Clueless
Feedback
Competition
AirClues
Issue 14 Autumn/Winter 2014
A Single
European Sky
Spry says…
Safety Awards
I did something
that even to this
day makes me
cringe…
Military Threat
or Opportunity?
Class F Advisory
Routes to go…
38
Air Clues
52
58
22
51
10
Contents
Spry’s view
4
Use it or lose it
28
There are no new accidents…
5
JFACTSU NOTAM
32
Could I learn about Human Factors from that? 6
Working together 34
8
Mid-Air Collision 38
DASORs
I learnt about flying from that…
10
Awards
42
Cultivating Safety
12
Competition Time
51
A Single European Sky
16
Docs Corner
52
CNS Snippets
21
Blast from the Past
54
Standardised European Rules of the Air
22
Coalition FOD walk 56
Class F Advisory Routes to go 26
The views expressed within Air Clues are those of the
authors concerned, and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Royal Air Force, or MOD. All rights reserved.
Winter Woes
58
Feedback
62
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without
prior permission in writing from the editor. Unless by prior
arrangement, articles and photographs will not normally
be returned.
Write to the Editor: [email protected]
ISSUE 14 contents
3
Air Clues
Spry’s view
Greetings from Spry Towers and welcome to the Autumn/
Winter 2014 edition of the Air Clues magazine.
A large portion of this particular edition is dedicated to the
Single European Sky (SES) project, thanks to the fellows over
at Defence Airspace and Air Traffic Management (DAATM).
They have provided us all with an excellent overview of
SES; you should find this to be an interesting set of articles
that brings some visible detail to an otherwise background
subject. I commend you all to read and digest. The SES project
aims to increase efficiency and flexibility and to improve
safety… I for one am extremely keen to make the skies a safer
place for us all. It is all a long way away from the carefree map
and stopwatch procedures of my day but, just like this new
multi-wotsit-gadget-thingy that Percy insists I carry around
with me, we must all embrace technology and look to
the future!
procedures and a gen-up on the information contained in
your aircrew manuals and generic procedures in AP3456
would certainly not go amiss. Here at the RAF Safety Centre
we focus on ‘Total Safety’. In winter months, we pay particular
attention to road safety. With that in mind, please ensure you
take care on the roads and, after your tough sortie and hardearned winning debrief, make sure you give your mighty
4 -wheeled chariot the utmost respect on your way home.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to urge you all to
stay SAFE for the remainder of 2014. If you have any feedback
or would like to submit an article, please get in touch.
Looking forward to the next issue in Spring/Summer 2015,
our star article is planned to be a Flying Display Director’s
view of Air Show organisation and execution, just in time
for next season!
Yours aye
Some areas of the UK Low Flying System have recently seen
an increase in activity thanks to upgrades and changes in
various fleets, such as the Puma, and the number of UK based
aircraft is set to increase again following withdrawal from
Afghanistan later this year. One of CAS’s top risks is that of
Mid Air Collision (MAC) and this, coupled with an anticipated
increase in low flying activity over the year ahead, has been
one of our main concerns in recent months. In our MAC article
you can read about the Safety Centre’s activity surrounding
MAC and tools such as the Collision Avoidance Detection
System (CADS) that can help reduce the MAC risk when used
properly. Personally I would like to take this opportunity to
remind you all of the basics from your flight training days…
use your eyes! To quote an old training video: “Look out and
fly accurately, Jim”.
With winter tugging at our coat tails, our Winter Weather
article, courtesy of the Met Office at RAF Cranwell, gives some
good reminders of what to expect should this winter prove
to be a bad one. It is well worth you dusting off your winter
4
spry’s view ISSUE 14
Spry
Download the free Blippar App from Google Play, Blackberry App World
(For the new Blackberry Z10 Series phone) or App stores and scan the page
or image wherever you see the Blippar logo.
Air Clues
There are no new accidents…
By Dr D Stevenson, RAF CAM MO2
On 14 August 2005 Helios Airways Flight 522 crashed into a
mountain near Athens, Greece when the aircraft ran out of
fuel. One hundred and twenty-one people died, although
they were probably already dead when the aircraft struck
the ground. The aircraft had taken off with the cabin
pressure switch in ‘Manual’ instead of ‘Auto’. The crew and
passengers became unconscious due to hypoxia as the
aircraft climbed without pressurizing. There were several
factors which, in concert, led to this incident, but one is
of special interest: to quote the official Greek accident
report, (available at http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/
books/1170.pdf) a direct cause of the accident was:
“Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector
was in the MAN (manual) position during the performance
of the:
a.Preflight procedure;
b.Before Start checklist; and
c.After Takeoff checklist.”
A captain with 16,900 total hours flying time, and a first officer
with 7,549 hours, on 3 occasions presumably read off the
checklist item, looked at the switch set on manual, and saw
what they expected to see, not what was really there.
Earlier this year the crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737 “…missed
an incorrect checklist response which led the aircraft to
depart without its pressurisation system active…”.
The captain responded “packs off”, when the first officer called
out the air conditioning system status. Whilst the before start
checklist requires the air conditioning packs to be off, the
after start checklist demands a “packs auto” response (detail
from Kaminski-Morrow; ‘Check slip led Ryanair 737 to take
off unpressurised’, Flight International, 15-21 July 2014,
p 22). Subsequent checks at 3,000 feet and 10,000 feet failed
to detect the incorrect system configuration. The crew were
alerted to the situation when the aircraft’s altitude warning
horn sounded, and they pressurised the aircraft successfully.
But, the brain must interpret what the ears hear and the
eyes see, and the brain is subject to the bias. In the above
situations, it appears that due to habit and repetition over
years of experience, the crew were so accustomed to seeing
the correct configuration that they perceived the situation
to be as it should be, as it always had been, rather than as it
actually was. This kind of error is much more likely to occur if
the crew are fatigued and/or distracted in some way.
What is the solution to this kind of error? The fact is, the
solution is to pay proper attention to what you are doing.
We simply have to be professional enough to be alert to
every checklist item when it comes up, no matter how many
hundreds of times we have accomplished the checklists, or
any other procedure for that matter, in the past. We have to
be especially alert and wary when we are fatigued and/or
distracted.
As the flight docs like to say:
“When things start happening, you have to pay attention to
paying attention.”
We have to watch out for each other, and try to pick up on the
errors which our crewmates are bound to make from time to
time, and correct them. It may seem obvious, even trite, to say
that we have to pay proper attention, but as these incidents
demonstrate, lapses do occur, and people die because of
them. I simply want to point out that being aware of the
Helios and Ryanair incidents should remind us how even the
most experienced pilots can be caught out in this regard.
“There are no new accidents…”
What is the saying?... “There are no new accidents; only
old accidents waiting to happen to new people.”
Highly experienced and qualified pilots, who had taken
off and landed innumerable times, accomplishing their
procedures correctly each of these times, in these two
instances apparently failed not once, not twice, but three
times to see an abnormal configuration which was right
before their ears and eyes.
ISSUE 14 There are no new accidents
5
Air Clues
By Vicky Cutler and Saskia Revell, RAF CAM
Human factors is an important part of flight safety, and
with Human Factors (HF) foundation courses, Defence
Aviation Error Management System (DAEMS) training,
and HF facilitators now present on most stations, the
availability of HF information is improving all the time.
However, there can be times when you have exhausted the
expertise available locally and feel that there is still more
to understand about the human factor. In these situations,
there are two aviation psychologists at the RAF Centre of
Aviation Medicine (RAF CAM) who are there to do just that
- to provide specialist HF input with the aim of identifying
and addressing HF issues that could influence flight safety.
In order to achieve this aim, it is really important that units
are aware of the team, who we are, what we do, and how to
get in touch – and that is what this article is all about.
Who we are
The RAF CAM aviation psychology team’s expertise is in
applying what we know about how people typically think
and behave to improve performance and safety in military
aviation. We apply our knowledge across the three Services,
and to all aspects of military aviation – including aircrew,
engineering, ground crew, and air traffic controllers.
Our training and experiences are about understanding the
6
Could i learn about human factors from that? ISSUE 14
people involved in aviation, and how those people interact
with the equipment, environment, processes and other
people that they work with.
Some examples of the types of areas that we can advise
on are:
•• Operator. The role of factors such as wellbeing, attitudes,
knowledge, and physical attributes in influencing actions
and decisions at work.
•• Behaviours. Understanding typical behaviours and the
nature of common errors that occur.
•• Environment. How environmental conditions such
as noise, light, temperature, and vibration influence
the individuals.
•• Equipment. Examining the interaction between people
and the equipment they use, including ergonomics and the
risk of error.
•• Task. The role of the number and nature of tasks
people perform in influencing behaviour and
performance.
Air Clues
•• Supervision. How elements of supervision such
as procedures, training, competency management
and culture can influence the individual.
•• Organisation. The role that external factors
have on the HF issues experienced.
As that is quite a broad remit, it is also important
to highlight what we do not do. As our focus is
on normal working behaviour, we are not able
to advise on mental health aspects or malicious
behaviour, or provide counselling. We do not have
a medical background, so cannot provide support
on aspects such as alcohol, medications, and the
aviation medicine matters you see in Doc’s Corner.
Finally, we are not trainers – although the areas we
cover are often included in HF training courses,
we are not the experts in delivering training on
these subjects.
What we do
All the work undertaken by the team is to provide
specialist HF support with the aim of improving
flight safety for aircraft currently in service. As part
of this aim we undertake three core tasks.
•• The team provides support to all Military Air Accident
Investigation Branch (MilAAIB) Service Inquiries (SI) from
the outset. This involvement is because most accidents
have one or more HF elements to them and it is beneficial
to consider HF early in the investigation process. Therefore,
the RAF CAM aviation psychologists will normally be part of
the team undertaking interviews in the first few weeks after
the accident. As the investigation continues, advice will be
provided on any HF issues that are identified, what led those
HF issues to occur, and what recommendations could be
made to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
•• The RAF CAM aviation psychology team also provides HF
advice to Occurance Safety Investigations (OSI) where
support is requested. The nature of the support provided
varies depending on the nature of the OSI, but can include
– identifying HF areas for investigation, providing questions
to ask those involved in the incident, reviewing information
gathered during the OSI, and assisting in the development
of recommendations to address HF issues.
•• From the work conducted supporting OSI and SI, we
know that many HF issues are present before the incident
occurred. Therefore, it is possible to identify and address
these HF issues without an accident taking place – and
it is doing this which is the other main focus of the RAF
CAM aviation psychology team. This work has become
known as Operational Events Analysis (OEA), as it looks at
typical operations to identify where there are HF issues
that increase the risk of an accident occurring, or reduce
the likelihood of successful recovery, escape and survival
following a safety incident. The OEA also provides a set of
recommendations to provide a starting point to address any
HF issues identified. As such, the OEA supports a proactive
safety culture, looking out for issues before they cause a
significant incident. To date, OEAs have been undertaken
at eighteen teams, Squadrons, and Regiments involved
in flying operations. The OEAs have involved aircrew,
engineering, ground crew and air traffic control teams
and a wide variety of HF issues have been identified and
addressed through the OEA process.
How to get in touch
There are many reasons why the RAF CAM Aviation
Psychology team receive HF queries from operational teams.
In some cases there is a particular incident or HF issue of
concern. In other situations, there may simply be a desire to
have an independent view of the working practices to act as
a HF “health check”. In all cases, I recommend speaking with
your local HF team as a first port of call; but if further HF input
would be beneficial, please get in touch with either Vicky
Cutler (Air 38Gp-CAM-AMW-Psych) or Saskia Revell (Air 38GpCAM-AMW-Psych2) at RAF CAM to discuss the scope for us to
provide support.
Spry Says
Vicky very kindly came to visit us here
in Spry Towers a few weeks back,
and presented some of the Human
Factors trend findings from the recent
investigations that she and Saskia have been part of.
It was a real eye-opener; back in my day accidents
were more often than not attributed to “pilot error”.
Recent times have seen huge improvement in the
understanding of Human Factors, helped in great part
by Vicky and Saskia across at the Centre of Aviation
Medicine. The young chaps joining the RAF now are
introduced to Human Factors during their phase 1
training, with the teaching of Foundation Module 1.
For those of us involved in aviation (the MAA describe
us as being part of the “4 worlds”), there is an additional
module, Module 2, which covers Error Management.
We are then required to complete currency training
every two years. You can find more information in AP
8000, leaflet 8141 (we keep this in the AP section of the
RAF Intranet Homepage).
ISSUE 14 Could I learn about human factors from that?
7
Air Clues
DASORs – a crucial
part of total safety
By Sqn Ldr Simon Oldfield, RAF Safety Centre
Have you filled out a Defence Air Safety Occurrence
Report (DASOR) recently? Did you find the form difficult
to navigate? Did it take longer than you would have
liked or initially expected it to? Did you have a safety
‘near miss’ and not submit a DASOR? For many of you,
I suspect the answer to one or more of these questions
is ‘yes’.
With an increasingly busy working environment, it is
hardly surprising that some of you may feel that you
struggle to devote enough time to all the various fields
required in a DASOR. However, once you are familiar
with the process it shouldn’t take as long as you might
think. DASORs are the fundamental element to aid our
understanding of why accidents, incidents and near misses
occur. The information you provide on each DASOR is crucial
and the work that is carried out after you have filed your
report can lead to changes in procedures or awareness,
leading to overall improvements in safety for you and
your colleagues.
With the introduction of ASIMS (Air Safety Information
Management System) version 3 (v3), expected early next year,
many of the fields that are currently optional will become
mandatory, so getting into good habits now should reduce
the shock of transition. Whilst understanding what happened
can be relatively straightforward, the provision of detailed
occurrence information allows us to address the underlying
chain of events; the more information you give, the better!
On a positive note, v3 will introduce several enhancements
to the system and aims to make the process of DASOR
submission smoother and easier than ever.
Safety is a team effort and it is encouraging that occurrence
reporting across all areas is on the increase. We can improve
safety throughout Defence by ensuring as much information
as possible is included within the reports and that all the
contributory factors are correctly incorporated. All of this will,
in turn, enable analysis to be conducted to identify trends and
lessons, essential knowledge which allows us to be proactive
in our approach to safety.
The ASIMS User Manual
Version 5.0 is available at
https://www.asims.r.mil.uk/
Docs/20140226-ASIMS%20
v2_3%20User%20
Manual%20v5%200%20
61-U.pdf
8
DASORS - a crucial part of TOTAL safety ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Here are some (certainly not all) helpful hints for those submitting or managing occurrence reports:
Occurrence Reporters:
For Occurrence Managers:
DO select a short and pertinent title that accurately
headlines the event.
DO conduct some form of investigation for each DASOR
that is assigned to you as the Occurrence Manager.
DO ensure that as much information as possible is
included, not just the mandatory fields.
DO consider carefully the distribution of the DASOR to
ensure that you get the appropriate input from the right
people with the minimum of delay.
DO take time to think over what happened/nearly
happened and describe the events in plain English in
the narrative.
DO ensure the correct ‘Event Type’ is selected
(mandatory) and don’t forget to link any ‘Additional
Reports’ if required.
DO seek the assistance of your Unit Flight Safety Officer
if you are unsure of what you should be writing.
DO allocate a causal factor to each DASOR (this will
become mandatory in ASIMS v3).
DO attribute at least one contributory factor to each
DASOR (this will also become mandatory in ASIMS
v3) and ensure that contributory factors identified in
Occurrence Safety Investigations (OSI), or any other form
of investigation, are included in the DASOR.
DON’T let a ‘near miss’ go unreported.
DO ensure that recommendations arising as a result of
any local investigation or OSI are transferred onto, tracked
and closed on the DASOR.
DON’T be tempted to record the ‘bare minimum’
of information in the report. We can all learn from
the experience of others and the more information,
the better!
DO provide progress reports and feedback to the person
who submitted the DASOR.
DON’T use uncommon abbreviations or acronyms –
not every reader of the report will be as familiar with
the terms as you are so explain them in full.
DON’T forget that the aim of the investigation is to
discover ‘why’ something occurred, rather than merely
stating ‘what’ happened.
DON’T fill in the report in capitals as it is more difficult
for the reader to assimilate the information.
DON’T allow DASORs that have personal or operational
information to be accepted into the system until any
sensitive information has been removed.
DON’T skip fields that are not mandatory in order to
save time – all data submitted on the DASOR is useful
and it facilitates further investigation.
DON’T process DASORs that are incomplete; engage
with the individual who submitted the report to ensure
that all the relevant detail has been captured.
DON’T leave DASORs open for longer than necessary –
if all actions are complete then close the report.
Spry Says
ASIMS is absolutely key to our management of safety. We have a really useful system in place now, and
the rate of reporting is on the up. What we need to do now is make sure that those valuable DASORs
are chock full of as much relevant information as possible. The primary aim of ASIMS and the associated
establishment of an open and honest reporting culture is to enable us to identify the root causes and
contributory factors that have resulted in an incident. Of even more value are the “near miss” reports, as these
allow us to be proactive…we want to prevent the “near miss” of today becoming the incident of tomorrow. Please do
consider Sqn Ldr Oldfield’s advice when you next think, “Perhaps this is worthy of a DASOR, but I don’t have the time.”.
Every single report you submit is valuable and could help improve safety for you, your colleagues and your friends.
