Does Government Performance Matter? Electoral Support for Incumbents in Six Post­Communist Countries Sergiu Gherghina PhD Researcher Department of Political Science University of Leiden [email protected] Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Munster 2010 (22‐27 March). Workshop: The Interrelationship between Institutional Performance and Political Support in Europe: Discussing Causes and Consequences Abstract For two decades, the Central and Eastern European party politics is characterized by the widespread inability of parties to secure stable political support (reflected in high levels of electoral volatility) that allows their presence in government for consecutive terms. This paper investigates the factors that trigger support for incumbent parties in post‐communist countries. In doing so, it examines the effect of individual evaluations at systemic level (i.e. satisfaction with democracy, government activity), partisan attachment (i.e. preference/identification), and objective indicators of individual economic success (i.e. the level of income) on the vote for incumbents. The analysis is cross‐national, conducted at individual‐level in six post‐communist countries chosen on the basis of the most similar system design. The study uses data from election surveys at two different moments in time (mid‐1990’s and the first elections of the 2000’s) and combines bivariate and multivariate statistics. The results indicate that partisanship and positive evaluations of the government explain most of the vote for incumbents. Apart from these visible patterns, there are some other valuable results in specific countries understandable solely within the larger domestic political context. Introduction The politics of post‐communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has evolved for two decades around parties. Being contemporary illustrative examples of how unthinkable (new) representative democracies are without political parties (Bryce 1921, 119; Schattschneider 1942, 1), this situation has two main causes. On the one hand, parties played crucial roles and fulfilled relevant functions in the process of regime change through initial design choices (Kitschelt 1992; Bozoki 1993; Berglund and Dellenbrant 1994; Elster et al. 1998) and in the constitutional phase of democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996; Pridham and Lewis 1996, 5). The breakdown of previous authoritarian regimes coincided with the (re)appearance1 of multi‐party systems in which independent and competitive actors had the opportunity to form elected governments. Parties were the first post‐communist institutional actors (i.e. before legislatures, governments, constitutions). From this position they had the opportunity to shape the decision‐making processes. On the other hand, legacies of the past position parties as main components of the political system. Whereas in recent decades the Western European established democracies witnessed a declining importance of parties and their replacement with alternative organizations (Lawson and Merkl 1988), the new democracies continued the party‐centered tradition of the previous regimes. Communist rulers in CEE channeled decisions through the single party (and its satellites). The weakness or lack of civil society/interest groups’ organizations strengthened the importance of political parties. This pivotal role is perpetuated and post‐communist politics is reduced to political parties (Enyedi and Toka 2007; Kopecký 2007). Such a claim is fueled by the isolated instances in which independents manage to secure seats into Parliaments or governments, the vast majority of decision‐making processes being the result of intra‐ and inter‐party competition and negotiations. Despite their prominence, most CEE political parties were created and developed in an unfriendly environment. At institutional level, their birth took place on the crude soil of no political representation and absence of democratic experiences. Moreover, they were confronted with adversarial attitudes and behaviors towards the concept of ”political party” associated in the past with the communist state. These initial settings combined with an ideological confusion and weak programmatic identities among the competitors in the first post‐communist elections (Kitschelt 1995; Grzymala‐Busse 1 Most of these countries had multi‐party competition in the inter‐war period. 1 2006) lead to situations in which voters can hardly be expected to attach specific party identification. In this respect, in spite of visible succeses at domestic (e.g. economic growth, political stability) and international levels (e.g. the NATO and EU accessions) citizens continue to perceive parties in a negative manner. Recent figures (CCEB 2001‐
2004; EB 2004‐2007) indicate that they are the least trusted political institutions in the region (the level of support rarely exceeds 15%) and this lasts from the beginning of transition (Rose 1996). Consequently, the electoral instability that characterizes the region does not come as a surprise. Their long lasting feature is the high level of electoral volatility both in absolute values and relative to the Western European countries (Rose et al. 1998; Krupavicius 1999; Lewis 2000; Birch 2001; van Biezen 2003; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005). Two direct effects are visible for parties. First, there is a severe decrease over time in the number of electoral competitors and parliamentary parties. Out of the few hundreds parties competing in elections during the past two decades approximately one sixth succeeds in continuously being represented in legislatures (Gherghina 2007). Second, there is a widespread inability of parties to secure the political support that allows their presence in government for consecutive terms. Only in isolated cases (e.g. Slovakia 1994, Czech Republic in 1998 and 2002, Hungary 2006) the same party governs or participates in coalition governments twice in a row. This situation indicates continuous loss of support by the parties in government irrespective of their label. In such a context, the empirical puzzle to be solved consists of finding appropriate explanations for this pronounced electoral vulnerability of incumbent parties in post‐communist countries. By examining political parties from six CEE countries, this study investigates the effect of government performance (citizens’ evaluations), satisfaction with democracy, party identification, and level of income on the political support for incumbents.. The central argument is that performance during the mandate in government has to be supplemented by factors such as party preference or satisfaction with the democratic development in the country to allow incumbent parties a successful appeal to voters. Conducted at individual level, the analysis is guided by the following question: What factors account for the support of incumbent parties in post­ communist countries? My quest for an answer relies on bivariate (crosstabs) and multivariate (binary logistic regression) statistics with data from surveys at two different temporal moments that 2 correspond to the post‐reform period in transition towards democracy (1996‐1998) and to the pre‐EU accession (2001‐2004). The first section of this paper focuses on the regional specificities and explores the interaction between political parties and voters in CEE. The following section formulates the hypotheses and provides the logical mechanisms for the relationships to be tested. The general situation of incumbents’ support and the results of the bivariate analyses are presented in the third and fourth sections. They are followed by a binary logistic analysis that reveals the role played by party preference, evaluations on government’s performance, and satisfaction with democracy in explaining the vote for incumbents. Finally, the conclusions summarize the main findings of the study and discuss its major implications. Why is the story different? The electoral behavior of citizens and implicitly their support for incumbents in the CEE countries has to be framed in terms of regional specificities. This section highlights the particularities of party formation and voter attachments in the post‐communist countries. In doing so, it explains how factors indicated by previous research as decisive in voting are not relevant in this context. The discussion is structured along three major institutional characteristics specific to the CEE parties and electorates: the party formation on bases that do not coincide with the Western European classical cleavages, unstable political environments where parties confront volatile electorates, and the difficult task of mobilizing elites’ loyalties. Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure (1967) cannot be identified as basis for party formation in the CEE countries. The communist regimes leveled out any type of major social differentiation through their egalitarian ideology (van Biezen 2003, 35‐36). Ethnicity, language, religion (i.e. Church isolation), and urban positioning did not make strong differences between citizens. Regarding ownership, only the state benefited of this right, eliminating possible disparities between owners and workers. As a result, the cleavage lines common to Western European countries do not find a correspondent in the CEE space (Rivera 1996). Therefore, parties could not appeal to interest representation of collective identities formed on faulty lines and their formation has other roots. Alternatively, they were created on the basis of attitudes towards institutional aspects of regime change (van Biezen 2003, 159). That explains why in 3 these countries more than one anti‐communist party emerged, with similar societal targets, but nuances in attitudes towards the previous regime. Given the absence of societal divisions, the vast majority of the CEE parties do not have societal, but rather institutional origins. Such a situation made hard to recognize the existence of traditional left‐right axes for the party competition within the CEE region. However, the absence of cleavages enforcing ideological and social differences does not imply that divisions associated with the electoral choices of citizens do not exist. Thus, although ideological differences between parties were blurry, the electoral competition was marked by debates over specific means to achieve common goals such as democratization, privatization, European accession etc. For example, the economic issues evolved around differences over growth and distribution of resources within society structured on several issues: the role and intensity of state intervention in redistributing income, free vs. directed mechanisms of distribution, and public vs. private property (Evans and Whitefield 1993). Electorates are open and volatile, rarely characterized by party identification (Rose and Mishler 1998). Generally considered indicative for the effectiveness of representation, the stability of partisan loyalties reflects the evaluations of citizens on the performances of parties, their votes being (re)allocated to reward or punish parties’ performance. Frequent vote shifts suggest a fragile identification of the electorate with established parties and indicate the availability of many voters for new electoral alternatives. CEE represents an illustrative case for these situations. Emerged in an environment with strong anti‐party feelings, post‐communist parties faced an initial problem of legitimacy that made difficult the existence of stable psychological attachments among voters. The non‐crystallization of identities did not allow a clear pattern of alignment (Mair 1997, 182). The weak societal roots strengthened the reticence of voters to attach long‐time loyalty to one political competitor. The picture of low party loyalty is complete if we add the absence of stable constituencies that may enact strong political identities among voters (van Biezen 2003, 37) and the occurrence of numerous small parties with no stable norms and conventions in the patterns of competition (Mair 1997). The latter make the electoral environment uncertain.. These are all reasons for which we cannot expect high levels of party identification. However, as hypothesized below (H2) in such a dry climate, whenever party identification occurs, it explains how people cast their votes. 4 The fluidity of political support in the CEE can be also justified from the macro‐
perspectives of trends within population and technological developments. On the one hand, the CEE post‐communist political parties occurred when volatility increased in the once stable Western European party systems (Rose and Urwin 1970; Pedersen 1983; Crewe and Denver 1985; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Franklin et al. 1992; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Thus, even within systems where preferences used to be stable voters modified their option. On the other hand, these parties burnt a few phases of development (i.e. the mass party phase and communication with the electorate through members and local organizations) and have direct access to modern resources. They took shape in an era of developed media with multiple channels of information, in a time when opinion polls are regular means of expressing public opinion, and when the voters have more access to high education and develop different values and interests compared with their predecessors. Apart from the observable advantages of such a context for political parties (i.e. effective messages to voters, higher visibility), it also provides the electorates access to more information about competitors, widening their spectrum of choices and increasing their availability. All these factors explain why variables such as party identification, positioning on the left‐right axis or discrepancies between rural and urban voters are unlikely to occur. Without societal segmentation and in the conditions of an open and available electorate, other factors may influence the voting decision. This paper focuses on four (plus two control) variables and tests hypothesized relationships. Political support for incumbents Political support represents a crucial component of the democratic governance by reflecting voters’ attitudes towards their representatives (both institutional and individual). It is built on a basis of exchange: politicians show their responsiveness towards citizens’ needs which in turn reward the responsiveness by providing support (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995). The latter, following Easton’s typology (1965), can be diffuse (i.e. evaluation of the political system as a whole) or specific (i.e. oriented towards the outputs). This study focuses on aspects partially reflecting both types of support to explain the preference for incumbents: satisfaction with democracy (diffuse) 5 and government/economic retrospective evaluations (specific).2 Additionally, two individual‐level variables are tested: party identification and the level of income. Satisfaction with democracy Satisfaction with democracy raises two problems regarding its interpretation at individual level. First, it is hard to know what people have in mind when assessing their level of satisfaction with democracy. I consider it to be a mixture of feelings in which people use long‐term evaluations of their general satisfaction with the political regime and specific short‐term experiences with the recent government performances. A particular example of how the mechanism functions is provided by Stokes (2001). In the absence of clear linkages and means of control between government and legislature, often identified through the degree of institutionalization and development of parties, the citizens witness unstable cabinets, weak, and immobile institutions. Consequently, the satisfaction with democracy cannot be high. Second, I refer to the satisfaction with democracy as reflecting the contribution of the above mentioned components (i.e. political system and government) to the happiness of the individuals. The higher this contribution, the better feelings voters have towards the system. Following this logic, satisfaction with democracy should be positively associated with incumbency and to be reflected at polls: H1: Voters satisfied with democracy in their country support the incumbents in elections. Party preference The conceptualization of party preference in this paper resembles that of identification and implies similar mechanisms at work. For reasons explained in the previous section, identification is hardly to occur as it requires long‐term stability and loyalty. Party identification has received considerable attention as determinant of the vote choice (Belknap and Campbell 1952; Miller 1952; Burdick and Brodbeck 1959; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1962). Two possible interpretations of the concept are available. First, it is seen as enduring psychological affinity between the individual and the party The reason for which I do not emphasize these categories is that they are more useful at conceptual level than in empirical terms. There are visible overlaps between them in individual evaluations, one example is provided in the sub‐section about satisfaction with democracy.
