Two Solitudes, One War:
Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada’s War
in Afghanistan
John Kirton, with Jenilee Guebert
University of Toronto
Paper prepared for a conference on “Quebec and War,” Université de Québec à Montréal,
Montreal, October 5–6, 2007. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Madeline Koch,
Harry Skinner, Lindsay Doyle, Hana Dhanji, and Kalyna Kardash. Version: October 8, 2007.
Abstract
Why did Canada, with its linguistically and regionally based strains of national unity, fight its
longest war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2007? Amidst the many external, societal and
governmental determinants that cause Canada and other countries to go to war, this study focuses
on the puzzle of why a country, with no national interests directly at stake, a distinctive national
value of anti-militarism and enduring political memories of the conscription crises of 1944 and
1917, fought for the first time, for so long, in the lead, in far-off Afghanistan, despite the
mounting opposition of its public, particularly its French-speaking citizens and their federal
representatives from Quebec. Externally grounded explanations featuring the September 11
terrorist attacks on North America, the involvement of American and British allies, and the
approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations do not explain a
Canadian participation that went through several stages of involvement, withdrawal and
leadership, and the general expansion of Canada’s increasingly costly commitment, even as the
memories of the catalytic 9/11 cause célèbre faded into an ever more distant past. Nor do
governmentally grounded explanations, based on the party and prime minister in power, their
regional and linguistic base, and their majority-minority status fit well the multi-stage, generally
expansionist trend.
To seek a satisfactory explanation at the societal level, this study develops and tests the model of
the “1939–41 myth,” first constructed to explain the Canadian government’s domestic
mobilization of consent for its first post–Cold War combat engagement in the Gulf War of 1990–
91. Here support for the war among converging anglophone and francophone communities rose
when national media, in both of the “two solitudes,” showed Canada going to war with Britain
and France without the United States to successfully stop a totalitarian dictatorship and the
Holocaust-like devastation it would bring. This study hypothesizes that to go to war in
Afghanistan Canada needed to mobilize consent from a public that was substantially permissive
but had a bottom line, do so in both largely francophone Quebec and the largely anglophone
Canada outside, and do so as the initial rally turned to reluctance and the conscription constraint
arose. The Canadian government secured such consent when polling questions and media
portraits offered to a “mythologically rational” mass public the “right allies,” reminders of the
“right wars,” support from the right “hometown” leaders, and the “right death ratio” of Canadian
civilian victims over Canadian soldiers killed abroad. The empirical results show mild support for
the classic 1939–41 myth based on the “right ally” combination (now revised to add the directly
attacked “Pearl Harbor” Americans), show strong support for the reinforcing “right war”
reminder (as the increasingly wrong 2003 Iraq contaminated the Afghanistan cause), some
support for the “right leaders” at home and strong support for the right death ratio.
1
Introduction
On September 12, 2001, Canada led the alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) into declaring war on Afghanistan, in response to the terrorist attacks on North America
the day before. Canada soon backed its diplomatic declaration with deadly force, dispatching
naval, air, special and regular ground combat troops to fight alongside its American NATO allies
in Afghanistan — a theatre half a world away, where Canadian forces had never fought before.
Six years later, Canadian forces are still fighting and dying in what has become Canada’s longest
war. With no victory still in sight, Afghanistan could become the first major war in Canada’s long
and war-drenched history that Canada would lose.
To fight for so long, so much, so far away and amidst such frustration, the Canadian government
needed to mobilize consent from its citizens for the cause. Given Canada’s distinctive
linguistically divided demography and history, defined by two divisive conscription crises,
Ottawa faced the further challenge of mobilizing consent from both its francophone citizens,
concentrated in Quebec, and its anglophone citizens, concentrated in the rest of Canada (ROC)
outside.1 The September 11 terrorist attacks may have “changed everything” for some. But for
Canadians, still scarred by the searing memory of the conscription crises of 1917 and 1944,
arising amidst worldwide wars of long duration with many deaths, the familiar threat to national
unity, and thus to Canada’s legitimacy and very survival, had not been blown away. Indeed, with
the separatist/sovereigntist Bloc Québécois as a major party in the federal House of Commons, a
separatist/sovereigntist Parti Québécois governing the province of Quebec and a Quebec
referendum on separation very narrowly defeated only six years before in 1995, the national unity
challenge was far closer to the surface than it had been in August 1990, when a post–Cold War
Canada went to war for the first time in 40 years.
Of the two challenges the Canadian government faced in mobilizing consent, securing support at
the start from Canadians as a whole was the easiest one it faced. After all, 24 innocent civilian
Canadians had been deliberately murdered on 9/11, in the twin towers of a city that was far closer
to Canada than Pearl Harbor had been in 1941, when the last bolt-out-of-the-blue attack had hit
the soil of its American neighbour. The conditions were thus especially ripe for the familiar “rally
effect” to spring to life in Canada, as in so many other countries when they first go to war. But it
was also subject to the “rally turned reluctance” syndrome as the war dragged on. Richard Falk
(1996, 496) is one of many observers who note, on the whole accurately, that “if the state is
democratic … it must persuade its citizenry of the merits of an interventionist policy, especially if
resistance is expected in the target society, casualties are anticipated as a distinct possibility, and
there is no assurance of a rapid end to hostilities.” Such consent is relatively easy to secure at the
start, but much more difficult to maintain as the combat continues, the coffins accumulate and the
victory celebrations fade into a far-off future that may never come.
In the mobilization and maintenance of consent, Falk (1996, 496) further notes that “historical
memory is also of crucial relevance, as is its most authoritative construction.” That is certainly
true in Canada where the politically constructed, publicized and remembered “Somalia
syndrome” of defeat in 1992–93, as opposed to the real material but socially unconstructed
success of Medak Pocket in September 1993, helped prevent any forceful Canadian reaction to
the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 — in part, presumably, because Canadians had come to
believe that the inherent racism in their own armed forces was worse than that in Rwandan
society at large. More broadly, the 1917 and 1944 memories, which dictate “do not conscript
1
The term “francophone” in this paper refers to Canadians whose first language is French and who speak
French at home. “Quebecers” refers to residents of Quebec, whether French or English.
2
Canadians for overseas service,” have reigned as a defining parameter constraining Canadian
foreign policy ever since (Stairs 1970–71; 1976; 1977–78).
Within these constraints, in the post-Cold War decade leading up to 9/11, the Canadian
government proved many times it could successfully mobilize the consent of its citizenry to go to
war. Its first and most formidable challenge came during the first Gulf War of 1990–91 when
Brian Mulroney, as the most unpopular Canadian prime minister in Canadian polling history, had
to convince his fellow citizens in the “peaceable” “peacekeeping kingdom,” to go to war for the
first time in 40 years. Not only that, but they had to do so alongside the Americans, under the
leadership of President Bush, in a distant theatre where Canadians had never fought before
(Kirton and Munton 1992). Mulroney met this challenge. In the campaign’s final days, when
Canadian forces went on the offensive to kill Iraqis, a majority of Canadians — anglophone and
francophone alike — approved. The government’s success on the home front was not due to any
skilled communications strategy from the start. Indeed, government efforts to convince Canadians
that this was just like peacekeeping, or like their effort in Korea from 1950 to 1953, had none of
the desired effect. Rather, without their government quite realizing it, anglophone and
francophone Canadians came to support Canada’s war in the Gulf when their media showed them
this was yet another case of Canada going to war, with and for France and Britain, without the
United States, against a totalitarian dictator (whose name began with H) who was devoted to
murdering innocent children and babies, and even gassing civilians to death innocent merely
because they were Jews. In the real material world it was a hard fact that the President George
Bush’s USA was involved in the war — indeed, was leading the coalition against Saddam
Hussein to which Canada contributed in a minor military way. But only when Canada’s media —
above all, their television network news that most defined public opinion on such issues —
mythologically constructed this war as a replay of 1939–41 did Canadians increasingly unite to
support their government’s decisions to go to war.
To be sure, Afghanistan in 2001–07 is not Iraq in 1990–91. Canadians’ firsthand experience of
1939-41 is far more limited. Moreover, a battle-hardened Canada had gone to war regularly for
over a decade when the World Trade Center and Pentagon were struck, giving Canadians much
more material with which to construct new myths. Afghanistan was far from the doorstep of a
Holocaust-shrouded Israel, and the latter’s Jewish citizens were far away from any gas-laden
SCUD missiles that the Taliban could ever send their way. Most prominently, Gulf War I was a
short, inexpensive, victorious conflict, to which no Canadian ground combat forces were sent,
and in which not a single member of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) died. In sharp contrast,
Afghanistan has become a long, costly, casualty-ridden conflict with no clear-cut victory, or even
stalemated end, in sight. On the other hand, as the Canadian government’s media messaging
highlights, Canada is fighting in Afghanistan under the auspices of NATO, as well as the UN, to
secure and develop one of the world’s poorest peoples and countries, and educate its young girls.
Amidst all these differences, is the 1939–41 myth, in its classic, adjusted or extended form, still a
dominant driver of when and why Canadians, from both solitudes, give their consent to their
government’s longest war?
The existing scholarly and popular literature does not think so, but offers no convincing or
consensus alternatives about why Canadians’ support for the war, and with it national unity, goes
up or down (Dawson 2003; Pigott 2007; McDonough 2007). Rather, it generates a great debate,
conducted with much passion but little analytical discipline or detailed evidence, about why
Canada is at war in Afghanistan and what part public opinion, media coverage and the overall
mobilization of consent plays. Grant Dawson (2003, 180–84) argues that Canada’s initial
“diplomatic pause,” “ambiguous approach” and “robust” but “controlled and measured” military
response “reflected the domestic” mood that wanted to fight terrorism and support the U.S. but
3
pulled back when told by pollsters that civilian or military Canadian casualties might be involved.
This domestically driven diplomacy of restraint pushing a cautious Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
is countered by Peter Pigott (2007, 203), who emphasizes the enthusiasm of the Canadian
government and people for war at the beginning an the expanded Canadian government
commitment six years later, but a Canadian public that by November 2006 wanted their troops
out in February 2009. Others declare that Canada went to war because of and for the Americans,
and perhaps their transatlantic allies, but their effort may come to poison the atmosphere for
future adventures back home (McDonough 2007).
The Model of the Mythological Mobilization of Consent
To add analytical discipline and detailed evidence to this debate, this study explores the
relationship among the government’s decisions to go to war in Afghanistan, domestic public
support for the war and the portrait of the war on Canadians’ national media in its anglophone
and francophone parts. To conduct this analysis, this paper constructs the following chain of
hypothesis, based on the best available argumentation and evidence to date, about how the
relationship among governors, publics, and media has operated in Canada over issues of war in
the past.
The Mobilization of Constrained Consent
First, Canada was not driven to, but constrained in, going to war in Afghanistan by mass public
opinion and the dominant media portrait of the war that lay behind. This is to say, the Canadian
government was given considerable latitude from its permissive public; but within these broad
boundaries, it was ultimately bounded in its behaviour, rather than given a blank cheque, by their
views. This hypothesis will be confirmed in its first component if government decisions to go to
war, to go to war more, or to continue at war at high levels, generally preceded public support,
rather than followed supportive public opinion that was known, and unfolded even as that support
declined, a minority government came, and general elections loomed.2 It will be confirmed in its
second point if the government stopped going into war and moved away from it when public
support for the war was very low, was low enough to approach or fell below Canadians’ “bottom
line.”
The Unified Mobilization of Constrained Consent
Second, these permissive boundaries narrowed, and the constraints mounted, as public opinion
and media portraits diverged into “two solitudes”: between Canada’s francophones/Quebecers
and the anglophone ROC. Ultimately, this relationship arose because the war itself and the 9/11
attack on North America that catalyzed it did not directly relate to Canada’s national interests of
survival, security, sovereignty, legitimacy, territory and relative capability, in the view of its
governors, publics or objective observers focused on hard facts (Kirton 2007, 17–20). However, a
growing, gaping gap in national unity caused by the war did threaten Canada’s national interests
of legitimacy and, ultimately, even survival itself, especially with memories of the 1995 near2
This hypothesis suggests that Canadian governments decided to go to war, or to go to war more, if and
when there was little or no public opinion to direct them; or if there was public opinion, it was unknown
to them. Therefore, if public opinion had been adamantly against going to war, the government likely
would not have gone, or gone in more.
4
death referendum still fresh, and with the separatist/sovereigntist Parti Québécois and Bloc
Québécois still a serious political force. Far more than in 1990, when the Gulf War began just
after the death of Meech Lake and the domestic insurrection of Oka, national unity was in doubt
in 2001. Canada thus needed at least minimum levels of consent from its francophones/Quebecers
to continue its war. This hypothesis will be confirmed if Canada does not go to war more, or goes
to war less, as francophone/Quebec support dropped to low levels and showed few signs of rising
as the months and years went on.
