On Not Defining "Rhetoric"
Author(s): Robert L. Scott
Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), pp. 81-96
Published by: Penn State University Press
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On Not Defining "Rhetoric"
Robert L Scott
One turns from objectìvity to intersubjectìvity, not simply
because one is overwhelmed and surfeited with objects
but because one finds thè more central problems really
are the intersubjective ones.
Walter J. Ong1
I
With The Prospect of Bhetoric before us, questions of définition
will be redoubled.2 As editor of The Quarterly Journal of Speech,
I hâve already received several letters, reviews, and prospecti
making such questions key. Many, perhaps most, of the articles
that hâve appeared in Philosophy and Rhetoric hâve had decidedly definitional content.
The problem of defining "rhetoric"seems irrésistible to rhetoricians. For many years I thought that that undertaking was my
principal concern, that somehow I would achieve nirvana, if in
twenty-five words or fewef, I could complete the sentence,
"Rhetoric is. ..." I no longer believe so. Stephen Toulmin makes
a great deal of sensé when he writes:
Définitions are like belts. The shorter they are, the more
elasüc they need to be. A short belt reveals nothing about
its wearer: by stretching, it can be made to fit almost
anybody. And a short définition, applied to a heterogeneous
set of examples, has to be expanded and contracted, qualified and reinterpreted, before it will fit every case. Yet
the hope of hitting on some définition which is at one
and the same time satisfactory and brief dies hard: much
Robert L. Scott is Professor of Speech-Communicationat the University
of Minnesota. Earlier versions of this paper were worked out as part of a
symposium sponsored by the Department of Politicai Science ana the Departmentof Speech at MacalesterCollege, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 3, 1971,
and for the Thirty-Seventh Annual Conference on Speech Education sponsored by the Department of Speech, Louisiana State University, June 10-16,
1971.
Philosophyit Rhetoric,Vol. 6, No. 2. Published by The PennsylvaniaState
University Press, University Park, Pa. and London.
81
82
ON NOT DEFINING "bHETORIC"
can be learned by seeing just how much elasticity is ultimately required of such portmanteau définitions.8
Toulmin was not talldng of "rhetoric" when he made this statement; he was discussing "science/* The enterprise he saw essential
for a philosophy of science seems at least as essential for a philosophy of rhetoric.
I hope in this essay to shed some light on the sorts of circumstances that hâve demanded elasticity from brief définitions of
rhetoric. More important than those définitions are the sorts of
circumstances in which we wish to use them. The stretching is
not necessarily bad action, but not knowing why and for what
we are stretching may be disabling.
I find it useful to proceed informally with a few examples.
But to help frame thèse examples, a partition of the whole undertaldng may be in order. I shall argue for the plausibility of thèse
propositions:
1. That people generally hâve a sensé of rhetoric. This sensé
or feeling, which précèdes any définition of rhetoric, is immediately rooted in expérience.
2. That the way in which and the degree to which one sensés
rhetoric is dépendent on one's set toward reality. Some personal
sets toward reality tend to close off the sensé of rhetoric. An intersubjective stance tends to open one to a sensé of rhetoric. The
intersubjectivist expériences his environment as rhetorical.
3. That although particular définitions of rhetoric may be useful in particular circumstances, thèse définitions should set one
toward knowing the reality of rhetoric on three levels: thè strategie, the substantial, and the dynamic. This set of labels, like
any other, is arbitrary and, if the terms are sensible, they are simultaneous aspects of reality.
II
The immediacy of rhetorio- the substantial and dynamic aspects that give the sensé or feeling of its présence - should be well
illustrated in this instance. Bobby Seale writes about policemen in
Oakland "checking out" some people, including some 'Tittle kids
on bicycles," near the Black Panther Party office when Huey P.
Newton intervened. Newton was armed.