2
6 (Campbell et al. 1960). Second, party identification is considered to be specific to the short‐term policy preferences and evaluations influencing the vote choice (Miller and Shanks 1996). From this perspective, it is not rigid and often suffers modifications depending on societal conditions or political contexts (Fiorina 1981, 102). Irrespective of its conceptualization, the logical mechanism through which party identification represents a valuable predictor for the voting behavior is the same: individuals who identify with a party tend to support it in elections. Moving to the CEE context, given voters’ flexibility and openness to alternatives, as soon as they feel closer to a party, they cast votes for it. It is quite possible to have modifications in the attachments in the future, but for the short‐term investigated effect it lacks relevance. Consequently, I expect a high support for incumbents in elections from people who feel closer to them: H2: Voters who declare preference for incumbent parties are likely to support them in elections. Government/economic performance Elections often serve as visible milestones that reflect voters’ tendencies to hold incumbents responsible for the domestic situation. The probability of the survival in office often depends on their performance (Przeworski et al. 1999). Overall, there is demand for political change whenever significant downturns in the salient issues occur during an electoral cycle. When the overall situation is good or improves between elections, there is no incentive for change and parties in government benefit at polls. They are directly affected by retrospective evaluations transformed into punishment or reward behaviors. Quite often, the general evaluations of government performance refer to the specific economic conditions. This equivalence is likely to occur in the CEE countries as they faced major troubles during the 90’s in securing successful transitions from central planned to market economy (Stark and Bruszt 1998). During that period, the government responsibility for policymaking and economic management was high both in objective and perceived terms. Moreover, economy represented a crucial component of the EU accession procedures. Candidate countries had to reach certain levels of economic development and reforms were undertaken throughout the transition period. Even in the eve of accession citizens from CEE countries still evaluate 7 government performance in economic terms. When asked about the most salient issue in the country, more than 80% of respondents indicated economy (ESS 2003). Using the same data, the correlation between evaluations on government activity and situation of the economy in the country ranges between 0.64 and 0.82 in the CEE countries, all statistically significant. Consequently, without ignoring the fact that political contexts are sometimes relevant in the assignment of credit and blame to incumbents (Anderson 2000) especially in local elections (Boyne et al. 2009), using economic evaluations as proxies for government performance reflects the social realities in the CEE countries (especially in the mid‐90’s). This approach is consistent with the conclusions reached by Fidrmuc (2000) regarding the high concern of Eastern Europeans about economic issues especially during times of economic turbulences. Previous research indicates how economic conditions (i.e. performance) play key roles in voters’ decisions (Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; Ferejohn 1986; Lewis‐Beck 1988; Lewis‐Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Studies conducted in the US and Western European countries reveal that despite the various degrees to which voters hold governments accountable for economic performance, the economic evaluations strongly influence voting decisions (Bellucci 1984; Powell and Whitten 1993; Dorussen and Taylor 2002; Anderson 2007). Despite a lower level of experience in elections, these mechanisms work also in the post‐communist countries where previous research (Pacek 1994; Fidrmuc 2000; Harper 2000; Jackson et al. 2005; Tucker 2006) identifies economic effects for the vote for particular types of parties (e.g. reformists or successor parties). The economic variable appears to play such an important role that even partisans can turn away from their party in times of scarce economic performance (Kinder and Kiewit 1981). The mechanism works for legislative elections as voters attribute the main responsibility for economic performance to the cabinet and rarely if ever the president (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). In sum, economic changes are associated with day‐to‐day popular support and at polls on election day of the government (Lewis‐Beck and Paldam 2000). Based on the previous argument that economic component is the largest share of government perception in the CEE countries, I expect evaluations of the government to be positively related to support for incumbents: H3: Citizens with positive attitudes towards government activity vote for incumbents. 8 Level of income The level of income is an objective indicator of personal economic situation. It reflects the socio‐economic status of the respondent, without considering the declared satisfaction. However, it assumes retrospective evaluation as the income was obtained during previous government terms. By capturing the egocentric perspective and complementing the previous emphasized sociotropic component, this variable assesses the individual well‐being and may reflect a vote for the incumbents. A high level of income suggests a good positioning of the individuals in society. The incentives to alter such a situation are reduced, the overthrown of incumbents may bring new challenges. Furthermore, this indicator partially reflects the difference between transitional losers and winners, expected to be visible especially in the 90’s. High income is associated with (in)direct benefits for individuals of the domestic economic changes and developments. Given the economic dynamism during transition and in its immediate aftermath, the better‐off individuals may associate their success with the activity of the previous government(s). Analogously, the losers, represented by the low income, strive for improvement of their situation and have incentives to support other competitors. Consequently, I hypothesize that: H4: Citizens with high level of income have the tendency to vote for incumbents. This variable bears another implication that should be tested. A good performance of the government affects poor voters more than it does with the rich ones. This is why in the multivariate statistical model I include an interaction effect between the evaluation of government performance and the level of income. Research design Based on similarities in terms of former political regime, non‐belonging to the Soviet Union, and paths towards democratization, this paper focuses on the six former Warsaw Pact countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The case selection has both theoretical and methodological bases. Most analyses conducted about the post‐communist countries represent either extensive single‐case studies or comparisons of two countries that can rarely be generalized (Pop‐Eleches 1991; Szczerbiak 1999; Lewis 2001; Moser 2001; Spirova 2007) or broad comparisons 9 that include general explanations, leaving aside details and variables relevant for many observed countries (Miller et al. 1998; Moser 1999; Tavits 2005). By occupying a middle position on the ladder of generality, a handful of relevant studies selected a medium number of cases to provide both an in‐depth analysis of political developments and comparative perspectives (Lawson et al. 1999; Grzymala‐Busse 2002; van Biezen 2003). Such an approach provides at least two advantages. On the one hand, it is possible to have a better investigation of the processes and developments in the selected countries, with a feasible potential for comparison. On the other hand, due to the different nature of variables, such a design allows the combination of statistical and narrative comparisons based on extensive information gathered (Mahoney 1999). Moreover, a mid‐range comparison is suitable for both a longitudinal and cross‐country research that provide rich information and increases the quality of comparisons. I use individual‐level data, collected through face‐to‐face interviews. Specifically, I rely on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data sets from modules 1 (1996‐
