iTSCi Governance Assessment
Kalimbi/Nyabibwe, South Kivu
March 2013
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
This governance assessment has been prepared by Channel Research for the iTSCi
Secretariat. The material contained herein is public. Please address all correspondence to:
[email protected]
Tel: +32 2 633 6529
Fax: +32 2 633 3092
Acknowledgment
The team would like to thank all of those who contributed to the study, for taking time to
answer their questions in Bukavu and Nyabibwe, notably the Minister of Mines represented
by his Chief Cabinet, the Chief of the Mines Division, Mines Division staff, OCC,
SAESSCAM, Head of the Administration Antenne, ANR, National Police, FARDC,
CSAC/CLS, OGP, WMC, transporters, negociants, miners, civil society representatives,
community members and iTSCi staff.
About iTSCi: The iTSCi Programme provides a robust,
verifiable system to address ‘conflict minerals’ concerns in the
tin, tantalum and tungsten ‘3T’ minerals industry, from mine
to smelter (the ‘upstream supply chain’), which incorporates actions recommended by the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from ConflictAffected and High-Risk Areas, taking into account the recommendations of the UN Panel of
Experts on the DRC, as well as the procedures developed by the ICGLR. It provides the
‘downstream’ supply chain with the required assurances that only ‘conflict free’ minerals
are entering the supply chain, a key element in the Conflict Free Smelter audit programme
that addresses the requirements of US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
registered companies to conform to the due diligence requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
About Channel Research: Channel Research is a
consultancy operating in fast changing, difficult
environments. Based on its experience in unstable
contexts and knowledge of the latest assessment methodologies, it assists public and private
sector clients to implement tailored monitoring and evaluation systems, and to mitigate
risks related to their activities. Channel is headquartered in Brussels with an office in
Burundi and Paris and has worldwide activities. Our core team of professionals in Brussels,
Paris and Burundi is complemented by a base of trusted associates and consultants in all
parts of the world.
STATUS: PUBLIC
2
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 3
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................ 4
Administrative map South Kivu...................................................................................... 5
I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 6
II. OVERVIEW 3T ACTIVITIES IN KALEHE/NYABIBWE .................................................... 8
III. RISKS ANALYSED IN REFERENCE TO THE OECD GUIDANCE .................................... 13
IV.
OVERVIEW OF SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE .......................................................... 19
V.
MINERAL SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT .............................................................. 22
VI.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 29
Annex 1: Incidents recorded by iTSCi in 2012 and 2013 ................................................ 36
Annex 2: Incidents recorded by CSAC/CLS from mid-October 2012 onwards ................. 45
Annex 3: Tag management and control ........................................................................ 51
© 2013 ITRI Ltd, on behalf of the iTSCi Programme
All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of ITRI Ltd. The report should
be reproduced only in full, with no part taken out of context without prior permission.
The authors believe the information provided is accurate and reliable, but it is furnished
without warranty of any kind. The iTSCi Programme gives no condition, warranty or
representation, express or implied, as to the conclusions and recommendations contained in
the report, and potential users shall be responsible for determining the suitability of the
information to their own circumstances. Under no circumstances will the iTSCi Programme
nor any of the companies or organisations within the Programme be liable for any loss or
claim whatsoever arising as a result of the use of or reliance upon such conclusions or
recommendations. Any conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are made
in good faith and on the basis of the information available to the authors at the time.
STATUS: PUBLIC
3
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANEMISKA:
Association de Négociants de Minerais Stanifert de Kalehe
ANR :
Agence National de Renseignements
APCLS :
Alliance Patriotique pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
BEPAT :
Bureau d'Etudes des Projets et d'Application Technique
BEST :
Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques
BGR:
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (Federal Institute
for Geosciences and Natural Resources)
CEEC:
Centre d'Evaluation, d'Expertise et de Certification des substances
minérales précieuses et sémi-précieuses
CFS:
Conflict-Free Smelter
CFTI :
Conflict-Free Tin Initative
CLS :
Conseil Local de Sécurité
CNDP :
Congrès National pour le Développement et la Paix
COOMBECKA :
Coopérative Minière du Bien être Communautaire de Kalehe
COMIKA :
Coopérative Minière de Kalehe
CPP :
Comité Provincial de Pilotage
CSAC:
Comité de Surveillance et Anti-Corruption
DFID:
UK Department for International Development
DRC :
Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC:
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FAZ :
Forces Armés Zaïrois
FDC :
Forces Démocratiques Congolaises
FDLR:
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FONER :
Fond National pour l'Entretien des Routes
FRF:
Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes
ICGLR:
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
iTSCi:
ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative
M23:
March 23rd Movement
MONUSCO:
United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
OCC:
Office Congolais de Contrôle
OECD:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP:
Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix
STATUS: PUBLIC
4
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
PARECO :
Patriotes Résistants Congolais
PMH:
Police des Mines et Hydrocarbures
PPRD :
Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie
PNC:
Police Nationale Congolaise
RCD :
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
SAESSCAM:
Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining
UN GoE:
United Nations Group of Experts
WMC :
World Mining Company
ADMINISTRATIVE MAP SOUTH KIVU
STATUS: PUBLIC
5
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
I.
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
This report presents the findings of an iTSCi Governance Assessment conducted in
Nyabibwe (Kalimbi mine) in Kalehe territory, South Kivu province in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and does not cover the wider mining sector in South Kivu
province. The Conflict Free Tin Initiative (CFTI) is operating a closed-pipeline pilot
program in Kalimbi, utilising the iTSCi traceability program and currently the only mine
in South Kivu province where the programme is implemented. 1 This Governance
Assessment therefore focuses on the Kalimbi / Nyabibwe area and does not cover South
Kivu province as a whole.
The fieldwork for this assessment took place between 15 and 20 February 2013. One day
was used to meet with relevant stakeholders in Bukavu, such as iTSCi staff, the
comptoir/exporter, the NGO Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix (OGP) and government
institutions such as the Ministry of Mines, SAESSCAM, OCC and the Mines Division.
Three days were spent in Nyabibwe to interview administrative and security services,
miners, negociants, local state agents (Mines Division, SAESSCAM), transporters, civil
society representatives, members from CSAC/CLS (local surveillance and anti-corruption
committee that reports on incidents) 2 , concessionaires and ordinary citizens. The
researcher organised an informal briefing on key findings for iTSCi staff at the end of the
fieldwork.
The scope of the assessment was to analyse OECD Due Diligence guidance Annex II risks
such as serious human rights abuses, the involvement of non-state armed groups, illegal
taxation, extortion and control by private/public security forces, bribery and fraudulent
misrepresentation of the origin of minerals, money laundering, and payment of taxes, fees
and royalties due to government. The study furthermore covers the security situation, the
chain of custody management, analysing the implementation of the tagging and
traceability process by state agents and iTSCi, and the incident reporting and stakeholder
engagement process.
The methodology for this assessment was qualitative by nature and mainly focused on
interviews whereby questions were asked in a semi-structured and open-ended manner.
Due to time limitations, about half of the interviews were conducted with a number of
people from the same institution at the same time (group interviews). Some of the group
interviews were heterogeneous, meaning that a number of services or organizations that
work closely together were interviewed jointly. In total 55 people were targeted through
Prior to the current program, the iTSCi pilot was implemented from June 2010. It was suspended because of
the mineral ban imposed by President Kabila in September 2010.
2 CSAC is a community structure that meets every week and discusses on observed problems linked to
community-life in general but focusses in particular on problems linked to the mining sector in Nyabibwe. A
variety of actors participate in CSAC (amongst others civil society, FARDC, SAESSCAM, Mines Division,
ANR, Police). CSAC was set up early 2012 by the Congolese organization OGP under a program funded by US
DRL, with in-kind contribution from ITRI, and which PACT also manages. CSAC reports findings to the
Provincial Pilot Committee in Bukavu. Within the context of the iTSCi program, the functioning of CSAC is
similar to the CLS (Local Monitoring Committee) set up by iTSCi in other areas (ex. Katanga).
1
6
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
14 individual and 11 group interviews. To ensure triangulation, attribution of referenced
issues to respondents and interviews was documented.
Checking on rumours
Due diligence in the mineral supply chain is sensitive and rumours flourish on cases of
discrepancies, smuggling or linkages with armed actors. Many of the rumours (e.g. tag
duplication, fraudulent exportation of minerals, tantalum being tagged as cassiterite), can
often be easily verified, or refuted. Other rumours are persistent but no organisation has
found evidence yet, e.g. for tag trading in the DRC.
The governance assessment team recommends to the different stakeholders that they
make sure that they collect evidence when possible and relay any possible issue, whether
verified or not, to the Channel Research team via the following email address:
[email protected]. Sensitive information and the identity of the source will be
kept confidential. Channel Research operates under the Chatham House Rule, which
means that statements cannot be attributed to their authors, unless specifically authorized
by the author prior to disclosure. Consultants are also available for direct communication
by email or phone.
The researcher encountered a number of challenges, among them the tight timeframe for
the fieldwork and the fact that stakeholders are experiencing interview fatigue, given the
high number of delegations and visitors at the site. The latter issue stems from the high
profile status of the Kalimbi mine in view of traceability in a high risk location. Since
October 2012 Nyabibwe and the mine received a large number of visitors from
government(s), mining companies, international and Congolese aid organisations,
independent researchers and media. Linked to a fatigue among actors who are repeatedly
being interviewed is the fact that local actors (from miners to state agents) are aware of the
importance of Kalimbi’s status as ‘approved’ (green) mine and pilot project and hence the
need to present a positive picture. The researcher noticed reluctance by interviewees to
share critical issues.
This report is structured as follows: Chapter two presents an overview of 3T activities in
Nyabibwe. Chapter three discusses the key OECD risks, followed by an analysis of the
security situation in chapter four. The fifth chapter addresses the management of the
mineral chain. The report ends with a conclusion and recommendations for high, medium
and low risks. The annexes include iTSCi and CSAC/CLS incident reports and details on
analyses of tags and logbooks.
Key findings

No major risks relating to OECD Annex II were identified by the researcher.

Allegations of harassment by soldiers in Nyabibwe-centre and SAESSCAM/Mines
Division agents demanding miners to pay small bribes ($2-3) in exchange for tagging
should be monitored and acted upon by iTSCi and the Provincial Pilot Committee.
STATUS: PUBLIC
7
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013

Global Witness reports of the involvement of three senior FARDC officials in nocturnal
movement of untagged minerals from Nyabibwe to Goma also require urgent
attention. Furthermore, the presence of a number of armed groups in areas
surrounding Nyabibwe needs close monitoring.

Several inconsistencies were observed with logbook and tag weights.

It also seems that iTCSi is not aware or not recording a number of incidents, raising the
need for improved procedures, monitoring and better collaboration between iTSCi and
CSAC/CLS.

Given the showcase status of the Nyabibwe pilot project and the vast number of
visitors and potential future donors and projects it attracts, improved coordination
between actors and better communication about the CFTI project and the role of the
Congolese state agencies in the project is recommended.

