South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT PLAN
(CEMP)
RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MITIGATION PLAN
(RAMP)
Effective Date: 11/30/12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RECORD OF REVISIONS
RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS’ SIGN-OFF SHEET
DISTRIBUTION
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Scope
P&P/SOG Cross Reference
Plan Development and Maintenance
Effective Date
Authorities
References
Incorporation into Existing Planning Mechanisms
Continued Public Involvement
PAGE
6
8
9
10
11
SECTION l: Risk Assessment & Hazard Mitigation Plan Background
1.1. Plan Purpose and Participating Agencies
1.2. Mitigation Planning Requirements
1.3. Plan Organization
13
14
15
SECTION II: Authority Profile
2.1. District’s History and Overview
2.2. Authority’s Location, Geographic and Climatic Characteristics
2.3. District’s Population Characteristics
16
16
18
SECTION III: Risk Assessment & Hazard Mitigation Planning Process
3.1 Step 1: Organizing the Effort
3.2 Step 2: Internal Stakeholder Input
3.3 Step 3: External Coordination
3.4 Step 4: Hazard Identification and Profile
3.5 Step 5: External Stakeholder Input: Community Members
3.6 Step 6: Mitigation Goal Setting
3.7 Step 7: Activities Review
3.8 Step 8: Action Plan Development
3.9 Step 9: Plan Adoption
3.10 Step 10: Plan Implementation, Evaluation, and Revision
26
27
28
29
31
31
34
34
34
34
34
2
SECTION
PAGE
SECTION IV: Risk Assessment
4.1 Risk Assessment & Identified Hazards Overview
4.2 Earthquake
4.3 Fires
4.4 Floods and Dam Failure
4.5 Hail
4.6 Hazardous Materials
4.7 Medical and Public Health Emergencies
4.8 Terrorism
4.9 Tornado
4.10 Transportation
4.11 Winter Storm
4.12 Hazard Profile Summary
4.13 Vulnerability Summary
35
42
49
56
61
66
77
85
91
96
108
112
114
SECTION V: Mitigation Strategy
5.1. Plan Strategy Statements, Goals, and Objectives
5.2. Identification of Mitigation Action Alternatives
5.3. Prioritization and Implementation of Mitigation Actions
116
117
121
SECTION VI: Plan Maintenance and Update
6.1 Plan Coordination
6.2 Plan Manager
6.3 Plan Adoption
6.4 Ongoing Monitoring
6.5 Yearly Internal Stakeholder Workgroup Meetings
6.6 Prioritizing Action Items
6.7 Five-year Review Process
122
124
124
125
125
126
127
SECTION VII: Appendices
Appendix A: Authority Board Adoption Resolution (future)
Appendix B: FEMA Crosswalk
Appendix C: Tapestry Segmentation Descriptions
Appendix D: Risk Assessment Work Group Charter
Appendix E: R.A.M.P. Planning Process Documentation
Appendix F: Public Notification Documentation
Appendix G: HazMat Classifications
Appendix H: RTD Critical Assets Requiring Protection
(Sensitive Propriety Data – Redact for Public Distribution)
Appendix I: Freight Rail Commodity Flow Data (2010)
(Sensitive Propriety Data – Redact for Public Distribution)
Appendix J: Mitigation Project Goals
128
130
136
153
154
164
167
168
169
170
3
FIGURES
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure 5:
Figure 6:
Figure 7:
Figure 8:
Figure 9:
Figure 10:
Figure 11:
Figure 12:
Figure 13:
Figure 14:
Figure 15:
Figure 16:
Figure 17:
SMFRA census population, 1990-2010
Tapestry Segmentation segments for SMFRA households
Tapestry LifeMode Groups for SMFRA Households
SMFRA Tapestry Segments and LifeMode Summary Groups
Perception of Hazard Priorities: Survey Result (2011)
2011 Community Wildfire Survey
Common Wildfire Cause
Structure Fire Common Cause
Front Range Hail Activity Distribution by Month 1955-2010
SMFRA Hail Activity Distribution by Month 1955-2010
Total HazMat Rail Cars by Class Code (2010)
Centennial Airport Monthly Operations (2009-2011)
Average Daily Light Rail Riders (2010)
Total Volume by Day of the Week (I-25 & Lincoln Avenue)
Traffic Volume by Hour (North and Southbound I-25 & Lincoln Ave.)
Colorado Snowfall Totals (December 20-21, 2006)
Graphical Risk Ranking of Hazards
Map 1:
Map 2:
Map 3:
Map 4:
Map 5:
Map 6:
Map 7:
Map 8:
Map 9:
Map 10:
Map 11:
Map 12:
Map 13:
Map 14:
Map 15:
Map 16:
Map 17:
Map 18:
Map 19:
Map 20:
Map 21:
Map 22:
Map 23:
Map 24:
Map 25:
SMFRA’s Service Area
SMFRA Census Population, 2010
Seismicity of Colorado 1990-2006
Colorado Earthquake (1962-2007)
Earthquake Event Magnitudes and Faults
Colorado Seismic Hazard Earthquake Peak Acceleration (2008)
Probability of Earthquake of 6.0 or Greater occurring within 100 years
SMFRA Wildland/Brush Fire Types Experience 2008-2010
Structure Fires Sample Period 2008-2010
CWPP Community Hazard Ranking
Service Area Drainage Creeks
Flood Plain Areas
Reuter Hess Inundation Area
Region Hail Activity 1955-2010
SMFRA Hail Activity 1955-2010
Transmission Line Diameters
Transmission Commodities
HazMat Locations in Service Area
Freight Rail Map
Listeria Monocytogenes: Persons Infected
Front Range Tornado Activity 1950-2010
SMFRA Tornado Activity 1950-2010
Southeast Light Rail Line
MVA Distribution (2010)
MVA Concentration Areas
MAPS
PAGE
18
22
23
24
32
33
51
52
63
63
71
97
100
101
101
109
113
PAGE
17
20
43
44
45
46
47
50
52
54
57
57
60
62
62
68
68
69
70
81
92
93
99
104
105
4
TABLES
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
Table 6:
Table 7:
Table 8:
Table 9:
Table 10:
Table 11:
Table 12:
Table 13:
Table 14:
Table 15:
Table 16:
Table 17:
Table 18:
Table 19:
Table 20:
Table 21:
Table 22:
Table 23:
Table 24:
Table 25:
Table 26:
Table 27:
Table 28:
Table 29:
Table 30:
Table 31:
Table 32:
SMFRA’s Top Ten Hazards
Demographic Summary and Comparison, Years 2000 and 2010
Demographic Data by City/County
City/County Employment by Industry
Tapestry Segmentation Summary
10-Step Planning Process Used to Develop the Plan
Risk Assessment Workgroup Members
OS&DP Committee Members
Internal Stakeholder Members
External Stakeholder Members
Documents Reviewed
Crosswalk of Hazards Reviewed by Jurisdiction
Hazards Not Profiled in Plan
Magnitude and Intensity Scales for Earthquakes
Identified High and Very High Hazard Areas
Reuter Hess Flood Inundation
TORRO Hailstorm Intensity Scale
Top 10 Damaging Hailstorms in Colorado
Average Daily Interstate Commodity Flows (2009-2011)
Service Area HazMat Responses (2009-2011)
Two-Alarm or Greater HazMat Responses
SMFRA 2011 Emergency Medical Incidents
SMFRA 2011 Emergency Trauma Incidents
Tornado Intensity Scales
Rail Road Related Accidents (Douglas County)
In-Service Area MVAs
Average Monthly Snow Accumulation Totals (inches)
2011 Parcel Use, Count, & Total Values
Critical Infrastructures
Overall Risk Ranking of Hazards
Summary of Mitigation Actions
Categories of Mitigation Actions
PAGE
7
19
21
21
22
26
27
28
29
29
30
40
41
42
55
60
61
64
72
73
73
79
79
91
103
104
108
114
115
112
116
117
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The South Metro Fire Rescue Authority (SMFRA) prepared the Risk Assessment and
Mitigation Plan (hereafter referred to as the RAMP) to eliminate or reduce long-term risks to
people, property, and the environment due to natural and human-caused hazards. Following
FEMA’s guidelines, the RAMP identifies risks, assesses vulnerabilities, and prioritizes goals
and actions for mitigating the affects of natural and human-caused hazards to SMFRA’s
communities.
Hazard mitigation is defined by FEMA as “any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate
long-term risk to human life and property from a hazard event.” Mitigation creates safer
communities by reducing loss of life and property damage. Hazard mitigation planning is the
process through which hazards that threaten communities are identified and profiled, likely
impacts of those hazards are assessed, and mitigation strategies to lessen those impacts are
identified, prioritized, and implemented. The results of a three-year, congressionally
mandated independent study to assess future savings from mitigation activities provides
evidence that mitigation activities are highly cost-effective. On average, each dollar spent on
mitigation saves society an average of $4 in avoided future losses in addition to saving lives
and preventing injuries (National Institute of Building Science Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council
2005).
The RAMP was prepared pursuant to the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
to achieve eligibility for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hazard
mitigation grant programs. Through the leadership of the Community Safety Services
Division, the Risk Assessment Work Group was formed to assist with the development of the
RAMP including data collection, stakeholder input, community asset/vulnerability analysis
and identification of preferred mitigation alternatives. The RAMP represents the collective
work of the citizens, elected and appointed officials, and other stakeholders in SMFRA’s
jurisdiction.
The risk assessment workgroup identified and profiled the following hazards (in alphabetic
order):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Earthquake
Fires
Floods and Dam Failure
Hail
Hazardous Materials
Medical and Public Health Emergencies
Terrorism
Tornado
Transportation
Winter Storm
Table 1 summarizes the top ten hazard risks that exist within SMFRA’s service area as
identified during the assessment process and stakeholder meetings.
6
Risk
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Table 1: SMFRA’s Top Ten Hazards
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/
Hazard
(F/P)
Severity (M/S)
Commercial Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Critical
Hazmat (Fixed Facility)
Highly Likely
Critical
Multi-Family Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Critical
Wildfire (20-100 acres)
Likely
Critical
CriticalWildfire (>100 acres)
Occasional
Catastrophic
Hazmat (Delivery Lines)
Highly Likely
Limited
Hazmat (Over-the-Road)
Highly Likely
Limited
Public Health (Outbreak)
Highly Likely
Limited
Single Family Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Limited
Tornado(F0-F1)
Highly Likely
Limited
Transport Vehicle Fire
Highly Likely
Limited
Wildfire (1-19 acres)
Highly Likely
Limited
Hazmat (Freight Train)
Occasional
Critical
Light Rail Accident
Occasional
Critical
Winter Storm (19”+)
Occasional
Critical
Aircraft Fire
Likely
Limited
Winter Storm (12-18”)
Likely
Limited
Public Health (Epidemic)
Occasional
Limited-Critical
Terrorism (Firearms)
Occasional
Limited-Critical
Earthquake (6.0+)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Dam Failure/Flood
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Public Health ( Pandemic)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Terrorism (Radiological/Nuclear)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Tornado(F3)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Earthquake (4-4.9)
Occasional
Limited
Freight Train Accident
Occasional
Limited
Riverline Flood
Occasional
Limited
Terrorism (Explosives)
Occasional
Limited
Earthquake (5-5.9)
Unlikely
Critical
Structural Aircraft Accident
Unlikely
Critical
Terrorism (Biological/Chemical)
Unlikely
Critical
Tornado(F2)
Unlikely
Critical
Total Risk
Score
(M/S x F/P)
36
27
22
20
18
15
14
13
10
9
The RAMP will continue to be developed and revised to support activities in SMFRA’s
service area. Coordination will continue with local municipalities to support future mitigation
activities. Opportunities will also be pursued to support local businesses and institutions to
encourage efforts to prepare and mitigate these identified risks.
7
RECORD OF REVISIONS
SMFRA’s RAMP is reviewed annually to update and revise the plan. Major changes are
recorded on the table below and inserts are prepared for inclusion in distributed copies. All
amendments to this plan must be fully implemented within six months after the change
occurs.
Change
#
Date
Entered
1.
8/20/10
2.
1/16/13
Contents of Change
Divided aircraft accidents into two categories: into structures
and stand-alone. Risk matrix adjusted accordingly.
Added SMFRA Board Adoption resolution, FEMA approval
letter, and approval matrix
RAMP
Administrator’s
Signature
Steven E Standridge
Steven E Standridge
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
8
RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL’S SIGN-OFFS
The following officials certify that they have participated in the development of this Plan or Annex,
fully understand the plans or action, policies, or procedures that are outlined in this document and
concur with the Plan or Annex(s) as written.
Name
Dan Qualman
Title
Chief of Department
Signature
Name
Robert Baker
Title
Operations Assistant Chief
Signature
Name
Vince Turner
Title
Support Services Assistant Chief
Signature
Name
Michael Dell’Orfano
Title
Community Safety Services Assistant Chief
Signature
Name
Marie Hoover
Title
Chief Financial Officer
Signature
9
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Division or Agency
SMFRA’s Intranet
Date Distributed
SMFRA’s Executive Command Staff
SMFRA’s Record Keeper
Arapahoe County Emergency Management Agencies
Douglas County Emergency Management Agencies
SMFRA’s Municipalities
10
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Scope
Once the RAMP is adopted by the Board of Directors, it will become the Authority’s official
risk assessment and mitigation plan.
P&P/SOG Cross Reference
1. Policy and Procedure (P&Ps) Cross Reference:
2. Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) Cross Reference:
Plan Development and Maintenance
Deficiencies found in this plan should be summarized and submitted in writing to the
Emergency Manager when noted.
The Emergency Manager maintains a file of recommended changes or improvements and
reviews the entire plan annually to ensure all procedures, policies, data and responsibilities
are current and reflect actual assignments.
Effective Date
The effective date of this RAMP is November 30, 2012. This document supersedes all
previously recognized risk assessment and mitigation plans for the South Metro Fire Rescue
Authority.
Authorities
Federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 44CFR 201.6 (DMA 2000)
FEMA Interim Final Rule (FEMA 2002a) 44 CFR Part 201: Mitigation Planning
References
Center on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI): Standard of Cover (5th ed.)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600: Standard for Disaster/ Emergency
Management and Business Continuity (2007 ed.)
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP)
Incorporation into Existing Planning Mechanisms
Accreditation
Strategic Plan
Standard of Cover
Operational Staffing Deployment Plan (OS&DP)
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)
11
Continued Public Involvement
FEMA Requirement
44 CFR Requirement §201.6(c)(4)(iii): [The plan maintenance process shall include a] discussion
on how the community will continue public participation in the plan maintenance process.
The Risk Assessment Workgroup is committed to identifying additional opportunities to raise
community awareness about the plan and mitigation efforts within the Authority. This
complies with EMAP Standard 4.4.4 by addressing an education and outreach strategy. As
part of this strategy, the RAMP will be posted on SMFRA’s webpage. The website will
contain an e-mail address and phone number to which people can direct their comments or
concerns.
SMFRA’s Assistant Chief of Community Safety Services Division or Emergency Manager will
present an update of the plan’s progress in the annual Authority report. This report will be
available to the public and will include a section on local hazard mitigation planning (or
similar).
The Emergency Manager will identify other opportunities to raise community awareness
about the RAMP and the hazards that affect the agency’s citizens. This effort will include
attendance and provision of materials at partnering city or county meetings and events,
school-sponsored events, Homeowner’s associations meetings, or through public mailings.
Any public comments received about the plan will be collected by the Emergency Manager
and included in the Annual Plan Progress Report.
During the plan update process, the Risk Assessment Workgroup will develop a schedule for
the public to submit comments to be considered for incorporation into the plan, as
appropriate.
12
SECTION I
RISK ASSESSEMENT & MITIGATION PLAN BACKGROOUND
1.1 Plan Purpose and Participating Agencies
SMFRA’s Community Safety Services (CSS) Division is dedicated to creating the safest
communities in the country. The division’s bureaus, units, and programs are a model in
the fire service and result in measurable, long-term reductions in the frequency and
effects of fires, medical emergencies, and disasters. The CSS mission is to enhance
community safety through the integrated and systematic delivery of engineering,
education, enforcement, and evaluation services. Delivery of these services is
proactive, customer-focused, and collaborative in order to improve prevention,
mitigation, and emergency response capabilities.
The CSS Division supports a vision where citizens and customers value and actively
participate in prevention and mitigation efforts and are more aware, self-reliant and
prepared for any emergency.
FEMA defines hazard mitigation as “any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate
long-term risk to human life and property from a hazard event.” Mitigation creates safer
communities by reducing loss of life and property damage. Hazard mitigation planning is
the process through which hazards that threaten communities are identified and
profiled, likely impacts of those hazards are assessed, and mitigation strategies to
lessen those impacts are identified, prioritized, and implemented. The results of a threeyear, congressionally mandated independent study to assess future savings from
mitigation activities provides evidence that mitigation activities are highly cost-effective.
On average, each dollar spent on mitigation saves society an average of $4 in avoided
future losses in addition to saving lives and preventing injuries (National Institute of
Building Science Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council 2005).
The RAMP was prepared pursuant to the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 to achieve eligibility for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
hazard mitigation grant programs. Through the leadership of the CSS Division, the Risk
Assessment Work Group was formed to assist with the development of the RAMP
including data collection, stakeholder input, community assets and strategies, and
identification of preferred mitigation alternatives. The RAMP represents the collective
work of the citizens, elected and appointed officials, and other stakeholders in SMFRA
jurisdiction. Following FEMA’s guidelines in developing a Risk Assessment and
Mitigation Plan, the RAMP identifies risks, assesses vulnerabilities, and identifies and
prioritizes goals and actions for mitigating the affects of natural and human-caused
hazards on SMFRA’s communities. This plan demonstrates SMFRA’s commitment to
reducing risks from hazards and serves as a tool to help decision makers direct and
coordinate mitigation activities and resources.
13
1.2 Mitigation Planning Requirements
In the Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan’s development, SMFRA adhered to federal
law and industry standards.
1.2.1 The Federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) - passed by
Congress includes a mitigation planning section (322). This section emphasizes
the need for State, Tribal, and local entities to coordinate mitigation planning and
implementation efforts. In addition, it provides the legal basis for FEMA’s
mitigation plan requirements for mitigation grant assistance.
To implement these planning requirements, FEMA published an Interim Final
Rule in the Federal Register on February 26, 2002 (FEMA 2002a), 44 CFR Part
201 with subsequent updates. The planning requirements for local entities are
identified in their appropriate sections throughout this plan. FEMA’s October 31,
2007 changes to 44 CFR Part 201 combined and expanded flood mitigation
planning requirements with local mitigation plans (44 CFR §201.6). It also
required participating National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) communities’
risk assessments and mitigation strategies to identify and address properties
repetitively damaged by flood. Appendix B includes a completed FEMA
crosswalk, which is an official report card used by FEMA reviewers, for local
hazard mitigation plans documenting compliance with 44 CFR§201.6.
1.2.2 Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) - In addition to
FEMA requirements, SMFRA also adheres to the standard set forth in the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). The following EMAP
Standards are addressed through this PDM Plan Update:
4.3 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Consequence Analysis
4.4 Hazard Mitigation
1.2.3 Commission on Fire Accreditation, International (CFAI) Performance
Indicators
Criterion 2A: Documentation of Area Characteristics - The agency collects
and analyzes data specific to the distinct characteristics of the community
served and applies the findings to organizational planning.
Criterion 2B: Fire Risk Assessment and Response Strategies - The agency
assesses the nature and magnitude of the hazards within its jurisdiction and
develops appropriate response coverage strategies. Each significant fire risk
should be categorized and listed to permit future analysis and study in
determining standards of response coverage and related services.
Criterion 2C: Non-Fire Risk Assessment and Response Strategies - The
agency assesses the nature and magnitude of other hazards and risks within
its jurisdiction and identified appropriate strategies, methods of operation, and
resource allocation required to mitigate potential emergencies. These may
include a wide variety of risk and service demands, e.g., hazardous materials,
emergency medical services, rescue, etc. Special attention should be paid to
identify, analyze, and develop strategies for non-fire or limited fire risks that
gain importance due to cultural, economic, environmental, or historical value.
14
1.3 Plan Organization
SMFRA’s RAMP is organized as follows:
Executive Summary provides a general summary of the RAMP update document.
Record of Revisions records all major updates or revisions to the RAMP as part of
the annual review process
Responsible Officials’ Sign-Off Sheet lists SMFRA’s Executive Staff signatures
indicating their participation in the development of the RAMP as well as their
commitment to adhere to the action plans, policies, or procedures detailed in the
Plan or its applicable Annex(s).
Distribution provides a list of internal departments and external agencies that
relieved a copy of the Board adopted final version of the RAMP.
Administrative Information provides information pertaining to the Plan’s Scope;
P&P/SOG Cross Reference; Plan Development and Maintenance; Effective Date;
Authorities; References; Incorporation into Existing Planning Mechanisms; and,
Continued Public Involvement.
Section I: Introduction describes the RAMP’s purpose, hazard mitigation planning
requirements, and federal hazard mitigation grant programs.
Section II: Community Profile provides a general description of the Authority,
including its location, geography, climate, population, and economy.
Section III: Planning Process describes the planning process used to develop the
RAMP, including how it was prepared, who was involved in the process, and how
the public was engaged.
Section IV: Risk Assessment identifies and profiles the hazards that could affect
the city and assesses vulnerability to those hazards. It provides an inventory of
critical facilities and other community assets in the city, and describes land use and
development trends. Chapter 4 also includes a capability assessment of the
existing plans, programs, and policies in the city related to mitigation.
Section V: Mitigation Strategy identifies goals and actions to mitigate hazards in
Colorado Springs based on the results of the risk assessment. The mitigation
actions are analyzed and prioritized, including a status update on the mitigation
actions identified in the 2005 PDMP. This chapter also includes an implementation
strategy.
Section VI: Appendices provide supplemental statistical, explanatory,
bibliographic, or other material to help readers better understand the information
and analysis provided in the RAMP.
15
SECTION II
AUTHORITY PROFILE
2.1 District’s History and Overview
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority (SMFRA, also referenced as the “Authority”) was
formed in 2008 through a merger of the Parker Fire Protection District and South Metro
Fire Rescue District. SMFRA is an authority as defined by Colorado’s Revised Statutes
(CRS) 29-1-203. This statute allows governmental entities to provide joint functions or
services. The SMFRA was formed by the Board of Directors of the South Metro Fire
Rescue and the Parker Fire Protection Districts to improve fire response, emergency
medical services, and enhance other special operations services. Both entities are fire
protection districts under CRS Title 32. The Authority was formed by intergovernmental
agreement on May 1, 2008 and began fully integrated operations as an Authority on
January 1, 2009. The Authority receives its funding by monies furnished by each district,
primarily derived from assessed valuations and specific ownership levies.
Prior to the merger, both fire districts were accredited through the Commission of Fire
Accreditation, International - a division of the Centers for Public Service Excellence.
Subsequent to the merger, the Authority earned accredited status in 2011. As part of the
accreditation process, it became an opportunity for the recently merged entity to examine
the combined risks in relation to the communities served as well as the larger region.
Furthermore, the multi-hazard nature of the FEMA hazard mitigation process supports
the department’s need to explore the impact large-scale disasters have on the agency’s
response, education, and mitigation activities for a 3-5 year period.
2.2 Authority’s Location, Geographic and Climatic Characteristics
2.2.1 Location
SMFRA serves portions of Arapahoe and Douglas counties. Within these two counties,
the incorporated cities served include: Castle Pines, Centennial, Cherry Hills Village,
Foxfield, Greenwood Village, Lone Tree, and Parker. SMFRA also serves several
communities within the unincorporated portions of both counties. There is also “dualjurisdiction” coverage shared with the City of Aurora on the northeast portion of the
jurisdiction. The total land mass served is 176 square miles. Map 1, next page, shows
these areas within SMFRA’s boundaries with the station locations.
16
Map 1: SMFRA’s Service Area
2.2.2 Geographic
SMFRA’s geography is characterized by close proximity to the Front Range mountains
to the west that transitions to rolling topography of the eastern plains. The eastern half
of the city consists of developed and vacant land on the typical grasslands and buttes of
the Colorado plains.
2.2.3
Climate
SMFRA’s climate is similar to that of the entire Front Range, with greatest correlation to
immediate Denver Metro area. The weather in the region is characterized by mild
climatic patterns that includes an average of 256 sunny days per year (not including
partly sunny or partly cloudy days).
Average snowfall in the Denver Metro area is approximately 60 inches per year.
Although snowstorms are common, the intensity of the high altitude sunshine typically
melts the snow and ice quickly from the streets.
17
The warmest month along the Front Range is July, with an average high temperature of
88 degrees. The coldest month is January, with an average high temperature of 43
degrees, and an average low temperature of 15 degrees. The Denver Metro area
receives approximately 16 inches of precipitation (including melted snowfall) per year on
average. The highest precipitation is during the month of May, with 2.3 inches on
average.
2.3 District’s Population Characteristics
2.3.1
Demographic Information
Based on the 2010 census, the current population of SMFRA is approximately 195,000
people. The population has grown quickly over the past 20 years, with about a 75%
growth between 1990 and 2000 and almost another 50% growth between 2000 and
2010 (Figure 1). The population has been culturally uniform with a primarily white, nonHispanic population (Table 2), although the Asian and Hispanic populations have
increased substantially. SMFRA’s residents are primarily English speaking and even
those who speak a language other than English still speak English well or very well
(less than 2% are in the not-well or not-at-all categories).
Figure 1: SMFRA census population, 1990-2010
250,000
200,000
Population
194,796
150,000
132,324
100,000
50,000
75,349
0
1990
2000
2010
Year
18
The population’s median age increased only slightly over the past decade; however, the
65-year and older population increased at a faster rate. The growth of family
households has slowed over the past decade and account for a much lower percentage
of married-couple and families-with-children households. The population is very
educated with almost 65% of 25-year-olds and older having a college degree. This may
have helped the population be successful, with frequent instances of high incomes and
home ownership. There, however, has been trend in the increase of renters and vacant
households, as well as households living below the poverty level.
Table 2: Demographic Summary and Comparison, Years 2000 and 2010
Total Population
Male
Female
Median Age
Under Age 5
Age 18+
Age 65+
White
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian
Pacific Islander
Other Race
Two or More Races
Hispanic
Population 25+
High School
Some College
Associate’s/Professional School
Degree
Bachelor’s
Master’s+
Total Households
Owner-Occupied Housing
Renter-Occupied Housing
Vacant Housing
Median Home Value
Ave. Household Size
Family Households
Married-Couple Families
Households w/ 1 or more under 18
Median Household Income
1,2
Households Below Poverty Level
2000
%
2010
132,324
194,796
Gender/Age
66,380
50.2
96,625
65,944
49.8
98,171
39.2
41.8
9,932
7.5
12,576
91,523
69.2
139,815
7,364
5.6
15,762
Race/Ethnicity
122,719
92.7
171,517
1,780
1.3
4,031
456
0.3
677
3,585
2.7
10,120
42
0.0
135
1,458
1.1
3,135
2,284
1.7
5,181
6,154
4.7
13,672
1,2
Education (25+ years old)
81,373
115,833
9,438
11.6
15,394
17,704
21.8
23,072
5,121
6.3
13,957
30,588
37.6
16,399
20.2
Households
45,798
39,446
86.1
6,352
13.9
1,658
3.6
$266,247
2.9
37,097
81.0
32,990
72.0
21,521
47.0
Income
1
$88,805
845
1.9
41,300
19,310
76,136
54,912
17,602
3,622
$325,560
2.8
53,315
45,229
29,274
$111,844
2,543
%
% Change
47.2
49.6
50.4
6.5
71.8
8.1
45.6
48.9
6.7
26.6
52.8
114.0
88.0
2.1
0.3
5.2
0.0
1.6
3.9
7.0
39.8
126.5
48.5
182.3
221.4
115.0
126.8
122.2
13.3
19.9
12.0
63.1
30.3
172.5
35.7
16.7
35.0
17.8
70.0
59.4
38.4
66.2
39.2
177.1
118.5
22.3
(3.4)
43.7
37.1
36.0
3.9
25.9
200.9
72.1
23.1
4.8
1. 2000 data retrieved from Esri American Community Survey 2000 Census Summary.