ISSUE 14 DASORS - A CRUCIAL PART OF TOTAL SAFETY
9
Air Clues
I learnt
about flying
from that…
By Flt Lt Robin Gould
I am currently a student on Basic Fast Jet
Training at RAF Linton-on-Ouse flying the
Tucano T1. It is a busy course with lots to
cover in a short period of time. From early
on in the syllabus, we are lucky enough
to be allowed to fly the aircraft solo in the
local area. Our inexperience unfortunately
does not make us immune to aircraft faults
and despite the various safety nets of the training system
we do sometimes end up in the situation where things are
going wrong and we need to stay calm and make decisions.
After completing my general handling I decided to give
myself a practise emergency forcing a recovery to our relief
landing ground at Topcliffe. I selected the correct ‘stud’ for
Topcliffe approach and put out my practice distress call only
to be informed by the instructor on the ground at Linton
that I was still on the quiet frequency. Again, he advised that
I continue by manually dialling in frequencies. This time,
however, the problem was not fixed and I was stuck on our
quiet frequency. He suggested that I return to Linton and
that Linton Approach would contact me on the frequency on
which I was stuck.
The incident in question occurred on a solo general handling
sortie in the run up to our first ‘check flight’. The weather
was great and I was very much looking forward to taking a
Tucano solo into the local area. During the pre-start checks all
the various tests of the radio confirmed that it was working
correctly, however on departure as I attempted to change
from the ‘tower’ frequency to the ‘departure’ frequency,
the pre-programmed ‘stud’ selector failed to change the
frequency as it should. ATC passed the correct frequency for
departures for me to manually dial into the radio and this
appeared to work satisfactorily so I continued the sortie.
Once away from the airfield I changed over to our ‘quiet’
frequency on which we usually operate and which is
monitored by an instructor on the ground at Linton in case
we run into difficulty.
They did so, and I began making my way home. Once in
sight of the airfield, Linton Tower began talking to me on
the same frequency and cleared me to join, asking that I
report when at the ‘initial’ point and about to run in to the
airfield. As instructed, when at initials, I called my position.
However, the radio had decided to change frequency and I
was met with a reply from Topcliffe Approach asking who I
was! Aware of the fact that I was at initials for Linton and not
in communication with them I turned away from the airfield
and eased away from the ground to sort the problem.
Wary of touching the radio in case I lost communication
all together, I gave Topcliffe Approach a run-down of my
situation. They contacted Linton and informed me that I
was to do a ‘no-comms’ recovery and that they were
expecting me.
10 I LEARNT ABOUT FLYING FROM THAT…issue 14
Air Clues
Fortunately, this was something which I had practised recently
and is a procedure for which we carry the instructions. I set
7600 on my transponder, the ‘comms failure’ code, and flew in
towards the airfield, down the deadside of the runway at 500’
while rocking the wings. I completed a low level circuit and
was expecting a green flare from the runway controller after
which I should have been clear to land.
As I continued down the final approach I was aware that I
had not yet received a flare. When I reached my minimum
go-around height of 200’ I had still not seen a flare. As such, I
could not be sure that I was clear to land and so I initiated a
go-around. I informed Topcliffe Approach, which was still the
agency with whom I had contact, and they passed a message
from Linton that I would certainly receive a flare the second
time. I repeated the procedure and sure enough received
the green flare and so landed without further incident.
On taxying back from the runway I was careful to complete
my after-landing checks properly; from an HF perspective,
we are reminded that any distraction, including a minor
emergency, can disrupt the flow of our checklist so I double
checked that I had made my ejection seat safe for parking.
So what exactly did I learn about flying from that?
There are a host of lessons applicable to myself as a trainee
from this incident. Firstly, despite being in a controlled training
environment, things can go wrong with your aircraft and no
matter how inexperienced you may be, you are the one who
is going to have to deal with the problems if you are solo.
To this end, knowledge of the emergency procedures is
essential, and not just to get a good score on a test! This was a
rare kind of emergency and not one which is usually practised,
so it is important to be able to tailor the procedures, come up
with a plan, and make use of the resources available to you; in
this case, a different ATC agency.
Secondly, when the procedures fall down, such as not
receiving the green flare you were expecting, you need to
have the confidence to make a decision and formulate a new
plan. As it happened, the flare had misfired but for all I knew
there could have been an obstruction on the runway and to
land when not cleared to do so could have been disastrous.
Flexibility is, as always, the key!
Thirdly, when faced with an unusual situation, the worst
thing you can do is panic. Being close to Linton and unable
to communicate with them, whilst knowing that other
aircraft were nearby, was a nerve racking experience but it is
important to maintain a cool head to keep making the right
decisions. It is, of course, easier said than done early on in your
flying career but if you find yourself panicking then you are
probably not thinking straight. Better to sit on your hands for
a minute and calm down than to make a bad decision and
make things worse.
Another issue was that something which appeared initially
to be a trivial problem, a wrongly studded aircraft in this case,
can turn out to be something more complex. If anything
about your aircraft is not as expected then be sure to try and
identify the full extent of the problem sooner rather than later.
It is also at times like these, when we are deviating from our
expected procedures, that we are most at risk of distraction
and this can make a difficult situation worse. It would have
been all too easy for me to land when not cleared to do so, or
to forget to make my seat safe, and so we must remember the
basics even at times of unexpected stress.
The biggest lesson for me though was something more
comforting and that was the support that is available
from other agencies. Despite having no control over who
I was talking to, the various air traffic controllers to whom
I spoke and indeed the instructor on the ground at Linton
were a fantastic help. They demonstrated a good ability to
communicate amongst themselves, despite being at different
airfields, which went a long way towards reducing the impact
of what was a very confusing situation for all involved.
Sgt Backtune Says
You may not be aware of this but
redundancy in flares or ‘vereys’ can
be a problem for Runway Caravan
Controllers. We have 2 ‘verey pistols’
in the Runway Caravan, each ready
to go with a red cartridge in the
standard configuration. This makes sense,
as the most important thing is for us to be able to
stop an aircraft from landing if we need to. If warned
of a no-comms aircraft inbound, we will change one
of the cartridges for a green, ready to indicate to
the pilot that he or she is cleared to land. If, as was
the case here, the green verey misfires, there is no
immediate back up green verey option. In fact a verey
pistol that has misfired must be left for 30 minutes
before removal of the cartridge and further use!
The runway controller here did try to use an ‘Aldis
Lamp’ as a back up but the green light, which also acts
as a positive clearance to land, was not observed by
the pilot. The Aldis Lamps are notoriously difficult to
see from the air thought, unless the pilot is looking
directly into the window of the Caravan, so the pilot
did the right thing to go around. I hope this helps, it
was certainly new to Plt Off Percy Prune, so I thought
you might like to know too!
issue 14 I LEARNT ABOUT FLYING FROM THAT… 11
Air Clues
Cultivating
Safety
By Dr Simon Bennett, originally published in ‘Air International’ magazine, March 2014
“Safety is an emergent property of conscientious
organisational behaviour”: sociologist Dr Simon Bennett
describes the less tangible measures of safety in aviation.
European commercial aviation may be heading for a fall.
The issue is how we measure safety.There are several ways to
do it. The most common indices are numbers of near-misses,
incidents and accidents. Judged against these, European
aviation is doing well. Safety can also be measured against
less tangible indices, like the number of ‘latent errors’ present
at any one time: also known as a resident pathogen, a latent
error is an embedded weakness or vulnerability that, under
12 cultivating safety issue 14
very specific and hard-to-foresee circumstances, manifests
as an incident or accident. Latent errors create a potential
for mishap. A common latent error – pilot fatigue – makes
misjudgment more likely, increasing the chance of mishap.
Others include lack of runway capacity, overflying city centres
on approach or climb-out, runways with busy public roads
at one or both ends, insufficient cockpit data for pilots to
maintain situational awareness, burdening young pilots with
debt, poor-quality, down-route pilot hotel accommodation,
short-notice roster changes – and dysfunctional airline
cultures. Being a sociologist I shall focus on this last type
of latent error.
Air Clues
Pathogenic Cultures?
In 1966 Marvin Bower, Managing Director of McKinsey and
Company, defined corporate culture as “the way we do
things around here”. Meanwhile, addressing those aspects of
organisational culture concerned with safety, academic Bro
Uttal says an organisation’s safety culture consists of “shared
values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work)
that interact with an organisation’s structures and control
systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things
around here)”.
Error reporting is an important activity that has a direct
bearing on safety. Unfortunately it is influenced by feelings
of personal security. Pilots who fear victimisation will not
report errors; only those who feel secure will. The underreporting of errors inhibits organisational learning and makes
incidents and accidents more likely. A just culture is one of
the preconditions for error reporting. Feelings of personal
security can be enhanced by a management style perceived
to be supportive and empathetic – but undermined by
an aggressive, mistrustful, judgmental, manipulative or
vindictive style. As the following examples show, getting the
management style wrong can have serious consequences
for trust and employees’ willingness to contribute. They do
not respond well to a negative regime. Reactions range from
withdrawal from organisational life to resignation. It goes
without saying that in a risk-laden activity like commercial
aviation it is vital to retain the trust, respect and co-operation
of employees. Losing any of these will compromise safety.
Case I – Cynicism and Disbelief
This case study concerns exchanges between an airline
manager and a pilot over a work absence. The case study is
based on a series of four unsolicited e-mails sent to the author
by a captain, the last of which was a copy of a message sent
to her by her manager. The following is a summary of the
captain’s uncorroborated statements and evidence.
A captain was waiting at a city centre bus stop for her
connection to the airport. She was in full uniform and carrying
a case for a long trip. As she prepared to board the airport bus
she heard a child screaming behind her. A man, presumed to
be related to the child, had collapsed. The captain attended
to him. His eyes were closing. Fearing he was passing away
she administered CPR while talking to paramedics on a
mobile phone.
When the paramedics arrived, they said that without her
intervention the man would have died. After dispatching
the man to hospital the paramedics told the captain to
declare herself unfit to fly. The next day she visited the
hospital to be told the man had died in the night.
Later that day the captain’s doctor declared her unfit to fly for
four days.
She later received the following written communication from
her manager: “Please provide details of your absence last
week. I understand that you were on your way to work when
you had to administer CPR to somebody in distress. I was
therefore very surprised to see that you had subsequently
called in sick as I assume that you were fit to come to work.
Additionally, your absence very neatly joins two periods of
OFF/Leave – always something that I find highly suspicious...
Please explain and, if able, provide a doctor’s note and any
information regarding your ‘Good Samaritan’ episode.”
The captain said she found this e-mail “disgusting”. She
resigned from the airline.
Case 2 – Promises or Threats?
Poor industrial relations can erode trust between
management and employees. In 2013 a public row erupted
at a successful European low-cost airline. Concerned that
changes to terms and conditions (like the ‘casualisation’ of
flight-crew labour with the use of ‘zero-hours’ contracts)
might impact safety, members of the airline’s unofficial pilot
association drafted a petition to the regulator alleging the
“unpredictable employment situation” at the airline was
becoming “an increasing distraction in daily flight operations”.
In response the airline’s chief pilot warned: “[A] pilot who
participates in this so-called safety petition will be guilty of
gross misconduct and will be liable for dismissal.”
The British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) has expressed
concerns about casualisation, a process it attributes to
employers’ drive for ‘short-term cost-benefits’. According
to the chairman of the unofficial association, about 75% of
the airline’s pilots are employed through agencies and the
majority of these are on zero-hours contracts.
Work is not guaranteed for a pilot on a zero-hours contract.
Rather, the pilot is rostered when needed. Such contracts
change the balance of power in management-employee
relations and employers can exploit this shift in the balance
of power to engineer behaviours they consider desirable.
Because employment is contingent on a manager’s decision,
some fear those subject to zero-hours contracts are less
inclined to do anything that might attract attention or create
work (like report an error) or challenge the company’s modus
operandi (eg, file a complaint with the regulator).
Put another way, zero-hours contracts have the potential to
undermine an airline’s safety culture by discouraging both the
reporting of pilot error and critiques of operational procedure
and performance. This is bad for passengers, employees,
airlines and the commercial aviation industry. The net result
of the two policies (dismissal for pilots who petition and
employment of pilots on zero-hours contracts) may be to
undermine the subject airline’s reporting culture – and a lax
issue 14 cultivating safety 13
Air Clues
reporting culture creates the potential for incident or accident
because weaknesses go uncorrected.
the need to guard against complacency and the importance
of not sacrificing safety for production.
Such a culture is pathogenic – cancerous, if you like.
Unless treated it may destroy the subject. Nearly 90% of
pilots surveyed by the pilot association said the airline did
not have a healthy safety culture. Two-thirds said they did
not feel comfortable raising issues through an internal
reporting system.
In its 1968 report into the disaster the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences made explicit reference to
complacency: “[Hundreds] of hours of successful testing with
100% pure oxygen... led to a false sense of confidence, and
therefore complacency, in this operation.”
Organisational Learning
The absence of mishaps should not be interpreted to mean
they cannot happen. A comprehensive measure of system
safety records not just incidents and accidents but also nearmisses and latent errors (embedded weaknesses).
Because they look out for and adopt good practice, learning
organisations give themselves the best chance of safety
improvement. But those unable or unwilling to learn give
themselves little chance to improve.
STS Challenger: Unheeded Warnings
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
an example of an organisation that habitually failed to learn
and apply the lessons of its own disasters. To date, it has had
three: the 1967 Apollo 1 launch-pad fire which killed three
astronauts; the 1986 loss of STS Challenger which killed seven;
and the 2003 loss of STS Columbia which killed seven more.
Had the lessons of the Apollo 1 fire been applied, NASA might
have enjoyed a better safety record, and 17 astronauts might
not have died in the line of duty. What were those lessons?
On 28 January, 1986, STS Challenger exploded shortly after liftoff. A malfunctioning solid rocket booster (SRB) o-ring seal had
leaked hot gases onto the external tank (ET), causing it
to explode. For the cognoscenti this was not entirely
unexpected – first, because o-ring leaks had occurred before;
second, because, once ignited, the SRBs could not be shut
down (they have been likened to giant fireworks); and third,
because the SRBs were located adjacent to a tank that
contained liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen at up to 22psi
(0.015kg/mm2).
Apollo 1: Accident-in-waiting
On 27 January, 1967, three astronauts were killed when
Apollo 1’s command module caught fire during a ground
test. Pressurised with oxygen to 16.7psi (0.011kg/mm2),
the module was destroyed in 25.5 seconds. The astronauts
stood little chance. Despite being aware of numerous fatal
incidents involving 100% oxygen environments, NASA used
pure oxygen in the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programmes
(there had been at least seven oxygen-related fires in US
testing facilities). Using oxygen saved weight and simplified
engineering – important considerations for a government
agency charged by a President with landing men on the
moon and returning them safely to earth in 1970. The safer
option, a nitrogen-oxygen mix, would have complicated
the engineering and added weight. The fact that neither
Mercury nor Gemini had suffered fires led NASA engineers
to downplay the risk associated with a 100% oxygen
environment, to the extent that astronauts were not
required to wear flame-retardant suits and ground tests
using pure oxygen at high pressures were not classified
as hazardous.
Some, like technician Tom Baron of prime contractor North
American Aviation, believed NASA subordinated safety to
production. His reservations were dismissed. The Apollo 1
disaster held many lessons for NASA – most conspicuously
14 cultivating safety issue 14
Despite the potentially catastrophic consequences of the
failure of such an important component, NASA, short of funds
and behind schedule, downplayed the o-ring problem to the
point where leaks were not considered a threat. Despite being
deviations from the norm of safe operation, SRB o-ring leaks
were treated as routine events.
As Diane Vaughan put it in her book The Challenger Launch
Decision, they were “normalised”. Once again, an underpressure NASA subordinated safety to production.
STS Columbia: Wilful Neglect
On 1 February, 2003, the returning STS Columbia disintegrated
in the earth’s atmosphere. During launch a suitcase-sized
piece of insulating foam detached from the ET and hit the
leading edge of Columbia’s left wing. The rupture went
unnoticed as there was no requirement to check for this
type of damage. During re-entry, plasma entered the wing,
destroying the structure and eventually causing Columbia
to disintegrate. The loss of ET insulating foam was such a
common event that NASA engineers had coined the term
‘foam-shedding’ to describe the phenomenon, trivialising
a potentially lethal structural failure. As with SRB o-ring
erosion prior to the Challenger disaster, NASA managers –
under time, budget and other pressures – had normalised a
safety deviation.
Air Clues
Agency Lessons
NASA’s three failures hold several lessons for commercial
aviation. First, even though the lessons of failure may be
obvious, documented and well-publicised, there is no
guarantee they will be acted on.
Second, an engineering failure may become so commonplace
that it is treated as routine and unproblematic: failures that
generate no adverse consequences are more likely to be
treated in this way. Leaking SRB o-rings and ballistic foam
insulation were seen as unproblematic largely because they
had not ended a mission. As with the space programme
prior to Apollo 1, the absence of failure led managers to
believe that nothing untoward could ever happen. The loss of
Challenger and Columbia demonstrated the speciousness of
this logic.
Third, design and operational decisions are influenced by cost
and timetable considerations. Had NASA not been working
to a very public deadline of 1970 to land men on the moon, it
might have provided the command module with a safer twogas atmosphere. It might also have designated live ground
tests as hazardous and provided astronauts with flameproof suits.
