Foreign Policy Analysis (2007) 3, 79–104
Leadership Style and International Norm
Violation: The Case of the Iraq War
VAUGHN P. SHANNON
University of Northern Iowa
JONATHAN W. KELLER
James Madison University
We examine the topic of decision making and norm violation in international politics. While constructivists emphasize norm conformity due
to global social pressures, and realists emphasize the ease of norm violation due to self-interest and the lack of a world enforcer, we argue that
these approaches fail to explain variation in normative behavior in foreign policy. We suggest that normative behavior is mitigated importantly
by leaders’ beliefs and decision-making styles. Leaders who view the
international environment in state-centric, Hobbesian terms and are less
sensitive to the political context are more likely to violate international
norms than leaders who view world politics in more benign terms and
are more sensitive to contextual pressures. We test these expectations by
correlating key leadership traits of Bush Administration officials with
their positions regarding the normatively suspect invasion of Iraq in
2003. The findings suggest that need for power, belief in ability to
control events, ingroup bias, and especially distrust may be important
predictors of one’s willingness to violate international norms. We discuss
the implications of our results for the prospect for international society
to regulate force, and call for a third wave of constructivism wedded to
its ideational ally of political psychology.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was broadly seen as a violation of international norms, by
legal and international opinion accounts. Lacking UN approval or credible evidence of imminent danger necessitating immediate preemptive action,1 the invasion’s counternormative nature was evident in the widespread condemnation of
statesmen and general publics alike. Administration arguments that the war was
authorized by previous UN resolutions or was justified on humanitarian grounds
have not been widely shared and validated by world or scholarly opinion. While the
wisdom of the Iraq war can be debated, there is ample evidence and general
Authors’ note: Many thanks are due to Margaret Hermann and Michael Young for input into this project. Thanks
are also due to Gavin Duffy and Don Sylvan for their useful comments, as well as those of the anonymous reviewers.
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2005.
1
We use the term preemption to refer to immediate action to deal with an imminent threat and the term preventive
war to indicate action that is intended to deal with a longer term (often potential) threat. Although the Bush
administration uses the label ‘‘preemption’’ to refer to its post-9/11 strategy of dealing with potential threats from
rogue states and terrorists, preventive war more accurately describes this strategy.
r 2007 International Studies Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
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Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
agreement among prowar and antiwar thinkers that the invasion was contrary to
much international opinion and a departure from prevailing normative conventions.
The U.S. under Bush has been described as revolutionary (Daalder and Lindsay
2005) and radical in its departure from UN Charter convention and the norms
underpinning the prevailing diplomatic culture (Wiseman 2005). The Iraq war
challenges liberal and constructivist theory regarding the power of norms to constrain powerful states from doing what they define to be in their interests. This case
casts doubt on the assumption that states carefully avoid looking like antisocial
norm violators, and seems to vindicate realism’s view that power and will are all that
matter. But showing that a state can violate norms when it wants to does not
clarify the conditions under which such violations are likely to occur. In short,
there remains considerable unexplained variation in the violation of international
norms.
Rather than look only at system norms or state-level characteristics to explain
violation, we suggest an examination of leadership style, the package of beliefs, values,
and decision-making tendencies that characterize a given decision maker. Scholarship indicates that two aspects of leadership style are particularly relevant for
explaining one’s propensity to respect or violate international norms. The first
element involves how sensitive leaders are to the political context. Some leaders are
more ‘‘ideologically driven’’ or task-oriented, closed to new information from the
environment, and relatively inattentive to social expectations and the preferences of
constituencies, while others are more pragmatic and highly attuned to these
external influences (Stoessinger 1979; Backman 1985; Hermann and Kegley 1995;
Cialdini and Trost 1998; Hermann et al. 2001; Renshon 2003; Keller 2005).
The second element involves how leaders view the international environment:
as a threatening, Hobbesian realm in which states must jealously guard their
sovereignty and aggressively promote their interests, or as a relatively benign
international society in which states are mutually enveloped by a structure of
norms and institutions (George 1969; Holsti 1970; Driver 1977; Hagan 1994;
Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). Leaders who view the world in more Hobbesian
terms and are less sensitive to the political context should be more likely to violate
international norms than those who have a more benign view of international
politics and are more sensitive to information and opinion in the broader environment.
The question of norm violation is important for the general conduct of international relations, and speaks more broadly to the theoretical debate about the
power of norms and the socialization process in international society. First-wave
system constructivists presumed socialization processes and systemic normative effects without explaining variation. Second-wave constructivists took note of differing levels of normative adoption among states, focusing particularly on the
‘‘cultural match’’ between domestic and global norms. We seek to foster a third
wave of constructivism that engages its ideational ally, political psychology, to
understand normative variation at the individual level of decision makers. Within a
state, leaders may vary in normative beliefs and the disposition to ignore the norms
of international society.
Below, we develop hypotheses regarding how specific leadership factors will
shape elites’ propensity to challenge normative constraints. We then test these hypotheses by assessing (through at-a-distance techniques) key leadership traits of
Bush administration officials and examining whether these characteristics help
explain variation in the positions adopted by these officials on the question of
invading Iraq in 2003. Our findings indicate that belief in ability to control events,
need for power, ingroup bias, and especially distrust may be particularly important
predictors of one’s willingness to violate international norms. We conclude by discussing the implications of this study and avenues for further research.
