CHAPTER
IV
THE WORKING 'OF INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
No constitution is perfect and tie Constitution of
India is no exception to it.
Similarly, it is a matter of
common observation that no federalism works strictly in
accordance with the Constitution on which it is based.
Various political,econom±ecand social forces emerge as a
consequence of which the working constitution becomes
different from the original written one.
Although the forms
i
of the constitution are kept the spirit and substance of it
undergo a change.
Federalism.
All this is true of the working of Indian
In thiisjbonnection Pylee writess
'‘That a consjtitution when written does not breathe.
It comes to life and begins to grow only when human
elements get together and work it.- As time passes,
it almost imperceptibly changes m form and content
and assumes a new shape and even a new meaning."l
f
-L
In a similar strain, Ambedkar observes s
-■ --r "However ^ ’-good^constitution1 may-be, it-is sure to
turn out bad because those who are called to work it
- - happen to-be-atbadvlot. -- However-bad a constitution
may be,it may turn out to be, good if those who are
called to'work it happen'-to-be'a good lot. The
working of a Constitution does not depend wholly
upon-the nature'-of the Constitution. ' The Constitu­
tion can provide only the organs of State such as the
Legislature, the Executive and the-Judiciary. The
factors on which the working of these organs of the
state 'depends are the people and the political parties
they will set up as their instruments to carry out
' - - - their wishes*- and*their policies.
."2
15'J
As observed by Riker^ developments m the actual
»
«.
working of any federalism may fall into one of the following
categories %
(1)
the central government can completely overawe the
constituent governments;
(2) ~
the central government cannot conpletely overawe the
constituents but if can keep them from overruling its
own decisions;
(3)
the constituent governments cannot completely overawe
the rulers of the centre, but they can significantly
vary the behaviour of the officials of the centre,
though central official cannot overawe them; and
(4)
the constituent governments can unilaterally completely
overawe the rulers of the centre.
After going through the four possible developments and
assuming that all these possible developments may be conce­
ived of the question that arises is into which of the above
developments does the working of Indian federal system fall.
There is a general agreement that the third and fourth
possibilities do not apply to the Indian situation.
In
other words, Riker,,§'assumption is, first’ and second possibi­
lities are applicable to Indian situation.
Most of the commentators on the working of the
Indian Constitution have supported tnis view.
The Veteran
1G0
statesman C.Rajagopalachari is reported, to have said xn
1962 s
"The independence of the States is forgotten and a
Unitary State is "..'being established in Inch, a thought­
lessly.1^ And few other observers who have remarked
that the centre has been exercising greater control
over states than that was laid down in the consti­
tution but that it was the outcome of a number of
fortuitous circumstances like planning and uniparty
governments both at the centre and the states and
with- the disappearance of these circumstances and the
growth of regional sentiments the trend is sure to be
reversed.*^
It may be argued by some that this trend is not a
departure from the Articles of the constitution and that it
is merely the logical outcome of the concept of a strong
centre embodied in it.
concept itself.
But this is to misunderstand the
We should not forget that the ‘Strong Centre
within the federal system1^, is a notion notalion to the Indian
Consiitution.
Because/ it is the founding fathers who
provided for the features of a federation/ in the country
and later changed the true nature of Indian federalism by /
incorporating certain unitary (non-federal) features in the
corstitution as well.
perhaps for this very
Further more/it can be said that
reason the founding fa tilers of the
Constitution refrained from describing India as a
federation and preferred to call it a ‘Union of States*.
This has lent support to the contention of the scholars
that the Indian Constitution is federal m form but unitary
-lW
......
/
161
In this context# it is our intention to examine the
factors or forces that contributed to a n >tion of a 'Strong
Centre within the federal system m India'.
In other words/
the actual working of Indian federalism shall be examined.
India began as a federation with a centralised and
disciplined party system.
The growth process of the system
reflected an awareness in depth of a "one party dominance
system".
In this context K..i*anthanam wrote*
"The Indian Republic started with a contradiction.
While the constitution established a federal system
of government/ all the political parties existing at
the time came into force were unitary and'highly centr­
alized. This was particularly the case with the
Congress" .7
Not only was there one-party hegemony but the party
structure of the Congress
-as itself unitary.