2001) and 2 (2001‐2006). Based on multistage probability samples with random selection of respondents, these surveys are based on the population of each country in which they are conducted, aged 18 and over. Each survey usually includes about 1,200 respondents with small variations. These data sets consist of national election surveys where an identical set of questions regarding attitudes towards politics and functioning of elections was administered in the participating countries. Although Slovakia is on the list of countries where interviews were conducted, there are no available data for it. The data for this country originate in national election surveys from 1999 and 2003 that have similar questions to the CSES datasets. Bulgaria has a similar story: it is present on the country lists from both modules, data are not available for 1996‐2001. In this case I could not identify any survey similar to CSES. The hypotheses are tested through bivariate (crosstabs) and multivariate statistics (binary logistic regression because the dependent variable is dichotomous). Given the different nature of the analyzed data, I avoid aggregating them into a common dataset, Thus, I run separate models for countries, emphasizing their difeerence and similarities. 10 The dependent variable of this study is the incumbent vote choice, measured 0,1 with 1 denoting vote for the incumbent. It is based on the question: “What party did you vote for in the most recent elections for the Lower Chamber?”.3 The first independent variables is the satisfaction with democracy, measured on a four point scale with 1 (very satisfied) and 4 (not at all satisfied) as extremes. The scale does not include a neutral position. It is based on the question “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” To simplify the interpretation of results, I recoded this variable into a dummy consistent with the hypothesis: 1 for satisfaction (values 1 and 2 in the initial coding) and 0 for lack of satisfaction with democracy (values 3 and 4 in the initial coding). The variable accounting for party identification of the respondent is based on the question “Which party do you feel closer to?” The answers were coded dichotomously: 1 for identification with an incumbent party/coalition of parties and 0 for the rest of the instances. The satisfaction with the government is evaluated through two different questions as the surveys do not contain the same item. For module 1, I use the proxy of economic evaluation and the question is: “Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in your country has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” For Module 2: “Thinking about the performance of the government in general, how good or bad a job do you think it has done?” The answers are coded 1 (satisfaction with the economy and government) and 0 (otherwise). Finally, household income is a five‐point scale that has as extremes the first and fifth quintiles. I recoded as 1 the fourth and fifth quintile (high income) and 0 the rest. Education and type of employment are the two control variables employed in the multivariate statistical model. A person with high education has access to more information and this allows a different evaluation of government performance. The education variable is coded 1 for those with university education or higher and 0 otherwise. At the same time, I expect people hired in the public sector to evaluate on a different basis the incumbents than those working in private or tertiary domains. The variable is coded 1 for individuals working for in the public sector and 0 otherwise. 3 Hungary has only one Chamber and a mixed electoral system that combines proportional representation on lists with single member districts. The question in this case referred to the vote for party lists. 11 Electoral support for incumbents The electoral success of incumbent parties varies both across countries and time in CEE. Figure 1 is illustrative for the diversity of support in the two investigated time moments among the six countries. Two general trends are visible from the graphic representation. First, incumbents are more successful in the 90’s than in the eve of the EU accession. With the exception of Romania where incumbents performed better in the 2004 elections compared to 1996 (the same party was in government before both elections)4, in all countries the parties in government performed better in the first analyzed elections. The highest discrepancies are visible in the Czech Republic where the support dropped from 50 to 20% and in Poland where the incumbents won in 2001 only 6% compared to 33% four years before. In fact, the Polish case is symptomatic for a more general pattern visible in three post‐communist countries in the elections at the end of the 90s. They mark the breakdown of major parties that opposed the previous regime. Their term in office was marked by economic hardships, and the forthcoming elections meant a diminishing or disappearance from the political scene in their countries. The Polish 1997‐2001 government was formed by the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), a coalition of numerous parties formed in 1996 on the ruins of the trade union that opposed the regime starting 1981 in Poland. Reforms related to domestic reforms, NATO entry, and the EU accession led to conflicts within the coalition with numerous members defecting and moving towards the Civic Platform or Law and Justice. As a result, in 2001 AWS failed to get access into Parliament and vanished. In Romania, the 1996‐2000 government had as main actor a historical party (i.e. the Christian‐Democratic National People’s Party) that failed to get into Parliament in the following 2000 elections due to numerous internal government crises culminating with the change of three prime‐
ministers during the four years. Ever since, the party did not succeed in making a come‐
back on the political scene. In Bulgaria, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was the key‐actor within a coalition that governed the country between 1997 and 2001. General public discontent over the social cost of the reforms (i.e. high unemployment and inflation), allegations of corruption led to a major defeat in the June 2001 elections. Ever since, the party plays a minor role in Bulgarian politics. 4 The Social‐Democratic Party was in government in 1992‐1996 and 2000‐2004 with different labels: the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) and the Social‐Democratic Party (PSD) following the merger with the Social‐Democratic Party from Romania in 2001 12 Figure 1: Electoral support for incumbents in Central and Eastern Europe 100
Percentage of votes
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Bulgaria
Czech Rep.