Ail the while Huey was letting thèse pigs know where
it was at The brothers observing would see that thèse pigs
ROBERT L. SCOTT
83
were scared of that big gun that a bad black but beautiful
nigger had in his hand. Every time Huey would say, "If
you shoot at me swine, I'm shooting back," niggers would
have to holler something like, 'Teil it, do it brother." All
that would do to Huey is let him know that he was
revolutionizing our culture; educating black people to be
revolutionaries, that the gun is where it's at and about
and in.4
Rhetoric is involved here. Huey had an audience. The audience
responded. Not only did they respond overtly during the incident
but, later, so Seale reports, "I think we got 10 or 12, maybe 13
extra members in thè party that day." Did Newton intend such a
response or was he simply confronting the policemen? That question may be impossible to answer, but Seale bothered to relate
the incident, making the gun not simply a physical threat of the
moment but a broad symbol of being revolutionary. Moreover,
Mitchell Goodman later chose to weave Seale's story into the
pattern of his book, one he calls a "collage," entitled The Movement toward a New America, The Beginnings of a Long Revolution. It's that book from which I have now quoted.
The event was made symbolic. The symbol became an instrument to affect the way people related to one another. Newton
so used it, apparently, and so did Seale. Certainly Goodman did,
stating his purposes for assembling his book in the foreword.5 All
sensed the rhetorical potential of the situation.
Let's look at another very différent instance. This one is from
a magazine ad, the sort of source from which we'd expect rhetoric.
The ad was placed in Time magazine about ten years ago- well
before the conflict in Indochina became what we expérience
today.
It was as follows. The upper two-thirds of a two-column space
is occupied by the picture of a bullet: stark against a black
background, the brass casing, suggested by whites and grays,
reflects highlights, but the lead slug is the emphasized datum.
Just below the bullet and above thè short text, set off by bold,
black Unes, is the single word DEFENSE. The text reads, "Defense is the largest single market in the world. Last year the U. S.
Défense Department spent an estimated $51 billion - for a wide
range of products from magnétos to missiles. What magazine is
most important to décision makers in the Pentagon? Not surprisingly, Time- thè story of the whole world's week. In an independent survey throughout the Défense Department, America's
84
ON NOT DEFINING "RHETORIC"
top military oflBcersvoted Time the most important magazine in
the U. S. today and their own personal favorite. In Défense,
as in every important field, Time serves thè U. S. Leadership
Community."6 A small rectangle in the lower left-hand corner
symbolizes Time magazine, tastefully small, perhaps only onetwentieth the size of the bullet.
There's more rhetoric hère than I can discuss. One may say,
"Ifs only institutional advertising. A litüe harmless self-congratulation." That description is accurate as far as it goes, and in it
lies part of thè power of the rhetoric we sensé. In context, at the
time the ad appeared, most readers would probably hâve found
the ad conventional. But through the conventions, special attitudes were courted. Time wanted to seil advertising to thè "U. S.
Leadership Community" for thè "U. S. Leadership Community."
The copy did not say, "Advertise your war material in Time,"
but it did seek to identify the magazine with both the national
interest and with those who manipulate power. What better symbol of power than a bullet? And what of the independent survey?
Authority is lent by this vague, commercial application of behavioral science. Who was surveyed? "America's top military
oflBcers."Again, symbols of power and also, explicitly, leadership.
The ad is brought to suggest, "We are leaders and they are
leaders." An executive in an American corporation might be inclined to complete the patterns of pronouns: "And if you are a
leader, then. . . ." One may sensé that suggestion in the verbal
and visual pattern, even though such words are not explicitly
présent.
The analysis I hâve given of two examples implies that rhetoric
is présent and is sensed as a part of the normal experiencing of
one's environment. The analysis, however, is open to rebuttal,
and at least one line of rebuttal helps to indicate how notions
of reality interact with a generai human propensity to sensé
rhetoric.
One possible response to my analysis of Huey P. Newton's
Statement and Time magazine's advertisement could be that although we ail respond to data such as thèse in our environment,
some responses to such data are clearly aberrant. It can be argued
that it is wishful and perhaps mistaken to give responses other
than those demanded by Äe concrete reality of the circumstances.
This sort of argument often cites physical examples. A person
may jump out of a third story window if he wishes, but what
ROBERT L. SCOTT
85
happens will be a resuit of certain scientific laws of motion, thè
physical characteristics of the human body, and the physical
makeup of the bodies of matter with which he cornes into contact. A person should know these laws and realities, at least in a
generai sort of way, before jumping. If he does not, his wishful
act is mistaken; if he does, his wishful act is aberrant, for selfdestruction is aberrant when foreseeable. Applied to rhetorical
responses such as I have hypothesized in the first section of this
essay, the counter-argument would run that data to "protect"
one against invitations in the Newton or the Time symbolisms
are knowable much as laws of motion are "protectively" knowable.
