n s in the list. T h u s there is disagreement
as to the best w a y t o deal with u n c e r t a i n t y . " There is n o reason,
t h o u g h , w h y individuals in m a k i n g their plans should n o t be
t h o u g h t of as following their inclinations in this case. Therefore any
principle of choice u n d e r uncertainty which seems plausible can be
a d d e d to t h e list, so long as decisive a r g u m e n t s against it are not
f o r t h c o m i n g . It is only in the thin theory of the good th a t we have
t o w o r r y a b o u t these m a tte r s . H e r e the notion of rationality must
be interpreted so th a t the general desire for the prim ary g o o d s can
be established and t h e choice of the principles of justice d e m o n ­
strated. But even in this case, I have suggested that the conception
of justice a d o p t e d is insensitive with respect to conflicting interpre­
tations of rationality. But in any event, once the principles of justice
are c h o se n , a n d we are w o r k i n g within the full theory, there is n o
need t o set u p the a c c o u n t of the good so as to force unanimity on
all the s t a n d a r d s of the rational choice. In fact, it would contradict
the freedom of choice t h a t justice as fairness assures to individuals
a n d g r o u p s within the f r a m e w o r k of just institutions.
A second c o n t r a s t between the right and the good is t h a t it is, in
general, a g o o d t h i n g t h a t individuals' conceptions of their good
sh o u ld differ in significant w a y s , w hereas this is n o t so for
c o n c e p t i o n s of right. In a well­ordered society citizens hold the
s a m e principles of right a n d they try to reach the same judgement in
p a r t i c u l a r cases. These principles are to establish a final ordering
a m o n g t h e conflicting claims t h a t persons m a k e u p o n o n e a n o t h e r
a n d it is essential t h a t this ordering be identifiable from everyone's
p o i n t of view, h o w e v e r difficult it m a y be in practice for everyone t o
accept it. O n the o t h e r h a n d , individuals find their good in different
w a y s , a n d m a n y things m a y be good for o n e person th a t w o u l d
n o t be g o o d for a n o t h e r . M o r e o v e r , there is n o urgency t o reach
50
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
publicly accepted judgement as to w h a t is the g o o d of particular
individuals. The reasons that make such an a g r e e m e n t necessary in
questions of justice do not obtain for judgements of value. Even
when we take up another's point of view and a t t e m p t to estimate
what would be to his advantage, we d o so as an adviser, so to
speak. We try to put ourselves in the other's place, a n d imagining
that we have his aims and w ants, we a t t e m p t to see things from his
standpoint. Cases of paternalism aside, our judgem ent is offered
when it is asked for, but there is no conflict of right if our advice is
disputed and our opinion is not acted u p o n .
In a well­ordered society, then, the plans of life of individuals are
different in the sense that these plans give p r o m i n e n c e to different
aims, and persons are left free to determine their g o o d , the views
of others being counted as merely advisory. N o w this variety in
conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, th a t is, it is rational
for members of a well­ordered society to w a n t their plans to be
different. The reasons for this are obvious. H u m a n beings have
various talents and abilities the totality of which is unrealizable by
any one person or group of persons. T h u s we n o t only benefit from
the complementary nature of our developed inclinations but we
take pleasure in one another's activities. It is as if others were
bringing forth a part of ourselves that we have n o t been able to
cultivate. We have had to devote ourselves t o o t h e r things, to
only a small part of what we might have d o n e . But the situation
is quite otherwise with justice: here w e require n o t only c o m m o n
principles but sufficiently similar ways of applying t h e m in particu­
lar cases so that a final ordering of conflicting claims can be defined.
Judgements of justice are advisory only in special circumstances.
The third difference is that many applications of the principles of
justice are restricted by the veil of ignorance, w h e r e a s e v a lu a tio n s
of a persons's good may rely u p o n a full k n o w l e d g e of the facts.
Thus, as we have seen, not only m u s t the principles of justice be
chosen in the absence of certain kinds of particular in f o r m a tio n ,
but when these principles are used in designing c o n stitu tio n s a n d
basic social arrangements, and in deciding betw een laws a n d
TK !M
'
a r although n o t as strict limitations.