The cooperatives have difficulties to monitor the exact number of miners working for
them and their own production statistics. The source of funding for mineral purchases
by the cooperatives is difficult to establish. It is furthermore important to monitor ongoing conflicts between cooperatives and between them and concessionaires given the
risk of potential violence and insecurity at the mine.
II. OVERVIEW OF 3T ACTIVITIES IN KALEHE/NYABIBWE
Nyabibwe is located 97 km north of Bukavu in Kalehe territory, South Kivu and is known
for its tin mine Kalimbi (cassiterite). The mine is situated 5km from Nyabibwe town and is
divided into two sections where exploitation historically takes place: T20 and Koweit
(respectively mine codes SKV001 and SKV002). The cassiterite of Kalimbi are generally
‘polluted’ with a relatively high degree of pyrite (iron sulphate).
The number of pits varies over time,
which is influenced by the number of
miners and productivity. At the time of
the iTSCi baseline study (September
2012), the Kalimbi mine consisted of 34
pits. Tin ore is dug in underground
tunnels. Especially in the lower-situated
Koweit-part,
groundwater
sources
produce up to eight litres of water per
second. As it floods part of the tunnels
and can cut off oxygen supply from
other parts, the water is a serious limitation for production. 3 During the rainy seasons
flooding is even more pronounced. Even though a new pump recently arrived for
3
http://fr.netlog.com/thierrymunga/blog; Ir Thierry MUNGAChargé des programmes B2B Sprl
STATUS: PUBLIC
8
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
dewatering and other pumps help to provide air to the tunnels, the technology used is still
relatively basic and no digital scales or niton equipment is available at mine and negociant
level.4 Most miners wear headlamps purchased as their own investment but lack other
protective gear.
A. LAND TENURE
Mining in Kalimbi takes place in purely
artisanal manner, with the exception of a
short period in the early 1980s, when the
Société Minière de Goma (SMDG) worked in the
Kalimbi mine on a semi-industrial scale. After
the departure of SMDG, all its mining assets
were taken over by members of the
Chirimwami family (relatives of the local
chief or ‘mwami’ Chirimwami of the Buhavu
chieftaincy in Kalehe). In the early 1990s
Placide Chirimwami (also a relative of the
chief) started the cooperative COOMBECKA
(Coopérative Minière du Bien-être de Kalehe),
which was officially recognized in 1993. 5 In
order to keep control of the mine during the time of conflict (1998-2002), several sources
stated that Placide developed contacts with key figures of the RCD (Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Démocratie) rebellion that then occupied the Kivus, in turn making him
unpopular in Nyabibwe. As many artisanal miners were unhappy with COOMBECKA, a
group of miners created the cooperative COMIKA (Cooperative Minière de Kalehe).
However, Placide never lost control over the mine because he reportedly kept close
contacts with rebel groups and the regular army.6 The November 2011 UN GoE report
cites local traders stating that, in March 2011, Placide met twice with Bosco Ntaganda (a
FARDC general that defected in March 2012 to create the M23 rebellion) and discussed a
military intervention by the ex-CNDP Colonel Saddam Ringo to protect his interests in
Kalimbi.7
In addition to the existing cooperatives in Kalimbi, the mining company SHAMIKA
Resources (founded in 2006 in Canada) was granted an exploration licence (PR 7647) in
2007 via its Congolese subsidiary SHAMIKA Congo Kalehe SPRL. Covering 169 km2 it
BGR allegedly provided SAESSCAM with digital scales, but those so far did not arrive in Nyabibwe. Niton
equipment is used to obtain and analyse geochemical data on the type and grade of a sample of ore.
5 Cuvelier, J. (2010) ‘The complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragility: the case of eastern
DRC’, IPIS/International Alert, p.51. / Claessens, K; Mudinga, E.; and Ansons, A (2013) ‘Land grabbing by
local elites in the territory of Kalehe, South Kivu’, paper prepared for the World Bank annual conference on
land and poverty, 8-13 April 2013 / Pourtier, R (2004) ‘’The Mining Economy in the Kivus and its regional
implications’, OECD Initiative for Central Africa, p.16. Several sources interviewed in Nyabibwe confirm this.
6 Cuvelier, J. (2010,p.54.) / Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix (2010) ‘Organisation économique des groupes
armées étrangères et nationaux au Sud Kivu pendant l’opération Amani Leo’, Bukavu, p.17.
7 UN Group of Experts Report (November 2011, p.119).
44
STATUS: PUBLIC
9
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
includes the Kalimbi mine. Upon acquisition, SHAMIKA estimated that artisanal tin
mining ran at the rate of 10 tonnes per week.8 SHAMIKA’s license expired on 30 June 2012
but the Congolese mining code foresees an extension by 5 years after a 50% reduction of
the size.9 Whilst conducting this assessment no up to date information could be obtained
on whether SHAMIKA will extend its license. A scheduled meeting with a SHAMIKA
representative was cancelled.
There are also ownership claims by seven people that claim to own the land where the
Kalimbi hill is situated. Allegedly, their ownership goes back to the early 1970s when they
obtained a customary land title (‘kalinzi’) granted by chief Chirimwami. When they
became aware that the Mining Code foresees that a cooperative should pay compensation
when operating on the land owned by somebody else, the seven landowners began a
process of legalising their traditional land title. This created a conflict between the land
owners and both cooperatives, with COOMBECKA filing a lawsuit against the land
owners. The land owners won and the ruling stated that they should be paid 4% in
compensation of the 10% production a cooperative receives as royalty (or 0.4% of the total
production).10 In September 2012, the landowners filed a lawsuit against COMIKA for not
respecting this obligation to pay compensation. With the help of the Non-Governmental
Organisation OGP (Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix) a solution was brokered late January
2013, whereby the landowners and cooperatives agreed on a 3% compensation payment of
which 0.5% is to be set aside for community development initiatives. By March 2013, iTSCi
reports that “the cooperatives have already made two payments to the land owners.” A
management mechanism for use of the 0.5% for development projects in the region is
currently being put in place.
B. CURRENT OPERATIONS
In July 2012, a joint validation mission was organized, including amongst others Congo’s
Federation of Enterprises (FEC)/mining branch, civil society, the German Federal Institute
for Geosciences and Natural Resources BGR, iTSCi, the UN mission to Congo MONUSCO
and the Congolese institutions CEEC (Centre d'Evaluation, d'Expertise et de Certification),
SAESSCAM (Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining) and the Mines
Division. They validated five mines in Kalehe territory as ‘green’ (Kalimbi, Kibato,
Nkwiro, Lijiwe, Kibuye). This was officially confirmed by Ministerial decree
0636/cab.min/mines/01/2012 of 19 November 2012.11 iTSCi also conducted its own baseline
studies in order to confirm the suitability of the site for inclusion in the project. Prior to the
current traceability program, the iTSCi pilot was implemented from June 2010. It was
suspended because of the mineral export ban imposed by President Kabila in September
2010.
SHAMIKA Ressources (2009), Exploration and near term production, company powerpoint
CTC Standards Set : Kalimbi Baseline Audit Report, September 2011 BGR-COCERTI Pilot, p.4.
10 On mine level the cooperatives collect 10% of the daily production from miners. This is mostly collected inkind (cassiterite). It concerns a contribution towards the services the cooperative provides (such as the
purchase of machinery to evacuate water from the pits). Of this 10% four percent ought to go to the concession
owners. This represents thus 0.4% of the total production.
11 http://www.mines-rdc.cd/fr/documents/Arretes/A0636_2012.pdf
8
9
STATUS: PUBLIC
10
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Partly funded for a one-year period12, the CFTI covers a ‘from mine to end user’ conflictfree closed pipeline project, initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, industry
partners (AIM Metals & Alloys, Tata Steel, Traxys, Malaysia Smelting Corporation,
Motorola, Blackberry, Fairphone, Alpha, Philips Electronics), ITRI and Pact. The program
builds on the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative iTSCi and the Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS)
program. It is in line with the OECD Due Diligence guidance and the International
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the DRC government and local civil
society are closely involved.13 Incidents are identified by and discussed in the Nyabibwebased Surveillance and Anti-Corruption Committee (CSAC/CLS) and the Provincial Pilot
Committee (CPP). Both comprise state and security bodies, economic operators and civil
society actors. CSAC is installed by the non-governmental organization Observatoire
Gouvernance et Paix (OGP). The initiative falls under another Pact project mostly funded by
US DRL, with some in-kind contributions from ITRI. The CSAC in Nyabibwe is the
equivalent of so-called Local Monitoring Committees (CLS) in other areas where the iTSCi
program is implemented.
Since tagging began on 24 October 2012, the number of artisanal miners has vastly
increased. Between 1,000 and 1,200 miners are currently working in Kalimbi. Their exact
number is difficult to estimate because both COMIKA and COOMBECKA do not keep
exact records of their members. Only COOMBECKA produced registration files with the
identities of members. The two cooperatives only produced records of the number of team
leaders (chef d’équipe), with each team comprising between 5 and 12 members. COMIKA
says it has 40 team leaders, COOMBECKA says it registered 108. However, SAESSCAM
says that COOMBECKA has 60 and COMIKA 58 team leaders. It remains questionable if
either of these estimates is correct, especially given widespread testimonies claiming that
COMIKA is currently by far the largest and most productive cooperative.14 Not knowing
who is working in the mine heightens the risk of infiltration of for example (ex) rebels and
military in civilian clothes (albeit not observed at this point in Nyabibwe).
The current number of negociants stands at 46 (of which 21 paid their registration card
according to COMIKA). World Mining Corporation (WMC) - buying the produce from
Kalimbi and currently the only approved member of iTSCi for South Kivu - states to do
business with 28 negociants and to always check if they are officially registered with the
state. WMC signed a contract with COMIKA for mineral supply but also buys from
COOMBECKA. Prior to tagging many so-called ‘shachouleur’ (unofficial commissionaires)
worked for unidentified people that funded mineral purchases or for the recognised
negociants. Even though some people who were interviewed claim that they are still
present, the majority of sources contacted deny this, allegedly because their old networks
in Goma dried up since the beginning of tagging. Recurrent conflict between the two
cooperatives (in a few cases resulting in deaths, which happened prior to the start of
Much of the costs are funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other costs are covered by the
Development Bank of Southern Africa and the comptoir levy.
13 See www.solutions-network.org for more information on the project.
14 It is to be noted COMIKA operates mostly in pits situated in the more productive part T20.
12
STATUS: PUBLIC
11
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
tagging) is a problem raised by many interviewees. Currently both cooperatives seem to
collaborate rather peacefully due to an effort by the provincial government to mediate as
well as the awareness that any conflict would have negative consequences on the mine’s
current ‘green’ status.
The start of tagging, a larger number of miners present on site, slightly improved
technology to evacuate water from the tunnels and relative stability of the relationship
between both cooperatives led to an increase in production.






The iTSCi baseline (September 2012) showed an estimated daily production of 263 to
2,182 kg/day (5,226 to 56,723 kg/month depending on the season). This was estimated
during a period with low prices and a limited market. Since the start of tagging on 24
October 2012 until 20 January 2013 mine-level production was 208,853 kg (69,618
kg/month).
The negociant association, ANEMISKA (Association de Négociants de Minerais Stanifert
de Kalehe) reports a gross negociant-level mineral weight of 179,032 kg until the end of
January 2012 (59,677 kg/month).
Statistics reported by the Mines Division in Nyabibwe show a mine-site production
from 24 October 2012 to 11 February 2013 of 246,516 kg (of which 205,815 kg was
already sold and transported to Bukavu.
COMIKA and COOMBECKA did not provide production statistics. It is difficult to
conclude whether this is caused by a lack of will or lack of capacity on production
monitoring by the cooperatives.15 In order to verify production (for example to assess
whether parallel circuits of mineral purchases exist) cooperative production and
production reported by local state authorities should be comparable to comptoir
purchases and export statistics in a closed pipeline system.
Statistics provided by the comptoir WMC show that five lots have so far been exported
(up to early February 2013) represent a net export weight of 117 tonnes. Figures
further show a 19% loss as compared to the tagged gross weight supplied to WMC.
Between mine and negociant level a processing loss of 24% is reported. These losses
can be expected given the composition and grade of cassiterite ore from Kalimbi.16
Differences between mine level production and gross-weight supplied to WMC are
further explained by the fact that not all produce is immediately sold to the comptoir.
WMC and iTSCi statistics show that negociant exit weight (tagged net-weight after
processing at negociant) is 13% - or 22 tonnes – higher than the gross entry weight at
the comptoir: i.e. the weight reduces between negociant and exporter. This is due to
moisture loss and to the fact that that negociant level tagged minerals still awaited
transportation at the moment the statistics were put together. The two trucks that go to
Bukavu once a week (one on Tuesdays, one on Fridays) have a joint capacity of 12-18
iTSCi confirms that they also encounter difficulties in obtaining information on production from both
cooperatives.
15
16
Ore from Kalimbi contains a relative high degree of pyrite pollution. Even though pyrite is easy to identify
(as its color and shininess does not resemble cassiterite) it is complicated to mechanically separate as pyrite is,
like cassiterite, not magnetic and nearly has the same relative weight.
STATUS: PUBLIC
12
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013