There is a sort of duality suggested: a reality of physical nature
and another of human nature. It is implied that human nature
is open to a highly similar, if not precisely the same, sort of
analysis as physical nature. Of course human needs are not
directly observable under controlied conditions, but neither are
the atoms in U-238. However, the effects of both are observable
and, therefore, scientific laws are a single sort of reality, not a
double sort.
From such an objective realist's point of view, if one jumps out
the window believing that he will float, he is simply ignorant and
mistaken. On the other hand, if one jumps out the window
knowing füll well that he will be smashed lifeless, then he still
may be called ignorant but in the sensé of aberrant ignorance. The
nature of society and the relation of thè individuai to it are
posited as matters of objective reality. From such an analysis, we
might say that individuals cannot be allowed to commit suicide
and, therefore, that they must be taught these facts along with
the laws of motion and the like. If a person proves incapable of
learning ail these objective facts, then he can be dealt with in
whatever ways objective reality dictâtes, for example, he could
be institutionalized. Comparable reasoning can be, and often
is, applied to determine what should be one's response to a
Huey Newton as a symbol, or an advertisement, a bullet, a book,
and so forth.
My attempt to this point has been to vivify my first proposition: that people generally have a sensé of rhetoric. This sensé or
f eeling, which précèdes any définition of rhetoric, is immediately
rooted in expérience. But I have also tried to introduce my second
proposition, that one's sensé of rhetoric is mediated by his set
toward reality.
86
ON NOT DEFINING "rHETORIC"
III
No doubt many sortings of what I cali "sets toward reality" are
possible. But three classes seem to me both exhaustive of the
possibilities and satisfactory. A rhetoric could be constructed from
the point of view of any of thèse. My point is simply that one
needs to take account of thè f act that a set toward reality has influence in creating a notion of rhetoric from the expériences he finds
immediate and in which symbolic prepotencies réside. Three
alternative sets seem to be:
1. Objective reality demonstrates that human will is but an
illusion.
2. The objective-subjective paradox suggests that although
there is a real world in which humans exist, human action will
always fall short of coping with reality, and humans must act
without certainty. It is this point of view that focuses sharply on
what is often called thè is-ought gap.
3. Intersubjective reality suggests that objectivity is an illusion
and that in any human action, including maldng careful statements about the physical nature of the world, a measure of
human will is always involved.
Although one can create a notion of rhetoric from any of thèse
points of view, that of the intersubjective realist is the most open
to a notion of a constructive rhetoric, since he accepts both human
will and thè inevitability of mutuai influence. The objective
realist tends to deny the former and the objective-subjectivist,
the latter.7
In order to show the importance of point of view in mediating
one's immediate expérience of the rhetorical in environment, I
shall briefly develop the conséquences of the intersubjectivist's
set toward reality. One can begin by examining some difficulties
in explaining our sensé of rhetoric which arise in proceeding
simply from définition.
The most f amous définition is Aristotle's "rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available
means of persuasion."8 In any définition there will be key words
that will need to be pressed. In Aristotle's one such word is
persuasion. But if we press the key words, we shall soon give
proof to Toulmin's insight about the elasticity of brief définitions.
It is populär thèse days to remark that Aristode was a sage
observer of the customs of his time and that his rhetoric is rooted
in the practices common in and around Athens in the fifth Century B.C. On the other hand, Kenneth Burke, who certainly
ROBERT L. SCOTT
87
knows Aristotle even though he sees a "new rhetoric" in the
making, wrote, "For rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past
condition of society. It is rooted in an essential function of hnguage itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually
born aneto; the use of hnguage as a symbolic means of inducing
coopération in beings that by nature respond to Symbols9'9
(emphasis in the original).
In a generai way, at least, Aristotle's and Burke's définitions can
be taken as équivalent, if "inducing coopération" and "persuasion" are seen as conscious effort on the part of a source of
communication to control thè way others will expérience reality
and if "the available means of persuasion" are seen as rooted in
"an essential condition of society." With these two common
définitions in mind, then, let us probe briefly thè ground that thè
key terms seem to indicate.