Had the shuttle programme not been so far behind schedule
and NASA so short of funds, the agency might have treated
o-ring erosion and foam-shedding as mission-threatening
failures rather than tolerable wear and tear. The Apollo 1,
Challenger and Columbia disasters show safety is built
on an energetic culture that supports vigilance, reporting
and pro-action. As shown by its response to the o-ring
and foam insulation problems, NASA’s safety culture
was dysfunctional.
A culture that normalises deviance creates a risk of incident
and accident. Dysfunctional cultures have their origins in a
range of internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous)
factors and behaviours. These include political agendas,
public expectation, media interest, time pressures, budget
constraints, hubris, introversion, denial, complacency
and management styles that alienate employees and
inhibit teamwork.
Cultivating Safety
Employees who feel alienated or marginalised are less inclined
to report – or make an intervention. And nothing is more likely
to alienate an employee than using threats or intimidation
to get them to behave in a certain way. Employees subject
to threats or intimidation are likely to withdraw from
organisational life and the resulting reduction of co-operation
and participation undermines the organisation’s safety culture.
Sending e-mails or letters perceived as threatening or, without
justification, questioning the integrity of an employee, will
drive a wedge between the recipient and the organisation.
Good management-employee relations are one of the
foundations of an energetic safety culture. What we say, and
how we say it, matter. The more judgmental, prejudiced
or aggressive a communication or conversation the more
likely it is that the employee will respond defensively – and
defensiveness and mistrust discourage openness and cooperation. Safety is undermined.
In systems theory terms, an airline with a dysfunctional culture
should be classified as a resident pathogen or latent error –
an accident waiting to happen. Safety should be measured
not only against numbers of near-misses, incidents and
accidents but also against numbers of embedded
weaknesses. One way of measuring the safety of Europe’s
aviation system is to count the number of airlines that have
so cowed and alienated their pilots, cabin crew and engineers
that errors are either not reported or are reported selectively.
The European Aviation Safety Agency might well be shocked
by the data.
Air International original article, March 2014
issue 14 cultivating safety 15
Air Clues
A Single
European Sky.
Military Threat
or Opportunity?
By Wg Cdr R Mckenzie, DAATM SO1 Europe
A look into the very near future…
The What
This year, 2014, sees the start of the deployment
(implementation) phase of an unprecedented industry-led
initiative in Europe to dramatically increase capacity and safety
in airspace management. The ‘Single European Sky’ promises
to deliver many improvements to airspace users, targeting
improvements in accuracy, safety, vastly improved situational
awareness, better avoidance, better de-confliction, and inbuilt
weather reporting and flow management. This article aims to
summarise the scope of the project, highlight areas that will
certainly affect us as military users, and explain the enabling
technologies that will be coming soon to a cockpit near you.
A list of factoids and definitions is given at the end of this article
16 A single european sky. military threat or opportunity? ISSUE 14
Air Clues
The Single European Sky will be to Air Traffic Management,
what the Internet was to communication. As the initiative
rolls out it will, in time, start to remove the traditional air traffic
controller from their screens to remote towers, in the same
way that remotely piloted air systems remove the need for
a pilot in cockpit. System Wide Information Management
(SWIM) will use underpinning data-links (ADS-B IN/OUT) to
connect all aircraft, service providers, airfields, meteorological
and technical support centres as enablers, thereby vastly
improving precision, separation and data collation including
live weather data and enabling the implementation of
4D tracking technologies. This will allow ‘The Air Traffic
Management Network’ to run itself, literally “ATC/ATM in The
Cloud”. Ultimately ADS-B will remove reliance on, or even the
need for primary and secondary RADAR. The Single European
Sky aims to allow aircraft to fly preferred (direct) routings
with flight paths de-conflicted both prior to take-off and
en-route. Fixed route flight planning will become obsolete,
tiny changes to airspeed will be communicated via SMS style
message and response systems, allowing seamless stitching
of aircraft into dynamically allocated descending arcs (point
merge) and negating the need for time consuming and
high fuel burn medium level holding patterns. 4D Business
Trajectory Management, or ‘Mission profiles’ will become the
norm, allowing aircraft (manned or unmanned) to alter flight
profiles en route via network messaging. Aircraft holding in
the traditional sense, will become a thing of the past.
embryonic, and many of which will require industry
innovation to solve and develop suitable future systems.
Current European Commercial Aviation
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
150 scheduled airlines
400 airports
60 Air Navigation Service Providers
3.1 million employees in the aviation sector
30,000 flight per day peak periods
800 million passengers in 2010
> € 220 billion EUR to European GDP
Delays cost up to € 5 billion per annum
Average routes 45km longer than required
How? This sounds impressive… but really? In the next
decade? To answer this question, a very quick look at the facts
will allow you to make your own assessment.
The Single European Skies project was conceived by
industry to renew European Air Traffic Management (ATM)
infrastructure. The concept aims to secure an improved
European ATM system that will be capable of managing, safely
and efficiently, the levels of air traffic, expected to double by
2025-2030. The concept is staggering in breadth, complexity,
and cost; the 2008-2013 development phase cost was € 2.1
billion alone, a mere fraction of the cost of the € 30 billion
‘deployment’ cost; the deployment/implementation phase
starts this year. The concept relies on the implementation
of high tech solutions, many of which are proven, some
AIM of the Single European Skies
•• Enable a three-fold increase in capacity
•• Improve safety by a factor of 10
•• Reduce environmental impact by 10% per flight
•• Reduce ATM costs by 50%
ISSUE 14 A SINGLE european sky. military threat or opportunity? 17
Air Clues
The European ATM structure of the future aims to support
diverse airspace user requirements and avoid, as much as
possible, the current rigid route structures flying fixed airways,
beacon to beacon. In the future, a theoretical electronic flight
plan is proposed to consist of little more than aircraft type,
persons on board, a few amplifying data and ‘requested time
at gate’. The ‘system’ will know the aircraft’s performance,
as well as the weather en route, and all other requests for
‘Business Trajectories’ made during the requested period of
flight. Responsibility for separation in managed airspace is
envisaged as transferring from controllers to pilots/systems.
So what of the Military, where the concept of a gate time
holds little relevance? The intention is for military airspace to
be allocated and tailored to specific mission requirements,
within the Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concept, and that
civilians and military will co-exist seamlessly and more safely.
Commercial Savings with a Single European Skies
•• Up to 43km less distance per flight
•• Time en route reduced by between 8-14 minutes
•• Between 300-500kg reduction in fuel burn
•• Between 945-1575kg reduction in CO2 emissions
The Threat to Military Aviation is significant…in terms
of potential cost…and potentially limited access…to
segregated airspace…
The Challenge
This brings the discussion to the impact on European
Militaries. The ICAO convention 1944 exempts military aviation
conducting operations and training, from the legislation that
adheres to our civilian counterparts. Nations in turn, ensure
that their State aircraft and ground systems are equivalent
in performance and therefore fit for purpose, under their
own State regulatory regime (in the UK through the MAA,
in close co-ordination with the CAA). In the context of a
Single European Sky however, this is potentially problematic.
The European Commission are busy legislating (in simplistic
terms, binding States to expensive long term equipment
programmes) to create a legal framework to realise the Single
European Sky. This tends to place the Military in an awkward
position, as this legislation does not apply. However the
military are likely to require similar equipment modifications,
over time, in order to be able to maintain access to airspace.
The military have no means to recoup the investment
required, and the military focus is mission effectiveness and
security, not operational efficiencies and bottom line.
The Single European Sky represents the largest and
most complex technical and conceptual undertaking
ever attempted by the EU....
So What?
The Single European Sky clearly has the potential to be an
extremely positive evolution, hence the UK supports the
concept. However, the threat of this project to military aviation
activity is significant, in terms of the potential costs and the
potentially limited or ‘billed per use’ access to segregated
airspace whilst servicing or flying GAT. The aims of the project
are laudable, but European militaries remain cautious. It is
commercially driven, therefore extreme care must be taken
to factor in the requirements of the unique nature of noncommerical State military aviation, that operate under State
juristiction and are therefore exempt from International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)/European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) legislation.
The Threats
There will be military costs to bear at some stage, for the
procurement and implementation of air and ground systems,
which could be very large should the UK MOD elect or
be obliged to comply in full. There are also operational
implications and potential affects on military airspace use; for
example non Mode S aircraft require 30 days prior notice to
transit through German airspace.
Techologies and Concepts. In a small but significant way,
incremental steps towards this Single European Sky goal
have already been implemented, and will have affected many
who will be reading this article. Reduced Vertical Separation
18 single european sky. military threat or opportunity? ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Minima (RVSM) was perhaps the most significant change in
the past decade, requiring both procedural and technical
solutions for implementation. The introduction of 8.33khz
radios and Mode S Transponders were further technological
steps towards the SES goal, but these alone will not satisfy
the demand for increased capacity in the European Air Traffic
Management Network. Additional advanced concepts such
as Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA), Functional Airspace Blocks
(FABs), Operational Air Traffic Transit System (OATTS), Future
Precision Approach and Landing Systems (FPALS), all support
the overarching aims of a Single European Sky. Technological
advances in the world of Communication, Navigation and
Surveillance (CNS), such as emergent requirements for ADS-B
(IN/OUT) will further facilitate the project. Civil/Military cooperation will be key throughout.
stakeholders including NATO, Partner Nations, the European
Defence Agency, EU Member States, and the experts within
the Civil Military ATM Co-ordination (CMAC) in Eurocontrol,
who are collectively working to deliver a harmonised air
power focussed military voice across the debate in Europe.
DAATM will ensure that the concerns regarding the military
impact of legislation are voiced and addressed through cooperation with civilian agencies including but not limited
to, EASA.
In terms of operational effectiveness we need to ensure
a similar level of access, primarily for transit to operations,
throughout global airspace. The EU is not alone in responding
to the International Aviation Certification Organisations (IACO)
call for global Aviation System Block Upgrades (ASBUs); 191
nations are signatories to the ICAO convention, and similar
initiatives are underway worldwide.
In Conclusion
The Mitigations
Mitigations are required to ensure the explicit and implied
military costs are affordable. Current mitigations include
exemptions (such as RVSM non-compliance rules), extensions
(to allow mid-life/in-life upgrades like Traffic Collision
Avoidance System 7.1), and equivalence (where we prove
that our current military equipment meets or exceeds
that required by legislation). As the Single European Sky
deployment progresses, mitigations will need to extend
beyond the national to a more pan-European (and even
Global) scope.
The promised gains for our civilian counterparts are tangible,
hence the level of commercial and political impetus to
achieve a successful and timely deployment. Add to this the
politically acceptable CO2 emissions reduction, and the fact
that currently the European Aviation industry generates up
to € 220 billion to collective GDP, with up to 30,000 flights per
day during peak periods, and predictions that this GDP will
increase to over € 400 billion by 2025, then one can assert
with some certainty that the European Commission (with
Member States backing) will ensure that this staggeringly
ambitious project, with industry backing, is likely to come to
fruition. Allied to this, other similar global initiatives, provide
an additional impetus for Europe to ensure that it remains
competitive and protective of European industry in the
rapidly expanding aviation sector. As military we must remain
vigilant and protect our unique focus of mission effectiveness
within the Single European Sky project, in order to ensure
we can reap the less commercially driven benefits of a Single
European Sky.
Defence Airspace and Air Traffic Management (DAATM) are
following the developments associated with the project as
it rolls out at source in Brussels. The European Commission’s
view is clear; State military conducting operations and
training are exempt from legislation, but the Commission do
not consider the same true for military aviation receiving or
delivering GAT services, and this has profound implications.
DAATM are fully engaged to ensure that UK Military concerns
regarding mission effectiveness and the need to maintain
unrestricted access to airspace, are voiced. DAATM are
working in close cooperation with other military and civilian
ISSUE 14 single european sky. military threat or opportunity? 19
Air Clues
Key References
SESARJU The Future of Flying
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/sesar/doc/2010_
the_future_of_flying_en.pdf
IS-DI, EDA (MIOS Cell), and the wider national network of ATM
representatives across Europe and beyond, for their collective
support and professionalism.
Eurocontrol
http://www.eurocontrol.int/sesar-research
European Commission Launch of SESAR
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-398_en.htm
Asia Pacific ATM Initiative
http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/singapore
-air-show/2014-02-10/asia-pacific-countries-taking-atm
-initiative
Imagery provided courtesy of NATS and Eurocontrol.
Article peer reviewed by Michael Steinfurth, Head of Civil
Military ATM Co-ordination (CMAC) within Eurocontrol.
A special thank you to Mike and his team of dedicated military
experts within CMAC who are particularly supportive of
DAATM SO1 Europe, and who have been collectively working
since 2003 to ensure that Military concerns are catered for in
their extensive work in relation to SES. Thanks also to NATO
Single European Sky Article Factoids
and Definitions
Remote Towers
Air traffic Services at an airfield are performed somewhere
else, other than in a local control tower. ATC Towers at
airfields would not be required and multiple airfields
world-wide could be run from a single Remote
Tower facility.
SWIM
System Wide Information Management. A complete
change in how information is managed and shared across
the whole European ATM system; both on the ground
and in the air.
ADS-B IN/OUT
Automatic Dependant Surveillance - Broadcast. If suitably
equipped, aircraft broadcast their position information
to ADS-B ground stations and other aircraft. This is called
ADS-B “Out.” Ground stations are also broadcasting
valuable information for use by aircraft crews, if the
aircraft is equipped to receive it using ADS-B “In”
technology.
Point Merge
This new procedure design builds upon precision
navigation technology (P-RNAV concept) for merging
traffic into a single entry point, which allows efficient
integration and sequencing of inbound traffic together
with Continuous Descent Approaches.
Spry Says
DAATM do a difficult job of
representing military aviation in the
civil arena. This article illustrates just
how complicated the DAATM task can
be and I for one am pleased to know they’re on the
case. The Single European Sky project is a terribly
complicated and vast beast and Wg Cdr Mckenzie
here has provided us with a fascinating glimpse.
Network messaging, 4D trajectory, ‘ATC/ATM in the
cloud’… I have to say, I feel like a bit of a dinosaur
but we must keep on top of these things
and make sure we move with the times!
(A)FUA
Airspace under the (Advanced) Flexible Use of Airspace
should no longer be designated as military or civil
airspace but should be considered as one continuum and
used flexibly on a day-to-day basis. In the future, airspace
requirements for military aircraft will be generated and
accommodated by the ATM system dynamically meaning
fixed operating areas may not be required.
FABs
Functional Airspace Blocks: Groups of nations aiming to
help reduce the current fragmentation of air navigation
service provision across national boundaries in Europe.
Parts of UK Airspace are already delegated to other
national ATC agencies and vice versa.
OATTS
Operational Air Traffic Transit Service: Facilitating military
aircraft transit and operations across national borders.
Trajectory Management
Moving from Airspace to 4D Trajectory Management
entails the systematic sharing of aircraft trajectories
between various participants in the ATM process to
ensure that all partners have a common view of a flight
and have access to the most up-to-date data available to
perform their tasks. It enables the dynamic adjustment of
airspace characteristics to meet predicted demand with
minimum distortions to the aircraft trajectories.
20 A single european sky. military threat or opportunity? ISSUE 14
Air Clues
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ISSUE 14 CNS SNIPPETS 21
Air Clues
Standardised European
Rules of the Air (SERA)
By Sqn Ldr D Austen, DAATM SO2 Airspace
22 standardised european rules of the air (SERA) ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Background
As part of the Single European Sky
(SES) Project the European Commission
has sought to standardise the Rules of
the Air (ROTA) across Europe through
Standardised European Rules of the
Air (SERA). SERA also seeks to minimize
the number of filed differences that
different countries currently have
with the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO). There is sense in
applying common rules and, whilst the
military is not specifically mandated
under SES Basic Regulations, the MOD
operates within the same airspace
environment and often from the same
airfields; hence it is sensible and safer
to adhere to these rules where they do
not impact on military operations and
training.
SERA Part A and B became EU law on
4 Dec 12. The UK, together with the
majority of other nations, delayed the
introduction of SERA until 4 Dec 14; the
UK intends to implement SERA Parts A
and B on 13 Nov 14, the Aeronautical
Information Regulation and Control
(AIRAC) publication date prior to 4
Dec 14. The operation of aircraft in UK
national airspace is currently governed
by the Air Navigation Order (ANO) 2009
and ROTA Regulations 2007; legislative
change is therefore necessary in order
to amend the ANO and ROTA to
repeal those elements that are
catered for by SERA and to harmonise
residual national provisions by the
established deadline.
What is happening now?
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has
run a consultation on how SERA should
be implemented and both the CAA
and the MOD have Working Groups assessing the impact on
military regulation, rules, Acceptable Means of Compliance
and Guidance Material. The MOD is now assessing the CAA
response and where military requirements could not be met
by a common regulation, the MOD has retained the right
to self-regulate for UK airspace. Therefore, whilst a common
regulation would be preferred, military regulation will be
amended where necessary to ensure that military operations
and training can continue to be carried out effectively.
SERA Part C is the last part of the series of documentation
that will include relevant complementary material from ICAO
Documents (Doc 4444 and Pan Ops) in particular interference,
emergency contingencies and interception, the use of
SSR transponder and voice communication procedures.