Hungary
1996‐1998
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
2001‐2004
Note: Excepting Bulgaria in 1997 (official election results, missing survey data), the bars indicate the aggregate levels of support derived from the declared vote of respondents. The official results are similar. The second observable trend is that only in only one third of the instances the incumbents receive relatively high levels of support. This happens in the Czech Republic in 1998, Hungary in 1998 and 2002, and Slovakia in 1998. The latter displays a paradox: although in 1998 incumbents have secured considerably more votes than in 2002, they did not continue to govern. In 1998, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) ruled by Vladimir Meciar won the elections by a narrow margin, but was unable to form the government. Their previous term in office was marked by numerous criticisms brought by Western countries and domestic opponents to Meciar (i.e. holding office as prime‐minister) for his autocratic style of administration, lack of respect for democracy, corruption scandals, and high adversity with the president of the country (Michal Kovac). In 2002, the party created in 2000 by the prime‐minister Mikulas Dzurinda, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) received less support from the population compared to HZDS in 1998. However, given the coalition potential of SDKU, it got into the coalition government the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), the Christian Democratic Union (KDH), and the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO). The elections in the Czech Republic tell the opposite story and the graphical illustration is straightforward. In 1998, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), and the Christian and Democratic Union – Czech People's Party (KDU‐CSL) were incumbents although the country had a caretaker government for six months. The government of Vaclav Klaus’ fell in the autumn of 1997 as soon as KDU‐CSL left the coalition. In the subsequent elections, the three incumbent parties gathered half of electorates’ support, but only CSSD governed. Its minority 13 cabinet was supported by ODS under the terms of a formal written pact – the "Opposition Agreement". In 2002, CSSD gained enough support to engage into a coalition government with two other parties: its former ally KDU‐CSL and the Freedom Union‐
Democratic Union (US‐DEU). In a nutshell, the Czech elections provided the opportunity of incumbents to continue their work in office under different conditions. In 1998, a great deal if the high support in the electorate for incumbents was directed towards one party and allowed it to form a minority government that resisted four years. In 2002, the support represented in the graph (higher in reality, of 30%), was below the one in 1998, but sufficiently high to put it on a governing track with two new partners.
In Hungary, the high support for incumbents is given by its party system format. Two major parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz), compete in elections and alternate in government. Even when these parties lose elections, their electoral results are around 40%. In figure 1 the bar for incumbents includes one of these two large parties and their minor partners. The elections analyzed in this study had different incumbents and marked the beginning of new governments. Thus, despite the level of support, they stepped down from office. Summing up, the dynamics and consequences of the vote for incumbents vary to a similar extent with the support within the electorate. Some of this background information is helpful in understanding certain patterns identified in the bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses from the following two sections. Who supports the incumbents: bivariate statistical analyses Satisfaction with democracy is positively associated with the vote for incumbents. In most of the cases, citizens contended with the way in which democracy develops in their country have a higher tendency to cast their vote for incumbents compared with those that are unsatisfied with democracy. Table 1 includes the percentages and association coefficients for each studied country. Poland is the only country where such a relationship does not exist at none of the analyzed moments (coefficients of 0.01 and 0.05), whereas the same situation registers for Romania in 1996 (0.03). At a glance, the latter result comes unexpected as the entire discourse of the opposition was based on the failures of the incumbents to deal with the democratization process. However, an analysis of how people voted indicates that the low coefficient is due to the fact that irrespective of their satisfaction with democracy voters supported the opposition in 14 elections. Thus, incumbents were voted by less than one third of the citizens that feel satisfied with how democracy works. A similar scenario goes on in Poland where in both elections people oriented towards the opposition irrespective of their thoughts about the democratic developments. However, a certain development can be observed with respect to the Romanian voters: in the 2004 elections those unsatisfied with the democratic status of the country oriented towards opposition. The association coefficient indicates such a trend: its value is 0.15, statistically significant. One possible explanation for this attitude is represented by the stake of the elections: the campaign was conducted on the grounds of Romania’s failure to get into the EU in the 2004 wave. In the words of the opposition, the incumbents were considered guilty for the shortcomings of democracy in the country. Table 1: Satisfaction with democracy and vote for incumbents in the CEE countries (percentages) Country Attitude 1996­1998 2001­2004 democracy Opposition Incumbents Opposition Incumbents Bulgaria Satisfied ‐ ‐ 55 45 Unsatisfied ‐ ‐ 92 8 Phi 0.42** Czech Rep. Satisfied 30 70 60 40 Unsatisfied 81 19 77 23 Phi 0.5** 0.17** Hungary Satisfied 35 65 25 75 Unsatisfied 72 28 91 9 Phi 0.37** 0.67** Poland Satisfied 67 33 92 8 Unsatisfied 67 33 95 5 Phi 0.01 0.05 Romania Satisfied 68 32 54 46 Unsatisfied 71 29 72 28 Phi 0.03 0.18** Slovakia Satisfied 46 54 64 36 Unsatisfied 62 38 79 21 Phi 0.15** 0.16** 693 < N < 1042 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 Slovakia is a country without apparent dynamism between the two elections in terms of association between satisfaction with democracy and voting. However, a difference between the 1998 and 2002 elections is visible: in 1998 a majority of people satisfied with democracy voted with the incumbents (54%), whereas in 2002 their percentage decreased to almost one third (36%). In other words, for the 1998 the discrepancy between satisfaction with democracy and vote for incumbents was more clear‐cut than in the 2002 elections when most of the people oriented towards the opposition. 