The Rally-to-Reluctance Cadence of Consent
Third, Canadians, like citizens of most other countries most of the time, rally freely and
spontaneously to offer massive consent when war begins. At that moment they typically “rally
around their flag” and country, trust their civilian and military leaders, and assume that whatever
their gender the “boys will be home by Christmas”, or equally quickly, after they have won the
war hands down. As Geoffrey Blainey (1967) notes, “recurrent optimism is a vital prelude to
war.” However, as the war drags on — and with it disappears the near-term prospects for the
delivered victory in the field and the victory parades for the returning troops back home — the
initial rally turns increasing to reluctance. Public support and political consent erode. In Canada’s
case, this hypothesis can be tested against and confirmed more broadly by the record in Canada’s
short winning wars of the post–Cold War period (starting with Gulf War I in 1990–91) and
Canada’s long, unwon war in Korea from 1950 to 1953. In the case of Afghanistan, this
hypothesis is confirmed if pan-Canadian, anglophone and francophone public support fades as
time goes by and the war remains unwon.
Ca nada’s Conscription Co nstraint in Consent
Fourth, Canadians in general, and francophones/Quebecers in particular, offer less consent
throughout than citizens in other countries (or Canadians before 1917) because of Canada’s
distinctive conscription constraint created by the threat to national unity in 1917 and again in
1944. In the words of the conclusion of the classic article by J.I. Gow (1979, 120–21), “les
Québécois étaient alors beaucoup plus prêts à voir le Canada jouer un rôle actif dans le monde.
Comparés avec les autres Canadiens ils étaient, cepandant, toujours plus hésitants à l’égard
d`engagements de forces canadiennes à l’étranger, de la conscription, du Commonwealth et de la
coexistence pacifique.” The strength of this conscription constraint is reinforced by its status as a
core component of Canada’s distinctive national value of anti-militarism, which checked the
other distinctive national values of openness, multiculturalism, globalism and international
institutionalism propelling Canada in 2001 into this directly value-driven war (Kirton 2007, 20–
25).3 Thus, pan-Canadian support for the war, particularly among francophones/Quebecers and
the unity between them and their fellow Canadian citizens, will diminish as:
a. Canada moves from dispatching air and naval forces to mainstream ground combat forces;
b. Canadian ground combat forces are sent to the dangerous front;
c. Canadian ground combat forces engage in combat with the enemy; and
3
Anti-militarism is now in its modern, most virulent expression of anti-nuclear weapons and now weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) more generally (including the chemical and biological ones, with which
Canadians had firsthand experience in World War I). As such, it was engaged in Gulf War I (Saddam
Hussein’s nuclear weapons), Iraq War II (his assumed terrorists and WMD at the start) and Afghanistan,
with the anthrax attack on America and a Talibanized Pakistan.
5
d. Canadian ground combat forces are killed in ever larger numbers, on a cumulative and
individual incident count.
Each of these changes makes it more likely, in the accurately remembered conscription myth, that
more ground combat forces from Canada will be required from Canada to win the war, and that
Canadians might ultimately need to be conscripted to meet this need.
This overall hypothesis, and its individual components generating 12 (three by four) relationships,
will be confirmed if evidence arises in the specified ways.
The Mythologically Rational Mass Public
Fifth, it does strain the credulity of outside objective analysts, as optimally rational calculators, to
imagine that Ottawa might introduce conscription for overseas service to feed its diminished-bydeath war machine in Afghanistan.4 But the mass Canadian public is not rational in this
particular, ideal-type way. To be sure, there is a rational mass Canadian public, whose views
about distant wars in Afghanistan are sufficient internally consistent, detailed and accurate, to
provide autonomous, self-contained opinions that governors take seriously in considering whether
they have mobilized sufficient consent to go to and stay at war. But this is a mythologically
rational mass public. It is this mythologically guided “bound rationality” or set of “satisficing”
shortcuts that matters in the end.
A. The Right Allies
Thus, Canadians’ rely, in the first instance, on what might be termed “trusted rationality.” They
provide consent when they are told or shown they are going to war with the right allies, who have
been the time-tested trusted allies they have always won with in their victorious war-drenched
past. References to the enemy (e.g., Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, terrorists)
might also matter at the margins, but ultimately what counts is who Canada is going to war with
and alongside, rather than against. Thus, as the classic 1939–41 myth affirms, Canadians will
support going to war with Britain and France without the United States.
Moreover, in an adaptation of the classic myth, references to international organizations are
unlikely to matter much, unless they are sufficiently small to connote the country actors who
compose the club and thus are involved in the war. Therefore today’s UN, and even NATO, with
so many members, should make little difference in evoking country connotations — of reminding
Canadians of the right allies contained within the club. To be sure, the UN mattered back in Gulf
War I because the UN and its secretary general were central in the drama of providing and
enforcing the authorizing resolution to use force, Canada was serving on the UN Security Council
(UNSC), and its permanent representative was the very francophone Yves Fortier. In sharp
contrast, after 9/11, the UN was missing in action from the start, as it shut down and disappeared,
Canada was not on the UNSC and the critical collective decision to use force from an
international organization came much more quickly and almost invisibly from elsewhere —
NATO in distant Brussels, rather than from nearby New York through an organization whose
precursor did not exist in 1939.
4
It is, however, worth noting that the option of reintroducing compulsory military service and the practice
of compelling reservists and guards to serve for longer overseas has reappeared in the neighbouring U.S.,
as a result of the still unwon Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
6
The G8, with only eight major powers that are easy to remember, should be more potent. But it
contains the right allies from World War II of Britain and France, the Johnny-come-lately allies
of the U.S., Russia and Italy, and the enemies of Germany and Japan. G8 member Germany was
an enemy in both 1914 and 1939, and not an active ally in 1950 or at the start in 1990. Its
presence through the G8 or even individually should make far less difference in evoking the
supportive mythological memory and right actor configuration than Britain and France, who were
almost always fighting alongside Canada from the very start.
B. The Right War
Second, to arrive rationally at their opinions that politically matter, mass publics rely on what
might be termed “remembered rationality” brought alive, in the current case and context, by
references to the well-remembered “winning wars” — the “right wars” — that they recall
favourably from the past. Small, short wars from the recent past matter, but more massive ones
from the ever distant past matter more, for they have had more time to solidify into deeply
embedded national myths. Here, Canada has an abundance of wars and especially wars it has
won: World War I, World War II, the Cold War, Gulf War I, the “Turbot War,” Kosovo. But it
also has also one war that it did not win — Korea — and several lesser conflicts that lie below the
war threshold and public radar screen that it has won (Medak Pocket 1993), tied (Zaire 1996) and
lost (Somalia 1992–93).
C. The Right Leaders
Third, when Canadians are told and shown by trusted individuals — the “right leaders” — whom
they treat as authorities on such matters at home, that this is a good war that they should support,
they will do so — especially if these authorities come from their linguistic and geographic
“hometown.” At the start, francophone Quebecer prime minister Jean Chrétien, anglophone
Albertan opposition leader Stockwell Day and francophone Quebecer Gilles Duceppe as third
party leader all said “support the war.” By the autumn of 2007, anglophone Albertan prime
minister Steven Harper alone said they should, while francophone Quebecer opposition leaders
Stéphane Dion and Gilles Duceppe said they should not.
Importantly, the actor configuration that matters is not that of trusted individual military
authorities from any American-like “iron triangle” of the White House, State Department and
Pentagon who ask their fellow Canadians to support or oppose the war. Rather, in contrast to the
U.S., it is the civilian leaders in Parliament, not military leaders in the Pentagon, State
Department (e.g., generals George Marshall, Colin Powell) or White House (e.g., generals
George Washington, Dwight Eisenhower) whom the anti-militaristic Canadians trust, treat as
authorities and pay attention to about going to war abroad.
D. The Right Death Ratio
Fourth, when the rational Canadian public is told and sees the “right death ratio” of many
Canadians civilian victims killed at home in North America by the enemy, relative to the few
Canadian soldiers killed fighting the enemy abroad in Afghanistan, they are more likely to
support the war. In an optimally rational world, it would be the real 24 Canadians killed in New
York on 9/11 relative to the initially none but now 71 soldiers killed in Afghanistan that matter.
But to the mythologically rational Canadian public, it is the much magnified numbers offered in
their pollsters’ questions or on their newscasts that really count. This hypothesis will be
7
confirmed if support is high when reported (possible and confirmed) Canadian civilian deaths in
North America are high, while reported deaths of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan are low.
Methodologically, in an extension of the first version and test of the 1939–41 myth, this
mythologically remembered rationality and trusted actor configuration is now hypothesized to be
directly relevant at the (often intervening) public opinion surveying stage, in the question
framing, wording and ordering, as well as in the sometimes more distant (independent and either
mediated or directly connected) media portrait stage.
Canada’s Real War in Afghanistan
C harting Canada’s Combat Involvement
To determine the part played by Canadian public opinion and media portraits in Canada’s war in
Afghanistan, it is important first to identify in considerable detail the dependent variable — the
cadence of Canada’s combat involvement in the war. That cadence can be continuously charted,
over its six long years, over several dimensions, such as the number of CAF services involved,
number of combat troops deployed in the theatre, the number deployed in dangerous areas, the
number given offensive combat roles, the number of combat operations conducted, the number of
deadly encounter resulting, and the number of enemies, civilians, allies and Canadians killed.
A superior specification, for a study concerned with over-time change, and the push or pull of
domestic determinants, is a tight focus on Canada’s sequence of major decisions to go to war.
Charting Canada’s move into and away from war in Afghanistan can thus be done by focusing on
the dozen major decisions — rather evenly spaced throughout the six-year period — that defined
the cadence of Canada’s combat involvement in the conflict (Pigott 2007; McDonough 2007). In
each case the decision revolves around the degree and durability of Canada’s deadly combat
involvement, including what branches of the armed forces were dispatched, to the rear or front
lines, and to engage in actual deadly combat or not.
Amidst the many decisions regarding Canada’s combat involvement in Afghanistan, taken by the
governments of Jean Chrétien (September 12, 2001, to December 12, 2003), Paul Martin
(December 12, 2003, to February 6, 2006) and Stephen Harper (February 6, 2006, to the present)
the following “decisive dozen” stand out.
Jean Chrétien’s Decisions
1. September 12, 2001: Declaring War
The first and most fundamental decision was to declare war. This was done at Canadian initiative,
through NATO, starting on the day the terrorists struck. The terrorists hit the twin towers in New
York at about 3:00 p.m. Brussels time. At that moment, the Canadian permanent representative to
the North Atlantic Council, David Wright, serving as the dean of the council with the
responsibility for setting its agenda, was at the normal, private, weekly working lunch between
the ambassadors and the secretary general of NATO — the meeting where the most difficult
matters are dealt with and the real work gets done.
When news of the attack came, Wright and U.S. ambassador Nick Burns, who had arrived at
NATO just ten days earlier, met privately with the secretary general. There Wright spontaneously
8
proposed that Article 5 on collective action be invoked.5 After some discussion, Burns made a
few phone calls to Washington to make sure the U.S. wanted this done. It did, but on condition
that all NATO allies agreed and that it be proven that the attacks were directed from abroad.
Wright phoned Ottawa to tell them what was involved and what NATO’s role in a war would be.
NATO held an emergency session overnight. Art Eggleton, Canada’s defence minister, and Ray
Henault, the chief of the defence staff, were both in Eastern Europe, due to fly home on
September 11. But when all the flights were cancelled they went to Brussels instead. That same
night Wright briefed them. The Canadians set about convincing the 19 NATO allies, with a
statement that the secretary general had prepared and the Canadians had seen. The council agreed
that if it were determined the attack came from abroad, it would invoke Article 5. It was quickly
determined that the attack had indeed come from abroad.
2. October 7, 2001: Attacking Afghanistan
The second decision came on October 7, 2001, when Chrétien announced that Canada, in
Operation Apollo, would contribute air, sea and land forces to the war against terrorism in
Afghanistan (Pigott 2007, 82–84; McDonough 2007). Canada contributed ships (four frigates,
one destroyer and one supply ship), special forces, and transport and surveillance aircraft to the
so-called coalition of the willing. Henault explained that Operation Apollo would run to October
2003, with Canadian warships already in the region since August (HMCS Halifax) and heading
for the Persian Gulf (HMCS Toronto and HMCS Charlottetown, due to arrive in December 2001)
joined by two maritime patrol aircraft, four strategic airlift planes and a Canadian Battle Group to
work with American forces in and around Kandahar in Afghanistan.
The decision may in part have been taken because of America (McDonough 2007, 621), but by
no means because of America alone. On September 28, 2001, the U.S. unilateral military mission
in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, had been sanctioned by the UN. NATO’s Article 5
decision was announced by Secretary General Lord George Robertson on October 2, five days
before Chrétien made his move. At home, all parties in the House of Commons strongly endorsed
Chrétien’s decision, save for small group of social democrats in Alexa McDonough’s NDP.
3. November 14, 2001: Sending Soldiers under American Com mand
The third decision came on November 14, 2001, when Canada sent soldiers in some force. It
expanded Operation Apollo by announcing it was deploying troops to Kandahar to fight under
American control. It put 1,000 members of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(PPCLI) based in Alberta on 48-hour standby. In February 2002 Canadian forces started arriving
in Afghanistan. A total of 880 soldiers were sent in the first wave.
5
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area” (see <www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>).