1 he delegates to a constitutional c o n v e n t i o n , a n d ideal legislators
and voters, are also required to take u p a point of view in w h i c h
they know only the appropriate general facts. A n individual's
conception of his good, on the other h a n d , is to be adjusted from
the start to his particular situation. A rational plan of life ta k e s into
account our special abilities, interests, a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d
therefore it quite properly depends u p o n o u r social position a n d
W
C
s u b
e c t
t o
s i m i l
John
Rawls
51
natural assets. T h e r e is n o objection to fitting rational plans to these
contingencies, since the principles of justice have already been
chosen a n d constrain the c o n te n t of these plans, the ends th a t they
e n c o u ra g e a n d the m e a n s t h a t they use. But in judgements of
justice, it is only at t h e judicial a n d administrative stage that all
restrictions o n i n f o r m a t i o n are d r o p p e d , and particular cases are to
be decided in view of all the relevant facts.
In the light of these contrasts w e may further clarify an i m p o r t a n t
difference b e t w e e n the c o n tra c t doctrine a n d utilitarianism. Since
the principle of utility is to m a x im iz e the g o o d understood as the
satisfaction of ra tio n a l desire, w e are to ta k e as given existing
preferences and the possibilities of their continuation into the
future, a n d then to strive for the greatest net balance of satisfaction.
But as w e h a v e seen, the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of rational plans is indeter­
minate in i m p o r t a n t w a y s . T h e m o r e evident and easily applied
principles of r a t i o n a l choice d o not specify the best plan; a
great deal re m a in s to be decided. This indeterminacy is n o difficulty
for justice as fairness, since the details of plans d o not affect in any
w ay w h a t is right or just. O u r w a y of life, whatever o u r particular
circum stances, m u s t a lw a y s conform to the principles of justice that
are arrived at in d e p e n d e n tly . T h u s the arbitrary features of plans of
life d o n o t affect these principles, o r h o w the basic structure is to be
a r r a n g e d . T h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y in the n o t i o n of rationality does n o t
translate itself i n t o legitimate claims th a t men can impose o n one
a n o t h e r . T h e priority of the right prevents this.
T h e utilitarian, o n the o t h e r h a n d , must concede the theoretical
possibility t h a t configurations of preferences allowed by this
in d e te rm in a c y m a y lead t o injustice as ordinarily u n d e r s to o d . For
e x a m p l e , a s s u m e t h a t the larger p a r t of society has an abhorrence
for certain religious o r sexual practices, a n d regards them as an
a b o m i n a t i o n . This feeling is so intense that it is n o t enough th a t
these practices be k e p t from the public view; the very t h o u g h t th a t
these things are g o in g o n is e n o u g h to arouse the majority to anger
a n d h a t r e d . Even w h e n these attitudes are u n s u p p o r t a b l e on moral
g r o u n d s , there a p p e a r s t o be n o sure w a y t o exclude them as
irrational. Seeking t h e greatest satisfaction of desire m a y , then,
justify h a r s h repressive m easures against actions th a t cause n o
social injury. T o defend individual liberty in this case the utilitarian
has to s h o w t h a t given the circumstances the real balance of
a d v a n t a g e s in the long r u n still lies o n the side of freedom; and this
a r g u m e n t m a y o r m a y n o t be successful.
In justice as fairness, h o w e v e r , this p r o b l e m never arises.
T h e intense convictions of the majority, if they are indeed mere
The Right
and the Good
Contrasted
p r e f e r e n c e s w i t h o u t a n y f o u n d a t i o n in the principles of justice
a n t e c e d e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d , h a v e n o w e i g h t to begin with. The
sa tisfa c tio n of these feelings has n o value t h a t can be put in the
scales a g a i n s t t h e c l a i m s of e q u a l liberty. T o have a complaint
a g a i n s t t h e c o n d u c t a n d belief of o t h e r s w e m u s t show that their
a c t i o n s injure us, o r t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s that authorize what they
d o t r e a t us unjustly. A n d this m e a n s t h a t w e m u s t appeal to the
p r i n c i p l e s t h a t w e w o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e in the original position.