2. 2010 data retrieved from Esri American Community Survey Population Summary, 2005-2009 Estimate.
19
Map 2 shows the distribution of the population using the Commission on Fire
Accreditation, International’s (CFAI) urban, suburban, and rural population density
categories. Approximately 61% of the population is located in the urban areas, 32% in
the suburban, and 7% in the rural.
Map 2: SMFRA Census Population, 2010
Table 3 and Table 4 show the demographic distribution by city and county and their
major employment industries within SMFRA’s service area.
20
County/
City
Arapahoe
(Total)
Arapahoe (Dist)
Centennial
Centennial
(Dist)
Cherry Hills
Fox Field
Greenwood
Village
Unincorporated
Douglas (Total)
Douglas (Dist)
Table 3: Demographic Data by City/County
Land
Area2
(SqMi)
Pop1
809
842,003
36
238,301
29
82,544
100,538
41
6
1
33,991
5,987
685
47
41
8
843
Pop
Median
65 &
Age Households1 Over1
13,830
27,682
285,465
112,252
Castle Pines
9
9,391
Lone Tree
10
10,958
Parker
21
44,676
Unincorporated
47,187
1. 2010 Census.
2. DRCOG 2009 estimates.
%
Other
45
36
No
data
39
33
Median
Household
Income2
Average
Household
Size2
Home
Ownership2
Poverty
Rate2
Vacancy
rate2
57,580
$58,968
2.53
67%
16%
7%
33.391
38,813
7,952
11,880
$85,185
2.7
85%
5%
3%
13,242
2,151
253
3,682
883
113
$226,552
$111,607
3.25
100%
91%
-
8%
-
6,262
11,316
106859
42,745
1,599
1,601
20343
7,810
$114,460
2.54
72%
5%
7%
$99,522
2.86
83%
3%
4%
3,331
4,671
16,314
18,413
732
826
2,146
4,102
$104,787
$87,098
2.62
2.86
70%
78%
No data
3%
5%
3%
Table 4: City/County Employment by Industry
Wholesale
Trade
Arapahoe
Centennial
3
8
Cherry Hills
10
9
Fox Field
1
10
Greenwood
2
4
Village
Douglas
3
5
Castle Pines
Lone Tree
2
1
Parker
5
4
2. DRCOG 2009 estimates.
Business
Services
Manufacture
Personal
Services
Professional
services
Public
Admin
Retail
Trade
Utilities &
Construction
25
16
21
38
3
0
2
0
22
70
27
20
18
4
7
25
3
3
0
2
10
10
28
5
10
2
3
3
15
6
9
2
0
3
32
41
44
16
10
4
3
1
4
15
38
22
8
1
5
2.3.2 Population Profiles
It is helpful to combine or summarize the typical demographic data (age, income,
ethnicity, etc.) in order to measure differences between neighborhoods or to more
accurately develop a profile that tells a story about the population. This analysis utilized
one way to achieve that story about the citizens of SMFRA through the use of Esri’s
Tapestry™ Segmentation data. Tapestry combines standard demographics with
socioeconomic indicators to provide a detailed understanding of the neighborhood’s
characteristics, as well as their lifestyles, attitudes, and behaviors. These attributes are
combined into 65 unique segments (socioeconomic and demographic compositions).
For a broader view of neighborhoods, the segments are also grouped into 12 LifeMode
Summary Groups (lifestyle/lifestage). Data was provided at the census block group
level. Detailed descriptions of each segment and group within SMFRA are found in
Appendix C (Tapestry Segmentation Descriptions).
21
The Tapestry results show that SMFRA’s households are characterized by 15 of the 65
Tapestry segments (Figure 2). Nearly 75% of SMFRA’s households are represented by
four of the segments, including Suburban Splendor, Boomburbs, Top Rung, and Up and
Coming Families. By comparison, these same segments account for only 7.2% of U.S.
households. Table 5 lists the four top tapestries that make up the majority of SMFRA’s
population.
Figure 2: Tapestry Segmentation for SMFRA households
08. Laptops and Lattes
2%
39. Young and Restless
2%
03. Connoisseurs
3%
16. Enterprising Professionals
3%
28. Aspiring Young Families
1%
10. Pleasant-Ville
2%
27. Metro Renters
1%
18. Cozy and Comfortable
0%
02. Suburban Splendor
32%
06. Sophisticated Squires
3%
13. In Style
4%
07. Exurbanites
4%
12. Up and Coming
Families
6%
01. Top Rung
11%
04. Boomburbs
26%
Table 5: Tapestry Segmentation Summary
Household
Type
Median Age
Income
Employment
02. Suburban
Splendor
04. Boomburbs
01. Top Rung
Married-couple families Married-couple w/ kids Married couple families
41.6
33.8
44.2
High
High
High
Professional/ Mgt.
Professional/ Mgt.
Professional/ Mgt.
Bachelors/Graduate
Some College,
Bachelors/Graduate
Education
Degree
Bachelors/Grad. Degree
Degree
Residential
Single family home
Single family home
Single family home
Race/ Ethnicity
White
White
White
Participate in public/
Activity
Gardening
Shop online
Civic activities
Hold large life insurance
Own stock worth
Financial
policies
Bank Online
$75,000+
Activity
Stay at Hilton Hotels
Visit Disneyworld (FL)
Vacation Oversees
Listen to classical, allMedia
Listen to all-news radio Listen to sports on radio
news radio
Read travel, sports
Vehicle
magazines
Own/lease SUV
Own/lease luxury car
12. Up and Coming
Families
Married couple w/ kids
31.9
Upper middle
Professional/ Mgt.
Some College,
Bachelors Degree
Single family home
White
Eat at Chic-fil-a
Have new car loan
Own a dog
Watch cable TV
Drive 20,000+ miles
annually
22
In a broader view, approximately 78% of SMFRA households fall into the High Society
LifeMode Summary Group (Figure 3), which is characterized by affluent, well-educated,
married-couple homeowners.
Figure 3: Tapestry LifeMode Groups for SMFRA Households
23
Figure 4 shows the distribution of segments and summary groups throughout SMFRA’s
boundaries. The results show not only surprising uniformity throughout the fire district,
but also a dramatic change in lifestyle/lifestage directly outside the borders to the north
and northwest.
Figure 4: SMFRA Tapestry Segments and LifeMode Summary Groups
Source: “Community Analyst” by Esri, n.d, retrieved on October 27, 2011, from www.esri.com/ca. Reprinted with permission.
24
The use of lifestyle or community profile data is common in the marketing and economic
development fields, but is a relatively new concept in the fire service. Typically, past
incident data is analyzed to determine which profiles are most at-risk for future fires or
emergencies and what are the most effective methods to reach those future customers.
Obtaining the profiles at the individual household level is the most effective, but census
block or census block group can also provide some insight. Therefore, the information
provided in this risk assessment & mitigation plan is most useful to start developing the
story about SMFRA’s community and how to reach them. Future efforts will continue to
seek more detailed information at the individual station or neighborhood level and look
closely at the relationship between demographics and incidents.
The urbanization in many of the communities served will continue for years to come.
With the growth in population comes growth in community risk. As an “all hazards”
agency, SMFRA must be prepared for all risks that can occur. Already providing
emergency response, the agency intends to improve its capabilities by better
understanding all risks. Furthermore, opportunities to mitigate known risks will be
pursued in the years to come.
25
SECTION III
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION PLANNING PROCESS
This chapter describes the planning process used to develop the RAMP, including how it was
prepared, what stakeholders were involved in the process, and how the Authority engaged its
citizens.
The Risk Assessment Workgroup members participated in the following activities for
development of the RAMP:
Attended and participated in meetings
Collected risk assessment data
Made decisions on plan process and content
Coordinated and assisted with the public outreach strategy
Reviewed plan drafts
Coordinated the final adoption of the plan
FEMA Requirement
Requirement §201.6(c)(1): [The plan shall document] the planning process used to develop the
plan, including how it was prepared, who was involved in the process and how the public was
involved.
A Risk Assessment Workgroup was created for the purpose of completing the SMFRA
RAMP which was prepared over a 12-month period. The Risk Assessment Workgroup used
FEMA’s planning process and integrated FEMA’s Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning
Guidance (2008) recommendations, the Local Mitigation Planning How-To Guides, and a
multi-step planning process. Table 6 shows how the modified 10-step process corresponds
with the planning requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act.
Table 6: 10-Step Planning Process Used to Develop the Plan
Disaster Mitigation Act Requirements
201.6(c)(1)
201.6(b)(1)
201.6(b)(2) and (3)
201.6(c)(2)(i) (ii)
201.6(b)(1)
201.6(c)(3)(i)
201.6(c)(3)(ii)
201.6(c)(3)(iii)
201.6(c)(5)
201.6(c)(4)
Modified CRS Planning Steps
Step 1: Organize the Planning Effort
Step 2: Involve internal stakeholders
Step 3: Coordinate with other agencies (external stakeholders)
Step 4: Identify and profile the hazards
Step 5: Public input
Step 6: Set mitigation goals
Step 7: Review possible activities
Step 8: Draft an action plan
Step 9: Adopt the plan
Step 10: Implement, evaluate, and revise the plan
Source: FEMA Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance, 2008
26
The following describes each step in the planning process.
3.1
Step 1: Organizing the effort
The planning process began with the creation of the Risk Assessment Workgroup
3.1.1 Risk Assessment Workgroup
The planning team, formally recognized as the Risk Assessment Workgroup, was
formed in December, 2010 within the Community Safety Services Division to identify
team members and begin the planning process. A team charter was sponsored by the
Assistant Chief, Community Safety Services and approved by the Fire Chief
(Appendix D: Risk Assessment Work Group Charter).
The overall process flow included the formation of internal and external stakeholder
groups, identification of risks/hazards and profiles, review of participant agencies risk
assessments, plans or other regional documents, and collaboration of final risk
assessment and mitigation planning documents. This process was not intended to
solicit direct input from citizens or the community served, rather the focus was
coordination of emergency managers for the communities served.
The risk assessment project leads were the department’s Emergency Manager and
the Planning and Analysis Coordinator. The project leads collaborated with other
department functions, principally the Operations Division, to identify internal and
external stakeholders to assist with the risk assessment process and incorporate risk
and hazard identification into its Operational Deployment and Staffing Plan (OS&DP).
Table 7 lists the participating members, their title, and major areas of responsibility to
contributions (reference Appendix E: R.A.M.P. Planning Process Documentation).
Name
Table 7: Risk Assessment Workgroup Members
Title
Contributions/Areas of Expertise
Mike Langello
Steve Standridge
Planning and Analysis Coordinator
Emergency Manager
Cheryl Poage
Mike Dell’Orfano
Rex Heck
Program Administrator
Assistant Chief Community Safety Services
GIS Analyst
Planning and Analysis, Document Editing
Planning and Analysis, Document Editing,
Stakeholder Liaison
Grant Coordination and Oversight
Project Oversight, District Level Analysis
GIS Support, Data Analysis
3.1.2 OS&DP Committee
The mission of the Operations Staffing and Deployment Plan Benchmarking
Committee (OS&DP) is to identify, develop, and evaluate benchmarks for integration
into SMFRA’s Operations Staffing and Deployment Plan along with the agency’s
Standards of Cover (SOC). This includes evaluation of nationally & internationally
recognized benchmarks codified by CFAI (Accreditation), ISO & NFPA; along with
benchmarks existing at other fire departments & identified in their respective SOCs.
The group supports operational and mitigation activities by identifying known or
probable risks. Using this information the group assesses staffing levels, equipment,
apparatus, and other capabilities in manner that supports the agency preparing or
27
responding to those risks. Closing gaps between risk and capabilities is a focus of the
group. Table 8 presents the personnel assigned to the committee.
Name
Table 8: OS&DP Committee Members
Title
Contributions/Areas of Expertise
Bob Baker
Doug Bloomquist
Dave Daley
Bob Herdt
Mike Lederhos
Bob Smith
Ron Barron
Operations Chief
Battalion Chief
Executive Officer
Battalion Chief
Battalion Chief
Battalion Chief
Battalion Chief
Mike West
Rick Lewis
Training Bureau Chief
EMS Bureau Chief
Anthony Vargo
Tom Hendrix
Jon Adams
Barb Andrews
Special Operations Chief
Captain
Lieutenant
Administrative Assistant
Planning and Analysis
Coordinator
Mike Langello
3.2
Command Staff Sponsor
Chair
Operations, hazardous materials, etc
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge, risks and
training needs
EMS operations and capabilities, etc.
Special operations capabilities
Liaison to Risk Assessment Workgroup
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge
Operations and organizational knowledge
Planning and Analysis, Survey, Liaison to Risk
Assessment Workgroup.
Step 2: Internal Stakeholder Input
The internal stakeholders included functional program coordinators or subject matter
authorities from Structural Firefighting, Wildland Firefighting, Technical Rescue, Water
Rescue and Recovery, Emergency Medical Services, Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting,
Operations Command, Communications, Fire Marshal and Facilities Management.
The group was given background information and support documentation for review of
the Authority’s hazards and they provided input on risks and capabilities based on
their specialty or expertise. An outcome from the internal stakeholder meeting was the
identification of potential cascading events related to each hazard and an initial
assessment of the Authority’s response capabilities assessment.
This group also completed the risk assessment survey providing input into the
prioritization of hazards and mitigation activities. The outcome from the survey is
presented with the results of an extended survey completed by community members
later in this section.
Lastly, internal stakeholders were invited to review and provide feedback for the final
draft of the assessment (Table 9). Opportunities for organizational change can be
pursued by the continued work of the OS&DP committee, Life Safety and Community
Preparedness Bureaus. This will extend to activities occurring in various station
districts involving Station Commanders, special teams’ members, and other line
personnel.
28
Name
Table 9: Internal Stakeholder Members
Title
Contributions/Areas of Expertise
Dave Becker
Doug Bloomquist
Ted Christopoulos
Dave Daley
Mike Dell’Orfano
Bryan DeWolfe
Brandon Eastburn
Rob Geislinger
Tom Hendrix
Lieutenant/Dive Team Coordinator
Battalion Chief
Captain/Wildland Coordinator
Executive Officer
Chief of Community Safety Services
Paramedic/Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO)
Lieutenant
Fire Marshal (former)
Captain
Mike Langello
Jeff Lanigan
Andy Lyon
Scott Sarver
Rick Lewis
Kevin Milan
Becky O’Guin
Steve Standridge
Planning and Analysis Coordinator
Captain/Aircraft Rescue Firefighting
(ARFF) Coordinator
Media Services Manager
Captain/Technical Rescue Coord.
EMS Bureau Chief
Fire Marshal (current)
Community Relations Director
Emergency Manager
Anthony Vargo
Randy Whipple
Special Operations Chief
Facilities Manager
3.3
Operations and Dive Rescue
Chair of OS&DP Committee
Operations and Wildland-Urban Interface
Operations, hazardous materials, etc
Fire and Building Codes
Operations and Terrorism/Homeland Security
Operations and HazMat
Fire and Building Codes
Operations and organizational knowledge
Planning and Analysis, Survey, Liaison to
Risk Assessment Workgroup.
Operations, Aircraft Rescue and Radios
External Communications
Operations and Technical Rescue
EMS operations and capabilities, etc.
Fire and Building Codes
External Communications
Emergency Planning/RAMP Co-Writer
Special operations capabilities
Liaison to Risk Assessment Workgroup
Facilities and Continuity of Operations
Step 3: External Coordination
External coordination consisted of two parts. The first involved a review of various
plans and studies related to risk assessment and mitigation. The second was
involvement of external stakeholder input (Table 10).
Name
Table 10: External Stakeholder Members
Title
Contributions/Areas of Expertise
Randy Corbitt
Lieutenant – Greenwood Village PD
Doreen Jokerst
Sergeant – Parker PD
Greg Palmer
Police Operations, Terrorism, Homeland
security, and general emergency management
Police Operations, Terrorism, Homeland
security, and general emergency management
Police Operations, Terrorism, Homeland
security, and general emergency management
Lieutenant – ACSO
Director of Emergency
Fran Santagata
Management – DCSO (former)
General emergency management
* Multiple invitations were sent to other partnering jurisdictions, but no other representatives participated.
3.3.1 Incorporation with other plans and studies
As part of coordinating with other departments and agencies, the Risk Assessment
Workgroup, in conjunction with the OS&DP Committee, reviewed and incorporated
existing plans, studies, reports, and technical information. This information assisted
with the development of hazards identification, vulnerability assessments and
formation of goals, objectives and mitigation actions in Section V. These sources are
29
documented throughout the RAMP. The plans and studies reviewed are listed in Table
11.
Table 11: Documents Reviewed
Document Title
SMFRA’s CFAI Accreditation Report (2011)
Internal
Information Relevant to Development
Recommendation to enhance current risk
assessment
Aligning organizational vision and goals
Identification of current risks and capabilities
Review of current practices and expectations
SMFRA’s Strategic Plan (2011)
SMFRA’s Standard of Cover
SMFRA’s Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs)
SMFRA’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
(CEMP)
Basis for all hazards response planning
SMFRA’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
Basis for emergency responses
SMFRA’s Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP)
Supportive evidence of community wildfire risks
SMFRA’s Wildfire Mitigation Plan
Basis for planning activities
SMFRA Incident History
Basis for service area response type frequency
External
State of Colorado Natural Hazards Risk Assessment (2011) Identification of natural hazard risks and info
State of Colorado State Emergency Operations Plan (2007) Identification of natural hazard risks and info
State of Colorado Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan (2010)
Identification of natural hazard risks and info
Colorado Earthquake Hazards by Colorado Earthquake
Hazard Mitigation Council (2008)
Identification of past events, magnitude
Denver Regional Council of Governments Natural Hazard
Mitigation Plan (2010)
Regional concurrence of hazards and risks
Arapahoe County Emergency Operations Plan (2007)
Aligning authority and expectations; basis for
emergency responses
Douglas County Emergency Operations Plan (2011)
Aligning authority and expectations; basis for
emergency responses
Cherry Hills Village (2006)
Aligning authority and expectations; basis for
emergency responses
Greenwood Village Emergency Operations Plan (2004)
Aligning authority and expectations; basis for
emergency responses
Town of Parker Emergency Operations Plan (2010)
Aligning authority and expectations; basis for
emergency responses
Calvaras County Water District Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan Model plan to compare risks and RAMP
Rancho Sante Fe, CA Fire Protection District Risk
Assessment and Mitigation Plan
Model plan to compare risks and RAMP
Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue (OR) EOP
Model plan to compare risks and RAMP
HAZUS Flood Data
Identification of natural hazard risks and info
NOAA Tornado Data
Identification of natural hazard risks and info
Colorado Blizzard Data
Identification of natural hazard risks and info
3.3.2 External Stakeholder Input: Subject Matter Authorities
In addition to reviewing the various plans and studies, it was also important to solicit
input from an external stakeholder group that included emergency managers from:
City of Greenwood Village
City of Parker
Arapahoe County Office of Emergency Management
Douglas County Office of Emergency Management
30
Each emergency manager was able to share their agencies’ methods used to develop
previous risk assessments and contributed to the development of this risk
assessment. Any agency’s previous efforts to include public input into their plans was
reviewed. Table 28 (page 112) summarizes the identified risks/hazards are presented
in Section IV Risk Assessment. This external group also completed the same risk
assessment survey with the internal stakeholder group. Those results are presented in
Section 3.8
Lastly, external stakeholders were invited to review and provide feedback for the final
draft of the assessment. Opportunities for continued risk assessment and mitigation
activities can be pursued by the continued work of the various committees or
workgroups at the county and regional level. A benefit of this process is improved
alignment of risk assessment and mitigation activities across agencies. Future efforts
will identify strengths from various agencies and identifying gaps and new
opportunities.
3.4
Step 4: Hazard Identification and Profile
At the Risk Assessment Workgroups first internal stakeholder meeting, the
coordinators presented information on the requirements for the risk assessment
section of the hazard mitigation plan. Internal stakeholders reviewed the list of hazards
that FEMA recommends for consideration in mitigation planning and discussed the
past and potential impacts of these hazards on the Authority. The Risk Assessment
Workgroup determined three hazards could be eliminated from the RAMP due to low
risk, insufficient data and/or lack of relevance with this plan’s purpose and scope
(avalanche, expansive soils, and extreme heat). Section IV: Risk Assessment
describes the hazards that impact the Authority.
3.5
Step 5: External Stakeholder Input: Community Members
FEMA Requirement
Requirement §201.6(b): An open public involvement process is essential to the development
of an effective plan. In order to develop a more comprehensive approach to reducing the
effects of natural disasters, the planning process shall include: (1) An opportunity for the
public to comment on the plan during the drafting stage and prior to plan approval; (2) An
opportunity for neighboring communities, local and regional agencies involved in hazard
mitigation activities, and agencies that have the authority to regulate development, as well as
businesses, academia and other private a non-profit interests to be involved in the planning
process; and (3) Review and incorporation, if appropriate, of existing plans, studies, reports,
and technical information.
To better understand community members’ perceptions of risks or hazards in the
immediate service area, a survey was constructed and participation announced via the
agency’s public information staff on the organization’s internet site, via
Facebook, and with a media announcement. A public announcement for input was
also made at the authority’s monthly board meeting. Additionally, a focused wildfire
survey was sent directly to home owner associations.
Community members were given several opportunities to participate in the planning
and development process. Both internal stakeholders from the authority and external
31
stakeholders from local and regional agencies were involved in the community survey
as described in Section 3.3. Two versions of the survey were used: a short form for
internal and external stakeholders/subject matter authorities; and a longer form for
community members. To support the completion of the survey, several public
announcements were made. Local community newspapers also picked up a general
press release to news outlets. This announcement and subsequent articles directed
community members to the authority web site to complete the survey.
Another opportunity for the public to contribute to the plan development was a
targeted e-mail invitation to community members, who participated in previous
authority strategic planning, to take the survey. Lastly, a public announcement was
made at a regularly scheduled authority board meeting inviting the public to participate
in the survey process. The final draft was placed on the external website for comment
by the public as well as directly targeted to the internal and external stakeholders for
further comment.
A comparison of perceived risk between “subject matter authorities” (SMA) and the
“public” is presented below. Participants were asked to rank the identified risks to each
other. The first, second, and third responses for each hazard were combined to create
a high perception of risk segment normalizing the responses. Generally, there was
good alignment of risk perception. Both groups identified wildland fire as the greatest
perceived risk. SMA’s selected blizzard/winter storms as number two while the public
participants selected structure fire as a greater perceived risk. The remainder of the
identified hazards was generally in agreement (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Perception of Hazard Priorities: Survey Result (2011)
Risk Perception by Group
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Public
SMA
It is important to state that the ranking of hazards as perceived (or experienced) by
both groups forced participants to compare each hazard to another rather than alone.
32
However, there was good awareness of several hazards being low risk and low
probability. Because wildland fire is a greater occurring hazard with associated risks, a
survey was completed using home owner association members in at-risk communities
to support assessment of risk, mitigation readiness, and willingness to improve
emergency readiness. Forty four percent of respondents identified wildfire as a
moderate risk in their community and another 45% viewed this as a high or extreme
risk. Only 11% thought of wildfire in their communities as low or no risk. The results for
risk perception from this sample group are below (Figure 6).
Figure 6
2011 Community Wildfire Survey
250
209
189
200
150
100
50
45
4
25
0
1 - No Risk 2 - Low Risk
34 - High Risk 5 - Extreme
Moderate
Risk
Risk
Both surveys sought to target perceptions of hazard risk and willingness to engage in
mitigation behavior and activities. A primary purpose of the surveys was to incorporate
public input to hazard identification and future mitigation activities. Additional
information from the public survey will be used for education, prevention, and
mitigation activities for all the identified hazards. The latter will be presented in
Section V.
Public input on the final draft will be requested after formal review by COEM, FEMA
and both internal and external stakeholders.
It should be noted that SMFRA has limited statutory authority to direct land use
policies within its service boundaries. These policies are set and managed at the
county and city level. SMFRA does have statutory authority for all fire related building
codes and the Authority works directly with each of its county and city partners to
adopt fire codes for each jurisdiction. The process is complicated by the fact that
partnering jurisdictions can adopt different or older versions of the fire code. To the
extent that SMFRA has influence over land use, these issues are related to water
supply and access for firefighting.
For new developments, partnering jurisdictions will seek SMFRA input during the
referral process. If specific recommendations are approved by the city or county the
33
requirements become enforceable. However, only those provisions, which fall under
the fire code adopted by the jurisdiction that SMFRA can enforce directly. All other
provisions are enforced through the city or county having authority.
3.6
Step 6: Mitigation Goal Setting
The mitigation strategy and the goals for 2012 are integrated into the CSS and
Community Preparedness Bureau’s Annual Management Plans.
3.7
Step 7: Activities Review
Members of the internal stakeholder group reviewed current and planned department
mitigation activities to determine what gaps exist and determine the plan of action for
mitigating the adverse impact of specific hazards.
3.8
Step 8: Action Plan Development
The Planning Subcommittee identified and prioritized mitigation actions at Planning
Subcommittee Meeting #2. Details on this process are included in Section V
(Mitigation Strategy). The Planning Subcommittee identified the responsible agency
and completed an implementation worksheet for each mitigation action. The purpose
of these worksheets is to document background information, ideas for implementation,
alternatives, responsible offices, partners, potential funding, cost estimates, benefits,
and timeline for each identified action.
3.9
Step 9: Plan Adoption
Following reviews of the document, The RAMP will be presented to the Board of
Directors for final adoption. A copy of the resolution of adoption will be included in
Appendix A.
3.10
Step 10: Plan Implementation, Evaluation, and Revision
The Risk Assessment Workgroup developed a method and scheduled for plan
implementation and for annually monitoring, evaluating, and maintaining the RAMP.
This information is described in the Administrative Section (Plan Maintenance).
34
SECTION IV
RISK ASSESSMENT
4.1
Risk Assessment and Identified Hazards Overview
FEMA Requirements
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(i): The risk assessment shall include a description of the types of all
natural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction.
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(i): The risk assessment shall include a description of the location and
extent of all natural hazards that affect the jurisdiction. The plan shall include information on previous
occurrences of hazard events and the probability of future hazard events.
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii): The risk assessment shall include a description of the jurisdiction’s
vulnerability to the hazards described in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section. This description shall
include an overall summary of each hazard and its impact on the community.
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(A): The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of the types and
numbers of existing and future buildings, infrastructure, and critical facilities located in the identified
hazard area.
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(B): The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of an estimate of the
potential dollar losses to vulnerable structures identified in paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A) of this section.
Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(C): The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of providing a
general description of land uses and development trends within the community so that mitigation
options can be considered in future land use decisions.
EMAP Standards
Standard 4.3.1: The program shall identify the natural and human-caused hazards that potentially
impact the jurisdiction using a broad range of sources. The program shall assess the risk and
vulnerability of people, property, the environment and the program/entity operations from these
hazards.
Standard 4.3.2: The program shall conduct a consequence analysis for the hazards identified in 4.3.1
to consider the impact on the public; responders; continuity of operations including continued delivery
of services; property, facilities and infrastructure; the environment; the economic condition of the
jurisdiction and public confidence in the jurisdiction’s governance.
CFAI Performance Indicators
Criterion 2A: Documentation of Area Characteristics - The agency collects and analyzes data specific
to the distinct characteristics of the community served and applies the findings to organizational
planning.