9
4. March 2002: Conducting Ground Offensive with the Americans
The fourth decision came in March 2002 when these Canadian forces joined their special forces’
colleagues in going on the offensive to find and kill the Taliban. In Canada’s largest ground
offensive since the Korean War, more than 500 Canadian forces swept a valley in eastern
Afghanistan and mounted a midnight rescue mission for a downed helicopter.
On December 20, 2001, UNSC resolution 1386 had authorized the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). It consisted of the 6,000 troops of the Kabul Multinational Brigade
(KMNB), designed to secure Kabul and its Bagram air base, from many NATO members and
likeminded outsiders, and financed by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).
5. May 21, 2002: Co ming Home from Kandahar
The fifth decision marked a major reversal of this four-fold cadence of going to war ever more.
On May 21, 2002, Ottawa announced its troops would return home in July, at the end of their six
month tour. To be sure, the Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) Special Forces would be replaced and
the air and naval forces in the region would remain. Moreover, Eggleton indicated it was possible
that Canadian troops might return in their former force in 2003. But Canada’s main ground
combat forces that had fought and killed the enemy alongside the Americans were being brought
back home. The PPCLI Battle Group arrived back at their base in Edmonton on July 28–30, 2002.
Analysts have identified several possible causes for the May decision to largely withdraw. The
announcement came one month after Canada had suffered its first casualties, when four Canadian
soldiers had been killed by American pilots in a friendly fire incident on April 18, 2002 (Pigott
2007, 89–91; Friscolanti 2005). Moreover, Canada had no soldiers in reserve to spare to replace
its unit in the field. Eggleton noted his forces were “stretched.”6 The U.S. had wanted Canada to
stay but its view did not prevail. Canadian military casualties and lack of the relevant specialized
capability, rather than American preferences, now seemed to be the cause.
6. February 12, 2003: Returning Multilaterally to Kabul
The sixth decision constituted the second reversal. For on February 12, 2003, the same majority
government of Prime Minister Chrétien’s Liberals sent the troops back in. On that day Canada
announced it would send 2,000 troops to Afghanistan for one year as part of the UN-mandated
ISAF in Kabul. A day later, it announced it would send the Iroquois command ship and two
frigates to the Afghanistan effort. Canada was thus sending its mainline ground combat forces
back in, but this time under the UN-legitimated, NATO-led ISAF mission in Kabul, rather than
for offensive combat missions with the Americans alone from Kandahar.
John McCallum, now minister of defence, explained in Brussels at a NATO gathering that
Canada would send 1,900 troops that summer to the mission in Kabul, and take command of the
KMNB in July (Pigott 2007, 92–93). In Parliament on March 17 Chrétien justified the decision as
6
With a limited number of troops, Chrétien’s Canada decided to redeploy the existing pool back home
rather than expand it by more active measures, including potentially compulsory ones, even though
Canada, with its fiscal surplus, had the cash to expand the ranks. If francophone/Quebecers were still
scarred by the conscription crisis, they could have breathed a collective sigh of relief. There is good
evidence that Chrétien remembered the conscription crisis very well (Martin 2003).
10
follows: “Our commitment to the war against terrorism is well known. We have already agreed to
send troops, thousands of them, next summer, to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. We will keep our
duty to do that.” The decision was widely seen as a clever minimum necessary side payment to
avoid Canada having to fight in the war in Iraq that George W. Bush was about to launch and to
minimize the diplomatic damage done in America from the decision to largely stay out.
Paul Martin’s Decisions
7. April 14, 2004: Extending the Mission
Canada’s seventh decision, and the first under the new Liberal prime minister Paul Martin from
Montreal, came on April 14, 2004. Then Canada extended its existing mission for another term.
On February 9, 2006, Canada’s Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier had taken command of ISAF for
six months. Canada’s 2,000-plus troops at Camp Julien then constituted the largest country
contribution to ISAF. Relative capability and command were rising, and seemed to cause the
Canadians to stay in.
8. March 21, 2005: Expanding and Returning to Kandahar
The eighth decision was to expand the force and move it to Kandahar once more. The decision
was an extension of a announcement by defence minister Bill Graham on February 13, 2005, that
Canada would double its troop strength in Afghanistan by the summer and shift the force from
relatively safe Kabul to the former Taliban heartland of Kandahar (Pigott 2007, 102). There it
would run theProvincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
The March 21 decision was taken in Ottawa in a meeting among Martin, Hillier and Jonathan
Fried, Martin’s foreign policy advisor (Pigott 2007, 102–04). Hillier wanted to move a full battle
group to Kandahar. Martin and the others were reluctant. But Martin, about to meet Bush at his
ranch for the first Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) summit, agreed. Canada thus moved
to the most dangerous front, where only the Americans, British and Dutch as allies also ventured.
The Canadian redeployment to Kandahar airfield began on June 29, 2005. American preferences
catalyzed by North American summitry, combined with Hillier’s Vimy Ridge logic, seemed to be
the dominant causes.
9. November 2005: Conducting Combat in Kandahar
The ninth decision came in November 2005, when the Canadian force in Kandahar went on the
offensive against the Taliban there. As they did, the casualties began to mount. On January 25,
2006, Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry was killed in a suicide attack.
Stephen Harper’s Decisions
10. March 13, 2006: Promising Leadership
The tenth decision was taken by the new Conservative prime minister Stephen Harper. From the
moment he was elected on January 23, 2006, Harper signalled that Afghanistan was a major issue
and that Canada was there for the long haul. On March 13, just six weeks after he was sworn in as
11
prime minister on February 6, he flew to Kandahar and promised that Canada would be a leader
in the war being waged there.
11. May 17, 2006: Extending to 2009
The 11th decision came on May 17, 2006. Then Parliament approved by a narrow margin the
decision of “Canada’s new government” to extend the existing combat mission in Kandahar, at
essentially the same force levels through to February 2009. In September, Harper reinforced the
battle group with Leopard tanks when a military need for heavier armour became evident during
the deadly but victorious summer battle with the Taliban at Panjawai.
12. June 22, 2007: “Parliament Will Decide”
The 12th and most recent major decision came on June 22, 2007. Then Harper indicated at a news
conference that he would seek an all-party agreement in the House of Commons and a consensus
among Canadians about what Canada’s role should be after February 2009. He thus opened the
possibility that the Canadian forces might taken on a different, less dangerous task, while
expressing his hope that Canada would remain, rather than just abandon Afghanistan by coming
home.
Harper’s decision came immediately after he met with NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop to
discuss at length how Canada could help expand the training of the Afghan army and police. It
also came a month before the deployment to Afghanistan in force of the francophone Royal 22nd
Regiment from Quebec (Van Doos) for the first time. Given the timing of the announcement —
almost two years before the February 2009 deadline, domestic political rather than external
military determinants seemed to be the dominant cause. While there was some frustration with
the failure of Canada’s ranking allies to contribute combat troops for combat missions in the
unstable south, several had done so since the NATO summit at the end of 2006 had called for
this. Moreover, France’s recently elected president Nicolas Sarkozy, whom Harper had just met at
the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, was about to take a more supportive stance. Indeed, Harper’s
signal reflected a calculation that his party did not wish to fight the next election, coming ever
closer, on the issue of Afghanistan. Rather it wished to neutralize this problematic issue by
spreading responsibility for the government’s singular and unpopular position, by having the
opposition Liberals, and ideally the Bloc Québécois from francophone Quebec, associated with a
new Canadian position as well.
The Cadence of Canada’s Co mbat Decisions and Their Improbable Ca uses
This review of the “decisive dozen” reveals that Canada went to war in five stages, defined by
major turning points, first, in direction and, second, in degree of its military involvement, as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
September 12, 2001, to March 2002: Getting in ever more deeply with the Americans;
Coming Home, May 2003 to February 2003;
Returning multilaterally to Kabul, February 2003 to March 2005;
Moving expansively to Kandahar, March 2005 to June 2007; and
Signalling a less combative shift, June 2007.
12
Furthermore, Canada spent less than one of the six years getting out, compared to a full five years
staying the course or getting in more. Over the full six-year period as a whole Canada’s central
cadence was to get in more, at least until the July 2007 signal of a shift.
These patterns poorly match the cadence of many of the standard determinants of Canadian
foreign policy behaviour, which are thus unlikely to explain Canada’s war. First, the external
determinant of the shock of 9/11 or the war or terrorism performs poorly, for as the immediate
impact and memory of 9/11 faded, Canada increasingly went to war. Similarly, American
preferences perform poorly, for they remained relatively constant in wanting Canada in more,
while Canada went in, out and back in.
Second, the external and societal determinant of real Canadian combat casualties performs
poorly, for as the monthly and yearly cadence and the cumulative number of Canadians killed in
Afghanistan went up, Canada increasingly went to war. Moreover, the many decisions to go to
war more were taken knowing that more Canadian soldiers would more likely die as a result.
Third, the societal, governmental and individual determinants of prime ministerial attributes and
personal beliefs, party in power, or minority or majority government seem to matter little. For
francophone Quebecer Chrétien’s Liberal majority initiated getting in, getting out and getting
back in. Anglophone Quebecer Paul Martin’s Liberal minority initiated going to war even more.
And anglophone Albertan Stephen Harper’s Conservative minority continued to get in ever more,
until the summer 2007 signal of a shift.
Given this cadence, it further seems unlikely that the Canadian government was pushed into and
kept in a great war adventure in Afghanistan by an enthusiastic Canadian mass public — unless it
can be shown that Canadians were so enduringly eager to move a reluctant government with a
veteran prime minister and massive majority at the start, and to move a still reluctant minority
government with a new prime minister at the end. To see if the public was so eager, and what role
public opinion might otherwise have played, it is important to examine the polls.
Canadian Public Opinion about Canada’s Afghanistan War
The Existence and Impact of Public Opinion
As noted above, there is a long and ongoing debate in Canada, as elsewhere, about whether the
public has any opinion that politicians should take seriously on matters as esoteric and so far
removed from personal experience as going to war half a world away. Some argue that Canadians
have no such opinion but make something up when the pollsters call, in order to get through
whatever the particular questions might be in the most polite, socially acceptable, time-efficient
way. Others argue that they may lack the detailed, accurate command of the facts that they would
need to do well on a university exam, but nonetheless have a pre-existing, rational, internally
logical, relatively stable command of the basics, which they authentically reproduce whenever the
pollsters call (Munton and Keating 2001). Their rationality arises in their answers to individual
questions and in the logical consistency of their answers to all questions within, and even across
polls. In the case of Canadians and issues of war, the latter view of a “rational Canadian public”
has the stronger case. But there is sufficient room for the retreat from “optimal rationality” to
intrude into the world of a “satisficing public,” to allow other elements, especially cues about
trusted actors or authorities and cherished memories to slip in. And it has long been known that
question ordering and question wording can have an important impact on the answers, due in part
to the frames they set, and the actors and authorities they show and the myths that they evoke.
13
Initial Public Opinion, September 2001
The first poll on 9/11 and Afghanistan, taken on September 17–20, 2001, showed, in overall
terms, a rational Canadian public supportive of a war effort they understood in a substantially
united way. In the majority, Canadians were strongly prepared to join the U.S. and declare war on
international terrorism (73%), even if it would expose civilians in Canada to attack (54%) from
the terrorists already in Canada waiting to hit (55%). To defend themselves, Canadians wanted to
give their security services more power (53%). Above all, they strongly approved Chrétien’s
handling of issues related to the terrorist attacks in the U.S. (74%). Whatever the subsequently
revealed accuracy of the pollsters’ assertion, it was rational to believe there were terrorists
waiting to attack in Canada, one week after everyone knew they had done so in the U.S. next door
and one year after Ahmed Ressam had been apprehended crossing from Canada into the U.S. to
attack an airport there. It was also rational to doubt that their government and their security
services could handle it (as a majority did), but not that the world was headed for nuclear war (as
only 21% did), given that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had been used by terrorists in
North America thus far (prior to the anthrax attacks that soon came). Canadians thus seemed
ready to fight abroad and die at home because they trusted their veteran prime minister at the top.
But from the start there were clear signs of two solitudes. A majority of Quebecers were prepared
to join the U.S. in the war (59%), but not if it would expose Canadians civilians to terrorist attack
(31%) from terrorists who might or might not be already here (50%). Quebecers, perhaps with
memories of October 1970, were least keen on giving the security services more power. But they
led Canadians (76%) in approving of how their linguistically and geographically hometown prime
minister — whom most had voted for — was handling the file. A trusted hometown prime
minister could and did bring francophones/Quebecers from their solitude into a unified panCanadian whole.
It is difficult to know if Canadians, across both solitudes, found it easier to support the right ally
combination of the 1939–41 myth, given that both Britain and France were absent from the
questions asked. But the U.S. as well as Canada were there, and Canadians were prepared to join
the U.S. alone — a rational response given that it had been attacked at home — in unspecified
ways, for the war on terrorism in general (as distinct from specifically sending troops to fight in
Afghanistan — unimaginable as Canada had never done such a thing before). And when asked
only about Canada — in the question about support for Chrétien’s handling — overall and unified
support received the highest approval of any question in the poll. Canadians thus rallied to
support Chrétien’s Canada and an American ally under deadly direct attack.