tonnes and usually take all produce for that week: because of security reasons,
negociants are never left with a substantial stock.
Statistics reported by various actors since tagging began are consistent.
EXISTING STOCKS
Before the start of tagging a stock of 21,080 kg17 of untagged cassiterite was identified in
Nyabibwe. On 28 November 2012, 11.9 tonnes of minerals belonging to five negociants
were brought to Bukavu, authorized by the Provincial Ministry of Mines.18 Even though
this stock was initially to be kept in the WMC warehouse, authorization was granted to
sell it to METACHEM comptoir. No solution has so far been found for the remaining
untagged stock of – according to iTSCi – 8,580 kg, which presents a risk in that it could be
fraudulently mixed into ongoing production and be tagged. Also, the comptoir Bakulikira
bought tagged minerals originating from Kalimbi (5.4 tonnes spread over four lots
between late November 2012 and late February 2013).19 Bakulikira has not yet entirely
finalized the procedures for being granted a treatment license by the Congolese
government, but is authorized to purchase, government representatives stated. Bakulikira
is also in the process of adhering to iTSCi.
III.
RISKS ANALYSED IN REFERENCE TO THE OECD GUIDANCE
This chapter analyses risks cited by the OECD Due Diligence guidance for minerals
originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Risks referenced in this chapter are
grouped into five sections: serious abuses; (in)direct support to non-state armed groups;
involvement of public/private security forces; money laundering and bribery; and
taxation.
A. SERIOUS ABUSES ASSOCIATED WITH MINERAL EXTRACTION, TRANSPORT AND TRADE
-
Forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
-
Forms of forced or compulsory labour, which means work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of penalty and for which said person has not offered himself voluntarily;
-
The worst forms of child labour;
-
Other gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence;
-
War crimes, serious violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity, genocide.
17
This is according to the negociant association ANEMISKA. iTSCi reports an untagged stock weight prior to
tagging of 20-28 tonnes.
18 The source for this is a letter written by the negociant association ANEMISKA in which the Ministerial letter
that authorized a field mission of the Mines Division to verify the stock is cited (85/CAB/MIN-PROEMHC/SK/2012, 28 November 2012).
19 After discussing the findings of this research with iTSCi staff in Bukavu, an incident was opened
(SK/2013/07) on the referenced transaction made by Bakulikira.
STATUS: PUBLIC
13
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Direct observation and field research give no indication of serious abuses that can be
linked to mineral exploitation in or around Nyabibwe. Children were not seen in the mine
and all miners, officials and ordinary citizens clearly cited the interdiction for children and
pregnant women to enter the mine. Accounts of sexual violence or other types of violence
or human rights abuses were not reported, apart from occasional conflict between miners
over the delineation of pits and production. However, a number of sources spoke of
forced labour imposed by FARDC soldiers during the ‘salongo’ (government installed
voluntary community labour on Saturday mornings).20 These incidents do not seem to
have a link with mineral exploitation. It is an issue that should be further researched if
such incidents continue to be reported.
B. DIRECT OR INDIRECT SUPPORT TO NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Procuring minerals from, making payments to or otherwise providing logistical assistance or equipment to,
non-state armed groups or their affiliates who:
-
Illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes, points where minerals are traded
and upstream actors in the supply chain; and/or
-
Illegally tax or extort money or minerals at points of access to mine sites, along transportation routes or
at points where minerals are traded; and/or
-
Illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export companies or international traders.
No evidence of non-state armed groups being involved in the mineral supply chain could
be established at the time of the field visit. All interviewees stated that no armed group is
present and active in or in the direct vicinity of the mines in Nyabibwe but a number of
groups used to operate and are still present in the area (please see the section on the
presence of security forces in section IV for more detail below).
C. ILLEGAL
TAXATION, EXTORTION OR CONTROL OF MINE SITES BY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
SECURITY FORCES
No evidence of current involvement of public security forces in the mineral supply chain
was found. All respondents firmly state that FARDC soldiers currently present in
Nyabibwe (101st sector since October 2012) are well informed to stay clear of the mine and
respect those orders 21 The Mining Police (a special section of the PNC) has not been
deployed in Nyabibwe and regular police forces are currently present in Nyabibwe with
10 policemen in the town center and an additional 20 in the surrounding areas. No reports
about abuses related to illegal taxation, extortion or control of mine sites by the police
have been recorded. The arrest and imprisonment of two previous commanders based in
20
It was reported that soldiers stopped miners on their way to the mine and asked them to work for them,
usually to build shelters. Some miners who refused had to pay the soldiers a few dollars and those without
means were obliged to work for a few hours for the soldiers.
21 During the army reform process different levels in military hierarchy were renamed. A sector refers to a
large contingent that is composed of a number of regiments. Even though the exact number of soldiers of the
101st sector could not be shared due to Defense regulations, it is believed to be around 1,000-1,200. Prior to the
101st sector, the much smaller military unit – the 101st regiment - had command over Nyabibwe.
STATUS: PUBLIC
14
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Nyabibwe in 2011 and early 2012 for mineral trafficking is likely to have served as a
warning to soldiers again getting involved in the mines (see chapter IV). However, the
behaviour of FARDC soldiers in the community is of concern. Civil society sources speak
of harassment of civilians by soldiers in and around Nyabibwe, mainly in the form of
extracting small sums of money, sometimes combined with arbitrary arrests. Soldiers are
also cited as being regularly fighting amongst themselves in Nyabibwe’s streets, often
under the influence of alcohol, in particular the locally popular strong liquor called ‘sapilo’
or ‘sans pitié’ (without mercy). The 101st FARDC sector is cited to be involved in its
distribution (distilling and transportation from Goma).
The only incident recorded by iTSCi
making reference to a FARDC-related risk
(2012/SK/012) recorded that “military were
passing through Nyabibwe from Bukavu to
Minova, the mineral transport route, and
some military were searching motorbikes
stealing mobile phones of passengers”.
Discussion of this incident in the CPP, the
Provincial Pilot Commission (composed of
various mineral sector actors such as the
Mines Division, FARDC, police, economic
operators, etc) led to the conclusion that
Nyabibwe only served as a transit point for
FARDC soldiers reinforcing their position
around Minova. With the withdrawal of the
M23 rebels from Goma, the security
situation normalised.
Guardes Creseurs
There are no contracted private security
forces present in Nyabibwe/Kalimbi,
other than a limited number of ‘Guardes
Creseurs’. These are miners that, on
behalf of the cooperatives, have been
chosen to perform surveillance tasks.
COMIKA states to have 30 guards,
COOMBECKA might have a similar
number. A guard that was interviewed
explains that his role is to avoid fighting
between miners and to assure that
untagged minerals do not leave or enter
the site. None of the GCs have received
specific security training and they do not
carry weapons.
Along the road Bukavu-Nyabibwe a number of police and army checkpoints exist. The
iTSCi baseline study (September 2012) makes mention of one police checkpoint, three
FARDC checkpoints and one FONER toll-barrier (National Road Works Fund). In
addition to these, the researcher observed a road police post in Murhundu (12 km from
Bukavu) and a new FARDC checkpoint between Katana and Kalehe, the latter allegedly
because of recent trouble linked to M23. A transporter (truck owner) testified that in
military at the FARDC checkpoint in Kazingo (9km from Bukavu) occasionally ask for
$20-30 bribes before allowing trucks to pass. This practice is reported to vary according to
which soldiers man the checkpoint and is not focused on mineral transport, as all trucks
with merchandise are harassed.22
22
That checkpoints are an unpredictable source of harassment was experienced when the Channel team
travelled to Nyabibwe for this assessment. At the FONER posting in Miti several FARDC soldiers approached
our car to ask for FC 1,000. At the Road Police posting in Murhundu an iTSCi field staff’s motorbike was
temporarily seized because he could not show his ‘Ordre de Mission’ (which was in the car following the
motorbike). At this same posting a taxi was stopped and a Guarde Républicaine soldier (the FARDC section
responsible for presidential protection) passing by physically assaulted the taxi driver, hitting him in the face.
STATUS: PUBLIC
15
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
D. MONEY
LAUNDERING, BRIBERY AND FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION OF THE ORIGIN
OF MINERALS
No evidence of money laundering or the misrepresentation of the origin of minerals in
Nyabibwe was found during the Governance Assessment. However, it is difficult to
identify the origin of funds involved in mineral purchase as negociants work mainly
independently and are not pre-financed by comptoir WMC or the cooperatives. Cases of
small-scale fraud have however occasionally been reported by both CSAC/CLS and iTSCi.
CSAC/CLS reports that the Mines Division on 23 December 2012 intercepted a truck
destined for Goma with ten untagged bags (270 kg) of cassiterite. On 5 January CSAC/CLS
records the following incident: “The interim chief of the Mines Division who handed the
work over to [his replacement] refused to provide the 270 kg of ceased cassiterite. In fact,
those minerals were already sold and his agents received money. The Sector Chief, ANR
and the State Posting received [money] as well. It was sold to a Nyabibwe based negociant
to be included in the tagging system.”23 This incident has also been reported by iTSCi
(2013/0006; 31st January 2013). iTSCi makes reference to 220 kg instead of 270k g and adds
that 62.5 kg of the seized minerals is still in the Nyabibwe’s Mine Division office.24 The
incident has not yet been closed as action from the Mines Division hierarchy is awaited.
iTSCi marked it as a level 3 incident (the least serious level). This case is particularly
concerning given the involvement of the very institution that is supposed to oversee the
orderly conduct of mineral exploitation in the area. The chief of the Mines Division
accused to be responsible for this incident is no longer in Nyabibwe and has allegedly
been transferred to a senior position in Shabunda (South Kivu).
CSAC/CLS also reports that 87 kg of cassiterite originating from Kasese (a non-certified
mine) was seized by SAESSCAM on 27 November 2012 in a house 2 km from Nyabibwe
centre.25 This incident was not reported by iTSCi.26 A recent Global Witness report states
that CSAC/CLS raised alarm to prevent the use of iTSCi tags “to smuggle minerals from
another mine site through the CFTI system”. 27 While there appear to be attempts to
infiltrate minerals – as the seizure of minerals from Kasese near Nyabibwe suggests - our
team did not find evidence of successful infiltration.
Movement of untagged minerals from Kalimbi to mostly Goma via a parallel supply chain
is however of serious concern. Several sources interviewed confirmed that prior to the
start of tagging many cases of nocturnal illegal transport of minerals from Nyabibwe to
Goma (by road) or by boat to Rwanda were reported, especially involving FARDC
contingents as main organizers. At the time, this was discussed with army authorities but
actual proof was difficult to find. A report was also received recently by text message to
23
The iTSCi incident states 220kg instead of the 270kg.
See annex 1 for a full overview of iTSCi reported incidents, as well as annex 2 for the incidents recorded by
CSAC. CSAC reports its incidents in handwriting in a block note.
25 See annex 2.
26 After the provision of feedback to iTSCi about the Nyabibwe assessment, iTSCi says it will open an incident.
27 Global Witness (7 May 2013) ‘Putting principles into practice: Risks and opportunities for conflict-free
sourcing in eastern Congo’, p.5.
24
STATUS: PUBLIC
16
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
iTSCi 28 and the issue was raised at the local, provincial and national level to be acted upon
by the relevant authorities.
Global Witness has evidence that since the start of the closed pipeline project this practice
continues with the involvement of at least three senior military figures of the 101 st FARDC
sector currently stationed in Nyabibwe: Commander Colonel Shaka and Majors Adoni
and Fikiri (see also chapter 4b). Global Witness’ whistle-blowers state that untagged
minerals are transported to Goma on motorbikes and in military vehicles. A FARDC
source Global Witness spoke with claims that in December 2012 about 2 tonnes of
untagged cassiterite was transported from Kalimbi to Goma.29 The transport of minerals to
Goma fuels concerns of stakeholders and observers about infiltration of minerals from the
Kivu provinces in the Rwandan supply chain. It also raises serious concerns about military
figures financially benefitting from part of the mineral production at Kalimbi. As Global
Witness argues, it is “a red flag that requires immediate attention in order to safeguard the
integrity of the project”. 30 Note that the allegations of senior military figures being
involved in smuggling were not confirmed by people interviewed for this assessment.
This is most likely due to the fact that it was the first time Channel researchers visited
Nyabibwe and that building trust takes time. However, the same individuals were named
by Channel’s sources as being involved in human rights abuses (as discussed in chapter
4b).
Small-scale bribery and corruption appears to be widespread. SAESSCAM and the Mines
Division are in various CSAC/CLS incidents reported to ask for $5-$10 bribes in exchange
for returning mostly untagged minerals that they had seized at the mine site. Even though
both have the mandate to seize minerals in case they observe irregularities (for example in
the absence of a miner card), claims of irregularities are often subjective and the line
between fines and extortion is fluid. Civil society representatives and CSAC/CLS reports
that SAESSCAM staff occasionally demands money from miners (around $2-3) before
starting the tagging on the site. The latest incident documented by CSAC/CLS was on 2
February 2013. On 28 February 2013 iTSCi filed an incident report on paid tagging in
response to the findings of this assessment (SK/2013/0009, paid tagging occurring after
official working hours). Such practice most likely takes place because of low and
infrequent salaries paid to state agents. SAESSCAM and Mines Division staff is entitled to
‘primes’ (no formal salary) and field staff state that they have not been paid since July
2012. The authorities in Bukavu claim that staff are well treated and paid. Local