Criterion 2B: Fire Risk Assessment and Response Strategies - The agency assesses the nature and
magnitude of the hazards within its jurisdiction and develops appropriate response coverage
strategies. Each significant fire risk should be categorized and listed to permit future analysis and
study in determining standards of response coverage and related services.
Criterion 2C: Non-Fire Risk Assessment and Response Strategies - The agency assesses the nature
and magnitude of other hazards and risks within its jurisdiction and identified appropriate strategies,
methods of operation, and resource allocation required to mitigate potential emergencies. These may
include a wide variety of risk and service demands, e.g., hazardous materials, emergency medical
services, rescue, etc. Special attention should be paid to identify, analyze and develop strategies for
non-fire or limited fire risks that gain importance due to cultural, economic, environmental, or
historical value.
35
This chapter profiles the natural hazards that affect SMFRA’s service area and assesses
vulnerability to those hazards. The risk assessment allows SMFRA to better understand its
risks and provides a framework for developing and prioritizing mitigation actions to reduce
risk from future natural hazard events.
Detailed profiles and vulnerability assessments include the following characteristics of each
identified hazard:
Hazard Description provides a general description of the hazard and considers the
relationship between hazards. Descriptions include content from several sources including
the State of Colorado’s natural hazards risk assessment and state mitigation plan, as well as
the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan.
Geographic Location describes the geographic extent or location of the hazard in the
planning area and determines which participating jurisdictions are affected by each hazard. It
is important to note that the “front range” region encompassing Fort Collins to the north and
Pueblo to the south is included for context and relevance. The areas served by SMFRA are
detailed and then also broken down into planning zones and/or stations districts. Several of
these planning zones include respective cities or unincorporated portions of the two counties
served.
Previous Occurrences includes information on the known hazard incidents and includes
information related to the impact of those events, if known. Information from numerous
resources is utilized to specify the location, and later severity, to illustrate the frequency.
Probability of Future Occurrence uses the frequency of past events to estimate the
likelihood of future occurrence. The probability, or chance of occurrence, was calculated
based on existing data derived from expert sources.
The probability was determined by dividing the number of events observed by the number of
years and multiplying by 100. This provides the percent chance of the event happening in
any given year. For example, three Level 3 tornadoes occurring over a 30-year period
suggests a 10 percent chance of a Level 3 tornado occurring in any given year.
Based on historical data, the probability of future occurrences are categorized as follows:
Highly Likely: 90-100 percent chance of occurrence next year or it happens every year
Likely: 50-89 percent chance of occurrence next year or it has a recurrence interval of
once every 2 years
Occasional: 10 - 49 percent chance of occurrence in the next year or it has a
recurrence interval of 5 years.
Highly Unlikely: 0-9 percent chance of occurrence in the next year or it has a
recurrence interval of every 10 years or greater.
36
Magnitude/Severity summarizes the extent or potential extent of a hazard event in terms of
deaths, injuries, property damage, and interruption of essential facilities and services.
SMFRA’s RAMP assessed the magnitude/severity for each potential hazard along five
dimensions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Life loss
Significant injuries
Economic loss
Critical infrastructures lost or damaged
Environmental damage
The final magnitude and severity score given each hazard are categorized as follows:
Catastrophic: extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, and/or government
functions which includes sustained city and regional impacts; overwhelms the existing
response strategies and state and local resources; and requires significant out-of-state
and Federal resources
Critical: Isolated deaths and/or multiple injuries and illnesses; major or long-term
property damage that threatens structural stability; and/or interruption of essential
facilities and services for 24-72 hours
Limited: Minor injuries and illnesses; minimal property damage that does not threaten
structural stability; and/or interruption of essential facilities and services for less than
24 hours
Negligible: No or few injuries or illnesses; minor quality of life loss; little or no property
damage; and/or brief interruption of essential facilities and services
Risk Rating
The main component of risk assessment lies in the construction of a risk rating matrix.
The qualitative and quantitative measurements of risk are derived and illustrated by
using this matrix tool. Designed in a graphical format, the matrix rates impact on the vertical
axis, ranging from negligible to catastrophic. An event likelihood is rated on the
horizontal axis, ranging from highly unlikely to highly likely. The graph is further broken down
into separate cells which are quantified based on the amount of risk present.
The methodology used to calculate each hazard’s total risk score followed the steps listed
below:
1. The probability or frequency data was collected and analyzed for each hazard.
2. Stakeholders were queried to determine their perceptions of the magnitude/severity for
each hazard, based on life loss or injury, property or economic loss, , loss of critical
infrastructure, and environmental damage.
3. Each hazard final risk score was calculated by multiplying probability/frequency by
magnitude/severity. Note: the scores for probability/frequency (1-4) and
magnitude/severity (1, 5, 9, and 13) were chosen so that the calculated total risk scores
would yield no duplicates. For example, had magnitude/severity been assigned scores
equal to probability/frequency (1-4), then the hazards in the Negligible/Highly Likely
category would have yielded the same score (1X4=4) as hazards assigned to the
Catastrophic/Unlikely (4X1=4) category.
4. Stakeholders verified and consensus given on final rankings.
37
The risk-rating matrix utilized in the RAMP is illustrated below:
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
Highly Likely
(4)
4
20
36
52
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly Unlikely
(1)
3
15
27
39
2
10
18
26
1
5
9
13
The Emergency Manager, with input from stakeholders, will review the risk rankings annually
to ensure hazards are prioritized in a way that focuses resources where they are most
needed.
Vulnerability Assessment identifies the potential impact a given hazard has on existing and
future facilities, industries, populations, communities, and infrastructures.
Data Limitations makes note of where the Risk Assessment Workgroup encountered data
limitations when completing the hazard profile.
The Authority responds to risks of various types and severity on a daily basis. The vast
majority are considered routine or low risk-high frequency. Vehicle accidents with injuries
and medical calls for service are the most frequent occurring. Loss of life and property occurs
from many natural and manmade events. The Authority’s Standard of Cover document
outlines all risks, including high risk-low frequency events that the department trains and
responds to. This risk assessment further examines low frequency catastrophic events to
better evaluate response, strategies, and capabilities. Collaboration with neighboring fire
departments and other agencies is essential to support daily operations and builds the basis
for needed support to each other during significant events.
Determining a given hazard’s probability/frequency is affected by the availability, accuracy,
and timeliness of the data. The data selected for calculating hazards were prioritized as
follows:
1. Data the Authority collects and maintains (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, structure and
wildland fires, hazmat incidents, etc).
2. Data regularly and accurately collected and maintained by local/regional agencies or
organizations within SMFRA’s jurisdiction (e.g., winter storm data by the National
Weather Service, Aircraft arrival/departure data by the Airport Authority, accident and
ridership information by the Rail Transit District, etc.).
3. Data sporadically or imprecisely collected and maintained by local/regional agencies
or organizations within SMFRA’s jurisdiction (e.g., traffic and commodity flow data by
the Colorado Department of Transportation, etc.).
4. Data sporadically or imprecisely collected and maintained by local/regional agencies
or organizations outside of SMFRA’s jurisdiction (e.g., tornado data by the National
Weather Service, earthquake data by the USGS etc.).
38
Risks and their associated profiles were developed following review of state, regional, and
local documents prepared for similar purposes. Most of the risks in these documents are
similar to the shared risks for the communities served by SMFRA. As part of the risk
assessment process noted in Section 3, assessments and plans from other relevant entities
were examined and compared, including:
State of Colorado Natural Hazards mitigation Plan (2011)
Denver Council of Regional Governments (2010)
Arapahoe County Emergency Operations Plan (2007)
Douglas County Emergency Operations Plan (2011)
Cherry Hills Village (2006)
Greenwood Village (2004)
Town of Parker (2010)
These assessments and plans are relevant for inclusion and comparison as they are from
legitimate government agencies the either supersede the authority or are served by the
authority. Table 12, below, presents the major hazards as described in the current plans.
39
Table 12: Crosswalk of Hazards Reviewed by Jurisdiction
State of Colorado
(2011)
DRCOG
(2010)
Arapahoe
County
(2007)
Natural and
Technological
Hazards
Dam Failure
and Floods
Floods and
Flash Floods
Natural Hazards
Cherry Hills
Village
(2006)
Greenwood
Village
(2004)
Town of Parker
(2010)
Aircraft Accident
Natural Hazards
Acts of Terrorism
Natural Hazards
Dam Failure
Flood
Severe Winter
Storm
Tornado
Technological
(Man-Made)
Hazards
Civil Disturbance
Flood
Severe Winter
Storm
Tornado
Douglas County
(2011)
Atmospheric
Hazards
Natural Hazards
Drought
Avalanche
Extreme Heat
Floods
Drought
Earthquake
Hailstorms
Flood
Tornadoes
HazMat Releases
Lightning
Hail
Severe Winter
Storms
Landslide or
Rockslide
Precipitation
Heat Wave
Thunderstorms
Landslide
Land
Subsidence
Public Health
Hazards
Severe Storm
and Wind
Thunderstorm
and Lightning
Tornadoes
Windstorms
Winter Weather
Geologic Hazards
Avalanche
Tornado
Earthquake
Erosion and
Deposition
Wildfire
Winter Storm
& Freezing
Technological
Hazards
HazMat
Releases
Earthquake
Flash Flood
Riverline Flood
Civil
Disturbances
Hazardous
Materials
Releases
Major Power
Outage
Mass Casualty
Incidents
Severe Weather
Terrorism
Mass Casualty
Incident
Public Health
Emergency
Tornadoes
Terrorist Attack
Utility Service
Failure
Cyberterrorism
Earthquake
Epidemic Control/
Biohazard
Fire
Flood
Hazardous
Materials
Search and
Rescue
Tornado/Wind
Storms
Transportation
Accident
Wildfires
Technological
(Man-Made)
Hazards
Civil
Disturbances
HazMat
Releases
Major Power
Outage
Mass Casualty
Incidents
Terrorism
Winter Storm
Wildland Fire
Winter Storm
Expansive Soils
Landslides, Mud and
Debris Flow, and
Rockfalls
Subsidence
Other
Wildfire
Grasshopper Infest
There are several exceptions where the jurisdictions served do not share the same risks or
perception of risk existence. These exceptions include avalanches, landslides, and
subsidence events. In contrast, there are several risks included in this risk assessment that
are not typically identified by other entities due to the nature of daily emergency response by
a fire/rescue department. Most notably this includes structure fires, transportation, and
vehicular accidents resulting in mass casualty events. The following risks were excluded from
analysis due to no identified risk, minimal impact to the community, or limited ability of a
special fire district to mitigate the hazard (Table 13).
40
Table 13: Hazards Not Profiled in Plan
Hazard
Avalanche
Expansive
Soils/Subsidence
Extreme
Heat/Drought
Civil Disturbances
Utilities Outages
Explanation for Omission
There is no avalanche measurement, management nor forecasting activities in the
areas served, nor are any expected to occur within the city limits.
Although some underlying swelling clays may exist in the service area, the overall
impacts are negligible and are mitigated through existing development policies and
practices.
This hazard has not created problems in the past that are unrelated to drought. It is
primarily an issue of human and livestock health. Since 1995, there were no recorded
deaths in Colorado caused by extreme heat (per the National Weather Service).
This hazard has not created problems in the past and most within the region are
typically isolated and of short duration in nature.
These problems are typically isolated and of short duration in nature. They are
addressed as part of the Authority’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). Future
iterations of the RAMP will re-assess need to integrate hazard into plan.
The following hazards and risks were identified by the planning group and stakeholders as
being the most impactful to the Authority and its citizens (not in order of risk ranking or
mitigation priority).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Earthquake
Fires
Floods and Dam Failure
Hail
Hazardous Materials
Medical and Public Health Emergencies
Terrorism
Tornado
Transportation
Winter Storm
These hazards, their associated risks, and the vulnerable populations are analyzed below.
41
4.2 Hazard Profile – Earthquake
Hazard Description
An earthquake is caused by a sudden slip on a fault. Stresses in the earth’s outer layer push
the sides of the fault together. Stress builds up and the rocks slip suddenly, releasing energy
in waves that travel through the earth’s crust and cause the shaking that is felt during an
earthquake. The amount of energy released during an earthquake is usually expressed as a
Richter magnitude and is measured directly from the earthquake as recorded on
seismographs. Another measure of earthquake severity is intensity. Intensity is an
expression of the amount of shaking, typically the greatest cause of losses to structures
during earthquakes, at any given location on the surface as felt by humans and defined in the
Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (Table 14).
Table 14: Magnitude and Intensity Scales for Earthquakes
Richter Scale
1.0 to 3.0
3.0 to 3.9
4.0 to 4.9
5.0 to 5.9
6.0 to 6.9
7.0 and Higher
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
Maximum Modified Mercalli Intensity
I
II to III
IV to V
VI to VII
VII to IX
VIII or Higher
Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale Rating
Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable conditions.
Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings.
Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. Many people do
not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations similar to the
passing of a truck. Duration estimated.
Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. Dishes,
windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking
building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably.
Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable objects
overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.
Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster.
Damage slight.
Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built
ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some
chimneys broken.
Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial
buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory
stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.
Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown
out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off
foundations.
Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with
foundations. Rails bent.
Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly.
Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.
Source: USGS, online at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/faq/?categoryID=2, accessed on Sept 2011.
42
According to the Colorado Geological Survey, Colorado is comprised of areas with low to
moderate potential for damaging earthquakes. There are about 90 potentially active faults
that have been identified in Colorado, with documented movement within the last 1.6 million
years. However, there are several thousand other faults that have been mapped in Colorado
that are believed to have little or no potential for producing future earthquakes.
Colorado is considered a low frequency, low intensity seismic area, which experiences minor
earthquake activity typically below a magnitude of 3.0. The greatest measured earthquake in
Colorado was a magnitude 6.6 in 1882.
Geographic Location
The majority of measurable earthquake activity is in the mountainous west and the south
central border with New Mexico. There are two faults immediately south of the SMFRA
service area that run generally north to south and which terminate 20 miles from the service
area border. These are approximately aged between 130,000 and 2 million years ago. Map 3
below presents Colorado seismicity for the years 1990-2006. The general clustering of
events was along the Rocky Mountains on the western slope, along the south central border
with New Mexico, and along the mid to lower Front Range.
Map 3: Seismicity of Colorado 1990-2006
Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/colorado/seismicity.php retrieved 09/21/2011
43
Previous Occurrences
There were three “instrumentally located epicenter” occurrences of a magnitude 4.0-4.9 in
the years 1962 to 2007 (Map 4). One was in the immediate service area and the other two
were on the broad border. However, the three immediate occurrences in relation to other
Denver metro area occurrences is a minor point when assessing this hazard. Any earthquake
in the metro area will have an impact on the jurisdiction commensurate with the magnitude of
the event (reference Map 5, next page, for historical magnitudes along the Front Range).
Map 4: Colorado Earthquake (1962-2007)
Source: United States Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center 1973 - 2011
44
Map 5: Earthquake Event Magnitudes and Fault Lines
Source: http://geosurvey.state.co.us/hazards/Earthquakes/Documents/Earthquake_Map_2008.pdf
retrieved Sept 2011
Case History #1: A magnitude 5.3 earthquake occurred near Trinidad Colorado on August
23, 2011. The reported depth was 2.5 miles and it was associated with a swarm, or cluster,
of smaller shocks occurring the previous day and as a result of normal faulting. There are
several more earthquake events of 5.0 magnitude or greater during the past 60 years.
Case History #2: The largest earthquake in modern Colorado history occurred in 1973. This
magnitude 5.7 as located approximately 50 miles north of Grand Junction on the western
slope.
Case History #3: The most costly earthquake occurred on August 9, 1967. It had a 5.3
magnitude and was centered in Commerce City located on the north side of Denver.
Probability of Future Occurrence
The probability of magnitude 4.0-4.9 earthquake in the Denver Front Range is 42% for any
given year (19 events in 45 years). A magnitude 5.0 and greater is 6.7% (3 events in 45
years). However, only one earthquake in the immediate service area was recorded with
instruments for a probability of 2%.
45
Map 6 presents earthquake magnitude based upon modeled peak acceleration of probable
events.
Map 6: Colorado Seismic Hazard Earthquake Peak Acceleration (2008)
Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/colorado/hazards.php Retrieved 09/21/2011
Typical Earthquake (4.0 - 4.9): Occasional (10-49%). The SMFRA service area and the
front range region experiences these minor earthquakes every other year.
Significant Earthquake (5.0 – 6.0>): Highly Unlikely (0-9&). While there have been no
recorded events of this magnitude in the SMFRA service area, several have occurred in
the front range and elsewhere in Colorado
46
Map 7: Probability of Earthquake of 6.0 or Greater occurring within 100 years
Source: USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eqprob/2002/out/image, October 2011.
Map 7 illustrates the probability of an earthquake of 6.0 or greater occurring within 100 year
in Colorado. The probability of a magnitude 5.0 or greater is predicted at 4% using the USGS
software. However, the actual experience based on recorded evidence is 7%; both figures
are presented here for clarification. The probability of a magnitude 6.0 or greater is predicted
at 0.5%. The probability of a significant event is highly unlikely, however, needs to be taken
seriously because of consequences should an event of this magnitude occur.
Magnitude/Severity
As with probability, earthquakes are placed into two distinct categories for magnitude: The
typical earthquake documented in the area, low on the Mercalli scale and rarely even felt by
people in the service area; and a significant earthquake (6.0 or 7.0 on the Richter scale)
should it occur. The magnitude of the two categories is as follows:
Typical Earthquake (4.0-4.9): Negligible. No or few injuries or illnesses; minor quality of life
loss; little or no property damage; and/or brief interruption of essential facilities and services
Significant Earthquake (5.0 >): Critical to Catastrophic. The majority of facilities and
infrastructure in the SMFRA service area are not designed or constructed following code
requirements as seen in earthquake prone regions. Therefore, what might be considered a
minor earthquake in other regions would have much greater consequences in Colorado.
47
Risk Ratings
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
5-5.9
(7%)
6.0>
(0.5%)
0-1.9
(100%)
2-3.9
(50%)
4-4.9
(42%)
Vulnerability Assessment
Due to the proximity of two fault lines, the possibility of a large earthquake is not entirely out
of the question. The documented earthquake history is relatively short in geologic time.
Depending on the location of the epicenter, and the magnitude of the quake, ground shaking
perception may differ from one area to another. Intense ground shaking and damages would
be greater in the urbanized areas of the jurisdiction. The significant ground shaking could
damage structures, roads, critical infrastructure, and cause bodily harm or death from
structural collapses. An earthquake would be an authority wide event.
Data Limitations
While there is information available as far back as 1867, it was not until 1962 that
measurement instruments were installed. The Rocky Mountains to the west were formed
over many millions of years. The rise of these mountains is due to several forces, most
notable volcanic pressure, and intra continental pressure relieved generally by uplifting.
While there are no significant tectonic plates under Colorado, the presence of faults is
evidence of past and potential for future events. An additional data problem exists in
determining the area of study for inclusion in the probability analysis. As can be seen in Map
4 and Map 5, the majority of past events occurred in the north metro area. However, these
events can damage property and injury or kill populations many miles from an event’s
epicenter.
48
4.3 Hazard Profile – Fires
Hazard Description
Fire is a naturally occurring event commonly
caused by lightening, or the excessive buildup of
heat or energy. It is a chemical reaction which
combusts fuel and continues until fuels and oxygen
conditions decrease. The following fire types are
common in the service area: wildland (including
brush, grass, vegetation, etc.), structure, vehicle
and other transportation (trains, planes, trucks, and
automobiles), dumpster, or other rubbish fires.
Wildland and structure fires will the primary focus
for this risk assessment.
There are numerous man made causes of fire, most notably, chemicals, mechanical,
electrical, or variations of these. Human caused fires can typically be defined as either
accidental or through some inadvertent action. For example, a cooking fire in a kitchen can
extend to the structure just as an outdoor barbeque fire can extend up the side of a house.
As another example, an appliance such as a coffee maker or furnace can malfunction and
cause a fire. An electrical system is often involved in fire starts.
Geographic Location
The SMFRA divides its service area into seventeen (17) planning and response zones
aligned with existing station districts (reference Map 1: SMFRA’s Service Area, page 17).
Each station district has its own varying fire incident history. The primary fire types that
present the greatest risks are presented in this section. These include wildland/brush,
structure, and transportation fires. Wildland or brush type fires occur generally in the south
western to eastern boundaries involving station districts 36, 39, 40, 43, 46, and 47. These
fires can also occur in other station districts with more development, but containing open
space parks and greenbelts. Structure fires occur in all station districts. Vehicle fires occur in
homes (garages or driveways) but more frequently on the primary road networks including
the highways.
49
Previous occurrence(s)
Wildland Fires: There are two primary locations for wildland/brush fires, the interface
areas between unpopulated areas and communities (wildland urban interface fires), and
those that occur in greenbelts or other open space areas (Map 8). Between 2008 and
2010, approximately 27% of all fires in the SMFRA combined district were wildfires. There
are cycles to fire seasons, typically spring through autumn, and influenced by draught
versus wet years. 2009 was a wet year with less fire starts. On average, there were about
100 wildfires per year.
Map 8: SMFRA Wildland/Brush Fire Types Experience 2008-2010
Figure 7 provides some insight into the common causes of wildland fires. The top wildland
fire causes were undetermined, smoking, natural source, incendiary, and equipment. The
information indicates that at least 38% of wildfires had a human element and may have been
preventable.
50
Figure 7: Common Wildland Fire Cause
Case History #1: From the limited historical data available, it appears that the normal
frequency and spread of wildfires is limited. However, as seen in the 2003 Cherokee Ranch
fire, there is a significant potential impact from wildfire under certain fuel and weather
conditions. The Cherokee Ranch Wildland Fire occurred on the south western portion of the
service area. The fire grew quickly to almost 1000 acres on a “red flag warning” day with
temperatures in the 80’s and winds of 20-30 miles per hour gusting to 40. A multi agency
response was needed to fight the fire, protect high value homes, and coordinate the
evacuation of 3000 residents, the largest evacuation in Colorado history.
Structure Fires: Similar to wildland fires, structure fires occur throughout the service
area. There is a strong correlation between population density and fire occurrence rates.
Another correlation is the age of the structures and fire occurrence rates. Generally, older
structures in dense population areas experience greater fire frequency. The majority of
structure inventory in the service area is newer in comparison to surrounding jurisdictions.
Additionally, about 75% of all structure fires occur where persons reside: 55% in 1 or 2
family homes and 20% in multi family structures such as townhomes, condominiums, and
apartment buildings. The remaining 25% of structure fires occur in commercial properties
of various size and use. The overall fire occurrence rate in the service area for all fire
types is less than 3% annually when compared to all incident types. This is generally less
frequent than other jurisdictions in the service area. Map 9 displays the distribution of
structure fires in the service area.
51
Map 9: Structure Fires Sample Period 2008-2010
Figure 8 displays the common fire causes in structure fires. Cooking fires remains the leading
common cause followed by a wide distribution other causes.
Figure 8: Structure Fire Common Causes
Case History #2: A new apartment building under construction experienced a total loss due
to fire on January 13, 2008. The 3-alarm response brought emergency units from several
stations and neighboring mutual aid. Over 2 million gallons of water were needed to
extinguish this fire. The fire began and was intensified when the first of nine 100 pound
propane tanks used for drying interior paint caught fire and exploded. The remainder soon
followed. While the building was a total loss there was no loss of life.
52
Probability of Future Occurrence
Wildland: Highly Likely (90-100%). The SMFRA service area experiences wildland fires
and the other types including brush and vegetation on an annual basis. The extent of the
fire spread does vary as very large wildland fires 100 acres or larger occurs infrequently
as compared to those 10 acres or smaller.
Structure Fires: Highly Likely (90-100%). Fires in homes and commercial buildings occur
many times each year. Fires in structures account for approximately
Magnitude/Severity
The severity of fire incidents ranges from limited to catastrophic. Small fires can spread
quickly from an object (or area) of origin to a room, floor, building or buildings. Similarly a
grass fire can spread to a large area and threaten lives and structures. The risk rating matrix
below shows the various fires types and severity.
Wildland Fires: Limited to Catastrophic. Isolated deaths and/or multiple injuries; major or
long-term property damage that threatens communities.
Structure Fires: Limited to Critical. Consequences from fires in single family home may
be limited and/or may include life loss. Fires in multi-family residences and commercial
structures can become extensive and expand loss of life, injuries, and economic harm to
communities.
Risk Ratings
Magnitude/Severity
Frequency/
Probability
Negligible
(1)
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Passenger
Vehicle
Rubbish
(100%)
Limited
(5)
Single
Family
Residential
Transport
Vehicle
Wildland/
Brush
1-19 acres
(100%)
Aircraft
(75%)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
Commercial
Structure
Multi Family
Resident
(100%)
Wildland/
Brush
20- 100
Acres
(50%)
Wildland/ Brush
>100 Acres
(10%)
53
It is important to note that while several fire types have 100% probability on an annual basis,
the frequency varies by year as well as in relation to one another. Although a rubbish fire
shares the same probability as a structure fire (100%) the actual frequency is less.
Vulnerability Assessment
The majority of fires in the service area generally have minor impacts to the communities, life
and property loss. While the direct losses of life or property are indeed seriously
consequential to those impacted, in relation to other incidents types occurs less than 3% on
an annual basis. Losses to single-family homes have the greatest frequency. A large home
or commercial structure experiences a full catastrophic loss every 5-10 years. Deaths related
to fire occur every three years and total property loss from residential homes ranges from
$300,000 to $6,000,000 and commercial up to $40,000,000. The largest wildland fire,
Cherokee Ranch burned mostly grass, brush, and scrub oaks. Only one outbuilding was lost
and the successful evacuation of affected communities further ensured life loss was avoided.
In 2009, a comprehensive risk assessment was completed resulting in an Authority-specific
Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP), which identified nine community hazard
rankings shown in Map 10 and listed in Table 15. The CWPP was limited in scope
evaluating only areas within Douglas County, but it accounts for the majority of SMFRA’s
wildland-urban interface communities. Cherry Creek State Park was identified as another
significant interface area and has been included in pre-planning efforts.
Douglas County Office of Emergency Management finalized a countywide CWPP of which
SMFRA subject matter experts (SMEs) were involved as identified stakeholders. This
process allowed for the identification of 16 additional areas of concerns (Table 15).
Map 10: CWPP Community Hazard Ranking
54
1.
2.
3.
4.
Table 15: Identified High and Very High Hazard Areas
Castle Pines Village – Very High
Cherry Creek Park – Very High
Corson/Scenic Ridge - Very High
Happy Canyon – Very High
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Black Forest – High
City of Castle Pines - High
Charter Oaks - High
Cherokee Ridge Estates - High
Democrat Road – High
Grandview Estates - High
Happy Canyon Ranches - High
Hidden Village - High
Homestead Hills – High
Johnson Road - High
Lemon Gulch – High
Livengood Estates - High
Louviers - High
McArthur Ranch South – High
Parker East - High
Parker View Estates - High
The Pinery – High
Ponderosa Hills - High
Surrey Ridge – High
The Timbers – High
Tomahawk - High
Windy Hills - High
Data Limitations
Data available from direct incident response in the service area is generally good for analysis
of basic information including frequency, timelines, and location. True property and contents
loss are difficult to update due to the time span that loss claims can take with insurance
companies. Fire loss in neighboring jurisdictions can be examined in the future to better
understand comparable experience and continue to support mutual and automatic aid
agreements.
55
4.4 Hazard Profile – Floods and Dam Failure
Hazard Description
SMFRA is at risk to “river line” small creek/stream and storm water flooding. River line
flooding is defined as when a watercourse exceeds its “bank-full” capacity and generally
occurs as a result of prolonged rainfall, sudden violent storms, snow melt, or rainfall that is
combined with soils already saturated from previous rain events. The area adjacent to a
stream channel is its floodplain. In its common usage, “floodplain” most often refers to that
area that is inundated by the 100-year flood, the flood that has a one percent chance in any
given year of being equaled or exceeded. The one percent annual flood (or base flood) is the
national standard to which communities regulate their floodplains through the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP).