Public Opinion, October to December 2001
As the autumn unfolded, Canadians’ unified support remained strong. The next poll, taken on
October 10–14, 2001, immediately after the October 7 American attack on Afghanistan, found a
majority of Canadians strongly supporting the American- and British-led air strikes on
Afghanistan, against the Taliban and Al Qaeda (72%), even though they were concerned that this
could lead to biological or chemical attacks aimed at civilians in Canada (66%). A still strong if
somewhat diminished majority (62%) approved Chrétien’s handling of “Canada’s response to last
month’s terrorist attacks and the military action now underway in Afghanistan.”
14
The two solitudes appeared again, but only in limited and particular ways. A majority of
Quebecers supported the American- and British-led attacks (60%), were worried about attacks on
Canadians (66%) and, above all, again supported Chrétien’s handing of Canada’s war (66%).
The 1939–41 myth receives stronger support from this October poll. Canadians and Quebecers
both supported attacks led by the now present British (mentioned specifically in the question) and
the Americans. The absence of any mention of the French is consistent with the 12% gap between
Canada as a whole and Quebec support. However, when their own, hometown prime minister was
put back into the question, which was now personalized as support for him, rather than the
American or the British, the national unity gap disappeared and even reversed. For more
Quebecers now narrowly supported what was presented to them as Jean Chrétien’s war (66%),
than did Canadians as a whole (62%) — a Chrétien who had just sent Canadian military forces to
war in Afghanistan five days before.
Another mid October poll was taken by Leger Marketing on October 16–21, two weeks after
Canada had sent the ships from Halifax to the theatre of war (and by no means to its front lines).
Here 84% of Canadians supported (50.5% fully, 33.3% partly) Ottawa’s decisions to offer
military support to the U.S. in the war against Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban. A lesser majority of
58.7% supported Canadian military assistance for a U.S. attack on a country other than
Afghanistan — suggesting that the initial rally effect was really on a roll. In Quebec, a strong
majority (78.4%) approved of Canada’s military support of the U.S. in the war against
Afghanistan. The classic 1939–41 myth was affirmed by the support for Canada’s war, and the
adjusted version by its support for the U.S., as a rational Canadian public adjusted to the reality
that the U.S. had been attacked directly this time. The two solitudes had virtually disappeared.
Quebecers joined their fellow Canadians in rallying around their trusted hometown prime
minister, if not the Canadian flag.
By November 6–8, an Ipsos-Reid poll showed that 67% of Canadians and 59% of Quebecers
agreed that, with the war on terrorism and military actions in Afghanistan, Remembrance Day
had a special meaning for them this year. By November 21–25 the Maclean’s annual year-end
poll found that a strong majority of Canadians (79%) supported (41% strongly, 38% somewhat)
Canada’s involvement in the action in Afghanistan. When presented as solely “Canada’s war,”
support was strong in all of Canada and also in Quebec. When military action in Afghanistan was
associated with Remembrance Day — a living myth dating back to the first and second world
wars and reminding Canadians of both loss of life in military action abroad, in and for France and
Britain, and the ultimate victory that made it worthwhile in the end, a special meaning was
evoked among most Canadians and almost as many in Quebec.7
Public Opinion, 2002
Going into 2002, overall Canadian support for the war remained. In January, Ipsos-Reid asked
Canadians if they would support sending 750 troops to assist the U.S.: 68% responded yes, even
though a majority (56%) of Canadians still believed that there were terrorists in Canada waiting
to attack. However, the two solitudes gap widened. Quebecers offered only a minority of 49%
support, with 55% believing there were terrorists in Canada waiting to attack. In contrast, the
ROC gave 72% support for assisting the U.S. (producing a national unity gap of 23%), even
7
November 11 is celebrated as Remembrance Day in Canada and the United Kingdom, as Armistice Day
in France, and as Veterans Day in the United States (which also celebrates Memorial Day on the last
Monday in May).
15
though 57% of them believed along with Quebecers that there were terrorists in Canada waiting
to strike.
Also of note, on January 31, 2002, Ipsos-Reid released a poll asking Canadians whether or not
they would support military action against countries other than Afghanistan: 70% of Canadians
responded yes, with a majority (58%) of support from Quebecers and 73% of support from the
ROC.
However, in September, after Chrétien had pulled the Canadian forces out, and a real American
attack on Iraq loomed, Canadians started to go soft on the Afghanistan war. When Ipsos-Reid
asked if the U.S. bore responsibility for terrorist attacks against it, a majority of Quebecers and
the ROC said some. Canadians, whose ground forces has already left, also felt “Canadian support
for the U.S. and its war on terrorism was enough”: 62% of all Canadians responded yes, with
Quebecers at 64%, and the ROC at 62%. In doing so, they rallied together behind the retreat and
the flag that Chrétien brought back home.
The classic 1939–41 myth offered no help in 2002. Canadians from both of the solitudes
continued to support the war at any existing level, with no mention of Britain or France; the U.S.
continued to receive high levels of support. While the ROC tended to be the more supportive,
Quebecers still showed substantial, if minority, support.
Around Remembrance Day, Ipsos-Reid asked which date has greater meaning, Remembrance
Day or September 11: 67% of all Canadians said Remembrance Day, but only 45% of Quebecers
agreed (while 71% of the ROC did). Next, they asked Canadians if they would attend a “formal
Remembrance Day service” that year: 54% of all Canadians said yes, with a strong 59% from the
ROC and only 33% from Quebec. Finally, they asked Canadians if they “should do more to
honour those who have died in war”: all Canadians responded 84% yes, with Quebecers slightly
below the national average at 74%, and the ROC slightly above at 86%.
In terms of the 1939–41 myth, it suggests that on the whole Canadians associated the war in
Afghanistan with Remembrance Day — and therefore the right wars of the past. However, as this
war entered its second year, Quebecers seemed to have remembered that the two big right wars of
the past each contained a conscription crisis that they disliked.
Public Opinion, 2006
In 2006, overall Canadian support for the war hovered around 50%. Ipsos-Reid and the Strategic
Counsel both asked Canadians if they supported Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. For the year,
once the polls were averaged out, Canadians had dropped below the 50% threshold to 48%.
However, support went as high as 57 in the months of May and October (both Ipsos-Reid) and as
low as 37%, in the month of August (Strategic Counsel). Across the two solitudes, very different
patterns emerged. In Quebec, support continued to be much lower than in the ROC. On average,
for 2006, Quebecers support was 34%, with the highest (45%) occurring in October and
November (both Ipsos-Reid) and the lowest (21%) occurring in September (Strategic Counsel). In
the ROC, support for the year averaged out at 53%, getting as high as 64% in May (Ipsos-Reid),
and as low as 42% in September (Strategic Counsel). On average, there was a gap of 19%
between Quebec and the ROC. The gap got as wide as 27% in May and as narrow as 8% in
October (both Ipsos-Reid). Therefore, although Canadians tended to offer close to 50% of support
16
for the war, for most of the year the support was coming largely from the anglophones/ROC and
not from francophones/Quebec.8
The wording of the question continued to be of no help in reminding Canadians of their “right”
allies in the war. On September 18, Strategic Counsel released a poll in which Canadians were
asked if they thought Canada was the only country fighting in Afghanistan. Only 4% of
Canadians answered yes — 5% of Quebecers, and 4% of the ROC. Without the countries or
organizations mentioned specifically in the question, it is difficult to say who the respondents
would have thought was by the Canadian Forces’ side.
Again, wording was of no help in offering trusted authorities. In June Decima Research asked
Canadians if they supported the House of Commons decision to extend the Afghanistan mission
by two years. Canadians, overall, responded with a mere 41%, with Quebecers responding 31%
and the ROC 47%. The House of Commons as an institution, as distinct from trusted individuals,
did not seem to drive support up.
In terms of which war Canadians were most likely to associate the war in Afghanistan with, no
questions offered any clues in 2006. However, with respect to the right death ratio, Strategic
Counsel asked Canadians if the casualties were too high a price to pay. On the whole, Canadians
responded 52% yes, with the number getting as high as 58% in August and as low as 39% in
March. Quebecers (67%) were much more likely to respond affirmatively than the ROC (48%),
suggesting that francophones/Quebecers were even more opposed to the war than
anglophones/ROC, and that the two solitudes were becoming divided on the issue — something
newly appointed anglophone Albertan prime minister Stephen Harper could not afford.
Public Opinion, 2007
In 2007, support for the war in Afghanistan was much the same as it had been in late 2006. It
continued to be higher in the ROC than in Quebec, and Canada’s trusted allies continued to be
largely absent from the polling questions. In April 2007, when Ipsos-Reid asked Canadians if
they “support Canadian Forces efforts in Afghanistan,” 54% of all Canadians said yes, but only
37% of Quebecers did; the ROC responded 58% yes. Asked the same question in July, Canada as
a whole still responded at 51%, but Quebecers’ response was also slightly lower (30%), and the
ROC also declined slightly (57%). This was a slight decline across the board, although the
national unity gap remained. Angus Reid Strategies asked Canadians if they thought “Canada was
shouldering too much of the burden of the Afghanistan mission.” In February, Canada as a whole
responded 65% yes, Quebecers responded 73% yes and the ROC responded 62% yes. In April,
Canadians on the whole responded 64% yes, Quebecers responded 67% yes and the ROC
responded 76% yes. By May all Canadians responded 55% yes, Quebecers 60% yes and the ROC
52% yes. In July the numbers had increased again slightly, with all Canadians responding 58%
yes, Quebecers response declining to 53% and the ROC increasing to 59%. In September 2007,
8
The two polling companies seemed to produce significantly different results. If the yearly average is
determined using only the Ipsos-Reid polls, the average is 52%; if the yearly average is calculated using
only the Strategic Counsel polls, the average is 44%. The numbers for each polling company were as
follows: Ipsos-Reid — beginning of March 54%, end of March 52%, May 57%, July 47%, September
51%, October 57%, November 44%; Strategic Counsel — March 55%, May 40%, August 37%,
September 42%, October 44%. Both show the same drop after March or May, and the drop to 44%
support by October–November, but only Strategic Counsel shows support coming back during the
intervening time.
17
the numbers had increased again back to 67% of all Canadians responding yes, 64% of Quebecers
responding yes and 68% of the ROC responding yes.
The polls seemed to be saying that Canadians, on the whole, continued to support the war, but
that Canada was playing too much of a role. Amongst the two solitudes, anglophone Canadians
appeared more supportive of the war effort than francophone Canadians; however, the strongest
feelings regarding “Canada bearing too much of the burden” fluctuated between Quebecers and
the ROC. The wording of the polling questions for 2007 indicated that the war in Afghanistan
was becoming increasingly Canada’s war, for questions continued to focus on Canada’s efforts,
not those of the Americans, or the British or French. This emphasis suggests that the classic or
adjusted 1939–41 myth had, more or less, disappeared.
Canadians were also repeatedly asked by Angus Reid Strategies if they thought the “Harper
government explained the Afghanistan mission clearly.” In February, all Canadians responded
27%, Quebecers responded 22% and the ROC responded 30%. In April, all Canadians responded
at a lower 23%, Quebecers also at a lower 20% and the ROC at a lower 23%. In May, all
Canadians responded the same as in April (23%), Quebecers responded slightly higher than the
previous time (23%) and the ROC had risen slightly (24%). In July, all Canadians responded
19%, Quebecers 17% and the ROC 20%.
A Leger Marketing Poll, conducted in May, asked Canadians if they “trust the Harper
government to manage the Afghanistan war.” A total 35% of all Canadians responded yes, but
only 27% of Quebecers did, while 39% of the ROC did. A poll taken by the Strategic Counsel for
The Globe and Mail and CTV in July asked Canadians “which leader would be trusted the most
for decisions in Afghanistan.” While Canada as a whole gave the highest rating to Prime Minister
Harper at 32%, Quebecers gave a higher rating to their hometown, francophone Gilles Duceppe
(24%) than to Harper (21%), while the ROC gave a higher rating to Harper at 35%. No single
actor was given an overwhelming amount of support or trust from Canadians — Harper, the
highest of all, at 32%, was a far cry from the 70% that Chrétien had received in 2001.
For 2007, none of the polls analyzed gave questions with “right” or “wrong” war reminders.
However, the Strategic Counsel did ask Canadians if the price of Canadian casualties was too
high. The response was affirmative for 60% of all Canadians, 72% of Quebecers and 56% of the
ROC. It appeared that the more dead bodies coming home (with no reminders of the initial
Canadian victims), the less supportive Canadians, especially francophones, were.
Canadian Media Portraits About Canada’s Afghanistan War
The Primacy of Media Portraits in Public and Political Opinion o n War
It has long been known through disciplined, detailed empirical studies that on the subset of
foreign policy issues — such as Canada’s war in Afghanistan — that unfold in far-away places —
where few Canadians have been — and that involve matters such as military combat — where
they have little first-hand ability to judge — Canadians depend primarily on the media to form
their views (Dewitt and Kirton 1989). It has also long been known that traditionally, in both the
United States and Canada, the primary determinant of mass public opinion in the immediate to
medium term (three months out) is television network news (Kirton 1993). The media portrait of
the war on national television news is thus what largely determines the thinking of Canadians
from the mass citizenry through to the political elite. Given the unique power of television rather
than radio or print (and perhaps the internet) to arouse citizens to politically consequential
18
behaviour, national television news determines what they will ask about and for, and how they
will act. At the same time, national newspapers remain relevant, especially in opinion formation
and in political calculation and action for the foreign policy and political elite.