As Arnal Ray
has pointed outs
"India's political power structure and the Congress
could, for all broad purposes, be identified during
the period of Constitution-making, and the Congress
in its decision-making could be equated with the
national leadership.
The Congress evolved a graded
organization with tne High Command possessing supreme
decision-making authority. Actually, the powerful
Nehru-Patel-Prasad trio constituted the most important
inner ring, and all major decisions used to emanate
from it. As India's federal structure was conceived
and planned m a unitary political environment, so it
was directed towards a powerful centre."8
On similar grounds, Venkatarangoiya and Shivian
observe that s
"Primarily it (congress party) weakened the will of
state governments for autonomy.
Ic created a feeling
A
162
among the state leaders that it would be best for
them to abide by the decisions of the central leaders
who could be credited with having more knowledge and
more ability and who commanded more prestige m the
country as a whole. Those who became chief ministers
in states occupied a lower rank m the Congress hierarchy as compared to Nehru, Patel), Azad and Rajendra
Prasad who were in power at'the centre.
It was but
natural for them to abide by the directions issued by
the leaders at the centre on all matters of policy
even when they were concerned with subjects within
the exclusive control of states. This also lightened
their task very much."9
It is also worthy of notice that at the centre there
whs perfect " amity between -the party organization and the
government.
The friction which appeared in 1951 ended with
the resignation of Tandon as ' President of the Congress.
F.rom that time on Nehru remained President for some years
and his nominees became Presidents subsequently.
The Congre-
ess Working Committee (in the Congress hierarchy it is the
i.ho-t is
Congress Working Committco^rosponsible to the All India
Congress Committee^hich is che wiclder Jf authority.
The
Working Committce^is popularly known as the Congress High
Command, is 11 the Highest executive authority of the
congress".,..)'3'0 had as its members only those who commanded
his confidence.
This, harmony between the party and the
government contributed much to the strength of the latter^-All this stood in contrast to the situation in states
where m general there was much friction between the party
and the government.
The two frequently quarrelled with
each other and the centre had to intervene to settle them.
The result was a considerable wearing of the capacity of
,
*
\
163
sta.te governments to oppose and much less to defy the
authority cf the centre.
Apart from this, a, mention has to be also made of the
V
Congress Party as a highly centralized organisation.
State
units have had little freedom to take decisions on their own.
Though for example the state committees took the first step
in nominating candidates for election to state assemblies
it has the central Parliamentary Board that took final
/
decisions on the matter.
This gave to it a sort of control
over the Congress members in the Assemblies.
Similarly it
was the Parliamentary Board that decided as to who should be
the leader of the Congress Legislature Parties m States and,
therefore, who
should be Chief Minister.
It is on its
instructions that Chief Ministers selected the ot:ier
ministers.
In some cases the Board sent so ic-r-c from out­
side a state to become its Cmef Minister irrespective of the
wishes of the Congress legislators m it.
Thus, as an ins-
of
^aa<&e'Aa . powerful central intervention through the Parlia­
mentary Board* we may recall the "Katju episode1' in Madhya
Pradesh.
In 1957 after the death of Chief Minister Shukla,
K.N.Katju, a stranger to Madhya Pradesh Politics and a
Union Minister at the time "was ushered in a Chief Minister
of Madhya Pradesh undar central direction".
tcnJiire
11
Even the
of chief ministers of states did not depend so
much on their having the confidence of the state legislat­
ures as on that of the central leadership.
This explains
164
why in general state governments lost both their will and
their capacity to oppose the centre even when they wore
convinced that m the interests of their states opposition
was:desirable.
Observers like Asok Chanda have pointed out;
"The significance of uniparty rule as the crucial
factor m the growth of the predominance of the
centre in the period upto 1967* He says, one party
government at the centre and the states has facilitated
and even encouraged Parliament to consider itself as
the apex of a legislative aid executive pyramid. The
Prime Minister and other ministers have not hesitated
to take an indirect and some tine s even a direct hand
in settling and deciding issues which are constitut­
ionally the responsibility of the states. The
limited sovereignty of the states is thus being
' surrendered by usage and sufferance and it would be
difficult for a state later to reassert or regain its
constitutional authority. It may be claimed that the
"advice11 tendered by the Union Ministers is m their
capacity aat members of the Congress High Command and
that there has' thus been no infraction of the sovere­
ignty of states. The sophistry will" hardly delude
many. "12
. —__
But the significance of uniparty rule in promoting the
paramountcy of the centre is negatively brought out by the
developments which followed the general election of 1967
which resulted m
the break of this and m the formation of
non-congress governments in several states.