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
81
System Norms and Agent Violation
Norm violation and compliance has been studied in the context of international
relations from various viewpoints and with mixed results (Chayes and Chayes 1995;
Krasner 1999; Shannon 2000; Herrmann and Shannon 2001). Rationalists presume that, for states trapped in a dangerous anarchic environment, norms and
rules are either irrelevant or convenient tools of utilitarian behavior (Mearsheimer
1995). For realists, rules are followed if they are useful, but are discarded if a state
has the power and interest to do so. Rulers pursuing goals vary in the degree to
which they are ‘‘dependent on external actors’’ as opposed to ‘‘rely almost exclusively on domestic sources’’ (Krasner 1999:7), but the assumption is that logics of
consequences trump normative obligations in the international environment.
Norms are at worst ‘‘brittle stalks’’ created and violated by the strong, or at best
‘‘cognitive scripts’’ that guide some talk and action but that are easily discarded
(Krasner1999:58–67; see also Schweller and Priess 1997).
Constructivists have pointed to the regulative and constitutive role of international law and rules in shaping state behavior and interests. Norms, if internalized
and habituated (Hopf 2002), are argued to be followed subconsciously without
decision. Even if not internalized, ‘‘weakly socialized’’ states follow norms out of fear
of shaming and social ostracism (Schimmelfennig 2001:62–65). This sociological,
structuralist approach often presumes a homogeneous normative culture and a
universal socializing process by which norms are clearly understood and followed
by all. Although some acknowledge variation in norms’ clarity and power (Legro
1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), systemic normative approaches are unable to
account for deviations in normative behavior (Shannon 2000:297–298; Keller
2005).
A second wave of constructivism has sought to explain such variation at the level
of state differences and socialization mechanisms. Different agents internalize the
same norm to different degrees based on preexisting domestic norms that more
or less ‘‘match’’ international norms. (Checkel 1999; Gurowitz 1999). Johnston
(2001:509) observed that different social environments vary in terms of their persuasiveness and social influence, suggesting that institutionalization can vary. While
this has clarified how some countries have adopted norms more easily than others,
this does not explain agentic variation within a state; namely, that different leaders
vary in terms of their receptivity to social influence. Johnston (2001:506) cites as
important understanding how agent characteristics ‘‘retard or propel the socialization process.’’ But Johnston and constructivists in general have not delved into
individual agency to theorize what micoprocesses interact with the social environment to affect the power of norms.
One study seeking to explain norm violation at the individual level focuses on
psychological mechanisms and the interpretation of ambiguous norms. Shannon
(2000) suggests ‘‘leaders who value their standing in international society seek to
avoid negative social judgments and are likely to violate the norm only if there is
room for interpretation of the norm or the situation.’’ Shannon (2000) adds that
‘‘the more parameters a norm possesses, and the more ambiguous those parameters are, the easier it is for actors to interpret them favorably to justify violation. . .If the situation is plausible for states to claim exemption, they violate;
otherwise they are constrained.’’2 Schimmelfennig (2001:65) notes that states
reinterpret norms or their situational relevance, to defend against the shaming of
others.
But the mere existence of norm ambiguity and plausible ‘‘exemption
claims’’ does not guarantee that leaders will violate norms, and even relatively
2
This formulation is consistent with Keller’s (2005) notion of potential domestic constraints, which tend to be
more ambiguous and more easily surmountable than direct constraints on leaders.
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Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
unambiguous norms are violated at times. We argue that in the agent–structure
debate individual beliefs deserve more attention as they mediate systemic normative influences (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Malici and Malici 2005). We agree with
Johnston’s (2001:506–507) call examining how individuals are (or are not) influenced by the social environment of international institutions, and tracing the effects
of such agents ‘‘on the foreign policy processes of states.’’ We do not dismiss norms
out of hand as do realists, for most rules are followed by most states most of the time
(Henkin 1979). Instead, we seek an understanding of which decision makers are
more likely to violate norms and why.
We suggest that two key aspects of leadership style are particularly important in
shaping how leaders perceive and respond to normative constraints: leaders’ sensitivity to the political context and their views of the political universe. We contend
that decision makers vary in sensitivity to the political and psychological costs of
norm violation, and in their views about the importance and determinants of their
standing in international society. Those who are primarily motivated by the advancement of an ideology or the achievement of a specific task (particularly if
defined in terms of national interests) will exhibit less sensitivity to international
opinion and a willingness to violate those norms that appear to interfere with these
cherished goals. While the threat of negative international evaluation may inhibit
one’s consideration of norm violation, evidence suggests that leaders differ in terms
of their concern for political approval, as well as which peer groups they are looking
to for approval (Renshon 2003). A leader may identify with, and thus seek approval
from, domestic constituencies rather than the ‘‘international community.’’ Thus,
while we agree that the motivation to maintain or enhance self-esteem is important
in explaining behavior, we argue that there are differences in the sources from
which leaders derive their self-esteem.
Leaders’ Sensitivity to the Political Context
Scholars of political leadership have identified leaders’ responsiveness to the political
environment as a variable that plays a crucial role in shaping their political behavior.
This important leadership variable, captured by such typologies as ‘‘crusader’’
versus ‘‘pragmatist’’ (Stoessinger 1979), ‘‘ideologue’’ versus ‘‘opportunist’’ (Ziller
et al. 1977), ‘‘directive’’ versus ‘‘consultative’’ (Bass and Valenzi 1974), ‘‘ideologically driven’’ versus ‘‘contextually sensitive’’ (Hermann and Kegley 1995), and
‘‘constraint challenger’’ versus ‘‘constraint respecter’’ (Keller 2005) has important
implications for how leaders will respond to normative constraints in their environments. For example, Stoessinger (1979, 2005:276) depicts ‘‘crusaders’’ as ‘‘rigid,
confident and intent on carrying through an agenda with little concern for others.’’