Storm water refers to water that collects on the ground surface or is carried in the storm
water system when it rains. In runoff events where the amount of storm water is too great for
the system, or if the channel system is disrupted by vegetation or other debris that blocks
inlets or pipes, excess water remains on the surface. This water may pond in low-lying areas,
often in street intersections. Storm water ponding, also known as localized flooding, may
result in deep water and pollution. Storm water can pick up debris, chemicals, dirt, and other
pollutants from impervious surfaces.
Dam failures are often cited as a source of flooding that can have catastrophic
consequences. The Reuter Hess reservoir in the south of the service area is one that has
numerous communities in its floodplain. While this reservoir and dam has been in existence
since 2004, water rights have not allowed it to fill and be used as intended until recently. An
expansion to the damn was approved in 2009. The final earthen dam was completed in
March 2012 at which point there was 4,000 acre feet of water contained. Total water supply
when full will be 72,000 acre feet.
The potential for flooding can change and increase through various land use changes and
changes to land surface. A change in environment can create localized flooding problems
inside and outside of natural floodplains by altering or confining watersheds or natural
drainage channels. These changes are commonly created by development and can also be
created by other events such as wildfires. Wildfires create hydrophobic soils, a hardening of
the earth’s surface that prevents rainfall from being absorbed into the ground, which can
increase runoff, erosion, and downstream sedimentation of channels.
Geographic Location
There are numerous small creek drainages throughout the service area. The majority are
annual in nature with only a few that are perennially flowing. All drain towards the two
prominent larger perennial streams: Cherry Creek which flows south to north on the eastern
border of the jurisdiction; and Plum Creek flowing south to north through the western portion
of the service area. Plum Creek enters Chatfield Reservoir before joining the South Platte
River (which also flows south to north on the western boundary in a neighboring agencies
56
jurisdiction). Cherry Creek joins the South Plate at Confluence Park in the City of Denver.
Map 11 displays the service area’s drainage creeks and Map 12 shows resultant flood areas.
Map 11: Service Area Drainage Creeks
Map 12: Flood Plain Areas
57
The Reuter Hess Reservoir is currently filling as water becomes available from water
agreements. The dam proper is an earthen structure 7,479 feet long and 196 feet high. There
are two pipe outlets to control movement of water for the City of Parker. The natural
streambed and identified floodplain travels northeast through several communities on the
way to joining the Cherry Creek drainage south of Cherry Creek State Park.
Previous Occurrences
Cherry Creek, East and West Plum Creeks, and the South Platte have had past events which
have caused major flooding, property devastation, and large loss of life. Both have been
largely mitigated by planning and mitigation activities over the past 50 years. However, an
event can occur and at times localized flooding occurs. The small feeder streams and ponds
throughout the service area do experience minor flooding. Greenbelts and ponds have
flooded to the extent that rescue or recovery operations were needed.
The first documented Cherry Creek flood was in 1864. Denver was a newly established city
and the former Rocky Mountain News was publishing for at least 4 years. Nineteen people
were killed in the May 20 flood, including a family homestead south of Castlerock on east
Plum Creek. This first documented flood event began with a heavy storm on the Palmer
Divide.
Other notable floods occurred in 1878, 1885, 1912, 1921, 1933, 1935, 1965, 1973, and 1983.
All of these storms occurred during spring and summer months when storm cells develop
rapidly and are often accompanied by hail and high winds. The 1965 flood destroyed roads,
rail, and bridges, and closed transportation for several weeks. A tornado was associated with
event which extended flooding into both Plum Creeks. The Castlewood Dam was first built in
the 1880’s and officially completed in 1890 and abandoned several times through the
decades and today is an attraction in a popular state park, Castlewood Canyon.
Further downstream on Cherry Creek, near the borders of Denver, Aurora, and Parker is the
Cherry Creek dam. Construction began in 1948 and was completed in 1950. Today the dam
and state park is a popular four-season attraction in the metro area. The dam was successful
mitigating downstream floods, however, minor annual flooding continues due to seasonal
storms both upstream and downstream. The same occurs in the other streams that feed the
dams/reservoirs of the South Platte River Basin.
Probability of Future Occurrence
Flash Flood: Highly Likely (90-100%). Local stream beds/creeks, whether annual or
perennial, flood when significant amounts of precipitation occur. Standing retention ponds
may also overflow their design.
Riverline: Occasional (10-49%). Significant precipitation, or frequent occurring storms
during a “wet year”, can result in streambeds rising over their banks.
Dam Failure: Highly Unlikely (0-9%). There have been no dam failures in the immediate
area for decades. However, each risk assessment conducted and physical
58
surveys/inspection of dams completed by neighboring agencies result in this hazard being
elevated as a risk.
Flooding can occur following thunderstorms, hailstorms, and winter snow melt. Any seasonal
event can lead to either local flooding or a more serious regional flooding. The counties, with
the Corps of Engineers control, have built dams to modern standards. These dams were built
to control flooding and to serve the water needs for the region. A dam failure would not affect
the service area, however, SMFRA would respond as mutual aid to other jurisdictions as
requested. There would be upstream flooding impacting ponds, dry creeks, and streets. The
perennial steam beds would flood their banks and water would inundate homes and
businesses in the flood plain.
Magnitude/Severity
Flash Flood – Negligible. With the exception of an occasional life loss in a stream or
pond, the majority of events pass with little disruption to persons, property, or the
economy.
River Line - Limited: Streambeds that overflow their banks increase potential or real
damage to persons and property, and can affect infrastructure. Homes and businesses
near streams will experience property damage.
Dam Failure - Catastrophic: extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or
disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, and/or
government functions which includes sustained city and regional impacts; overwhelms the
existing response strategies and state and local resources; and requires significant out-ofstate and Federal resources.
Risk Ratings
Magnitude/Severity
Frequency/
Probability
Negligible
(1)
Highly
Flash Flood
Likely
(100%)
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Limited
(5)
River Line
(10%)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
Dam Failure
(<1%)
Vulnerability Assessment
There are no repetitive loss properties due to flooding in the service area. Localized flooding
is the greatest risk to communities in the service area. The source causes include rain, hail,
or snow. Residential homes and small businesses are most vulnerable to localized flooding;
59
mostly basements and lower levels becoming inundated with water, mud, and debris.
Commercial structures are both less numerous and constructed with larger foundations that
minimize flood inundation. Additionally, commercial districts and residential communities
have benefited from master development planning where greenbelts, open space, and other
areas support storm runoff holding flooding waters generally within the intended areas.
Several dry dams exist in the service area.
The Reuter Hess dam and reservoir is designed for use by several local municipalities. While
available for local use, it also was intended to support replenishment of the aquifer an as a
reserve for better water management during a drought. Given the large earthen dam and
water pipe outlets for water treatment, large quantities of water can be moved quickly. If there
were a breach of the dam, inundation of several local communities would occur as water
coursed towards the Cherry Creek Reservoir. That reservoir, and associated land in the state
park, can accommodate the full volume of floodwater. Map 13 and Table 16 below estimates
full property loss and valuation from the engineering study and assessor’s office.
Map 13: Reuter Hess Inundation Area
Table 16: Reuter Hess Flood Inundation
Data Limitations
Information on major floods is available through several sources. However, there is no
repository or other source documenting localized flooding events. Data that the Authority and
other agencies primarily rely upon (e.g. HAZUS) do not get updated frequently. Furthermore,
canals, dry dams, and other water retention systems are not included in the database.
Current HAZUS data sets do not include Reuter Hess reservoir or its floodplain.
60
4.5 Hazard Profile – Hail
Hazard Description: Hail storms, tornados, thunder storms, and severe wind events are
both independent and interdependent events occurring along the “Front Range” of Colorado.
For example, a hail storm may be preceded by a tornado or a high wind advisory may lead to
a tornado. Similarly, a thunderstorm can become a hail storm which can become a severe
wind or tornado event. In contrast, high wind advisories and warnings can occur along the
Front Range independently.
Hail is precipitation in the form of spherical or irregular ice pellets usually consisting of
concentric layers larger than 0.2 inches. It is formed as moisture freezes and thaws several
times cyclically as it falls and rises repeatedly in the atmosphere. Hail in the Front Range
region can reach 5 inches in diameter. Generally, hailstorms generate pellets of a ½ inch to 3
inches in diameter. Hailstorms cause damage to structures and other types of property, as
well as crops and livestock, and in rare cases to humans. Table 17 below presents a size
and intensity scale.
Intensity
Category
Table 17: TORRO Hailstorm Intensity Scale
Diameter
(in.)
Size
Description
0.4-0.6
0.6-0.8
Mothball
Marble, grape
Severe
Severe
0.8-1.2
1.2-1.6
Walnut
Pigeon's egg > squash ball
Destructive
Destructive
Destructive
Destructive
1.6-2.0
2.0-2.4
2.4-3.0
3.0-3.5
Golf ball
Hen's egg
Tennis ball > cricket ball
Large orange > Soft ball
Hard Hail
Potentially
Damaging
Significant
0.2-0.4
Pea
Typical Damage Impacts
No damage
Slight general damage to plants, crops
Significant damage to fruit, crops, vegetation
Severe damage to fruit and crops, damage to glass and plastic
structures, paint and wood scored
Widespread glass damage, vehicle bodywork damage
Wholesale destruction of glass, damage to tiled roofs, significant
risk of injuries
Bodywork of grounded aircraft dented, brick walls pitted
Severe roof damage, risk of serious injuries
Severe damage to aircraft bodywork
Super
Extensive structural damage. Risk of severe or even fatal
Hailstorms
3.6-3.9
Grapefruit
injuries to persons caught in the open
Super
Extensive structural damage. Risk of severe or even fatal
Hailstorms
4.0+
Melon
injuries to persons caught in the open
Source: Tornado and Storm Research Organization (TORRO), Department of Geography, Oxford Brookes University.
Geographic Location
Hail and associated storms can occur anywhere in the service area. The intensity and
magnitude may vary as the storm moves and is impacted by atmospheric conditions. One
community may be impacted greater than another, with other communities not experiencing
any hail. That is the nature of hailstorms in this region.
Previous Occurrences
Hail storms occur on a regular basis. The regional map (Map 14) presented below contains
such events during the past fifty five years. Small hail is most common during most events;
however, the exceptional destructive or catastrophic hail storms occur every other year. Map
14 and Map 15 below show regional and local events from 1955 – 2010.
61
Map 14: Region Hail Activity 1955-2010
Map 15: SMFRA Hail Activity 1955-2010
There were one hundred thirteen (113) hail storm events in the service area during the fifty
five (55) year study period. The vast majority of these were in the one to two inch diameter
size. The greater Front Range study area had more frequent occurring and greater intensity
storms (Figure 9). This may be due to atmospheric conditions that push the storms further
north and east. However, the variability of these storms can cause great damage where none
has occurred in the past. The histogram below demonstrates the frequency of events in the
Front Range area. The months of May through August are the most active (Figure 10).
62
Figure 9: Front Range Hail Activity Distribution
by Month 1955-2010
2,000
1,500
1,000
1,950
1,312
500
0
943
2
Feb
14
Mar
918
279
226
Apr
May
June
July
Aug
Sept
37
Oct
Figure 10: SMFRA Hail Activity Distribution by Month 1955-2010
60
50
40
30
56
20
10
0
4
Apr
19
22
July
Aug
9
May
June
1
Sept
2
Oct
63
In 2009, the costliest hailstorm in total property damage spawned two tornados, which added
great wind and flying debris damage to vehicles, homes, and businesses (Table 18).
Table 18: Top 10 Damaging Hailstorms in Colorado*
Cost When Occurred
(Millions)
2010 Dollars
(Millions)*
Denver Metro
$767.6
$780.2
July 11, 1990
Denver Metro
$625.0
$1.04 Billion
June 6-15, 2009
Denver Metro
$353.3
$359.1
June 13-14, 1984
Denver Metro
$276.7
$580.7
July 29, 2009
Pueblo
$232.8
$236.6
October 1, 1994
Denver Metro
$225.0
$331.1
May 22, 2008
Windsor
$193.5
$196.0
July 13, 2011
CO Front Range
$164.8
$164.8
June 8-9, 2004
Denver Metro
$146.5
$169.1
August 11, 1997
Denver Metro
$128.0
$173.9
May 22, 1996
Denver Metro
$122.0
$169.5
Date
Location
July 20, 2009
*2010 estimated cost calculations based on the Consumer Price Index
Source: Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association, retrieved via internet 09/20/2011
The Denver Metro area (including the SMFRA service area) experience the costliest storms
partly because of the population density and property valuations. Similar to tornado
experience, Colorado’s Front Range is referred to as “hail alley” as it experiences the highest
frequency of large hail in all of North America.
Case History #1: On July 11,1990 the second costliest storm in Colorado history caused
$625 million in 2010 dollars. This citywide storm was preceded by a typical warm summer
day. As the storm developed, large violent clouds could be seen for miles and the defining
storm lines were captured in televised news reports. The official weather station at Denver
Stapleton Airport (pre-Denver International) only recorded a few hail stones.
Case History #2: July 2009 a severe summer storm brought the costliest hail storm in
Colorado history at $780 million in 2010 dollars. Arvada, Wheatridge, and Lakewood were
inundated with 1-3 inch size hail. There were at least two confirmed tornados associated with
this storm, although neither touched ground. Homes and vehicles accounted for the majority
of damage. Combined with the June 6-15 storms which caused $161 million in damage to
property in Parker, Centennial, and Aurora, this proved to be the most catastrophic season in
Colorado.
Probability of Future Occurrence
0-2 Inch: Highly Likely (90-100%). There were 113 events in the fifty-five year study
period. The majority of events had hail with 2 inches diameter or less.
2.1-3 Inch: Highly Unlikely (0-9%). The greater region studied had over 200 events with
hail in the 2-5 inch diameter which can be highly destructive. These sizes have been
recorded quite infrequently in the immediate service area.
64
Magnitude/Severity
0-2 Inch: Negligible. The primary impact is to structures, vegetation, and vehicles causing
damage to each. A secondary impact is localized flooding and association with tornadoes
and other climactic activity.
2.1-3 Inch: Limited. Overall damage is magnified as size continues to increase. There
was one reported death of a minor in the 1990’s due to a head injury. The historic high
dollar loss due to hail is generally due to the extent of damage to numerous properties
versus great loss to singular properties.
Risk Ratings
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
1-2”
(100%)
2-3”
(4%)
Vulnerability Assessment
The SMFRA service area is vulnerable to significant hailstorms in the future. There are
warning systems communicated via radio and television stations, however these do not
reach all intended persons reliably. Additionally, current technology does not accurately
predict the specific area or extent of potential damage to persons and property. Given a
history of occurrence, it is reasonable to expect future damage to vehicles, structures, and
potentially individuals. Hailstorms often are community wide events leading to property
damage, specifically to roofs, windows, and siding.
Outdoor venues and special events are specifically vulnerable to hail storms due to poorly
defined communication plans and defensible or sheltering spaces. Commuters in vehicles
often seek shelter under overpasses during storms causing additional accidents.
Data Limitations
Data limitations for hail include the short historic time span and poor searchable database of
events linking to property damage or injuries and death. Furthermore, there is poor economic
or other loss data for hail events less than 2 inches; these account for 95% of total events.
65
4.6 Hazard Profile – Hazardous Materials
Hazard Description: Incidents involving hazardous materials (hazmat) have the potential to
be one of SMFRA’s most catastrophic risks. SMFRA prepares for known hazmat risks
through planning and code enforcement but also must be capable of handling catastrophic
events with Authority and regional resources.
There are three recognized sources for hazmat incidents within the jurisdiction: delivery lines,
fixed facilities storage and use, and transportation of hazardous materials.
Delivery Lines: Natural gas and petroleum-based products are transported through
SMFRA’s jurisdiction using transmission pipelines, which are typically composed of highstrength steel pipe or poly vinyl chloride (PVC) ranging from 2 to 42 inches in diameter
(Map 16 and Map 17). These lines move large quantities of natural gas and petroleumbased products from the producing regions to local distribution companies (LDCs). The
pressure of gas in each section of line typically ranges from 200 pounds to 1,500 pounds
per square inch, depending on the type of area in which the pipeline is operating. As a
safety measure, pipelines are designed to handle greater pressures than are actually
delivered in a system. For example, pipelines in more populated areas operate at less
than one-half of their design pressure level. Additionally, many major pipelines are
"looped" allowing for two or more lines running parallel to each other in the same right of
way. This provides maximum capacity during peak demand periods. The pipeline rights of
way are usually 100 feet wide and are leased from landowners with restrictions on
construction activities to minimize the potential for accidental damage. 1
Fixed Facility: SMFRA has numerous facilities and occupancies that contain hazardous
materials for various industrial or commercial uses. For example, water and gas utilities
are the largest users of common hazardous materials. Food processing, storage, and
distribution companies use high quantities of refrigerants containing hazardous agents.
Several industrial mining laboratories contain chemical inventories for testing and
processing samples. Vehicle repair shops keep chemicals for welding and other shop
repair services.
These facilities are required to report to their respective county and maintain detection
and suppression systems to mitigate the increased risks. SMFRA’s Life Safety
Technicians and Hazmat Specialists also inspect facilities containing hazardous materials
and processes to ensure code compliance.
1
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA). http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/about/agency
66
Transportation: Transportation of hazardous materials through SMFRA’s jurisdiction
occurs by way of aircraft, freight train, and over-the-road commercial carriers. Over-theroad carriers account for the largest transportation of hazardous materials through the
district by this mode of transportation. There is, however, imprecise data as to the
number of vehicles as well as types and quantities of materials transiting the district. Most
over-the-road hazmat incidents involve passenger vehicles that leak 25 gallons or less of
gasoline, which first arriving units mitigate without additional resources. Larger spills,
however, typically require additional resources, which includes SMFRA’s and/or other
regional HazMat teams.
Data for transporting hazardous materials via aircraft is not available; however, given that
there have been no incidents involving this mode of transport releasing hazardous
materials within SMFRA’s jurisdiction, it represents the least frequent and severe
mechanism for a hazmat related event of all modes.
Geographic Location: Hazmat related incidents occur throughout SMFRA’s jurisdiction
annually. The intensity and magnitude of each event depends on the location, time of day,
weather conditions, and mechanism of release (e.g., transportation versus fixed facility). The
following provides an overview of each transportation-related hazard characteristic.
Delivery Lines: Numerous gas and petroleum-based pipelines traverse SMFRA’s
jurisdiction and a full accounting of their locations and size of lines is not available. Most
ruptures or delivery system malfunctions are isolated events with limited potential to
become large-scale incidents. For most of these events, the primary hazard is the
explosive nature of the gas compounds. However, since the majority of these incidents
occur outside structures, the risk to the lives is isolated to the immediate area of origin or
nearby structures where gases can accumulate. SMFRA maps the line diameters (Map
16) and types of commodities that flow through specific lines (Map 17).
67
Map 16: Transmission Line Diameters
Map 17: Transmission Commodities
68
Fixed Facility: SMFRA uses incident history, institutional knowledge, plan review, and
inspection of new construction, on-going business inspections, and hazardous materials
reporting databases to determine facilities that store, use and handle hazardous
materials. For the purposes of this risk assessment, the Arapahoe County Hazardous
Materials SARA Title III database was queried to determine all facilities that have reported
hazardous materials. There are approximately 882 businesses that contain hazardous
materials of varying quantities and dangers. In order to determine the facilities with the
highest risks. Those with extremely hazardous substances (EHS) were extracted. These
locations were further limited to include only those that have had significant past
incidents, have hazardous materials in locations that may not be obvious to emergency
responders, and process the materials in a manner that would pose a greater threat. The
result was a list of 56 facilities, shown in Map 18.
Map 18: HazMat Locations in Service Area
69
Transportation
o Aircraft Transport: Aircraft transiting the district is primarily contained to entering
and existing Centennial Airport’s airspace and fixed facilities. Although aircraft
incidents occur throughout the jurisdiction, most hazmat-related incidents occur on
Centennial Airport grounds and within a fixed facility. There was no data available for
analysis indicating the number, types, and quantities of hazardous materials
transported by aircraft into and out of the airport. Thus, no definitive risk determination
was made to the community.
o Freight Rail Transport:
The freight rail line runs north and south and bifurcates district 40’s response area on
the far west section of the Authority’s service are (Map 19)
Map 19: Freight Rail Map
70
In 2010, BNSF and Union Pacific Railroads transported 19,566 cars containing a
hazardous material. Figure 11 shows the breakdown for each hazmat code
classification with the majority falling into Class 9 (Miscellaneous), Class 3
(Flammable Liquids), and Class 2.1 (Flammable Gases). Reference Appendix E for a
list of HazMat classifications.
Figure 11
o Over-the-Road Transport: According to a Colorado Department of Transportation
analyst, the commodity flow data analyzed in 2009 for C-470 at Santa Fe road is
similar to most of the state’s other interstate highways. Therefore, the data provided
in Table 19 is representative of the hazmat transiting the district, as a percentage of
traffic flow, for any of SMFRA’s three highways.
As such, the average commodity flow of hazardous materials transported via
commercial carriers is approximately 0.03% – 0.05%. Extrapolating the traffic data
from several sources included the data contained in the Transportation Hazards
section (p. 81-83) the anticipated flow of hazardous materials through SMFRA’s
jurisdiction along one of its three interstates averages approximately 110 daily
commercial carriers during peak hours (7 am to 7 pm). This approximates to be
71
40,150 hazmat transits through the jurisdiction annually (Table 19).
Table 19: Average Daily Interstate Commodity Flows (2009-2011)
Vehicle Counts
HazMat Class Code
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Class 5
Class 6
Class 7
Class 8
Class 9
Unknown
Average Total Vehicles (07:00-19:00 hours)
Average Percent Transporting HazMat
Average Daily Carriers Transporting HazMat
Source: Colorado Department of Transportation
I-25
1.5
12
19
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
89,400
0.04%
35.5
C-470
2
14
21
1
1
0
0
3
0
0
100,000
0.04%
41
I-225
1.5
11
18
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
83,700
0.04%
33.5
Total
Interstates
5
37
58
3
3
0
0
7
0
0
273,100
0.04%
110
Previous Occurrences: As can be seen in Table 20, from 2009 through 2011, SMFRA
responded to 1,453 hazmat incidents in district. Of these, the two most frequently responded
to categories were carbon monoxide calls and inside structure natural gas leaks. Most of
these incidents were handled by one or two units and did not involve a hazmat team
response.
Indoor and outdoor gas leaks combined account for over half of all incidents during the study
period. Carbon monoxide incidents account for another 30% of all hazmat call types.
However, 11% of these either were detector malfunctions or no carbon monoxide found.
Other less frequently occurring incidents make up the balance of hazardous materials
response. Some of these can be quite serious and pose a significant exposure to occupants,
responders, and the surrounding community. These incidents required multiple units and
during 2009 through 2011, SMFRA responded to 19 hazmat incidents that required eight or
more units (Table 21).
SMFRA maintains a hazardous materials team for deployment with specialty apparatus and
equipment. Front line units have detection and monitoring equipment and are trained to
manage incidents to conclusion or establish initial actions as the special team mobilizes.
SMFRA also participates with county and regional groups.
72
Table 20: Service Area HazMat Responses
Incident Type
Air or gas rupture of pressure or process vessel
2009
2010
2011
1
Biological hazard investigation, none found
1
1
1
Biological hazard, confirmed or suspected
Carbon monoxide incident
188
Chemical hazard (no spill or leak)
8
Explosion (no fire), not otherwise classified
5
Explosive, bomb removal (for bomb scare, use 721)
Fireworks explosion (no fire)
2
28
391
3
8
1
1
Flammable gas or liquid condition, other
Gasoline or other flammable liquid spill
175
2
3
Chemical spill or leak
46
Grand
Total
8
24
1
6
1
2
2
3
1
1
2
51
34
131
9
12
Hazmat release investigation w/ no hazmat
3
Malfunction - due to carbon monoxide detector activation
2
13
234
249
151
126
96
373
Natural gas or LPG leak (outside)
20
18
19
57
Natural gas or LPG leak (outside) due to cut gas line
47
48
36
131
5
9
1
1
Natural gas or LPG leak (inside)
Oil or other combustible liquid spill
4
Overpressure rupture from air or gas, not otherwise classified
Overpressure rupture of steam boiler
Overpressure rupture, explosion, overheat not otherwise
classified
2
2
3
3
Radiation leak, radioactive material
1
1
Radioactive condition, other
1
1
Refrigeration leak
1
1
Unintentional - carbon monoxide detector activation (no CO)
Grand Total
477
454
Table 21: Two-Alarm or Greater HazMat Responses
Number of Units
Incident Year
8
9
10
11
12
13
17
2009
2
5
2010
2
1
2
1
2011
1
1
2
1
Grand Total
4
6
2
2
2
1
1
47
47
522
1453
19
1
1
Grand
Total
8
6
5
19
73
Probability of Future Occurrence
Delivery Lines: Highly Likely (90-100%). SMFRA experiences a delivery line rupture or
cut every year.
Fixed Facility: Highly Likely (90-100%). SMFRA experiences a hazmat release within or
on a fixed facility every year.
Transportation
o Aircraft Transport: Highly Unlikely (0-9%). SMFRA has not experience a major
hazmat release related to an aircraft accident. Much of the hazmat related to this
type of incident is a result of a limited quantity of jet or aviation fuel spilled.
o Freight Rail Transport: Occasional (10-49%). SMFRA has not experienced a
significant hazmat release due to a freight train accident. However, within the region,
there have been several hazmat release due to a freight train accident. The
probability of a release in SMFRA’s jurisdiction is determined to be less probable to
due to the limited number of vehicle crossing points (two) and number of freight yards
where hazardous materials are loaded or off loaded. The Louviers business center is
the only area where hazmat is transferred on or off freight rail cars.
o Over-the-Road Transport: Highly Likely (90-100%). SMFRA experiences an annual
hazmat release due to an over-the-road transport accident every year.
Magnitude/Severity
The severity of a hazmat related incident ranges from limited to catastrophic. Large hazmat
releases are capable of harming individuals, the environment, and livestock. However, the
severity of each source of potential hazmat release is dependent upon such variables as
material involved, quantities released, location of the incident (e.g., proximity to densely
populated areas, access to waterways, etc.), and weather conditions.
Delivery Lines: Critical. The rupture or cutting of delivery lines typically occurs in
SMFRA’s more urban and suburban areas. This exposes more people to the risk of
potential life loss, injuries, and significant economic damage.
Fixed Facility: Limited. The release of fixed facility hazmat is typically confined to a
limited and enclosed area. Additionally, these facilities are regularly required to report
their onsite quantities under SARA Title III and are subject to regular inspections by
SMFRA/
Transportation
o Aircraft Transport: Limited. The data is not available to indicate the amount of
hazardous materials transported via this mode of transportation. Given the lack of
historical data there is limited exposure of life loss, injuries, economic loss, or
environmental damage resulting from a hazmat release due to an aircraft accident.
o Freight Rail Transport: Critical. Due to the limited population along the Santa Fe
corridor the exposure to this risk is reduced. However, as it urbanizes, this risk is
expected to increase. It is anticipated that this region will experience significant
population growth and development, which will increase this population exposure to
potential life loss, injuries, and environmental damage resulting from a hazardous
materials release from a freight train accident.
o Over-the-Road Transport: Limited. This mode transports limited quantities and
toxicity levels of hazmat
74
Risk Ratings
Magnitude/Severity
Frequency/
Probability
Negligible
(1)
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Limited
(5)
Delivery
Lines
(100%)
Over-theRoad
(100%)
Catastrophic
(13)
Fixed
Facility
(100%)
Freight
Train
(10%)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Critical
(9)
Aircraft
(<1%)
Vulnerability Assessment: Typically, the majority of hazmat-related accidents in SMFRA’s
service area have a minor impact to lives, property or the environment and. A community’s,
facility’s or individual’s vulnerability of a given hazmat incident is determined by many of the
same factors that determine a given source’s severity rating. Annually, transportation related
accidents account for approximately 3% to 4% of all incident responses within SMFRA’s
service area. The following provides an overview of each source and the vulnerability it
posses to SMFRA’s communities and its citizens:
Delivery Lines: Releases of hazardous gases or petroleum-based products from
pipelines accounted for less than 1% of all hazmat related incidents. Moreover, these
incidents are typically isolated to close proximity of the location of the material’s release.