There will also be an extension of the scope of SERA Part C to
cover aerodrome operations, including recent amendments
to the ICAO Annex.
How does SERA A and B affect me?
The main changes are as follows:
Quadrantal Rule replaced by Semi-Circular Cruising
Levels. ICAO Semi-Circular Cruising Levels (1,000 ft levels) will
be adopted outside controlled airspace to Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR) aircraft when operating in level flight above 3000
ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL). The CAA will recommend,
not mandate, that Visual Flight Rules (VFR) aircraft fly at ICAO
VFR 500 ft levels unless operating in conformity with air
traffic control instructions. Note that under SERA, the SemiCircular Cruising Level system applies without reference to the
transition level, as is currently the case in UK ROTA.
Formation Flights. SERA will mandate that formations will
be separated by 1KM and +-100ft (which is defined as being
at the same level). However, the military within the UK will
apply 1NM and +-100ft, including within Controlled Airspace
(CAS). The military formation parameters will apply equally
to mixed civil/military formations and also to civil formations
which are undertaking a military task. Crews are to note that
this will be a UK-only decision, elsewhere in Europe 1KM and
+-100ft is likely to be mandated.
Minimum Heights. SERA states that “except when necessary
for take-off or landing, or except by permission from the
competent authority, aircraft shall not be flown over the
congested areas of cities, towns or settlements or over an
open-air assembly of persons, unless at such a height as
will permit, in the event of an emergency arising, a landing
to be made without undue hazard to persons or property
on the surface”. It is intended to retain the current MOD
regulation (RA 2330 Low Flying) in order to permit the wide
variety of low-level VFR and IFR operations undertaken by
military aircraft, many of which are incompatible with SERA as
proposed. These include, but are not limited to:
•• Booked low level flying
•• Unbooked low level flying when forced by weather
or emergency
•• Weapon delivery profiles
•• Internal-aids (Radar Altimeter or Terrain Following Radar)
ISSUE 14 standardised european rules of the air (SERA) 23
Air Clues
•• Instrument Metereological Conditions (IMC) descent to
achieve Visual Meterological Conditions (VMC) at low-level
•• IMC low-level operations in the Highland Restricted Area
•• Night Vision Goggle (NVG) low-level operations
•• Night VFR and Day / Night IFR operations at minimum
en-route altitude (for which the Tornado GR4 Force uses a
terrain margin of 500ft, vs SERA 1000ft/2000ft).
of the increasing number of Class G users such as police
helicopters. Where an ATS is unavailable, such as for low level
NVG work, aircrew will still be able to continue with their task.
The MOD will continue to self-regulate to continue night
VFR low level flight below a 750ft ceiling and VFR airfield
operations under an 1100ft ceiling. No changes are expected
to current processes for VFR at night.
Right Hand Rule. The ‘Right-Hand Rule’ will be removed
from UK legislation (the UK and Ireland are the only European
countries that applied this rule). The ‘Right Hand Rule’ is
sometimes used as the basis for local deconfliction measures
at some UK military airfields; however, since such measures
are defined in local orders, these could continue even if the
actual ‘UK Rule of the Air’ were to be withdrawn as there is
no specific need for local procedures to be underpinned by
CAA or MOD regulation. The MOD has asked for the rule to
be retained as Acceptable Means of Compliance or Guidance
Material for use when applying airmanship in support of
achieving the requirements for aircraft approaching head on
to alter their course to the right; the result of this request will
be confirmed in due course.
Special VFR (SVFR). A speed limit of 140KT has been
introduced for SVFR. The issues surrounding this speed
limitation have been debated; however, the UK position on
this issue has yet to be confirmed. It is noted that with the
change to VMC criteria, the number of requests for a SVFR
clearance will increase and a controlling authority may not
have the capacity to provide all of the approvals.
Rights of Way on the Ground. Changes to the current
UK ROTA regarding ‘Rights of Way on the Ground’ have been
accepted. SERA will remove the requirement to overtake on
the left and will also specify that vehicles and vehicles towing
aircraft shall give way to aircraft which are landing, taking off
or taxiing, and that vehicles shall give way to other vehicles
towing aircraft. In addition, the UK’s prescriptive requirement
regarding overtaking and passing will be removed.
Aerodrome Markings and Signal Squares. Aerodrome
markings and signal squares (the MOD does not operate
signal squares, although some may still be in existence) will
change in line with the SERA guidelines; however, there
is no intent or requirement to expend resources to meet
the implementation date. In due course, changes will be
introduced to meet the SERA standard (where these do not
conflict with a military requirement) during normal scheduled
maintenance periods for the airfields and a statement will be
placed into the AIP regarding non-conformity. The Manual
of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding will be updated to
reflect the changes required.
VFR at Night. Civil aircraft operators will be authorised
to operate VFR at night. There are additional requirements
that the MOD should be able to accept; this includes the
requiremement to file a flight plan ( however, the normal
booking out process is accepted as meeting the flight plan
requirement) and a requirement for two-way R/T with an
appropriate Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) to receive
an Air Traffic Service (ATS), when available. This is considered
appropriate during night VFR operations, especially in view
24 standardised european rules of the air (SERA) ISSUE 14
Reclassification of the London Control Zone (CTR).
The London CTR will be changed from Class A to Class D.
Replacement of Class F Airspace. Many of the Class
F airways will be replaced by Class E airways, others will
be removed; see chart. In addition, Class E ‘fillets’ will be
introduced in the vicinity of Aberdeen, though EGD613A will
have precedence when activated. These changes are detailed
in the next article but further information can be found at:
http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=1350&pagetype=90
&pageid=15248
VMC Criteria. One of the major changes within SERA is the
removal of ‘clear of cloud and with the surface in sight’ from
within CAS. This may impact flights operating within Class
D Control Zones (CTRs) where 1000ft vertically from cloud
will have to be maintained when flying VFR. This change
would bring the UK in line with ICAO operations below
3,000ft in CAS and would better enable VFR aircraft to carry
out their responsibility to avoid IFR aircraft within CAS; as a
consequence, and in order to adopt identical rules where
possible, the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) will not selfregulate. In addition, within Class F and Class G below 3000ft,
the VFR minima option of ‘1000ft clear of cloud’ will be
removed. This could introduce an unintended consequence
where a fog layer or a low cloud layer prevented VFR below
3000ft as the surface was not in sight. However, following
much discussion, neither the MOD nor the CAA intends to
seek derogation on this. The SERA VMC criteria are given in the
following table.
Air Clues
Summary
Anyone involved in the operation or control of military
aircraft needs to be aware of these changes. It is essential
that documents and training are updated to reflect the
changes. SERA is already EU Law and becomes UK law by 4
Dec 14, or when implemented if earlier; the intended date for
implementation in the UK is 13 Nov 14.
However these together with any further changes made by
ICAO will be considered in conjunction with the CAA.
Anyone who requires additional information on SERA is asked
to contact DAATM on 0207453 (or DFTS 96453) extension
6575 or 6574.
Work on SERA will continue with the inclusion of SERA Part
C and in relation to Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS).
Altitude Band
Airspace Class
Flight Visibility
Distance from Cloud
At and above
3,050m (10,000ft*)
AMSL
A*** B C D E F G
8 km
1,500m horizontally
300m (1,000ft) vertically
Below 3,050m
(10,000ft*) AMSL
and above 900m
(3,000ft) AMSL,
or above 300m
(1,000ft) above
terrain, whichever
is the higher
A***B C D E F G
5 km
1,500m horizontally
300m (1,000ft) vertically
At and below
900m (3,000ft)
AMSL, or 300m
(1,000ft) above
terrain, whichever
is the higher
A***B C D E
5 km
1,500m horizontally
300m (1,000ft) vertically
FG
5 km**
Clear of cloud and with the surface in sight
* When the height of the transition altitude is lower than 3,050m (10,000ft) AMSL, FL100 shall be used in lieu of 10,000ft.
** When so prescribed by the competent authority:
1.Flight visibilities reduced to not less than 1 500 m may be permitted for flights operating:
a.At speeds of 140KT IAS or less to give adequate opportunity to observe other traffic or any obstacles in time to avoid
collision; or
b.In circumstances in which the probability of encounters with other traffic would normally be low, e.g. in areas of low
volume traffic and for aerial work at low levels.
1.2. Helicopters may be permitted to operate in less than 1,500m but not less than 800m flight visibility, if manoeuvred
at a speed that will give adequate opportunity to observe other traffic or any obstacles in time to avoid collision.
Flight visibilities lower than 800m may be permitted for special cases, such as medical flights, search and rescue
operations and fire-fighting.
*** The VMC minima in Class A airspace are included for guidance to pilots and do not imply acceptance of VFR flights in
Class A airspace.
Note: A specific table will be produced for military operations as there will be some differences to the military requirements in Class F and
G airspace.
This article was reproduced in Air Safety Matters issue 26 however some figures were missing from the table above. The table above and Air Safety
Matters issue 27 (Data Amendment) contain the full and correct VMC criteria.
ISSUE 14 standardised european rules of the air (SERA) 25
Air Clues
Class F
Advisory
Routes
To Go
What do you know
about Class E?
By Sqn Ldr S Jackson-Smith, DAATM SO2 Airspace 2
Following the CAA decision to introduce Class E Controlled
Airspace (CAS) into the UK En-Route system to replace Class
F Advisory Routes, this article aims to provide an overview
of what to expect with Class E. The change is due to take
place on 13 Nov 14, so if you are not sure what it means to
you, please read on…
Why Change?
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines
Class F Airspace as a temporary measure designed to support
Air Traffic Control (ATC) infrastructure improvements that
ultimately lead to the establishment of CAS, where warranted.
To comply with ICAO and new European regulation, the Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) has decided to reclassify the greater
part of the Advisory Route structure as Class E airspace, where
ATC surveillance and communication infrastructure allow
and where sufficient demand exists. Where demand is not
justified, Class F Advisory Routes will be disestablished with
26 class f advisory routes to go issue 14
the airspace reverting to Class G. These changes are depicted
on the map.
Why Class E?
Class E airspace is considered to offer the best compromise
between the requirement to provide guaranteed control
services to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights against the
ability for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights to retain access to the
airspace structure, taking into consideration the volume of IFR
flights operating along such routes.
What is Class E?
Class E already exists within the UK but until now it has been
confined to small areas of both the Belfast and Scottish
Terminal Control Areas (TMA). Within other states it is used
over much wider areas and roughly equates to Air Traffic
Services Outside Controlled Airspace (ATSOCAS), as used
within the UK. However as CAS, IFR flights are guaranteed ATC
Air Clues
service provision and they are mandated to be in receipt of
such control services and comply with instructions for
the purposes of separation against other IFR aircraft.
Therefore, for IFR flights, Class E airspace is no different from
any other classification of CAS.
VFR flights within Class E airspace are not required to be in
receipt of a clearance or to establish/maintain radio contact
with ATC. As such, Class E access is un-restricted to VFR flights,
subject to the requirement to maintain Visual Meteorological
Conditions (VMC) and to avoid all other ac. Aircrew may
elect to receive an ATC service to aid them in discharging
this responsibility; however, ATC will not provide instructions
to VFR flights for the purposes of separation from any other
traffic. Aircrew should also note that any instruction by ATC
that removes their ability to maintain VFR should not be
complied with.
For IFR flights, ATC will provide mandatory instructions to
ensure prescribed separation is maintained between other
IFR flights and provide traffic information on VFR flights.
Avoidance instructions on VFR flights may be requested by
the pilot, but will not be unilaterally offered by ATC. To ensure
a known environment, the CAA has included the mandate
for VFR flights to carry and operate a serviceable transponder.
Nominally this will be Mode S; however, Ministry of Defence
(MOD) exceptions for the use of Mode 3A/C transponders
will continue to apply. Equally, whilst civil ac are restricted to
a speed not in excess of 250Kts below FL100, military ac are
exempt from this regulation.
including non-transponding traffic, such ac may be
deemed to be operating outwith that volume of airspace.
When providing services to ac at the base or top of Class
E airspace, relevant traffic information on such ac shall be
passed to aid pilot awareness. Where Class C lies above Class E,
separation shall be assumed to be required on descending
En-Route traffic, unless it is known that such ac will operate
under VFR on entering Class E.
ATS VFR – Where a pilot requests a VFR service, such services
shall be provided in accordance with UK Flight Information
Services, noting that Deconfliction Service is no longer
available to VFR flights. Where practicable, relevant Traffic
Information should be provided on all observed conflictions,
to aid the pilot in discharging the responsibility to avoid
collisions. No ATC instruction should be provided that requires
an ac operating under VFR to enter IMC; as such it is advisable
to include the phrase ‘Maintain VFR’ to such ac.
Communication - In all circumstances the flight rules
under which a pilot elects to operate define the separation
requirements and thus the level of responsibility that the pilot
has assumed. Therefore, communication between pilots and
ATC, and from controller to controller, must specify the flight
rules in use to facilitate ATS provision.
Aircrew wishing to cross or operate within Class E
airspace should consider the prevailing met conditions.
Where there is any doubt regarding the ability to maintain
VFR or discharge the responsibility to avoid other ac, an Air
Traffic Control Service (Radar Control) should be requested
from an authorised unit prior to entry. The initial request for
service should clearly state that an IFR crossing is required.
An overview of the rules…
ATS IFR – Provision of an Air Traffic Control Service to IFR
flights within CAS is mandatory and instructions are provided
to maintain separation between IFR flights; for UK purposes
this equates to Radar Control. Relevant traffic information on
VFR flights is provided but separation is not required unless
specifically requested by the pilot. Where such a request is
made, controllers are to endeavour to achieve the standard
separation criteria; however, it is recognised that this may
not be possible in all circumstances. Furthermore, where
it is known or suspected that an ac is lost or suffering an
emergency, including radio failure, separation instructions
shall be given. Where an ac is observed to be operating
outside the lateral or vertical limits of Class E airspace,
issue 14 class f advisory routes to go 27
Air Clues
Use it or
Lose it!
Time to think
outside the box…
or at least your area
By Cdr D Robertson RN DAATM SO1 Airspace
Having strapped in and launched for a sortie, how much
thought did you give to the airspace that you are operating
in and the effect that you may have on other airspace users?
It may be hard to accept but airspace is a scarce resource,
which squadrons are traditionally quick to book but slow to
hand back when sorties are changed or cancelled.
Does this matter? Not to the pilot whose sortie has been
cancelled but it does affect the other squadrons and
commercial operators who are still forced to avoid that
airspace. While you may believe airspace is handed back, the
statistics prove otherwise.
The statistics show that the Central (EGD613) and Southern
(EGD323) Military Danger Areas (MDA) were booked but not
used for 60-70% of the time, during which time they were
unavailable to those that required access to that segregated
28 use it or lose it ISSUE 14
airspace. This inefficient use of airspace has to change or
there is a risk that action could be taken against the military
that would see greater restrictions being imposed on the
availability of segregated airspace.
The MDAs are located in one of the busiest areas of airspace in
the UK, both in terms of military operational training activity
over the North Sea and in the civil route network. The Military
Airspace Booking & Coordination Cell (MABCC) is responsible
for managing the booking process with military and civil
negotiations conducted through the Airspace Management
Cell (AMC). From a civil perspective, the key timeline is 3 hours
prior to the booking/activation (H-3), after which it is too
late to submit a Flight Plan to route across an MDA. As a
result, civil aircraft have to travel greater distances,
carrying and burning more fuel, thus increasing the cost
of your holidays!
Air Clues
So what? At a time when military airspace requirements are
changing, with the move of Typhoon to Lossiemouth and the
future basing of Lightning II at Marham, it is vital that action
is taken now to address inefficiencies in the booking and
cancellation process. It must be recognised that airspace is a
State resource that is neither considered civil or military;
it is one continuum that should be used efficiently and
shared under the principles of Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA).
As part of the UK’s Future Airspace Strategy (FAS), the aim
of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is to provide ‘safe and
efficient’ airspace, which meets increasing capacity demands;
however, to achieve this, it is important that all aviation
stakeholders act responsibly when assessing their airspace
needs. It is of note that airspace performance targets are not
set against the military within European legislation; however,
they are set against the UK as a State. As such, should the UK
fail to achieve FUA targets (for which the military plays a large
part) then the UK Government could be fined. Should this
happen, military use of airspace is likely to come under greater
Government scrutiny, at a time when there is significant focus
on increasing commercial capacity within the UK.
What can be done to improve the FUA? For a start, the AMC
at RAF Unit Swanwick is working hard to make improvements
in the booking process (later booking times to ensure greater
accuracy in sortie requirements) and better use of Airspace
Management (ASM) tools such as the Local And sub-Regional
Airspace (LARA) Management Support System. However, the
onus is on airspace users to ensure that bookings are tightly
managed in terms of the area required to achieve sortie
objectives (some training missions could be achieved in nonsegregated airspace), operating levels and, more importantly,
cancellation when the airspace is not being used.