In contrast, ‘‘pragmatists’’ assess situations with ‘‘input from a wide array of voices’’
and are ‘‘flexible and sensitive to the consequences of actions when considering
decisions’’ (Stoessinger 2005:276). The primary psychological explanation for why
some leaders are crusaders or pragmatists revolves around the source of a given
leader’s self-validation or sense of self-worth. Some leaders derive their self-worth
through faithful adherence to a set of internal principles, an ideology, or a sacred
task, while others derive their self-validation through achieving and maintaining
the support of key actors in their environment (Hermann 1993; Renshon
2003:287–288; Keller 2005).
Leaders’ Views of the Political Universe
How decision makers view the political universe also has important implications for
their willingness to violate international norms. Whereas structuralists like Wendt
(1999) argue the existence of a ‘‘culture of anarchy’’ that is Hobbesian, Lockean, or
Kantian, we suggest that agents vary in their normative orientations even within
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
83
single states. From the ‘‘operational code’’ framework, the question becomes
whether a decision maker perceives a Hobbesian state of natureFin which states
must rely on self-help strategies and assertively defend their interests in the face of
a range of threatsFor perceives a relatively nonthreatening domain in which states
are intertwined in an international society of laws and constrained by international
institutions (George 1969; Holsti 1970; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998).3 While
most leaders are concerned with both national security and international legitimacy,
those who are quicker to see threats to their state’s security and are more attached
to their state’s sovereignty are more likely to believe it necessary to violate norms
that appear to costrain the defense of these interests.
This is the point made by democratic peace theorists, who explain the ‘‘dyadic
peace’’ (the fact that democracies do not fight each other, but will fight nondemocratic states) in terms of democratic leaders’ willingness to circumvent domestic
institutional and normative constraintsFat times engaging in preemptive attacks on
nondemocraciesFbecause they fear exploitation by these adversaries (Doyle 1986;
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Rousseau et al. 1996).4 Hagan (1994)
similarly connects leaders’ beliefs regarding the nature of the international environment to their orientations toward constraints: leaders with a ‘‘moderate’’ or ‘‘acquiescent’’ orientation do not see the international environment as particularly
threatening and ‘‘recognize significant internal economic, societal, and political
constraints on their use of national power’’ (Hagan 1994:199). In contrast, leaders
with ‘‘militant’’ or ‘‘radical’’ orientations view the international environment as
extremely threatening to state interests and tend to challenge constraints that
interfere with their use of the confrontational political, economic, and military
tactics that are deemed necessary to deal with a host of enemies (Hagan 1994:200).
Along the same lines, research on prospect theory (Levy 1997) indicates that a
relatively Hobbesian view of world politics may shape how leaders define their
‘‘reference point,’’ systematically placing them in the ‘‘domain of losses’’ due to
perceived threats and provoking more risk-acceptant foreign policy behavior in an
attempt to avoid anticipated losses. This risk-acceptant orientation implies decreased sensitivity to international condemnation and other risks associated with
forceful foreign policy acts.
Leadership Characteristics and Willingness to Violate International Norms
The two critical leadership factors examined aboveFsensitivity to the political
context and views of the political universeFare relatively broad categories into
which one may place the more specific leadership traits that are typically examined
in empirical studies. Distrust and ingroup bias are two traits that directly involve
leaders’ views of the political universe, while task emphasis, need for power, belief
in ability to control events, self-confidence, and conceptual complexity each shape,
in ways described below, the degree to which a leader is responsive to the political
context. The following draws on theory and research in the fields of political leadership, psychology, and management science to develop hypotheses concerning
how each of these traits will affect leaders’ willingness to violate international
norms.5
3
The first philosophical belief in the Operational Codes scheme is: ‘‘What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life?
Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political
opponents?’’ (George 1969:201)
4
These scholars generally treat leaders’ perceptions regarding their vulnerability as a constant rather than a
variable (effectively eliminating leadership style as an explanatory variable). For a critique of this work, see Keller
2005.
5
In assessing the effects of leadership style on norm violation, we have chosen to focus on the seven leadership
traits that comprise the LTA system rather than the philosophical and instrumental beliefs that make up the
Operational Codes scheme for two reasons. First, there are somewhat clearer theoretical links (explicated in the
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Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
Distrust
Distrust is the general belief that others’ statements and actions are often insincere
and that one should regard with suspicion the motives underlying others’ behavior
(Tucker 1965; Stuart and Starr 1982). Leaders with higher levels of distrust see the
world as more threatening and their adversaries as more implacably hostile than
leaders who are more trusting, and these magnified threat perceptions lead to an
enhanced willingness to use forceful policy instruments in order to neutralize these
threats (Holsti 1962; Driver 1977). Therefore, leaders who are high in distrust
should be more willing to violate norms that constrain one’s ability to deal with such
threats (particularly norms restricting the use of military force under certain circumstances).
Ingroup Bias
Ingroup bias is a view of the world in which one’s own group (social, political,
ethnic, etc.) holds center stage. There are strong emotional attachments to this
ingroupFwhich is perceived as the bestFthere is also an emphasis on maintaining
ingroup culture and status (Druckman 1968; LeVine and Campbell 1972;
Hermann 1999:29). Leaders high on ingroup bias tend to see the world in ‘‘us
versus them’’ terms, remain highly vigilant regarding threats to their group, and
are quick to respond to perceived threats with forceful policy instruments (Crow
and Noel 1977). They place great importance on maintaining the honor and independence of the group from external sources that are perceived to be meddling
in the group’s internal affairs. Hence, leaders high on this characteristic should be
more skeptical of international norms in general and willing to violate those norms
that are perceived to interfere with the sovereign exercise of their state’s prerogatives in defending its interests. Because both ingroup bias and distrust have been
linked to a preference for more aggressive foreign policy actions and an inclination
to circumvent constraints on the use of force (Hagan 1994), these two characteristics represent the best predictors of leaders’ willingness to violate norms of the
nonuse of force.