In regard to Canada’s war in Afghanistan, these facts have been affirmed or accepted, if with less
precision and evidence by scholars. Most notably, Mark Yaniszewski (2007, 363) writes that “the
primary source of military and defence-related information for most Canadians is not parliament,
academic journals, specialized university courses, or personal experience (e.g., service in the
military or defence administration), but the popular media” and notes that “the media’s central
role in shaping public attitudes.” It is plausible that in the case of Afghanistan parliamentarians,
and even their Cabinet members and prime minister subset, were also importantly moved by
media portraits through direct acquisition, without mass public opinion, measured by polls or
other mechanisms, required to bring the media message to them.
For some purposes it may be relevant to worry about whether the media portrait is accurate in
getting the hard facts right, or in giving the right facts the right prominence, context and case in a
causal chain that leads to a conclusion, explicitly or implicitly judged correct for most or all.
Concern and laments about the Canadian media’s poor performance in this regard abound. Thus
Yaniszewski (2007, 362) asks, as his central question, “how effective is the media in providing
accurate and meaningful information.”
The accuracy of the information delivered by the media might matter more if the audience were
like students taking a course with an exam at the end, where knowledge of the facts, right or
wrong, were the primary or only concern. But Canadians most clearly are not in that category.
Canadian television network news broadcasts, with a grade seven vocabulary and a comparable
level of comprehension to viewers who are assumed to be somewhat tired (at 9:00 p.m., 10:00
p.m. or 11:00 p.m.), distracted by several household tasks, if not actually dozing off, and
dependent on the visuals and voice tones more than the words spoken to interpret what the story
is all about. Each story, as well as the overall newscast, is constructed as a mini-drama, to keep
the easily distracted, dozy audience emotionally and cognitively involved. To do so the newscast
offers symbols and stories of what the audience already knows, believes and feels. Meaningful
information is thus that which retells well-known myths in new contexts or terms.
Canadians, overall, and in their two solitudes, share some very distinctive myths with one
another, as well as with some people in the rest of the world. Where going to war is concerned,
over a century of recurrent experience has made the central myth not about peacekeeping (the
transitory 1956–90 pastime), the Cold War, the decolonization crusade, about the UN, NATO or
the defence of Canada from terrorists or anyone else, or even about democratizing and developing
a distant poor country and educating its young girls. It is, above all, about the 1939–41 myth
where, from 1914 to 1917 in World War I, from 1939 to 1941 in World War II, from 1990 to
1991 in Gulf War II, from 1992 to 1999 in the Balkans and Kosovo, and 1996 in Rwanda, Canada
went to war with and for France and Britain, often without the United States at first, and before or
without any conscription crisis erupting to attack national unity at home.
To capture the presence and power of this dominant war justifying myth, each story in the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) The National, Société Radio Canada’s (SRC)
Téléjournal and, occasionally, CTV’s nightly newscast is coded for the visual or verbal
appearance of the following elements:
19
a. Volume, portion and prominence of September 11/Afghanistan coverage (with the two fused
into one in the first three and a half months following 9/11 but separated theoretically and
empirically at the end in 2007);
b. Trusted allies (Canada, Britain and France but not the U.S.);
c. Well-remembered right wars (both world wars, Remembrance Day, the Cold War, but not
Korea, Vietnam, Iraq);
d. The right leaders; and
e. The right death ratio: Canadian civilians at home versus Canadian military abroad, Canadian
military versus allies abroad (burden sharing — whether Canadians are fighting and dying in
this war alone), and the mythological media versus real-world body count.
For all of the above, attention is given to the patterns arising from all Canada, anglophone/ROC
and francophone/Quebec, and the gap between the latter two.
The Initial Media Frame: September 11–30, 2001
When the Al Qaeda–captured planes hit the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in
Pennsylvania on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, anglophone Canadians could see
from the start, from their own media, that this was a war that Canada would be fighting with, and
for, a France and Israel under attack, under the leadership of a popular francophone Canadian
prime minister from Quebec.9 That evening, CBC’s The National devoted its entire nightly
newscast to the 9/11 story, identified Afghanistan and the Taliban as relevant in the third story,
showed Chrétien calling for calm and offering condolences to the Americans in the fourth story
and indicated that the Israeli embassies were threatened in Ottawa and around the world. The 12th
story showed Britain’s Tony Blair calling on all democracies to defeat this evil, and Germany,
Russia, NATO, and Europe acting in support. The final story began: “The French judge
investigating the 1994 hijacking of an Air France jet found an international network of Islamic
extremist terrorist groups, including a Canadian connection … hooked up to Osama bin Laden’s
network of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.”
To be sure, the U.S. appeared in every one of the 16 stories, and George W. Bush himself in
three. But anglophones watching the entire newscasts — and most were glued to their TV sets
that day — could see the war in Afghanistan, framed from the first day, as a modern
manifestation of the 1939–41 myth to a very high degree, even with Israel under attack, as in
1990–91. Those watching CTV News an hour later could also see the same myth develop: once
again France, Israel, Britain and Chrétien appeared, and they were joined by the G8, whose next
summit Canada had the responsibility to host in the summer of 2002.
The portrait on francophone Canadian media appears to be distinctly different. The first available
newscasts, as distinct from continuous coverage, came on day three — September 13. All ten
Téléjournal stories focused on the 9/11 attacks, and the second story dealt with Afghanistan itself,
but France and all European countries and organizations were entirely absent. Rather, the first
story led with Bush declaring the start of the first war of the 21st century, with his “opérations
militaires” serving as the major message of this story and the next. Chrétien appeared only in the
eighth story, calling on Canadians not to let their reaction erode the ethnic or religious tolerance
they enjoyed. Israel appeared in the next story, which began: “Un autre incursion israélienne a
eu lieu dans les territoires palestiniens … Israël aurait eu carte blanche pour prévenir le
terrorisme sur son territoire.” That same day, on CBC, the first story showed George Bush
9
A Gallup poll taken September 17–24 gave Chrétien a 62% approval rating, up 7% from August.
20
crying, the second noted 30,000 body bags were ready for use in New York and the fourth
showed Jean Chrétien declaring, “We will join all civilized nations in pledging our complete
support in the days to come.”
As the initial framing gave way to the general impression created by the sheer volume of
coverage in the following weeks, the two solitudes within the Canadian media and its audience
narrowed. In the 43 available newscasts analyzed from September 11 to the end of the month, the
U.S. appeared in every one, or 100%, almost all of which were devoted to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and their aftermath. Canada appeared in almost as many 40 (93%), with Chrétien himself
in 29 (67%). References to Quebec arose in 32 (74%). Britain was present in 20 (47%) and
France in 8 (19%). This was, in the first instance, America’s war, but almost as much Canada’s,
largely Chrétien’s, and substantially Britain’s and France’s as well.
Within each of the two solitudes, the portrait was substantially the same. On CBC the U.S. came
in at 100%, Canada at 100%, Chrétien at 80%, Quebec at 80%, Britain at 40% and France at
20%. On Téléjournal, the pattern was U.S. 100%, Canada 77%, Chrétien 54%, Quebec 62%,
Britain 31% and France 23%. Thus, this was even more France’s war. Together the portraits were
sufficiently strong, similar and mythologically authentic to engender support from a united
Canada for this war. But among francophones, Canada, Chrétien — and Quebec as well — were
less present, even if France was somewhat more. A greater linguistic gulf emerges if CTV serves
as the anglophone Canadian newscast of choice. For its 15 summarized stories, the results were
U.S. and Canada at 100%, Chrétien at 67%, Quebec at 80%, Britain at 67% and France at a
fragile 13%.
The 1939–41 myth certainly seemed to be present in the right war reminders that appeared in
Canadian newscasts in September 2001. Of the four war reminders, three referred to World War
II and one referred to World War I. However, all four references came from anglophone
newscasts, perhaps reflecting the need not to bring up reminders of the 1917 and 1944
conscription crises.
While Chrétien’s presence in the media has been accounted for, other trusted authorities also
appeared. Foreign affairs minister John Manley and former Conservative prime minister Joe
Clark appeared the most frequently, after the prime minister (who appeared 18 times, 13 on CBC
and 5 on SRC). Manley appeared four times (three on CBC and on on SRC) and Clark also
appeared four times (three on CBC and one on SRC). Stockwell Day, the opposition leader, and
Paul Martin, the finance minister, tied for third place, with three appearances each. Day appeared
on CBC twice and SRC once, while Martin appeared on CBC all three times.10 Several other
people appeared once or twice; however, as they were all on anglophone CBC, Quebecers were
much more likely to see their francophone prime minister than any other authority — he appeared
five times more than any other individual, suggesting that Quebecers would still be inclined to
support the war efforts.
In terms of the body count, for the month of September 2001, Canadians were frequently updated
with the number of civilians who had been killed in the 9/11 attacks. On September 14, CBC
reported the number as high as 100 — a far stretch from the 24 who actually died. While
10
Totals only include CBC and SRC to account for more accurate comparisons to 2007 data, where CTV
was absent. Totals include references to September 11. For Afghanistan only, the counts were as follows:
Chrétien (two overall, two CBC, zero SRC); Manley (one overall, one CBC, zero SRC); Clark (one
overall, one CBC, one SRC); Day (two overall, two CBC, zero SRC); Martin (one overall, one CBC,
zero SRC). These figures apply to all right-leaders analysis that appears in the media to follow.
21
Téléjournal was less likely to report on the specific number of Canadian civilian deaths, on
September 16 it reported that the total number of civilian deaths at 5,511 — almost twice as many
as actually occurred. This suggests that Canadians should have been supportive for the war efforts
at this time. Innocent civilians, including a significant number of Canadians, had been directly
affected by the September 11 attacks, indicating it was the time for a “rally around the flag”
effect.
The Evolving Media Portrait: October–December 2001
Much the same portrait remained for the two months that followed September 11, although it
started to fade as time went on. In October 2001, the events of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan
continued to appear in the majority of Canadian newscasts. Of the stories that were summarized
for the month, 240 contained references to 9/11-Afghanistan: 116 referred to 9/11, 144 to
Afghanistan and 21 referred to both. By October, stories, rather than newscasts, had become the
appropriate unit of analysis as most Canadians were no longer watching the entire newscast as
one single 9/11-Afghanistan assemblage on their TV. At this level, as the data show, the war in
Afghanistan was clearly starting to separate from the 9/11 terrorist attacks that provided the
catalyst and cause célèbre at the start.
However, with the affects of 9/11 always very much in the minds of the North Americans, it
remained “America’s War,” but with Canada and Britain largely present, and the French,
although much fewer in number, still there. The trusted ally combination and thus the 1939–41
myth remained, but in considerably diminished form. More specifically, of the 240 9/11Afghanistan stories, the U.S. appeared in 73%. Canada came in at a much lower 22%. Jean
Chrétien had almost disappeared, coming in at 5%. Quebec had also declined, coming in at 6%.
Britain was still there, but declining, at 10%, and France appeared in only one story, with a score
of 0.4%.
In October, national unity remained intact, as the two networks showed their audience much the
same thing. On the CBC, the U.S. appeared in 69% of the news stories. Canada came in at 29%,
while Chrétien came in slightly higher than the monthly average at 9%. Quebec appeared 10% of
the time. Britain still appeared in 13% of the news stories, but France had disappeared. On SRC,
the U.S. came in at 73%, Canada at 10%, Chrétien at 1% (appearing in only one story), Quebec at
1%, Britain at 3% and France at 1%. Therefore, for the francophones, just as in September,
Canada, Chrétien and Quebec continued to be less present, while France remained slightly more
present, with Britain appearing less than in the anglophone newscasts. The results of CTV were
similar to that of CBC: U.S. 76%, Canada 24%, Chrétien 5%, Britain 13% and France 0%.
Canada was still appearing in highest numbers, next to the directly attacked United States, on
both English and French television. Britain was appearing in fewer numbers, but was still present
in both solitudes, as was Chrétien and Quebec, on the whole. And while France had disappeared
from English television, it was still present, if just barely, on Téléjournal.
The number of war reminders had decreased to two by October. While one still served as a right
war reminder (of the Cold War), the other referred to the “wrong war” of Iraq II. However, these
two reminders may not portray the 50-50 split that might appear obvious, due to the fact that the
reference to Iraq was a response to the notion the U.S. striking Iraq. Moreover, at this point the
decision was not as controversial and negative as it later became. Both references continued to
appear on English newscasts alone.
22
While Chrétien still appeared more than any other trusted authority, he was no longer in the lead
on Téléjournal. Manley appeared three times, in comparison to Chrétien’s once. He even
appeared more on Téléjournal than on The National, where he only appeared twice. While CBC
viewers were still likely to see numerous trusted authorities — there were 31 appearances for the
month of October — SRC viewers only saw four.