A g a i n s t t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s n e i t h e r the intensity of feeling nor its being
s h a r e d by t h e m a j o r i t y c o u n t s for a n y t h i n g . O n the contract view,
t h e n , t h e g r o u n d s of liberty are c o m p l e t e l y separate from existing
p r e f e r e n c e s . I n d e e d , w e m a y t h i n k of the principles of justice as an
a g r e e m e n t n o t t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t certain feelings when assessing
t h e c o n d u c t of o t h e r s . As I n o t e d before, these points are familiar
e l e m e n t s of the classical liberal d o c t r i n e . I have mentioned them
a g a i n in o r d e r to s h o w t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y in the full theory of
t h e g o o d is n o c a u s e for o b j e c t i o n . It m a y leave a person unsettled
as t o w h a t to d o , since it c a n n o t p r o v i d e him with instructions as to
h o w t o d e c i d e . But since t h e aim of justice is n o t to maximize the
fulfilment of r a t i o n a l p l a n s , t h e c o n t e n t of justice is n o t in any way
affected. Of c o u r s e , it c a n n o t be denied th a t prevailing social
a t t i t u d e s tie t h e s t a t e s m a n ' s h a n d s . T h e convictions and passions of
t h e m a j o r i t y m a y m a k e liberty i m p o s s i b l e to m a i n t a i n . But bowing
t o t h e s e p r a c t i c a l necessities is a different thing from accepting the
justification t h a t if these feelings a r e s t r o n g e n o u g h and outweigh in
in te n sity a n y feelings t h a t m i g h t replace t h e m , they should carry the
d e c i s i o n . By c o n t r a s t , t h e c o n t r a c t view requires that we move
t o w a r d s just i n s t i t u t i o n s as speedily as t h e circumstances permit
ir r e s p e c tiv e of e x i s t i n g s e n t i m e n t s . A definite scheme of ideal
i n s t i t u t i o n s is e m b e d d e d in its p r i n c i p l e s of justice.
It is e v i d e n t from these c o n t r a s t s t h a t in justice as fairness the
c o n c e p t s of t h e r i g h t a n d t h e g o o d h a v e m a r k e d l y distinct features.
T h e s e differences arise f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o n t r a c t theory and the
p r i o r i t y of r i g h t a n d justice t h a t r e s u l t s . I d o n o t suggest, however,
t h a t t h e t e r m s ' r i g h t ' a n d ' g o o d ' ( a n d their relatives) are normally
u s e d in w a y s t h a t reflect t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s . A l t h o u g h o u r ordinary
s p e e c h m a y t e n d to s u p p o r t t h e a c c o u n t of these concepts, this
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e is n o t n e e d e d for t h e correctness of the contract
d o c t r i n e . R a t h e r , t w o t h i n g s suffice. First, there is a w ay of mapping
o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g e m e n t s i n t o t h e t h e o r y of justice such that in
reflective e q u i l i b r i u m t h e c o u n t e r p a r t s of these convictions turn out
t o be t r u e , t o e x p r e s s j u d g e m e n t s t h a t w e can accept. A n d second,
o n c e w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e t h e o r y , w e can a c k n o w l e d g e these interpre­
John Ratvls
53
tations as suitable renderings of w h a t on reflection we now wish to
m a i n t a i n . Even t h o u g h we w o u l d not normally use these replace­
m e n t s , p e r h a p s because they are t o o c u m b e r s o m e , or w ould be
m i s u n d e r s t o o d , o r w h a t e v e r , w e are prepared to grant that they
cover in s u b s t a n c e all th a t w a n t s to be said. Certainly these
substitutes m a y n o t m e a n the same as the o rd in a ry judgements with
which they are paired. H o w far this is the case is a question that 1
shall n o t e x a m i n e . M o r e o v e r , the replacements may indicate a shift
m o r e o r less drastic from o u r initial moral judgements as they
existed p r i o r to philosophical reflection. Some changes anyw ay are
b o u n d to h a v e taken place as philosophical criticism and construc­
tion lead us to revise a n d extend o u r views. But w h a t counts
is w h e t h e r the c o n c e p t i o n of justice as fairness, better than any
o t h e r theory presently k n o w n to us, turns o u t to lead to true inter­
p r e t a t i o n s of o u r considered judgements, and provides a m o d e of
expression for w h a t w e w a n t to affirm.