Task/Interpersonal Emphasis
Task/interpersonal emphasis refers to the extent to which, in one’s dealings with
others, one is relatively more concerned with getting the task accomplished, or
attending to the feelings and needs of others (Bales 1950; Fiedler 1967; Byars 1972,
1973). Task-oriented leaders are less sensitive to others’ views and inclined to
ignore or suppress opposition, while interpersonally oriented leaders commonly
seek consensus and accommodate opposition (McGregor 1960; Blake and Mouton
1964; Likert 1967; Hersey and Blanchard 1982). Hence, task-oriented leaders
should be more willing to violate norms and ignore domestic or international
opinion when these obstacles interfere with achievement of the all-important task.
Need for Power
Need for power involves the desire to influence, control, or dominate other people
and groups (Winter 1973; McClelland 1975). Individuals scoring higher on the
power motive adopt a more zero-sum approach to bargaining situations, focusing
on self-interested payoffs rather than accommodation or mutual gains. Importantly,
such individuals display a heightened willingness to manipulate and deceive others,
violating certain norms of ‘‘fair play’’ in order to achieve their goals (Terhune
following pages) between each of the LTA traits and norm violation/acceptance than between the Operational Code
beliefs and norm violation. Second, the LTA scheme incorporates several of the Op Code beliefs that we believe will
shape leaders’ orientations toward norms (for instance, the LTA trait ‘‘belief in ability to control events’’ assesses
locus of control, which is the basis for the ‘‘historical development’’ philosophical belief in the Operational Codes
scheme).
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
85
1968a, 1968b). As with task emphasis, this characteristic has also been linked to a
preference for relatively ‘‘autocratic’’ decision-making methods and the suppression of dissent (McClelland 1961; Winter 1973; Fodor and Smith 1982; Preston
2001). For these reasons, we expect leaders scoring higher on the power motive to
be more willing to circumvent normative constraints in the pursuit of their own
objectives.
Belief in Ability to Control Events
Belief in ability to control events is a view of the world in which individuals and
governments can exercise some degree of control over the situations in which they
find themselves. Leaders high in this trait tend to pursue active policy agendas,
seeking to control policymaking and implementation rather than delegating tasks
to others. Such leaders are so sure they can have an impact on the world, they are
less prone to compromise and they ‘‘exude confidence in their decisionFthey
know what should be done’’ (Hermann 1999:14–15). Those with this characteristic
should be more willing to violate those norms that stand in the way of their ability to
control outcomesFparticularly once they have made a decision to pursue a specific
course of action. Leaders who do not believe they can control events are more
reactive and cautious, unwilling to initiate bold policies, and content with letting
others take the lead. According to Hermann (1999:13), leaders low in both need for
power and belief in ability to control events respect constraints in their environments and work within the parameters established by others’ preferences, while
leaders who are high in both traits challenge these constraints and take charge to
achieve their objectives.
Self-Confidence
Self-confidence indicates one’s sense of self-importance, an individual’s image of his
or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment (Ziller
et al. 1977). Leaders with high self-confidence are less sensitive to information from
the environment and less likely to adapt to changing circumstances: ‘‘information is
filtered and reinterpreted based on their high sense of self-worth’’ (Hermann
1999:21). Leaders low in self-confidence often appear chameleon-like, shifting
based on the political winds and highly attuned to the preferences of others. We
thus expect leaders higher in self-confidence to be less responsive to norms and less
concerned about identifying and abiding by others’ wishes.
Conceptual Complexity
Conceptual complexity is the degree of differentiation that an individual shows in
describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things. Individuals
lower in conceptual complexity see the world in more black–white, either-or terms,
while those higher in complexity see shades of gray and significant complexity in
the environment (Hermann 1999; Preston and ‘t Hart 1999). Hence, those lower in
complexity tend to be closed to new information, highly trusting of their own
instincts, and relatively inflexible, while those higher in conceptual complexity actively seek out a range of opinions, take a long time making decisions, and include a
range of actors in the deliberative process (Hermann 1999). Lower levels of conceptual complexity may also be associated with a greater willingness to resort to
forceful policy instruments (Driver 1977; Hermann 1984; Preston 2001). One can
infer from these findings that leaders who are lower in conceptual complexity will
be relatively insensitive to international opinion and more likely to violate international norms.
We now turn to a preliminary test of these hypotheses in the context of the U.S.
decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
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Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
The Case of Iraq: Research Design
The events of the 2003 Iraq crisis present a useful opportunity to examine the
plausibility of the above hypotheses. Because we are examining a relatively small
sample of leaders in the context of a single case, this study is best viewed as a
preliminary test of the theoretically grounded hypotheses advanced above. Our
goal is to explore whether each of the above characteristics is correlated with policy
preferences as expected, and what traits are particularly potent predictors of these
preferences. Therefore, we keep these traits separate for the empirical analysis
rather than combining them into composite indicators.
Our focus on the leadership characteristics of key Bush administration officials as
potential explanatory variables appears to be particularly appropriate in this case,
given research showing that elite beliefs and personalities are especially relevant in
crisis situations when (a) such figures occupy a strategic position, (b) the situation is
ambiguous or complex, (c) power is concentrated in the hands of a few decision
makers, and (d) there is change or transition (Greenstein 1987; Winter 2003a:112).