There have been no recorded incidents of serious injuries, illnesses or fatalities as a
result of a hazardous materials release due to a rupture, cut or failure in a delivery
pipeline.
Fixed Facility: Annually, over 90% of all hazmat incidents occur at a fixed facility, and
are typically contained inside the structure. Therefore, the immediate occupants are the
most vulnerable to these sources of hazmat releases. As with all other hazmat incidents,
vulnerability is affected by the amount and location of the substance released. Future
revisions to the RAMP will examine individual facilities and adjacent communities to detail
the vulnerability associated with the risks.
Transportation
o Aircraft Transport: Although aircraft incidents account for less than 2% of all
transportation-related incidents, they have never led to a large-scale hazmat incident
within SMFRA’s service area.
75
o Freight Rail Transport: The impact of a freight rail accident is most associated with
the potential release of hazardous materials contained in the cars. Since this area is
sparsely populated the impact of such an event will depend on factors such as
location, weather conditions and the release of specific hazardous materials.
However, as the anticipated growth of the Sterling Ranch area comes about, the
density of this community may increase the vulnerability of its citizens to a freight rail
accident. Future RAMP revisions will incorporate more in depth analyses of plume
modeling on this geographic area as development proceeds.
o Over-the-Road Transport: Given that the majority of hazardous materials
transported through SMFRA’s jurisdiction occurs using over-the-road commercial
carriers and that motor vehicles accidents account for the highest percentage of the
Authority’s incidents, this creates greater vulnerability.
Data Limitations: The limitations of the data varied by the source for a potential hazmat
incident. Generally, for those agencies responsible for the direct movement of hazmat (e.g.,
freight train) or for those agencies required to report directly to one of SMFRA’s county
agencies, the data was more detailed and sufficient for extrapolating potential risks. For other
sources such as aircraft and over-the-road carriers, data was unavailable or lacked detail
(e.g., the number and types of vehicles, quantities, and categories of hazmat transiting the
jurisdiction, etc.). However, despite these limitations, historical data as well as information
provided by internal and external stakeholder input provided sufficient information to assess
each mode’s potential risk factor.
76
4.7 Hazard Profile – Medical and Public Health Emergencies
Hazard Description: SMFRA responds to a variety of medical and public health
emergencies as part of its emergency medical services.
Medical Emergency: is defined as any incident requiring an Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) response following a medical or trauma related event. The “continuum
of care” begins with activation of the emergency 911 system at the dispatch center
and continues with arrival of basic (BLS) and advanced life saving (ALS) capabilities.
These two levels of pre-hospital care are provided by emergency medical techniciansbasic (EMT-B) and paramedics (EMT-P). The continuum of care continues with onscene assessment, treatment, and transport to an appropriate receiving hospital when
appropriate. Typical emergency medical incidents are those that have a general
medical nature involving any physiological systems.
A trauma related event, similar to the medical event, is one requiring emergency
medical services but has an identified mechanism or cause of injury. These are often
due to vehicle accidents, falls, entrapments, and assaults of various types, etc.
Public Health Emergency: is defined as an
“occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is believed
to be caused by bioterrorism, the appearance of a novel of previously controlled
or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin, a natural disaster, a chemical
attack or accidental release, or a nuclear attack or accident AND poses a high
probability of a large number of deaths in the affected population, a large
number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected population, or
widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that posses a significant
risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the affected
population.” 2
Implicit in this definition is the correlation of a “public health emergency” as a
“natural disaster,” which poses “a high probability of a large number of deaths”
or harm to a given population.
Public health emergencies can take many forms including as:
o
o
o
o
o
2
Disease epidemics or pandemics,
Large-scale incidents of food or water contamination,
Extended periods without adequate water and sewer services,
Harmful exposure to chemical, radiological or biological agents, and
Large-scale infestations of disease-carrying insects or rodents
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), 2001, retrieved from
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf
77
These events can also occur as primary events or may be secondary to another disaster.
For the purpose of the RAMP, the focus will be on three types of public health emergencies
SMFRA may respond to or be operationally impacted (e.g., reduced staffing levels, medical
response surges, etc.). These events include:
Outbreaks: occur when an infectious disease spreads within a localized population or
geographic but has the potential to reach the larger populace or expand beyond its
geographic area without preventative measures.
Epidemics: occur when an infectious disease spreads beyond a local population,
lasting longer and reaching people in a wider geographical area. According to the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the difference between an outbreak and an
epidemic is the percentage of overall deaths caused by the disease. Every week, the
CDC gathers morbidity data from hospitals in 122 cities throughout the country and
estimates the percentage of deaths related to a given cause. When the number of
deaths exceeds a pre-determined percent of the total in a contagious disease
category, the CDC then determines the United States has an official epidemic.3
Pandemics: occur when an epidemic expands into a global outbreak. Typically, a
pandemic has the following characteristics:4
o A new subtype of virus arises where humans have little or no immunity to it and
large swaths of a population are at risk.
o The virus can spread easily from person to person, such as through sneezing or
coughing.
o As the virus spreads, it causes serious illness worldwide often within six to nine
months of initial onset, if not sooner with the potential of spread from air travel. A
pandemic can occur in waves where different parts of the world may affected at
different times.
The number of pandemic related deaths varies on a several factors including:
o The number of infected people
o The vulnerability of affected populations
o The severity of disease or virus – including its virulence and permutation.
o The effectiveness of preventive actions
Public health emergencies are a significant threat to human health and safety
particularly to those populations with weakened or undeveloped immune systems.
Additionally, economic impacts from this hazard can be severe because of lost wages,
medical expenses for impacted persons, and stressed medical systems.
3
The CDC does make some distinction between the two terms as it creates epidemic thresholds for several
diseases – e.g., the “flu,” meningococcal disease. However, the CDC generally uses the term outbreak and
epidemic interchangeably but prefers the former as it is often less alarming to the public.
4
It is important to note that no definition was found that quantifies when an epidemic becomes a pandemic.
Moreover, the term epidemic has been used to describe a variety of public health related ailments that are not
applicable to emergency medical first responder service providers (e.g., the obesity “epidemic”).
78
Past Events
Medical Emergencies – All Emergency Medical Service (EMS) incidents account for 55% of
all agency incident responses. Two-thirds of these are medical incidents and the other onethird is trauma related. Table 22 and Table 23, below, list all medical and trauma EMS
responses for 2011.
Table 22: SMFRA 2011 Emergency Medical Incidents
Primary Patient Problem
Traumatic injury
*Other
Altered level of consciousness (LOC)
Chest pain / discomfort
Abdominal pain / problems
Syncope / dizziness
Syncope / fainting
Back Pain/Injury
Seizures
Behavioral / psychiatric disorder
Dyspnea
Poisoning / drug ingestion
Vomiting
Respiratory Distress
Diabetic symptoms (hypoglycemia)
Allergic reaction
Cardiac rhythm disturbance
Total
1875
862
822
512
425
390
336
334
322
294
270
214
140
121
101
80
77
Primary Patient Problem
Stroke/CVA
Cardiac arrest
Obvious Death
Hyperventilation
Choking or airway obstruction
Epistaxis
Pregnancy / OB delivery
Hypovolemia / shock
Hyperthermia
Vaginal bleeding
Inhalation injury (toxic gas)
Hypothermia
Respiratory arrest
Electrocution
Stings / venomous bites
Sexual assault / rape
Grand Total
Total
65
65
57
50
49
42
16
16
13
10
8
8
5
3
3
3
6727
Table 23: SMFRA 2011 Emergency Trauma Incidents
Trauma Incident Type
Falls
Motor vehicle traffic accident
Other, not classified by available codes
Motor vehicle - motorcycle
Bicycle crash
Struck by blunt/thrown object
Auto pedestrian accident
Stabbing/cutting accidental
Unknown or not determined
Motor vehicle non-traffic accident
Assault -stabbing/cutting
Bites
Equipment or machinery
Non-motorized vehicle accident
Excessive heat
Firearm- self inflicted
Total
1062
822
247
74
58
53
28
24
22
19
15
13
11
9
8
8
Trauma Incident Type
Assault- sexual
Mechanical suffocation
Assault -child battering
Electrocution (not lightning)
Machinery accident
Fire/flames
Drowing or near drowning
Smoke inhalation
Stings
Poisoning- chemical
Firearm- injury
Firearm assault
Excessive- cold
Aircraft related accident
Explosion (other than fireworks)
Grand Total
Total
5
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2515
79
Public Health Emergencies – Public health emergencies can result from a number of
causes such as food borne illness, waterborne pathogens, loss of sewer/water service and
epidemics of communicable diseases. In recent years, the risk of a public health emergency
resulting from an intentional release of a chemical, biological or radiological agent has
become more apparent.
According to the Tri-County Health, no public health emergency has ever been declared
within SMFRA’s service area. However, at least three statewide emergencies may have
affected local residents:
Case History #1: 2008 Salmonella Epidemic (Alamosa, Colorado)
In the second week of March 2008, residents of Alamosa, Colorado fell ill with severe
gastrointestinal symptoms, including diarrhea and abdominal cramps. The Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) determined that the city’s entire
public water system was contaminated with Salmonella bacteria. The resulting contamination
resulted in 442 reported illnesses, 122 of which were laboratory-confirmed, and one death.
Epidemiological estimates suggest that up to 1,300 people may have been ill.
Because Alamosa’s public water facility supplies potable water to most of its residents, the
outbreak constituted a severe health threat. State emergency management and health
officials mobilized a statewide response to the outbreak. The response lasted approximately
one month and involved numerous response agencies who were coordinated using the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS).
Because of the quick operational response and the changes made to the physical
infrastructure of the Alamosa public water system, the water was made safe and illnesses
were contained.
Case History #2: 2009-2010 H1N1 Pandemic
In the spring of 2009, a new flu virus spread quickly across the United States and the world.
The first case detected in the United States was diagnosed April 15 in a 10-year-old patient
in California. By April 21, the CDC began developing a vaccine to protect against the novel
virus. On April 26, the U.S. government declared a public health emergency for H1N1 flu. In
June, the number of cases in the U.S. were 18,000 and 74 countries were affected by the
pandemic.
By November 2009, 48 states reported cases of H1N1, with young people disproportionately
affected. The CDC estimates that from April 2009 to April 2010, between 43 million and 89
million people had H1N1 with an 8,870 and 18,300 associated with the outbreak.
On June 23, 2010, U.S. officials suspended the H1N1 Public Health Emergency. On August
10, 2010 the World Health Organization (WHO) similarly declared an end to the global H1N1
flu pandemic.
80
Because of the novel characteristics of H1N1, the CDC developed a limited supply of a
vaccine that necessitated prioritization of those initially eligible for inoculation. 5 The CDC
established guidelines for prioritization of the initial inoculations. The targeted groups
included:
Pregnant women
Parents of or caretakers of infants younger than 6 months of age
Health care and emergency medical services personnel
Infants 6 months through young adults 24 years of age
Adults 25 through 64 years of age deemed to be at a higher risk due to chronic health
disorders or compromised immune systems.
As the reported of cases of H1N1 declined, over 61 million vaccine doses were ready for
distribution and by the end of the outbreak a total of 80 million individuals were vaccinated.
Case History #3: Listeriosis Epidemic (Colorado)
In 2011, the CDC collaborated with multiple state public health agencies to investigate and
contain a multistate outbreak of listeriosis (Map 20). Listeriosis is an infection usually caused
by eating food contaminated with the bacterium Listeria monocytogenes. The relevant
statistics are as follows:
146 persons were confirmed to be infected with four strains of Listeria monocytogenes
The onset reported illnesses began July 31st and ran through October 27, 2011.
Ages of those affected ranged from under one to 96 years, with most over 60 years.
58% of ill persons were female.
Among the 144 reported ill, 142 (99%) were hospitalized.
Colorado experienced the highest mortality related to the outbreak (8).
The ages of those who died ranged from 48 to 96 years, with the median 82.5 years.
A pregnant woman, at the time of illness, had a miscarriage.
Seven of the illnesses were related to a pregnancy with three diagnosed in newborns.
Map 20: Listeria Monocytogenes: Persons Infected
Source: CDC, retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/
5
A novel strain is a genetic subtype of an existing or known virus or bacteria in which there is a lack of
preexisting immunity.
81
Probability of Future Occurrence
Emergency Medical:
o Medical: Highly Likely (90-100%). The frequency of these events varies on an
annual basis within this category. For example, an altered consciousness event
occurs daily, whereas cardiac events have a daily probability of 38%.
o Trauma: Highly Likely (90-100%). Near 100 percent chance of occurrence next
year or it happens every year. Please note, the frequency of these events vary on
an annual basis within this category. For example, a vehicle accident with injuries
event occurs daily, whereas an traumatic assault has a daily probability of 31%.
Public Health Emergencies: According to the TCHD the following probabilities of
these events within the service area or region are as follows:
o Outbreaks: – Highly Likely (90-100%). The Tri-County Health Department (TCHD)
investigated 844 cases of diseases in 2010 (excluding sexually-transmitted
diseases or seasonal influenza) and found the following:
 Total Cases per County (844)
 Arapahoe County - 381
 Douglas County - 172
 Outbreak Investigations (47)
 Arapahoe County - 22
 Douglas County - 12
 Outbreaks by Location
 Long-Term Care Facilities – 28
 Restaurants - 10
 Child Care Facilities - 4
o Epidemics: Occasional (10 – 49%). SMFRA has not experienced an epidemic in
the last ten years but Colorado has experienced two in a ten-year period.
o Pandemics: Unlikely (0-9 %). Although the H1N1 affected millions of US citizens,
the cases of the pandemic in Colorado were not accurately recorded.
Magnitude/Severity
Emergency Medical:
o Medical: Limited: The magnitude for this hazard applies to the area served in
general as most medical incidents involve limited scope injuries and illnesses. To
the individual and family, the event may be critical with major illness and/or life loss
and major disruption to the family.
o Trauma: Limited: The magnitude for this hazard applies to the area served in
general as most medical incidents involve limited scope injuries. To the individual
and family, the event may be critical with major illness and/or life loss and major
disruption to the family. Furthermore, a mass casualty event may be critical to the
individual, family, and or community.
Public Health Emergencies
o Outbreaks: Limited – These incidents are isolated to a very small population with
minor illnesses and/or interruption of essential facilities and services.
82
o Epidemics: Limited-Critical. These events are typically isolated to a region and
cause minimal deaths and/or moderate illnesses. There may be disruption to a
local economy; critical infrastructures and/or government functions. If not
contained, these events can easily spread to become an epidemic.
o Pandemics: Catastrophic. These events can cause mass casualties and create
significant service disruptions to the broader economy; local and regional critical
infrastructures and/or government functions. These events also overwhelm
existing response strategies and state and local resources.
Risk Ratings
Magnitude/Severity
Frequency/
Probability
Negligible
(1)
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Med & Trauma
MVAs w/
Injuries
(100%)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
Outbreaks
(100%)
Epidemics
(10%)
Pandemics
(<1%)
Vulnerability Assessment
The nature of medical and public health emergencies is such that they can occur anywhere
within the service area and can affect the entire population. The typical medical emergency
is isolated to under three patients (e.g., cardiac event, carbon monoxide poisoning, etc.) or
are limited to a confined geographic area (e.g., a mass casualty incident due to a
transportation accident). Public health emergencies, by contrast, can have the potential to
affect a much larger population within a region or globally; therefore, assessing the
vulnerability of these events is difficult and dependent on a variety of factors related to the
nature of the virus or bacteria, susceptibility of the population affected, means of
transmission, etc. Historical events, however, indicate that certain populations more are
affected by public health emergencies than the population at large. The following are a list of
potential vulnerable populations or facilities within SMFRA’s jurisdiction that present the
greatest likelihood of a public health emergency affecting them. They include:
Assisted Living or Nursing Facilities
Hospitals
Schools
83
Data Limitations
Data was sufficient for extrapolating the risk for a given medical type and its impact on the
community for routine medical emergencies (e.g., cardiac, traumas, general medical). Public
health emergencies, by contrast, are much more difficult to assess given their infrequent and
diffuse nature. Moreover, public health officials charged with defining and tracking these
events are not in concurrence with the demarcation between one category of event from
another; therefore, assessing whether an event was an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic
depends on a number of variables that change with the event, so no consistent measure is
applicable across the range of possible events.
84
4.8 Hazard Profile: Terrorism
Hazard Description: The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) defines terrorism as
“an activity that involves an act dangerous to
human life or potentially destructive of critical
infrastructure or key resources and is a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State or other subdivision of the United States in
which it occurs and is intended to intimidate or
coerce the civilian population or influence a
government or affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”6
FEMA’s State and Local Guidance for Integrating Man Caused Hazards into Pre-Disaster
mitigation planning (2003, version 2) document suggests integrating terrorism related events
into local risk assessment and mitigation catastrophic planning processes.
SMFRA has the potential to respond to terrorism related incidents that include the use of the
following mechanisms to incite fear, destroy property, cause injuries, and fatalities:
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosion (CBRNE)
o Biological/Chemical: Biological and chemical agents can be utilized as a
weapon to cause harm, intimidate and/or coerce civilian populations or
governments, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives. The primary hazard effects of biological agents are the direct
physical harm to populations with some effects realized immediately while
others will exhibit delayed onset based on exposure and delivery mechanisms.
Secondary effects include social impacts based on the event including cyclical
or sustained long-term mass casualties, disruption of regular services (localized
or widespread), panic, interruption of economic activities, stresses on the local
medical systems and reduction in response and recovery capabilities.
Infectious Disease is category of biological terrorism, which is caused by microorganisms or other agents, such as a bacterium, fungus, or virus that enter an
organism. Many of these diseases are highly contagious, which when
transmitted by various means of contact spreads rapidly expanding well beyond
its site of origin. Some prevalent infectious diseases include Ebola virus,
HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, Influenza, measles, and chicken pox. The susceptibility to
an infectious disease can be universal and widespread over a large geographic
area. Although treatments such as antibiotics, antiviral, antifungal and anti6
Source: Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, Section 2 (15), 116 Stat. 213 5 (2002).
85
parasitic could serve to prevent or lessen the effects of an infectious disease
there is still the possibility of significant harm to populations to include the
potential for mass fatalities. The occurrence of an infectious disease cannot be
predicted with certainty but the State of Colorado has experienced four notable
infectious disease outbreaks in the past.
o Radiological/Nuclear: A radiological dispersion device is often referred to as a
“dirty bomb” and is used to spread radioactive material in proximity to a densely
populated area. The primary effects of a terrorism radiological event are
physical damage of property (from localized damage to large-scale
infrastructure damage) and death/casualties within proximity to the initial attack.
Most injuries from a dirty bomb occur from the heat, debris, radiological dust,
and force of the conventional explosion used to disperse the radioactive
material and would result in a surge on local medical facilities and capabilities.
Long-term hazard effects include the impact of radiation sources on local
population as well as exposure to surrounding infrastructure.
o Explosive Devices: This terrorist method uses explosive devices to intimidate
or coerce civilian populations or governments, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives. They can be detonated by impact,
proximity to an object, a remote detonator, or a timing mechanism. An incident
involving this type of device must be assumed to be an act of terrorism until
deemed otherwise. If detonated, there is a high likelihood for property
destruction and mass casualties and/or fatalities.
Firearms: These types of terrorist devices may be the most commonly used due to
their relative ease of access, use, and potential for mass casualties and fatalities.
Combat weapons include pistols, rifles, and assault weapons. These threats can be
used in tactically sophisticated ways and possess high lethality due to their ease of
transport and access to vulnerable civilians in public spaces.
Geographic Location
Terrorism related incidents can occur throughout the Authority’s jurisdiction. However,
specific facilities or venues are limited to specific geographic areas and are documented in
the Vulnerability section. The intensity and magnitude of each terrorism related event may
vary depending on the location, time of day, and mechanism used to incite fear, inflict
damage and cause casualties and fatalities.
Past Events Although September 11, 2001 is the most vivid and catastrophic terrorism event
in the nation’s history, there have been numerous incidents since then that have terrorized
and killed US citizens. While the list of events is long, the following details several small
scale events that occurred throughout the United States including three that occurred in
Colorado. While experts debate whether these incidents constitute terrorism or simply acts of
violence, they all demonstrate the same characteristics: they are not only probable, they can
occur in virtually any community and have high destructive potential.
86
1. Explosive Devices
Southwest Plaza Mall: On April 20, 2011, Earl Moore placed an explosive device
attached to two Coleman-style propane tanks in the mall along with another pipe
bomb. The incident initially was called in as a fire in the hallway near the Food Court.
West Metro firefighters quickly extinguished the fire. After a search of the fire’s origin,
firefighters discovered the two explosive devices. No injuries and limited property
damage were reported.
Colorado Mills Shopping Center (Borders): On June 25, 2011 David Lawless broke
into a Borders branch at the Mills through a glass door. Lawless planted explosives on
a café area table and a computer desk. The explosion did little damage and no
injuries were sustained.
2. Mass Fatality Shootings
Mall Shootings
o Tacoma Mall: On November 20, 2005, a man entered a mall in Tacoma,
Washington and opened fire with a pair of assault rifles. After shooting six people,
one of them critically, the gunman surrendered to authorities. After the police
searched his car and apartment, they found a recipe for making Ricin poison as
well as bomb-making plans and materials.
o Westroads Mall: On December 5, 2007, a man entered an Omaha, Nebraska mall
and killed nine people (including himself) and wounded four others using a
commercial reproduction of a AKM 7.62x39mm semi-automatic rifle.
School Shootings
o Columbine High School: On April 20, 1999, at Columbine High School in
Columbine, in Jefferson County, Colorado, two high school students entered
school grounds and killed 12 students, one teacher and injured 21. The assault
was carried out using several shotguns, a semi-automatic rifle, a semi-automatic
handgun, and several homemade explosives. The two shooters killed themselves
approximately 45 minutes after entering the school. During the investigation, local
police discovered several homemade unexploded pipe and propane bombs.
o Platt Canyon High School: On September 27, 2006, a man entered the Platt
Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado. The gunman took six female students
hostage and later released four. Upon the police entering the classroom, the man
used a semi-automatic pistol to shoot and kill one of his hostages and then killed
himself.
Church Shooting
o Youth With A Mission (YWAM) Center (Arvada)/New Life Church (Colorado
Springs): On December 9, 2007, a lone gunman entered the center shot and killed
three and critically wounded one. The following morning the same gunmen
entered the New Life Church property in Colorado Springs and killed two and
wounded three others before he shot himself.
87
Probability of Future Occurrence
Biological/Chemical: Unlikely (0-9 %). There are no historical chemical terrorist
attacks within SMFRA’s service area or the region. The probability of such an event is
unlikely given the difficulty of weaponizing these events for a mass attack.
Radiological/Nuclear: Unlikely (0-9 %). There are no historical chemical terrorist
attacks within U.S. The probability of such an event is unlikely given the difficulty of
weaponizing these events for a mass attack.
Explosive: Occasional (10 – 49%). There are no historical explosive device related
terrorist events within SMFRA’s service area. However, there has been one
explosives detonation and one attempted discharge in public settings in the Front
Range region in the last 10 years. Given that these events are not confined or
associated with a specific geographic area and have the same probability of
occurrence within SMFRA’s jurisdiction as the other Front Range locations, the
probability of an event occurring within the service area is approximately 20% in the
next 10 years.
Firearms: Occasional (10 – 49%). There are no recorded terrorist events within
SMFRA’s service area using combat weapons. However, there have been at least
two multi-fatality shootings in public settings in the Front Range region in the last 10
years. Given that these events are not confined or associated with a specific
geographic area and have the same probability of occurrence within SMFRA’s
jurisdiction as the other Front Range locations, the probability of an event occurring
within the service area is approximately 20% in the next 10 years.
Magnitude/Severity
Biological/Chemical: Critical. A successful attack using biological or chemical
agents would have the potential to cause significant fatalities, illnesses and
environmental damage. The disruption to economic, critical infrastructures, and/or
governmental services would be limited as it would be confined to a small geographic
area.
Radiological/Nuclear: Catastrophic. A successful attack using nuclear device would
have the potential to cause significant fatalities, injuries, illnesses and environmental
damage. The disruption to economic, critical infrastructures, and/or governmental
services would be critical as the potential for future attacks could have long-term
effects.
Explosive: Limited. A successful attack has the potential to cause significant fatalities
and injuries. The disruption to economic, critical infrastructures, and/or governmental
services would be limited as it would be confined to a small geographic area.
Firearms: Limited-Critical. A successful attack has the potential to cause significant
fatalities and injuries. The disruption to economic, critical infrastructures, and/or
governmental services would be negligible as it would be confined to a small
geographic area.
88
Risk Ratings
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
Explosive
Devices
(20%)
Combat Weapons (20%)
Biological
Chemical
(<1%)
Radiological/
Nuclear
(<1%)
Vulnerability
Security experts have expressed increasing concern over potential attacks on what they term
“soft targets.” Soft targets are public locations where large crowds assemble but are
vulnerable to violent attacks due to easy access and their relative defenselessness. SMFRA
has identified numerous soft targets within its jurisdiction that have the potential for a terrorist
related incident. These include:
Schools: SMFRA is home to eight high schools, four middle schools, and 45
elementary schools. While there have been no instances of violence on par with
Columbine or Platt Canyon, all the region’s schools are vulnerable to similar attacks.
The school districts, given the lessons learned from previous school shootings are
proactive in their development of preparedness and mitigation activities; however,
given legal and practical constraints these facilities still remain soft targets with
potential for attacks. Most of attacks are isolated events with no connection to a larger
terrorist network.
Park Meadows Mall: One type of soft target that has received too little attention is the
retail mall. With all the other soft targets that exist (e.g., transit systems, schools,
hospitals, etc.), why should citizens be concerned about attacks against shopping
malls? One reason is that the nature of malls makes them very vulnerable: there are
multiple entrances and exits, and they are open to the public. Large numbers of
people come and go, making it easy for potential terrorists to blend in unnoticed. Many
of the visitors carry large parcels that could hide a bomb or other weapon. There are
multiple ways to attack a mall, ranging from automatic weapons to car bombs to
bombs placed inside the mall, even to an attack using a biological or chemical agent.
Moreover, the consequences of an attack could be quite serious. In the case of an
attack using a biological or chemical agent, or a bomb blast resulting in structural
89
collapse, the casualties could be very high. An attack could also produce insurance
and job losses. A coordinated series of attacks against malls would almost certainly
result in long-term lost business and serious regional or national economic
consequences.
Light Rail Line: The Regional Transit District (RTD) operates two Light Rail lines off
its Southeast Corridor system. This corridor transits the jurisdiction from Belleview to
Lincoln with a spur breaking along I-225 up to Parker Road. In total, SMFRA covers
approximately 19 miles of line. In 1988, The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its
1988 assessment of the vulnerability of public transportation to acts of terrorism and
extreme violence, entitled Domestic Terrorism: Prevention Efforts in Selected Federal
Courts and Mass Transit Systems, developed a useful analytical tool to identify critical
assets. Based on this model, Appendix G (Redacted for Public Distribution due to
security sensitive information) presents the results of analysis performed by FTA’s
Office of Safety and Security concerning the criticality of generic rail and bus assets.