84.
HEDONISM
AS A
METHOD
OF
CHOICE
T ra d itio n a lly h e d o n i s m is interpreted in one of t w o ways: either as
the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the sole intrinsic good is pleasurable feeling, or
as the psychological thesis that the only thing individuals strive for
is pleasure. H o w e v e r 1 shall u n d e r s t a n d hedonism in a third way,
namely, as trying to carry t h r o u g h the d o m i n a n t ­ e n d conception of
deliberation. It a t t e m p t s t o s h o w h o w a rational choice is always
possible, at least in principle. A lthough this effort fails, I shall
e x a m i n e it briefly for the light it t h r o w s u p o n the contrast between
utilitarianism a n d the c o n t r a c t d o c trin e .
I im agine the h e d o n i s t to reason as follows. First he thinks that, if
h u m a n life is to be guided by reason, there m u s t exist a d o m i n a n t
end. T h e r e is n o ra tio n a l w a y to balance o u r competing aims
against o n e a n o t h e r e x c e p t as m e a n s to some higher end. Second, he
interprets pleasure n a r r o w l y as agreeable feeling. Pleasantness as an
a t t r i b u t e of feeling a n d sensation is t h o u g h t t o be the only plausible
c a n d i d a t e for the role of the d o m i n a n t end, a n d therefore it is the
only thing g o o d in itself. T h a t , so conceived, pleasure alone is good
is n o t p o s t u l a t e d s t r a i g h t w a y as a first principle and then held to
accord w i t h o u r c o n sid e re d judgements of value. Rather pleasure
is arrived at as the d o m i n a n t end by a process of elimination.
G r a n t i n g t h a t ra tio n a l choices are possible, such an end must exist.
At the s a m e time this e n d c a n n o t be happiness or any objective
goal. T o a v o id the circularity of the o n e and the inhumanity and
54
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
fanaticism of the other, the hedonist turns i n w a r d s . H e finds t h e
ultimate end in some definite quality of sensation or feeling
identifiable by introspection. W e can suppose, if w e like, t h a t
pleasantness can be ostensively defined as that attribute w h i c h is
c o m m o n t o the feelings and experiences t o w a r d s which we h a v e a
favourable attitude and wish to prolong, other things equal. T h u s ,
for purposes of illustration, o n e might say that pleasantness is t h a t
feature which is c o m m o n t o the experience of smelling roses, of
tasting chocolate, of requited affection, and so o n , and analogously
for the opposite attribute of p a i n f u l n e s s .
The hedonist maintains, then, th a t a rational agent k n o w s
exactly how to proceed in determining his good: he is to ascertain
which of the plans open to him promises the greatest net balance of
pleasure over pain. This plan defines his rational choice, the best
way to order his competing aims. T h e c o u n tin g principles n o w
apply trivially, since all good things are h o m o g e n e o u s and therefore
comparable as means to the one end of pleasure. Of course these
assessments are plagued by uncertainties and lack of i n f o r m a t i o n ,
and normally only the crudest estimates can be m a d e . Yet for
hedonism this is not a real difficulty: w h a t counts is th a t the
maximum of pleasure provides a clear idea of the good. W e are n o w
said to k n o w the one thing the pursuit of which gives rational form
to our life. Largely for these reasons Sidgwick thinks that p le a su re
must be the single rational end t h a t is to guide deliberation.
It is im portant to note t w o points. First, w h e n pleasure is
regarded as a special attribute of feeling and sensation, it is
conceived as a definite measure on which calculations can be based.
By reckoning in terms of the intensity and d u r a t i o n of p l e a s a n t
experiences, the necessary c o m p u t a t i o n s can theoretically be m a d e .