By October, the body counts reported by the news media started to become more accurate. On
October 4, CBC reported that 23 Canadian civilians had died as a result of 9/11. At this point,
SRC seemed to focus more on the war in Afghanistan, and was more likely to report on Afghan
civilian deaths (200 was the highest count for the month). Again, this could suggest that the two
solitudes were becoming more divided. English television media continued to focus on the
Canadian civilian deaths, while French television media simply portrayed more innocent
civilians, perhaps dying as a result of the war efforts.
In November 2001, 9/11 and Afghanistan continued to appear in all Canadian newscasts, but their
portion of the overall newscasts declined. For November, the 25 available and summarized
newscasts contained 84 new stories that referred to 9/11-Afghanistan (75 to Afghanistan, 9 to
9/11 and 0 referred to both). At the story level, Afghanistan was now completely distinct from
9/11 and had far surpassed at the newscast level in the audience’s view. The reason why Canada
was going to war in Afghanistan was thus in danger of dropping from the public’s mind.
Overall, the U.S. was still the dominant presence, but had declined from the previous months to
45%. Canada came in at numbers consistent with October (25%). Chrétien’s appearances
continued to decline, coming in at 4%. Quebec came in at 7%. Britain appeared in 11% of the
stories and France increased slightly from the previous months to 5%. With America down and
France up, the 1939–41 myth revived. While the United States still led, Canada appeared more
than half as often as the Americans, Britain half as often as Canada and France half as often as
Britain.
In November, however, the two solitudes were separating. On the CBC, the U.S. appeared in
44%, Canada in 29%, Chrétien in 3%, Quebec in 6%, Britain in 15% and France in 3%. On SRC
the U.S. and Quebec continued to appear in similar numbers: U.S. at 42% and Quebec at 5%. But
Canada was significantly lower at 5%. Chrétien did not appear at all. Britain only appeared 5% of
the time, producing a gap of 10%. And France continued to appear in higher numbers, at 5%.
CTV had the U.S. at 48%, Canada at 32%, Chrétien at 6% and Quebec at 10%, but with Britain at
10% and France at 6%.
In anglophone Canada, the war was becoming more of “Canada’s War” and less of “America’s
War.” In francophone Canada, America still dominated, but the trusted allies were still there in
some force and thus the 1939–41 myth endured. A mythologically rational Canadian public may
have felt it worthwhile, for the first time, to allow America to carry more of the burden as it had
been attacked first this time.
In November the war references declined again to one. It referred to the “wrong war” in Iraq, and
once again appeared on English TV. The body count references for the month of November were
almost nonexistent. On November 4, CBC made a sole reference about enemy deaths, reporting
that 6,000 Taliban troops had been killed. The “death watch” had turned from innocent Canadian
civilians at home to the “military criminals” abroad.
By November, the number of trusted authorities appearing in Canadian news stories related to
9/11-Afghanistan had dwindled to five, all on CBC. Now francophones had absolutely no
23
guidance from their trusted authorities; anglophones were still getting some guidance, but much
less than in the months before, perhaps suggesting that Canadians were forming opinions about
the war through other media or means.
By December, attention to 9/11-Afghnaistan diminished even more. The 17 available newscasts
included 56 9/11-Afghanistan stories (50 on Afghanistan, 9 on 9/11, 3 on both). The U.S.
appeared in 66% of the news stories, slightly more than in the previous month. Canada declined
to 16%, while Chrétien disappeared completely. Quebec remained steady at 7%. Britain and
France both appeared in 4%.
In December, the 1939–41 myth remained, if in very fragile form. Again, the U.S. continued to
appear in the highest numbers, with Canada second. France and Britain remained present.
In December the two solitudes grew apart, through an inversion where the critical allies of Britain
and France were concerned. CBC had the U.S. at 68%, Canada 21%, Chrétien 0%, Quebec 5%,
Britain at 0% and France at 5%. SRC put the U.S. at 64%, Canada 18%, Chrétien 0%, Quebec
9%, Britain 9% and France 0%. Therefore, for the first time, France appeared in higher numbers
in the English newscasts than in the French ones (where it was absent), while Britain appeared in
higher numbers in the French newscasts (and was absent from the English). CTV showed the U.S.
in 65% of the 9/11-Afghanistan stories, Canada in 21%, Chrétien at 0%, Quebec at 8%, and
Britain and France both at 4%. CTV thus had the only newscast where both France and Britain
appeared.
By December, there were no war references. There were no trusted authorities appearing in any
9/11-Afghanistan news stories. The body count references had increased somewhat, but only in
an anglophone context: on December 1, CTV reported one U.S. military death; on December 16,
it reported somewhere between 300 and 1,000 Taliban had been killed; and on December 26, it
announced the adjusted figure of 2940 civilians who had died on September 11. This suggests
that anglophone Canadians should have been supportive of the war effort, even if it was no longer
associated with any right war in the past.
The Mature Media Portrait: August–September 2007
By August 2007, the portrait had showed that this had become Canada’s War, with Canadians
appearing in 52% of Afghanistan-related news stories. The portrait also showed that it was
starting to become Quebec’s war, with Quebec appearing in a significant 18% of all news
stories.11 America was still fighting a little (it appeared in 22% of all Afghanistan-related news
stories), Britain a little less (appearing in 8%) and France not at all (0%). Stephen Harper, the
anglophone prime minister from western Canada, appeared in 11% of all newscasts. Therefore,
there continued to be support, however, it was fairly limited and fragile — with allied support
reflecting a considerable anglophone component.
This was basically the same for English Canada, although it was even more of a
Canadian/Quebec-American affair. On CBC the U.S. appeared in 26% of all Afghanistan-related
newscasts; Canadians were slightly above the monthly average at 58%; Harper appeared 13% of
11
For 2007, references to September 11 are no longer considered the same as Afghanistan references, as it
was less likely that Canadians continued to think of them as connected entities. To this end, there were
only 2 out of 109 references (approximately 2%) to both 9/11 and Afghanistan. In 2001, 56 out of 373
references (approximately 15%) were made to both 9/11 and Afghanistan.
24
the time; the British were significantly below the monthly average, at only 3%; the French were
not present; and Quebec showed a significant appearance at 23% — almost half of Canada’s
overall appearance. On SRC, it was a little of a Canadian-American affair (Canada appeared in
47% of all Afghanistan-related stories, and Harper in 9%, while the U.S. appeared in 18%), but
even more so, it was a British affair (with Britain coming in above the monthly average, at 12%
— a difference of 9% from the portrait on CBC). Quebec continued to appear in significant
numbers, coming in at 15%. Therefore, for Canada as a whole, in both francophone and
anglophone Canada, it seemed to largely be becoming not only Canada’s war, but Quebec’s war.
Five war references were made in August 2007. Of them, four were made to “bad wars” (Iraq II
in all cases) and one to a “good war” (Iraq I). Téléjournal made two of the five references, and
there were both to “bad wars.” This would suggest that all Canadians, and even more so
francophone Canada/Quebec, was beginning to associate the war in Afghanistan with bad wars,
and that support for the war efforts were in decline.
In terms of the trusted authorities, the leader of the country continued to appear in the highest
numbers — seven for the month of August, with four appearances on CBC, and three on SRC.
Francophone authorities — opposition leader Stéphane Dion, leader of the Bloc Québécois Gilles
Duceppe and Quebec premier Jean Charest — appeared next highest to the prime minister on
Téléjournal, each twice, with all three more likely to appear on the French SRC than on the
English CBC. And the gap had begun to close amongst the two solitudes, with 19 authorities
appearing on CBC, and a close 14 appearing on SRC. The increase in overall appearances and the
increase in francophone authority appearances both seem to suggest that it was, indeed, becoming
Quebec’s war.
The body counts started to tell an even more interesting story. In August, both CBC and SRC
reported significantly more deaths than what actually occurred — The National 20 and
Téléjournal 17 (in comparison to the three that actually occurred).12 This suggests that Canadians,
both anglophone and francophone, were being highly exposed to the number of Canadians being
killed in Afghanistan, indicating that overall support for the war should have been declining.
By September 2007, overall, it had become even more both Canada’s and Quebec’s war. 13
Canada appeared in 68% of all Afghanistan-related news stories and Harper in 18%, while
Quebec appeared in 30%, almost half of Canada’s appearances. The Americans were less present
(20%), the British had remained fairly consistent (7%) and the French had come back, appearing
in 5% of all Afghanistan-related news stories. Nationally, it was Canada’s war two thirds of the
time and Quebec’s war one third of the time, and only America’s war 17% of the time — or about
half of that of Quebec. War was now being waged alone by Canada and Quebec.
Amongst the two solitudes there were notable differences, with francophone Canada signalling
much less support for the war than anglophone Canada. Canada was much more likely to appear
in English news stories than French ones — on CBC, Canada appeared in 79% of all
Afghanistan-related news stories, while on SRC, it appeared in only 55%, a gap of 24%. Harper
also produced a major gap (25%) between anglophone and francophone viewership, appearing
30% of the time on CBC, but only 5% on SRC. The U.S. appeared in 25% of the Afghanistan12
The number of deaths reported by the media includes every death reported in a story for the day. For
example, if there were three news stories that reported on the same death, it would count as three
reported deaths. Therefore, the difference in reported and actual deaths does not reflect misinformation; it
merely points out the focus and content being reported to a somewhat disengaged Canadian viewer.
13
Media analysis for the month of September 2007 includes data only until September 26.
25
related news stories on CBC, but in only 15% of the news stories on SRC. Britain was no longer
present in any of SRC’s Afghanistan-related news stories, but appeared in 13% of CBC’s. On the
other hand, France appeared in approximately the same numbers — 4% on CBC and 5% on SRC.
Quebec also appeared in close numbers, although slightly higher in anglophone Canada: 33% on
CBC and 25% on SRC.
Therefore, the two solitudes were telling slightly different stories. In anglophone Canada, it was
Canada’s war, it was also, significantly, Quebec’s war. Canada and Quebec were fighting largely
with their anglophone allies, although the French were present as well. In francophone Canada, it
was still Canada’s war and, very significantly, it was also Quebec’s war, but the anglophone allies
were less significantly present, respectively 15% for the Americans and 0% for the British, while
the French were still by their side at 5%. Again, in both cases, Canada and Quebec seemed to
bear most of the burden.
Again, in September 2007, the war references continued to reflect upon wrong wars. Of the three
references made, two referred to Iraq II, and one referred to the Korean War — the stalemate
from long ago. Interestingly, it was The National that referred to the Korean War, while
Téléjournal’s focus had turned purely negative. In comparison to 2001, when Téléjournal had
nothing to say, either positive or negative, with respect to war references, in 2007 all of the
references were negative — perhaps suggesting that francophones/Quebecers had much more to
say when they were adamantly against the war than when they were either supportive or
undecided on the issue.
The number of trusted authorities had increased in anglophone Canada, with 21 appearances on
the CBC. The numbers had declined on Téléjournal to five, but over half of them continued to be
francophone: two from Dion and one from newly appointed minister of foreign affairs Maxime
Bernier. Again, this seemed to suggest that it was becoming more Canada’s and Quebec’s war,
with the continual appearance of trusted authorities on the news — many more than had been
there in November or December 2001 (respectively five and zero). As well, the continued
appearance of francophone authorities on Téléjournal seemed to suggest that francophone
engagement was increasing — three might seem low, but by October 2001, which was much
closer to the 9/11 attacks, there was only one, and in November and December 2001, there were
none.
Again, the body counts told a similar story. Both The National and Téléjournal reported on more
deaths that what actually occurred (CBC reported five and SRC reported three, compared to the
one that actually occurred). Again, this suggested that support for the war was declining in both
of the two solitudes. By this time 71 members of the Canadian military had been killed in
Afghanistan, in comparison to the 24 Canadian civilians who died as a result of 9/11 — a
connection that Canadians were less likely to draw as time went on.
The Mature Newspaper Portrait: August–September 2007
For the months of August and September 2007, three key Canadian newspapers were analyzed
for additional focus and measurement: two English — The Globe and Mail and the National Post,
and one French — La Presse. On the whole, Afghanistan-related stories were likely to appear on
the front page 58% of the time. They were most likely to appear on the front of The Globe and
Mail (74%) and least likely on front page of the National Post (46%); they appeared 54% of the
time on the front page of La Presse. Overall, they covered approximately 18% of the space on the
26
front page, with The Globe and Mail in the lead at 20%, La Presse closely behind at 19% and the
National Post at 14%.14
Editorials were also accounted for. In August, 30% of editorials focused on Afghanistan for all of
the newspapers analyzed. The Globe and Mail continued its leadership trend at 41%. Again, La
Presse followed (26%), while the National Post had the least (23%). Overall, 14% of editorials
contained a reference to Afghanistan. The Globe and Mail and La Presse both came in at 15%,
and the National Post came in at a lower 11%.
The portrait displayed for the month of August seemed to be mixed, and depended upon which
newspapers were read. All three newspapers seemed to have a dominant front-page focus on
Afghanistan, suggesting that this was still Canada’s war.