Danger area
Hours Published and/
or booked
Hours still allocated
3 hours prior to
booking/activation
time
Hours used
% used versus hours
still booked 3 hours
prior to sortie
EGD 323A
2324.00
2238.50
666.00
29.75
EGD 323B
2114.25
2034.00
796.50
39.16
EGD 323C
2071.00
1974.50
762.50
38.62
EGD 323D
837.75
791.00
280.00
35.40
EGD 323E
835.75
787.75
282.75
35.89
EGD 323F
839.00
792.50
282.25
35.62
EGD 613A
1231.50
1133.50
452.00
39.88
EGD 613B
1244.75
1155.50
490.75
42.47
EGD 613C
1236.75
1148.50
460.75
40.12
ISSUE 14 use it or lose it 29
Air Clues
To assist, the AMC has implemented a revised booking process
that allows squadrons to book airspace as late as 1800 on the
day prior to the required booking. It is anticipated that by
enabling later bookings, squadrons would be better placed to
predict their airspace requirements for the next day, based on
a more accurate picture of weather, airframe and engineering
issues and aircrew availability. It is understood that changes,
which could affect airspace requirements, are inevitable.
However, the importance of making sure that bookings
are cancelled at the earliest opportunity cannot be over
emphasised to ensure that the airspace can be reallocated
appropriately either for military or for civil use. While H-3 is
a key timeline, should this not be feasible, airspace released
after this time can still be effectively utilised on a tactical basis.
Even when airborne, handing back those levels above you
that you do not require allow it to be allocated on a tactical
basis to other military and/or commercial operators with a
commensurate reduction in fuel burn and CO2 emissions.
Spry Says
This is a warning that we must not
ignore. It’s always easy to think that
local action (or inaction) has no effect
on the bigger picture, but this one
needs everybody’s buy-in. Airspace is gold dust in
modern aviation. So, come on guys – put a process in
place that sorts this out!
While military airframe numbers have been reducing and
greater emphasis is likely to be placed on synthetic training,
there is little doubt that there is still the military need to
have access to suitable blocks of airspace in order to meet
operational training requirements. It is recognised that current
airspace arrangements in relation to the position and size of
the MDAs and Military Training Areas (MTA) may not be the
optimal solution; however, it must be appreciated that the
military is afforded priority over vast tracts of airspace. It is all
you have got, so do not jeopardise this position.
For the future, it is recognised that a more dynamic approach
to Airspace Management must be adopted. There are some
significant planned improvements ahead that should be of
benefit to the military; however, for now, the military must
demonstrate that it is sufficiently agile in its use of airspace to
safeguard its access into the future.
In considering your sortie airspace requirements consider
the following: book and cancel responsibly or risk losing
out to commercial operators. We can all play our part: the
planning crew who decide that the weather is not suitable;
those airborne in the area releasing airspace above them;
Battlespace Managers handing back airspace for ‘no shows’
or once playtime is over; and the Duty Authoriser with the
strategic view of the flying programme or as part of the
in-brief.
Flexibility is the key to air power. Use it, or lose it.
“Waddaya mean you forgot to tell AU we were gonna be here?”
30 use it or lose it ISSUE 14
Air Clues
AP 8000 The Royal Air Force Safety and
Environmental Management System
Following the establishment of the RAF Safety Centre
at HQ Air Command, AP3207 ‘The RAF Manual of Flight
Safety’, was replaced by AP8000 ‘The Royal Air Force Safety
and Environmental Management System’. AP8000 is now
accessible on the RAF Publications Library and this should
be your primary source for the most current version of
the document.
You will find AP8000 in the ‘Reference’ section in
‘Publications by Category’ and listed in the ‘Publications
by Number’ section. The document, which is at: http://
defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/Organisations/Orgs/RAF/
Reference/Publications/Pages/AP8000.aspx consists of the
main body and a series of leaflets that are categorised into
Policy, Organisational, Safety Management Activity, Flight
Safety and General.
AP8000 The Royal Air Force
Safety and Environmental
Management System
“Safeguarding our
people so we can fly safe
aircraft safely, in order to
maintain our capability”
Please take the time to familiarise yourselves with the
AP8000 and please submit a ‘Request for Change Form’
(leaflet 8011) if you notice an error or ommission.
ISSUE 14 AIR CLUELESS 31
Air Clues
Operations within a Joint
Forward Air Control Training and
Standardisation Unit (JFACTSU)
Notice to Airmen(NOTAM)
By Flight Lieutenant J Meadows, JFACTSU Deputy Flight Commander
Some of you reading this may have seen a Joint Forward
Air Control Training and Standardisation Unit (JFACTSU)
NOTAM during sortie planning and experienced some
frustration as a result. Whilst many operators will amend
their sortie profiles to avoid the NOTAM, there may be
occasions when this is not possible without impacting
upon the aims of the sortie. Furthermore, the NOTAM is a
warning, not an avoid, allowing crews to operate within the
airspace if they wish. This article will provide some insight
into the nature of JFACTSU operations within the NOTAM,
which will hopefully help crews operate safely whilst
32 JFACTSU NOTAM ISSUE 14
minimising disruption to their planned sortie profiles. The
issued NOTAM should be viewed as an aid to safe planning,
rather than a hindrance.
JFACTSU is the only UK unit conducting Forward Air Controller
(FAC) training. The training consists of both simulated and
live aircraft controls; the latter being conducted at a selection
of Observation Posts (OPs). The student FACs and FAC-Is
(instructors) will deploy to the OP, generally within 60nm of
RAF Leeming, and they will usually operate from 0900L to
1700L (the hours of operation will be detailed in the NOTAM).
Air Clues
Throughout the promulgated active hours there will be a
variety of aircraft operating with the FACs, including the
dedicated JFACTSU Hawks. JFACTSU exercises are additionally
supported by the front-line squadrons and will, therefore,
host a variety of platforms throughout the published hours
of operation.
The airspace detailed in the NOTAM will often be 5nm in
radius and will extend from the surface to a height usually
between 5,000ft and 14,000ft. The NOTAM will include
contact mobile phone numbers and radio frequencies.
Aircraft operating with the FACs will be utilising a single UHF
frequency for training whilst receiving an ATC service on the
JFACTSU-owned VHF frequency (131.175). JFACTSU Royal
Signals personnel at the OP will monitor the published phone
numbers and radio frequencies. The OP callsign, ‘JACKPOT
CONTROL’, can be contacted either on the JFACTSU VHF or
allocated UHF frequency.
Aircraft operating in support of the FAC training do not
operate solely within the confines of the NOTAM.
Participating aircraft will seek to minimise their time at low
level and we may have aircraft holding outside the NOTAM
awaiting clearance to join. The pilots’ workload is extremely
high as they are required to deliver simulated Close Air
Support and act as airborne instructors to the student FACs,
in consultation with the FAC-Is on the ground. The aircraft will
conduct highly dynamic manoeuvres at low and medium
altitude. Our primary concerns at JFACTSU are Controlled
Flight into Terrain (CFIT) and Mid-air Collision (MAC), owing to
the high workload and dynamic manoeuvres being flown.
The sorties are R/T intensive for the participating crews,
requiring them to receive briefs and rapid “talk-ons” from the
student FACs, whilst maintaining a listening watch with ATC
and JACKPOT CONTROL. Where possible, we request that
crews attempt deconfliction in the planning stage, prior to
getting airborne. The easiest way to achieve this is to call the
mobile phone number given in the NOTAM. Whilst JFACTSU
exercises are planned to maximise the training for our student
FACs, we will always try to minimise disruption to other
aircraft operating in the surrounding area. Where possible, we
will instruct participating aircraft to remain at medium-level
such that other aircraft are able to transit the NOTAM safely.
However, we are unable to achieve this if we do not know
your intentions.
JFACTSU have elected to establish a NOTAM to provide some
protection to aircraft operating in the area. The NOTAM is
there to provide valuable situational awareness, and whilst it
is a ‘warning’, as opposed to an ‘avoid’, I hope that this article
illustrates how important it is to heed the NOTAM in order for
all airspace users to operate safely. We will do all that we can
to minimise disruption to your sortie, but we are unable to do
this if we do not know that you are there.
Spry Says
I thank Meds for his explanation
of what the JFACTSU chaps are up
to in this very busy airspace. The
JFACTSU sorties are devilishly busy for the
participating aircrew and this is a pertinent reminder
to us all that we have a responsibility to let them know
if we are planning on flying close to their NOTAM.
Whilst they have elected to establish a warning, I would
encourage all aircraft to avoid the area where possible,
and to always give JACKPOT CONTROL an early call to let
them know your intentions – they will really appreciate
your call. I know that young Percy is sometimes a little
shy on the radio. I am always telling him that saying
something is better than saying nothing!
ISSUE 14 jfactsu notam 33
Working together
By Sqn Ldr Pete Brombley, HQ Air Command
An airprox last year involving a light helicopter and an RAF Tornado has again raised
questions about how GA pilots can safely share Class G airspace with military fast jets
Being able to operate close to the ground is essential
to maintain an effective air force and regular training is
necessary to maintain the skill. Low flying over the UK is
34 WORKING TOGETHER issue 14
carried out by the RAF, the Royal Navy, and the Army Air
Corps. A small amount of low flying is also undertaken by
other NATO air forces on a reciprocal basis.
Air Clues
report and then traced the Tornado. Analysis of the Tornado
mission recording revealed the aircraft had indeed had an
airprox just over one mile outside the NOTAM area.
It can be appreciated from the Tornado crew’s views above
that the AS350 was difficult to see. It was only the aircraft’s
Infra-Red (IR) equipment that detected the AS350, and that
was only from seven seconds prior to the closest point of
approach. Furthermore, the helicopter’s aspect to the Tornado
was almost tail-on, and the relative angular motion (less than
1° per second) across the crew’s visual field of view was very
small, making the helicopter even harder to detect visually.
RAF Flight Safety analysis of the footage estimated the miss
distance to be in the order of 70ft. UKAB agreed that the
Tornado crew were correct to concentrate on visual lookout
rather than rely on internal displays. The facility to display
IR contacts in the Head Up Display (HUD) was not selected
and might have detected the AS350. As the airprox occurred
outside the CANP, some members thought it might have been
helpful to include additional information such as routing to
and from the area. UKAB thought this would be good practice
but that it would not always be practical.
In this airprox over the Scottish Highlands, a Eurocopter
AS350 Écureuil was operating along the A9 road, carrying out
work with underslung loads and had submitted a military
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) (a ’Z NOTAM’ is transmitted over
a military only messaging system to military aircrew, they
are not published in the UK AIS domain) under the Civil Air
Notification Procedure (CANP) system.
The helicopter was heading 150° at 120kt at around 400ft and
the pilot had his anti-collision lights and High Intensity Strobe
Lights (HISL) switched on, but his transponder off. The weather
was reported as good Visual Meterological Conditions (VMC)
with greater than 10km visibility with a layer of clouds about
1000ft above. The pilot was aware of the Tornado passing
his aircraft, but due to a late sighting was unable to take any
avoiding action.
The Tornado crew were also flying along the A9 valley at
420kt, 440ft (Rad Alt) squawking Mode3A/7001 with Mode C
and S selected on. The aircraft navigation and anti-collision
lights were selected on. The crew were aware of the CANP as
it came up on their displays and had devised a plan to avoid
the location and turn toward better weather to the south.
The crew were unaware that they had passed close by
the AS350.
The airprox was initially reported by a person parked in a
lay-by on the A9 and he alerted the UK Airprox Board (UKAB).
The board began tracing action once the AS350 had filed his
The AS350 pilot was entitled to position for a photography
task, but the selected height of 400ft increased his likelihood
of conflict with a military aircraft. The UKAB noted: The UK
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 1.1 (General
Rules) 1.1-32 dated 7 Mar 13 states: 5.2.7 UK Military Low
Flying System 5.2.7.1 Military low flying occurs in most parts
of the United Kingdom at any height up to 2000ft above the
surface. However, the greatest concentration is between 250ft
and 500ft and civil pilots are advised to avoid flying in that
height band whenever possible.
The pilot reported that his transponder was turned off, which
as UKAB pointed out, is not good practice. A functioning
transponder with Mode C provides improved safety margins
for Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) equipped aircraft
and Air Traffic Control (ATC).
All operations in Class G airspace rely upon the ‘see and avoid’,
or ‘see and be seen’ principle for collision avoidance.
Wherever possible, AIP advice to avoid operations in the
intensive 250-500ft height band should be heeded.
UKAB were hampered on this occasion, because they cannot
initiate airprox action unless a member of the flight crew or
an Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) submits a report. Prompt
reporting of all airprox occurrences is good flight safety sense
and all aircrew, military and civilian must report an airprox as
soon as possible (by Radio Telephony on the regional Flight
Information Service and say the magic word ‘airprox’).
Many military aircraft are now equipped with TCAS and many
others are being upgraded. All military aircraft squawk Mode
issue 14 WORKING TOGETHER 35
Air Clues
3A/7001 with C when low flying. If you have a transponder,
using it with Mode3A/7000 Mode C selected will make you
more detectable by TCAS-equipped aircraft. If you have TCAS,
use it at least in Traffic Advisory mode; all military aircraft in
the Low Flying System are required to squawk so it may assist
you in seeing and avoiding. If you are engaged in unusual
activity in Class G below 2,000ft, submit a CANP NOTAM.
Include as much detail regarding your activity including
proposed routing between support sites (for refuelling,
passenger pick-up etc) in addition to the routine CANP details.
Include a contact telephone number whereby military crews
can contact your operations to get more information about
you and your activity.
If you have a Very High Frequency you will be working on (or
indeed just listening out) include it on the NOTAM. If you do,
military crews will strive to call you if they are approaching
your working area to improve their situational awareness and
thus improve safety margins.
The RAF has many Regional Airspace Users Working Groups
(RAUWGs) who meet regularly to share information about
each other’s aviation activities. Contact details for these
groups are included in the following Mid-Air Collision
(MAC) article. You can contact your nearest RAF airfield and
ask for the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) or the
Station Flight Safety Officer (SFSO) who will be delighted to
include you in future meetings. It is by working together and
understanding each other that we can have a flexible and
equitable use of the free airspace we all enjoy.
For further advice regarding military low flying and the
General Aviation community, have a look at the Civil Aviation
Authority’s Safety Sense Leaflet No 18 (go to caa.co.uk and put
safety sense leaflets in the search box) and there’s further info
at www.gov.uk/military-low-flying.
Spry Says
I wonder how many times there has been
an Airprox when neither party knew it had
happened? Did it happen on your last sortie?
You will probably never know. There is some good
advice in this article for the civilian pilots who are
reading this (and I know many of you do!) but that advice equally
applies to those of us that serve Her Majesty. Nobody has more of
a right than anybody else to be in Class G Airspace, and there are
many ways of making ‘see and avoid’ a bit easier, we should use
as many methods as we possibly can. I consider myself privileged
to have spent so much time flying all sorts of aircraft at low level
and I enjoy the freedom of Class G Airspace; I would not deny
any other person the chance to enjoy the same freedoms, but we
must appreciate each other and do our best to keep everybody
safe to come back another day and do it again!
36 WORKING TOGETHER issue 14
Air Clues
If you are engaged in unusual activity in Class G below
2,000f t, submit a CANP NOTAM. Include as much detail
regarding your activity, including proposed routing
between support sites (for refuelling, passenger pick-up etc)
in addition to the routine CANP details. Include a contact
telephone number whereby military crews can contact
your operations to get more information about you and
your activity.
issue 14 WORKING TOGETHER 37
Air Clues
Mid-Air Collision
By Sqn Ldr Tom Hill, RAF Safety Centre
Military Aviation Duty Holders (DHs) are legally obliged
to reduce, to the minimum practicable level, any risk to
life associated with the aviation activities for which they
are responsible. Mid Air Collision (MAC) is consistently
one of the top 5 issues for DHs, with most regarding it as
their top Flight Safety priority. Activity to reduce the risk
of MAC is extensive and requires us all to understand the
problem and to play our part, in line with the DH’s intent.
For most of us, this simply involves having the courage to
question when something doesn’t look right. For those
38 MID-AIR COLLISION ISSUE 14
working within Operations Wings on units, the tasks are
more specific but are still based on an ability to recognise a
potential hazard and then take positive preventative action.
Let’s start with the most obvious MAC mitigation activity:
lookout. Aircrew are trained to look out of the cockpit whilst
flying, as part of a disciplined workcycle. This applies in all
regimes of flight, by day and night. Lookout is taught and
assessed from the earliest phase of Flying Training and
then honed as an individual’s career progresses. Lookout is
Air Clues
Regional Airspace User Working Groups
Area
Unit
Organising POC
Contact Number
London/Oxfordshire
(Location varies)
Oxford Airport
Flt Lt Lana Balmer,
ATCO RAF Benson
01491 837766 Ext 7017
South England
MOD Boscombe Down
Flt Lt Ben Cribb,
DSATCO
01980 662994
Lincolnshire
RAFC Cranwell
Sqn Ldr Guy Shirley, SATCO
01400 267283
North England
RAF Leeming
Sqn Ldr Karen Lofthouse,
SATCO
01677 457229
SE Scotland
RAF Leuchars
WO Paul Taylor, ATCO
01334 857282
NE Scotland
RAF Lossiemouth
Sqn Ldr Lisa Mullineux,
SATCO
01343 817414
East Anglia
RAF Marham
Flt Lt Daz Miller, DSATCO
01760 444949
Wales and West Midlands
(Location Varies)
RAF Shawbury
FS Kiel McPhillips, Shawbury
ATCO
01939 250351 Ext 7231
RAF Valley
Sqn Ldr Sharon Loe, Valley
SATCO
01407 762241 Ext 7204
consistently one of the most effective ‘barriers’ to MAC ie. it
is frequently the main reason why 2 aircraft miss each other
rather than collide.