The method of hedonism provides a first­person p r o c e d u r e of
choice as the standard of happiness does not. Second, t a k i n g
pleasure as the d o m i n a n t end does not imply th a t w e h a v e a n y
particular objective goals. W e find pleasure in the m o s t v a r ie d
activities and in the quest for any n u m b e r of things. T h e r e f o r e
aiming to maximize pleasurable feeling seems at least t o avoid t h e
appearance of fanaticism a n d inhumanity while still defining a
rational m e t h o d for first­person choice. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t w o
traditional interpretations of hedonism are n o w easily a c c o u n t e d
for. If pleasure is indeed the only end the pursuit of w h i c h enables
us to identify rational plans, then surely pleasure w o u l d a p p e a r t o
be the sole intrinsic g o o d , a n d so w e w o u l d have arrived at t h e
principle of hedonism by an argument from the conditions of
rational deliberation. A variant of psychological h e d o n ism a ls o
14
John
Rawls
55
follows: for a l t h o u g h it is going t o o far to say th a t rational conduct
w ould a lw a y s consciously aim at pleasure, it w ould in any case be
regulated by a schedule of activities designed to maximize the net
balance of p l e a s u r a b l e feeling. Since it leads to the more familiar
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , the thesis t h a t the pursuit of pleasure provides the
only rational m e t h o d of deliberation seems to be the fundamental
idea of h e d o n i s m .
It seems o b v i o u s t h a t h e d o n i s m fails to define a reasonable
d o m i n a n t e n d . W e need only note th a t once pleasure is conceived,
as it m u s t be, in a sufficiently definite w ay so that its intensity and
d u r a t i o n can enter i n t o the agent's calculations, then it is n o longer
plausible t h a t it s h o u l d be taken as the sole rational a i m . Surely
the preference for a certain a ttr ib u te of feeling or sensation above
all else is as u n b a l a n c e d a n d i n h u m a n as an overriding desire to
m a x im iz e o n e ' s p o w e r o v e r others or one's material wealth. N o
d o u b t it is for this r e a s o n t h a t Sidgwick is reluctant to grant that
pleasantness is a p a r t i c u l a r quality of feeling; yet he must concede
this if pleasure is to serve, as he w a n t s it t o , as the ultimate criterion
to weigh ideal values such as know ledge, beauty, and friendship
against o n e a n o t h e r .
A n d t h e n t o o there is the fact t h a t there are different sorts of
agreeable feelings themselves i n c o m p a r a b l e , as well as the quantita­
tive d i m e n s i o n s of p le a su re , intensity and d u r a t i o n . H o w are we to
balance these w h e n they conflict? Are we to choose a brief but
intense p l e a s a n t experience of o n e kind of feeling over a less intense
b u t longer p l e a s a n t experience of another? Aristotle says that the
g o o d m a n if necessary lays d o w n his life for his friends, since he
prefers a s h o r t p e r i o d of intense pleasure to a long one of mild
enjoyment, a t w e l v e m o n t h of noble life to m a n y years of h u m d r u m
e x i s t e n c e . But h o w d o e s he decide this? Further, as Santayana
observes, w e m u s t settle the relative w o r t h of pleasure and pain.
W h e n Petrarch says t h a t a t h o u s a n d pleasures are not w o r t h one
pain, he a d o p t s a s t a n d a r d for c o m p a r i n g them th a t is m o r e basic
t h a n either. T h e p e r s o n himself m u s t m a k e this decision, taking
i n t o a c c o u n t the full r a n g e of inclinations a n d desires, present
a n d future. Clearly w e have m a d e n o advance beyond deliberate
rationality. T h e p r o b l e m of a plurality of ends arises all over again
within t h e class of subjective f e e l i n g s .
It m a y be objected t h a t in e c o n o m ic s and decision theory these
p r o b l e m s are o v e r c o m e . But this contention is based on a misunder­
s t a n d i n g . In t h e t h e o r y of d e m a n d , for exam ple, it is assumed that
the c o n s u m e r ' s preferences satisfy various postulates: they define a
c o m p le te o r d e r i n g over t h e set of alternatives and exhibit the
16
1 7
18
19
56
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
properties of convexity and continuity, a n d the like. Given these
assumptions, it can be shown that a utility function exists w h i c h
matches these preferences in the sense that one alternative is c h o se n
over another if and only if the value of the function for the selected
alternative is greater. This function characterizes the individual's
choices, w h a t he in fact prefers, granted t h a t his preferences m e e t
certain stipulations. It asserts nothing at all a b o u t h o w a p e r s o n
arranges his decisions in such a coherent order to begin w i t h , n o r
clearly can it claim to be a first­person p r o c e d u r e of choice t h a t
someone might reasonably follow, since it only records t h e
outcome of his deliberations. At best the principles th a t e c o n o m i s t s
have supposed the choices of rational individuals to satisfy c a n be
presented as guidelines for us to consider w h e n w e m a k e o u r
decisions. But so understood, these criteria are just the principles of
rational choice (or their analogues) and w e are back once again
with deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y .