These factors should be particularly relevant in the case of IraqFthe planning for
which began early in a new administration and accelerated in the emotionally
charged high-threat environment of the post-9/11 world. The Iraq case allows us to
examine variation in propensity to circumvent norms within the world’s superpower, a case in which realists would presume violation would be easiest to accomplish. Evidence of normative constraint within the global superpower’s decision
circle would challenge realist expectations.
Our selection of the Iraq case is also based on the assertion that the invasion was a
norm violation. Identifying an action as a norm violation can be difficult and potentially controversial, and we use two criteria below to justify the case: (1) legal
arguments, as the written and codified reflection of collective beliefs about legitimate force and their application in a specific case; and (2) intersubjective normative
assessments by the international community regarding the use of force (Krasner
1999; Cronin 2001). Further, we address the perspectives of U.S. decision makers
themselves on these dimensions, such that they recognize what they are doing is
normatively controversial or suspect if not more. As noted earlier, we do not seek to
debate the wisdom of the Iraq war or the desirability of existing norms but simply
to establish (as both proponents and opponents of the war generally accept) that
this action ran contrary to international opinion and certain prevailing normative
guidelines.
Iraq as Norm Violation
Norm violation is not exactly the same thing as ‘‘illegal’’Fbut the latter is a subset
and indicator of the former. Most legal scholars agree that the prevailing UN
Charter paradigm restricts the use of force to limited circumstances of self-defense
and UN Security Council authorization (Henkin 1989; Simma 1999; Dahl 2004:2;
Kacerauskis 2005:79–80). Within the realm of self-defense, the notion of legal
preemption has been acknowledged on the basis of necessity, immediacy, and proportionality (Dahl 2004:2–3; Kacerauskis 2005:73–75). Israel’s strike against Arab
neighbors in the 1967 Six Day War has been argued to be legal preemption, for
example. But Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor was rejected as an
act of preemptive self-defense and condemned by the Security Council unanimously.
The U.S. sought cover under both the UN authorization tack and the preemptive
self-defense claim against future attack. The U.S. position included a claim to have
legal authority based on resolution 1441 and previous resolutions adopted in
1990–1991 (Ackerman 2003). A few scholars have given the U.S. legal position
credence, suggesting either that existing norms are silent on preemption against
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
87
global terror (Howard 2006), that law is too ambiguous and politicized to assess
(Arend 2003; Has the War in Iraq Made Preemption Less Likely? 2004), or that the Iraq
case met the ‘‘tests’’ of identifying ‘‘when WMD are likely to be used by a state,
directly or through surrogates, and all reasonable means short of force have been
exhausted’’ (Sofaer 2003). But numerous experts in international law were not
convinced either by the argument that military action against Iraq was authorized
by earlier UN resolutions or that the UN Charter allows self-defense against a
perceived future threat, and many legal experts consider the attack to be a violation
of international law (LCNP 2002; Kegley and Raymond 2003; Thomasson 2003).
Further, as we show below, the Bush administration itself was ambivalent about its
position vis-a-vis existing conventions, suggesting an awareness that their approach
was not in the mainstream.
A second way to assess the presence of norm violation is to see what society thinks
about an action. Norms are more than mere laws; they are the intersubjective
prevailing societal ideas of legitimate behavior. If an action provokes widespread
criticism, it can be indicative of behavior out of conformity with social expectations.
Dombrowski and Payne (2003:405), noting that ‘‘numerous states and international
lawyers explicitly view the U.S. action as illegal,’’ conclude that ‘‘with the United
States failing to convince most of the world about the legitimacy of its views, it has
been reduced to violating international norms, all protestations to the contrary.’’
The UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, declared explicitly that the
U.S.-led invasion was ‘‘not in conformity with the UN charter’’ and thus ‘‘from our
point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal’’ (Macaskill and
Borger 2004). Another relevant UN voice, weapons inspection leader and international lawyer Hans Blix, agreed, saying he didnot ‘‘buy the argument the war was
legalised by the Iraqi violation of earlier resolutions,’’ and that ‘‘the Security
Council . . . not the U.K. and U.S. individually . . . has ownership of the ceasefire’’
(Penketh and Grice 2004).
Indeed, the lack of international support is reflected by the failure to obtain an
explicit resolution authorizing force. Michael Glennon points to the obvious conclusion that ‘‘the Security Council wasn’t behind the war in Iraq because the U.S.
couldn’t get the votes’’ (Has the War in Iraq Made Preemption Less Likely? 2004).
Although some supportive countriesFdubbed the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’Fvaried in the degree to which they vocally supported and contributed to the military
operation, a distinct majority of countries argued, as the EU did in an early 2003
resolution, that ‘‘a preemptive strike would not be in accordance with international
law and the UN Charter’’ (Dombrowski and Payne 2003:398–399).
The dimension of world public opinion factors into a general assessment of the
normative nature of an action. In this case, Dombrowski and Payne (2003:402)
report that, while participation in rallies and polls cannot be clearly defined as
‘‘some kind of sophisticated argument against the Bush Doctrine,’’ they did ‘‘clearly
signal widespread opposition to its application in the Iraqi case.’’ They note the five
million participants in worldwide protests in February 2003 and more after the
outbreak of the war, and cite a Gallup International Poll showing that most people
opposing a war carried on ‘‘unilaterally by America and its allies’’ without UN
sanction (Dombrowski and Payne 2003:401).
Finally, relevant to this study is whether the decision makers themselves perceived
their actions as counternormative, defined as we have above as breaking or bending
international law and/or running counter to international opinion about the appropriateness of a particular use of force. In this case, the decision makers themselves seemed aware that they were preparing for and taking action that was
normatively suspect on one or both of the criteria we have discussed: legal and
intersubjective.