13
These govern­
ments, however, were not prepared to blindly accept the
dictates of the centre.
They emphasised the need for
maintaining intact the principle of state autonomy as
guaranteed by the constitution.
Therefore, the non-
congress governments in Kerala and.West Bengal even adopted
a policy of confrontation and defied the authority of the
165
centra on a number of issues*
The D M K m Tarrul-Nadu
pressed its demand for more autonomy.
These developments
show that for the maintenance of federal balance it is
necessary that in at least some states the parties in power
should be different from the party in power at the centre.
This conclusion received further strength from what
followed the general,elections to State Assemblies in 1971
and the general elections .to State Assemblies in 1972.
The Congress party returned top power in Lok Sabha with a
two-third majority and hence weakening the parties in Opposi tion.
The elections to the State Assemblies in March
1972 restored to the Congress the kind of control it enjoyed
before 1967 in
tates except Tamil Nadu, Orissa and to
some extent in Kerala.
By this time Indira Gandhi became a
Charismatic loader and under her leadership the Congress was
transformed into a more monolithic organisation tnan what it
was before.
Ad hoc Congress Committees with ' members aid
presidents nominated through harte i recti on s came into exist­
ence before elections.
her
took office.
New Chief Ministers nominated by
Nominations for elections to State
Assemblies were made under her direction.
State units of
the party, the Congress Legislature parties m States, and
Chief Ministers came much
directly under central control.
There were also attempts made to weaken regional parties
since 1971 but m vam.
During the 1971-75 period o strong
Congress government at the centre undertook the task cf
166
augmenting the power of the Indian State^by taking practical
steps to bring the fields of security, resources control and
mobilisation and control of labour etc., increasingly under
Central control with the result that the power of the States
was diluted,
Mrs.Indira Gandhi herself emerged during this
period as the Chief Architect of unitarism m India’s develop­
ment,
Further, the Emergency (1975-77) provided a useful
opportunity for the Central Government and the national
ruling party to take the theme of unitarism a step further
by launching a serious effort to convert the federal consti­
tution intern unitary one by entering into the jurisdiction
of the State Government^s in the name of the unity and solidarity
of the nanon as well as its overall economic and political 4-s
development.
Thus, the federal balance which had tilted a
little towards the states in the years 1967-71aonce more
tilted away from them.
But, from 1977 onwards, a chorus of
different political voices rose throughout India demanding
decentralisation of political power an all levels, and in
all dimensions.
In mid-1979, the relations between the
Centre and the States entered a chaotic phase.
This led to
the paralytic condition of the Janata rule at the Centre and
which consequently led to its fall.
In a climate of such confusion, the General Elections
of 1980 were held and the new Government under Mrs,Indira
Gandhi came to power with a thumping majority.
unitarism again gained further strength.
Here,
Under Mrs. Gandhi,
167
loaders were trained at the centre and sent to the states.
This^policj^of the Congress leaders led to instability0 and
innerparty conflict in the Staces,
The leaders imposed
from above naturally were men who enjoyed the confidence of the
Central leadership.
They had often not enjoyed the necess­
ary support and confidence of the party legislators.
sult was
The re­
excessive dependence by the Chief Ministers on the
Central leadership in the policy-making process.
This
arrangement enabled the national leaders to centralize powers,
while the States lost the initiative and the ability to undertake welfare programmes and,solve local problems.
Adso,
may
a mention^be made of Indira Gandhi*s dictatorial role, where
she used to topple state governments. either by means of
bribing or by unconstitutional manipulation of the federal
' .
14
system.
' '
*
'
'
It is ,in such circumstonccs,■ that the Congress (I)
as a national party is> on decline and the regionaliorgani­
zations are replacing it in some states.
Therefore, soon
after the Congress party's decline,-•' split and degeneration
into a personality cult, regional parties grew in-strength
and -numbers-- *
-- -
On October 31, 1984 with the assassination of Indira
Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother.