If lookout is hampered by poor visibility, aircrew are required
to supplement their awareness of other aircraft using radar
services from Air Traffic Control. Various types of radar service
are offered and aircrew must fully understand that, whilst
they might be receiving information about other aircraft, it is
usually still their own responsibility to monitor and steer clear.
Of course, these radar services are available when the weather
is good too!
Clearly, Air Traffic Controllers have a fundamental role in
the prevention of MAC. The quality and timeliness of the
information passed to aircraft under their control has a direct
influence on whether or not a situation deteriorates to the
extent where 2 aircraft have an Airprox ie. get close enough
to cause concern. Studies of human factors have identified
that busy people doing complex tasks can become saturated
with information, resulting in a reduced response to new
inputs. Some of the most effective MAC-prevention activity
occurs when an Air Traffic Controller adjusts the style of
their communication, adds emphasis or simply adopts plain
English, to ensure that the pilot receives the information
despite having to cope with a multitude of other factors.
Ultimately, the important thing is that the message is passed
effectively. Air Traffic Control must also be aware of incorrect
readbacks, perhaps when aircrew do not repeat an entire
clearance or instruction. The old mantra that applies here is
‘don’t assume, check’ – repeat the message and demand a
full readback. Confusion and assumption have no place in
professional aviation.
As well as ground-based radar services, some aircraft have
on-board radar and other detection systems, which aircrew
are expected to use in order to clear their flight path.
This fusing of information from separate systems in order
to enhance awareness is expected on all sorties, at all times,
unless those systems are needed for their primary tactical
function. Of course, aviators need to also bear in mind that
deliberately getting close to another aircraft is likely to
trigger that aircraft’s Collision Warning System and
generate avoiding action.
The use of the Centralised Aviation Data Service (CADS)
during sortie-planning has added a further layer of protection
against MAC. CADS is an internet-based planning tool, on
which aircrew plot their expected route and check for any
confliction with other known routes. If a conflict is identified,
the aircrew can adjust their route or simply phone the other
crew and agree on a plan to preserve safe separation. CADS
is by no means a replacement for lookout and effective
sensor-management, and only depicts the routes of other
CADS users, but it is a valuable facility for identifying potential
conflicts before takeoff.
ISSUE 14 MID-AIR COLLISION 39
Air Clues
Much of the RAF’s MAC prevention activity is based on sharing
knowledge, plans and information with other users of the
airspace. This occurs using a country-wide system of Regional
Airspace User Working Groups (RAUWG), hosted by various
RAF units. The meetings are attended by representatives
from civilian flying clubs and local airfields as well as military
planners, who can use the forum to ensure that flying activity
proceeds as safely as possible. Details of each RAUWG are in
the table overleaf.
The widespread use of small aircraft, microlights, hangliders
and even model aircraft has resulted in increasingly congested
airspace across much of the United Kingdom. Some of these
vehicles are difficult to detect, so military aircrew are expected
to be prudent in their choice of routing in order to avoid areas
of dense population, as well as using disciplined lookout and
sensor-management to provide the earliest warning of a
potential Airprox. Regulatory organisations are drafting rules
that will help to reduce the risk of MAC; in the meantime the
Air Navigation Order helps military pilots by insisting that all
On 20 Nov 14, the Military Aviation Authority (MAA)
will be hosting a conference on “Reducing the
Risk of Mid-Air Collision” at the Defence Academy,
Shrivenham. The event will include speakers from
Defence, Civil Aviation and Industry and aims to
facilitate discussion between Duty Holders (DH), their
Air Safety Staff and representatives from across the
DH-facing community. Spaces at the Conference are
limited and have been allocated to Aviation Duty
Holders and key DH- facing organisations, however,
if you would like to attend then contact your friendly
Air Safety Staff to see if they have spaces available.
40 MID-AIR COLLISION ISSUE 14
civilian aviators ‘must not recklessly or negligently cause or
permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.’
Within the military, we must adhere to the Armed Forces Act
in this matter, which prohibits dangerous flying.
Unfortunately, despite best efforts, aircraft do occasionally get
too close to one another. When this occurs, it is important
(in fact, the regulations demand) that a Defence Air Safety
Occurance Report (DASOR) is submitted with a full account
of the circumstances; each RAF unit has safety staff who are
required to collate all the relevant information and instigate
an investigation. This is done entirely with Just Culture in
mind; people make mistakes and it is essential that we learn
the lessons. The completed DASOR, along with all additional
information, is then used by the United Kingdom Airprox
Board (UKAB) to make an assessment of the cause and
severity of the event. The most severe Airproxs are usually
a result of neither pilot seeing the other aircraft, or a similar
breakdown in Situational Awareness. In these circumstances,
a collision was often only avoided by chance, as the human
Spry Says
In my prime, jumping in the old
string-bag and committing aviation
was often done on an ad-hoc basis,
with the minimum of planning.
The sky was a big place and most of the
flying machines were not blessed with the most
spirited performance. These days, the kites have
evolved and things happen more quickly. The tasks
are more complex and require a disciplined mix of
scanning gauges and looking through the perspex.
In addition, aviation as a sport of kings is now
available to more and more people, who possess
a wide variety of experience and training. Military
aircrew nowadays have to negotiate busy airspace
in order to complete their task. A healthy distrust of
other aviators and a defensive approach to things
will help to avoid unnecessary incidents, as will the
appropriate use of all the available gadgets and
services. Fly safe chaps - tally ho!
Air Clues
element in the chain had not intervened early enough to
affect the outcome. The UKAB publishes its observations and
recommendations every month, which is distributed to the
RAF by the Safety Centre at HQ Air Cmd.
In summary, reducing the risk of MAC to the lowest
practicable level remains one of the top safety priorities
for the RAF. Only by learning the lessons can we avoid
repeating the same mistakes; it is incumbent on each of us to
report incidents, including as much information as possible.
For the operators amongst you, ensure that you are fully
familiar with the limitations of each of the Air Traffic Services
and that the constraints of fuel, time and the task are balanced
against the need to preserve separation from other aircraft
around you. Ensure that all the barriers to MAC, including
CADS, are available and functioning; any loss of capability
with these must be communicated to your DH. Planners
and supervisors can significantly reduce the risk of MAC
by sharing information with local airspace users via
the RAUWG network. No matter what your role, if you
see something unusual then have the confidence to
highlight this to someone who can help eg. Air Traffic Control.
ISSUE 14 MID-AIR COLLISION 41
Air Clues
Awards
Flight Lieutenant Clemett, Green Endorsement
Flt Lt Clemett was the aircraft commander of a Merlin helicopter
conducting a trial of its Defensive Aids Suite on Friday 1 November
2013. On completion of the trial, the crew observed and responded to
a serious road traffic accident. Their swift actions, timely coordination
of external resources, outstanding airmanship and lateral thinking
combined to ensure a very serious situation was handled successfully.
The aircraft was en-route to RAF Waddington at low level when one of
the crewmen observed a serious accident involving 2 cars. Flt Lt Clemett
initiated an orbit whilst the crew assessed the scene; there were clearly
casualties, including walking wounded and one trapped in a vehicle. Quickly and efficiently, he coordinated
an emergency services response via RAF Waddington, prior to the aircraft landing on. The two crewmen
disembarked the aircraft to secure the scene and prevent further accidents, and provided immediate first aid to
the injured.
The arrival of an air ambulance and a second ambulance provided vital support for the cardiac patient;
however, a second casualty, suspected of having suffered a major chest trauma, needed immediate hospital
care. The Merlin crew was requested to conduct a swift transfer to a suitable hospital; demonstrating flexibility
and resourcefulness, they rapidly considered the constraints of the landing site, fuel state and refuel options, as
well as the fading light and low cloud base. Having planned the best course of action, Flt Lt Clemett decided to
support the request and the casualty and doctor were immediately emplaned. Despite challenging conditions,
exacerbated by the requirement to fly through controlled airspace, they safely and rapidly transported the
casualty to Nottingham Hospital. Through sensible decision-making and excellent airmanship, Flt Lt Clemett
was able to mitigate the ‘armed’ state of the aircraft.
Flt Lt Clemett played a pivotal role in what was very much a crew effort. His crew’s actions and contributions,
collectively and individually, resulted in a successful conclusion to a high pressure life or death situation,
exacerbated by several complications and distractions. This incident is a fine example of Crew Resource
Management and teamwork of the highest level.
42 awards ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Petty Officer Spencer, Green Endorsement
PO Spencer was one of two crewmen of a Merlin helicopter conducting a
trial of its Defensive Aids Suite on Friday 1 November 2013. On completion
of the trial, the crew observed and responded to a serious road traffic
accident. Their swift actions, timely coordination of external resources,
outstanding airmanship and lateral thinking combined to ensure a very
serious situation was handled successfully.
The aircraft was en-route to RAF Waddington at low level when the crew
observed a serious accident involving 2 cars which had clearly led to
casualties, including walking wounded and one trapped in a vehicle.
The aircraft commander coordinated an emergency services response via RAF Waddington, prior to the aircraft
landing on. PO Spencer and the other crewman disembarked the aircraft and secured the scene in order to
prevent further accidents and provide immediate first aid. PO Spencer used the aircraft’s First Aid Kit to treat
the casualties and co-opted members of the general public to control traffic flow. He continued to monitor and
reassure the casualties until paramedics arrived on scene and then provided a thorough situation report, handing
over responsibility for treatment whilst continuing to assist. PO Spencer identified that the casualty in the vehicle
had suffered a cardiac arrest and was tasked with the casualty’s swift evacuation while the paramedics prepared
defibrillation equipment.
The arrival of an air ambulance and a second ambulance provided vital support for the cardiac patient; however,
a second casualty, suspected of having suffered a major chest trauma, needed immediate hospital care.
The Merlin crew was requested to conduct a swift transfer to a suitable hospital; demonstrating flexibility and
resourcefulness, they rapidly considered the constraints of the landing site, fuel state and refuel options, as well
as the fading light and low cloud base. Having planned the best course of action, they were able to support the
request and the casualty and doctor were immediately emplaned. Despite challenging conditions, exacerbated
by the requirement to fly through controlled airspace, they safely and rapidly transported the casualty to
Nottingham Hospital.
PO Spencer played a pivotal role in what was very much a crew effort. Their actions and contributions, collectively
and individually, resulted in a successful conclusion to a high pressure life or death situation, exacerbated by
several complications and distractions. This incident is a fine example of Crew Resource Management and
teamwork of the highest level.
ISSUE 14 awards 43
Air Clues
Sergeant Wilson, Green Endorsement
Sgt Wilson was one of two crewmen of a Merlin helicopter conducting
a trial of its Defensive Aids Suite on Friday 1 November 2013.
On completion of the trial, the crew observed and responded to a
serious road traffic accident. Their swift actions, timely coordination
of external resources, outstanding airmanship and lateral thinking
combined to ensure a very serious situation was handled successfully.
The aircraft was en-route to RAF Waddington at low level when the
crew observed a serious accident involving 2 cars which had clearly
led to casualties, including walking wounded and one trapped in a
vehicle. The aircraft commander coordinated an emergency services response via RAF Waddington, prior to the
aircraft landing on. Sgt Wilson and the other crewman disembarked the aircraft and secured the scene in order
to prevent further accidents and provide immediate first aid. Sgt Wilson used the aircraft’s First Aid Kit to treat
the casualties and co-opted members of the general public to control traffic flow. He continued to monitor and
reassure the casualties until paramedics arrived on scene and then provided a thorough situation report, handing
over responsibility for treatment whilst continuing to assist.
The arrival of an air ambulance and a second ambulance provided vital support for the cardiac patient; however,
a second casualty, suspected of having suffered a major chest trauma, needed immediate hospital care.
The Merlin crew was requested to conduct a swift transfer to a suitable hospital; demonstrating flexibility and
resourcefulness, they rapidly considered the constraints of the landing site, fuel state and refuel options, as well
as the fading light and low cloud base. Having planned the best course of action, they were able to support the
request and the casualty and doctor were immediately emplaned. Despite challenging conditions, exacerbated
by the requirement to fly through controlled airspace, they safely and rapidly transported the casualty to
Nottingham Hospital
Sgt Wilson played a pivotal role in what was very much a crew effort. Their actions and contributions, collectively
and individually, resulted in a successful conclusion to a high pressure life or death situation, exacerbated by
several complications and distractions. This incident is a fine example of Crew Resource Management and
teamwork of the highest level.
44 AWARDS ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Flight Lieutenant Andrew Fellowes-Freeman,
Green Endorsement
Flt Lt Andrew Fellowes-Freeman was the aircraft commander of Hercules
C Mk4, ZH869, which departed Kandahar Airfield on 12 Jun 2013 to return
to the UK via Minhad and Akrotiri. In his comprehensive briefing to the
crew, he specified the limited aircraft performance due to the aircraft’s
weight, the airfield elevation and the high ambient temperature, and
included the option, following the unlikely event of two engines failing
after take, of executing a controlled crash landing.
On passing 7000 ft, No 2 and No 3 engines’ oil temperatures were
observed to be abnormally high; Fellowes-Freeman was immediately aware that such prolonged high
temperatures, or any further temperature rises, could result in fires in both engines or require both to be shut
down. He briefed the crew on the situation, instructed the co-pilot to read through all associated drills rather
than simply the one for the displayed advisory caption, and immediately formulated a recovery plan to Kandahar.
Aware that he was above the small arms threat band, he reduced power to the affected engines in an attempt to
reduce their temperatures.
This serious situation called for quick thinking; declaring an emergency, Fellowes-Freeman rapidly negotiated
a non-standard visual left turn with Air Traffic Control to join downwind at Kandahar and levelled above the
substantial surface-to-air threat, clear of the danger areas and restricted operating zones. With his superior
technical knowledge, he was able to reset the engine control systems of the affected engines; despite this,
the oil temperature continued to rise and Fellowes-Freeman realised that the oil temperature would exceed
the maximum limit on both engines before he could land the aircraft. He recognised that he may have to
shut both engines down or risk catastrophic failure or fire should he elect to keep them running. The situation
was exacerbated by the oil temperatures of No 1 and No 4 engines rising, with one abnormally high.
Fellowes-Freeman immediately declared a MAYDAY and, after confirming the surface wind at Kandahar,
he positioned the aircraft to carry out a downwind approach and landing. This is a potentially difficult and
dangerous procedure, not normally practised, particularly given the strength of the tailwind, the aircraft’s mass,
the performance limitations and the nature of the emergency. Aware of the potential asymmetric problem
should he be forced to shut down two engines, he quickly calculated a tactical descent profile to achieve the
highest possible speed at the lowest possible power setting, thereby maintaining a cooling airflow through the
engines and gearbox.
During the turn onto right base, the co-pilot reported that the No 3 engine’s oil temperature was now ‘in the red’
and an emergency engine shutdown was required. Fellowes-Freeman acknowledged the temperature, confirmed
with the Aircraft Ground Engineer that there were no external signs of fire and re-affirmed that he would keep the
engine running. He then positioned the aircraft high on the approach path, which allowed it to glide at flight idle,
and elected not to shut down any engines, in case he was required to go-around. Fellowes-Freeman constantly
gave clear concise briefings to his crew, ensuring that they were fully aware of his intentions. He displayed
exemplary CRM by employing the whole crew to manage the situation, tasking the rear crew to maintain a close
watch on No 2 and No 3 engines, whilst scanning for signs of enemy fire, and tasking the co-pilot to maintain
a commentary on the status of the engine instrumentation and aircraft systems. Crew communications were
frequently interrupted by ATC transmissions seeking information on the nature of the emergency; despite this,
no crewmember was ever in any doubt of Fellowes-Freeman’s intent, or their role, thanks to his clear, articulate
briefings. At every stage of this challenging occurrence, Fellowes-Freeman demonstrated exemplary levels of
airmanship, CRM, technical ability and courageous leadership. In the face of a very real threat, he remained one
step ahead of the emergency, making firm, correct and timely decisions. His exemplary aircraft handling and
calm leadership were in the finest traditions of the Royal Air Force. There is no doubt that the decisions made by
Fellowes-Freeman, and the manner in which he executed them, saved the crew and aircraft from a potentially
catastrophic outcome.
ISSUE 14 AWARDS 45
Air Clues
Flight Lieutenant Harkin, Green Endorsement
On Wednesday 8 January 2014, Flt Lt Harkin flew as part of a 4-ship
Typhoon formation on the first leg of a trail from RAF Leuchars to Lajes
in the Azores. Early in the sortie, Flt Lt Harkin began to experience some
intermittent failures to his Computer Symbol Generator (CSG), which
affected his Head-Down and Head-Up-Displays. These intermittent
problems proved a significant distraction during the first refuelling
bracket, which was conducted in poor weather and moderate turbulence.
Nevertheless, Flt Lt Harkin successfully refuelled with minimum delay,
notably achieving the refuelling bracket without a usable HUD. As the trail
progressed over the Atlantic, the situation worsened with a total
CSG failure and failure of the aircraft Environmental Conditioning System, resulting in a dark and cold cockpit.
Despite extremely low cockpit temperatures, Flt Lt Harkin remained calm and sought engineering advice. Once it
became apparent that the failures could not be rectified, a formation diversion was initiated to a civilian airfield
in Spain.
