© Michael Lacewing
Expressivism: Do we value the ar tists’ selfexpression or our responses?
The numbered artworks referred to in this handout are listed, with links, on the
companion website.
AESTHETIC EMOTION?
One theory of why we value art is that good art moves us. To say this is to refer to the
emotions evoked in the audience. But understanding this emotional affect is problematic
once we say that there is not just one, special ‘aesthetic emotion’ (or aesthetic pleasure)
we experience in front of all good works of art. For example, if the account of
expression given above is correct, then there is a way in which a sad painting makes us
feel sad.
But in what way? It doesn’t make us feel sad in the same way as receiving bad news.
When we feel sad in everyday life, there is normally something about which we feel sad.
What do we feel sad about when looking at a sad painting? Nothing in particular; or if
there is something it is something personal in our lives, and the painting doesn’t express
sadness about that. Furthermore, feeling sad in real life won’t make us feel happy, but we
can enjoy how we feel in response to a sad painting.
So does a sad painting make us feel sad in a ‘disinterested’ way? Is there a special
‘aesthetic’ sadness? Perhaps it isn’t quite right to say we feel sad; rather, we imagine
feeling sad. We could argue that the artwork represents an object (7. Vernet’s A
Landscape at Sunset (1773) and 8. Turner’s The Scarlet Sunset (1830-40)) or situation (24.
Grünewald’s The Crucifixion (c. 1502)) that would arouse emotion in real life, and invites
us to imagine how we would feel if we came face-to-face with it. But this is too
superficial. In 15. Leonardo Da Vinci, The Virgin of the Rocks (c. 1491-1508), it is not
(just?) the situation but the way it has been expressed that creates the emotional
response. In any case, this explanation can only work for artwork that is representative.
What of abstract art (26. Rothko’s Red on Maroon (1959)) or conceptual art (21.
Duchamp’s Fountain (1917)) or music? So we don’t respond by imagining what we would
feel in a situation in real life.
Another answer is that we use our imagination to retrieve what it is that the artist is
expressing. The ‘aesthetic’ way in which we feel relates to the way the artist expresses the
emotion in the painting. This is different from how we experience and express emotion
in daily life. An artwork is not an outpouring of emotion, as the artist must be able to
work with the emotion to find the precise expression. So, as Wordsworth said, it involves
emotion ‘recollected in tranquillity’ (Lyrical Ballads, Introduction). Furthermore, what the
artwork expresses is not a direct emotional response to any event. It is more general, as
expressing oneself in art is part of a way of living. If we experience a version of what the
artist has expressed, then this explains many of the differences between emotions in
response to art and emotions in response to everyday life.
CONNECTING EXPRESSION AND RESPONSE
To talk of what an artwork expresses is not to talk just of what we feel in response to it.
This would be too subjective and doesn’t take account of what the artist sought to
express. For example, someone might be saddened by 34. Schedoni’s Holy Family as it
reminds them of the loss of intimacy in their own family. That a painting merely causes
an emotion is not enough to say that it expresses that emotion. The person won’t say
that the painting is sad merely because it causes them to be sad. On their own, the
emotions caused in me are too subjective to ascribe any expressive property to the
painting. Therefore, if we value art for its expressive quality, then it cannot be just our
responses to it that we value.
However, to say that we value just the artist’s self-expression, and not our responses, is
also implausible. That we enjoy art and that it can illuminate our experience are both
clearly aspects of art’s value to us.
The account of expression above connects the artist’s self-expression and our responses
as two sides of the same coin. We seek to experience what the artist has tried to express;
the artist tries to find exactly the expression that will enable us to do this. In valuing
expression, we value both what the artist has to express – the vision and feelings – and
our own responses to this, including the work of imagination required of us to achieve it,
the emotions evoked, and the effects of the experience.
‘THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY’
In saying why we value art, we have referred to what the artist ‘intended’ to represent or
express in order to understand an artwork. But any attempt to refer to the artist’s state of
mind in this way faces an important objection known as ‘the intentional fallacy’ (Wimsatt
& Beardley, ‘The intentional fallacy’).
The objection makes two points. First, it contrasts the public, accessible nature of the
artwork, something we can all experience; and the private nature of the mind – each of
us knows our own mental states ‘first-hand’, in a way that no one else can. From the
artwork, we cannot infer the state of mind of the artist. We cannot know what the artist
intended when creating the artwork. Second, it emphasises the distinction between the
artwork and the artist’s mind. These are distinct things; it is the artwork we respond to
and should be thinking about, not the mind of the artist. For both reasons, the artist’s
intention is irrelevant to our interpretation and aesthetic response to the work. If this is
right, then we cannot value art for what the artist’s self-expression, since we cannot
know this. To disagree is to commit the intentional fallacy.
To come to know about the artist’s mind, we would need to study the artist, i.e. engage
in biography. Or if we think we do know of some intention the artist had when making
the artwork, then we need to check this by finding evidence of it in the artwork itself – in
which case, again, we don’t need to refer to the artist, but can study just the artwork on
its own. The objection concludes that in making judgments about an artwork –
interpreting it or valuing it – we should do it entirely on its own merits (the ‘internal
evidence’, i.e. the evidence present in the artwork itself) and not in terms of the
psychological or social background which contributed to its creation (the ‘external
evidence’).