15 The Czech Republic and Hungary display two different trends: in the former the association between the satisfaction with democracy decreased (from 0.5 to 0.17), whereas in the second increased (from 0.37 to 0.67). Two different explanations are possible for the opposed situations. In the Czech republic, the importance of democracy decreased as time passed by. Once the country reached a certain level of democracy, the evaluations of the national performance switch to other dimensions (e.g. economy). The political discourse is consistent with this interpretation. Whether for the 1998 elections the emphasis was on the stability and democratic performance of the country still in transition, in 2002 the level of democracy was secured and the prospects for the EU accession were clearer. In Hungary, the increase of association may be caused by the experiences of the Fidesz government (1998‐2002). Although doing a good job in starting the negotiation procedures with the EU (that formally mark the establishment of democracy in political terms), the government had the tendency to polarize the society. Those satisfied with the developments supported the government, whereas those unsatisfied went with the opposition (ironically, a successor party of the Hungarian Communists). Summing up, there is partial support for the first hypothesis. Overall, there is weak to moderate association between satisfaction with democracy and vote for incumbents. According to the hypothesis we would expect such a relationship to be stronger in countries that faced problems in their democratization processes (Bulgaria and Romania). In the Bulgarian case, for the 2001 elections, the association is quite high (0.42) following a term in office of UDF (see above). However, the association in Romania is weaker than in countries with higher democratic performances (e.g. the Czech Republic or Hungary). The relevance of satisfaction with democracy in explaining the vote for incumbents is not affected by these countries getting closer to the EU accession. Thus, the objective democratic performances do not correspond for many respondents with their perception of democratic functioning. The role of party preference Preference for a party (i.e. feeling closer to) is overall highly associated with the vote for incumbents. With the exception of Hungary in the 2002 elections (see table 2), the coefficients are medium and high and statistically significant. The peaks are reached by Hungary in 1998, Bulgaria in 2001, and the Czech Republic in 2002 where almost no 16 variance is left unexplained. Once we know the party preference of an individual, the certainty to determine the vote choice is very high, almost deterministic. For most of the other cases the prediction of how people vote on the bases of their party preference works quite well. For the Czech Republic and Slovakia the coefficients improve in the 2002 elections compared to their 1998 electoral contests. Slovakia is the country where more people feeling closer to the incumbents vote for the opposition than the other way around. In Hungary, Romania and Poland they decrease as time passes by. Possible explanations for these longitudinal trends are connected with the structure of competition and government stability, explained in the previous section. Table 2: Party preference and vote for incumbents in the CEE countries (percentages) Country 1996­1998 2001­2004 Preference Opposition Incumbents Opposition Incumbents Bulgaria Opposition ‐ ‐ 97 3 Incumbents ‐ ‐ 1 99 Phi 0.94** Czech Rep. Opposition 66 34 97 3 Incumbents 3 97 11 89 Phi 0.56** 0.87** Hungary Opposition 98 2 58 42 Incumbents 1 99 0 100 Phi 0.97** 0.1* Poland Opposition 82 18 97 3 Incumbents 8 92 31 69 Phi 0.64** 0.61** Romania Opposition 78 22 71 29 Incumbents 20 81 2 98 Phi 0.44** 0.38** Slovakia Opposition 80 20 96 4 Incumbents 33 67 27 73 Phi 0.48** 0.73** 490 < N < 1229 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 The puzzling situation occurs for Hungary, country that registers the extreme values of the association coefficients between the two variables. Why was this in 1998 so high and in 2002 so low? Before providing an answer, the percentages of people voting with the incumbents are relevant. In both elections almost all identifying with the government parties voted for them. Percentages modify only when it comes to the preference for an opposition party where 40% vote for incumbents. Moreover, this may be surprising in the context of the opposition parties winning the elections. The explanation is technical rather than empirical. It lies in the large discrepancy between people identifying with the incumbents and opposition. In this respect, out of the total number of valid answers 17 (946) not more than 10% declared closer to the incumbents whereas the bulk of respondents mentioned opposition parties. Concluding, the second hypothesis finds substantial support in all the CEE countries for at least one moment in time. As expected, once people feel closer to a party, they have the tendency to cast their votes according to their preference. Government evaluation and income level The hypothesis regarding the relationship between government evaluation and the vote for incumbents finds medium to high support in the CEE countries. Slovakia in 1998 (see table 3) is the only case where there is almost no relationship between the satisfaction with government activity and the vote. No matter what, people oriented towards the opposition. The association coefficient is negative because people evaluating as positive the government activity vote more with the opposition than those considering it as negative. As mentioned, the proxy used for those elections is the economic performance. Given that they had to evaluate the Meciar government, satisfaction with the economy does not reflect entirely their opinion on government activity. Thus, although they had a positive attitude towards the economic development, the scandals, corruption, and political hatred fight between the prime‐minister and the president may have determined a vote for the opposition. At the same time, this low coefficient may not come as a surprise when looking at the 2002 elections. The association between government evaluation and vote for incumbents is quite weak (0.26), smaller values are registered only in Poland. For the latter, citizens appear to vote for the opposition irrespective of their evaluations of the government performances. In 1997, the percentage of voters is almost equally divided between incumbents and opposition among the voters with positive evaluation of the government (but still a minus for the incumbents), whereas in 2001 the satisfaction with the government determined only one fifth of the voters to orient towards incumbents. In Hungary, the importance of government performance in explaining the vote for incumbents increases in 2002 compared to 1998. This coincides with the shaping of the party system in the format of two large parties and two‐three minor competitors that may be their allies in forming a government. The main beneficiaries of the satisfaction with the government were the incumbents, whereas the unsatisfied population oriented towards the opposition parties. Although the population was 18 somehow evenly distributed between satisfaction and dissatisfaction category, the vote of a smaller proportion from the satisfied camp with the incumbents may have caused their loss. Table 3: Satisfaction with government performance and vote for incumbents (percentages) Country 1996­1998 2001­2004 Gov. performance Opposition Incumbents Opposition Incumbents Bulgaria Good ‐ ‐ 53 47 Bad ‐ ‐ 94 6 Phi 0.48** Czech Rep. Good 