Reality is simply what reality is, nothing more or less. That
remark seems truistic enough, but humans never approach such
a simple truth. When we take the world, or any part thereof, we
always take it both more and less. This is to say that the world
is what we expérience- either directly or indirectìy. Our fundamental activity in experiencing, putting aside thè by no means
negligible problem of perception, is the making of and responding
to catégories. Human intelligence seems to be largely a matter
of recognizing classes of things and, when presented with thè
idea of a class of things, in attending to appropriate individuale.10
We respond not simply to a physical object but to, say, a tree.
We respond not only to the physical attributes of that event in
that moment but also to our past expériences; in so doing we push
our responses into the future, as we do in undertaking to climb
the tree or deciding that thè apples are not ripe enough to pick,
and the like. Of course we hâve built up an idea of tree and this
idea enables us to respond. It is possible that we could build up
such ideas in utter social isolation, that we could build up catégories and individuate from ideas of catégories. But we do not.
None of us has any expérience in attaining or utilizing catégories
that is not socially impregnated.
If we recognize that our names for things are inventions and
that différent groups of peoples have invented differently, apparently out of différent developmental needs, we recognize that
there is an urgency in the very words we use to refer to things.11
If I say something as simple as "This is an appiè tree," there will
be attendant, even though tacit, ali sorts of directives, such as,
"Protect thè bark this winter from possible damage by rodents."
88
ON NOT DEFINING "rHETORIC"
These urgencies will corne to us from our past and be quickened
in the context of the moments. Given certain expériences and
moments an appiè tree may be a beautiful symbol of life to be
loved, enjoyed, and protected.
Now someone may be inclined to label ail of this "very poetic
but not very scientific." But suppose a person is interested in the
health of appiè trees and, as a botanist, attempts to isolate a
certain sort of leaf blight in order to study its etiology. Early in
the process, he will hâve to make a category, that is, to define
what will count as a blighted leaf and what will not. But he would
still deal with both more and less than the reality that présents
itself to his observation. He is not interested simply in the leaves
he examines. He is interested in generalizing, that is, in making
categorical Statements that can be sensibly applied to other leaves
that he has not examined, and even to leaves that do not now
exist. Further, he is interested in less than the reality observed.
The poetic conception that the leaves' falling symbolizes the passing of life is excluded; and even if one believes that that sort of
reality doesn't count, the botanist might easily study other physical aspects of the leaves. But he omits thèse; he must in order to
deal with his problem.
The very propensity of the scientist to speak of a problem as
"his" indicates the irreducible modicum of human valuing in
every human action. Further, since it is impossible for most of
us to think about humans isolated from ail other humans except
in highly extreme cases such as the wild children accounts, we
recognize that our tendencies to value actions of various sorts are
shared. Actions are scarcely things-in-the-world of the same sort
as physical objects. And talking of being with others in the world
indicates an aspect of reality other than the physical.
If we agrée that we think through catégories, and that our
catégories are symbols invented and shared by ourselves and
others, and, further, that our symbols bring an urgency into the
contexts within which we think and act, then thè ground for
rhetoric is indicated. We may or may not always seek to maximize rhetorical potentialities in our circumstances, but they are
always there for us to maximize if we choose.
We can find rhetorical potentialities in the most everyday sort
of occurrences. If, for example, on a social occasion, one person
remarks to another, "My glass is empty," the one person being
a guest and the other a host, the host may take the remark as a
request and fili the glass. But that is only one thing that might
happen. The host might believe that the request is inappropri-
ROBERT L. SCOTT
89
ately put and, in some way, demand that it be put properly.
Someone with a turn of mind that would probably be called
"literal," might remark that the glass is not at all empty, that it
is filled with something other than what the guest wishes.
Some might object to this, saying that in the circumstances
the guest should indicate his désires in the clearest, simplest
manner possible. But what would that be? "I have finished the
drink you gave me and would very much appreciate your giving
me another"? So put, a request might possibly be taken as insulting. At any rate, even specifying a desire in the clearest,
simplest manner is to recognize potentialities in the circumstances
and to make the least of the latitudes available.