Since his
landslide election victory in December 1984, and his quick
and smooth succession to the high office and the manner m
168
which he settled down to business were all due to the
concentric nature of the power structure within the party/
with the long-time practice/ even from the <hys of Nehru,
of combining the office of the
President of the party and
tne prime ministership in one and same person, and his
absolute control over the party affairs.
Ever since Hr.
Rajiv Gandhi received the massive mandate he has showed some
disinclination to inpose President's rule m States,
is a one-party polity,
India
-hs#a motion perhaps encouraged
Mr.Gandhi in his canpaign for the Assembly election in 1985,
&s such, he impressed upon the electorate that m the
interest of national unity and development of the States,
the party ruling at the Centre be voted to power m the
States alsoj
though this has been^tradition in this country
which has almost eroded state autonomy.
But me mature
electorate rejected Mr.Gandhi's thesis whichAin favour of
centralization and hence m most of the states non-congress
governments sat on. the saddle.
But today, we observe that the centralizing forces
in operation in Indian federalism have been chaHanged
although not continuously but inter-mittently, by certain
decentralising forces which guarantee substantial state
autonomy, and put a brake to the process of total inte­
gration which has.setth „mohion. in .India -fey-the
XDOwerful "triple" i.e., national plan, missive grants and
a ^ 15
party.
One such decentralising force is what K.C.Wheare
169
calls "the self-consciousness and self-assertiveness- of
the regional governments"'i
increasing in India,
g
wmch is slowly but perceptibly
But at titties when the Centre decides
\
to mate a major and direct assault on state autonomy# or
tries to encroach upon what the States believe really belongs
to them# the State conciousness transcends the rigidity of
party loyalty# and becomes enormously active to challenge the
centre‘s intervention.
And this sense of State rights gains
more in strength whenever a powerful local leadership arises
to give the resentment of a State a thrust and a focus.
Today in most of the parts of the country regional forces
have been raising their heads.
The trend towards regionalism
is growing m States like Punjab#£ami'l- Nadu# Assam# Kashmir#
Andhra Pradesh# etc,# wmch jEsi-accompanied by the growth of
^
^
_
1
_
____
regional parties.
-
Local issues are being considered more
important than national issuesi and local leaders are building
their support base in their own localities# sometimes adhering
to political goals and ideals different from those of the
nation.
The days of single party dominance# a centralized
party system and directives from the Centre to the S-tates
through party channels are gone and federalism in India has
entered a new phase.
But# asf_ yet# no strong national
opposition party to the Congress (I) has emerged to give
a." better shape to the centre-state relations in India
without affecting the unity and integrity of the nation.
170
Another Centrifugal force in operation is provided
by the prospect of forma-cion of coalition or opposition
governments m
some of the states.
The best and current
example shall be the Kerala ministry which is a coalition one
aoregards to opposition parties, Karnataka, West™
Bengal and Tripura shall be quoted.
The possibility of
some opposition or coalition minisljry being formed'm a
State always puts
State government on guard against
central encroachment, goads it to assert itself against
f
Central government.
For, too much of toeing the line of
Centre may lead to^surrender of local interests and distin­
ctiveness, and this will generate widespread local resent­
ment.
The Opposition will seize the opportunity for
organising popular upsurge with a view to discrediting the
existing State Government and finally coming to power.
IniHe.
ultimate analysis, a state government is sustained by local
support and not by central blessing, and hence it will not
pursue a policy of integration with the Centre to that
extent where there is a risk of the electorate being
alienated.
As such,^State Government with opposition party
in power will' not rush into a policy of conplete integra­
tion with the Centre leading to virtual abnegation of State
autonomy.
It is the power
of the electorate, con^ious of
local interest and distinctiveness to freely choose a
government that exerts a strong decentralising influence
in the working of Indian federation.
171
The next force shall bo the system of planning which
has been another important factor m the growth of the
paramountcy of the centre.
It is generally believed that
federalism suffers most in a system of planning, for
planning introduces a powerful centralist dir©ttisioxv.dn
Centre-state relations which federalism seeks to prevent•
17
The central agency of planning in India is the Planning
Commission.
Established in March 1950 by a formal resolution
of the Government of India.
Government.