14 86 53 47 Bad 61 39 87 13 Phi 0.4** 0.35** Hungary Good 27 73 25 75 Bad 68 32 95 5 Phi 0.39** 0.71** Poland Good 46 54 79 21 Bad 73 27 96 4 Phi 0.22** 0.23** Romania Good 52 48 38 62 Bad 73 27 82 18 Phi 0.16** 0.46** Slovakia Good 62 38 55 45 Bad 52 48 80 20 Phi ‐0.05 0.26** 560 < N < 1139 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 Income and control variables The hypothesis regarding the level of income finds the least support among the tested relationships. The results are mixed, having countries in which rich people vote less for incumbents than citizens with low income (e.g. Romania), countries in which the opposite happens (e.g. Bulgaria), and countries with almost no relationship (e.g. Hungary, Poland). The Romanian situation can be explained by the profile of the voters. Usually, voters of the National Liberal Party (PNL) are better off compared to the rest of the citizens. As PNL was in opposition for both investigated elections, the high percentage of people with high income voting for opposition may not come as a surprise. With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, the association of the variables disappears between the mid 90’s elections and those from the beginning of 2000. For example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia displayed a tendency of the people with high income to vote for incumbents, but it disappears (and if it exist, there is in the opposite direction) four years later. 19 Table 4: Level of income and vote for incumbents (percentages) Country Level 1996­1998 2001­2004 Income Opposition Incumbents Opposition Incumbents Bulgaria Low ‐ ‐ 89 11 High ‐ ‐ 79 21 Phi 0.13** Czech Rep. Low 57 43 68 32 High 43 57 69 31 Phi 0.14** ‐0.01 Hungary Low 57 43 54 46 High 51 49 60 60 Phi 0.06 ‐0.05 Poland Low 69 31 94 6 High 66 34 93 7 Phi 0.03** 0.01 Romania Low 64 36 56 44 High 79 21 72 28 Phi ‐0.16** ‐0.17** Slovakia Low 57 43 74 26 High 48 52 83 17 Phi 0.09** ‐0.03 537 < N < 1272 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 I have controlled for education and type of employment and both provide very weak association coefficients. The highest value is 0.08, not significant. The bivariate statistical analyses indicate that the strongest support was found for the hypothesis regarding the party preference, followed by the satisfaction with the government, and satisfaction with democracy. The latter loses substantial meaning in some cases. The level of income appears as a poor predictor for the vote for incumbents, reaching only isolated weak support. Given these findings, the multivariate statistical analysis can clarify how the variables perform in a common model. Findings of the Multivariate Statistical Analysis The binary logistic regression estimates for the country surveys are displayed in tables 5 and 6. The Hosmer and Lemeshow tests provide non‐significant statistical results (0.33 < p < 0.88) and thus indicate that each used model adequately fits the data. The results of the likelihood ratio tests and the chi square values allow rejecting the hypothesis that all coefficients in the model excepting the constant are 0. At least 76% of the cases were correctly predicted in all elections, with a peak of 98% for the 1998 elections in Hungary and for the 2001 elections in Bulgaria. The tables reflect the simplest models from which control variables were excluded after observing their lack of statistical significance and impact on the vote choice. Variables in the models are dummies, I have also ran the 20 analysis with the initial coding (i.e. multiple categories or ordinal values) and the results are similar. For the sake of consistency and simplicity, I stick to the use and interpretation of dichotomous variables. Table 5 presents analyses from the elections at the mid 90’s, including five countries given the missing Bulgarian data. The logistic regression coefficients for the individual variables are consistent with the findings of the bivariate analyses. Voters’ support for incumbents is mainly decided by party preference and retrospective evaluation of the government activity. Not surprisingly, party preference has a strong positive impact on vote choice for incumbents in all the CEE countries at this moment in time. For a substantial understanding of the impact, let us take the extreme example of Hungary in 1998 (the country with the highest coefficient in the regression). Moving from a value of 0 (no preference for incumbents) to 1 (voters feeling close to incumbents), the change in the probability of voting for the incumbent is about 90 points, practically explaining it entirely. When calculating the predicted probabilities I assume the most common values for the other variables in the model. Table 5: Logistic regression of incumbent vote for CEE countries – elections 1996­1998 Variable Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Democratic performance 1.81** 0.97 ‐0.16 0.14 1.01** (0.2) (0.91) (0.22) (0.17) (0.28) Party preference 3.95** 8.97** 4.15** 2.54** 2.69** (0.44) (1.27) (0.3) (0.26) (0.24) Government evaluation 1.47** 3.58* 1.04** 0.9** 0.04 (0.35) (1.49) (0.31) (0.3) (0.65) Income level 0.52** 1.02 ‐0.24 ‐0.84** 0.52** (0.2) (1.38) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) Gov. evaluation * income ‐0.28 ‐2.89 0.6 ‐0.53 ‐0.09 (0.48) (2.3) (0.44) (0.5) (0.8) Constant ‐2.29 ‐6.17 ‐1.7 ‐1.16 1.27 (0.19) (1.35) (0.21) (0.14) (0.31) 0.59 0.95 0.54 0.27 0.41 Nagelkerke R2 Cases correctly predicted (%) 80 98 85 78 76 Note: Main entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 Government evaluation appears as the second important predictor of the model. The only country where it does not make much of a difference is Slovakia in 1998. As previously explained in the bivariate analysis, there are empirical reasons for this poor explanatory potential. The positive evaluation of the government’s activity has impact in the rest of the models, but more reduced than party preference. To take the same Hungarian example, the change in voter support for the incumbent is quite responsive to 21 the positive evaluation. I estimate the change in the probability in voting for the incumbent to be around 40 points from about 0.2 to about 0.6. Therefore, Hungarian voters positively evaluating the government are more likely to vote for incumbents compared to the rest of citizens. There is mixed evidence in support of the hypothesis that satisfaction with democracy influences the vote for incumbents. There is isolated statistically significant impact of this variable (the Czech Republic and Slovakia). By checking the change in probability to vote for incumbents once they hold positive evaluations over democracy in their country, the results indicate around 20 points in Slovakia and 30 in the Czech Republic. The income level and the interaction effect have overall weak and not statistically significant results (the exception is Romania for the level of income). They provide the least important results for the model. Wrapping up, for the mid‐90’s elections the evaluation of government activity has to be complemented mainly by party preference in order to explain the vote for incumbents. In fact, party preference bears most of the explanatory potential, as revealed also in the bivariate analyses. Table 6 includes the same