In September 2007, similar to August, Afghanistan-related stories were likely to appear, overall,
57% of the time. The Globe and Mail continued its lead (63%), the National Post had increased
from the month before (57%), and La Presse remained at 50%. The amount of the front page
covered decreased slightly to 15%, with all three newspapers approximately the same: The Globe
and Mail 15%, National Post 15% and La Presse 14%. However, the figures for editorials had
changed quite significantly. La Presse came out on top at 50%, The Globe and Mail at 25% and
the National Post at 17%. The percentage of editorials had also changed accordingly, with La
Presse again in the lead at 25%, and The Globe and Mail and the National Post both at 8%.
According to the editorials accounted for, this was increasingly becoming Quebec’s war. While
Afghanistan continued to receive front-page coverage similar to its anglophone counterparts, its
editorials, or “care and/or concern” pieces, had come to focus much more on the war efforts.
Conclusion
The Mobilization of Constrained Consent
The first hypothesis of the constrained mobilization of consent is confirmed, in its first
component, by the many critical decisions where government action preceded any push from
mass public opinion, or persisted in the status quo or went in the opposite direction in defiance of
what mass public opinion was known to be. Canada initiated its first decision of declaring war
immediately after its representative in distant Brussels heard of the 9/11 attacks, long before the
first polls or even the first evening newscast could be seen. Into 2002, Canada went to war more,
even as still majority public opinion support declined.15 Most strikingly, in the most recent period,
the Harper government moved more into war, even as public support on the whole continued to
decline and support from francophones/Quebecers remained firmly negative. This hypothesis is
confirmed in its second component of a critical minimum constraint (rather than a completely free
14
Percentage of articles is accounted for by the number of stories and not the actual amount of the front
page or editorial section that is covered. For example, if there were four articles on the front page and
Afghanistan was mentioned in two of them, it would be considered 50% of the front page. Also, if the
relationship to Afghanistan was mentioned in the continuation of a front-page article elsewhere in the
newspaper, this too was included in these calculations.
15
It should be noted that public opinion remained well above the 50 percent margin in all of Canada, as
well as in each of the solitudes — making it important to remember that this hypothesis does not
necessarily hold true if there is an adamant desire from the public to not go to war.
27
hand) by the Harper government’s June 2007 signal, at a time when public support had plunged
to a new national low of 40% and showed no signs of turning upward, to seek multi-party support
for extending the mission beyond February 2009.
The Unified Mobilization of Consent
The second hypothesis, of the unified mobilization of consent, predicts that Canada will not go to
war more, or will go to war less, as francophone/Quebec support drops to low levels and shows
few signs of rising as the months and years go on. It is confirmed by the first four decisions
constituting the “go to war more” phase, when francophones/Quebec offered majority support on
most questions, particularly on the “trust the prime minister” one that is the most authentic test of
the first hypothesis of the constrained mobilization of consent. As a result the national unity gap
in the polls was either nonexistent or support in Quebec remained above the majority, especially
where support for the prime minister was concerned. Moreover, in the summer and autumn of
2007, when the national unity gap grew wide and support from Quebec remained well below
40%, a previously moving-into-war prime minister indicated his shift to a bi- or multi-partisan
pause and a prospective pull-back after February 2009.
The Rally-to-Reluctance Cadence of Consent
The third hypothesis, of a rally-to-reluctance cadence is confirmed as well, to a strong degree
with the adjustment of a “ratchet down but reversible effect,” and especially for
francophones/Quebec in an “early evaporation” form. Canadian support for the war eroded in a
unidirectional, ratcheted, downward fashion as time went on, regardless of what was happening
on the front lines, at home or in the government messages put out. The friendly fire incident of
April 2002 did not itself precipitate a great plunge in public support, for blame for the incident
was substantially shared and shrugged off. Nor did the great force-on-force victory at the Battle
of Panjawai in the summer of 2006 push support up to high levels once again. To be sure, the
single, downward direction of support, in somewhat steady fashion, is broadly consistent with the
cumulative death toll among Canadian soldiers in the field. But there is sufficient inconsistency in
the cadence of the two trends to doubt that it was the cumulative death toll from the front, rather
than a more general war weariness, that drove the downward trend.
Ca nada’s Conscription Co nstraint in Consent
The fourth hypothesis, of Canada’s distinctive conscription constraint in consent, has 12
components, as follows: Three factors — pan-Canadian support for the war, that of its
francophones/Quebecers in particular and the unity between them and their fellow Canadian
citizens — are each predicted to diminish as four forces arise: as Canada moves from air and
naval forces to mainstream ground combat forces, as Canadian ground combat forces are sent to
the dangerous front, as Canadian ground combat forces engage in combat with the enemy and as
Canadian ground combat forces are killed in increasing numbers on a cumulative and individual
incident count. With only 12 cases of major decisions to test 12 relationships (formed by
multiplying the four causes by the three effects), no conclusive answers can be given. Yet the
available evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that greater combat and combat deaths lessen
support for the war from francophones/Quebecers and thus increase the national unity gap.
However, the major moves away from war — in May 2002 and June 2007 — did not appear, with
the evidence available, to produce any converse, corresponding support for what the government
had done on the first occasion, but did on the much milder second one.
28
The Mythologically Rational Mass Public
The fifth hypothesis, of the mythologically rational mass public model, and its four components,
is confirmed, if in varying degrees.
The first component of the right allies, based on the 1939–41 myth, is supported in its modified
form that makes allowance — in the first stage — for the presence as a leading ally of an
America that had been directly attacked (that is, when 1941 extended to embrace Pearl Harbor at
the end). In this phase, when pan-Canadian and anglophone/ROC support was strong,
francophone/Quebec support substantial, and the national unity gap small, France and Britain
appeared alongside Canada and America, as allies on both the CBC’s The National and SRC’s
Téléjournal. The U.S. appeared along with Canada and even Britain in the wording of the polling
questions. With these combinations, support was usually strong. To be sure, Quebec support
dropped below 50% for the first time on January 8–10, 2002, for “sending 750 troops to assist the
U.S.” and for the “Canadian Forces taking on a combat mission.” But it could have been the
common element of sending mainstream ground troops to combat (hypothesis three), rather than
the U.S. only in the first question, that evoked the opposition. And when asked in mid April who
was responsible for the friendly fire incident that killed four Canadians, 53% of Quebecers and
42% of the ROC agreed that no one was to blame.
The second component, of the right war, is also supported to a high degree. Remembrance Day
mattered for both solitudes in 2001 and 2002, even if Quebecers (who may well have
remembered not just the victory, but conscription the year before) said that 9/11 mattered more
(53%). By September 2002, as the prospective American attack to start the wrong war against
Iraq came more into view, 66% of Quebecers and 71% of the ROC agreed that the U.S. bore
some responsibility for the terrorist attacks against it. The causis belli of 9/11, and with it the
justification for American and Canadian military action in Afghanistan, was starting to wear off.
Most strikingly, in 2001, when unified support for Canada’s war was strong, it was primarily
associated on English TV with the right wars of World War I, World War II and the Cold War. In
2007, when support for the war, particularly in Quebec, was weak, it was primarily associated on
French TV with the wrong war — the U.S. fighting and now losing in Iraq.
The third component, of the right leaders or trusted authorities, is confirmed to a reasonable
degree. At the start when support was high, francophone Quebecer prime minister Jean Chrétien
was there on TV, leading all of Canada, as well as the two solitudes in support. But by 2007, with
anglophone Albertan prime minister Stephen Harper leading the war, Quebecers support had
dropped. Overall, Canadians showed less support for the war — with Harper appearing less often
on Canadian news in August and September 2007 combined than Chrétien had in September
2001 alone.
The fourth component of the right death ratio is strongly confirmed by the available evidence thus
far. In 2001, when support for Canada’s war was high, Canadian TV told Canadians that up to a
100 Canadians might be dead and that 24 eventually were, whereas no Canadian troops had died,
and none in combat with the enemy would through 2002. By 2007, however, 71 Canadians had
died in the real world, but many more had, in the mediated magnification of TV, if one added
each Afghanistan story that referred to such a death on Canadian TV. References to the 9/11
victims had disappeared, and those to how many Canadian soldiers had died to win the right wars
of the past and thus put the current body count into a comparative historical context had as well.
29
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34
Appendix A: Public Opinion Polls
Public Opinion Polls: Measuring Support for Ca nada’s War in Afgha nistan,
2001–2007
Poll
Date (YMD)
Company
Question Wording
010912 D1: Declaring War
011007 D2: Attacking Afghanistan
010917-20*
IR
Support with U.S.
011016-21*
LM
Support with U.S.
011114 D3: Sending Soldiers under American Command
020113
IR
Support with U.S.
0303 D4: Conducting Ground Offensive with the Americans
030521 D5: Coming Home from Kandahar
030212 D6: Returning Multilaterally to Kabul
040414 D7: Extending the Mission
040321 D8: Expanding and Returning to Kandahar
0511 D9: Conducting Combat in Kandahar
060304
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
060309-12*
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
060313 D10: Promising Leadership
060325
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
060505
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
060517 D11: Extending to 2009
060520
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
060729
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
060814
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
060909
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
060918
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
061006
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
061016
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
061104
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
070424
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
070514-17*
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
070622 D12: “Parliament Will Decide”
070712-15*
SC
Support for Canadian Forces
070716
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
070825
IR
Support for Canadian Forces
All
ROC
Quebec
Gap
73%
84%
78%
86%
59%
78%
19%
8%
68%
72%
49%
23%
54%
55%
58%
59%
33%
43%
25%
16%
52%
40%
57%
44%
37%
27%
20%
17%
57%
47%
37%
51%
42%
57%
44%
44%
54%
40%
64%
50%
42%
53%
47%
63%
49%
50%
58%
45%
37%
35%
21%
45%
27%
45%
30%
31%
37%
24%
27%
15%
21%
8%
20%
18%
19%
19%
21%
21%
36%
51%
53%
41%
55%
57%
22%
30%
35%
19%
25%
22%
Notes:
*Dates refer to when poll was conducted, all other dates refer to when poll was released.
IR=Ipsos Reid; SC=Strategic Counsel, LM=Leger Marketing.
Bold indicates a drop of 9 or more percentage points. Italics indicates a new low (outside the 3%
margin of error).
Questions include the following wording: “Support Canadian Forces in Afghanistan,” “Support
troops in Afghanistan,” “Join U.S./declare war,” “Support Canadian military for U.S.,” “Send
troops to assist U.S.,” “Support Canadian Forces efforts in Afghanistan,” “Support sending
troops” and “Support Canadian troops for combat in Afghanistan.”
35
Appendix B: Percentage of Trusted Allies That Appear in Canadian
Television News
Percentag e of References That Appear in Canadian Newscasts, September 2001
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Chrétien
Quebec
Overall
(N=43)
100%
93%
47%
19%
67%
74%
CBC
(N=15)
100%
73%
40%
20%
80%
80%
SRC
(N=13)
100%
77%
31%
23%
54%
62%
CTV
(N=15)
100%
100%
67%
13%
67%
80%
Gap between
CBC and SRC
0%
-4%
9%
-3%
26%
18%
Gap between
CTV and SRC
0%
23%
36%
-10%
13%
18%
Percentag e of References That Appear in 9/11-Afghanistan–Related Canadian
News Stories, October 2001
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Chrétien
Quebec
Overall
(N=240)
73%
22%
10%
0.4%
5%
6%
CBC
(N=80)
69%
29%
13%
0%
9%
10%
SRC
(N=67)
73%
10%
3%
1%
1%
1%
CTV
(N=93)
76%
24%
13%
0%
5%
6%
Gap between
CBC and SRC
-4%
19%
10%
-1%
8%
9%
Gap between
CTV and SRC
3%
14%
10%
-1%
4%
5%
Percentag e of References That Appear in 9/11/Afghanista n-Related Canadian News
Stories, November 2001
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Chrétien
Quebec
Overall
(N=84)
45%
25%
11%
5%
4%
7%
CBC
(N=34)
44%
29%
15%
3%
3%
6%
SRC
(N=19)
42%
5%
5%
5%
0%
5%
CTV
(N=31)
48%
32%
10%
6%
6%
10%
36
Gap between
CBC and SRC
2%
24%
10%
-2%
3%
1%
Gap between
CTV and SRC
6%
27%
5%
1%
6%
5%
Percentag e of References That Appear in 9/11-Afghanistan–Related Canadian
Newscasts, December 2001
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Chrétien
Quebec
Overall
(N=56)
66%
16%
4%
4%
0%
7%
CBC
(N=19)
68%
21%
0%
5%
0%
5%
SRC
(N=11)
64%
18%
9%
0%
0%
9%
CTV
(N=26)
65%
12%
4%
4%
0%
8%
Gap between
CBC and SRC
4%
3%
-9%
5%
0%
-4%
Gap between
CTV and SRC
1%
-6%
-5%
4%
0%
-1%
Percentag e of References That Appear in Afghanistan-Related Canadian
Newscasts, August 2007
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Harper
Quebec
Overall
(N=65)
22%
52%
8%
0%
11%
18%
CBC
(N=31)
26%
58%
3%
0%
13%
23%
SRC
(N=34)
18%
47%
12%
0%
9%
15%
Gap between English and French Newscasts
8%
11%
-9%
0%
4%
8%
Percentag e of References That Appear in Afghanistan-Related Canadian
Newscasts, September 2007
U.S.