Thus, a creation of Union
The Commission will "(1) make an assessment of
the material, capital and human resources of the country,
including technical personnel, and investigate the possi­
bilities of augmenting such'of these resources as are found
to bo deficient in relation to the nations requirements;
'(2) formulate a plan for tne most effective and balanced
utilisation of die councry's resources;
(3) on a deter­
mination of the priorities, define the stage m which the plan
should be carried out and propose the allocation of reso­
urces for the due completion of
each stage;
(4) indicate
the factors which are tending to retard economic development
and determine the conditions which in view of the current
social and political situation, should be established for
the successful execution of the plan;
(5) determine the
nature of the machinery which will be necessary for secu­
ring the successful implementation of each stage of the
plan m all its aspects;
(6) appraise from tine to time
the progress achieved m the execution ^E each s "'g
j
of
172
the plan and recommend the adjustments e£ policy and measures
that such appraisal may snow to bo necessary; and (7) make
such ^interim or ancillary recommendations as appear to be
appropriate on a consideration of the prevailing economic
conditions/ current policies/ measures and development
programmes or on an examination of such specific problems as
may
be referred to it for advice by Central or State
w
governments for facilitating the discharge of the duties
, ^ , 18
assigned to it.
A cursory glance at the foregoing functions of the
or
Commission gives us an idea of how rcmarkably^i^ortailt^EOle
it plays m the making of nations economic policies.
Although/
the Commission^not endowed with any constitutional or stat—
it
utory status,^ has come to "'ssume virtually the role of the
architect of India's destiny.
-Lhs
Since^Commission's inception, the Prime Minister
has been its Chairman and some of the Prime Minister's import­
ant colleagues in the Union Council of Ministers are its
members/ and the Cabinet Secretary ±s.?the secretary to the
(1
Commission.
^
This^has added considerably to the prestige
of the Commission and has helped it a great deal in co­
ordinating its functions.
The Planning is regarded as a
joint enterprise of both the centre and-the states.
This
was recognised by the founding fathers themselves and
this is why they included "Economic and Social Planning" in
the concurrent list.
173
However, the role of the Centre in the formulation
and execution of the Five-Year Plans becomes paramount and
that of the states quite subsidiary*
It is true that in
shaping the plan at different stages and giving it a final
form the National Development Council on which the Chief
Ministers of all states are represented is consulted and
its ajjproval taken.
But observers comment that the role
of the Council has all along been a formal one.
It has
neither the time nor the expert knowledge needed to scrut19
inise the plan as drafted by the Planning Commission
and
no effort has been made to organise it on a more efficient
basis.
Before q 'Five Year Plan is given its shape each stato
is asked top prepare its o^n plan m the light of the targets
and priorities laid down by the Planning Commission.
no state plan comes into operation unless it
and approved
by the Commission,
But
scrutinised
It is true that there
are frequent discussions between the Commission and the
concerned state representatives before a state plan is
finalised by the former.
a formal character.
.
But these discussions are also of
In the end it is the views of the
Commission that prevail.
20
Thus the line on which a State
should develop its economy isflctermined for it by the
centre through tnc Planning Commission.
Even while scrutinising the State's Plans to find
out whether they are m conformity with chc targits end
174
priorities that it lays down,
not limited m this regard.
the Planning Comaission is
All are agreed that there
should be conform cy m the interests of national develop­
ment as a whole.
The fact, however,iak .that the scrutiny
extends to minute details in state pla^s, to individual
schemes drawn by State governments to satisfy local require­
ments and needs.
The Commission has no hesitation in re­
jecting schemes which states consider to be of great import­
ance and retaining those to which they do not attach similar
importance.
....
All this based on the mistaken assumption that
the centre knows better than the states,what priorities
the latter should observe; what details their schemes should
have and to what extent virement should be permitted.
These
are all questionable assumptions particularly when extended
to individual schemes with_n a sector of development, for a
state as a rule is m a better position -co assess the
claims of different achemes in relation to its own needs
and capacities.
Those vary from state to state and yet
uniform schemes with regimented patterns are suggested by
_
the
centre. 21
The fact that even though state plans deal with
subjects m the states’exclusive list they require the
approval of the Planning Commission before they can be
put into operation and that this approval is needed even
m respect of individual schemes has led Santhanara to
observe;
22
Planning for purposes of economic development
practically superseded the Federal Constitution so far
as
S-tates were concerned but tms supersession was not legal
or constitutional but was by agreement ard consent.
has been comprehensive.