SEASSCAM and Mines Division staff and miners deny that they request payment for
tagging; iTSCi is further investigating the allegations. Discussion with CSAC/CLS did not
lead to evidence or a formal complaint.
Even though not directly linked to Kalimbi, concerns raised by the UN GoE about crossborder smuggling from South Kivu into Rwanda in its most recent report persist. The
report argues that in Idjwi (the island in Lake Kivu) and Masisi territory (bordering
Incident (SK-2013-0014) of 15th April 2013; see Annex 1.
Global Witness (2013), p.8.
30 Global Witness (2013), p.8.
28
29
STATUS: PUBLIC
17
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Kalehe in North Kivu) a large number of miners have moved from tin to tungsten and
tantalum mines. The UN GoE claims that the latter minerals are more profitable to
smuggle because of higher profit margins per weight.31 Tungsten is exploited in several
locations in South Kivu too (Luntukulu/Walungu, Mitale/Kalehe, Minembwe/Fizi and
Idjwi), but for this assessment contacted authorities (such as the CEEC) say they did not
register a gram passing through formal channels over the past three years. This is
confirmed by a recent Global Witness report explaining it as an indication of a high
likelihood of large-scale smuggling.32 The UN GoE report states that “this illegal trade
undermines the exercise of due diligence in the DRC”.33
E. PAYMENT OF TAXES, FEES AND ROYALTIES DUE TO GOVERNMENTS
The iTSCi baseline study for Kalimbi (October 2012) lists both recognised and illegal taxes
(see table below). In 2012, provincial regulation caused the negociant and miner cards to
be higher priced than what the national law prescribes (mine card $5/year, negociant card
$250/year). The provincial arête of 18 January 2013 (No.13/002/GP/SK) concerning
provincial taxation for the year 2013 has lowered the price of a miner card to $10/year
(still $5 higher than national tax regulations) and a negociant card to $250/year (for which
in addition a $60 administration fee is requested (no invoice provided). When questioned,
most people interviewed stated that many illegal taxes formerly collected - and listed in
the table below - are no longer collected; this could not be confirmed. In addition,
negociants argue that they have to pay a vending/display tax (taxe d’étalage) of 0.1$/kg.
This is a remnant of mini market taxation during the RCD period (1998-2002). Even
though no longer officially recognised, the chefferie still collects this tax.
Recognised taxes
Frais rénumeratoir
Negociant card
Miner card
Decentralised Entity Tax
Cooperative royalties
Illegal taxes34
Transport authorisation
Identification form miners
Adult identification form
Right to washing
Land owner rights
Land access rights
Miner card (supplement)
Pit owner identification
Commissioner card
Négociant pays SAESSCAM
Négociant pays Mines Division
Miner pays Mines Division
Négociant pays Mines Division
Miners pay cooperatives
$0.10/kg
$560/year
$37.5/year
$0.10kg
10% of production
Négociant pays Mines Division
Miners pay SAESSCAM
Miners pay SAESSCAM
Miners pay SAESSCAM
Miners pay land owner
Washers pay land owner
Miners pay Mines Division
Chef de puit pays SAESSCAM
Commissioners pay Mines Division
$10/lot
$10/year
$10/year
$10/month
3-4% of production
$3/month/station
$12/month
$15/year
$120/year
UN GoE report November 2012, p.40 and p.53
Global Witness (2013, p.7).
33 UN GoE report November 2012, p.40.
34 Please note that the landowner’s tax is listed as an illegal tax but was found by the research team to be an
official recognized tax.
31
32
STATUS: PUBLIC
18
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Cooperative identification
Mine/well identification
Cooperative pays Mines Division
Chef de puit pays Mines Division
$100/year
$50/year
IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE
Even though the current security situation appears calm, Nyabibwe, and to a wider extent
Kalehe territory, have a turbulent recent history when it comes to rebel movements and
FARDC presence, which presents a backdrop of volatility. Both Kalehe and neighbouring
Masisi territories (Masisi is north of Kalehe in North Kivu) are characterised by complex
grievances and power struggles over land tenure; mineral wealth and politico-military
influence have a strong ethnic connotation and mutual spill-over of conflict has occurred
regularly. Especially the haut-plateaux and Kahuzi Biega National park in the vicinity of
Nyabibwe are known for FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda)
presence ever since this predominantly ethnic-Hutu militia fled Rwanda after the 1994
genocide. According to the iTSCi baseline, the last time the FDLR attacked Nyabibwe was
in 2003; at that time they had their base in Numbi, which is located about 70km west of
Nyabibwe.
A. ARMED GROUPS
A number of armed groups used to, or continue to be present and active in the Kivu
provinces and these are described here. However, no armed groups have impacted the
Kalimbi-Nyabibwe-Bukavu supply chain of tagged mineral.
In late November 2012 the M23 rebellion launched an offensive that originated in Masisi
and Rutshuru territories and took control of Goma (North Kivu) and advanced to Minova
(50km north of Nyabibwe), which triggered concern about overall stability in the Kivu
provinces. State agents and mining operators were also concerned that the M23 might
move into Nyabibwe. The Provincial Monitoring Committee (CPP) discussed the matter
and determined a plan to stop tagging and evacuate in case the M23 would approach
further. But as the M23 was pushed back and negotiations with the rebels began, the risk
for Nyabibwe waned.
A mid-February 2013 UN security briefing for the humanitarian community in South Kivu
did not report incidents linked to armed groups in Kalehe territory. The third in command
of the FARDC sector in Nyabibwe interviewed by Chanel Research however stated that
around 10 to 20 members of the Mai Mai Nyatura were identified in Numbi (70km west
from Nyabibwe) in mid-February and harassed the population. Even though cassiterite is
mined in Numbi (a site not included in the iTSCi tagging scheme), he added that the Mai
Mai were not present at the mine and were pushed out of Kalehe by the FARDC.
Another group formerly active in the area is PARECO (Patriots Resistants Congolais), which
from 2006 onwards de-facto operated alongside the FDLR in parts of Masisi, where the
FARDC was unable to provide a counter-force to the Tutsi dominated CNDP (Congrès
STATUS: PUBLIC
19
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
National pour le Développement et la Paix). 35 Congo expert Jason Sterns argues in a report
published in early 2013 that PARECO is “the manifestation of a deliberate strategy on the
part of military and political elites to reposition themselves in the face of new threats and
military movements”.36 The UN GoE suspects that ex-PARECO elements are working as
miners in Kalimbi (especially on behalf of COMIKA cooperative) but this could not be
verified during the fieldwork for this assessment. The history of conflict in the DRC has
shown that continuous loyalties to militia may sooner or later contribute to the outbreak
of renewed violence.
The same report references 15 small splinter groups in South Kivu’s Kalehe territory
alone. Event though not all Hutu-based, the two best-known examples are PARECO-fort
and the Mai Mai Nyatura (‘hit hard’ in Kinyarwanda)37, both also operating in Masisi
territory. The Mai Mai Nyatura were also reported to be involved in entering Rutshuru
together with FDLR in late February 2013. 38 Since 2012, incidents involving different
ethnic groups surged in central Masisi and involve various armed groups such as the
APCLS (Alliance Patriotique pour un Congo Libre et Souverain), the FDC (Forces Démocratiques
Congolaises), the Maï Maï Kifuafua, and the Maï Maï Kikokota. 39 The ethnic-Tutsi
dominated M23 rebellion (dubbed by many as the CNDP under a new name) also started
from Masisi territory. The news website IRIN reports that violence in Masisi in 2012 “was
worse than at any time since the 1990s, contributing to the displacement of up to half a
million people in North Kivu”.40
Another rebel group of concern for the Nyabibwe area is the Maï Maï Raia Mutomboki
(‘angry citizens’). Initially formed in 2005 in the southern part of South Kivu’s Shabunda
territory to fight against the FDLR, the group emerged in 2011 in northern Shabunda too
(Northern Shabunda borders Kalehe territory to the West). This is most likely another
grouping using the same name rather than the spread of a centralized structure.41 In early
2012, the Maï Maï Raia Mutomboki surfaced in Bunyakiri (Kalehe territory, 80km northeast of Bukavu) and in July 2012 they were first seen in North Kivu (Walikale and Masisi).
Especially the Kalehe branch of the Maï Maï Raia Mutomboki is feared for their brutal
killings and mutilations, and in particular target Rwandaphone people (FDLR but also
ordinary citizens). In September 2012 their alleged top-leader was arrested in Kindu
(Maniema province).42
Stearns, Jason (2013), PARECO: Land, local strongmen and the roots of militia politics in North Kivu,
London/Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, p.30.
36 Idem, p.23.
37 Idem, p.39.
38 Radio Okapi, 1 March 2013, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/02/28/nord-kivu-rutshuru-centre-seraittombe-aux-mains-des-fdlr/
39 UN News Centre, 4 January 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43879#.UU_9TTfjWNg
40 IRIN news, 6 March 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97602/Briefing-Militias-in-Masisi
41 Online blog by Jason Stearns, http://congosiasa.blogspot.nl/
42 Associated Press, 14-11-2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-congo-rebel-groups-kill-264-people-april
35
STATUS: PUBLIC
20
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
B. FARDC CONTROL AND ABUSES
The FARDC presence in Nyabibwe is closely intertwined with the above-analyzed ethnopolitical context of armed groups. Since October 2012 the 101st FARDC sector has
responsibility for Nyabibwe, but over the past two years various FARDC contingents were
stationed in Nyabibwe. Up to mid-2011 the 24st FARDC sector under command of
Colonel Gwigwi, an ethnic-Hutu and ex-PARECO commander, was stationed in
Nyabibwe. Already back in 2009, Colonel Gwigwi was cited by the UN GoE for having a
track record of human rights abuses, especially the recruitment of child soldiers.43 In July
2011 Colonel Gwigwi was arrested for mineral trafficking during the mineral export
suspension period installed by President Kabila (March to September 2011). The UN GoE
concluded in November 2011 that his arrest “did not intent to put a halt to military
involvement in mineral trafficking, but rather to replace one criminal FARDC network by
another”.44
From July 2011 to April 2012, the 103rd FARDC regiment under command of Colonel
Biyoyo (ex-CNDP and prior to that Mudundu 40, a Maï Maï group operating mostly in
Walungu and especially active between 1998-2003, allegedly in alliance with the RCD) was
stationed in Nyabibwe.45 Colonel Biyoyo is reported to be among the military figures that
spearheaded the defections leading to the creation of the M23 rebellion in March 2012.46
He was arrested late April 2012 because a large stockpile of arms was found in his house
in Nyabibwe.47 The UN GoE also reported that when he was in command of Nyabibwe he
was involved in extortions from civilians in Nyabibwe48 and in illegal mineral trafficking.49
From April to October 2012, the 101st regiment controlled Nyabibwe. Citizens testify that
this regiment was disciplined and no complaints about extortions and abuses committed
by soldiers were recorded. Interestingly, the international NGO Search for Common
Ground (SFCG) targeted the 101st regiment with their human-rights focused ‘Lobi Mokolo
ya Sika’ project for the army (‘tomorrow is a new day’). This project, amongst others, trains
soldiers to be human rights activists and develops activities that help strengthening civilmilitary relations.
The 101st sector is under command of Colonel Makanika who originates from the FRF
(Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes) and integrated into the FARDC in February 2011. 50
UN GoE report November 2012, p.35 ; Stearns, Jason (2013) ‘PARECO : Questions foncières, hommes forts
locaux et politique de milices au Nord Kivu’, London : Rift Valley Institute, Usalama project, p.51.
44 UN GoE report November 2011, p.137.
45 In 2006 he was convicted by a Congolese court for human rights abuses and child recruitment but fled
prison in 2009 and was subsequently appointed FARDC Colonel.
46 UN GoE report June 2012, p.20.
47 Idem ; interview UN expert group.
48 UN GoE report June 2012, p.38.
49 UN GoE report November 2011.
50 The FRF is a South Kivu based Banyamulenge-led (ethnic Tutsi) military movement largely composed of
dissident rebels that refused to integrate in the FARDC and on several occasions clashed with the army that is
in South Kivu under command of General Masunzu, a Banyamulenge. See
43
STATUS: PUBLIC
21
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Second in command is Colonel Shaka, who the UN GoE reports to be responsible for child
soldier recruitment within the FRF prior to integrating the FARDC.51 Third in command is
Colonel Guinaro (ex-FAZ, Forces Armés Zaïrois, the army of late President Mobutu). A
number of civil society sources in Nyabibwe cite Colonel Shaka to be most influential.
Another military figure cited as influential is Major Adoni, the chief of T2 (the intelligence
and security branch of the FARDC). Sources interviewed by Channel Research state that
both Colonel Shaka and the T2 are at least aware of, but often also responsible for the
forced labor, harassment and arbitrary arrests analyzed in the previous sections of this
report. Global Witness reported that Colonel Shaka, Major Adoni and a third colleague
(Major Fikiri) are involved in ongoing movement of untagged minerals from Kalimbi to
Goma52, as discussed in chapter 3d. As mentioned earlier, the current police force consists
of 30 officers, of which ten are stationed in Nyabibwe center. As their number is small
compared to the FARDC, and their superintendent is lower ranking than the army
Colonels, the PNC has not much influence in Nyabibwe.
V. MINERAL SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
This chapter addresses mineral chain management, starting with a short section on iTSCi
implementation, including the role of state actors. Thereafter the practice of tag
management and control is discussed. The last two sections present a brief description of
other supply chain initiatives and actors working on or interested to work on the mining
sector in Nyabibwe and community engagement.
A. ITSCI IMPLEMENTATION
The iTSCi baseline for Kalimbi reports 7 permanent staff members for SAESSCAM, 6 for
the Mines Division, 3 of the Administration office, 9 for the ANR and two of the anti-fraud
team. During the assessment the Mines Division stated to have ten staff members now.
Even though their number appears sufficient, especially the Mines Division staff is very
frequently rotated (every few months). Some are moved as part of normal administrative
procedures, some were not sufficiently skilled or professional and iTSCi pressed for their
replacement. For example, since October 2012 three different people so far managed the
Nyabibwe Mines Bureau. This means that the tagging process has to be explained anew
for each new staff member, attesting to the weak institutional capacity and repetitive
errors. iTSCi recently negotiated the placement of staff with sufficient skills. Another
serious problem is the lack of acceptable and frequent salaries for state agents. As low and
infrequently paid salaries are the main factors fuelling corruption, this issue presents a