Comfort Dental Amphitheatre: The Comfort Dental Amphitheatre is an 18,000
capacity outdoor venue located in Greenwood Village, Colorado. It is the largest
outdoor amphitheatre in the Denver metropolitan area and generally operates from
May through September. The number and types of musical concerts the venue hosts
approximately a dozen concerts each year from a wide range of genres.
Consequently, the venue draws large and diverse crowds dependent upon the musical
genre.
Local Special Events: Many communities in SMFRA’s jurisdiction are host to large
annual events including concerts, carnivals, sporting matches, and other pre-planned
social gatherings. Each of these events presents a potential target for those desiring
to incite fear and inflict damage. SMFRA works with its local partners to better preplan for catastrophic events and implemented a special events procedure internally to
better coordinate all the agency’s preparedness and mitigation efforts. Some of the
larger events include the Parker Country Festival, Taste of Lone Tree, Lone Tree and
Parker Fourth of July fireworks events, and Greenwood Village Day.
Hospitals: SMFRA is home to two large regional hospitals and a third smaller
emergent facility, each of which are considered soft targets. As such, SMFRA
coordinates with the two regional hospitals through their respective preparedness and
emergency planning teams.
Data Limitations
Due to the infrequent and asymmetrical nature of terrorism related events, there is no
accurate data available to predict the probability of an event within SMFRA’s service area.
National and regional historical data, however, indicates these events can occur without
warning and to catastrophic affects. SMFRA continues to improve its assessment process
through its use of the state’s Fusion Center (the Colorado Information Analyst Center),
involvement in the state’s Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, and collaborative
assessment tools such as the DHS’s Automated Critical Asset Management System
(ACAMS). Refinement of the agency’s terrorism assessment process will enable it to
develop more effective mitigation strategies in future iterations of the RAMP.
90
4.9 Hazard Profile: Tornado
Hazard Description: Tornados, thunderstorms,
hailstorms, and severe wind events are both independent
and interdependent events occurring along the “Front
Range” of Colorado. For example, a tornado may be
preceded by a hail storm, or a high wind advisory may
lead to a tornado. Similarly, a thunderstorm can become a
hail storm, which can become a severe wind or tornado
event. In contrast high wind advisories and warnings can
occur along the Front Range independently.
The National Weather Service defines a tornado as a “violently rotating column of air
extending from a thunderstorm to the ground.” Tornadoes are the most violent of all
atmospheric storms. Wind speeds can exceed 250 miles per hour, and damage paths can be
more than one mile wide and 50 miles long. The current tornado rating scale is the
“Enhanced Fujita Scale”. This scale replaced the previous Fujita scale in 2007. The
enhanced scale uses both wind speed and damage that takes into account the materials
affected and the construction of structures damaged by a tornado. Table 24 is presented
below.
Intensity
Category
(F-Scale)
Wind Estimate
(3 Second
Gust)
Table 24: Tornado Intensity Scales
Intensity
Category
(Operational
EF-Scale)
Wind Estimate (3
Second Gust)
EF0
65-85 mph
Typical Damage Impacts
Light damage: Some damage to chimneys; branches
broken off trees; shallow-rooted trees pushed over; sign
boards damaged.
Moderate damage: Peels surface off roofs; mobile
F1
homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving
79-117 mph EF1
86-110 mph
autos blown off roads.
Considerable damage: Roofs torn off frame houses;
118-161
mobile homes demolished; boxcars overturned; large
F2
EF2
111-135 mph
trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles
mph
generated; cars lifted off ground.
Severe damage: Roofs and some walls torn off well162-209
constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in
F3
EF3
136-165 mph
forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and
mph
thrown.
Devastating damage: Well-constructed houses leveled;
210-261
structures with weak foundations blown away some
F4
EF4
166-200 mph
mph
distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.
Incredible damage: Strong frame houses leveled off
262-317
foundations and swept away; automobile-sized missiles
F5
EF5
Over 200 mph
fly through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yds);
mph
trees debarked; incredible phenomena will occur.
Source: NOAA Storm Prediction Center at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/ef-scale.html and http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/f-scale.html, accessed 23
October 2009.
F0
45-78 mph
91
Geographic Location: The “Front Range” of Colorado refers to the eastern plains plateau
as it meets the Rocky Mountain foothills. It stretches generally form Cheyenne, Wyoming in
the north to Pueblo, Colorado in the south. For purposes here, Fort Collins in the north will be
the upper limit for inclusion in this study. Seasonal weather is greatly affected by the interface
of warm moist air coming north from the Gulf of Mexico with cold dry air from Pacific and
Canadian wind currents. The northern boundary of the Front Range forms a convergence
zone. This convergence zone spawns tornado events on an annual basis. While these
events generally are not as strong as in the Midwest states, the frequency is greater than
most people perceive or acknowledge.
Previous Occurrences: Tornadoes occur annually. Most tornados in Colorado occur
between May through mid August with the majority (75%) occurring between noon and seven
in the evening, and generally moving from southwest to northeast. The peak season is
somewhat smaller with two thirds of tornados developing between May and June. The
stronger events have been catastrophic on several occasions. Map 21 below presents
tornado activity along the Front Range from the years 1950 to 2010.
Map 21: Front Range Tornado Activity 1950-2010
As can be seen from Map 21 above, there were 1,117 tornado events in the immediate Front
Range area in the past 60 years. While the majority of these events were EF1 or less, there
is potential for stronger more destructive events to occur throughout the area. Map 22 below
presents tornado activity in the SMFRA service area during the same time study period.
92
Map 22: SMFRA Tornado Activity 1950-2010
There were 26 tornado events in the service area in the past 60 years. The greatest event
was an EF2. The most notable in recent Colorado history include the following examples.
Case History #1: The June, 1990 Limon Tornado, an F2 caused $25 million in damages with
117 homes and 23 businesses destroyed. The fire and police departments, town hall and the
post office were all damaged along, with the loss of phone service and other utilities
throughout the entire community.
Case History #2: In 2007 an EF3 tornado found a “blind spot” in Colorado’s Doppler radar
coverage. Without notice, at 8:11p.m., that tornado cut a 4 block wide, 2.2 mile long swath
through the southeastern Colorado community of Holly. With a population of 961, Holly
suffered 35 homes destroyed, an additional 32 damaged with 11 people injured, 7 of which
were serious enough to require transport and hospitalization outside of the region. July 2009
Case History #3: On Friday the 23rd of May 2008, the largest of several tornados to develop
north of Denver, plowed northwest through the community of Gilcrest to Windsor. Moving at a
steady rate of 30-mph, it pulled down power lines, damaged or destroyed a day care and at
least 60 homes, derailed part of a train including tankers and cattle cars, tore up irrigation
systems and farms. Accompanied by baseball size hail, the storm caused multiple crashes
and some injuries on area roads and rolled several semis off U.S. 85 north of Gilcrest.
93
Probability of Future Occurrence
F0 – F1: Highly Likely (90-100%). High wind events are common to the SMFRA service
area. Local tornado events have typically touched down briefly and in low population
areas. Potential damage from these type of events will continue to increase as the service
area continues to urbanize.
F2 –F3>: Highly Unlikely (0-9%). There have been more than 70 tornadoes of this
magnitude in the larger study area.
There were 26 confirmed tornado events during the 60 year study period. The occurrence
probability rate on an annual basis is 43%, or every other year. The Front Range study area
experienced 1,117 tornado events during the same study period which equates to a 100%
probability of an event on an annual basis.
Magnitude/Severity
F0 – F1: Limited: Isolated deaths and/or multiple injuries and illnesses; major or long-term
property damage that threatens structural stability; and/or interruption of essential
facilities and services for 24-72 hours.
F2 –F3>: Critical to Catastrophic. There would be widespread damage, loss of life and
injury, with impact to infrastructure and economic disruption.
There were 351 EF1, 65 EF2, and 13 EF3 tornado events during the study period. Of these,
12 EF1 and 1 EF2 events occurred in the service area. However, several of the EF2 and EF3
events have occurred close to the service area, so it should not be assumed a greater
magnitude event could not happen in the jurisdiction.
Risk Ratings
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
F2 (3%)
F3
(<1%)
F0 –F1
(97%)
94
Vulnerability Assessment
Several tornadoes have caused injuries and property damages in the service area during the
past 60 years. With a likely probability, a significant event (F3) can be expected to occur.
However, knowing exactly where, or how severe, is impossible to determine. There is no
reliable data that expresses past events with direct loss for the service area.
Most construction in the service area has been completed using modern building codes.
Vulnerability exists with moderate to large assemblies (indoor and outdoor). Community
based special events held outdoors pose a heightened vulnerability as high attendance
coupled with poor evacuation or sheltering can result in large life injury or loss.
Healthcare facilities where non mobile residents cannot self evacuate are also more
vulnerable than typical structures. Smaller facilities in residential style constructed homes are
more vulnerable than larger buildings with concrete construction.
Tornadoes can cause significant damage to structures, trees, utilities, crops, and have the
potential to injure and kill people. Tornadoes affect the entire planning area, including all
above-ground structures and utilities. Due to the erratic nature of tornadoes, destruction often
appears random. There are no specific identified hazard areas as the entire city is
susceptible to tornadoes. Early warning notification systems are available throughout the
service area but are not 100% reliant or timely. With advance warning, people can evacuate
to safe rooms, or to more structurally sound shelter areas within a building. Basements are
considered one of the safest places to seek shelter during a tornadic event.
Future assessments will include station district specific boundaries and building inventory. It
will be important to gain information pertaining to above ground electrical power delivery and
outdoor hazardous materials storage areas to identify additional mitigation and/or response
strategies.
Data Limitations
Data limitations for tornadoes include the short historic time span and poor searchable
database of past damage to property and infrastructure.
95
4.10 Hazard Profile: Transportation
Hazard Description: A transportation hazard is one that can involve a mode of
transportation that includes passenger vehicles, freight trucks, rail, pipeline, air, or mass
transit where the exact location cannot be predetermined. Transportation hazards are divided
into two categories:
Hazards created by the transportation mode itself; and,
Hazards created by transported materials.7
These include incidents involving the transport of hazardous materials, mass casualties and
extensive property and environmental damage.
Transportation systems available in SMFRA’s jurisdictions include air, freight and mass
transit rail, and road. All of these systems and supporting transportation resources provide
services on a national, regional, and local basis. A major accident is possible in any of these
modes of transportation. The following will provide an overview of each mode of
transportation that transits the service area.
Hazard Characteristics
Aircraft: The Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority,
more commonly referred to as Centennial Airport, is located
approximately 13 miles south of Downtown Denver in the
heart of the Denver Tech Center surrounded by 23
individual business parks. Centennial is designated as a
General Aviation Reliever airport by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), meaning that it relieves congestion
from Denver International Airport (DIA). The airport opened
on May 13, 1967 and has become the third busiest General Aviation Airport in the nation. It
is home to approximately 950 aircraft, with about 130 of those being jets. Other non-profit
and governmental agencies such as Flight for Life, interstate medical transfers, and law
enforcement also use the airport as their base of operations or transition point. The airport
offers support for several flight schools, flying clubs, air charter services, aircraft sales
services and aircraft maintenance services.
From 2009 through September 2011, the average daily operations of aircraft take-offs
or landings at the airport were relatively consistent from year to year. The highest average
daily operations occurred in August (between approximately 26,000 – 33,300 take-offs or
landings) and the low occurring in February (between approximately 17,000 – 20,000 takeoffs or landings) (Figure 12).
7
This hazard is detailed in the Hazardous Materials section (pp. 61).
96
Figure 12
As DIA’s reliever airport, Centennial does not have any scheduled passenger airline service.
This allows the airport to be free from certain Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).
Specifically FAR Part 139 which pertains to Airports with scheduled service operating aircraft
with more than nine passenger seats or unscheduled service operating aircraft with more
than 30 seats; neither of which are allowed at Centennial Airport. Because of this, Centennial
Airport does not have an official Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Index. However, if
it did, Index B would be most applicable because of the size of aircraft that regularly use the
airport.
The Airport ARFF Index combines the length of aircraft and the average daily departures of
the aircraft. Index B includes aircraft at least 90 feet long but less than 126 feet.
The Airport is now home to four full service Fixed Based Operators (FBOs), one
helicopter FBO, eleven different flight schools, eleven air charter operators, a 24/7 FAA
staffed Control Tower, 24/7 U.S. Customs Service, various aircraft maintenance companies,
three restaurants, a golf course, and even a go-cart track. There are a total of 36 fuel tanks
storing a total of 270,000 gallons of Jet-A, 73,050 gallons of 100 Low Lead (AvGas), 13,700
gallons of Unleaded, and 13,000 gallons of Diesel fuel. In addition to the 406,150 gallons of
fuel in the fuel tanks, there are numerous fuel trucks on the airfield used to transport the fuel
from the fuel farms to the aircraft.
In 2010, the airport had 289,546 operations (an operation equals one take-off or onelanding). In past years, the airport regularly saw more than 400,000 annual operations and is
designed to handle up to 540,000 operations per year. A total of 10,162,223 gallons of fuel
(9,614,703 Jet / 547,520 AvGas) was sold at the airport in 2010. The airport has a weight
limit of 75,000 lbs. max gross take-off weight but does allow exceptions on a case-by-case
97
basis. The largest aircraft to regularly fly out of Centennial are the Global 8000 and
Gulfstream 550. The largest aircraft to occasionally use the airport is the military C-130.
In 2008, the Colorado Department of Transportation Aeronautics Division performed
an Economic Impact Study of airports around the State of Colorado. This study found that
Centennial airport directly and indirectly brought in $897,122,800 to the state. The only two
airports to bring in more were Denver International ($7,064,743,700) and Colorado Springs
Airport ($1,959,776,400) both of which are commercial service airports. The study also
determined that the Airport provided for 10,485 different jobs with a total salary output of
$356,654,900. Centennial is not only an integral part of the national airspace system, but is
also a very valuable part of the local community.
Freight Rail Line: The Santa Fe Corridor rail freight line enters
SMFRA’s jurisdiction just south of C470 and Blakeland Drive
(39°33'33.01"N Lat. and 105° 2'11.76"W Long.) and transits
the district to just south of the Town of Louviers
(39°27'23.89"NLat. and 104°59'1.00"W Long.) for
approximately 7.75 miles . The line is operated by Burlington
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP) railroads.
BNSF averages 30 to 40 trains per day with most cars hauling
coal with full loads normally running south and empties
returning north. The remaining materials transported through
SMFRA’s district contain a variety of hazardous materials listed
in Appendix H (Redacted for Public Distribution due to proprietary data). BNSF runs more
cars through the joint line than UP. Both rail companies operate 24 hours a day and do not
run trains on a specific schedule. On average, over a 24-hour period, the Santa Fe Corridor
rail line transits approximately 50 trains with the following categories of freight per shipment:
13 Loaded Coal Trains – average 119 cars
15 Empty Coal Trains – average 119 cars
4 Foreign Trains (Union Pacific)
11 Mixed Merchandise Trains – average 70 cars – may contain HAZMAT
1 Local Train – average 25 cars – may contain HAZMAT
4 Unit Trains (Military) – average 64 cars
1 Vehicle Train (cars and trucks) – average 60 cars
98
Light Rail Line: The Regional Transportation District’s
(RTD) Southeast Corridor light rail system is a multi-modal
line, which operates adjacent to vehicular traffic. The
Southeast Corridor rail line is one of four RTD corridors that
includes the Central, the Southwest, the Central and Platte
Valley Corridors. The light rail system is further segmented
into six operational lines. Of the six, four lines transit through
SMFRA’s jurisdiction: E (Lincoln to Union Station), F (Lincoln
to 18th and California), G (Lincoln to Nine Mile), and H (Nine
Mile to 18th and California) lines.
The Southeast Corridor consists of 19 miles of double-tracked light rail transit, which
originates at the I-25 and Broadway station and terminates at Lincoln Avenue (Map 23).
There are six station stops in SMFRA’s jurisdiction: Belleview, Orchard, Arapahoe, Dry
Creek, County Line, and Lincoln. The corridor also includes an alignment along I-225 in the
median, that starts at the I-25/I-225 interchange and runs to Parker Road.
Map 23: Southeast Light Rail Line
99
The Southeast Corridor average daily ridership ranges from nearly 1,500 to slightly
over 4,000 riders per hour at each of SMFR’s six stops (Figure 13).
Figure 13
Average Number of Daily Riders
Average Daily Light Rail Riders
(2010)
4500
4000
4012
3500
3000
2698
2500
2000
1500
1750
1478
1541
1250
1000
500
0
Belleview
Orchard
Arapahoe Dry Creek
County
Line
Lincoln
SMFRA Stations
Motor Vehicle
Interstate 25: The I-25 corridor divides SMFRA’s
district east and west for approximately 16 miles from
Belleview Avenue (mile marker 199) to approximately 1.65
miles south of Happy Canyon Road (mile marker 188). In
2010, the average daily traffic flow ranged from approximately
45,000 to over 58,000 vehicles in both the north or
southbound directions with the highest flows on Fridays
(Figure 14). Correspondingly, an analysis of the 2010
average volume by hour indicates clear spikes in the morning northbound traffic and a similar
spike in the afternoon southbound traffic flow (Figure 15).
100
Figure 14
Figure 15
101
C-470/E-470: The C-470/E-470 corridor bifurcates SMFRA’s district north and south
for approximately 4 miles from Quebec Avenue (mile marker 24) to Smokey Hill Road (mile
marker 10). In 2010, SMFRA responded to 65 MVAs along the authority’s C-470/E-470
corridor.
Interstate 225: The northbound I-225 corridor extends into SMFRA’s northern
jurisdictional boundary for approximately 1.5 miles from Yosemite (mile marker 1B) to
approximately mid-point of the Cherry Creek Dam at approximately Latitude 39°39'1.16"N
and Longitude 104°51'39.25"W. Although no formal agreement exists between SMFRA and
Denver Fire Department (DFD), the latter provides the initial response to most incidents
along the northbound section of I-225.
Feeder Roads: The majority of roadways in SMFRA’s jurisdiction are secondary
and feeder roads. As such, these roadways experience the greatest overall volume of traffic,
thus vehicle-related incidents. There is, however, no reliable traffic flow data available from
the cities, counties or Colorado Department of Transportation. This represents an area of
future analysis and potential mitigation activity.
Geographic Location
Transportation related incidents occur throughout the Authority’s jurisdiction. However,
specific transportation modes are limited to specific geographic areas and are documented in
the previous section. The intensity and magnitude of each transportation related event may
vary depending on the location, time of day, and mode of transportation. For most vehiclerelated events, the majority occur in the urban-suburban areas.
Previous Occurrences
Aircraft: From 2004 through 2011, SMFRA responded to 233 air-related incidents of
which, seven patients were treated and nine fatalities occurred. Most air-related events
jurisdiction involved a single or double engine aircraft with one to two persons aboard.
Freight Rail: SMFRA has not experienced any multicar derailment, vehicle versus train,
or other large-scale event as a result of a train accident. Douglas County has had several
small incidents (Table 25). The few incidents SMFRA responded to relating to the rail line
were grass fires or medical events caused by persons being hit or run over by a rail car.
"Accidents/incidents" includes all events reportable to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration under applicable regulations.
102
Table 25: Rail Road Related Accidents (Douglas County)
Category
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
2
Employee on duty
deaths
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
Trespasser deaths
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
1
Trespasser injuries
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
1
.
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
HAZMAT RELEASES
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
HIGHWAY-RAIL INCIDENTS
.
1
1
.
1
.
.
.
.
.
3
Highway-rail incidents
deaths
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Highway-rail incidents
injuries
.
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
3
.
1
.
1
.
1
1
2
1
10
Other incidents deaths
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
2
Other incidents injuries
2
.
1
.
1
.
1
1
2
.
8
TOTAL FATALITIES
TRAIN ACCIDENTS
Train accident injuries
OTHER ACCIDENTS/
INCIDENTS
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, available at http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/publicsite/Query/tenyr2a.aspx as of
December 31, 2011
Light Rail: Since the I-25 corridor Light Rail line went “live” it has experienced no events
related to its operation. In the last three years, SMFRA has run on several medical or
trapped persons in facility elevator incidents but none related to a light rail accident.
Motor Vehicle: Historically, Motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) account for more
transportation linked responses than all other modes combined. In 2011, SMFRA
responded to 10,15 motor vehicle accidents with reported injuries. This represents
increases of 8.0% (938) and 10.0% (925) in 2009 and 2010 responses, respectively.
MVA responses on one of SMFRA’s three interstates account for approximately 23-27%
of all MVA incidents (Table 26). MVA accidents were evenly distributed along the corridor
with no obvious locations experiencing higher abnormally high responses (Map 24 and
Map 25). The majority of MVAs with injuries occurred on feeder or secondary roads, of
which roughly 67-83% occurred within 100 feet of an intersection (Map 24 and Map 25).
This represents an area of opportunity for future mitigation efforts with SMFRA
collaborating agencies and jurisdictions.
103
Table 26: In-Service Area MVAs
2009
2010
2011
Total In-Service Area MVAs
1387
1290
1569
Total In-District MVAs with Injuries
MVAs with Injuries (I-25)
MVAs with Injuries (C470/E470)
MVAs with Injuries (I-225)
MVAs with Injuries (Feeders/Secondary
Roads)
o MVAs with Injuries at a
Feeder/Secondary Road Intersection8
682
205
48
3
678
165
50
1
747
175
68
3
426
462
501
284
351
414
Map 24: MVA Distribution (2010)
8
MVAs involving pedestrians or bicycles were excluded from this analysis. These incidents account for
approximately 50 calls per year and will be analyzed in subsequent revisions to the RAMP.
104
Map 25: MVA Concentration Areas
Probability of Future Occurrence
Aircraft: A decision was made to separate aircraft accidents into two categories:
o Standalone Aircraft Accidents: Highly Likely (90-100%). Because of Centennial
Airport’s current index rating, which limits the size of passenger aircraft, there is a low
probability for a large-scale air-related mass casualty incident. However, there is a
near 100% probability that an air-related accident will involve either a patient transport
and/or a fatality in a given year.
o Structural Aircraft Accidents: Highly Unlikely (0-9%). SMFRA has experienced no
aircraft accidents into a structure.
Freight Rail: Occasional (10 – 49%). SMFRA has not responded to any freight train
accidents due to a derailment within its service area. Additionally, most freight train
accidents occur at vehicular crossing, therefore the low number of those intersections in
the service area (two) reduces this possibility. However, data provided by the
Department of Transportation indicates that there have been two freight train accidents in
the last ten years putting the probability of such an event at 20%.
Light Rail: Occasional (10 – 49%). In the entire RTD system, most of the light rail related
incidents occurred in the City and County of Denver where pedestrian or vehicular traffic
crosses over Light Rail tracks. Since SMFRA has no similar intersections, the probability
for a large-scale mass casualty event caused by the Light Rail system is estimated to be
approximately 10%.
Motor Vehicle: Highly Likely (90-100%). Motor vehicle accidents within the service area
occur every year.
105
Magnitude/Severity
Aircraft: Centennial Airport’s current index rating limits the size of passenger aircraft,
which limits the magnitude of a mass casualty incident.
o Standalone Aircraft Accidents: Negligible. Most of Centennial Airport traffic is
limited to small aircraft carrying one to four passengers, which have historically
crashed on airport property or in uninhabited areas.
o Structural Aircraft Accidents: Critical. The airport’s approach and departure paths
are over densely populated urban and suburban areas, which create the potential for a
critical magnitude/severity incident.
Freight Rail: Limited. Given that most freight train accidents occur at vehicular
crossings, the two that exist in the service area have low crossing volume. Additionally,
the Santa Fe corridor is sparsely populated; therefore, the magnitude/severity is limited.
Light Rail: Critical. Given the number of persons riding the light rail line at any given time,
the severity/magnitude of a potential event is higher.
Motor Vehicle: Of all the modes of transportation, MVAs have the greatest potential for
limited scale mass fatalities due the volume of people transported via this mode and the
number of persons that can become involved in an accident. However, most MVAs
involve typically 1-3 patients.
Risk Ratings
Magnitude/Severity
Frequency/
Probability
Negligible
(1)
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Motor
Vehicle
(100%)
Standalone
Aircraft
(100%)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Freight
Train
(20%)
Light Rail
(10%)
Catastrophic
(13)
Structural
Aircraft
(100%)
It is important to note that while several transportation incident types have 100% probabilities
on an annual basis, the frequency varies by year as well as in relation to one another.
Although aircraft accidents have the same probability as motor vehicle accidents (100%) the
actual frequency is less.
106
Vulnerability Assessment
Typically, the majority of transportation-related accidents in SMFRA’s service area have a
minor impact to lives and incur minimal relative property damage. While life or property loss
can be significant for those involved, in relation to other incident types, these events tend to
be isolated in nature and affect fewer individuals per incident. Annually, transportation
related accidents account for approximately 10-12% of all incident responses within
SMFRA’s service area. The following addresses the vulnerability of each transportation
mode:
Aircraft: Although aircraft incidents account for less than 2% of all transportation-related
incidents, they account for a disproportionately high number of deaths relative to
frequency of responses to these events.
Freight Rail: The impact of a freight rail accident is most associated with the potential
release of hazardous materials contained in the cars. Since this area is sparsely
populated the impact of such an event will depend on factors such as location, weather
conditions and the release of specific hazardous materials. However, as the anticipated
growth of the Sterling Ranch area comes about, the density of this community may
increase the vulnerability of its citizens to a freight rail accident. Future RAMP revisions
will incorporate more in depth analyses of plume modeling on this geographic area as
development proceeds.
Light Rail: The impact from a light rail accident has the greatest potential for mass
casualties as evidenced by other similar incidents in other metro areas. These incidents,
generally occur in locations where pedestrian and vehicular traffic cross directly over light
rail lines. Future expansion for the I-25 Southeast Corridor will extend service from
Lincoln Avenue south along I-25 to the RidgeGate Parkway interchange. Development is
planned south of Lincoln Avenue on the east and west side of I-25. The Southeast Rail
Extension project is currently in the evaluation phase and based on input received during
this phase, RTD will refine and finalize the project’s scope. RTD expects to have the
Federal Transit Administration’s final Decision Document by the end of 2012 with
construction contingent on funding. No construction start date has been established. The
Southeast Corridor will increase ridership as additional stations are built and growth
expands in the surrounding area. Vulnerabilities should be negligible and the greatest risk
potential will be from increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
Motor Vehicle: Motor vehicle accidents account for the majority of transportation-related
incidents. Additionally, they also comprise a higher number of annual deaths than any
other mode. As development within the district continues, it is anticipated that the number
of these types of events will increase as well.
Data Limitations
The limitations of the data varied by transportation type. Generally, for those agencies
responsible for the direct movement of their mode of transportation (e.g., Regional Transit
Authority, Centennial Airport Authority, etc.) the data was detailed and sufficient for
extrapolating potential risks. For other modes (highways, freight, etc.) data was unavailable
or lacked detail such as the number and types of vehicles, quantities, and categories of
hazmat transiting the jurisdiction, etc. However, despite these limitations, historical data as
well as information provided by internal and external stakeholder input provided sufficient
information to assess each mode’s potential risk factor.
107
4.11 Hazard Detail: Winter Storms
Hazard Description
Severe winter storm hazards may include
snow, ice, blizzard conditions, and extreme
cold. Some winter storms are accompanied
by strong winds, creating blizzard
conditions with blinding wind-driven snow,
severe drifting, and dangerous wind chills.
Extreme cold often accompanies or follows
a winter storm. Depending on storm
dynamics, ice can build one surface roads
as the storm begins or as the cycle of
melting and freezing occurs for days.
Geographic Location
Winter storms can occur anywhere in the South Metro Fire Rescue Authority service area.