analysis conducted for the elections in the 2000’s. The patterns detected for the previous period are valid in this situation as well. Results indicate a general strong positive impact of party preference on vote for incumbents. The countries with the highest change in the predicted probability of voting for the incumbents relatively to party preference are Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, both with values over 80 points. As visible also in the bivariate statistical analysis, the connection between party preference and vote is different in Hungary than four years before: the direction of the impact is the same (positive), but the intensity is considerably weakened (approximately 15 points of change in probability of vote compared to the 90 points from the previous elections). Table 6: Logistic regression of incumbent vote for CEE countries – elections 2001­2004 Variable Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Democratic performance 0.78 1.0* 2.83** ‐0.45 0.17 (0.73) (0.5) (0.41) (0.6) (0.35) Party preference 8.55** 5.7** 1.4** 4.5** 2.43** (0.73) (0.57) (0.21) (0.62) (0.34) Government evaluation 3.7** 0.28 3.97** 2.06* 1.73** (1.2) (0.75) (0.78) (0.85) (0.31) Income level 1.04 ‐0.71 0.33 ‐0.59 ‐1.21** (1.3) (1.01) (1.04) (0.75) (0.43) Gov. evaluation * income ‐1.73 0.7 ‐0.39 1.39 0.7 (1.5) (1.16) (1.09) (1.13) (0.53) Constant ‐5.84 ‐3.78 ‐4.98 ‐3.71 ‐1.51 Slovakia 0.26 (0.45) 4.04** (0.47) 0.52 (0.45) ‐0.34 (0.25) 1.12 (0.67) ‐3.57 22 (1.53) (0.67) (0.77) (0.47) (0.24) (0.44) 0.91 0.81 0.76 0.52 0.68 0.62 Nagelkerke R2 Cases correctly predicted (%) 98 94 91 95 86 89 Note: Main entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.05 The impact of government evaluation is in most cases significant (with the exception of Slovakia) and always positive. The change in probability in voting for the incumbents ranges between about 20 points in the case of a positive evaluation (e.g. Poland) to slightly more than 40 points (e.g. Hungary). The evaluation of government activity appears to explain the vote for incumbents; however, with less impact than the party preference does it. The connection between the satisfaction with democracy and vote for incumbents is sometimes significant, sometimes not, but in almost all countries (with the exception of Poland in the 2001 elections) is positive. The reduced impact of this variable is revealed by the fact that in Hungary, the country with the highest coefficient, the change in predicted probabilities for the vote of an incumbent is no more than 35 points, whereas in the Czech Republic evolves somewhere around 10. A similar blurry picture is observable for the other two variables in the model (i.e. the level of income, the interaction effect). Mixed evidence and lack of statistical significance in almost all cases (with the exception of Romania for the level of income in its 2004 elections) illustrates the reduced importance of these variables in predicting the vote choice for incumbents. Summing up, the binary logistic regression confirms the results of the bivariate statistical analyses. The hypotheses regarding the impact of party preference and evaluation of government’s activity on electoral support for incumbents found most support. For the other relationships there is mixed and weak evidence that does not allow drawing relevant conclusions. Conclusions Incumbents are rarely successful at the polls in the CEE elections. With isolated exceptions, most of them lose the support of the electorate at the end of their term in office. This paper investigated four possible explanations (plus controlling for one interaction effect two socio‐demographic factors) of the vote for incumbents in six post‐
communist countries. The results of the bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses 23 indicate that the main variable influencing voter’s decision is their preference for parties. Such a conclusion is not surprising in established democracies. However, given the particularities emphasized in the second section of this paper, it is relevant for the CEE context. As soon as voters attach partisan loyalties to one competitor, their vote decision follows those lines. Incumbents rarely lose voters who feel attracted to them, most of the times it happens in times of radical change (e.g. when people generally vote for the opposition no matter what). Evaluations of government performance, either on economic (the data from mid‐
90’s) or general terms, has not only statistically significant influence on the individual vote, but also substantive meaning. As both cross‐tab analyses and multivariate statistical models indicate, citizens bearing positive attitudes towards the work of the government have the tendency to support incumbents for a future mandate. This pattern can be observed in every country at various extents. Most of the times, the intensity of the influence can be explained through contextual domestic factors. The latter also explain the few instances in which the satisfaction with democracy is related to the vote for incumbents. Only in a few cases (e.g. the Czech Republic in 1998 and 2002) it has significant impact the vote decision and people satisfied with democracy vote for incumbents. In the other countries the picture is blurry. The same happens with the level of income where no visible strong pattern can be detected among the rich people. In most instances, there is a weak relationship between the two variables and quite often registered only for one election in a country (it disappears in the second). The study has two major theoretical and empirical implications. First, the bases on which people take decisions for their vote are not different in the new democracies compared to the consolidated ones. Citizens cast their vote for parties that attract them and do well in government. The longitudinal dimension approached in the paper allows observing almost no discrepancies between the relevance of these two variables at different moments in time. Both during transition and democratic consolidation periods, the CEE citizens give priority to their subjective evaluations in terms of party preference and government evaluation. In their decision, general items like satisfaction with democracy do not play a major role. The same happens with specific economic wealth, type of employment or level of education, none of these influencing the vote for incumbents. 24 Second, at empirical level, these findings illustrate how citizens use elections to express approval or disapproval for the government performance. This implies that voters hold cabinets directly accountable for the domestic situation more in economic terms than in those referring to democratic performances. What governments do matters for their future. However, they may survive the electoral tests with poor performances as long as they manage to create feelings of partisanship among voters. The lack of strong relationships between the evaluations of incumbents’ work and the preference for them (correlation coefficients between 0.23 and 0.55) indicate that the latter has other sources. In the electoral environment characterized by openness and availability, such sources may be valuable in explaining support for incumbents. 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