In complex circumstances that make people believe matters
that are criticai to their well being are involved, the impulses
toward rhetorical modes of behavior are apt to be intense. Although it seems that people bring thèse impulses into being, we
ought to recognize also that the impulses are so thoroughly woven
into thè ongoing process of social interactions that it is also accurate to say the environment is experienced as being rhetorical.
If this is thè case, then one may have an uneasiness about the
unidirectional aspect that characterizes the définitions cited from
Kenneth Burke and Aristotle.
Aristotle pictured rhetoric as an instrumental art, that is, one
to be used; the persuader is the user. The potentials for persuasion
might be discovered in the social and politicai situations as the
Greeks lived them, but rhetoric began when some one person
grasped the means and used them toward his ends. Burke's
"inducing coopération" is also open to the sort of unidirectional
interprétation that Aristotle's work has always invited,12 but
Burke's phrase may invite us to see the audience in a more active
rôle. The invitation is issued even more sharply in Wayne C.
Booth's récent définition of rhetoric as "the whole of maris efforts
to discover and share warrantable assent"ls (italics in the original). This phrasing strongly suggests that we recast sharply
our notions of the rôles of speakers and listeners, writers and
readers, senders and receivers, in a direction more consistent
with the way an intersubjective realist expériences the rhetorical
environment.
Part of the difficulty in the unidirectional vision of the flow
of persuasion is in the necessity of discovering intent Does the
guest who says, "My glass is empty," intend to symbolize his
belonging to the group which uses this conventional locution?
Does he intend to prove his acceptance by gaining thè coopera-
90
ON NOT DEFINING "RHETORIC"
tion of his host in completing thè conventìonal action? In reporting to the nation on the Laotian "incursion," did President
Nixon intend to undercut criticism of his décision as one widening the war but intend also to do so in a way that would not
unduly upset those who supported an aggressive policy? In such
cases the persuader is not apt to acknowledge such intentions.
But despite déniais, one in such a situation might find potentialities of the sorts I hâve mentioned quickened through the discourse of the guest or the President.
The same examples reveal another difficulty that arises from
the tendency to see rhetoric as primarily if not exclusively unidirectional. One does not, from such a view, account for the
responses of listeners, or readers, or receivers. If he assumes an
intention on the part of a sender of a message, one may respond
in a variety of ways, or he may respond in such diffuse ways that
explaining the response by alleging a particular kind of stimulus
is impossible. Or one may respond consistently with the "kind"
of message presupposed and yet attribute his responses to other
forces altogether. In such cases we might say that the rhetoric
has been inefficient or of uncertain impact.
We should not put aside the speaker and his intentions as
insignificant to rhetoric; but we should widen our view to see
the various and active rôles audiences hâve when experiencing
rhetoric. For example, audiences do not simply listen to speakers.
They seek out speakers. This was trae long before the electronic
mass media provided machines that switch Channels. And even
when a listener is tuned in on a given speaker, he processes the
message through his own skein of abilities and interests and the
resuit may be a very différent expérience from that which his
neighbor has.
Donald C. Bryant has suggested that "rhetoric"is an ambiguous
concept pointing to a number of différent activities, among them,
those of the speaker, the teacher, the theorist, and die critic, each
of whom has his function as a rhetor and produces rhetoric.14 I
am suggesting that listeners are makers of rhetoric also. We are
not only persuaded, but we seek to be persuaded; that is, we
find grounds for our belief s and, hopefully, continually refine our
beliefs in the process.15 There are undoubtedly states of being in
which people are particularly passive and malléable. Given complete control of ail the activity of an individuai over a protracted
period of time, some people hâve been quite successful in manipulating the beliefs of others; the most dramatic, contemporary
ROBERT L. SCOTT
91
example is called "brainwashing." But such states of being are
probably rare and are rather commonly agreed to be undesirable.
Booth's phrase, "to discover and share warrantable assent,"
invites us to see the audience as creating rhetoric just as certainly
as a speaker créâtes it. But the rhetoric that either créâtes will
transcend him in time and place if it is indeed meaningful; for
example, we hâve no difficulty imagining an incident such as the
following. Imagine that you enter a room in which a party is in
füll swing. There is an argument going on. After a little time, you
get the drift of the proceedings and enter the argument. People
corne and go. Soon no one is left arguing who was there when you
entered. But the argument goes on. You leave. And you are confident that the argument will continue.