UN Ambassador John Negroponte’s letter to the Security Council at the beginning of the war summarized the official U.S. position that the war was ‘‘necessary in
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Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
view of Iraq’s continued material breaches of its disarmament obligations under
relevant Security Council resolutions’’ (Negroponte 2003). The operations were
argued to be authorized under existing Council resolutions 678, 687, and 1441,
wherein ‘‘it has long been recognized and understood that a material breach of
these obligations removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority to use
force under resolution 678.’’ Resolution 1441 ‘‘provided Iraq a ‘‘final opportunity’’
to comply, but stated specifically that violations by Iraq of its obligations under
resolution 1441 to present a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all
aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs and to comply with and cooperate fully in the resolution’s implementation would constitute a further material
breach.’’ In view of Iraq’s material breaches, ‘‘the basis for the cease-fire has been
removed, and use of force is authorized under resolution 678.’’
Whatever the claims of ‘‘necessity’’ and force as ‘‘an appropriate response,’’ it was
clear to the United States and United Kingdom that there was widespread global
opposition at the level of elite and public opinion. The British government and
Attorney General, until right before the war began, apparently ‘‘assumed . . . that it
needed a specific UN mandate’’ to authorize military action (Penketh and Grice
2004). The push in 2002 for a UN resolution that authorized ‘‘all necessary means’’
to go after Iraq (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:137) suggests that the lack of such
language indicates the absence of such authority. U.S. officials, despite some claims
that 1441 authorized force, at times acknowledged that it was not such an authorization. U.S. ambassador Negroponte assured his diplomatic peers that ‘‘this Resolution contains no ‘‘hidden triggers’’ and no ‘‘automaticity’’ with respect to the use
of force’’ (Bye 2006). France, Russia, and China deflected explicit language authorizing force in Resolution 1441, stating that the resolution ‘‘excludes an automaticity in the use of force’’ (Dombrowski and Payne 2003:399).
While U.S. leaders at times argued within the existing framework of international
law, they oftentimes spoke explicitly of eschewing conventional rules, deriding
them as dated in the face of a ‘‘new’’ world of threats. Rhetorically, they in fact
boasted at times of their departure from the conventions and the need for a new
approach to new threats in a new century. The key document exemplifying ‘‘new
thinking’’ about old norms is the 2002 National Security Strategy, which articulates
the Bush administration’s doctrine of ‘‘preemption.’’ Suggesting that conventional
rules and conventional policies such as deterrence are ineffective against ‘‘shadowy
terrorist networks’’ and ‘‘unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction,’’
the Bush Doctrine is founded on the belief that attacking in advance of a perceived
threat is not only permissible but a necessity (National Security Strategy 2002;
Drumbl 2003; Howard 2006:454–459). The U.S. position was that the focus of
‘‘legal scholars and international jurists’’ on ‘‘imminent threat’’ in legitimating preemption needed to be ‘‘adapted’’ to the ‘‘capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:123).
The Dependent Variable: leaders’ Policy Preferences Regarding Iraq
We selected seven key Bush administration officials6 for this study: President
George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz. Clearly, these were not the only influential voices in the deliberations
leading up to the war, but this group includes the principals of the major foreign
policy bureaucracies and members of the Bush ‘‘war cabinet’’ for whom we found
6
We do not include extra-administration critics (e.g., Senator John Kerry) or foreign leaders in an effort to hold
the policy making context constant. For example, the fact that Senator Kerry was not a policy maker but rather a
challenger for the presidency (and hence faced a different situational context than did administration officials) may
have affected his trait scores and the framing of his policy preferences.
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
89
sufficient data and adequate clarity of positions on Iraq (Woodward 2004). Vice
President Cheney is included by virtue of his stature as a key advisor to President
Bush, and Paul Wolfowitz is included despite his ‘‘nonprincipal’’ status due to his
widely recognized position as an early and forceful proponent of regime change in
Iraq (and perhaps the most prominent member of the so-called ‘‘neocons’’). Armitage also merits inclusion due to his position as Powell’s principal deputy.7
To measure the dependent variable, we sought to identify these leaders’ willingness to use force against Iraq in the absence of a UN mandate or international
approvalFan action that appeared to fall outside existing international norms
about the use of force. Our identification of the positions of the selected elites is
based on an analysis of available primary and secondary accounts of the decisionmaking process in the lead-up to war. We provide our coding decisions and accompanying evidence for each actor in turn.
President George W. Bush was an ardent supporter of invading and removing
the regime of Saddam Hussein, and was unconcerned with violating rules or procedures of international norms and law. From his brash vow of March
2002F‘‘Fnnn Saddam, we’re taking him out’’Fto his subsequent attempts to justify ‘‘preemption’’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:129), Bush confessed not to be
bound by ‘‘procedure’’ or to need a ‘‘permission slip’’ for war. Bush’s preemption
doctrine indicates a willingness to discard the existing rules as outdated and dangerous, as suggested by his 2002 State of the Union remark about the Axis of Evil:
‘‘I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America
will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s
most destructive weapons’’ (Stoessinger 2005:280). Bush vowed not to be bound by
‘‘following a process’’ but rather to focus on ‘‘achieving results’’ (Daalder and
Lindsay 2005:198). He once asked rhetorically whether it makes ‘‘any sense for the
world to wait to confront him [Saddam] as he grows even stronger’’ and answered
‘‘we cannot wait for the final proof ’’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:147). Although
Bush was willing to give the UN route a try, and welcomed allies to join the U.S.
campaign, it was not at the price of letting others ‘‘dictate’’ how to proceed. He
conceded that ‘‘at some point we may be the only ones left’’ and ‘‘that’s okay with
me. We are America’’ (Woodward 2002:81).