Canada
UK
France
Harper
Quebec
Overall
(N=44)
20%
68%
7%
5%
18%
30%
CBC
(N=24)
25%
79%
13%
4%
30%
33%
SRC
(N=20)
15%
55%
0%
5%
5%
25%
Gap between English and French Newscasts
10%
24%
13%
-1%
25%
8%
Notes:
CBC=Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
SRC=Société Radio-Canada
For September 2001, N refers to number of newscasts that were analyzed. For October–
December 2001, N refers to number of 9/11-Afghanistan news stories that were analyzed. For
August–September 2007, N refers to number of Afghanistan news stories that were analyzed.
37
Appendix C: References to Right or Wrong Wars That Appear on
Canadian Television News
War References That Appear in 9/11-Afghanistan–Related Canadian News Stories
Date
YMD
Network
September 2001
010911
CTV
010911
010916
CTV
CTV
010925
CBC
Total: 4
October 2001
011009
CBC
011010
CBC
Total: 2
November 2001
011127
CTV
Total: 1
December 2001
Total: 0
August 2007
P
Reference
4 Veteran journalist … compared the [9/11] events to Pearl Harbor
U.S. stock exchange closed … first prolonged cessation since
9 WWII
6 Wall Street trading ... Stopped for so long since WWI
Donald Rumsfeld … echoed Winston Churchill’s statement that
6 sometimes truth must be protected by lies
George Robertson (NATO secretary general): “In the Cold War, we
5 spent billions of dollars to ensure our safety of future generations”
Tony Blair met … suggestion that the U.S. may strike Iraq… full
8 backing of the UN.
Rival Afghan factions sat down in Germany…meanwhile, in the
U.S. … keep pressure on terrorist as U.S. warplanes struck near the
7 Iraqi No-Fly Zone
NA
070805
SRC
6
070819
CBC
10
070822
CBC
1
070824
070824
Total: 5
CBC
SRC
10
7
Maison blanche préfèrent à concentrer ses efforts en Afghanistan,
pas de question ailleurs dans la région. Trop compliquer et surtout
trop cher — la guerre en Iraq siphonne des milliards et milliards de
dollars américains.
They said [protest] would be family friendly, and it was: hundreds
of protestors, a few shadowy ones, but all well behaved, enjoying
the sunshine, united against U.S. president George Bush, the war in
Iraq, the mission in Afghanistan.”
“one of the best ... Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan before” [referring to
Canadian soldiers’ past experiences, i.e., previous to Afghanistan].
References to U.S. military hospitals in Germany, Iraq and
Afghanistan
Profile de l’hôpital en Afghanistan, Iraq, U.S.
38
September 2007
070905
CBC
070907
SRC
070923
Total: 3
SRC
1 Canada’s biggest combat role since Korean war
3 Bin Laden video: Al Jazeera, U.S. Bush, Iraq
Changement climatique, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur — les crises qui
confrontent Assemblée generale de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies cette semaine, mais pour le moment c’est le président iranien
2 qui retient toute l’attention a New York.
Notes:
Bold indicates “right wars”; italics indicates “wrong wars.”
War references include any references to specific wars, easily recognizable war characters,
identifiable war incidents and reference to current war situations. They exclude references to
countries that have previously been in wars but are not currently (unless the country is mentioned
in one of the previously mentioned ways). Korea, as an unwon war, is coded as a wrong war.
Data for 2001 include news stories related to 9/11 and Afghanistan. Data for 2007 includes only
Afghanistan-related news stories.
39
Appendix D: References to Trusted Authorities That Appear on Canadian Television News
Trusted Authorities in Canadian News Stories
2001
September (N=28)
October (N=39)
2007
November (N=17)
December (N=11)
August (N=28)
September (N=28)
Individual
Jean
Chrétien
Stephen
Harper
Overall
CBC
SRC
Gap
Overall
CBC
SRC
Gap
Overall
CBC
SRC
Gap
Overall
CBC
SRC
Gap
Overall
CBC
TJL
Gap
Overall
CBC
TJL
Gap
18(2)
13(2)
5(0)
8(2)
8(3)
7(3)
1(0)
6(3)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
7(7)
4(4)
3(3)
1(1)
8(8)
7(7)
1(1)
6(6)
John Manley
Peter
MacKay
Giuliano
Zaccardelli
4(1)
3(1)
1(0)
2(1)
5(1)
2(1)
3(0)
-1(-1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(2)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
2(2)
2(2)
0(0)
2(2)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Mike Harris
Maxime
Bernier
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
2(0)
2(0)
0(0)
2(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(3)
2(2)
1(1)
1(1)
3(3)
2(2)
1(1)
1(1)
David Harris
Shireen
Hunter
2(1)
2(1)
0(0)
2(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Joe Clark
Elinor
Caplan
Stockwell
Day
Stephane
Dion
Lawrence
MacAulay
4(1)
3(1)
1(0)
2(1)
2(0)
2(0)
0(0)
2(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(1)
2(1)
0(0)
2(1)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(2)
2(2)
1(0)
1(2)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(3)
1(1)
2(2)
-1(-1)
4(4)
2(2)
2(2)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Rick Hillier
Norman
Inkster
John
Reynolds
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Bill Blaikie
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Paul Martin
3(1)
3(1)
0(0)
3(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Bill Hogg
Alexa
McDonough
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
-1(-1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(0)
2(0)
0(0)
2(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
40
Jack Layton
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(3)
2(2)
1(1)
1(1)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
Gilles Dugay
0(0
0(0)
0(0)
Brian Tobin
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
-1(-1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Art Eggleton
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
3(2)
3(2)
0(0)
3(2)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Jim Peterson
Anne
McLellan
David
Collenette
Paul
DeVillers
Pierre
Pettigrew
Casey
McLean
Anthony
Cordesman
Hercule
Gosslin
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(0)
2(0)
0(0)
2(0)
3(0)
3(0)
0(0)
3(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
John Baird
Denis
Coderre
Remy
Landry
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(2)
2(2)
0(0)
2(2)
Josee Verner
Richard
Marceau
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
-1(-1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Bernard Lord
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Jean Charest
Gilles
Duceppe
Gordan
Campbell
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(2)
0(0)
2(2)
-2(-2)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(3)
1(1)
2(2)
-1(-1)
2(2)
2(2)
0(0)
2(2)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
James Moore
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Allan Rock
Allan
Gottlieb
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
2(0)
2(0)
0(0)
2(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Ward Elcock
Lloyd
Axworthy
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Bill Graham
Lyle
Vanclief
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
41
Don Cherry
Diane
Abloncsy
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(1)
1(1)
0(0)
1(1)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
Notes:
N refers to the number of newscasts analyzed for the month. Numbers in parentheses refer to Afghanistan-related news stories; others include
9/11-related news stories. For 2007, the numbers inside and outside of parentheses are identical, as 9/11 stories were not included in the analysis.
“Trusted individuals” includes political or civilian characters who are considered to be civilian leaders and would be easily recognizable to
Canadian viewers or who are identified by title to Canadian viewers. It excludes individuals who would not be easily recognizable to Canadian
viewers or who are not identified by title and/or name in the news story. It also excludes individuals who would not be considered civilian leaders,
such as academics and specialists on such subjects.
42
Appendix E: Repeated versus Actual Canadian Military Deaths
Reported Canadian Military Deaths* versus Actual Ca nadian Military Deaths,
Aug ust and September 2007
Date (YMD)
August 2007
070802
070807
070819
070820
070822
070823
070826
070827
070829
070830
070831
Total
September 2007
070918
070923
070924
070925
Total
Overall Total
CBC
SRC
Gap
Actual Deaths
CBC Difference
SRC Difference
1
1
3
1
2
7
2
1
1
1
0
20
0
0
1
1
3
6
2
1
1
1
1
17
1
1
2
0
-1
1
0
0
0
0
-1
3
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
2
1
0
7
2
1
1
1
0
17
0
0
0
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
1
14
0
4
0
1
5
25
1
0
0
2
3
20
-1
4
0
-1
2
5
0
0
1
0
1
4
0
4
-1
1
4
21
1
0
-1
2
2
16
Notes:
*The number of deaths includes every death reported in a story for the day’s death stories. For
example, if three news stories reported on the same death, it counts as three reported deaths.
Therefore, difference in reported versus actual deaths does not reflect misinformation; it points
out the focus and content being reported to the attentive Canadian citizenry.
Media analysis only includes Afghanistan-related news stories.
43
Appendix F: Right Death Ratio
Number of Deaths Reported on Ca nadia n Television
Date
Network
September 2001
010911
CBC
010911
CBC
010911
CBC
010911
CTV
010912
CBC
010912
CBC
010913
CBC
010913
CBC
010913
CBC
010913
CBC
010913
CTV
010914
CBC
010914
CBC
010916
SRC
010916
CTV
010917
CBC
010917
SRC
010917
CTV
010920
CBC
010920
SRC
10930
CBC
October 2001
011004
CBC
P
2
5
15
1
2
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
7
7
4
2
6
7
7
3
3
011009
CTV
7
011009
011011
011011
CTV
CBC
CTV
7
3
5
011011
CTV
6
011011
011011
011014
011015
011023
011028
CTV
CTV
SRC
CTV
CTV
SRC
6
6
1
10
10
1
011028
011031
SRC
CTV
1
9
9
Canadian
Civil
Deaths
Other Civil
Deaths
64
1
20,000–50,000
1,000–10,000
82
less than 800
30,000
94 bodies
70 body parts
190
200 firefighters
184
6-100
5,511
75
75
5,000
5,422
5,400
6,333
6,333
5,219
23
366 bodies
identified
480 bodies
unidentified
200 (Afghans)
4,000–5,000
5,160 in New
York
384 bodies
identified
189 in Pentagon
200 (Afghans)
15 (Afghans)
8,000 (Afghans)
15 (Afghans)
9 (Afghan
children)
4,700
44
Canadian
Military
Deaths
Allied
Military
Deaths
Enemy
Deaths
011031
CTV
9
343 firefighters
230 VPs of major
financial
institutions
011031
CTV
November 2001
011104
CBC
December 2001
011201
CTV
9
011216
CTV
011226
CTV
August 2007
070802
CBC
070806
CBC
070807
CBC
1
6
070817
070819
070819
070819
070820
070920
070822
070822
070822
CBC
CBC
CBC
SRC
CBC
SRC
CBC
SRC
SRC
8
1
2
1
6
1
6
1
2
070823
070823
CBC
CBC
1
2
1
1
070823
070823
070823
070823
070824
070824
070825
CBC
SRC
SRC
SRC
CBC
CBC
SRC
3
1
2
3
9
5
6
1
070826
070826
CBC
CBC
3
8
070826
070827
070827
070829
070829
070830
070830
070831
SRC
CBC
SRC
CBC
SRC
SRC
SRC
SRC
3
6
2
3
5
1
1
2
2
6,000
6
7
5
3
1 U.S.
300–
1,000
2,940
1
1
1,000 (Afghans)
15 (Afghans)
1
1
1
? Not
specified
1 (67th to die)
1
1 (67th to die)
1 (67th to die)
1
2
2
1
2 (69th soldier
killed)
3
2 (57 deaths
by friendly
fire)
2
2
2
1 U.S.
3 UK
3 UK
8 (afghans)
2 (68th and
69th)
18 (afghans)
2 (68th and
69th)
1
1
1
1
3 UK
1
1
45
September 2007
070904
070918
070921
070921
070922
070923
070924
070925
070925
070925
070926
070926
SRC
SRC
CBC
CBC
SRC
CBC
CBC
CBC
SRC
SRC
SRC
CBC
1
7
10
11
4
3
3
1
2
4
6
9
57 have died,
31 in vicious
way
1
1 France
1
? not specified
70 have died
4
70 have died
1
1
1
2 (Afghans)
2 (Afghans)
Notes:
Data for 2001 include 9/11-Afghanistan–related news stories. Data for 2007 include only Afghanistanrelated news stories.
46
Appendix G: Canadian Newspapers Focus on Afghanistan
Ca nadian Newspapers’ Afgha nistan Focus on Average, August 2007
Front-page
articles
Percentage
Editorials
Percentage
Overall
Globe
and
Mail
National
Post
La
Presse
Gap between Globe
and Mail and La
Presse
Gap between
National Post and
La Presse
58%
18%
30%
14%
74%
20%
41%
15%
46%
14%
23%
11%
54%
19%
26%
15%
20%
1%
15%
0%
-8%
-5%
-3%
-4%
Ca nadian Newspapers’ Afgha nistan Focus on Average, September 2007
Front-page
articles
Percentage
Editorials
Percentage
Overall
Globe
and
Mail
National
Post
La
Presse
Gap between
Globe and Mail
and La Presse
Gap between
National Post and
La Presse
57%
15%
31%
14%
63%
15%
25%
8%
57%
15%
17%
8%
50%
14%
50%
25%
13%
1%
-25%
-17%
7%
1%
-33%
-17%
47