The backbone of democracy: electoral availability
and European elections
Federico Vegetti† , Cristiano Vezzoni‡ , Paolo Segatti?
† Central
European University,
of Trento,
? University of Milan
‡ University
[email protected]
Final Conference of the European Election Study 2014
University of Mannheim, November 6-8, 2015
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
What
Electoral competition is a multidimensional concept.
It can be studied with respect to the supply side...
E.g. what strategies do parties or candidates adopt to compete
for the votes?
...or to the demand side.
E.g. how do the citizens respond to such strategies?
What kind of incentives citizens offer to (future) party
competition?
Here we focus on the latter.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Why
Citizens’ support is the ultimate incentive for parties to be
responsive and responsible.
By potentially withdrawing their support, citizens can direct
legislation and governmental action towards the public will.
However, there are several degrees of “potentially”.
Citizens can be “stubborn”, and keep on supporting the same
party no matter what.
Citizens can just give up on politics, leaving the command to
the most motivated (often stubborn) supporters.
If citizens do not play their role of directors and watchdogs of
policy making, the assumptions on which democracies are
built are not met.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Competitiveness
How does a competitive electoral environment look like?
1 Citizens are engaged:
They are willing to participate in politics, to go and vote.
2
Citizens are available:
They are open to switch their allegiances between different
parties.
When condition 1 is not met, governmental action can only
reflect personal interests or the will of a few “hardliners”.
When condition 2 is not met, parties have no incentives to
deliver because nobody will hold them accountable for their
actions.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
How
How do we assess competitiveness at the level of the
electorate?
We use “propensity to vote” (PTV) scores.
A battery of N questions, each asked for a different party.
Example wording from EES2014:
We have a number of political parties in [COUNTRY] each of
which would like to get your vote. How probable is it
that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please
answer on a scale where ‘0’ means ‘‘not at all probable’’
and ‘10’ means ‘‘very probable’’.
If you think of [Party X], what mark out of ten best
describes how probable it is that you will ever vote for
this party?
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
How, exactly?
A high PTV score means a high propensity to vote for a party.
A person who gives low PTV scores to all the parties, is
probably not engaged.
A person who gives a high PTV score to one party and a low
PTV score to all the others, is probably not available.
Therefore:
1
The value of the highest PTV given by a respondent reflects
her/his degree of engagement.
2
The value of the second highest PTV given by a respondent
(holding the first constant) reflects her/his degree of
availability.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
PTVs and competition
To represent the idea of engagement/availability, we can use a graph
with gradients (like temperature, hot where there is a lot of competition,
cold where there is no race).
Sheet1
nd
2
MAX
PTV
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
MAX PTV
0
1
2
3
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
4
5
6
7
The backbone of democracy
8
9
10
Example: cyclicality of EP elections
European elections are regarded as “second order”: voters
voice their dissatisfaction with national parties or
governments, rather than voting on European issues.
This should be reflected by:
Lower engagement: lower interest in participating to the
election.
Lower availability: missing the importance of short-term issues,
party loyalties should have the strongest impact.
However, this effect should vary across the electoral cycle,
i.e. the distance from the “first order” (national) elections.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Electoral Cycle
We want to see how engagement and availability change
across the electoral cycle, controlling for other individual
predictors.
We also want to compare 2009 with 2014. Was the 2014
election less second-order than the 2009?
Operationalization of the electoral cycle:
Time distance from the previous national election, divided by
the total length of legislative period in a given country.
Ranges between 0 (same time as the previous national
election) and 1 (right before the next national election).
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Electoral Cycle in 2009 and 2014
UK
SWE
SVK
SPA
SLO
RO
PT
PL
NL
MT
LUX
LIT
LAT
IT
IRE
HUN
HR
GRE
GER
FR
FI
EE
DK
CZ
CY
BG
BE-W
BE-F
AT
Year
2009
2014
0.00
0.25
0.50
Electoral Cycle
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
0.75
1.00
The backbone of democracy
A model for engagement and availability
Engagement:


