/
iERNAL SECURITY
ROLE OF THE POLICE
POSITION BEFORE HUNT REPORT
1.
Prior to 1969 every member of the RUC had a pistol as a personal issue.
In
addition, the Reserve Force platoons were equipped with armoured cars, armoured
personnel carriers and automatic weapons.
Rifles and some automatic weapons were
available for the defence of stations, but stocks were mostly held in reserve at
Sprucefield Depot.
2.
The part-time USC were provided with rifle s in country areas and IIi th pistols
in Belfast.
Mobil i zed members who carried out duties with the RUC were equipped
in the same way as regular police.
Those who were called up to guard installations
during the IRA campaign in the late fifties and early sixties were normally supplied
with rifles an~or automatics.
THE RUNT PEPORT
3.
The Hunt Gommittee expressed the hope (paragraph 27) that the removal of causes
of discontent would make a renewal of terrorism less likely.
Nevertheless they
tho1lght it necessary to consider the worst that might happen and to take precautions
against possible terrorist attacks (paragraph 28).
4.
In particular the Committee believed (paragraph 167) that it would be
necessary for some time to come to protect key installations and to undertake such
othel' tasks as might be required to guard against the threat of armed guerilla-type
attacks.
But they added that all threats to the security of Northern Ireland from
armed incursions and attacks, from whatever quarter
and whatever form they might
take, was a proper military responsibility and should rest
Westminster.
~th
the Government at
They proposed (paragraph 171) a locally recruited part-time force
under the commend of the GOC to undertake this role.
5.
So far as the RUe were concerned the Committee believed (paragraph 81) that
any police force, military in appearance and equipment, was less acceptable to
minori~
and moderate opinion than if it were clearly civilian in character, and
they therefore recommended (paragraph 82) that the RUC be relieved of all duties of
a military nature.
6.
In pursuit of this policy they proposed (paragraph 102) that the general issue
and carrying of arms should be phased out.
1•
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All automatic weapons and self-loading
~les
should cease to be part of the equipment of the RUC.
_T
The only firearms
retained should be .38 revolvers, .303 rifles and gas pistols or gas grenades;
these should be available under strict security conditions at selected police
stations for issue as required.
Ordinarily (paragraph 103) firearms should be
available only to personnel on mobile or detective duties or for the protection of
police stations.
Armoured cars should cease to be part of police equipment
(paragr~ph
114).
Armoured
personnel carriers and jeeps should be retained, but not replaced, until experience
showed the extent to which they were likely to be required in future.
7.
All these recommendations Vlere carried out.
POSITION FOLLOWING HUNT P.EPORT
8.
With the recrudescence of IRA activity in 1970 police personnel began to come
unuer armed
attac~.
The response to this was nfofold.
In th8 first place police
patrols moving into dAngerous areas were given Arrry protection.
Police
Authori~
Secondly, the
ordered larger supplies of the new Walther pistol, which is now
the standard weapon for British police forces.
of the cld .38 pistols were re-issued.
Pending the arrival of sUPFlies many
Pistols are still not a personal issue
(except in the case of a few members of the force whose lives have been thre~tened),
but they are available at all
stat~ons,
are carried by all mobile patrols and
be issued in other circumstances at the discretion of the station commander.
m~
A
total of 2,400 are either issued or on order.
9.
A new situation has, however, arisen as a result of the stepping-up of IRA
attacks, and the
securi~
forces now require firearms not only for personal protec-
tion but also in the following circumstances
10..
1.
Crowd control
2.
Engagement of IRA
3.
4.
Protection of police stations
Protection of key installations
Crowd control becomes an i . . rroy responsibility as soon as serious violence
erupts; there is, therefore, no
circumstances.
c~se
for the police to be specially armed in these
The engagement and pursuit of armed terrorists is also an
A~
responsibility, and the view taken is that mobile patrols of the RUC should not be
armed with automatic weapons for what would then be front-line duties.
11.
© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
This leaves the static protection of police stations and key
2.
instnllations~
anu
~e
there is an acute problem.
Since attacks can be mounted with automatic weapons,
s"tatic guards must be put on equal ten.IS.
The guarding of police .:;tation::; by the
Rue would mean not only a re-arming of the force with
diversion of men from beat duty.
hc a~
weapons but also the
The guarding of key installations by the RUe would
be out of the question on manpower grounds alone.
12.