Bush later defended the Iraq war in a famous 2004 State of the Union claim that
‘‘America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our people,’’
suggesting that unilateral and preemptive decisions are acceptable whenever
deemed necessary.8 Bush also vowed that ‘‘the use of troops to defend America
must never be subject to a veto by countries like France.’’ and that ‘‘I will never
submit America’s national security to an international test’’ (Milbank 2004).
Vice President Dick Cheney was a strident supporter of regime change in Iraq
since the 1990s. As a member of the Project for the New American Century
(PNAC), he endorsed a posture of asserting American power and ‘‘meet[ing]
threats before they become dire’’ (http://www.newamericancentury.org/statem
entofprinciples.htm). Against concerns that preemption would be a radical departure for American foreign policy, Cheney countered that ‘‘the risk of inaction is far
greater than the risk of action’’ and that ‘‘we will take whatever action is necessary’’
rather than ‘‘give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness’’ (Pat Harris, ‘‘Cheney
States Case for Pre-Emptive Strike on Iraq,’’ Reuters, August 26, 2002). For Cheney,
the perceived prospect of a nuclear Iraq justified action against Iraq in advance
(Daalder and Lindsay 2005:135–36). The UN route was not only unnecessary to
Cheney but a nuisance. Downplaying international opposition, Cheney asserted
that ‘‘they don’t have the capability to do anything about it anyway’’ and predicted
7
CIA director George Tenet was involved in decision-making but we found insufficient texts from which to
make confident claims regarding his leadership traits.
8
Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
90
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
‘‘a good part of the world, especially our allies, will come around to our way of
thinking’’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:134).
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld joined Bush and Cheney in an assertive
posture toward Iraq. He raised the prospect of going after Iraq immediately after 9/
11, stressing Iraq as target-rich and not attentive to any notion of restrictions on the
use of force (Woodward 2002:49). Also a PNAC member of the 1990s, he signed off
on a letter that advocated ‘‘the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power,’’
and argued that the only ‘‘acceptable strategy’’ was the elimination of ‘‘the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction’’
(http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm). While National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice viewed her role as more of an ‘‘honest broker’’
than an advocate, she is reported as feeling there was little choice but to pursue
preemptive offensive action against Iraq (Woodward 2002:349–350). Skeptical
of estimates suggesting nuclear weapons were years off, Rice cautioned ‘‘anyone
willing to wait’’ of the dangers of being wrong, stating that a nuclear Iraq was
her ‘‘overwhelming, unmitigated disaster and nightmare.’’ Asking an interviewer
‘‘Are you prepared to let this nightmare stand,’’ she implies that she was not so
prepared (Woodward 2002:350). She assisted in drafting the doctrine on preemption (‘‘Rice on Iraq, War and Politics,’’ 2002), and she comfortably declared
Iraq in ‘‘material breach’’ of UN resolutions and warned Iraq that ‘‘time is running
out’’ (Rice 2003).
Bush has been characterized as surrounded by neoconservativesFPaul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle among the most prominent (Stoessinger 2005:279). Paul
Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s Deputy at the Pentagon, was also a PNAC member in the
1990s, signing the above-mentioned letter advocating regime change in 1998. He
argued for going after Iraq right after 9/11, given his estimated odds (10–50%
chance) that Iraq was behind the attack (Woodward 2002).
Secretary of State Colin Powell, dubbed ‘‘the Bush cabinet’s lonesome dove,’’
pushed for action through the Security Council when others sought unilateral U.S.
action. Powell was said to be fighting ‘‘hawks at the Pentagon who argued the
United States did not need UN permission to go to war’’ (Mohammed 2003). Powell
and Cheney have been portrayed as ‘‘representing the competing poles in the
debate’’ on Iraq (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:133). Powell argued it would be far
easier to rally the world and win approval of a broad UN resolution by keeping the
war on terror focused on Al-Qaeda (Woodward 2002:48). When others pushed
early for action against Iraq, he asserted that ‘‘any action needs public support,’’
referring to both international and American support (Woodward 2002:49).
Richard Perle (2004) and other administration officials labeled Powell one of the
misguided ‘‘soft-liners’’ who shows devotion ‘‘to the UN, their belief in the efficacy
of international law.’’
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage shared Powell’s approach to Iraq.
Armitage was a close confidant of Powell, and shared in the skeptical ‘‘Pottery Barn
rule’’ of going into Iraq: ‘‘You break it, you own it’’ (Woodward 2004:150). He is
characterized in contrast to the ‘‘overreaching and hyperbole’’ of those zealously
building cases for attack on flimsy and selective intelligence, such as Scooter Libby
and Wolfowitz (Woodward 2004:289–290). Armitage pushed for inspections, and
supported going after Iraq if necessary, but ‘‘in a way that would preserve the antiSaddam international coalition that had supported the 1991 Gulf War’’ (Woodward
2004:39).
In sum, this group of seven leaders exhibits important variation in policy preferences. Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz were clearly in favor of
military action against Iraq even in the absence of a UN mandate and skeptical that
UN inspections or diplomacy would solve the crisis. Powell was the strongest advocate among the principals of seeking the legitimacy of UN approval and raised
the strongest objections and doubts about the wisdom of invading Iraq (Woodward
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
91
2002, 2004) before ultimately getting on board. Armitage exhibited reservations
similar to Powell’s. That Bush gave the UN route a chance in 2002 through early
2003 indicates Bush’s willingness to try to do things by the book, but it became clear
that this route was expendable in the face of the collective beliefs of administration
hawks that a looming Iraqi threat was going unmet.