serious risk to traceability.
http://journalminembwe.blogspot.nl/2011/02/les-forces-militaires-de-frf-gumino.html for more information
about the integration of 500 FRF elements into the FARDC.
51 UN GoE report November 2012, p.173.
52 Global Witness (2013), p.8.
STATUS: PUBLIC
22
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Besides the state agents, seven staff members are responsible for iTSCi implementation in
South Kivu, of which one is employed by the NGO Pact (project manager) and the other
six by BEPAT, the research institute subcontracted to implement the technical part of the
project (Bureau d'Etudes des Projets et d'Application Technique). Since the program is so far
only implemented in Nyabibwe/Kalimbi (even though baselines are being conducted on
other green sites) staff levels appear to be sufficient.53
B. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF TAGGING AND INCIDENT PROCEDURES
Management of the tagging process is generally well organized and it is impressive to see
- in a relatively short period of time (only three months of implementation until the time
of this assessment) - how much local communities know about tagging and how well
informed responsible state agents are. However, derived from the observations made
during the assessment the following paragraph addresses areas for improvement; this
should be read as constructive criticism to improve and strengthen the system.
Stock keeping of logbooks and tags: The
original filled-in logbook sheets are kept in an
orderly manner by iTSCi Bukavu in three binders
(mine, negociant, comptoir). iTSCi Bukavu holds
the correct white copies, with the exception of a
few yellow copies that should be held by the
comptoir, dating from the very beginning of the
tagging process, hence resulting probably from
confusion at the beginning. In Nyabibwe to-be
distributed tags and logbooks are kept safe
inside the iTSCi premise (behind locked doors).
As for the Mines Division and SAESSCAM, both
have offices that close with padlocks; both keep
the tags and logbooks in a carton box without Logbook pages, Mines Division
additional protection. Staff members responsible Nyabibwe
for filling the logbook at the mine site only bring
a limited number of empty pages with them to avoid staining by rain.
Neither the Mines Division nor SAESSCAM keep completed logbook pages in binders.
Whereas SAESSCAM has organised the pages in a transparent manner per series, period
and location, the Mines Division holds several piles of log book pages that are
disorganised and mixed up with other paperwork. Staff was incapable of providing a
requested page because they could not find it. iTSCi staff reports to have organised the
pages for the Mines Division in an attempt to install order but Mine Division staff
53
BEPAT staff members have previous experience in the mining sector working for SAESSCAM, BANRO,
BGR or the Mines Ministry. The field team is still accumulating experience and is quite young and lacks a
strong track-record of work experience in the sector; the combination of these two factors might weaken their
influence over seasoned mining authorities in Nyabibwe.
STATUS: PUBLIC
23
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
continue to fail the orderly filing of the papers. This lack of organization does not affect
traceability as iTSCi keeps the original copies in a structured manner.
Cancellation of logbook pages and tag incidents:
Between 25 October 2012 and 8 January 2013 the
authorities (mostly the Mines Division) cancelled or
replaced 23 pages of the 605 pages of the negociant
logbook series 1019001-1019605 (less than 4%). 12
reports (called process-verbal) were written by the
mining authorities in a timespan of roughly 11 weeks
(see annex 3a for detail); the reasons for the
cancellations include wrongly registered mine tag
numbers, double registration of mine tag numbers, and
pages that were not correctly numbered. iTSCi
considers the correction of errors and cancellation of
logbooks an essential part of the training process for the Mines Division office Nyabibwe
state agents and does not open incidents unless
persistent problems exist and training does not resolve the issues. The process-verbal are
included in the iTSCi binders with the original logbook copies (and attached to the
cancelled page numbers) and cancelled logbook sheets are notified and marked in the
main database held in London. An overview of cancelled and replaced logbook pages/tags
relevant to Nyabibwe was not available in the local iTSCi office. The incident reports make
mention of four page cancellations of other negociant logbook pages.54 Furthermore, the
Mines Division reported one lost and replaced tag that is not included in the iTSCi
incident reports,55 while six iTSCi incident reports refer to a tag issues concerning errors,
missing tags or stolen tags.56 For one of these incidents the replacement tag number is not
referenced in the summary file of incidents; for two others the tag number is wrong
(missing a digit).57
Incident reports: This assessment found no inconsistencies relating to iTSCi incident
reports. However, a few issues should be raised: Out of the 24 mining-related incidents
reported by CSAC/CLS only three are included in iTSCi incident reports (see annex 1 and
2). Taking into consideration that not all issues CSAC/CLS reports fulfil iTSCi incident
criteria, some non-reported issues appear to be eligible such as a deadly accident and
tagging that had to be paid for. When inquiring further it appeared that iTSCi staff was
not aware of many of the issues raised by CSAC/CLS, suggesting that iTSCi is not making
54
0019055 cancelled but replacement not mentioned; 1019006 to be replaced by 1019010; 1019022 and 1019049
to be replaced by 1019050; 1019590 to be replaced by 1019635 and 1019636.
55
Tag 0624037 was lost and replaced by tag 0626001 (negociant logbook page 1019004). A report/note by the
Mines Division is attached to the referenced logbook page and included in the negociant binder at iTSCi. iTSCi
states it will open an incident but confirms the lost tag had been reported in its database.
56 Reports 2012/SK/007; 2012/SK/008; 2012/SK/009; 2012/SK/010; 2012/SK/011; 2013/SK/004
57 2012/SK/011 is lacking the replacing tag number; 2012/SK/009 makes mention of mine tag 058084 and
0585085 (whereby in the first figure a 5 is missing); 2013/SK/004 makes mention of mine tag 058970. Here also
a number is missing. iTSCi promised to correct these.
STATUS: PUBLIC
24
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
full use of available information. Criteria that define if incidents are to be reported or not
are not clear to all staff, which has resulted in the incident reporting protocol being
currently updated. Compared to CSAC/CLS incident reporting, iTSCi incidents are
usually documented one to three weeks later; rapid documentation of incidents positively
affects the possibility for action.
Weight inconsistencies between mine and
negociant logbooks: A spot-check was carried out to
verify whether weights for mine tags entered in the
mine logbook roughly correspond with mine tag
weights entered in the negociant log book (gross
entry weight). Two randomly selected negociant
pages were analysed: 1019001 and 1019593.
Negociant fiche 1019593 (covering 2 to 7 January 2013
and representing the produce bought by one
negociant) showed considerable variation for seven
of the 16 reported mine tags. The total weight for the
tags on the mine logbook is 712 kg, whereas the same
tags in the negociant logbook add to 646 kg, showing
a weight loss of 66 kg (see annex 3b). Mine
production weight is compared with entry weights
received by the negociant and from experience we
know that small weight differences of up to 2.5 kg
may occur because of the evaporation/addition of
moisture, small losses due to a hole in the bag or
scale calibration problems58. The seven individual tags for which variation occurred each
represent loss or increase of over 7 kg (20-66% weight loss, or 25-32% weight increase for
the same tag). These percentages cannot be explained by moisture loss/addition and are
unlikely the result of a hole in the bag or calibration. They should hence be considered as
irregularities and be reported. Whether this specific weight difference is caused by
mistakes of staff filling in logbooks or, for the tags where substantial weight is gained
means the inclusion of other minerals (impurities) is difficult to establish retrospectively,
however, since the overall loss is greater than the gain the former is more likely. The
logbook page 1019593 forms part of the produce rejected by the comptoir WMC on 12
January 2013 due to high levels of the mineral pyrite. Channel Research was not able to
analyse a larger sample of pages and recommends iTSCi to analyse the other logbook
pages for the rejected deliveries to see if similar weight differences occur and to check if
weights differ or if the cited example it is just an isolated case, and/or related to the
retraining needs of new project participants .59 Channel Research furthermore strongly
encourages companies and stakeholders to report any irregularities immediately to iTSCi.
Differences of up to 5% can normally be explained by moisture gains or losses; although moisture loss will
be very slow from a bag and coarse minerals cannot hold much moisture as it would simply drain away.
Holes in bags can also explain losses, but not gains. Well calibrated scales can give variations up to +/-3%.
59 In the meantime, iTSCi has started investigation under incident SK/2013/0012.
58
STATUS: PUBLIC
25
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Weight inconsistencies between negociant and comptoir logbooks: As part of a
verification of negociant tag weights registered in the comptoir logbook against the
corresponding tag numbers in the negociant logbook, comptoir logbook pages 2016501 to
2016599 were analysed, covering the period 6 November to 22 December 2012 (all pages
were present in the iTSCi office and hence available for analysis). The gross entry weight
in the comptoir logbooks mostly vary by 0.5 kg as compared to the net exit weigh of the
same tag on negociant level; this can be explained by better weighing equipment used at
comptoir level and moisture. However, the comptoir logbook also shows a recurring
number of negociant tags (poids entrants) with a weight of much less than the 50 kg
reported for the same tag in the negociant logbook. For 18 tags a weight of between 4 and
20 kg was reported instead of 50 kg reported for the same tag in the negociant log book as
net exit weight (these do not concern the last tag of a lot, which is usually lower because
the remaining quantity simply does not add up to 50 kg). The weight loss for these 18
tags/bags adds up to a difference of 375 kg. See annex 3c for details on the figures. Even
though these represent only a small percentage the total tags used in the stated period, on
average three times a week such an error occurs (18 tags, 6 week period).
iTSCi staff initially suspected that the above might have a link with incident SK/2013/0002
of 12 January (still under investigation), when comptoir WMC was offered respectively 9
and 7.5 tonnes of cassiterite with a high concentrate of pyrite and refused to buy part of it.
(hence lower weights being report on comptoir level). However, negociant logbook pages
that are referenced in the SK/2013/0002 incident report have serial numbers that do not
match the sample of negociant logbook pages in annex 3c. After Channel Research
encouraged iTSCi and its partners to investigate this issue (under incident report
SK/2013/0010), iTSCi comes to the conclusion that it concerns wrong transcription by
CEEC staff rather than a real drop weight. It also relates to another observation made by
iTSCi after investigation: It appears that a number of negociants claim to have a certain
weight, which is registered and tagged by Mine Division staff without counter-weighing
it. Claimed weights are mostly higher than the real weight. It is the hypothesis that
negociants hope the ‘imaginary weight’ slips the attention of the comptoir in order to earn
more money. iTSCi is encouraged to monitoring if similar errors continue to persist
because recurring errors flaw the procedures and system.
C. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT THROUGH STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS
The community of Nyabibwe is in particular involved through the surveillance and anticorruption committee CSAC/CLS, put in place in March 2012 by the NGO Observatoire
Gouvernance et Paix (OGP) under a project funded by US DRL and managed by Pact (well
before tagging started). CSAC/CLS consists of five sub-committees positioned in villages
around Nyabibwe. CSAC/CLS Nyabibwe counts 30 members, representing a variety of
actors from local civil society organisations, state institutions and mining cooperatives that
take part in bi-monthly meetings. The state institutions and mining cooperatives are not
always present and some of the delegated participants lack capability and authority to
engage in the meetings or follow up on issues that are raised. Civil society representatives
see this as an obstacle.
STATUS: PUBLIC
26
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
CSAC/CLS was initially set up with a broad mandate to report and mediate in cases of
conflict, human rights abuses and illegal practices at community level. In practice
however most of the reported incidents have indirect links with mineral exploitation or
the actors involved. In other areas were the iTSCi programme is implemented, so called
Comités Locaux de Suivi (local monitoring committees, CLS) are put in place, but in order
not to duplicate efforts CSAC plays that role in Nyabibwe. Because CSAC/CLS is active in
raising awareness, citizens of Nyabibwe are very aware of the traceability program and its
benefit for the community. As compared to the period prior to tagging the local market is
flourishing.60 Due to the resumption of the possibility to sell minerals, people say, the local
economy is experiencing a boom 61 and staple products have become less expensive.
Nearly all people interviewed are very focused on not wanting to lose the ’green’ status of
Kalimbi mine and state that they were to take action against people that put this status at
risk. When asked where citizens would report incidents mixed answers are given ranging
from individuals known to be active human rights defenders to the public administration.
CSAC/CLS is not yet widely known but as the community is small and the bodies that
receive the reports are also represented in CSAC/CLS, it should get informed anyhow. In
short, even though CSAC/CLS has not assigned a structure or clearly identified individual
that serve as contact person for whistle-blowers, CSAC/CLS does mostly play the whistleblowing role. Information discussed in CSAC/CLS is passed on to higher levels (such as
the Provincial Pilot Committee, CPP) is relevant.
Even though iTSCi staff participates in CSAC/CLS meetings, it appears as if information
sharing, joint learning and action on incidents can be strengthened as cooperation between
iTSCi and CSAC/CLS becomes clearer and more standardized. Also the explicit and
’formal’ status of CSAC/CLS as a structure with a mandate to discuss and act upon mining
incidents could be strengthened as CSAC/CLS is relatively often seen as a project activity
initiated by OGP, instead of CSAC/CLS reflecting community engagement.
D. OTHER INITIATIVES
The Kalimbi mine has received a huge amount of interest since it received its green status
confirming low risks of conflict and military involvement, and its status as pilot site for
the CFTI and with it, the implementation of tagging in South Kivu. The following
initiatives provide an incomplete overview of activities by other actors:

BGR/GIZ: The German government, through its Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is funding a program focused on certification
of mineral resources (mines, minerals) in order to strengthen transparency and control.
Kalimbi was affected by the suspension period (export ban imposed by President Kabila) between
September 2010 and March 2011. During that period production was very low. In the period following the lift
of the ban and the start of tagging (April 2011-October 2012) there was an implicit ‘embargo’, causing low
market activity.
60
61
A woman running a popular local restaurant says that prior to October 2012 she had to slaughter one goat
every four days and quite often threw the meat away because it did not sell. Now she slaughters a goat on a
daily basis.
STATUS: PUBLIC
27
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
It is jointly implemented by BGR and GIZ. In Nyabibwe people had limited awareness
of this program and referred to visiting staff as being ‘auditors of the mine’.

PROMINES: PROMINES is a technical assistance project of the World Bank, cofunded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), to work with
the Congolese government to restructure the mining sector. Its objectives are to
increase the volume and value of mineral production, strengthen the management
capacity of the state, and increase the benefits of mineral exploitation into growth and
development. IPIS has been contracted by PROMINES to conduct a mapping of mine
sites (focused on the security situation) and to build the capacities of SAESSCAM and
the Mines Cadastre to do the same. No concrete actions of PROMINES appear to have
targeted Nyabibwe/Kalimbi so far.