The
A~
have, therefore, assumed responsibility for guarding a limited number
of police stations which are at Epecial risk.
reg~rds
as purely
tempora~
and as particularly distasteful because it deprives l1im
of troops for use in an offensive role.
the UDR can provide
This is a commitment which the GOC
~ight-time
So f a r as key installations are concerned
protection, though a recent examination has identified
a limited number of members of the UDR ablexnd willing to undertake spells of
du~
at all hours; these men will be e!!lployed at f\'_ll-time rates of pay to guard police
stations and key point s l'equlring twenty-four-four protection.
however, primarily
13.
~
The UDR remains,
night-time or weekend force.
Much better defensive covamge could be provided if a full-time battalion of
the UDR were fonned.
Pressure is now being exerted by the Northern Ireland Govern-
ment for the early creation of such a battalion.
only of men
servir~
The battalion could be
a~de
up not
long engagements but also of men willing to volunteer for short
periods of mobilized service.
14-.
Until the UDR can be made a more effective force by these means it will be
necessar.y for the
A~
to continue to provide soldiers to guard police stations and
to provide sone armed guards or patrols at stormont or oth8r prestige targets.
~rqy
The
view is that the job could be done by the police within the terms of the
Hunt Report.
But if the Army are left with the task it !!lay well be that the need to save regular
troops- will accelera te the creation of a permanent UDR battalion.
would be the general re-arming of tre RUC.
The alternative
This would mean a reversal of the Hunt
Report which might be unacceptabJb to the Police
Authori~
and, from the Northern Ireland Government's point of view,
and the Home Secretar.y,
mig}~
create more
problems than it would solve.
15.
0.. t
A note on the UDR is
Appendix B.
© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
~ttached
at Appendix A, and a comparison of police strengths
'ENDIX A
ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT
The UDR was formed on 1 January 1970 and began to undertake operational dutie s on
1 April 1970.
the Regular
disch~rges
The Regiment is a part-time volunteer force whose role i" to support
Ar~
in protecting tho security of the Border and the State.
It
this duty in the main by providing guards for key points and undortaking
Border patrols and
check-po~nt
duties when
nocess~ry.
The Regiment is not employed
in crowd control or riot duties in towns.
The SecretalY of state for Defence announced in January 1971 that recruiting to the
Regime:J.t would proceed as quickly as possible to achieve a forc.: of 6,000.
Tho Regiment is divided into 7 battalions and 38 companies, and on 23 ,Tuly 1971 the
stre~gth
was 249 officers and 3,907 soldiers.
240 soldiers who are
~ll-timo
These figures include 12 officers and
members on consolidated rates of pay.
The balance
are part-time members of whom about 11% are not ye t fully traine d.
Rocrui ting has recently shown an improvement and there are a considerable n'lobor of
applications in the pipeline being processed.
18 to 25 age group - are
no~
cooing forward.
applicants were in the 40 to 50 age group.
Since 1 April 1970 over 170,000
t'1.sks
wh~.ch
It is worthy of note
ma~days
of
Previously
t~~t
~ consider~ble
younger me:J. number of
The general
st~n~~rd
oper~tional
duty have been underGaken on
would ot11e rwise have fnllen upon regulflr troops.
3lso is rising.
These can be broken
down into the following main groups:Routine Commitments
The most important routine
t~sk
of the UDR is to provide static guards
certain Key Points and the patrol of Key Poir!ts not requiri':1g
st~tic
~t
night on
guards.
The
Regiment has provided static guards' at night for 16 Key Points, includine 4 border
police stations.
In addition an average of 17 patrols operate each night, oainly in
the border areas, visiting target installations not requiring static guards.
The
total manpower !'equirement for both these cOf.lf.litments is approximately 250 men per
night.
Patrols, particularly in remote rural
~reas,
were initially restricted in their
mobility due to the lack of vehicles and radios.
However, each battalion now has
adequate vehicles and equipment to operate with a high degree of mobility
flexibility.
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© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
an~
§;>-,-urity Committee Oper,:E);tions
Many operations, pn.rticularly at weekends, ere planned through Area Security Committes3
on which the Regular Army, UDR .:md RUG 2re represented Olnd the UDR contribution -Go
these co-ordin2ted oper'ltions usulily consists of patrollhlg cOI:lbined with road blocks
in rural areas .
On occasions UDR reinforcements have been sent by helicopters.
An example of this type of operation occurred when trouble was expected some time ago
outside the jail at Armagh , and an operntion was launched to dQmin2te the situation.
Regular troops were given tasks wi thin the city of Armagh, and the UD::.t set up road
blocks for twenty-four hours on n.ll routes entering the city.
co-ordinated the UDR
cont~~bution
The second battalion
as well as providing six road blocks and two
heliborne border patrols.
