Military Power
Explaining Victory and Defeat
in Modern Battle
Stephen Biddle
November 10, 2004
U.S. U.S.
Army
Army
War War
College
College
Strategic
Strategic
Studies
Studies
Institute
Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Agenda
1.
What is “military power”?
2.
Standard explanations
3.
A new explanation
4.
Recent experience: Afghanistan and Iraq
5.
Implications
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
What is “Military Power”?
•
Ability to take and hold territory
•
Ability to inflict (and avoid)
casualties
•
Time required
U.S. Army War College
Initial focus:
mid-high intensity
conventional
warfare
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Standard Explanations
1.
Material Preponderance (Quantity)
2.
Technology (Quality)
3.
Force Employment
(Strategy, tactics, skill, motivation)
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
A New Explanation
Force employment-technology interaction as key
• Radical lethality as dominant technological fact of post-1900 battlefield
• Survival requires exposure reduction
• Since 1918, “modern system” force employment has been key to exposure
reduction – and thus, successful operations
• Problems with the modern system:
–
–
Very hard to do
Politically unpopular side effects
• Result is wide variation in degree of implementation
• Where fully implemented, limits impact of weapons’ growing lethality, range
• Where little-implemented, troops exposed to full weight of modern firepower
–
–
Increasingly grave consequences as firepower has grown more lethal
Growing gap in real military power of those who can, and cannot, implement
• Effects of technology depend on force employment:
–
–
Technological change can have opposite effects depending on force employment
Modern system force employment can compensate for wide range of technical,
numerical, shortcomings
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Lethality Trends
Armor Penetration
Artillery Range
8000
6000
100
meters
kilo m eters
150
50
0
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
meters
4000
2000
0
8000
200 mm RHA penetration range
Mean Penetration Range of U.S.
Heavy Antitank Systems
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
6000
• Ongoing, progressive increase in
lethality for last 100 years
4000
• Central problem of modern tactics:
How to survive long enough to
perform meaningful missions?
2000
0
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
The Modern System
•
Cover, concealment
•
Dispersion
•
Small unit independent maneuver
•
Suppression
•
Combined arms
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Problems with the Modern System
•
Very hard to do
– Individual, custom decision making by thousands of jr. leaders
– Tight coordination between dispersed, moving units, multiple
commanders
– Leaders must master employment, support requirements of
multiple, radically dissimilar weapon types
•
Unpopular Political, Organizational Side Effects
– Requires devolution of authority; autonomy, initiative at jr. levels
– Harder for superiors to control subordinates’ behavior
– Yields territory early
– Requires high military proficiency
U.S. Army War College
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Attacker Territorial Gain (km)
New Theory Summarized
1000
Non-Modern-System Defense
100
10
Modern-System Offense and Defense
1
Non-Modern-System Offense
0.1
1900
1925
U.S. Army War College
1950
1975
2000
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Recent Experience: Afghanistan and Iraq
•
Does 21st century technology undermine modern
system, overturn new theory?
– Many see ongoing military revolution requiring
transformed military; Afghanistan and Iraq as examples
– New theory sees no revolution: incremental extension of
trends dating to First World War
•
Do Afghanistan or Iraq suggest radical departure?
No.
Recent warfare as further examples of force
employment’s role in surviving modern firepower
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Afghanistan, 2001-2
•
•
•
•
•
Many see Afghanistan as campaign of standoff precision warfare
At first it was: indigenous Afghan Taliban unskilled, unable to
reduce exposure, easily defeated by standoff precision
As target base shifts to better-skilled al Qaeda, close combat
increasingly necessary
Al Qaeda adopts important
elements of modern system;
reduces exposure
Operation Anaconda (3/02):
– Under 50% of al Qaeda's actual
fighting positions identified
prior to ground contact, in spite
of intensive intelligence effort
– Most fire received by US units
came from initially unseen,
unanticipated al Qaeda fighting
positions
U.S. Army War College
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Iraq, 2003
•
•
•
Why were Coalition casualties so low?