Although snow fall may vary, these events are typically region wide. The higher bluffs to the
south often typically receive more snow during a winter storm event.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Weather Service
provide official forecasting, watches/warnings, and historical data. Denver/Boulder is the
official “primary local climatological data site” for the service area. The historic annual
average snowfall is 57.5 inches. Severe winter storms and blizzards are cyclical in nature on
a monthly and annual basis, similar to other weather events. Most winters will experience 4-7
significant snowfall events with additional minor accumulations. Table 27, below, shows the
monthly normal accumulations for typical seasons.
Table 27: Average Monthly Snow Accumulation Totals (inches)
Monthly
Normal
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
2.1
4.1
10.7
8.7
7.7
6.3
11.7
9.1
1.3
Historically, each decade has experienced one to two significant extreme winters with several
blizzards. During the last decade, 2000-2009, the winter of 2006/2007 experienced 8
significant storms with 4 blizzards. The following winter experienced similar storms but fewer
blizzards. The last significant season was 1997-1998.
108
Previous Occurrences
Case History #1: The storm called “Holiday Blizzard I” occurred December 20-21, 2006 and
covered the Colorado Front Range, the Colorado Eastern Plains and surrounding states
Figure 16). Interstate highways were closed and the city of Denver was completely shut
down, mail was undeliverable, and a state wide disaster was declared. It was estimated that
drifts in some areas of Denver reached up to 5 feet with an average depth of about 3 feet. By
most estimates, it was the 4th largest storm in state recorded history, (though some readings
place it at 6th), and the largest state blizzard since March 2003.
Figure 16
The Holiday Blizzard II occurred on December 28-29 and was more intense than the first.
The blizzard caused four deaths in the Front Range Area.
Case History #2: A late winter blizzard arrived to the Denver Front Range area March 17-19,
2003. Depths varied by community due to accompanying high winds but the area average
was 30 inches. This blizzard brought the greatest single storm recorded depth since 1913.
Snow loads on roof tops exceeded constructions requirements resulting in record collapses
throughout the region. Total storm damage exceeded 93 million dollars.
109
Probability of Future Occurrence
Highly Likely: Near 100 percent chance of
occurrence next year or it happens every year.
Snowstorms occur on an annual basis although
the intensity varies. It cannot be assumed that the
greatest storms occur at the height of winter.
Rather, severe depth storms can occur in early
October as well as late as April. In most cases,
recovery from a storm usually begins when the
snow stops. Sunshine contributes greatly to
recovery although runoff from snow melt can bring
additional problems.
Photo courtesy of Martin/Martin Inc.
Magnitude/Severity
Critical: Isolated deaths and/or multiple injuries and illnesses; major or long-term property
damage that threatens structural stability; and/or interruption of essential facilities and
services for 24-72 hours.
Risk Ratings
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/Severity
Highly
Likely
(4)
Likely
(3)
Occasional
(2)
Highly
Unlikely
(1)
Negligible
(1)
Limited
(5)
Critical
(9)
Catastrophic
(13)
0-11”
(100%)
12-18”
(50%)
19+”
(10%)
Vulnerability Assessment
Severe snow storms generally occur several times each year from autumn into spring. These
are service area wide events often impacting the greater Front Range area. The frequency
supports minimal life loss and property damage. Vehicle accidents increase during and after
storms and are the most frequent cause of life and property loss during a snow storm. Snow
loads contribute to structural weakness and collapse although injury is very low given that as
the snow accumulates, most community members return to their homes and vacate
110
commercial/retail buildings. The economic vulnerability increases the longer a storm
continues as it impacts ease of movement and return to work.
Data Limitations
There is much information available from local and regional agencies in both government and
media. While snow fall depth and storm condition information is readily available, data
limitations to assess snow melt flooding and damage is needed.
111
4.12 Hazard Profile Summary
Table 28 lists and Figure 17 graphically illustrates the top ten risks as determined by the
probability/frequency and the magnitude/severity of a possible event.
Risk
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Table 28: Overall Risk Ranking of Hazards
Frequency/
Probability
Magnitude/
Hazard
(F/P)
Severity (M/S)
Commercial Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Critical
Hazmat (Fixed Facility)
Highly Likely
Critical
Multi-Family Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Critical
Wildfire (20-100 acres)
Likely
Critical
CriticalWildfire (>100 acres)
Occasional
Catastrophic
Hazmat (Delivery Lines)
Highly Likely
Limited
Hazmat (Over-the-Road)
Highly Likely
Limited
Public Health (Outbreak)
Highly Likely
Limited
Single Family Structure Fire
Highly Likely
Limited
Tornado(F0-F1)
Highly Likely
Limited
Transport Vehicle Fire
Highly Likely
Limited
Wildfire (1-19 acres)
Highly Likely
Limited
Hazmat (Freight Train)
Occasional
Critical
Light Rail Accident
Occasional
Critical
Winter Storm (19”+)
Occasional
Critical
Aircraft Fire
Likely
Limited
Winter Storm (12-18”)
Likely
Limited
Public Health (Epidemic)
Occasional
Limited-Critical
Terrorism (Firearms)
Occasional
Limited-Critical
Earthquake (6.0+)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Dam Failure/Flood
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Public Health ( Pandemic)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Terrorism (Radiological/Nuclear)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Tornado(F3)
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Earthquake (4-4.9)
Occasional
Limited
Freight Train Accident
Occasional
Limited
Riverline Flood
Occasional
Limited
Terrorism (Explosives)
Occasional
Limited
Earthquake (5-5.9)
Unlikely
Critical
Structural Aircraft Accident
Unlikely
Critical
Terrorism (Biological/Chemical)
Unlikely
Critical
Tornado(F2)
Unlikely
Critical
Total Risk
Score
(M/S x F/P)
36
27
22
20
18
15
14
13
10
9
112
Figure 17: Graphical Risk Ranking of Hazards
113
4.13 Vulnerability Summary
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority maintains several databases that contribute to
assessment and emergency response. One database is dedicated to incident response
activities. Another database pertains to development activities, complexes or occupancies
under construction, or known occupancies that it has the responsibility to inspect. Permits are
issued by the Life Safety Bureau, under the direction of the Fire Marshall. The Authority
obtains parcel specific information from the two county assessor’s office (Table 29).
Depending upon the hazard type and event, damage can be localized or widespread. The
following information is provided to support the reader in understanding the various parcel
types in the service area.
Table 29: 2011 Parcel Use, Count, & Total Values
Parcel Use
Parcel Count
Sum of Appraised
Values
Sum of Assessed
Value
Agriculture
Commercial
Hotel/Motel
Jails
Medical
Multi Family
Other
Residential
Schools
Unknown
Vacant
1,433
2,777
43
3
53
8,411
13
52,740
85
6,723
6,115
$38,498,278
$6,417,683,974
$219,280,051
$15,830,822
$388,921,843
$3,000,403,127
$6,229,753
$24,000,440,807
$776,488,635
$349,504,531
$804,938,343
$6,412,130
$1,850,606,320
$60,089,330
$4,590,940
$107,275,100
$247,022,280
$1,806,650
$1,914,017,970
$225,181,700
$82,227,710
$216,735,410
Grand Total
78,396
$36,018,220,164
$4,715,965,540
Commercial and residential properties are the bulk of parcels and occupancies in the service
area. Life and property loss will be greatest in these types and areas where they cluster in
communities. High occupancy structures such as hotels, high rises, jails and hospitals
present unique risks during emergencies. However, there are many health care facilities in
residential areas which pose risk also because of low mobility residents. Both large and small
facilities present risks to focus prevention, education, and mitigation efforts.
Vulnerability can also be examined by the property use description based upon Homeland
Security’s master list of critical infrastructure. Table 30, next page, presents the current
inventory count of these types of facilities.
114
Table 30: Critical Infrastructures
Count of Occupancy ID
Property Use Description
Airport passenger terminal
Communications center
Computer center
Courthouse
Defense, military installation
Electrical distribution
Electricity generating plant
Fire station
Health care, detention, & correction, other
Hospital - medical or psychiatric
Industrial, utility, defense, agriculture, mining, other
Police station
Post office or mailing firms
Public or government, other
Railroad yard
Rapid transit station
Sanitation utility
Utility or Distribution system, other
Water utility
Grand Total
Total
1
41
10
2
1
3
3
19
1
4
7
2
10
5
2
3
2
18
130
264
Those critical infrastructure occupancies that have a significant hazard rating as well as a
large economic impact to the community should be noted and potentially receive an
increased response to an emergency. Future updates of this risk and mitigation plan will
include more information on specific vulnerabilities to persons, property, and economic
impacts.
115
SECTION V
MITIGATION STRATEGY
5.1 Plan Strategy Statements, Goals, and Objectives
FEMA Requirement
4 CFR Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(i): The mitigation strategy shall include a] description of
mitigation goals to reduce or avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified hazards.
Strategic Goal: Reduce the frequency of and impact to the community from fires,
medical emergencies, and natural/man-made disasters.
1. Goal A: Develop or enhance improvements to response and preparedness plans
and programs to reduce risk and vulnerability.
2. Goal B: Develop or enhance programs, plans, procedures, and relationships with
existing organizations to implement or improve planned or existing mitigation
activities.
3. Goal C: Build upon existing public education and outreach efforts to reduce risk
and vulnerability for identified hazards.
Table 31 provides a brief description of each Hazard Type and a summary of the initiated or
planned activities.
Table 31: Summary of Mitigation Actions
Earthquake
Hazard
Fires
Floods and Dam Failure
Hail
Hazardous Materials Releases
Medical & Public Health Emergencies
Terrorism
Tornado
Transportation
Winter Storm
Initiated or Planned Actions
1. Emergency Services – Tech Rescue Team capability
improvements:
Structure Collapse and Confined Space
1. Prevention - Development and Construction Plan Reviews
2. Prevention - Code Compliance
3. CWPP and Wildfire Mitigation Activities
1. Emergency Services – Dive Team
1. Special Events Planning with partnering jurisdictions.
1. Prevention - HazMat Facilities Inspections
2. Emergency Services – HazMat Team
1. Emergency Services – Operations Division: Fire & EMS
2. Public Education & Awareness - CORRP
1. Emergency Services – SWAT Medics
2. Prevention - TLO Program
3. Prevention & Public Education & Awareness
ACAMS Assessments
CORRP Assessments
1. Emergency Services – Tech Rescue Team capability
improvements:
Structure Collapse
Confined Space
1. Emergency Services – improve response capabilities:
ARFF Team
Tech Rescue Team
EMS
1. Emergency Services - All
5.2 Identification of Mitigation Action Alternatives
FEMA Requirement
4 CFR Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(ii): [The mitigation strategy shall include] a section that identifies
and analyzes a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects being considered to
reduce the effects of each hazard, with particular emphasis on new and existing buildings and
infrastructure. [The mitigation strategy] must also address the jurisdictions’ participation in the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and continued compliance with NFIP requirements, as
appropriate.
EMAP Standard
Standard 4.4.4: The mitigation plan shall be based on the natural and human-caused hazards
identified by the jurisdiction and the risk and consequences of those hazards. The mitigation
plan for the jurisdiction shall establish interim and long-term strategies, goals and objectives,
programs, and actions to reduce vulnerability to the hazards identified including a cost-benefit
analysis. The plan ranks projects based upon the greatest opportunity for loss reduction and
documents how specific mitigation actions contribute to the overall risk reduction. The plan
addresses an education and outreach strategy.
In order to identify the appropriate mitigation strategies it first must understand the range of
possible activities are available and then determine those that are directly within the
Authority’s statutory responsibility. Table 32 lists the most common categories of mitigation
activities a governmental body can facilitate.
Table 32: Categories of Mitigation Actions
Definition
Actions that, in addition to minimizing hazard losses, also
Natural Resource Protection
preserve or restore the functions of natural systems
Emergency Services
Actions that ensure the continuity of emergency services
Administrative or regulatory actions or processes that
Prevention
influence the way land and buildings are developed and built
Actions that involve the modification of existing buildings or
structures to protect them from a hazard or remove them
Property Protection
from the hazard area
Actions to inform and educate citizens, elected officials, and
Public Education &
property owners about the hazards and potential ways to
Awareness
mitigate them.
Actions that involve the construction of structures to reduce
Structural
the impact of hazard
Category
Source: National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3655
117
The following details SMFRA’s specific mitigation programs and activities centered on
emergency services, prevention, and public education and awareness:
Emergency Services: SMFRA’s Operations Division directs several emergency
service programs and special operations teams to prepare for and respond to a variety
of incidents including those outlined above. SMFRA provides the following emergency
response capabilities:
o Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting
o Emergency Medical Services
o Fire Suppression
o Hazardous Materials
o SWAT Medics
o Technical Rescue
o Type 4 All Hazards Incident Management Team
o Water Rescue and Recovery
o Wildland/Urban Interface Firefighting
Prevention
o Life Safety Bureau
 Development and Construction: applies adopted codes and standards as
they apply to new commercial and residential developments, buildings,
occupancies, and special events.
 Code Compliance: applies adopted Codes and Standards in existing
subdivisions, buildings, and occupancies. Staff achieves compliance through
education of external customers of the code requirements and hazards faced in
their enterprises. Warnings and legal action are reserved to those cases where
a responsible party is unwilling to resolve significant life or property hazards.
* Existing Building Inspections: are conducted by full time Life Safety
Technicians (LSTs).
* Hazardous Materials: applies the hazardous materials provisions of the
adopted fire code.
o Emergency Management:
 Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program: provides a platform for collecting,
sharing, and analyzing security sensitive information deemed vital for the safety
of SMFRA personnel and its citizens. Law enforcement related information
sharing is facilitated through the Colorado Department of Public Safety’s
Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC). The CIAC attempts to eliminate
barriers that prevent stakeholders from sharing information that may be critical
for preventing, preparing for or responding to terrorism events.
SMFRA’s TLOs are responsible for coordinating terrorist and other criminal
intelligence information through the CIAC and other local law enforcement
agencies.
118

Automated Critical Asset management System (ACAMS): As a critical part
of supporting the Homeland Security Mission in Colorado, GOHS recommends
that all local jurisdictions adopt the ACAMS Program as a key tool for critical
infrastructure protection.
Using ACAMS provides state and local jurisdictions a practical way to
implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), including the
NIPP Risk Management Framework. It gives SMFRA direct knowledge of and
access to information related to CIKR’s within the jurisdiction.
Public Education and Awareness
o Operations Division: Station crews participate in a number of school-based
education and outreach programs designed to teach safety lessons to pre-schools
through elementary children. This approach enables critical lessons to be taught at
ages where many aspects of safety can be introduced and built upon in future
years.
o Community Safety Services Division (CSS)
 Coordinated Occupancy Risk Reduction Program (CORRP): partners
station officers, Life Safety Educators (LSEs), Life Safety Technicians (LSTs),
EMS Supervisors, and Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) to improve information
sharing and planning for SMFRA’s highest risk facilities. The program outcome
and goals are to:
* Identify unique life safety hazards, fire protection and warning systems, and
operational issues for pre-planning, enforcement and educational purposes.
* Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) Pre-Planning.
* Assess vulnerabilities and identify mitigation and preparedness actions.
* Develop or revise a facility’s Emergency Response/Operations Plan.
 Wildfire Mitigation: Due to the significant number of wildland-urban areas
within SMFRA’s service area, the potential exists for considerable fire danger
within these communities. The goal of the wildfire mitigation program is to
reduce the frequency and impact of wildfires to SMFRA’s communities through
development of Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP).
o Life Safety Education Unit
 Child Passenger Safety: As the leading cause of unintentional injury and
death in the United States, motor vehicle crashes often involve children victims
in these devastating events and the correct use of child restraints, seat belts,
and following safety recommendations could drastically reduce the injury and
death rate for all age groups.
 Juvenile Firesetter Intervention/Education (JFS): Due to the commonality of
fire being used appropriately as a tool, juveniles are often exposed to adults
using these tools, therefore, appealing to their curiosity and exploration of their
surroundings. The JFS program is designed to mitigate any situations in which
a juvenile displays a curiosity in fire play, fire setting, or fire use. The JFS’s goal
is to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of JFS interventions conducted
by the Authority with a result in a 0% recidivism rate.
119
SMASHED Car Safety Education: Nationwide and within Colorado,
teenagers face higher risks while driving and riding in vehicles because of their
inexperience, their impulsive reactions, and their growing brains. Those risks
often manifest in crashes that can be fatal or life altering when traumatic brain
injuries or other serious injuries occur. SMASHED’s goal is to decrease the
severity of motor vehicle crashes experienced by teens as drivers and
passengers.
 Senior Citizens – Injury Prevention: Nationwide, adults aged 65 and older
are more likely to suffer independence-ending injuries from falls than adults
younger than that age. Those falls are preventable and by reducing them we’ll
be improving the quality of life for these valuable residents. The goal of the
program is to decrease the number of falls and resulting injuries among the
elderly.
 Senior Citizens – Fire Prevention: Nationwide, adults aged 65 and older are
more likely to die in fires than adults younger than that age. Those fires are
preventable and by reducing them we’ll be improving the quality of life for these
valuable residents. The goal is to decrease the number of fires and resulting
injuries and property loss among the elderly.
o Life Safety Foundation
 CPR and First Aid: Is a two-year American Heart Association (AHA)
certification in Cardiopulmonary Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) for adults,
children and infants, basic adult first aid and automatic external defibrillator
(AED) use. Course work and practical skills are completed during a seven-hour
class.
 Super Babysitting: Students, 11 years and older, are trained and certified to
provide advanced childcare and pediatric first aid skills including infant and
Child CPR and use of an AED.
 AED Placement: The Foundation raises charitable funds to buy and place
AEDs in high-risk facilities including schools. The ready access to these
devices provides immediate cardiac care prior to the arrival of EMS personnel
thus improving the survivability rate of victims.
 Driver Safety Education: The Foundation offers several driver education and
safety courses to decrease the incidents of driver caused accidents.
* Crash Avoidance: Is a hands-on course that teaches a variety of crash
avoidance techniques (e.g., skid control and recovery, threshold braking,
arm lock and hand-to-hand steering, off-road recovery, and visual
perception training). This training gives drivers the skills necessary to help
avoid vehicular accidents due to inclement weather.
* Driver Awareness Program: Is a Colorado Department of Transportation
(CDOT) approved driver awareness program necessary for obtaining a
Colorado driver’s permit. The program includes information covering driver
safety on highways, country roads, towns, signage, pedestrians, and work
zone areas. Students use computerized simulation modules to develop the
hands-on skills necessary to be safer drivers.
* License to Survive: Is a course for teen drivers (15-17 years old) who are
starting the driving permit process or have up to one year’s driving

120
*
*
5.3
experience. The seminar introduces driver safety awareness as a means of
decreasing teen-related MVAs.
Seat Belt Awareness Program: Nationwide and within Colorado,
unrestrained drivers and passengers experience significantly higher rates of
death and serious injuries in motor vehicle crashes. This project’s goal is to
decrease the number of unrestrained occupants and to improve the general
publics’ understanding of child restraints and the need to restrain objects in
the vehicle.
Winter Driving Skills: Is a hands-on skills course for adults unfamiliar with
driving in Colorado’s winter road conditions.
Prioritization and Implementation of Mitigation Actions
FEMA Requirement
44 CFR Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(iii): The mitigation strategy shall include an action strategy
describing how the actions identified in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) will be prioritized, implemented,
and administered by the local jurisdiction. Prioritization shall include a special emphasis on
the extent to which benefits are maximized according to a cost benefits review of the
proposed projects and their associated costs.
Given statutory constraints, the jurisdiction has comparatively limited ability to initiate specific
mitigation activities. Those activities within the Authority’s direct legal purview include:
Emergency Services
Prevention
Public Education and Awareness
Appendix J (Mitigation Project Goals) details the specific tasks and outcomes SMFRA will
pursue in 2012 to accomplish the stated mitigation objectives. The stakeholder group did not
prioritize the mitigation objectives and will do so as part of the 2013 RAMP revisions.
121
SECTION VI
PLAN MAINTENANCE AND UPDATE
Plan maintenance is a critical component of SMFRA’s RAMP. Proper maintenance of the
Plan ensures it will maximize SMFRA’s efforts to reduce the risks posed by natural hazards,
and that the Authority’s efforts are coordinated with the efforts of participating jurisdictions
and other partners. This section describes a process to ensure that a regular review and
update of the Plan occurs.
6.1 Plan Coordination
The RAMP includes a range of actions that, when implemented, will reduce loss from hazard
events in the Authority. Within the plan, FEMA requires the identification of existing programs
that might be used to implement these actions and, where applicable, the updated actions
call out potential connections to existing plans.
Where possible, the Authority should implement the recommended actions through existing
plans and policies. Plans and policies already in existence have support from local residents,
businesses, and policy makers. Many comprehensive, and strategic plans get updated
regularly, and can adapt easily to changing conditions and needs. Existing plans that can
incorporate mitigation actions include:
SMFRA’s Strategic Plan
Accreditation Process
Building Fire Code permit process, and new and existing building code review
SMFRA’s Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP)
The State of Colorado and others are important planning partners that can contribute to
mitigation planning efforts; their roles are called out in section 6.2.
6.1.1 State of Colorado Partners
All mitigation is local, and the primary responsibility for development and
implementation of risk reduction strategies and policies lies with local jurisdictions.
Local jurisdictions, however, are not alone. Partners and resources exist at the
state and federal levels. Numerous Colorado state agencies have a role in natural
hazards and natural hazard mitigation. Some of the key agencies include:
Colorado Office of Emergency Management (COEM) is responsible for disaster
mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and the administration of federal
funds after a major disaster declaration.
Colorado State Forest Service (CSFS) and the Division of Fire Prevention and
Control (DFPC) are responsible for all aspects of wildland fire protection on
federal lands.
Colorado Geologic Survey (CGS) provides information and new knowledge
about geologic hazards, mineral and energy resources, water resources, and
more to contribute to economic growth and improve the quality of life.
Colorado Department of Local Affairs (DOLA) provides financial and technical
assistance, emergency management services, property tax administration and
122
programs addressing affordable housing and homelessness to local
communities.
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) is responsible for highways
and bridges throughout the state and in Garfield Authority. CDOT also provides
support to local airports.
The Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) provides policy direction and
information resources on water issues. The CWCB’s responsibilities range from
protecting Colorado’s streams and lakes to water conservation, flood mitigation,
watershed protection, stream restoration, drought planning, water supply
planning and water project financing.
The Colorado Division of Water Resources (DWR), also known as the Office of
the State Engineer, administers water rights, issues water well permits,
represents Colorado in interstate water compact proceedings, monitors stream
flow and water use, approves construction and repair of dams and performs
dam safety inspections, issues licenses for well drillers and assures the safe
and proper construction of water wells, and maintains numerous databases of
Colorado water information.
Colorado Division of Housing, Housing Technology and Standards (HTS)
Section can provide technical assistance related to manufactured housing to
ensure that currently adopted building codes are enforced.
6.1.2 Federal Partners
National Weather Service provides weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts
and warnings.
Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) supports citizens and
first responders to build, sustain, and improve our capabilities to prepare for,
protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.
6.1.3 Other partners
Mitigation actions can be implemented through the ongoing efforts of SMFRA’s
partners, many of whom were involved in the process of developing this Plan. The
Authority will actively seek out opportunities to further develop such partnerships,
in the furtherance of RAMP objectives.
Internal Stakeholder Workgroup: The RAMP and other strategic plans (e.g.,
SMFRA’s 5-Year Strategic Plan, Division and Bureau Annual Management
Plans, etc.) that are developed and/or maintained annually will also contribute
to the goals in the RAMP. The Emergency Manager will ensure the specific
plans identified by the RAMP Stakeholder Workgroup are integrated in each
Bureau and Division’s Annual Management Plans are integrated into the
RAMP.
Multi-jurisdictional Partners: SMFRA’s partners will continue to be critical for
identifying vulnerabilities, identifying risks, and implementing mitigation actions.
Coordination and collaboration of mitigation plans between SMFRA’s cities,
towns, and counties will ensure overlapping mitigation goals are achieved. A
process for involving the jurisdictions covered under this Plan is described later
123
in this section, but the Authority will continue outreach to all jurisdictions
throughout the planning process.
Public Health and Social Service Providers: As organizations that interface
with the public on a daily basis, public health and social service providers can
be a conduit for direct public information dissemination. They can also provide
SMFRA with critical information about vulnerabilities that exist in the population.
These organizations are natural partners in hazard mitigation.
Utilities and Other Special Districts: contribute to the identification of
vulnerabilities, identifying risks and helping implement mitigation measures.
Citizens: There are numerous ways in which citizens and residents of
SMFRA’s service area are already involved in mitigation actions. For example,
the CWPP process entails significant citizen participation for identifying
acceptable mitigation actions in areas with significant wildland-urban interface
risk. Connections with the activities of other partners are part of the Authority’s
strategy for ongoing public involvement. It allows the Authority to present
mitigation actions and ideas more holistically, within the context of existing
groups.
6.2 Plan Manager
SMFRA’s Emergency Manager will be the convener for the ongoing plan maintenance
process including adoption of the plan; ongoing monitoring of plan implementation; yearly
Internal Stakeholder meeting agenda development and facilitation; and prioritizing action
items for implementation. Agency will also be responsible for the 2017 formal update of this
Plan and continued public involvement. The rest of this section describes these
responsibilities in more detail.
6.3 Plan Adoption
SMFRA’s Board of Directors will be responsible for adopting the RAMP, it’s annual updates,
and providing the necessary support to ensure plan implementation. Once the plan has been
adopted, SMFRA’s Emergency Manager will be responsible for submitting it to the State
Hazard Mitigation Officer at Colorado Division of Emergency Management. Colorado Division
of Emergency Management will submit the plan to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) for review. This review will address the federal criteria outlined in FEMA’s
Flood Mitigation Assistance program and in the October 1, 2002 Mitigation Planning Final
Interim Rule amending 44 CFR Part 201.6. Upon acceptance of the plan by FEMA, Garfield
Authority will maintain eligibility for Flood Mitigation Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, and Pre-Disaster Mitigation funds.
124
6.4 Ongoing Monitoring
The Workgroup will be responsible for implementing the RAMP and all identified mitigation
objectives, plans, and actions. In addition, the Workgroup will meet annually, and as needed,
to:
Review the hazard risk assessments to determine the need to add, update or modify
risks as appropriate.
Review all relevant mitigation plans and their outcomes
Identify opportunities for collaboration and integration with existing or new projects or
programs.
Discuss needed updates and changes to the plans for which they are responsible for
executing.
Establish new or revised RAMP mitigation goals and objectives.
The Workgroup will consider the following factors when evaluating the RAMP:
Continued appropriateness of action items
New, changes to existing, or reallocation of funding
Prioritization of potential mitigation projects
Education and outreach on the plan and mitigation in general
New science or data that changes or updates the risk assessment
Any additional issues that may not have been identified when the plan was
developed
Lessons learned from drills, exercises, training, or hazard events
Coordination with other emergency management-related plans and procedures
The Emergency Manager will document key discussion points and outcomes of meetings.
The format of this plan allows any pressing or urgent updates to be made at any time – it is
designed to be a living document that remains current and relevant to SMFRA and the
participating jurisdictions.
6.5 Yearly Internal Stakeholder Workgroup Meetings
In addition to the annual Internal Stakeholder Workgroup meetings, the following actions will
be taken:
The Emergency Manager will update SMFRA’s Board of Directors annually, or as
necessary.
The Emergency Manager will meet with or SMFRA’s multi-jurisdictional partners to
determine the effectiveness of the programs and to review any changes necessary
to the plan and associated action items.
Depending upon the calendar year, the Internal Stakeholder Workgroup should also
consider the following agenda:
o Year 1 (2013): Review Actions for implementation progress and prioritization and
select hazards (e.g., HazMat, Transportation, and Commercial Structure Fires)
for updating risk assessment.
o Year 2 (2014): Review select hazards for updating risk assessment to include
new data if applicable. Document mitigation successes.