Each person who argued created rhetoric in the sensé that he
wished to induce the coopération of others. Each person who
argued created rhetoric in the sensé that he potentially opened
himself to the arguments of others. In the interaction, warrantable assent may hâve been discovered and shared. But there is
another sensé in which argument was created; that is the sensé
of "argument" that transcended any of the arguers, which was
created by ail of them, and continued even though the arguers
retired one by one.
I hâve been trying to show in several ways that an ever-shifting
environment of rhetoric exists. It is difficult to imagine a human
society in which this would not be the case. People discover and
share warrantable assent because the warrants exist By "warrants" I mean those stable values that communities create and
that serve to justify actions within those communities.16 When I
say stable, one may feel the need to qualify the terni, perhaps
with something like "more or less." But such qualification is necessary for anything to which one might refer, for what is called
"matter"is but Systems of energy in constant change.
A rhetorical environment exists as an ever-shifting product of
the constant controversées of a people. Speaking of such a reality
as existing is as sensible as speaking of the Black Forest as
existing, or of Presidential inaugural speeches as existing, or of the
journal Philosophy and Rhetoric as existing.
To the objectivist, insisting that rhetoric is immediately apparent may seem to be contradictory because of the obvious
appeal to the observer's participation in the reality observed. The
subjectivist will hâve a différent sort of difficulty in experiencing
the environment as rhetorical for he will tend to sensé rhetoric
92
ON NOT DEFINING "rHETORIC"
as wholly his own reaching out to shape and his expériences as
private. The intersubjective realist, however, may sensé rhetoric
as simultaneously in the world and of his expérience.
Although it may often be useful to stipulate définitions, and I
hâve used Aristotle's, Kenneth Burke's, and Wayne C. Booth's,
it is essential to recognize that a définition must be made in a
context. I hâve suggested that one's sensé of an environment
experienced as rhetorical and an effort to take account of one's set
toward reality are prior concerns, hence contexts of definitional
behavior.
IV
At the outset of this paper I suggested that we must find some
way to deal successfully with both the concreteness and abstractness that any définition of rhetoric demands. I shall suggest one
way that seems to me consistent with the direction that the best
current rhetorical scholarship is taking.
Wayne C. Booth makes a cautionary statement that seems to me
extremely important. In defining rtrhetoric,"he says, we may be
guilty of an ill-timed imperialism. This statement recognizes that
the human territory in which we are interested is one in which
many humans are at work from many points of view. These points
of view go by various names, among them, politicai science,
sociology, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and
history. If we want to know the territory we refer to as "rhetorical," we must, as Booth puts it, repudiate "once and for ail the
notion of a takeover and embrace rather the notion of a pluralistic set of arts, learning from ail relevant disciplines and indeed
willing to be absorbed by other disciplines at appropriate
moments/'17
It may not be patently absurd, as James Steel Smith thinks, to
talk of a "rhetoric of city planning."18There is certainly a strong
body of arguments on this topic. The arguments hâve persisted
over a long enough time to take some recognizable shapes, and
a person entering into such arguments, as speaker, listener, critic,
or whatever will become aware of the reality of that rhetorical
environment. But if one were to become interested in those sorts
of arguments, he would find himself involved in a complex séries
of actions and pressures that would be amenable to politicai,
historical, or psychological analysis as well as to rhetorical
analysis. Although he might recognize a strong point of view that
ROBERT L. SCOTT
93
would give substanceto any one of thèse concepts, he probably
also would recognize the way they shade off into one another,
and, perhaps, the most important constituents of the planning
enterprisewould be no one of thèse but ratherthe unique something pointed to by all of them.