Planning
It has covered all the spheres of
the activities of both the centre and the states.
In fact,
it has covered even the sphere of literature, art, and even
sports.
Under educational planning, grants have been given
for establishing gymanasia, for Cricket coaching etc. So,
the Planning may in some sense be called totalitarian, but
for the evil association of the word totalitarian1•
Therefore, no further comment is necessary to show
how the planning system has' become a factor in the erosion
/
of state autonomy.
to 'thG imposition of unifor­
mity of policy in spheres like land tenures, agriculture
and education where such uniformity produces disastrous
i
consequences*
It has thus defeated the primary purpose of
federalism which3e@gal£©s that when conditions, circumstan­
ce^ and traditions differ from state to state each state
should be free to adopt policies and programmes which suit
it best.
Further Art. 282 provides for the grants to be made
by the centre for purposes of planning, and as such they
are discretionary in character.
They do not come within
the purview of the Finance Commission.
It is the
Planning Commission that virtually determines what grants
176
should be made.
It is this that gives the centre the power
and the opportunity to decide what the outlay on state
plans should be, how it should be distributed among different
schemes in the plans and m what way the amounts earmarked
for each scheme should be spent.
Another factor which has contributed to the paramountcy
of the centre is the inadequacy of the financial resources of
the states.
This is a problem met with in all federations.
It arises out of the difficulty m devising a financial
system under which both the central and state governments will
be in a position to raise resources independently of each
other and adequate to discharge the responsibilities which
they have to shoulder under the constitution.
Everywhere the
centre is m such a position while the units suffer from
serious handicaps.
This makes them financially dependent on
the centre and financial dependence leads to political
dependence to some extent.
\
The most powerful centrifugal force m India is
provided by linguistic pressures.
The conflict of lingui­
stic regionalism with the centre and its final victory
constitutes a revealing chapter of Indian federalism which
shows that at times centripetal force has to give way to
centrifugal pressure.
As F»G, Carnell observes, "as the
recent states reorganisation suggests, the centre cannot
always triumph.
At the very time when the Planning
Commission would have liked to reduce India to a unitary
177
character with five enormous provinces, coinciding with
'nodal1 economic regions served by river valley projects
and other schemes which completely cut across state boundaries, linguistic regionalism was powerful enough to insist
on
4
purely tribal in its
23
approach to social, economic and political problems".
-
states reorganisation which was
Thus, the foregoing account of Camell leads us to
think as to how the call to national unity and party soli­
darity has virtually drowned m the loud voice of linguism.
It has not only led us to think that the reorganisation of
states on a unilingual basis has not only revealed the
massive- strength and vitality of linguistic regionalism, but
has also released certain forces m the direction of deepening
the regional awareness.
Today, this type of awareness is
becoming more and more m different states of the Indian
Union.
And consequently the state governments have been
trying their best in adopting the regional languages for
their respective states and making the same the medium of
instruction which is in fact an hurdle for the national
unity and solidarity.
Concerned to the distribution of pox^ers as such,
the pattern of distribution of powers in India has created a
powerful
centre with a strong unitary bias*
It is said
that the Union Governments jurisdiction is much wider in the
Indian Constitution than m other federal constitutions.
178
This is not accidental.
Fully conscious of the fxssiparous
tendencies m the country, the framers of the Constitution
deliberately gave more powers to the Centre.
And the scheme
of division of powers between the Union and the States
clearly demonstrates this thinking.
Distnoution of powers
in India, however^ elaborate and exhaustive it may be, has
given rise to a demand for more autonomy to the States by
devolving more powers from the Centro to the States.
The office of the Governor has also contributed to the
growth of the paramountcy of the centre though its contri­
bution has not been as continuous as that of the system of
finances and planning.
dual
He is able to do so because of the
role of the Governor, as the Constitutional Head of'
his State and as the agent of the centre m it.
However,
his role as the Centre1s agent gives him opportunity to
tilt the federal balance m favour of the Centre in normal
times and to upset it complorely in tines of emergerc y under
Art, 356 of the Constitution.