It seems indisputable, then, that there is n o d o m i n a n t end t h e
pursuit of which accords with our considered judgements of value.
The inclusive end of realizing a rational plan of life is an entirely
different thing. But the failure of hedonism to provide a r a t i o n a l
procedure of choice should occasion n o surprise. W ittgenstein
showed that it is a mistake to postulate certain special experiences
to explain h o w we distinguish memories from imaginings, beliefs
from suppositions, and so o n for other mental acts. Similarly, it is
antecedently unlikely th a t certain kinds of agreeable feeling c a n
define a unit of account the use of which explains t h e possibility of
rational deliberation. Neither pleasure n o r any o t h e r d e t e r m i n a t e
end can play the role that the hedonist w ould assign i t .
N o w philosophers have supposed t h a t characteristic experiences
exist and guide o u r mental life for many different reasons. So while
it seems a simple matter to show t h a t h e d o n i s m gets us n o w h e r e ,
the i m p o r t a n t thing is to see why o n e might be driven to resort t o
such a desperate expedient. I have already noted o n e possible
reason: the desire t o n a r r o w d o w n the scope of purely preferential
choice in determining our good. In a teleological t h e o r y a n y
vagueness or ambiguity in the conception of the good is transferred
to that of the right. Hence if the g o o d of individuals is s o m e t h i n g
that, so to speak, is just up to t h e m t o decide as individuals, so
likewise within certain limits is that w h i c h is right. But it is n a t u r a l
to think that w h a t is right is not a m a tte r of mere preference, a n d
therefore one tries t o find a definite conception of the g o o d .
There is, however, a n o t h e r reason: a teleological theory needs a
way to com pare the diverse goods of different individuals so t h a t
20
21
John
Raivls
57
the total g o o d can be m a x i m i z e d . H o w can these assessments be
made? Even if certain e n d s serve to organize the plans of individuals
taken singly, they d o n o t suffice to define a conception of right. It
would a p p e a r , t h e n , t h a t the turn inwards to the standard of
agreeable feeling is an a t t e m p t to find a c o m m o n denominator
a m o n g the plurality of p e r s o n s , an interpersonal currency as it
were, by m e a n s of w h i c h the social ordering can be specified. And
this suggestion is all the m o r e compelling if it is already maintained
that this s t a n d a r d is the aim of each person to the extent that he is
rational.
By w ay of c o n c l u s i o n , 1 should not say that a teleological
doctrine is necessarily driven to some form of hedonism in order to
define a c o h e r e n t t h e o r y . Yet it does seem that the tendency in this
direction has a certain n a t u r a l n e s s . H e d o n i s m is, one might say, the
s y m p t o m a t i c drift of teleological theories insofar as they try to
formulate a clear a n d applicable m e t h o d of moral reasoning. The
weakness of h e d o n i s m reflects the impossibility of defining an
a p p r o p r i a t e definite e n d t o be maximized. And this suggests that
the structure of teleological doctrines is radically misconceived:
from the start they relate the right and the good in the w r o n g way.
We sh o u ld n o t a t t e m p t to give form to our life by first looking to
the g o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y defined. It is not our aims that primarily
reveal o u r n a t u r e b u t r a t h e r the principles that w e would acknowl­
edge to govern the b a c k g r o u n d conditions under which these aims
are to be formed a n d the m a n n e r in which they are to be pursued.
For the self is p r i o r to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a
d o m i n a n t end m u s t be chosen from a m o n g n u m e r o u s possibilities.