A total CSG failure in a Typhoon results in the loss of all onboard approach aids and the radar. With the weather
at the diversion airfield now Green and with the time beyond twilight, Flt Lt Harkin had to carry out a night close
formation approach. The recovery to the diversion airfield was hindered by an unfamiliar ATC service, which
resulted in a very late descent and feed-in to the instrument pattern. During this approach in thick cloud, Flt Lt
Harkin lost visual contact with his leader. Decisively and calmly, he executed lost-visual procedures and climbed
to a safe altitude, before expeditiously rejoining his leader in very busy Spanish controlled airspace; all of this was
done on standby instruments whilst calmly managing his multiple in-cockpit failures. During the subsequent
approach and landing in heavy showers, thick cloud and a crosswind that was close to the Release-To-Service
limits, Flt Lt Harkin demonstrated great skill in maintaining formation and positioning for his night landing on a
near-flooded runway. His HUD-out landing was faultless.
Flt Lt Harkin is a relatively inexperienced Typhoon pilot and was participating in his first overseas trail. In light
of this fact, he demonstrated calm professionalism when faced with a progressively deteriorating emergency
situation. Moreover, he remained unfazed when presented with a completely unfamiliar recovery profile.
When the first approach resulted in a loss of visual contact, he demonstrated a level of composure belying his
experience, resulting in a safe, swift recovery in testing weather conditions. Many would not have dealt with the
severity of this emergency as well as Harkin. He showed exceptional piloting skills and ensured the safe recovery
of the aircraft.
46 awards ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Corporal B Marsden, Good Show
In March 2014, Corporal Marsden was a mechanical tradesman and Line
Supervisor on II(AC) Squadron, deployed on Operation HERRICK to Kandahar
airfield. On the evening of 21 March, he was supervising the see-off of a
Tornado GR4 on a night operational sortie.
The start-up was completed routinely and on time, but, once the aircraft had
taxied, and despite the poor lighting in that area, Marsden noticed a pool of
oil outside the front of the shelter with a trail of spilt oil leading towards the
apron exit.
He immediately suspected a leak from the taxiing aircraft, and ran to inform the line ‘Hit Team’. They confirmed
the suspected leak and radioed Line Control to recall the aircraft, but, unfortunately, it had just taken off.
The message was passed to the crew, who jettisoned fuel and landed some 20 minutes later. As the aircraft
taxied in, the groundcrew observed a steady stream of oil leaking from its right-hand Secondary Power System
Bay. The right-hand hydraulics system was inspected and was seen to have lost approximately 7 litres of oil
through the right-hand taileron actuator. Had the aircraft not landed when it did, the hydraulic oil loss would
have ultimately led to compete Right Hydraulics system failure, and the crew would have had to engage the
approach end cable when landing. This would have had considerable impact on further operations at Kandahar
that night.
Marsden’s excellent attention to detail when spotting this issue, his swift diagnosis of its potential outcome,
and his moral courage to request that the aircraft return for further inspection are all highly commendable.
His actions undoubtedly prevented the aircraft sortie developing into a major emergency, with adverse
consequences to the airfield’s operational capability, and he is a worthy recipient of this Good Show.
ISSUE 14 awards 47
Air Clues
Flight Lieutenant N A Dearden, Well Done
In March 2014, Flight Lieutenant Dearden was a junior pilot on II(AC)
Squadron, deployed on Operation HERRICK to Kandahar airfield.
On the evening of 19 March, he was the pilot of the Number 2 aircraft
of a Tornado formation on a night operational mission.
Whilst recovering to Kandahar airfield, the Tornado formation was cleared
to join the circuit from the break at the approach end of the runway.
Kandahar Tower made a call to a formation of AH-64 Apache helicopters
to descend to below 3900 feet, but did not inform the Tornado formation
of the Apache position. The lead Tornado aircraft made the break at
the approach end at 4900 feet with an information call to Tower. At that point, Tower informed him that there
were two helicopters off his right-hand side, indicating 5000 feet and descending. On hearing the call, Flight
Lieutenant Dearden was able to discern the shape of an Apache and recognised that his Flight Lead was on a
conflicting path; calmly and professionally, he instantly called for the Lead to “pull up”. The lead pilot reacted
immediately, rolled wings level and pulled up to 5400 feet. Some 3 seconds later, the lead crew became visual
with the Apache at a similar level, on their right-hand side at unknown range, later estimated to be in the region
of 400 meters. Had Flight Lieutenant Dearden not directed his leader to take action when he did, the lead aircraft
would have continued the level turn at 4900 feet unsighted to, and in conflict with, the Apache.
The instinctive, timely and correct intervention by Flight Lieutenant Dearden, particularly as this situation
occurred at night, on Night Vision Goggles, and at the end of a long operational sortie, prevented his leader from
potentially colliding with an Apache helicopter in the Kandahar circuit at night.
Flight Lieutenant Dearden had only been on II(AC) Squadron for 8 months, and this was one of his first
operational night sorties in a demanding environment. The exceptional lookout, airmanship and presence of
mind he demonstrated in this incident make him a deserving recipient of this Well Done.
48 awards ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Corporal Bonnell, AOC No.1 Group Safety
Commendation
Whilst carrying out acceptance checks on refurbished Heavy Duty
Ejector Release Units (HDERUs) from a contracted civilian repair agent,
Corporal Bonnell noticed that the wedges at the 14-inch hook position,
on one particular HDERU, appeared to stop short of the correct position
when released. Upon further investigation, outside of the scope of the
maintenance procedure, he discovered that the 14-inch hook guide
sleeves had been assembled incorrectly; thus preventing the wedges
from moving to their correct position. Corporal Bonnell immediately
informed his supervisor and recommended that his findings were
reported to the Project Team. In the interim, he instructed his team to check all HDERUs within the Section to
ascertain if any displayed a similar fault.
Corporal Bonnell’s vigilance not only prevented the faulty HDERU being issued to an aircraft, but also triggered
the Project Team to release a fleet-wide Routine Technical Instruction to ensure that all HDERUs fitted to aircraft
were operating correctly.
Further investigation by the contracted civilian repair agency, responsible for the incorrect assembly, revealed
that the lack of full-forward movement from the Wedges could have reduced the capability to secure the store
being carried by the Tornado aircraft; usually an under-wing fuel tank, but could equally apply to an explosive
store. Whilst the HDERU would have indicated that it was within the tolerances, this could have caused inflight vibration and, in an extreme case, could have resulted in the loss of the store. Corporal Bonnell should be
commended for his dedication and professionalism.
Corporal Bonnell identified an issue that was outside of his remit for the inspection that he was undertaking.
He undertook the correct course of action to highlight the airworthiness concerns to the relevant Project Team
and maintain a level of assurance that the risk controls were effective; excellent for a JNCO.
Corporal Bonnell should be recognised for his technical knowledge that initially indentified the issue.
Moreover, his follow-up actions fully supported the requirements of the Safety Management System and
mitigated a potential risk occurrence. Therefore, I fully support Corporal Bonnell’s nomination for a Flight
Safety award.
ISSUE 14 awards 49
Air Clues
Corporal Dunse, AOC 22 (Training) Group Flight
Safety Award
On 19 Nov 13 Cpl Dunse, the 60(R) Sqn Ops JNCO, was preparing the night
flying brief for 60(R) Sqn and noticed on the Centralised Aviation Data
Service (CADS) that a Merlin helicopter had entered a route that would
conflict with Sqn planned night flying activity. The local flying area around
Shawbury is a Dedicated User Area (DUA) and all traffic wishing to use it
must book in through Shawbury Ops, on this occasion the Merlin had not
done so.
After extensive checks both on and off the Stn he ensured that this
potential confliction was averted. Cpl Dunse then questioned how a professional helicopter crew could make
such an error and so examined the Low Flying Handbook (LFHB), which details the procedures to be used for
the Shawbury DUA. He discovered several inaccuracies in the detail of the Shawbury DUA; including Shawbury
Operations opening times, use of CADS and the level of activity at both Chetwynd and Ternhill. By raising an
occurrence report through the station Flight Safety chain, and through Stn Operations, Cpl Dunse ensured that
the LFHB was updated to better reflect use of the DUA. Through his prompt actions and proactive attitude, Cpl
Dunse demonstrated a high level of Flight Safety awareness, and for his actions he is awarded an AOC 22(Trg) Gp
Flight Safety Award.
Senior Aircraftsman Tilsley, British Forces South
Atlantic Islands, Flight Safety Award
On 20 Jan 14, CRC GRIFFIN provided weapons control to two 1435 Flight
Typhoon aircraft as they intercepted the SAA, which was inbound to
Mount Pleasant Airfield. In an Operations room full of more senior and
experienced operators, SAC Tilsley noticed a slight difference in the
position of radar returns between the radars contributing to the RAP.
Had the Typhoon aircraft required ‘Alpha-Control’ from CRC GRIFFIN for
the intercept, this could have caused a potentially hazardous situation,
whereby the Weapons Controller could have provided inaccurate target
information to the Typhoons. After SAC Tilsley reported her observation,
303 SU commenced an investigation into the performance of the T101 radars in the Falkland Islands and
subsequently reviewed their provision of radar services. Her actions directly resulted in CRC GRIFFIN providing a
safer service to aircraft operating in the Falkland Islands Theatre. For her awareness, positive actions, and moral
courage in questioning the error instead of quietly maintaining the status quo, SAC Tilsley is awarded a BFSAI
Flight Safety Award.
50 awards ISSUE 14
Air Clues
Competition time
Win…
We would like to thank those of you who have already contributed to our safety
poster collection but we still need more. If you have an idea for a poster or
punchy slogan but you’re not sure where to start with poster design, or if you
have already designed your own poster or fancy giving it a go, we would love to
hear from you so please send us your submissions!
The top 3 entries, judged by the staff here at Spry Towers, will earn the designer
a Haynes RAF Typhoon or Avro Lancaster Manual, courtesy of Haynes Publishing.
Your posters will also feature in the next edition of Air Clues. Please remember
copyright restrictions apply, so do not download pictures from the internet.
The deadline for entries is 30th December 2014 so get designing!
Percy
Entries can either
be mailed to:
Plt Off Prune’s Poster Competition
RAF Flight Safety
HQ Air Command
Lancaster Block
RAF High Wycombe
Bucks
HP14 4UE
SE N D
Or emailed to:
[email protected]
entitled Plt Off Prune’s Poster
Competition
issue 14 competition time 51
Air Clues
Docs
corner
Doc,
I have a pilot friend who has told me that he has some concerns regarding his own mental health which he would
like to discuss with the Military Aviation Medicine Examiner (MAME), but he is terrified that he might be permanently
grounded. What is his status in discussing mental health issues with his MAME?
Flt Lt Anxious Buddy
Dear Flt Lt Buddy,
I have discussed your friend’s case with the RAF Consultant
Advisor in Psychiatry, Wg Cdr Shapland. He sends his warm
regards and hopes the following information is helpful.
The first thing, he says, is to congratulate your friend on
having the courage to come forward for help. By doing
so he has already overcome the most important barrier
to care and positively contributed to Air Safety. He also ​
says that by discussing it, your friend is already well on
his way to getting rid of his problem. Most aircrew, due
to the nature of their training, are already very sturdy
individuals and most of them recover very well from
mental health issues.
Wg Cdr Shapland and I would like to offer the following
information to give an overview of what your friend or any
of you aircrew mates should expect on raising a mental
health issue with a MAME:
The process of getting better involves you taking the
first step. It is about forming one-to-one relationships.
Initially that is with your MAME, who lives on the same
Station as you, and is dedicated to keeping you and your
aircraft together safely.
52 docs corner ISSUE 14
Your MAME has 2 roles, or 2 ‘hats’ if you like:
The first hat your MAME wears is as your doctor and he
will give you a confidential assessment and will then work
out, with you, how to go about solving your problem.
Remember, the RAF has already chosen you as someone
with a high degree of ability and responsibility and it is
almost inconceivable that your MAME would temporarily
remove your flying medical category without you already
knowing that he or she needed to do so – it won’t come as
a surprise in other words, and most aircrew in that situation
find it a relief.
Sometimes very minor clinical conditions e.g. sleep
problems and worry after the end of an important personal
relationship can be dealt with by your MAME with a
temporary rest from flying duties. This need NOT involve
a medical downgrading. The MAME can also call on the
services of the Community Mental Health Nurse who visits
the station, and who has a range of skills to help you deal
with common mental health symptoms – even those that
aren’t severe but still affect your overall health. Examples
might include having experienced a ‘near miss’ or an
ejection which could shake you up or make you anxious in
certain situations.
Air Clues
The MAME also wears a second hat of responsibility for
Flight Safety. It is his or her duty to consider your safety in
the air and the safety of the public.
The examples above might produce symptoms which don’t
resolve naturally, or you might develop a depressive illness
(which affects 1 in 10 men and 1 in 5 women in a lifetime).
In which case the MAME may judge it is going to take
more time to get better, and he or she could temporarily
medically downgrade you. Yes, this would mean you would
lose your flying medical category, but this is preferable to
risking a lapse of concentration whilst flying which can
affect your situational awareness.
The MAME will in all likelihood ask the local community
mental health team to see you. The team is led by a
psychiatrist who will conduct an assessment; he or she
will then usually ask a Community Mental Health Nurse to
assess you and sometimes involve a psychologist. If you
require medication the psychiatrist or MAME will prescribe
it. You will also be referred to an Aviation Experienced
Psychiatrist (AEP) who has some specialist aviation
knowledge, who may be located some distance from
your base . It is the AEP’s role to outline the management
plan for returning you to flying as quickly as it is safe to
do so.
Once your condition has improved, your clinical team will
try to help you regain your flying medical category. To do
this you will need to allow your MAME to speak to your
Flight Commander, or an appropriate senior, to help you
get support from your Squadron to regain your medical
category. They will need to ensure you get sufficient
simulator time, flying with suitably experienced crewmates, limited flying (type or hours as required) or that rotas
are altered if necessary etc. At every stage in this process
your MAME, your AEP and your mental health nurse and/
or psychologist will work together with you and your
Squadron to return you safely to flying.
Doc
ISSUE 14 docs corner 53
Air Clues
“I did something that
even to this day makes
me cringe…”
Blast from the past…
By Unknown Contributor, Air Clues July 1980, Vol 3, No.7
Having completed my training and a double tour on
Meteors and Hunters, I re-entered the pilot training world
at the end of the ‘50s as a B2 QFI. I was amazed by all the
new rules and regulations that had sprung up in Flying
Training Command and the generation of ‘old’ QFIs who
had inherited the flight and squadron commander’s jobs.
They preached rigid adherence to the rules and (in my
jaundiced view) were breeding a generation of straight
and level bomber pilots rather than the press-on fighter
aces that (I thought) the RAF really needed. I felt it my duty,
therefore, to inculcate into my students the necessary dash
and determination to view the [myriad of assorted] rules
with disdain, if not quite complete disregard.
Towards the end of my three year QFI stint, I inherited a rather
shy, nervous and unlikely student pilot who was under review
and in danger of being ‘chopped’. My professional ability was
at stake. Therefore, as an A2, I would get him through – first
of all by superior instruction (not that rubbish propounded
in [the AP]) and secondly, by turning him into a ‘press-on’
fighter type, full of dash and determination to do or die.
54 blast from the past ISSUE 14
All he needed was some good example to mould himself on!
Our Relief Landing Ground (RLG) was some 15 miles from
base. That particular July day I was over there with my prodigy,
and after he had made the requisite safe three approaches
and landings, I got out and went and sat in the Tower and
drank tea with the controller. My student and three others
lurched around the circuit – frightening themselves and each
other – until it was time to come in and refuel.
My lad was due in last, and despite a call over the R/T, was
still merrily going round and round long after the other three
had landed. Still, 5 o’clock was drawing near so I had him
called in after checking fuel remaining – ‘Rules’ said there
must be 800 lb remaining before leaving the RLG. He had
650 lb. Anyway, the aged civilian bowser and it’s equally aged
operator were almost empty and tired (respectively), so why
waste time refuelling when all you needed was a maximum of
200 lbs to go straight home.
I climbed up onto the wing and, with the engine running and
the hood open, started to take off the canvas cover of my
Air Clues
ejection seat. My student tapped his hand on the fuel gauge.
The gauge read just over 450 lb. “Not to worry”, I shouted,
“that’s plenty to get home with”. This would show him some
of the fighter pilot’s ‘press-on’ spirit. To save wasting any more
fuel, I then did something that even to this day makes me
cringe. I got into the cockpit and sat on top of the canvascovered ejection seat, plugged in my R/T lead and said, “OK,
I’ll ride on the seat like this without strapping in, so make sure
you find the way home and don’t get lost”. We called “taxiing”,
did the pre-take-off checks on the roll and were “airborne, to
base local frequency” in no time flat.
Sitting in the sun after a busy but enjoyable day’s work, I was
pleasantly relaxed and enjoying the passing countryside
from 1500 ft when my reverie was shattered: local said, “All
aircraft stand-off. We have an obstruction on the runway.
No further landings”.
The old fighter pilot reflexes leapt into life, - runway
obstructed – no further landings- us with not much fuel
– and me not strapped into my bang seat. I can report,
authoritatively, that when airborne it is impossible to take the
cover off the Martin-Baker Mk4 ejection seat, get strapped in
and remove the safety pins – believe you me I tried b…dy
hard to succeed as we orbited the airfield that afternoon.