Recognizing that the environment in which humans live is
created to a significantdegree by human interactionand that a
sense of "rhetoric"may be one amongmany points of view useful
for getting one's bearings in that environment,Aristotle's"the
availablemeans of persuasion"may become quite an appropriate
définition, but one must not think of rhetorical attributes as
exclusively the property of speakers,writers, or other messagesenders. By analogy consider the fréquent uses of the word
"people"these days. People'sPark,People'sGovernment,People's
Grocery,and Power to thè People are all common phrases.We
also hear such things as, 'We are fighting in Vietnam to assure
the right of the people to choose. . . ." Such sounds as 'We the
people of the United States in orderto form . . ." or "government
of the people, by the people, and for the people . . ." may echo
in our ears when we are presented with current uses of the
obviously potent term.
In thinkingof the term,"people,"we may make severalobservations that specify the sensés of rhetoricto which I have alluded.
We may notice (1) that the term is ambiguous,(2) that the term
has traditionalappeal, and (3) that the term has différentcognitive and affective content for différent communitiesof users.
(The firsttwo assertionsmay seem quite acceptable;in référence
to the third, I shall remarkonly that the person who feels quite
comfortablereadingthe GettysburgAddressmight feel quite uncomfortablesimply seeing the slogan "Powerto the People" in
the daily newspaper.) In these simple assertionsrésides the potency of rhetoric.That potency résides methodologicallyin the
interprétationthat symbol-using makes mandatory; it résides
traditionallyin the past expériencesthat are the starting points
for any meaning arising from interprétationsof the moment;
and it résides currentlyin the ongoing processes of mutuai persuasion that produce shiftìngs of meanings or even reappropriations of meanings.
Let me try to restatethese three observationsas levels on which
we sense rhetoric.
1. We have rhetoricin a strategiesense. This sense of rhetoric
suggests that there are forms that endure; that is, that are not
peculiar to particularcircumstances.The stratégies- the forms-
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ON NOT DEFINING "rHETORIC"
that are rhetorical can be used to shape discourse, or they can be
used to understand discourse. The assumption that informs this
sensé of rhetoric is that symbolic forms tend to govern human
response- cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally.
2. We hâve rhetoric in a substantial sensé. This sensé of rhetoric suggests that styles of discourse embody well recognized and
fundamental values operative in a society. There is a reciprocai
relationship between a society and its rhetoric, each drawing
from the other.
3. We hâve rhetoric in a dynamic sensé. This sensé of rhetoric
suggests that the day-to-day living patterns, life-styles, of people
will enforce différences, that thèse will be reflected in vocabularies,
and that thèse vocabularies will help identify within a shifting
society the important groups that constitute thè larger body. AU
three sensés of rhetoric are abstract, but the third sensé is the
least abstract
Rhetoric in the first sensé, thè strategie, ìs the old rhetoric of
form. This is the sensé most prévalent in the traditional théories
of rhetoric. To say that it is a rhetoric of form is to say that this
rhetoric is basicaÛy a set of Statements, more or less systematic,
purporting to explain how connections may be made among the
éléments of a communicative situation. The old rhetoric is apt
to discuss forms of argument, forms of appeal, forms of phrasing
arguments and appeals, and the lîke. To say that this is the old
rhetoric is not to say that it is bad. In fact, such rhetoric is badly
needed as insight into possible ways of lessening différences that
prove hurtful.
We may find it helpful to think of the second and third sensés
of rhetoric as forming together a new rhetoric of value-evolution.
Undoubtedly there has always been rhetoric of this sort, but the
traditional théories did not tend to focus on it. An enlarged concept of rhetoric is necessary if we are to comprehend the substantial and dynamic sensés in which rhetoric functions to
generate continuous validation of ways in which communities
act together.
Today we often hear claims that each community or culture
has a rhetoric uniquely its own and that to this community or
culture the old rhetoric that has been taught across the centuries
in the dominant Western intellectual tradition is no longer relevant. One will risk little in saying that there is both truth and
falsity in this assertion; that sort of judgment is possible about
almost any sweeping assertion. What the assertion recognizes
validly is the substantial and, especially, the dynamic sensés of
ROBERT L. SCOTT
95
rhetoric. These sensés make new rhetorics, and the new rhetorics
we would do well to study. The task of studying such rhetorics
is endless.
I am not arguing that there is, in addition to the new rhetorics,
an old rhetoric that is timeless and universal. But I do believe
that rhetoric in its strategie sense binds together the rhetorics of
many times and places.