Many credit technology: warfare
transformed by speed, precision strike
But Iraqi force employment very
permissive: non-modern system
•
•
•
U.S. Army War College
In 2003, 21st c. firepower punishes nonmodern-system exposure very severely
2003 does not suggest that new
technology can overwhelm modern
system exposure reduction
Caution warranted in extrapolating
technology’s effects vs. other militaries
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Central Findings
•
Force employment and technology interact in powerful,
nonlinear way
– Predictions of combat outcomes based on materiel alone
subject to gross error
•
Future warfare debate exaggerates change,
underestimates continuity
– Technology’s role in war commonly overestimated
– Force employment’s role understudied, underemphasized
•
Current developments are extensions of longstanding
trends; no revolutionary discontinuity in prospect
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Implications: Policy
•
Force Structure
– Many advocate radical restructuring to shift away from orthodox close
combat, toward standoff precision and/or SASO, COIN
– Risky:
Š
Š
Š
•
Works well vs. non-modern-system opponent
Ineffective otherwise
Cannot guarantee that we will never again
face a modern-system opponent
Joint Doctrine
– Many advocate radical change:
Š
Š
Š
Change is needed, but
orthodox incremental
adaptation is
sufficient
Emphasize speed, nonlinear operations;
avoid close combat
Neither take nor hold terrain per se
Replace concentration-breakthrough-exploitation with simultaneous operations
throughout depth of enemy positions
– Neither necessary nor desirable
Š
Š
Warfare not being revolutionized: radical change not necessary to keep up
Radical doctrines require unskilled enemy to work; cannot guarantee this
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Backup Slides
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
How to Explain Military Power?
•
•
Formal modeling
Small-n case method testing
– Operation Michael, March 1918
– Operation Goodwood, July 1944
– Operation Desert Storm, January-February 1991
•
Large-n statistical testing
– COW
– CDB90 (“HERO”)
– Miltech
•
Ex ante simulation experimentation
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Implications: IR Theory
•
Standard material indicators are poor proxies for actual capability
– Empirical literature likely to underestimate effects of capability relative
to resolve, audience costs, signaling
– Potential effects across wide range of empirical studies in IR
•
Offense-Defense Theory misspecifies technology’s role
•
To do better, must account for force employment
Central role of states’ internal characteristics
•
– Force employment variance driven by states’ varying internal politics,
social organization
•
Avenues for research:
– Other conflict types
– Explanation of variance in force employment; ex ante prediction
– Data development for force employment variables
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
2
Allied
1.5
Allied
Allied
German
1917
1918
1
0.5
0
1915
1916
Technology:
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Local Numerical Balances
Attacker:Defender Divisions
Attacker/Defender Troops
Theater Numerical Balance
5
4
3
2
MICHAEL
1
0
1915
1916
U.S. Army War College
1917
1918
1919
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
Depth of Prepared Defenses
20000
Yards
15000
10000
5000
MICHAEL
0
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
Fraction of Defenders in Reserve
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
MICHAEL
0.1
0
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
Technology:
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Force Employment:
• Modern-System German attack
• Non-Modern-System British defense
– Exposed
– Shallow
– Forward
U.S. Army War College
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
Outcome:
• Breakthrough
– 47 battalions of
British infantry
annihilated
– 530 British guns
overrun
• Exploitation fails
– 40 mile advance
– Exhaustion, Allied
reserve arrivals
halt offensive
– 250K casualties ea
– War continues
Technology:
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Force Employment:
• Modern-System German attack
• Non-Modern-System British defense
– Exposed
– Shallow
– Forward
Orthodox theories predict shattered offensive
New theory predicts offensive breakthrough, but limited consequences
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Experimental Test: Refighting the Battle of 73 Easting
•
•
•
Many see Desert Storm result as
technologically predetermined
New theory implies not: if Iraqis
had used modern system, no rout
Test via Janus recreation of 1991
Battle of 73 Easting
Counterfactuals:
– What if Iraqis had used modern
system in 1991?
– What if US technology had been
less advanced?
Experimental Results,
73 Easting Janus Simulation
Iraqi Losses
100
US Losses
90
Armored Vehicle Losses
•
80
70
60
50
σ
40
30
20
10
0
Historical Base
O lder US
Te chnology
Modern
System Iraqi
Tactics
Findings: Outcome not technologically predetermined
• Technology’s effects influenced powerfully by force employment
• Modern system defensive tactics negate Iraqi technological inferiority
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Anaconda Battlefield
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From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004