Though as tne Constitutional head of the state he
t
has^normally jsd' abide by the advice of his Council of
o
>
Ministers he has also certain discretionary powers which
all' Cons titutional heads are expected to exercise.
relate to (1)
the appointment of Chief Ministers,
dismissal of ministers (3)
They
(2) the
the dissolution of State
Assemblies before the expiry of their term of five years.
179
In tho light of non-congress parties holding office
in States the Governor as a nominee of the centre has an
important role in this regard.
Where a party like Congress
is in power at the Centre it may not like the idea of non­
congress parties holding offices m states and may make
attempts to prevent such parties from coming to power or
manoeuvre to bring about, their removal from office after
they come Into power.
As such, it puts pressure on the
Governor to exercise his discretionary powers in a way that
suits its interests.
He yields to such pressures because
he holds his office during the pleasure of the President
which means of the party m power at the Centre.
Such a
use of his discretionary powers results in the erosion of
state autonomy.
Apart from this' it is ;>ne of the duties of the
Governor as the agent of rho Centre to report whether a
situation has arisen under which tho government of his state
cannot be carried on m accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution and whether the state should come under
President’s rule which means the rule of the Central
Government.
Under such a rule State autonomy completely
disappears and the state comes to be administered directly
by the centre.
Unitarism takes the place of federalism
under Art. 356.
In a.similar strain Venkatarangaiya and Shiviah
rightly conclude that the Constitution has provided for a
180
federal set-up with a string centre.
The above survey shows
that the strong centre became a paramount centre under the
influence of the operation of a variety of factors.
This
trend has to be reversed if the federal equilibrium is to
be maintained.
Tnere is a general agreement that m a
country like India with its vast size, with regions at
different levels of development and with linguistic and
other diversities
federalism is most appropriate*'
-
/
It follows from this that everything should be done to
24
preserve and not to weaken the spirit of federalism.
181
References
1.
PylCO/M.V., Constitutional Government: in_India,
Asia Publishing House,Bombay,
1968, p.768.
2.
C,A,D., Vol.X, p.975.
3.
Quoted m Venkatarangaiya, M andShiviah, M.,
Indian Federalism, Arnold Heinemann, New Delhi,
1975, p.92.
4.
Ibid., p.93.
5.
Quoted m Bombwall, K.R., 1916, The Foundations.. of
Indian Federalism, Asia Publishing House, Bombay,
1967, pp.310-315.
6.
Chhabra, Hanndcr, K., S tate Politics m India; A
Study of Centro-State Relations, Surject
Publications, Delhi, 1977, p.91.
7.
Santhanam, K., "Political Parties in India", The
White Star, 6, Bombay, July, 1969.
8.
Ray,Ama 1, Tension Areas m Indian Federal System,
World Press, Calcutta, 1970, p*5.
9.
Venkatarangaiya, M., and Shiviah, M., op.cit.,
pp.96-97.
10.
Quoted m Ray,Amal, Intergovernmental Relations in
Indiag A Study of Indian Federalism, Asia Pub­
lishing House, Bombay, 1966, p.127.
182
Gangal,S.C., “An Approach to Indian Federalism,”
/
Political Science Quarterly, June, 1962.
,
i
Chanda,Asok, Federalism m India; Study of Union. State
Relations, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1965,
p.132.
Bhambhri, C.P., “Political Parties and Centre - State
Relations m India" in Kashyap Subhas,C.,(Ed),
Union-State Relations in India, Institute of
Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New
Delhi, 1969, pp.48-49.
Manor,James, "India; Awakening and decay",Current
History, 85 (509), March, 1986, p.103.
Ray, Arnal, Intergovernmental Relations m Iqdia;
A Study of Indian Federalism, op.cit., p. 129.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.114.
Gazette*
of India (Extraordinary) , March 15, 1950;
referred to in Amal Ray, Ibid,, p.115.
Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations,
Administrative Reforms., Commission, Vo 1.1, Government
of India, 1968, pp.102-104.
Ray, Amal, Tension Areas in Indian Federal System,
op,cit., p.38.
Report of the Study Team on Centre - State Relations,
op.cit., p.110.
183
22.
Santnanam, K., Union-State Relations m India,
Asia, Bombay, 1967, p.47.
23.
Quoted in Ray, Amal, Inter-governmental Relations in
India, op.cit.,
24.
id,
131.
Venkatarangaiya, M., and Shiviah, M., op.cit.,
p.116.