125
o Year 3 (2015): Review select hazards for updating risk assessment to include
new data if applicable. Review Actions for implementation progress and
prioritization.
o Year 4 (2016): Review select hazards for updating risk assessment to include
new data if applicable. Begin formal 5-year update of the Mitigation Plan
o Year 5 (2017): Formal Update of the Hazard Mitigation Update Plan for FEMA
review.
6.6 Prioritizing Action Items
For calendar year 2012, the Internal Stakeholder group did not prioritize the list of action
items as the group had previously identified specific activities within each of their respective
functional areas. These activities were approved, adopted and budgeted for as part of the
department’s 2012 Strategic Plan revisions and the agency’s annual budget (Appendix J:
Mitigation Project Goals).
Once the Authority’s Board of Directors approves the RAMP, the Internal Stakeholder Group
will meet in late 2012 or early 2013 to identify and prioritize mitigation activities for the
remainder of 2013 and for all of 2014.
Action items identified in Appendix J include short and long-term activities as well as ongoing
efforts. Short-term action items are activities which Internal Stakeholder members either
deem a high priority for implementation or as achievable with existing resources and
authorities within one to two years. Long-term action items may require new or additional
resources or authorities, and may take between one and five years to implement. Ongoing
actions are either currently underway or will be implemented on a continuous or cyclical
basis.
Generally, prioritization of mitigation activities will align with SMFRA’S top ten hazards (Table
1, pg 25)., which are deemed to be of higher probability and consequence. To achieve the
RAMP’s goals, the Authority will remain flexible in its response to available resources.
Further prioritization can occur at any point during plan implementation. The Internal
Stakeholder will prioritize action items for implementation by assessing the importance of
each item relative to the plan’s goals and the hazard(s) each item addressed; in response to
changes in community characteristics, vulnerability, or risk; and to take advantage of
available resources.
SMFRA’s Executive leadership team in consult with the Internal Stakeholder Group and the
Board of Directors have the option to implement any of the action items at any time and as
opportunities and funding are available. This permits the agency to pursue or alter
mitigation strategies as the situation dictates or as unique opportunities arise.
Other prioritization tools may also be useful for federal funding sources. FEMA’s methods of
identifying the costs and benefits associated with natural hazard mitigation strategies,
measures, or projects fall into two general categories: benefit/cost analysis and costeffectiveness analysis.
126
Conducting a benefit/cost analysis for a mitigation activity can assist communities in
determining whether a project is worth undertaking now, in order to avoid disaster related
damages later. A cost-effectiveness analysis evaluates how best to spend a given amount of
money to achieve a specific goal. Determining the economic feasibility of mitigating natural
hazards provides decision-makers with an understanding of the potential benefits and costs
of an activity, as well as a basis upon which to compare alternative projects.
The Internal Stakeholder Workgroup will use FEMA’s approved cost benefit methodologies
as a tool for identifying and prioritizing mitigation action items when applying for federal
mitigation funding. For other projects and funding sources, the Internal Stakeholder
Workgroup will use other approaches to understand the costs and benefits of each action
item and develop a prioritized list.
6.7 Five-Year Review Process
The RAMP will be updated every five years in accordance with the update schedule outlined
in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. During this plan update, the following questions will be
asked to determine what actions are necessary to update the plan. The Authority Manager’s
Office will be responsible for engaging in the formal update process to address the questions
outlined below
Are the plan’s goals still applicable?
Do the plan’s priorities align with State priorities?
Are there new partners that should be brought to the table?
Are there new local, regional, state or federal policies addressing natural hazards that
should be incorporated?
Has the community successfully implemented any mitigation activities?
Have new hazard related issues or problems been identified?
Do existing actions need to be reprioritized for implementation?
Are the actions still appropriate, given current resources, community needs, and
priorities?
Have there been any changes in development patterns that could influence the effects
of hazards?
Are there new studies or data available that would enhance the risk assessment?
Has the community been affected by any disasters? If yes, did the plan accurately
address the impacts of this event?
127
APPENDIX A
AUTHORITY BOARD ADOPTION RESOLUTION
128
129
APPENDIX B
LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW TOOL
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority, CO 2012
LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW TOOL
The Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool demonstrates how the Local Mitigation Plan meets the regulation in 44
CFR §201.6 and offers States and FEMA Mitigation Planners an opportunity to provide feedback to the
community.
•
•
•
The Regulation Checklist provides a summary of FEMA’s evaluation of whether the Plan has addressed
all requirements.
The Plan Assessment identifies the plan’s strengths as well as documents areas for future improvement.
The Multi-jurisdiction Summary Sheet is an optional worksheet that can be used to document how each
jurisdiction met the requirements of the each Element of the Plan (Planning Process; Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment; Mitigation Strategy; Plan Review, Evaluation, and Implementation;
and Plan Adoption).
The FEMA Mitigation Planner must reference this Local Mitigation Plan Review Guide when completing the
Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool.
Jurisdiction:
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
Local Point of Contact:
Steve Standridge
Title:
Emergency Manager
Agency:
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
Phone Number:
720-989-2280
Title of Plan:
Date of Plan:
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority Risk
August 2012
Assessment and Mitigation Plan
Address:
9195 East Mineral Avenue
Centennial, CO 80112
E-Mail:
[email protected]
State Reviewer:
Ken Brink
Title:
Mitigation Team Supervisor
Date:
August 20, 2012
FEMA Reviewer:
Margaret Doherty
Date Received in FEMA Region VIII
Plan Not Approved
Plan Approvable Pending Adoption
Plan Approved
Title:
Community Planner
August 20, 2012
Date:
September 21, 2012
September 24, 2012
November 29, 2012
131
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority, CO 2012
SECTION 1:
MULTI-JURISTICTION SUMMARY SHEET
MULTI-JURISTICTION SUMMARY SHEET
1
South Metro Fire Rescue
Authority
Fire District
Steve Standridge
steve.standridge@sout
hmetro
X
X
X
NA
X
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority, CO 2012
SECTION 2: REGULATION CHECKLIST
REGULATION CHECKLIST
Regulation (44 CFR 201.6 Local Mitigation Plans)
Location in
Plan
(section and/or
page number)
Met
Not
Met
ELEMENT A. PLANNING PROCESS
A1. Does the Plan document the planning process, including how it
was prepared and who was involved in the process for each
jurisdiction? (Requirement §201.6(c)(1))
Pages 13, 26-34 and
Appendix D
A2. Does the Plan document an opportunity for neighboring
communities, local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation
activities, agencies that have the authority to regulate development as
well as other interests to be involved in the planning process?
(Requirement §201.6(b)(2))
Pages 13, 26-34 and
Appendix D
A3. Does the Plan document how the public was involved in the
planning process during the drafting stage? (Requirement
§201.6(b)(1))
Pages 13, 26-34 and
Appendix D
A4. Does the Plan describe the review and incorporation of existing
plans, studies, reports, and technical information? (Requirement
§201.6(b)(3))
Pages 30 and 39-40
A5. Is there discussion of how the community(ies) will continue public
participation in the plan maintenance process? (Requirement
§201.6(c)(4)(iii))
Pages 122-125
A6. Is there a description of the method and schedule for keeping the
plan current (monitoring, evaluating and updating the mitigation plan
within a 5-year cycle)? (Requirement §201.6(c)(4)(i))
ELEMENT A: REQUIRED REVISIONS
Pages 122-125 and
127
B1. Does the Plan include a description of the type, location, and
extent of all natural hazards that can affect each jurisdiction(s)?
(Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(i))
Pages 42-131
B2. Does the Plan include information on previous occurrences of
hazard events and on the probability of future hazard events for each
jurisdiction? (Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(i))
Pages 42-131
B3. Is there a description of each identified hazard’s impact on the
community as well as an overall summary of the community’s
vulnerability for each jurisdiction? (Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii))
Pages 42-131
B4. Does the Plan address NFIP insured structures within the
jurisdiction that have been repetitively damaged by floods?
(Requirement §201.6(c)(2)(ii))
ELEMENT B: REQUIRED REVISIONS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NA
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority, CO 2012
REGULATION CHECKLIST
Regulation (44 CFR 201.6 Local Mitigation Plans)
C1. Does the plan document each jurisdiction’s existing authorities,
policies, programs and resources and its ability to expand on and
improve these existing policies and programs? (Requirement
§201.6(c)(3))
Location in
Plan
(section and/or
page number)
Pages 118-121 and
Appendix
Met
Not
Met
X
C2. Does the Plan address each jurisdiction’s participation in the NFIP
and continued compliance with NFIP requirements, as appropriate?
(Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(ii))
NA
C3. Does the Plan include goals to reduce/avoid long-term
vulnerabilities to the identified hazards? (Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(i))
Page 116
C4. Does the Plan identify and analyze a comprehensive range of
specific mitigation actions and projects for each jurisdiction being
considered to reduce the effects of hazards, with emphasis on new
and existing buildings and infrastructure? (Requirement
§201.6(c)(3)(ii))
Pages 118-121 and
Appendix J
C5. Does the Plan contain an action plan that describes how the
actions identified will be prioritized (including cost benefit review),
implemented, and administered by each jurisdiction? (Requirement
§201.6(c)(3)(iv)); (Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(iii))
Pages 121, 126-127,
and Appendix J
C6. Does the Plan describe a process by which local governments will
integrate the requirements of the mitigation plan into other planning
mechanisms, such as comprehensive or capital improvement plans,
when appropriate? (Requirement §201.6(c)(4)(ii))
Pages 118-121 and
Appendix J
X
X
X
X
ELEMENT C: REQUIRED REVISIONS
D1. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in development?
(Requirement §201.6(d)(3))
NA
D2. Was the plan revised to reflect progress in local mitigation efforts?
(Requirement §201.6(d)(3))
NA
D3. Was the plan revised to reflect changes in priorities?
(Requirement §201.6(d)(3))
NA
ELEMENT D: REQUIRED REVISIONS
134
South Metro Fire Rescue Authority, CO 2012
REGULATION CHECKLIST
Regulation (44 CFR 201.6 Local Mitigation Plans)
Location in Plan
(section and/or
page number)
E1. Does the Plan include documentation that the plan has been
formally adopted by the governing body of the jurisdiction requesting
approval? (Requirement §201.6(c)(5))
E2. For multi-jurisdictional plans, has each jurisdiction requesting
approval of the plan documented formal plan adoption? (Requirement
§201.6(c)(5))
ELEMENT E: REQUIRED REVISIONS
E1. The SMFRA will adopt the plan upon notice that the plan is approvable pending adoption.
Met
Not
Met
X
X
F1.
NA
F2.
NA
ELEMENT F: REQUIRED REVISIONS
135
APPENDIX C
TAPESTRY SEGMENTATION DESCRIPTIONS
Note. From “Tapestry Segmentation Reference Guide” by Esri, 2011, retrieved August 24, 2011, from
www.esri.com/tapestry. Reprinted with permission.
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
LifeMode Group: L1 High Society
Segment Codes: 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07
Residents of the seven High Society neighborhoods are affluent and well educated. They
represent slightly more than 12 percent of all US households but generate nearly one-quarter
of the total US income. Employment in high paying positions, such as professional or
managerial occupations, is a primary reason why the median household income for this
group is $100,983. Most households are married couple families who live in affluent
neighborhoods where the median home value is $320,065. Although this is one of the least
ethnically diverse groups in the United States, it is one of the fastest growing, increasing by
more than 2 percent annually since 2000. Residents of High Society are affluent and active—
financially, civically, and physically. They participate in a wide variety of public activities and
sports and travel extensively. Try the Internet or radio instead of television to reach these
markets.
LifeMode Group: L2 Upscale Avenues
Segment Codes: 09, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18
Prosperity is the overriding attribute shared by the seven segments in Upscale Avenues.
Residents have earned their success from years of hard work. Similar to the High Society
segments, many in this group are also well educated with above-average earnings. However,
their housing choices reveal their distinct preferences. Urban markets such as Urban Chic
and Pacific Heights favor townhouses and high-rises, Pleasant-Ville residents prefer singlefamily homes in suburban neighborhoods, and Green Acres residents opt for open spaces.
Some have not settled on a home yet, such as the renters among Enterprising Professionals;
others, such as Cozy and Comfortable residents, have been settled for years. The median
household income for the group is $69,770, and their median net worth is $182,330.
Prosperous domesticity also characterizes the lifestyle in Upscale Avenues. They invest in
their homes; the owners work on landscaping and home remodeling projects, and the renters
buy new furnishings and appliances. They play golf, lift weights, go bicycling, and take
domestic vacations. Although they are partial to new cars, they also save and invest their
earnings.
LifeMode Group: L4 Solo Acts
Segment Codes: 08, 23, 27, 36, 39
Residents of the Solo Acts summary group segments are singles who prefer city life. Many
are young, just starting out in more densely populated US neighborhoods; others are wellestablished singles who have no home ownership or child-rearing responsibilities. Second
only to High Society, residents of this group tend to be well-educated, working professionals
who are either attending college or already hold a degree. Their incomes reflect their
employment experience, ranging from a low median of $44,601 (Old and Newcomers)
among the newest households to approximately $93,899 (Laptops & Lattes) among
established singles. Home ownership is at 28 percent; the median home value is $236,054.
Contrary to modern migration patterns that flow away from the largest cities, Solo Acts’
residents are moving into major cities such as New York City; Chicago; Washington, D.C.;
Boston; Los Angeles; and San Francisco. With considerable discretionary income and few
commitments, their lifestyle is urban, including the best of city life—dining out, attending
151
plays and concerts, and visiting museums—and, for a break from constant connectivity,
extensive travel domestically and abroad.
LifeMode Group: L7 High Hopes
Segment Codes: 28, 48
The High Hopes summary group includes Aspiring Young Families and Great Expectations.
These residents are a mix of married couples, single parents, and singles who seek the
“American Dream” of home ownership and a rewarding job. Most live in single-family houses
or multiunit buildings; approximately half own their homes. The median home value is
$119,508. Many would move to a new location for better opportunities. Many are young,
mobile, and college educated; one-third are younger than 35 years. The median household
income is $47,263, and the median net worth is $29,218.
LifeMode Group: L9 Family Portrait
Segment Codes: 12, 19, 21, 59, 64
Family Portrait has the fastest-growing population of the LifeMode summary groups, driven
primarily by the rapid increase in the Up and Coming Families segment. Youth, family life,
and the presence of children are the common characteristics across the five markets in
Family Portrait. The group is also ethnically diverse: more than 30 percent of the residents
are of Hispanic descent. The neighborhoods are predominantly composed of homeowners
who live in single-family homes. Most households include married couples with children who
contribute to the group’s large household size, averaging more than 3.1 persons per
household. Their lifestyle reflects their youth and family orientation—buying infant and
children’s clothing and toys and visiting theme parks and zoos.
152
APPENDIX D
RISK ASSESSMENT WORK GROUP CHARTER
Name of Committee/Work Group: Risk Assessment Work Group
Date: 01/06/11
Chartering
Sponsor
Chair
Committee Inception Date
Group
Steve Standridge, CPB
Mike Dell’Orfano,
Michael Langello,
Assistant Chief CSS
Planning & Analysis
01/01/2011
The mission of the Risk Assessment Work Group is to identify, develop & evaluate all
hazards that have the potential to adversely affect SMFRA and its citizens. These
Mission Statement
hazards will be integrated into SMFRA’s Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan and its
Standards of Cover (SOC). This includes evaluating risk models of other agencies
including fire departments.
Develop a comprehensive Hazard Profile for the Authority and each Station
District/Response Zone
Develop risk factors for each hazard
Rate each risk factor based on such factors as probability, frequency impact,
consequences
Provide useful data to the OS&DP Benchmarking Committee to:
Goals & Objectives
o Determine the departments current operational capabilities
o Determine operational capability gaps
o Establish a plan of action to address gaps
o Establish appropriate benchmarks and staffing patterns to address
specific hazards/risks.
Provide useful data for determining mitigation strategies
Finalized Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan. Submission to State & FEMA for formal
approval & qualification for potential mitigation grant funding; Alignment between cities
Success Indicators
and counties emergency management plans and mitigation efforts
Feedback Plan
Feedback will be given through the Sponsor & Chairs during scheduled meetings
(How do we communicate?)
of Command & Executive Staff.
The Risk Assessment Work Group will work cooperatively with other SMFRA groups,
Scope
teams, bureaus and committees to develop recommendations.
Meeting Frequency & Schedule
See attached schedule of stakeholder and Workgroup meeting timelines.
Posting
All members will be compensated with regular salaries and overtime, where
appropriate. CSS will also fund any necessary backfill related to this work group. Grant
Budget
funding has been obtained to help pay for salaries and expenses and will be managed
by Steve Standridge and Cheryl Poage.
Final recommendations or decisions are made by consensus of the Workgroup
members, sub-workgroups and/or internal stakeholders. The Chairs & Sponsor will
Decision Making Process
present recommendations to Command & Executive Staff, who will confer with the
Board of Directors as necessary for implementation.
Dave Becker (Dive) | Doug Bloomquist | Ted Christopoulos (Wildland) | Bryan
DeWolfe (TLO) | Rob Geislinger | Tom Hendrix | Mike Langello | Jeff Lanigan
Team Members
(ARFF) | Rick Lewis | Jeff Meyers (HazMat) | Scott Sarver (Tech) | Paul Smith |
Steve Standridge | Anthony Vargo | Mike West | Randy Whipple
Team Review Schedule
Monthly review by Sponsor
Community Safety
Services Division
153
APPENDIX E
RAMP PLANNING PROCESS DOCUMENTATION
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
APPENDIX F
PUBLIC NOTIFICATION DOCUMENTATION
166
APPENDIX G
HAZMAT CLASSIFICATIONS
Class 1: Explosives
o Division 1.1 Explosives with a mass explosion hazard
o Division 1.2 Explosives with a projection hazard
o Division 1.3 Explosives with predominantly a fire hazard
o Division 1.4 Explosives with no significant blast hazard
o Division 1.5 Very insensitive explosives
o Division 1.6 Extremely insensitive explosive articles
Class 2: Gases
o Division 2.1 Flammable gases
o Division 2.2 Nonflammable gases
o Division 2.3 Poison gas
o Division 2.4 Corrosive gases
Class 3: Flammable Liquids
o
o
o Division 3.1 Flashpoint below -18 C (0 F)
o
o
o
o Division 3.2 Flashpoint -18 C and above, but less than 23 C (73 F)
o
o
o
o Division 3.3 Flashpoint 23 C and up to 61 C (141 F)
Class 4: Flammable Solids (spontaneously combustible materials; and materials that
are dangerous when wet)
o Division 4.1 Flammable solids
o Division 4.2 Spontaneously combustible materials
o Division 4.3 Materials that are dangerous when wet
Class 5: Oxidizers and Organic Peroxides
o Division 5.1 Oxidizers
o Division 5.2 Organic peroxides
Class 6: Poisons and Etiologic Materials
o Division 6.1 Poisonous materials
o Division 6.2 Etiologic (infectious) materials
Class 7: Radioactive Materials
o Any material, or combination of materials, that spontaneously gives off ionizing
radiation. It has a specific activity greater than 0.002 microcuries per gram.
Class 8: Corrosives
o A material, liquid or solid, that causes visible destruction or irreversible alteration to
human skin or a liquid that has a severe corrosion rate on steel or aluminum.
Class 9: Miscellaneous
o A material which presents a hazard during transport, but which is not included in any
other hazard class (such as a hazardous substance or a hazardous waste).
ORM-D: Other Regulated Material
o A material which, although otherwise subjected to regulations, presents a limited
hazard during transportation due to its form, quantity and packaging.
167
APPENDIX H
RTD CRITICAL ASSETS REQUIRING PROTECTION
(Sensitive Propriety Data – Redact for Public Distribution)
168
APPENDIX I
FREIGHT RAIL COMMODITY FLOW DATA (2010)
(Sensitive Propriety Data – Redact for Public Distribution)
169
APPENDIX J
MITIGATION PROJECT GOALS
Goal A: Develop or enhance improvements to response and preparedness plans and programs to reduce risk and vulnerability.
Objective
Improve SMFRA’s response to
medical emergencies.
Task 1:
Improve SMFRA’s response
capabilities to known hazards (other
than medical emergencies).
Task 1:
Task 2:
Task 3:
Task 4:
Task 5:
Task 6:
Improve SMFRA’s preparedness for
and response to large-scale
emergencies and disasters
Task 1:
Increase response capabilities
through mutual or automatic aid
agreements
Task 1:
Task 2:
Task 2:
Task 3:
Task 4:
Task 5:
Task
Evaluate the current ALS transport model to identify areas
for improvement.
Conduct an annual analysis of apparatus deployment plan.
Conduct a detailed analysis of each station district to find
travel time efficiencies, evaluate deployment strategies, and
determine future needs by 2012.
Develop alternative deployment strategies for urban,
suburban, and
rural population densities and specific
station district demands by 2012.
Develop criteria for dual-company stations (i.e., multiple
engines and/or trucks) by 2012.
Reduce turnout times so that all personnel and units are
within the ranges specified in the Standard of Cover by 2013
Reduce dispatch time delays with neighboring agencies by
2014
Expand water rescue and recovery capabilities near the
Reuter-Hess reservoir by providing light dive rescue
equipment, storage, and personnel by 2015.
Reduce wildfire hazards in the wildland-urban interface
areas identified in the Community Wildfire Protection Plan by
implementing mitigation activities by 2013.
Establish an automatic aid agreement with the City of Aurora
by 2011.
Expand EMS with the City of Englewood from mutual aid to
automatic aid by 2013.
Establish an automatic aid agreement with the City of
Denver by 2015.
Investigate collaborative staffing models with West Metro
Fire for the Station 40 response area by 2015.
Develop cooperative agreements to provide hazmat,
technical rescue and dive response capabilities throughout
the region by 2015.
Hazard Addressed
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies
Terrorism – All
Transportation – All
All Hazards
Fire – Wildland
Floods & Dam
Inundation
All Hazards
Responsible
EMS
Operations Division
Special Operations
Operations Division
EMS Bureau
Special Operations
Goal B: Develop or enhance programs, plans, procedures, and relationships with existing organizations to implement or improve
planned or existing mitigation activities.
Objective
Develop or revise CEMP Plans by
end of 2012
Wildfire Mitigation: By 2015, 90% of
all at-risk communities will have
improved the safety of their
communities from wildfire by
mitigating hazards in the built and
native environments.
Enhance safety systems in existing
buildings
Plan Review
Participate in strategic regional
planning groups, committees and
processes
Task
Task 1: Complete the Recovery Plan component of the CEMP by
2012.
Task 2: Revise the RAMP:
 HazMat Risk Assessment
 Transportation Assessment
 Fire – Structural (Commercial) Assessment
Task 3: Develop at least three station level vulnerability assessment
plans (one for each of the Authority’s population types:
urban, suburban and rural)
Hazard Addressed
Responsible
Transportation - All
Fires – Structural
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies
HazMat - All
CSS Div. – Admin.
Operations Division
Planning & Analysis
CPB
LSB
Fire - Wildfire
CSS Division
Special Operations
Fire - Structural
LSB
Fire - Structural
LSB
Task 1: By 2015, 90% of all at-risk communities will have a
community-based CWPP.
Task 1: Inspect existing building every two years
Task 2: Develop or revise pre-plans for existing buildings every
three years.
Task 1: Improve interaction with the preplan program by adjusting
plan submittal requirements and occupancy information
transfer by 2011.
Task 2: Achieve improved quality and 90% accuracy of historical and
future fire and occupancy data by 2012.
Task 1: Participate in monthly North Central Region Committee
Meetings
Task 2: Participate in monthly municipality and county building official
meetings
Task 3: Participate in monthly State Fire Marshall Association
meetings.
All Hazards
Fire – Structural
Emergency Manager
Operations Division
171
Goal C: Build upon existing public education and outreach efforts to reduce risk and vulnerability for identified hazards.
Objective
Station Level School Education Visits:
Decrease the risk taking activities of a
middle school aged child and
empower them with information on
how to live safer to educate family
and friends.
CORRP Assessments: Ensure the
highest level of life safety by
improving information sharing and
planning between the Operations and
Community Safety Services Division
for high-risk facilities.
Wildfire Mitigation Education:
Reduce the potential impact to the
community from wildfires
Child Passenger Safety Education:
Reduce the number of children and
adults improperly restrained or
unrestrained, while traveling in
vehicles
Juvenile Firesetter Intervention (JFS):
Improve the timeliness and
effectiveness of JFS interventions
conducted by SMFRA
Elementary School Age Education:
Reduce the risk taking behaviors of
elementary school aged children.
Middle School Age Education:
Reduce the risk taking behaviors of
th
th
middle school aged children (6 – 8
Grades).
High School Age School Age
Education: Reduce the risk taking
behaviors of high school aged
th
th
children: (9 – 12 Grades).
Senior Citizens – Injury and Fire
Prevention Education: Reduce the
risk taking behaviors of SMFRA’s
Task
Task 1: By the end of 2012, on-duty fire personnel will deliver preschool
safety messages as needed.
Hazard Addressed
Responsible
All Hazards
Operations Division
CPB
All Hazards
CSS Division Admin.
CPB
LSB
Operations Division
Fire – Wildland
CSS Div. – Admin.
Operations Division
Transportation –
Vehicular
CPB
Fire - All
CPB
All Hazards
CPB
All Hazards
CPB
All Hazards
CPB
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies Falls
CPB
Task 1: By the end of 2012, Complete 6 assessments.
Task 1: By 2015, there will be a 50% improvement in community
awareness and acceptance of wildfire mitigation efforts,
as measured through surveys.
Task 2: Participate in at least one vegetation removal or prescribed
fire project related to priorities identified in CWPP.
Task 1: Conduct 12 car safety seat inspections in 2012.
Task 1:
Task 2:
Develop and implement an SOP for JFS interventions.
Network with partnering local law enforcement agencies.
Task 1:
By the end of 2012, refine CPB programming for this age
group based on program evaluations, risk assessment and
national trends.
By the end of 2012, refine CPB programming for this age
group based on program evaluations, risk assessment and
national trends.
Task 1:
Task 1:
Task 1:
By the end of 2012, refine CPB programming for this age
group based on program evaluations, risk assessment and
national trends.
By the end of 2012, refine CPB programming for this age
group based on program evaluations, risk assessment and
national trends.
172
senior citizens.
Objective
CPR and First Aid Training: Increase
the number of citizens trained in CPR
and AED use.
Babysitting Training: Increase in the
emergency response capability of
youths that are accepting temporary
adult responsibilities.
AED Placement: Decrease in the
number of Sudden Cardiac Arrest
fatalities by giving AEDs to 100% of
the schools in the District and to
provide low cost access to other
facilities and individuals.
Driver Safety Education: Decrease in
the number of motor vehicle crashes
through collaboration with other
entities; focusing on educational
awareness.
Task
Task 1:
By the end of 2012, deliver 26 CPR and AED courses through
the Foundation.
Task 1:
By the end of 2012, deliver 15 Super Sitter courses
Task 1:
By the end of 2013, 100% of the schools within the SMFR
jurisdiction will have AEDs.
Task 1:
Task 2:
Task 3:
Task 4:
By the end of 2012, deliver 15 Driver Awareness Program
courses.
By the end of 2012, deliver 4 License to Survive seminars
By the end of 2012, deliver 15 Crash Avoidance Classes
By the end of 2012, deliver one (1) adult Winter Driving
Skills trainings
Hazard Addressed
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies Cardiac
Life Safety
Foundation
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies All
Life Safety
Foundation
Medical & Public
Health Emergencies Cardiac
Life Safety
Foundation
Transportation –
Vehicular
Life Safety
Foundation
173