V
In summary, I have tried to make three generai arguments
about defining or not defining rhetoric. First, that any définition
of rhetoric that is taken as once-and-for-all is apt to be gravely
misleading. Any définition is best grounded in some sense of reality; thus the second point. To me the pertinent sensés of reality
tend to be of three sorts, but I am sure that they could be seen
otherwise. The point of view I have used to indicate levels of
rhetoric is that of intersubjective reality. Thirdly, I have argued
that our environment is rhetorical and have tried to indicate
several concomitants of that statement Among thèse is the position that any définition of rhetoric to be useful must point to
several levels of expérience. I have designated thèse as thè strategie, the substantial, and the dynamic. But more important than
thèse labels is the division of rhetoric into the "old"and the "new."
Our study of rhetoric will be more fruitful if we take thèse as
différent but not competing sensés of rhetoric.
NOTES
1 "Religion, Scholarship, and the Resituation of Man," Daedalus, 91
(Spring 1962), 425.
2 I refer to the Proceedings of the National Developmental Project on
Rhetoric sponsored by the Speech CommunicationAssociation supported by
a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, 1970. These
have now been published as The Prospect of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer
and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971).
3 Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry tnto the Atms of Science
(1961; rpt. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 18.
4 "Huey Backs the Pigs Down with an M-l Rifle and a Law Book,
in Mitchell Goodman, assembler, The Movement Toward a New America,
The Beginning of a Long Revolution (New York: Knopf/Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970), p. 206.
Ibid., p. 5 ff.
Time, 15 Febr. 1963, p. 106.
7 I have discussed thèse sorts of questions several times. Especially
96
ON NOT DEFINING "rHETORIC"
relevant to the problem at hand are "A Rhetoric of Facts: Arthur Larson's
Stance as a Persuader,"Speech Monographs,35 (June 1968), 109-121; and
"On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," The Central States Speech Journal,
18 (Febr. 1967), 9-17.
8 Bhetoric I. 2 (1355b). W. Rhys Roberts trans.
» A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 43.
10 My thought on thèse points is much influenced by Jérôme S. Bruner,
Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New
York: Science Editions, 1962), esp. chapter 1. But I work from their book.
11 Cf. Richard M. Weaver, "Language L· Sermonic," in Dimensions of
Rhetorical Scholarship, éd. Roger Nebergall (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma
Department of Speech, 1963).
12 For rhetoricians, the problem of interpreting Aristotle seems endless.
Edwin Black (Rhetorical Criticism, New York: Macmillan, 1965) suggests
that a dominant trend in interprétation should be referred to as neoAristotelian.Lloyd Bitzer's well-known explanationof Aristotle'senthymeme
(The QuarterlyJournalof Speech, 45 [Dec. 1959], 399-408) suggests to me
a stronger, that is a less passive, rôle for the audience. Cf. also Lawrence
Rosenfield, "Rhetorical Criticism and an Aristotelian Notion of Process,"
Sveech Monozravhs. 33 (March 1966). 1-16.
!» "The Scope of Rhetoric Today: A Polemical Excursion,"in The Prospect of RJietoric,p. 106.
14 See "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," The
Quarterly Journal
of Speech, 39 (Dec. 1953), 407.
15 Cf. Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the Contemporary
World," in The Prospect of Rhetoric,pp. 21-43. Becker argues that the most
important concept to attain is that of message-mosiac, that is, to recognize
that a person constantly audits from his environment message-bits with
which he makes the messages he receives. Think, for example, of the message of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy as that message
came to exist in your life.
16 Many will think of Stephen S. Toulmin's The Uses of Argument
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958) in connection with this point.
I believe that my sensé of warrant is similar to his, although he does not
stress it as necessarily a value assumption or premise, as I tend to do.
One might also compare Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation,"
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Jan. 1968), 1-14. It seems to me that Bitzer
argues for the reality of rhetoric in the situation, i.e., the environment;but
he stresses this reality- the exigences, constraints, and audiences* inclinations- as it reveals resourcesfor the speaker. That is a useful way to look at
the rhetorical situation, but we ought not to limit our view; and, I think,
Bitzer's essay does invite a broader interprétation.
17 The Prospect of Rhetoric, p. 106.
18 "Jargonin the Humanities,"Harpers, March 1964, p. 112.