BEST: The local organization BEST (Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques) is
known for awareness raising and education activities in the mines around Nyabibwe
and is in particular visibly present (use of banners in the mines where it is stated what
is not allowed in the mine).62
Beyond the iTSCi program, PACT implements two other projects related to mining in
South Kivu. First, a supply chain project funded by the US bureau for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labour (DRL) focusing on awareness raising and reform of the mineral sector.
This project is implemented in collaboration with Search for Common Ground (SFCG, an
American organisation specialised in communication. Second, a project that combines
microcredit support for (amongst others) female artisanal miners with an information and
documentation centre on mineral traceability, and capacity building of Centre de Negoce. It
is funded by USAID and implemented with (amongst others) the Congolese organisation
OGP (Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix). It was also under this project that the CSAC were
initiated as a local mechanism to identify conflict issues and stimulate multi-stakeholder
resolutions.
The fact that PACT runs a number of projects, collaborates with various local stakeholders
and disposes of several funding sources in South Kivu is an advantage because it gives the
organisation a unique position to bring about change in the important mining sector.
These various roles however also bring about challenges, such as the risk that local people
interpret traceability simply as yet another project in a context flooded with humanitarian
and development actors and efforts.
An ‘attention overkill’ aimed at Nyabibwe mining activities (see text box) results from
growing popularity among international donors and NGOs for the mining sector as
development theme. If not well coordinated and monitored an overkill of funds flowing
into a small community risks creating adverse effects. 63 Coordination mechanisms for
The person that manages BEST has on a personal basis collaborated with IPIS in data gathering in
Nyabibwe.
63 Perverse effects of humanitarian and development assistance refer to a variety of (unintended) negative
effects of assistance such increasing abuse of funds, fostering poor governance, increasing dependency,
62
STATUS: PUBLIC
28
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
development funding should pick up on this; they usually include UN structures, the
Congolese Ministry of Planning, local NGOs and international donors.
Attention overkill
In the two days the assessment team was in Nyabibwe, cars and expat-visitors were
identified from the UNDP Social Fund, the Fond pour la Consolidation de la Paix of the
German Development Bank (KFW), Oxfam-Novib, the EU network for Central Africa
EURAC and Aljazeera/an independent filmmaker. All Nyabibwe actors confirm that they
receive an overload of visitors, whether it is for auditing and research purposes, project
identification or media reports. Even though they welcome the opportunity to show what
is happening in the Kalimbi pilot site for traceability of cassiterite in South Kivu, the
assessment team sensed a degree of fatigue and growing suspicion. It is important that
the CFTI manages this attention overkill and reminds particularly donors and journalists
that thousands of other miners face the same challenges in other sites in the DRC and the
wider region.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While the functioning of the traceability programme is impressively well implemented
given the recent start of the closed pipeline project, a number of issues merit further
research or monitoring.
As for the OECD referenced risks, no serious abuses were found relating to torture, worst
forms of child labour or widespread sexual violence associated with mineral extraction,
transport and trade or to (in)direct support to non-state armed groups. There is no proof
that public security forces 64 (101st sector FARDC and police) are involved in taxation,
extortion or control of tagged minerals. FARDC soldiers are however reported to be
involved in arbitrary arrests and other human rights abuses of citizens in Nyabibwecenter. Sources claim Colonel Shaka and Major Adoni are responsible for such abuses.
Extortion was reported at one FARDC roadblock near Bukavu, targeting all trucks and not
just those transporting minerals. Of greater concern is a report by Global Witness that
claims movement of untagged cassiterite from Kalimbi to Goma controlled by the above
mentioned FARDC officials (plus a third person named Major Fikiri).65
The assessment provided no indication for money laundering, even though the lack of
transparency on where funds for mineral purchase originate from heightens the risk. In
addition to FARDC-led trading, other cases of fraud have been reported by iTSCi,
stigmatizing target groups and the phenomena whereby people ‘invent’ to be victim of human rights abuses in
order to ‘fulfill’ the NGO selection criteria for assistance. In eastern Congo this has for example been the case
in relation to sexual violence assistance.
64 Reference is only made to public security forces here as private security groups are not active in Kalimbi.
65 Global Witness (2013), p.8.
STATUS: PUBLIC
29
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
CSAC/CLS and Global Witness, including occasional attempts to move non-tagged
minerals in (from for example Kasese) and state officials reselling seized minerals.
CSAC/CLS reported that SAESSCAM and Mines Division agents occasionally demand
money before starting tagging, which is most likely motivated by infrequent and low
salaries. . With the exception of a non-recognised display tax collected by the chefferie,
findings of the assessment give way to believe that taxation is conform with provincial
legislation.
A serious concern is that ethnic violence has vastly increased in Masisi territory and may
impact further south. Groups such as the FDLR, Maï Maï Nyatura, Maï Maï Raia
Mutomboki and PARECO splinter groups are all reported to have bases and support in
Kalehe territory but are currently not active in the vicinity of Nyabibwe and its mine. As
for the FARDC, commanders of contingents previously but no longer stationed in
Nyabibwe (between 2010 and early 2012) are reported to have been involved in illegal
mineral trade. Citizens of Nyabibwe testify that the period was characterised by mineral
trafficking involving the army and human rights abuses. The military leadership of the
101st sector, currently in command of Nyabibwe, is accused of not sufficiently stepping up
against the extortion of money and arbitrary arrests. This does not take place in the mine
however Global Witness reports them to be responsible for occasional nocturnal transport
of untagged minerals to Goma.
The Kalimbi mine has historically been subject to a multiplicity of ownership claims,
currently in particular by the cooperatives COOMBECKA and COMIKA, the company
SHAMIKA and a number of local concessionaires. Conflict between them broke out on a
number of occasions and has resulted in physical assaults and legal action. Even though
there is no indication that this issue currently seriously affects the mineral chain, it is
important to follow closely the evolution in the relationship between cooperatives and
concessionaires and to analyse the potential for conflict.
The current number of miners can only be estimated at around 1,200 as the two
cooperatives COMIKA and COOMBECKA lack well-structured identification procedures.
This presents a risk given the UN GoE’s concerns over the suspected presence of ex-rebels
(previous loyalties may play a role in possible future conflict). Neither cooperative shared
production statistics, highlighting their inability to monitor miners and their production.
This presents the risk of not knowing exactly who works in the mine and, for authorities,
rapid access to how production compares to export (in view of potential parallel mineral
circuits).
Statistics provided by other sources (Mines Division, negociants and the comptoir WMC,
iTSCi) show relative consistency of approximately 240 tonnes of cassiterite produced at
mine level from 24 October 2012 (start of tagging) to mid-February 2013. Losses between
mine-negociant and negociant-comptoir (approximately 40% in total) appear to align with
the cassiterite composition from Kalimbi. A 22 tonnes difference between negociant net
exit weight and comptoir gross entry weight is most likely due to a temporary stock with
negociants prior to purchase and transport to the Bukavu comptoir WMC. Also, a solution
still needs to be found for a remaining 8.5 tonnes untagged stock from the period
preceding tagging.
STATUS: PUBLIC
30
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
In conclusion, Nyabibwe is situated in the Kalehe-Masisi border area, which has a history
of rebel movements and spillover of rebel activities in the region and has a legacy of
criminal behavior by FARDC commanders who have roots in rebel movements. Even
though Channel Research did not come across direct security risks for Nyabibwe, active
monitoring of rebel movements and follow up on the allegations of FARDC involvement
in mineral trafficking, forced labor and human rights issues in Nyabibwe should be a
priority for iTSCi, the CFTI, and its implementing partners.
The implementation of the tagging since 24 October 2012 is considered a success but high
levels of staff-turnover especially among the Mines Division staff is however of concern in
light of capacity loss and weak institutional learning. Tagging and logbook reporting is
considered adequate, even though a number of issues need to be highlighted:




SAESSCAM and Mines Division offices in Nyabibwe are insufficiently secured for
stocking tags and empty logbooks and completed logbook copies held by the Mines
Division are not adequately filed or organised to enable those services to maintain
their own records.
iTSCi-kept logbook copies show that 23 negociant pages were cancelled and replaced
by state agents (wrong tag numbers, double tag numbers, no subsequent numbering of
pages). Many of the errors are linked to wrong transcripts, corrected by training of
state agents. Even though for that reason most are not translated into an incident
report, they are corrected and included in the master database. An overview of
cancelled and replaced logbook pages/tags relevant to Nyabibwe was not available in
the local iTSCi office.
Of 24 incidents reported by CSAC/CLS only three are included in iTSCi incident
report, despite some seeming to fulfil incident criteria (e.g. corruption, fraud,
accidents). iTSCi thus seems not to make full use of CSAC/CLS information, or the
criteria for logging incidents are unclear.
A verification of a sample of tag weights from logbook pages 1019001 and 1019593
shows for a 7 out of 16 tags a significant ‘surplus’ or loss (over 7 kg more or less) when
comparing the mine weights and negociant gross entry weights; although on average
this represented an overall loss. Furthermore, between net negociant weight (the
weight in the tagged bag) and gross comptoir weight (prior to cutting the tag)
recurring significant weight losses were observed (between 7 and 30 kg per tag). In the
sampled six-week period this problem was observed for 18 tags (roughly 3 tags a
week), representing 375 kg that went missing. Both cases appear to be most likely
linked to wrong transcription, though monitoring of the situation is required.
Community members are fully informed about the process of tagging and have
experienced the benefits of for example more local market activity and increased incomes.
Because of this, they are ready to ‘protect’ the green status of the mine by reporting
irregularities. However, they are not well aware who to report irregularities to. Few have
heard of CSAC/CLS or only know it as an NGO activity rather than a process that is
implemented (partly) on behalf of the Congolese state. iTSCi also only fairly recently
starting engaging with CSAC/CLS, which can be explained by the recent recruitment,
training and field deployment of iTSCi field-staff.
STATUS: PUBLIC
31
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Please find a summary of the key risks that stem from the above conclusions and related
recommendations in the table on the following pages, categorised in high, medium and
low-level risks. None of them however directly relate to the OECD Annex II issues, which
is a sign of the positive influence tagging has on securing the exploitation and trade of
cassiterite from Kalimbi.
STATUS: PUBLIC
32
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
HIGH RISKS
Issues
Non-payment of
salaries state agents
FARDC involvement
in smuggling of
untagged Kalimbi
minerals to Goma
Significant FARDC
presence in Nyabibwe
town
Presence of multiple
armed groups in
Kalehe/Masisi
Non-transparent cashflows for mineral
purchase
Absence of clear
identification of
miners
Remaining untagged
stock of 8.5 tonnes
Risks
Money being
asked by
SAESSCAM/Mine
s Division for
tagging
Fraud affects the
project’s integrity
Category
Tagging,
corruption
Recommendation
 Assure frequent and sufficient payment of staff
salaries.
 Continue implementing strict sanctions in case
abuse of the process is observed.
Responsible
SAESSCAM,
Ministry of Mines
Follow-up
Immediately
Fraud

Raise the issue with FARDC leadership in
Bukavu and Nyabibwe and implement
appropriate measures
CPP, FARDC,
iTSCi
Immediately
Harassment
Security,
fraud

Closely monitor soldiers’ behaviour and report
harassment to the authorities
FARDC, CPP,
iTSCi
Continuous
Conflict
Security

iTSCi, CPP
Continuous
Moneylaundering
Money
laundering/fr
aud
Security

Closely monitor movement of these groups and
provide updates to all stakeholders via CPP
meetings
Be transparent on the origin of money used for
mineral purchase
July 2013

Reinforce the identification process of miners at
cooperative and miner-card level
Tagging

Evacuate the untagged stock via a channel
agreed upon by main actors
COMIKA,
COOMBECKA,
WMC, iTSCi
SAESSCAM,
COOMBECKA,
COMIKA, Mines
Division
Ministry of
Mines, iTSCi; civil
society, CFS,
OECD,
international
NGO’s
Association with
(former) armed
groups
Fraud
33
Immediately
As soon as
possible
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
MEDIUM RISKS
Issues
Confusion about
procedures for
incident reporting
Frequent
errors/inconsistencies
in weights between
logbooks
Unsafe storage of tags
and logbooks by state
agencies
LOW RISKS
Issues
Absence of clear
overviews of
production statistics
(cooperatives and
state agencies)
Frequent turn-over of
Mines Division and
SAESSCAM staff
Multiplication of
actors
Risks
Non-action upon
incidents
Category
Incidents
Recommendation
 Strengthen incident reporting (making use of
CSAC/CLS information, speed-up the process,
disseminate clear guidance on criteria)
 Investigate the examples raised in this report
 Continue training staff on errors and
inconsistencies and related incident reporting
Responsible
iTSCi
Follow-up
Immediately
Potential fraud
Tagging
iTSCi,
SAESSCAM,
Mines Division,
WMC
Immediately
Theft
Tagging

iTSCi,
SAESSCAM,
Mines Division
Immediately
Risks
Potential fraud
Category
Production
Recommendation
 Ask the cooperatives and Nyabibwe-based
state agencies to report clear and frequent
statistics to ensure full transparency and
traceability in the closed pipeline system.
Responsible
SAESSCAM,
Mines Division,
COMIKA
COOMBECKA
Follow-up
Immediately
Loss of capacities
Human
resources