Luckily, the obstruction was dragged clear in record time and
by saying (nonchalantly of course), “Rather short of fuel at
this time, request priority”, we made a safe and expeditious
landing, taxied in and shut down. I said nothing to my
student, and he said nothing to me.
I had almost forgotten this incident until some time later
when I met my student again. He was a squadron leader and
flight commander on a fighter unit. Despite not seeing each
other for over 10 years, his first words as we shook hands were,
“Hello, tried strapping-in to any ejection seats lately?”.
Obviously, he had ‘learned about flying’ from my crass
stupidity and over-confidence that day. I certainly did, and
for the remainder of my active flying in the RAF I checked
that bang-seat and strapped it to my back like it was the best
friend I ever had.
“turning him into a ‘press-on’ fighter type, full of dash
and determination…”
NO PARKING
IN FRONT OF
THE HANGAR
ISSUE 14 blast from the past 55
Air Clues
Coalition FOD Walk
By Flt Lt Karl Wright, Duty Air Movements Officer, Camp Bastion
Camp Bastion airfield has always been busy and, as
drawdown commences, Camp Bastion is central to
achieving the redeployment of the majority of personnel
and equipment from Op HERRICK. This is not just the UK
units deployed in Afghanistan; other North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) elements at Camp Bastion/Leatherneck
are in the midst of recovery, including United States Air
Force (USAF), Danish, Georgian, Estonian, Bosnian and
Herzegovinian Forces.
The Commanding Officer of 903 Expeditionary Air Wing
(EAW) currently lists Foreign Object Debris (FOD) as one of
the biggest threats to Air Safety at Camp Bastion. There is an
increased amount of FOD being created as an effect of the
remediation of Camp Bastion and this, combined with the
windy desert conditions, is causing the FOD to be blown onto
the airfield; the result of which could impact air operations at
this location.
Personnel from the Joint Movements Unit (JMU) at Camp
Bastion take an air minded, proactive stance against the risk of
56 coalition fod walk ISSUE 14
FOD on a daily basis. The JMU is made up of Trade Group 18
Logistic (Movements) personnel and our mission is to manage
the logistical flow of air passengers, freight and cargo both
in and out of Theatre, and to handle a range of Air Transport
aircraft 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
As the Duty Air Movements Officer (DAMO), my shift and
I work predominantly out of the Air Cargo Yard Facility.
We share this facility with our colleagues in the USAF, and
occasionally Danish and other NATO nations will also prepare
freight for air travel from this location. The Air Cargo Yard is
where all outbound freight is built onto aircraft pallets and
manifested, and where inbound freight is first brought in
from aircraft such as chartered Boeing 747 and C17 aircraft.
As the Air Cargo Yard has direct access to Charlie ramp,
where the majority of air movements take place, the JMU
wanted to take decisive action to thoroughly sanitise this
area, which we believed could easily become a source for
FOD to originate from. Rather than it just being a UK only
effort we enlisted the help and assistance of our NATO allies,
hence we came up with the idea of holding a ‘Coalition
FOD Walk’.
Air Clues
‘Kick-off’ consisted of Staff Sgt Counts (USAF) giving all
participants a brief about the imperative need to be vigilant
against FOD and the possible damage it could cause.
Cpl Wally Campbell (RAF) then briefed the requirement to
conduct thorough tyre checks when driving vehicles onto
the airfield.
With teams comprised of UK, US and Danish Movements staff
or ‘Movers’, we issued bin-bags and set ourselves the aim of
FOD sweeping the entire Air Cargo Yard and surrounding
area. As a further incentive, the team that picked up the most
FOD was to be rewarded with a Starbucks Iced Mocha for
each team member.
Afghanistan evening, because a real sense of contest emerged
with neither the Brits, Americans or Danes wanting to allow
the other teams to out-do them in picking up the most FOD!
The camaraderie and banter that emerged during the FOD
Walk turned the occasion into an enjoyable event.
Our simple idea turned out to be really effective means
of tackling FOD at Camp Bastion; it brought different
nationalities together, we cleared up a surprising amount of
FOD, positive air safety culture was promoted amongst a wide
audience and everyone had a laugh in the process. Such was
its success that the intention is now to do this on a monthly
basis. Who knows… maybe it could become a recognised
international tournament!
The spirit of international competitiveness connected to
the FIFA World Cup must have been in the air on that warm
ISSUE 14 coalition fod walk 57
Air Clues
Winter Woes
By Emma Howard and Dave Angwin, Met Office, RAFC Cranwell.
Winter may be considered the most hazardous season
for those working in aviation, and the different types of
weather hazard experienced during these months can
vary significantly year-on-year. The potential dangers
and challenges posed to aircrew and ground crew by the
varying types of winter weather are diverse.
During 2012/13 an easterly flow from the continent
dominated for large periods, generally producing a cold, dry
airflow across the UK. There was also a Siberian high pressure
area slightly further north than usual, allowing moisture
to be dragged up from the south, leading to cold and
snowy conditions.
The changeable nature of UK winter weather can be aptly
demonstrated by discussing the contrast between the
weather last winter compared to the previous year.
The snow and ice hazards of 2012/13, combined with days
of persistent fog, led to poor visibility and low cloud hazards,
repeatedly grounding most military aircraft and making the
58 WINTER WOES issue 14
Air Clues
finding of safe diversion airfields very difficult. The snow
showers, seen particularly down the eastern coast, were
the result of unstable conditions due to higher sea surface
temperatures in comparison to the land, thus allowing the
formation of Cumulonimbus (CB) clouds, which can pose a
risk to pilots at any time of year. CBs are associated with severe
icing and severe turbulence which can be very dangerous
to pilots and their aircraft. Flying through cloud with icing
for long periods can cause ice to build up on the airframe,
increasing the weight and drag through the atmosphere.
Helicopters are particularly prone to ice building up on the
blades and flying units such as Middle Wallop and Shawbury
are, not surprisingly, extremely interested in potential icing,
whether from CBs or from sub-zero cloud. Cloud is classed as
sub-zero when it forms above the freezing level i.e. the point
going up through the atmosphere where the temperature
falls below zero. During winter, colder air generally flows
across the UK, reducing temperatures and meaning the
freezing level is very close to, if not at, ground level and all
cloud is therefore sub-zero.
Whilst creating hazards in the air, snow and ice also
cause issues for the movement of aircraft on the ground.
All stations receive a ‘Blacktop’ snow and ice forecast from the
Met Office daily throughout the winter months. This ensures
that appropriate action can be taken in the interest of safety
across the base. Snow and ice can make taxiways and runways
unusable; an unusable runway is termed as ‘black’. Some
stations have the option to lay ‘Clearway’, a liquid
anti-icing substance laid prior to icy conditions, which
can allow aircraft movements to continue. The forecasting
of icy conditions is therefore essential to ensure taxiways
and runways can be maintained and utilised safely.
In contrast, the hazards experienced last winter were
somewhat different: we saw strong jets across the Atlantic
pushing relentless frontal systems in from the west, resulting
in weather that, in the main, could be described as ‘wet, windy
and mild’.
These wet, windy and mild conditions left pilots with a whole
set of different hazards. The extensive rainfall, which led to
flooding in many parts of the country, dramatically altered
runway conditions. The amount of precipitation or ‘pooling’ of
water on runway surfaces is significant as some aircraft have
strict take-off and landing limits depending on whether the
runway is dry, damp or wet. This was then compounded by
the second major hazard of last winter; the strong wind.
issue 14 WINTER WOES 59
Air Clues
The strong and, at times, gale force winds of winter 2013/14
created multiple aviation hazards. Runway cross winds in
general are an issue for many aircraft, particularly those with
a large wing span or for light aircraft, such as the Tutor, used
during initial aircrew training. Most aircraft take off and land
into the wind and even if the wind direction is suitable,
strong, gusty winds make the aircraft much more difficult to
manoeuvre during take off or landing. Here at RAFC Cranwell,
as a training base with new pilots, the enforced wind limits are
very strict, even when the wind is blowing straight down the
runway; the winds last winter were a forecasting challenge for
us all! Associated with gusty winds is low level turbulence and
this was classed as ‘severe’ on numerous occasions across the
UK last winter. Severe turbulence of any kind is dangerous to
all aircraft; it makes the aircraft difficult to handle and can be
uncomfortable for those onboard. Finally, the wind can cause
issues on the ground, making it sometimes impossible to even
get the aircraft out of the hangars due to the safe operating
limits for opening the hangar doors!
Although last winter was, on the whole, a mild one, we
still saw a few cold nights with temperatures dropping
well below zero. In these conditions it is ice, above all, that
most consistently causes issues during the winter months,
often leading to problems for people travelling into work;
icy, slippery roads and pavements, coupled with the joys of
de-icing the car. Whilst these can be accepted as expected
winter problems, which generally cause little more than
an inconvenience, for those involved with station de-icing
more consideration is needed to keep the airfield operating
safely. I recall a morning at Waddington where the runway
and taxiways were ice free thanks to ‘Clearway’ having been
laid the previous evening, but flying still had to be delayed
because the hangar door channels were frozen solid. It took a
couple of hours to clear the ice and finally get the doors open.
As a result ‘Clearway’ is now applied to the hangar
door channels when required.
Another form of ice that can very quickly cause chaos,
is freezing rain, which occurs due to super-cooled water
droplets. As the name would imply, super-cooled water is
liquid water that is below freezing point. This usually occurs
when a layer of air that is above freezing intrudes into air
that is below freezing through the entire atmosphere. If this
intrusion occurs at just the right height then falling snow will
melt in this warmer air, then cool below zero again as it enters
the colder air below, but not have time to freeze. The result
is freezing rain. If you go to a Meteorological Brief, you might
hear the phrase ‘warm nose’ which refers to this warm air aloft.
When super-cooled water comes into contact with a surface
that is already below freezing, it instantly turns to ice. This can
lead to large areas of ice formation over very short periods of
time. This happened on the M4 motorway near Bristol a few
years ago causing numerous accidents and leading to the
60 WINTER WOES issue 14
Air Clues
closure of sections of the M4 due to miles of icy roads.
Aircraft and vehicles parked outside during a period of
freezing rain are also likely to get a covering of ice in very
short order.
As you can see, when it comes to British weather, we all need
to be prepared for anything! Rest assured that whatever the
weather hazard, whatever the time of year, your local Met
Office will help keep your station prepared for any eventuality.
For further information contact: Met Office Press Office 01392
886655 or email [email protected]
issue 14 WINTER WOES 61
Air Clues
Feedback…
tell us what you think about Air Clues
New Message
To: [email protected]
CC:
Subject: Regulation 18
Dear Wg Cdr Spry,
I just wanted to say that I have read the article on Reg 18 in the latest edition of Airclues and to thank
the author for an excellent description of the issue in non-legal parlance. I and a number of my
team are currently under Reg 18 following an incident involving an air cadet. It’s not a good place
to be but the article was very reassuring. I will be copying it to all the team who are under Reg 18 to
provide them with the same information.
Air Cdre D A McCafferty
New Message
To:
CC:
Subject:
Airclues Reader
RE: Regulation 18
Ma’am
Thank you for your email. I imagine this must be a worrying time for you and your team. I am grateful
that you took the time to let us know how the Reg 18 article was able to alleviate some of your
concerns. I hope the rest of your team found it equally reassuring.
Spry
62 FEEDBACK ISSUE 14
Autumn/Winter 2014
Air Clues
DACOS Flight Safety
Gp Capt Brian James
Air-SafetyCtre-DACOS FS
95221-6842
DACOS Tech
CESO
COS
Gp Capt Andrew Campbell
Air-SafetyCtre-DACOS Tech
Paul Byers (B2)
Air-SafetyCtre-CESO
Wg Cdr Laurie Dunn
Air-SafetyCtre-COS
1 Gp
2 Gp
22 Trg Gp
JHC
3FTS Gliding (VGS)
Wg Cdr Stu Oliver
Air-1Gp-STAR SO1
95221-6645
Wg Cdr John Parker
Air-Ops2Gp-STAR Trg Assure SO1
95221-5049
Wg Cdr Robbie Robertson
22TrgGp-FT ASAR ASM SO1
96798 -0101
Wg Cdr Donal McGurk
JHC-Safety-SO1
94391- 7485
Sqn Ldr Adey Hobson
3FTS-CGS-ASARSO2
95751-4532
United Kingdom Units
Station
Name
Telephone
email
CRC Boulmer
Sqn Ldr Charlotte Best
95818-7405
BOU-SptWg-Force Dev OC
Benson
Flt Lt Mike Forwood/ Flt Lt Dave Hill
95261-6666
BEN-AirSafety (MULTIUSER)
Boscombe Down
Sqn D RAE
9214807-2087
[email protected]
Boulmer
Sqn Ldr Charlotte Best
95818-7405
BOU-Spt Wg-Force Dev OC
Brize Norton
Flt Lt Jill Starling
95461-7539
BZN-Air Safety-XO Flt Safety
Brize Norton
Sqn Ldr Kevin Booth
95461-6821
BZN-Air Safety Manager
Church Fenton
Flt Lt Henly Johnson
95871-7986
CRN 1EFTS CF-3 Sqn QFI 08
Coningsby
Sqn Ldr Russ Leaviss
95721-7040
CON-SSC SFSO
Cosford
Flt Lt Russ Williams
95561-4037
DSAE-1SofTT 238Line JnrEngOffr
Cranwell
Flt Lt Jim Allen
95751-6666
CRN-Ops-SFSO
Halton
Sqn Ldr Gary Coleman
95237-6506
HAL-Ops SO2
Henlow
Flt Lt Gavin Nicholson
95381-6150
HLW-Airfield Manager
High Wycombe
Fg Off Kyle Evans
95221-6748
HWY-ADJT
Honington
Mr Mick Liston
95991-7118
HON-SptWg FDS Stn Ops
LATCC(Mil)
Flt Lt Michael Lyddon
95586-2447
LATCC-FSO (BM) SO3
Leeming
Sqn Ldr Paul Richley
95851-6666
LEE-Air Safety Cell-SO2
Leuchars
Flt Lt Mathew Paterson
95151-6666
LEU-Air Safety-SFSO
Linton-on-Ouse
Flt Lt Neil Heaney
95871-6666
LIN-OPS [email protected]
Lossiemouth
Flt Lt Ash Priddle
95161-6666/7714
LOS-Ops SFSO
Marham
Flt Lt Jonathan Gwynn
95951-6666
MRM-AirSafetyCell SFSO
Northolt
Flt Lt Jason Eden
95233-8571
NOR-OPS SFSO
Odiham
Flt Lt Jez Allinson
95235-6666/5227
ODI-SFSO
SARF HQ
Flt Lt Sophia Mason
95581-6628
SAR-HQ FSO
Shawbury
Sqn Ldr Gary James
95531-6666
SHY-OPSAdm Ops SFSO
Tactical Supply Wing
WO Tony Hughes
95521-7232
TSW-HQ-LSF-Eng-WO
Valley
Flt Lt Sam Hudson
95581-7245
VAL-Ops Wg SFSO
Waddington
MULTIUSER
95771-6666
WAD-Ops Flight Safety (MULTIUSER)
Wittering
Flt Lt Hamilton-Bing
95351-7050
WIT-OpsWg ATC Controller 01
Wyton
Flt Lt Gareth Walker
95371-8776
3FTS-57Sqn-FSO (MULTIUSER)
Station
Name
Telephone
email
Ascension
Flt Lt John Daws
923198537 3307
BFSAI-ASC Ops OC
Creech AFB
TBC
9205 312 384 4866
39Sqn-Flight Safety
Akrotiri
Flt Lt Craig Docker
94120-6362
BFC-AKR-COSU-DXO
Edward’s AFB
WO O’Hare
9205 312 525 2772
AWC-JSF TES WO
Gibraltar
Flt Lt Mick Hardaker
92319-3386
GIB-RAF-OC OPS
MPA
Flt Lt Ben Slaughter
0050 073620
BFSAI-FLK-905EAW-ASM
83 EAG
Sqn Ldr Sam Martin
926091-9533 3108
83 EAG-AIROPS FSO
Do you have any Air Safety Concerns? Call us!
ISSUE 13 The icing on the wing 63
For all amendments and general enquiries contact the RAF Safety Centre on 95221 3895
R AF AEMS
Aviation | Error | Management | System
Report Today for a Safer Tomorrow
I observed a hazard
I spent a few minutes writing
my concern on one of those
AEMS forms
You
I posted the form to my LEMSCo
Feedback
I let the reporter
know that their
concerns are
being looked
at further
I received an AEMS Form
through the internal mail
LEMSCo
Feedback
I instigated some corrective
local-level mitigations
I passed the AEMS Form
on to the SEMSCo
I received an RAF AEMS form from the
LEMSCo. The issue was air safety related
so I raised a DASOR on ASIMS
SEMSCo
You
Due to the air safety implications,
the Stn Cdr instigated an Occurrence
Safety Investigation (OSI)
The investigation provided
the justification for funding
to fix the issue
I observed change
LEMSCo = Local Error Management System Coordinator
SEMSCo = Station Error Management System Coordinator
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© UK MOD Crown Copyright, 2013