In support of the objection, we can point to the distinction we make between applying
certain psychological properties to the work and applying them to the artist. So we might
say that the work is elegant, without saying the artist is elegant. To say a work is sad is
not to say that the artist is sad (to express sadness in the work, they need to recollect
sadness, not be sad). The psychological descriptions of an artwork don’t derive from the
psychological properties of the artist, they stand alone.
Since we respond to an artwork without knowing the mind of the artist, it cannot be the
artist’s state of mind that we value, but what the artwork evokes in us. The value of art
must therefore lie in our responses.
Objection
The distinction between the artwork and the artist’s mind is an important one. But we
can respond that it does not mean that we cannot refer to the mind of the artist at all in
interpreting and valuing an artwork. We should note that some descriptions of an
artwork only make sense if we apply them to the artist as well, e.g. ‘perceptive’,
‘sensitive’, ‘mature’, ‘courageous’, or ‘pretentious’. An artwork can’t be perceptive in its
own right; rather, we mean that it demonstrates an insight of the artist’s, which they have
then expressed in and through the artwork.
But surely, we can reply, someone might create, say, a pretentious artwork without being
a pretentious person. This is right, but isn’t an objection. To say an artwork is
pretentious is to say that the artist displays this quality in this artwork, on this occasion,
not that they are generally a pretentious person. Likewise with perceptive, sensitive,
mature and so on. We can therefore argue that we can value art for its expression of the
artist’s mind. The ‘intentional fallacy’ is not a fallacy at all.
THE ARTIST’S MIND IN THE ARTWORK
If the artist only displays a quality in the artwork, then we can still distinguish between
the work and the artist’s mind. In literature, for instance, a man can write a novel from
the first-person perspective of someone completely different, e.g. a little girl. This is a
kind of imitation or impersonation. Likewise, an actor can portray someone with
completely different qualities to themselves. We can generalise: From the artwork we can
infer the psychological properties of the person ‘imitated’, but this still tells us nothing
about the artist themselves.
This argument is confused. First, while a novelist may write a novel to seem as if a little
girl had written it, to say that an artwork is pretentious is not to say that the artist has
successfully created the artwork to seem as if someone pretentious created it. To call an
artwork pretentious is a criticism; to say that the artist successfully imitates someone
pretentious in creating it can be praise, as this is difficult and may require great insight
into how a pretentious person would think and create.
Second, the argument contradicts itself. It refers to the intentions of the artist while
saying that we cannot do this. When a male novelist writes from the perspective of a girl,
we can know that he intends this effect because we know he is not a girl. It is relevant to
our assessment of the novel that we know this. Suppose we didn’t know who the author
was – we didn’t know whether it was a little girl or an adult, male writer. Then, for
example, we could not judge whether the effect is successful, whether the author has
insight into the mind of a little girl or not, and so on. The same issue arises for whether
an artwork is ironic or satirical. It is only satirical if the artist intends it to be. But if we do
not know this, we may mistakenly take what the point of view it expresses seriously. To
say the artist imitates someone pretentious in making the artwork likewise requires us to
refer to the intentions of the artist; an imitation is only an imitation if it is intended. So
making the judgment that a work has its psychological properties because the artist
imitated a person with those properties requires us to refer to the intentions of the artist
– which is just what the argument says we can’t do.
Third, some psychological properties cannot be imitated successfully by someone who
doesn’t have them. Someone who is not perceptive cannot successfully imitate being
perceptive; someone who is immature cannot successfully imitate maturity. So a
perceptive and mature artwork must be created by a perceptive and mature artist. Again,
to say this is not to say the artist is perceptive and mature throughout all aspects of their
lives. The distinction we need to observe is not between the artwork and the artist’s
mind, but between those psychological properties of the artist displayed in the artwork
and the psychological properties that characterise the artist as a person generally. An
artist may only be mature or perceptive when creating art, and a mess in the rest of their
life.
This last point has an important implication, viz. that the best or even the only evidence
that an artist is mature, perceptive etc. is their art. So the argument against the intentional
fallacy is right to say that we need to find evidence of any intention in the artwork. But it
is wrong to say that other sources of information, e.g. biography, are irrelevant, as these
can help us to see the intention expressed in the work.
It is worth emphasising a final time that in interpreting and valuing a work for what it
expresses does not attempt to establish what went on consciously in the artist’s mind.
Expression is formed by much more than this. First, there are unconscious mental states
that contribute to the process. Second, various happy accidents in making the work may
lead the artist to adapt the picture. Third, as they respond to the work in creating it, they
may alter their intention. Precisely what the work will be is not fixed in advance.
For these reasons, what the artist says the work expresses does not have special
authority. What they say may only reflect what they are conscious of, while the artwork
may express psychological properties of which they are not conscious. The artist may be
more perceptive in creating the work than in interpreting it themselves! Their ability to
express themselves in art does not mean they are equally able to express themselves in
descriptions of art.