Contingonc~Operations
The 0DR has made an important contribution to security during
tl~
past year by taking
part in a nunber of contir:gency operations planned in close co-ordination with the
Regul a r
A~ .
One of these operations provides for up to 120 road blocks and vehicle
contrul points in depth to cover' all ronds leading from the border.
il.t present, if
all positions are manned simultaneously the t a sk is shared between the Regular AT'f:JS'
and the UDR.
On these occasions the lmR has produced up to 800 men at a time everJ
24 hours for this task.
l\nother contingency plan is a UDR oper'ltjon,
31 vehicle control points on the
periphe~
of Belfast.
m~ing
up to
Up to 400 men are deployed at
anyone time on this operation .
The manpower required for these operations is in addition to existing routine commitments; ancJ. Brigade GOLlIIlanders hnve on the se occasions authorised cnll-out i'or the
strength of force required t o meet the task.
If road block operations are ce.rried or
extended beyond eight hours, a roster has to be orgnnised to relieve those on duty.
Because contingency operations are superimposed on routine tasks, members of the
una
from Belfast, Down or Antrim carry out n. t least ore operational duty every week of
eight hours' duration.
Immediate Reaction Force
There have been a number of occasions when the UDR hn.s been called out at short
notice for full-time duty, with the ain of relieving the Regular hnny to deal with
disorders in urban areas .
On these occasions the UDR battalions
~~ve
taken over
operational control within certain n.reas , relieving the Regular Amy of 24-hour
static gun.rds and providing additional road blocks.
© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
The Reginent has the capabilH;y
~ manning
up to 230 road blocks at short notice on roads in the home areas of UDR
This operation requires up to 1,800 ruemb<";:'D
locations throughout Northern Ireland.
of the UDR at anyone time.
Initially the UDR has been armed with the same weapons as the USC - No
Sterlings.
The No
4 rifles will be replaced with the SLR.
"1'he scale of radios is being increased from 163 to 340.
corr~land
4 rifles and
posts dovl!l to platoon level.
Radios exist at all
Company commander vehicles and certain vehicles
usod for patroJs will contain sets.
The UDR is trained to enable it tf) work in close conjunction with Regular
units.
A.~lny
It is the aim to bring the force to progressively higher standards of field
craft, signals and W81.pOn training and to increase its mobility.
Additional paid
training is being provided to this end over and above the minimum laid down for
recruits.
Provision is also made for officers and senior NCOs to attend selected
centralised courses at Ministry of Defence schools and elsEH7here o
It is expected tbat the everall strength of the Regiment vall increase steadily but
perhaps slowly towards full establishment.
The main problem is to maintain keenness
in carrying out duties which are for the most part repetitive and unspectacular.
training standards improve the UDR 1;: ill vary its methods of carrying out tasks.
As
In
addition to helicopter sorties thought is being given to water-borne operations in
loughs and sheltered inlets.
Proposals arc currently being examined for forming a
full-time battalion; this would have the same general role in support of the Army
as the part-time force with which it would bo closely integrD.ted.
The morale of the
Regiment is good, particularly in times of stress, and men respond willingly to
exacting calls to attend duties and training.
Discipline when on duty is excellent
and co-operation between regular units ana the force is easy and efficier.t.
'r ho image of the force could be improved if it were
r:hich it is doing.
This is not oasy in
vi(~w
poss~_ble
to publicise the work
of its relatively routine chare.cter o
Euch of the work of the security forces attracting favourable notice - searches,
c at ch~s,
etc - has been performed in the main by the regular forces, Army and
Police, and not by the UDR on i t s
Offil.
Any steps that can be taken to encourage recruiting should be taken - not
o~ly
to
strengthen the UDR but to make it clear that opportunities exist for men of good
vall to assist in the defence of Northern
Ireland~
3.
© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
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/
POLICE STRENGTH DURING
APPENDIX B
1956-196U~
Total
Full-time
Part·-tiillo
USC
201
3,021
10,274
29
478
3,308
10,750
2,8 27
45
1,417
4,289
12,301
31.1.59
2,852
40
1,579
4,471
12,223
3'1.1 60
2,839
49
1,625
4,513
12 ,185
31.1.61
2,679
56
1 ~376
4,311
i
31.1.62
2,934
55
1,203
4,192
11,596
Rue
Men
ilomon
YI.1.56
2,783
37
31. L57
2,801
31.1 .. 58
0
Mobilized
USC
1,946
AT 30.6.1971
3,808
Tho
author~sed
115
3,923
strengths are;-
RUe
4,940
Reserve
1,500
UDlt
6,000
T
© PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4
Rue
Reserve
UDR
792
4,1 83