Assure the placement of capable individuals
and avoid too frequent turnover of staff
SAESSCAM,
Ministry of Mines
Continuous
Fragmented
sensitization,
traceability
misunderstood,
abuse
Projects

Strengthen coordination of (international)
NGOs and other actors working in the mining
sector
Mainstream awareness raising messages,
including information about the initiative and
actors involved in tagging
CFTI, iTSCi and
partners, Ministry
of Mines/Ministry
of Planning,
UN/NGO
coordination
structures
As soon as
possible
STATUS: PUBLIC

Better secure storage of logbooks and copies by
SAESSCAM and Mines Division
34
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Local incident
reporting and whistle
blowing
Missing out on
critical
information
Incidents


STATUS: PUBLIC
Clarify the role and mandate of CSAC/CLS on
community level, being clear about the
procedure to follow for whistle-blowing
Improve participation of all actors (and
especially coordination with iTSCi)
35
iTSCi, CPP, OGP
and partners
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
As soon as
possible
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
ANNEX 1: INCIDENTS RECORDED BY ITSCI IN 2012 AND 201366
Report no
Category
SK/2012/0001 Tagging
SK/2012/0002 Tagging
Level
3
3
Site/Company
Bukavu
Bukavu/ WMC
Status
Start Date
Date
Closed
Summary
Actions taken / to be taken
During the meeting of the Provincial
Monitoring Committee, an unknown
meeting participant fiddled with one
of the tags and accidentally closed it,
rendering this tag useless.
Tag number was sent to UK data team
to be cancelled in database.
Closed.
22-10-2012 31-10-2012
One sack arriving at the comptoir
had lost its negociant tag. A
difference was found between mine
exit weight (650kg) and weight
entering the comptoir (687.2 Kg).
iTSCi made another tag available to
replace the one that was destroyed. The
UK data team was informed of the
destroyed tag number to cancel it in
the database. Transaction suspended
by the CEEC and Div Mines agents
awaiting clarification of weight
Closed
difference. iTSCi to investigate the
possibility of inaccurate scales. A new
negociant tag was attributed at the
batch. WMC and the negociant agreed
on the weight, and decided on the one
that is consigned on the negociant
logbook sheet.
07-11-2012 07-12-2012
This table presents the content of the summary of iTSCi incidents. None of the information included in this table represents the point of view or analysis of the Channel
Research researchers.
66
36
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
SK/2012/0003 Tagging
3
Bukavu/ WMC
SK/2012/0004 Tagging
3
Bukavu/ WMC
SK/2012/0005 Tagging
3
Nyabibwe/
DivMines
SK/2012/0006 Tagging
3
Nyabibwe/
DivMines
STATUS: PUBLIC
Transaction suspended by the CEEC
and Divimines agents awaiting
clarification of weight difference.
Minerals are being kept at the comptoir
depot while iTSCi investigates the
origin of the mine tag 0584252. Incident
sent to CPS for analysis. During the
CPS, a committee was created to
investigate the case. The report will be
communicated during the next CPS in
January 2013.
A compromise was found between the
comptoir and the negociant where
A difference was found between the
WMC will only pay for the quantity
mine exit weight of 15 sacks (750kg)
recorded on the logbook sheet. The
and the weight entering the comptoir
excess weight will be quarantined
(777.3Kg).
awaiting instructions from ITRI on
how to handle this problem.
The negociant sheet 1019006 was
cancelled and the data transferred to a
Errors in the completion of a
new sheet 1019010. Instructions were
negociant logbook sheet.
given to Div Mines agents to prevent
these sorts of mistakes in the future.
Sheets 1019022 and 1019049 cancelled
and data transferred to sheet number
Errors in the completion of a
1019050. Refresher training session
negociant logbook sheets 1019022
provided for Div Mines agents,
and 1019049.
negociants and cooperatives working
in the centre de negoce in Nyabibwe on
correct completion of logbooks.
A batch of minerals arrived at the
comptoir which had a greater weight
(1,217.2 Kg) than the mine exit
weight declared by the negociant
(1,150 Kg). Amongst the tags that the
negociant gave to the comptoir, the
mine tag 0584252 on the mine data
sheet 0019055 (weight 22 Kg), was
not recorded on either of the two
negociant sheets.
37
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Open;
awaiting
08-11-2012
analysis
by CPS.
Open.
08-11-2012
Closed.
09-11-2012 11-11-2012
Closed.
13-11-2012 14-11-2012
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
SK/2012/0007 Tagging
3
Bukavu/ WMC
SK/2012/0008 Tagging
2
Nyabibwe
SK/2012/0009 Tagging
2
Nyabibwe/
SAESSCAM
SK/2012/0010 Tagging
2
Bukavu
STATUS: PUBLIC
Project Manager visited Division des
mines in BUKAVU and Nyabibwe to
discuss with partners (negociants,
Errors were discovered on negociant Division des mines agents). It was
sheets 1019013 and 1019014 at the
agreed that contrary to the old
comptoir: the sum of the exit weights regulations that required negociants to
(900KG) did not match what was
only make sacks of 50kg, any quantity
written in the total exit weight box
of minerals can be tagged and the real
(870kg). Mine tag number 0584549
weight must be recorded on the
had been recorded as 058459.
negociant sheet. Official
documentation showed that the real
weight of minerals dispatched by this
negociant was 870kg.
During the night, two tagged sacks of Informed relevant authorities and UK
minerals (numbers 0624474 and
data team to cancel tag numbers in
0624479) were stolen from a
database. iTSCi to provide further
negociant's house through a hole in
training for State partners on how to
the wall.
deal with such incidents.
Two SAESSCAM agents reported
Informed relevant authorities and Uk
that they had lost two mine tags
data team to cancel tag numbers in
numbered 058084 and 0585085 from
database.
a bag with a hole in it.
All other boxes of tags in the iTSCi
iTSCi staff discovered ten negociant
office were checked. Informed UK data
tags numbered 0625111 to 0625120
team to cancel tag numbers. From now
missing from a brand new box of
on, all packages arriving at the Bukavu
tags which had been allocated to
office will be checked before being
Nyabibwe.
accepted.
38
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Closed.
13-11-2012 20-11-2012
Open.
21-11-2012
Closed.
21-11-2012 05-12-2012
Closed.
24-11-2012 05-12-2012
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
SK/2012/0011 Tagging
A negociant was found to be in
possession of a different tag number
to that written on her negociant
logbook sheet.
3
WMC
SK/2012/0012 Security
3
iTSCi received reports that military
were passing through Nyabibwe
from Bukavu to Minova, the mineral
Nyabibwe/FARDC transport route, and some military
had been were stopping and
searching motorbikes and taking
mobile phones off passers-by.
SK/2012/0013 Tagging
2
WMC
Persistent errors in the logbooks
Human
rights
3
Nyabibwe/T20
Cave in in site T20
SK/2012/0015 Tagging
2
WMC
Loss of a package of minerals
Nyabibwe/Stock
Stock of untagged minerals already
in Nyabibwe before the starting of
the implementation of the project.
This stock of untagged minerals
could contaminate the system.
SK/2012/0014
SK/2012/0016 Tagging
3
STATUS: PUBLIC
39
After investigation, it was found that
there had been an accidental swap of
tags between two negociants. Clear
instructions were given that each
negociant must jealously guard their
mine tags and check them before
delivering them to the comptoir.
It was assessed by the CPP that the
centre of Nyabibwe was only serving
as a transit point for the military, and
most have now been evacuated to
Minova. With the withdrawal of the
M23 rebels from Goma, and the
advance of the FARDC into North
Kivu, the security situation has
normalised.
Investigation conducted and
instruction to WMC to keep these
minerals until this case is solved
The miners were brought to hospital;
interdiction to access this dig
Vigilance from WMC and
communication of the tags to DATA
Base
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Closed.
15-11-2012 20-11-2012
Closed.
26-11-2012 30-11-2012
Open
19/11/2012
Closed.
11-12-2012 12-12-2012
Closed
14-12-2012 15/12/2012
Open
24-12-2012
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Report no
Categor
y
Level
Site/Com
pany
Summary
Actions taken / to be taken
Human
rights
During water removal, a pipe of the motor
Koweit/ pump was damaged and seven miners
3
Combika suffered from suffocation. Only one was sent
to hospital.
SK/2013/0002 Tagging
Negocian WMC refused to buy to negociant 6,070 kg of
3 ts/
cassiterite out of 9,070 due to the presence of
WMC
high rate of pyrite.
Tagging
SK/2013/0003 /
Security
Nyabibw
e/
People broke in to Antenne des mines office
3 Antenne on 22 December 2012. After investigation the
des
tags and logbooks are intact.
mines
SK/2013/0001
STATUS: PUBLIC
40
Status
The victim was sent to hospital. iTSCi
recommended that they pay particular
attention to ventilation in the pits and
Closed
that a medical team should be available
in case of incidents.
Negotiations between negociants and
WMC to find an agreement regarding
these lot of mineral; discussion of this
incident at the CLS; Check the quality of
the rock of Tunnel 20. A sub commission
was created by the CPP. Following
negotiations, WMC agreed to buy 6,376
kg of minerals. 3,197 kg were not bought
by WMC. However, a second lot of
minerals of bad quality arrived at WMC Open
(7.558,2 kg). After a second negotiation,
WMC agreed to buy a total of 6,320 kg of
cassiterite. The remaining 4,345kg were
not bought due to the absence of the
negociants. WMC asked the negociants
to come to discuss about these minerals.
The sub commission recommended
SAESSCAM to provide a spectrometer in
Nyabibwe and to sensitize the miners.
Request Antenne des mines to change the
door and padlock and keep iTSCi
Closed
equipment in secure places
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Start Date
11-1-2013
Date
Closed
11-1-2013
12-1-2013
31-1-2013
31-1-2013
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
SK/2013/0004 Tagging
SK/2013/0005 Tagging
SK/2013/0006 Tagging
A negociant observed that the part of the
mine tag number fell off. The sack was still
3 Kalimbi
sealed. SAESSCAM and Divimines witnessed
it.
The incident is related to incident
SK/2013/0002. One negociant had his lot
partially bougt by WMC. The negoiant
logbook sheet 1019590 was cancelled and
Negocian
replaced by two other sheets (1019635 and
3 ts/SAESS
1019636). However, iTSCi noticed that the
CAM
negociant signature was not the same. After
investigations, it appeared that the negociant
was not there and asks the state agents if his
son could sign on his behalf.
The incident is related to incident
SK/2012/0016 (stock of untagged mineral).
Cassiterite was found in a truck near
Nyabibwe on 23 December 2012. It was
confiscated by the Antenne des Mines which
did not indicate the weight of the minerals
Antenne confiscated. After complaints formulated from
des
the other administration, they agreed to
3 mines
record that the minerals weighed 202 kg.
Nyabibw However, during the ceremony during which
e
the new chief of Antenne des mines was
appointed, it was discovered that out of the
202 kg that were stored at the Antenne des
mines, only 62,5 were remaining (the rest was
sand). Investigations were launched. The
former Antenne des mines team was involved
in this incident.
STATUS: PUBLIC
41
The mine tag number 058970 was
cancelled and another attributed to this
sack.
Closed
The initial logbook sheet (1019590).
SAESSCAM and Divmines were
reminded to check the signature in case
of cancellation.
Closed
Investigations are opened. CLS is
involved in the resolution of this
incident. A New assessment of the stock
is going to be conducted. See incident
SK/2012/0016.
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Open
27-1-2013
28-1-2013
31-1-2013
31-1-2013
31/01/2013
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
Although after the date of the visit of the Channel Research team a summary of incident SK/2013/0014 is also
included below for additional information.
Report no
Category
Level
Site/Com
pany
Summary
Actions taken / to be taken
Status
Start
Date
Divimines, SAESSCAM and other partners were
informed; négociant SHABOTE was invited to the
office of Divimines in order to provide more
information; investigation opened by the Antenne des
Mines and SAESSCAM to find out the origin, quantity
and nature of the fraudulently transported minerals.
SK/2013/0014
Tagging/
2
Security
On 13 April, a vehicle has allegedly
transported more than 20 bags of
cassiterite towards Goma. The
persons who were transporting the
minerals have not yet been
identified. The minerals were
Nyabibw
transported with the complicity of
e/FARD
two Majors of the 101th sector, who
C
are based in Nyabibwe and who are
called Aboni and Fikiri. Reportedly,
the minerals belonged to Mr
Mupenda Kayumbu who is staying
at the house of the négociant called
Shabote.
STATUS: PUBLIC
42
On 22nd April, following the report from the CLS,
and similar allegations later enclosed in the report of
Global Witness (published 2nd May), Kay Nimmo
informed Mr Joseph Ikoli (Chief of staff of the
Ministry of Mines) of the concerns on behalf of the
iTSCi Governance Committee, which was followed up
Open
by Yves Bawa on 25th April.
At the international level various discussions with
stakeholders were held at the OECD meeting in Paris
on 2nd May (including with Mr Joseph Ikoli and GW),
and the CFTI programme wrote to Minister
Kabwelulu in a letter dated 24th May. On 7 June, the
Ministry of Defence noted receipt of the letter sent by
CFTI in relation to this incident. The Minister
condemned the actions of the military and was
requesting to have the source of information; On 14th
June, the Ministry of Mines stated in a letter that
appropriate measures will be taken in relation to this
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
13/04/201
3
Date
Closed
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
incident and that a mitigation plan will be drafted
with the help of ITRI and Pact;
At the provincial level, several missions of the CPP
were organised to discuss the issue (April and May
2013) and on 29th May, a delegation from the CPS
went to Nyabibwe to check the information collected
during the earlier mission of Col Bahati. The
delegation met with representatives of the FARDC,
the cooperatives, the negociants, the civil society, the
police and the ANR;
Following this mission, a mitigation plan was drafted
and finalised on 12 June, sent to the governor for
action, and iTSCi field staff is following up on its
implementation which recommends;
•
Following up with the thematic group of the
status of Shaka in Kinshasa
•
Awareness raising among the military
•
Request to the South Kivu authority to reduce
the presence of military and deploy police des mines;
arrest militaries involved in mineral dealing as an
example to others
•
Request IOM to speed up the training and
provision of equipment of police des mines for
nyabibwe
•
Repeat confirmation from all partners to
respect principles of traceability
On 3rd June, USAID, shared information according to
which so far, no administrative nor judicial measures
were taken against Col Shaka, Major Adoni and Fikiri.
The Colonel Shaka is apparently present in Kinshasa
for more than two months. He was sent there to
STATUS: PUBLIC
43
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
attend a seminar and is waiting for instruction from
the President. Major Adoni was transferred in Fizi,
while Major Fikiri is apparently still present in
Nyabibwe. No investigation was opened at the
Military Prosecution Office (Auditorat Militaire);
On 11 and 12 June, the local NGO OGP organized a
two days workshop for the FARDC. The purpose of
the workshop was to raise awareness among military
in order for them to not to get involved in mining
activities at the sites or along the mineral supply
chain.
On 17 June 2013, the Colonel Shaka was interviewed
by the MONUSCO JMAC. He stated that he was
innocent and affirmed that he was willing to face
justice;
The report of the CPP including the mitigation actions is also included below.
STATUS: PUBLIC
44
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
STATUS: PUBLIC
45
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
STATUS: PUBLIC
46
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
STATUS: PUBLIC
47
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
STATUS: PUBLIC
48
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
ANNEX 2: INCIDENTS RECORDED BY CSAC/CLS FROM MID-OCTOBER 2012 ONWARDS
Date
Incident67
Category
Solution/recommendation
15 Oct/12
SAESSCAM refused to tag three small bags of 3kg and put them together in one bag with one tag.
When the three miners were on their way with this ‘combined bag’ a Mines Division staff cut their
tag before reaching the selling point.
SAESSCAM refused to tag minerals weighing under 10kg because tags would finish too quickly.
Tagging
Better explanation of state
agents needed
Tagging
Contact with SAESSCAM
Two Mine Division chiefs fought in Nyabibwe town centre during the day. One said the other
should not be in the office because he is suspended by the hierarchy.
8eme Military Region (Nord Kivu) has stopped a bus carrying 26 bags of cassiterite coming from
Nyabibwe. Minerals belonged to [X] and [Y]. Minerals were seized in Nord Kivu.
A COMIKA chief seized the pit from a T20 team leader because the latter did no longer want to be
member of COMIKA.
A security staff of COMIKA personnel said SAESSCAM could not tag the minerals of [X] who is
‘shashulese’ (not official). [X] corrupted the security staff and only after SAESSCAM was also
corrupted they tagged it.
[X] and [Y] (COMIKA) intercepted a bag of cassiterite from [Z] because he is not member of their
cooperative. After paying $10, the bag was released.
8kg of [X] was taken by [Y] (COMIKA member) because he said [X] does not belong to a
cooperative. He was obliged to pay $5 for his minerals to be handed back and SAESSCAM tagged
it only after a corruption too.
FARDC military passing through Nyabibwe after Goma was taken by M23, no incidents reported.
The concessionaries arrived on the mine to create trouble because they are not paid for the land.
Conflict
(Not reported)
Corruption
No
Security
Under investigation by NK
authorities
Contact with COMIKA
Corruption
Lobby among COMIKA
No
Corruption
Lobby among COMIKA
Corruption
Meeting with hose that
intercepted the material and
COMIKA leaders
(Not reported)
CSAC/CLS brought the
concessionaires home
Not directly
relevant
Not directly
relevant
27 Oct/12
31 Oct/12
01 Nov/12
06 Nov/12
9 Nov/12
12 Nov/12
12 Nov/12
20 Nov/12
21 Nov/12
67
Security
Security
For the purpose of confidentiality, names of people reference in the CSAC reports are reported as [X], etc.
STATUS: PUBLIC
49
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
iTSCi
incident
report
No (training
issue)
No (training
issue)
Not required
Not required
SK/2012/0012
Not directly
relevant
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
27 Nov/12
27 Nov/12
29 Nov/12
11 Dec/12
17 Dec/12
21 Dec/12
22 Dec/12
23 Dec/12
05 Jan/13
12 Jan/13
21 Jan/13
29 Jan/13
[X] was caught with 87kg (43 and 44kg) of cassiterite on a motorbike coming from Kasese and
wanted to have it tagged in Kalimbi. COMIKA and COOMBECKA started searching for the
minerals that were hidden in the house of [Y] (2km from centre). SAESSCAM confiscated the
minerals and the person was arrested.
SAESSCAM agents [X] and [Y] do not arrive around 08.00hr. If they arrive they stay at Rusangwa
(buvette) and come to the site around 16.00hrs and start asking FC 2000 to FC 3000 for tagging
saying ‘heures supplementaires’ (overtime).
Remise et reprise chef Antenne ([X] is leaving).
Mudslide in T20 harmed [X]. His colleagues pulled him out and he went to hospital.
Corruption
SAESSCAM and Mines
Division intercepted the
minerals
No
Tagging
Contact with SAESSCAM
No
Not relevant
No
Mine Division staff [X], [Y] and [Z]) were drunk at the site and confiscated 15kg cassiterite from
[A] claiming she used somebody to carry it who was not known. After she paid $5 the carrier was
liberated and after a long negociation with SAESSCAM and iTSCi being present the 15kg were
handed back too.
Chef d’antenne mine arrested [X], [Y] and his father for having asked for a fiche the negociant
card but never came back to pay the card.
The secretary [X] from the Mines Division raised a barrier on the road to the mine and seized 37kg
from [Y] (chef d’équipe COOMBECKA) who has a card, saying one of the miners does not have a
card.
Fuso truck was captured with number plate CGO 882GAB/19 that transported minerals to Goma
(10 non tagged bags, 270kg) from [X]. The seized minerals were brought to the Mines Division
office at the presence of all state actors and iTSCi
Interim chef of Mines Division who handed the work over to [X] refused to provide the 270kg
cassiterite that were intercepted in a Fuso truck to Goma. In fact, those minerals were already sold
and his agents received money ($50), a sector staff member received $60, and others at ANR, Poste
d’État received as well. It was sold to a Nyabibwe based negociant to be included in the tagging
system. CSAC/CLS was refused to enter where the money was shared.
Drunken miners and Rastafari’s fought in a bistro near the mine and one miner and his wife were
seriously wounded [X]
At midnight an earthquake and mudslide in T20/Ngoyi (affecting the pit of [X]). Two miners
seriously wounded and one died in Goma hospital.
Conflict between a miner from COMIKA who wanted to steal the well from a COOMBECKA
Corruption
(Not reported)
Sensitization in the mine by
CSAC/CLS on protection
Mines Division Nyabibwe
informed
Human rights
Hierarchy informed
Not relevant
Corruption
Reported to Mines Division
chef but no measure taken
No
Corruption
(Not reported)
SK/2013/0006
Corruption/tag
ging
(Not reported)
SK/2013/0006
Security
Some miners were arrested
by PNC
A wall has been building the
well by the well owner
Mines division is dealing
Not relevant
STATUS: PUBLIC
50
Human rights
Human rights
Instability, risk
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
No
No
Not relevant
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
2 Feb/13
11 Feb/13
colleague.
SAESSCAM staff [X] and [Y] asked miners for FC 2000 otherwise they would not provide the tags.
of conflict
Corruption
Miner [X] was beaten by the T3 of the 101st FARDC sector because he refused to conduct forced
work for the soldier. The soldiers have a tendency to install a barrier on the road that goes to the
mine.
Human rights
with the case
SAESSCAM
manager
contacted; staff temporarily
suspended; problem no
longer observed.
Commander FARDC was
contacted; T3 temporarily
suspended.
No
No
ANNEX 3: TAG MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
A) Logbook pages cancelled by Mines Division
Date
27 Nov/12
27 Nov/12
Pages cancelled
1019052, 1019053, 1019054, 1019068 and 1019069
1019072, 1019073, 1019074, 1019075 and 1019076
10 Dec/12
07 Dec/12
14 Dec/12
28 Dec/12
30 Dec/12
30 Dec/12
03 Jan/13
03 Jan/13
08 Jan/13
1019477 and 1019480
1019485
1019469 and 1019470
1019542 and 1019543
1019536 and 109540
1019023
1019572
1019525 and 1019526
1019591 and 1019592
STATUS: PUBLIC
Pages replaced by
1019070 and 1019071
1019451, 1019452, 1019453,
1019454 and 1019455
1019488 and 1010489
1019487
1019503 and 1019504
1019549 and 101950
1019566 and 1019567
1019565
1019573
1019574 and 1019575
1019599, 1019598 and 1019600
51
Motivation
Mistakes in filling them out
Not entirely clear from PV, probably linked to mistakes in filling them
Logbook pages don’t follow in order and mine tag 0585165 doesn’t exis
Mine tag 0585904 appeared twice
Duplication of mine tag numbers 0585392 and 0585800
Duplication of mine tag numbers earlier processed
Logbook pages don’t follow in order
Mine tag 0584720 didn’t belong to negociant (should have been 058445
Double registration of mine tag 0587551
Logbook pages don’t follow in order (which isn’t really the case)
Double registration of mine tags
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
B) Weight differences between mine- and negociant logbooks68
Mine tag
0587369
0587292
0587293
0587839
0587840
0588097
0588068
0588067
0587841
0588001
0587927
0587498
0587500
0587943
0587435
0587403
kg (gross weight from mine)
27
52
48
68
30
76
39
40
22
35
33
55
42
34
56
55
712 kg total
Logbook negociant (page nr)
0019185
0019182
0019182
0019023
0019023
0019203
0019202
0019202
0019202
0019150
0019145
0019149
0019149
0019145
0019188
0019187
kg (gross entry weight negociant)
27
52
48
55
10
61
30
40
29
45
35
55
45
36
25
53
646 kg total
Difference kg
0
0
0
-13
-20
-15
-9
0
+7
+10
+2
0
+3
+2
-31
-2
Difference %
0
0
0
-19.1%
-66.6%
-19.7%
-23%
0
+31.8%
+25.5%
+6%
0
+7.1%
+5.8%
-55.3%
-3.6%
-9.3%
C) Weight differences between negociant- and comptoir logbooks
Tag negociant
062 40 78
062 41 58
062 41 04
062 41 14
68
Logbook page
negociant
1019009
1019016
1019013
1019013
Net weight negociant
(tagged bag) kg
50
50
50
50
Logbook page comptoir
2016503 (12/11)
2016506 (14/11)
2016510 (20/11)
2016510 (20/11)
Gross weight comptoir
(tagged bag) kg
43.3
39.2
43
35.5
Difference
kg
- 6.7
- 10.8
- 7
- 14.5
The cells marked red represent weigh differences of over or under 10% whether they are losses or gains. On average weight is reducing as anticipated.
STATUS: PUBLIC
52
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
% Loss
13.4%
21.6%
14%
29%
Governance Assessment Nyabibwe – March 2013
062 43 61
062 46 17
062 48 36
062 47 52
062 50 11
062 50 87
062 51 31
062 55 58
062 57 43
062 57 65
062 57 60
062 58 53
062 59 14
062 60 33
1019034
1019061
1019081
1019452
1019098
1019462
1019465
1019482
1019495
1019507
1019507
1019519
1019523
1019529
Total
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
900 kg
STATUS: PUBLIC
2016514 (23/11)
2016527 (28/11)
2016529 (30/11)
2016535 (30/11)
2016540 (03/12)
2016544 (07/12)
2016546 (07/12)
2016559 (12/12)
2016565 (13/12)
2016571 (13/12)
2016575 (15/12)
2016578 (17/12)
2016579 (20/12)
2016586 (22/12)
Total
53
42.4
19.6
23.5
34.1
23.6
20
38.4
23.6
23.1
26
25.6
20
20
24
569 kg
© 2013 ITRI (on behalf of the iTSCi Programme)
- 7.6
- 30.4
- 26.5
- 15.9
- 26.4
- 30
- 11.6
- 26.4
- 26.9
- 24
- 24.4
- 30
- 30
- 26
- 375 kg
15.2%
60.8%
53%
31.8%
52.8%
60%
23.2%
52.8%
53.8%
48%
48.8%
60%
60%
52%
41.6%