MaxPTVij = β0j + βINDIVIDUAL Xij + ij
(1)


β0j = γ00 + γCONTEXTUAL Zj + υ0j
Availability:


2nd MaxPTVij = β0j + MaxPTVij + βINDIVIDUAL Xij + ij


β0j = γ00 + γCONTEXTUAL Zj + υ0j
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
(2)
Individual level predictors of engagement and availability
MAX PTV
2nd MAX PTV
Max PTV
Age
Gender (Female)
Education
Politican Interest
Political Knowledge
L-R Extremity
Is a Partisan
Distance from
Closest Party
Distance Difference
2 Closest Parties
0.0
0.5
1.0
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
1.5
-0.50
-0.25
The backbone of democracy
0.00
0.25
0.50
Contextual level predictors of engagement and availability
MAX PTV
2nd MAX PTV
Post-Communist
Country
Cycle
Cycle Sq.
Year 2014
-2
-1
0
1
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
2
-2
-1
0
The backbone of democracy
1
2
Electoral Cycle and MAX PTV
Predicted MAX PTV
7.0
6.5
6.0
0.00
0.25
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
0.50
Cycle
0.75
The backbone of democracy
1.00
Electoral Cycle and MAX PTV (2009 and 2014)
2009
2014
7.0
BE-F
SLO
Predicted MAX PTV
SVK
EE
IRE
LIT
RO
SWE
LAT
MT
SPA
IT
UK
HUN
PL
FR
GRE
LIT
NL
AT
GER
DK
LAT
EE
FI
GER
FI
AT
6.5
BE-W
CY
SWE
MT
DK
LUX
NL
CZ
HUN
PT
BG
CZ
ROFR GRE
IRE
HR
PL
BG
LUX
IT
PT
UK
BE-W
BE-F
CY
SVK
SPA
6.0
SLO
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
1.00
0.00
Cycle
0.25
0.50
The backbone of democracy
0.75
1.00
Electoral Cycle and 2nd MAX PTV
3.5
Predicted 2nd MAX PTV
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
0.00
0.25
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
0.50
Cycle
0.75
The backbone of democracy
1.00
Electoral Cycle and 2nd MAX PTV (2009 and 2014)
2009
2014
3.5
3.0
Predicted 2nd MAX PTV
SLO
LIT
IT
UK
HUN
IRE
LUX
2.5
FI
EE
SPA
RO
LIT
MT
CY
SWE
ROFR GRE
NL
BE-W
SVK
SVK
AT
LUX
PT
CZ
DK
EE
LAT
FI
SPA
HR
PT
MT
GER
GRE
PL
SWE
PL
BE-F
BG
LAT
DK
FR BE-W
BE-F
2.0
GER
NL
AT
CZ
IRE
CY
SLO
IT
HUN
BG
UK
1.5
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
1.00
0.00
Cycle
0.25
0.50
The backbone of democracy
0.75
1.00
Results
Electoral cycle seems to have a significant effect on
engagement.
No evident effect on availability (however, sensitive to model
specification).
Apparent difference between 2009 and 2014 regarding the
effect of cycle, but not significant.
2014 has a negative effect on both “MAX PTV” and “2nd
MAX PTV” (but, sensitive to model specification).
Fun fact: if we model the difference between “MAX PTV”
and “2nd MAX PTV” (that we can call “PTV certainty”),
and we include “MAX PTV” among the predictors, we get
exactly the same coefficients as the model for “2nd MAX
PTV”, just with opposite sign.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Modeling & Conceptual Issues
Ideally, we would include both “MAX PTV” and “2nd MAX
PTV” in a single path model.
In the model for “2nd MAX PTV”, should we exclude the
intercept?
Results are very sensitive to model specification. Considering
the “peculiar” nature of the model, this deserves some more
thought.
We would expect different effects for supporters of a party in
government vs. supporters of other parties.
Electoral cycle could be more qualified.
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy
Thank you!
Vegetti, Vezzoni & Segatti
The backbone of democracy