There is n o w a y to get b e y o n d deliberative rationality. We should
therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good
p ro p o se d by teleological doctrines a n d view the right as prior. The
moral t h e o r y is then developed by w o r k i n g in the opposite
direction.
NOTES
On this point see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 416 f.
^ See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. 5, last two paras.
For Bentham see The Principles of International Law, Essay I, in The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh, 1838­43),
vol. II, p. 5 3 7 ; for Edgeworth see Mathematical Psychics, pp. 52­6, and
also the first pages of T h e Pure Theory of Taxation', Economic
Journal, vol. 7 (1897), where the same argument is presented more
briefly.
Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, sec. IV.
58
5
6
7
s
9
1 0
11
1 2
1 3
1 4
15
1 6
18
19
The Right and the Good
Contrasted
The priority of right is a central feature of Kant's ethics. See, for
example, The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt I, especially
pp. 62­5 of vol. 5 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Preussische
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1913). A clear statement is to
be found in 'Theory and Practice' (to abbreviate the title), Political
Writings, pp. 67 f.
'Of the Original Contract', Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, vol. 1 (London, 1875), pp. 454 f.
See, for example, W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, The
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 21, 2 6 ­8 , 35, 57 f. Similarly, Leibniz in
'On the Ultimate Origin of Things' (1697) speaks of the law of justice
which 'declares that each one [each individual] participate in the
perfection of the universe and in a happiness of his own in proportion
to his own virtue and to the good will he entertains toward the common
good.' Leibniz, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1951), p. 353.
See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1935), pp. 5 4 ­7 .
See Knight, ibid., p. 56 n.
Here I borrow from Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 64 f.
See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, The Clarendon Press,
1961), p. 39; and Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, ch. 5.
On this point, see Feinberg, ibid., pp. 62, 69 n.
See the discussion in R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 278­306.
The illustration is from C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 186 f.
The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn (London, Macmillan, 1907),
pp. 4 0 5 ­7 ,4 7 9 .
As Broad observes in Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 187.
In Methods of Ethics, p. 127, Sidgwick denies that pleasure is a
measurable quality of feeling independent of its relation from volition.
This is the view of some writers, he says, but one he cannot accept. He
defines pleasure 'as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent
beings, is at least apprehended as desirable or ­ in cases of comparison ­
preferable'. It would seem that the view he here rejects is the one he
relies upon later as the final criterion to introduce coherence among
ends. See pp. 405­7, 479. Otherwise the hedonist method of choice no
longer provides instructions that can be followed.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1169al7­26.
The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, Charles Scribner's,
Sons 1905), pp. 237 f.
Thus to the objection that price theory must fail because it seeks to
predict the unpredictable, the decisions of persons with free will, Walras
says: 'Actually, we have never attempted to predict decisions made
under conditions of perfect freedom; we have only tried to express the
John Rawls
59
effects of such decisions in terms of mathematics. In our theory each
trader may be assumed to determine his utility or want curves as he
pleases.' Elements of Pure Economics, trans. William Jaffe (Home­
wood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, 1954), p. 256. See also P. A. Samuelson,
Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1947), the remarks pp. 9 0 ­ 2 , 97 f; and R.D. Luce and Howard
Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957),
pp. 1 6 , 2 1 ­ 4 , 3 8 .
See the Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953).
The argument against postulating special experiences is made through­
out for many different cases. For the application to pleasure, see the
remarks of G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1957). Anscombe says: 'We might adapt a remark of Wittgenstein's
about meaning and say "Pleasure cannot be an impression; for no
impression could have the consequences of pleasure." They [the British
Empiricists] were saying that something which they thought of as like a
particular tickle or itch was quite obviously the point of doing anything
whatsoever' (p. 77). See also Gilbert Ryle, 'Pleasure', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 28 (1954), and Dilemmas (Cambridge,
The University Press, 1954), ch. 4; Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion
and Will (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 6; and
C. C. W. Taylor, 'Pleasure', Analysis, supp. vol. (1963). These studies
present what seems to be the more correct view. In the text I try to
explain the motivation from the standpoint of moral philosophy of the
so­called British Empiricist conception of pleasure. That it is fallacious I
pretty much take for granted, as the writers mentioned have, I believe,
shown.