Based on these policy preferences, we would anticipate that the trait scores exhibited by Powell and Armitage would more closely fit the profile of the ‘‘norm
respecting’’ leader (higher on conceptual complexity, lower on need for power, task
emphasis, distrust, ingroup bias, self-confidence, and belief in ability to control
events) than those members of the Bush administration who were forceful advocates of military intervention.
Measuring Leadership Style
For each leader in our sample, we obtained scores on each of the seven prominent
leadership characteristics highlighted above using Hermann’s Leadership Trait
Analysis (LTA) system (Hermann 1987a, 1987b). This system derives trait scores by
using content analysis of verbal material. Recognizing that leaders’ public utterances may be calculated to mislead or obscure underlying intentions and motives,
the LTA system does not take leaders’ statements at face value but instead focuses
on their latent contentFhow leaders use words, rather than the surface substance
of their remarks. While Hermann prefers to code relatively spontaneous verbal
material (press conference answers and interview responses), other scholars (e.g.,
Winter 2003b) contend that more formal, scripted speeches are preferable for this
purpose.9 A symposium assessing psychological characteristics at a distance found
important differences between trait scores generated by scripted and spontaneous
material, but noted that the reasons for these differences are unclear. (The only
LTA trait examined in this symposium was conceptual complexity, so it is unclear
how scores on other LTA traits are affected by type of source material). Walker
argues that future studies should explicitly take into account these differences in
source material and context, and highlights the fact that we do not know whether
scores derived from spontaneous or scripted remarks are better suited for predicting leaders’ policy choices (Walker 2000:599–600).10 Studies have found significant differences between scripted and spontaneous trait scores, but it remains
unclear which type of source material is preferable, so we follow Walker’s admonition and code both spontaneous and scripted material in order to allow comparison between the resulting scores.
The reliability and validity of the LTA system have been tested through a series of
studies (e.g., Hermann 1980, 1988), with highly favorable results. Table A1 summarizes the coding procedures for the seven characteristics examined in this study.
The LTA coding scheme has been automated by Michael Young in consultation
with Hermann and is available as part of the ProfilerPlus software package (http://
www.socialscienceautomation.com). We used this automated text analysis software
to score our leaders on the seven traits of interest. While computer-assisted content
analysis is highly reliable in terms of coding the same phrase the same way every
time, it sacrifices some of the validity associated with having a human coder make
coding decisions. Nevertheless, several of the characteristics require absolutely no
subjective judgments (e.g., those for which coding criteria consist of word lists), and
the parsing software underlying ProfilerPlus has become increasingly sophisticated.
9
For research exploring the differences between prepared and spontaneous remarks in the assessment of
personality at a distance, see Hermann 1986; Dille 2000; Dille and Young 2000; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Walker
2000).
10
While Dille and Young (2000) suggest caution in using scripted remarks, Dille’s (2000:583) study concludes
that ‘‘[R]easoned, prudent use of prepared public speeches can lead to useful conclusions concerning the personalities and decision-making processes of leaders.’’
92
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
For each Bush administration official, at least 180 interview or press conference
responses (of at least 100 words each) were coded. The last row in Table 3 shows the
exact number of responses coded for each leader. Hermann (1999) recommends at
least 50 responses of 100 words or more per leader, so we deem the quantity of
material coded more than adequate. We included roughly equal numbers of responses from 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. We did thisFdespite the fact that the
Iraq War began in early 2003Fbecause in developing an overall profile of a leader’s
traits, it is important not to privilege a specific time period (or else scores may be
unduly affected by a specific event). Having said this, we did categorize responses
by topic, time period, and audience, so that we could examine context effects and
determine whether these factors affected trait scores. Obviously, leaders’ scores
when the topic is Iraq may be particularly relevant for this study. Interviews consisted primarily of appearances on programs such as NBC’s Meet the Press with Tim
Russert, PBS’s News Hour with Jim Lehrer, and CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer.
For President Bush, all major press conferences of his first term were selected, in
addition to his responses during the three presidential debates in 2004 and a
sample of less salient question-and-answer sessions.
In addition, one prepared speech per month (where available), from January
2001 through December 2004, was coded for each leader. At least 39 speeches were
available during this period for each leader except for Armitage (25) and Rice
(15).11 The last two rows of Table 2 show the number of speeches and total
‘‘scripted’’ words coded for each leader. An effort was made to select speeches on a
variety of topics, but this was not possible for all leaders and so leaders’ overall
scores on scripted material may not be directly comparable. To overcome this
limitation, we coded all speeches on Iraq made by these leaders between Septembers 2002 and 2003. This time period ensures consistency across all leaders, as
several officials only made Iraq speeches during this period. As with the spontaneous material, prepared remarks were categorized by time period, topic, and
audience in order to assess context effects.
There are two possible approaches to interpreting the trait scores of the leaders
in our sample. One approach would involve examining how each leader’s scores
compare with those of his or her colleagues, without any outside reference point
such as the mean scores of all heads of state or North American leaders. While this
approach would not allow us to claim whether a given leader in our study scores
high on a certain characteristic relative to a large sample of leaders, we could
determine that the leader in question scores higher than the other Bush administration officials. As we are interested in explaining variation in the policy preferences of the seven leaders in our sample, this is reasonable. One potential
problem with this approach, however, is the difficulty in discerning whether a
difference in scores is substantively meaningful. Knowing the means and standard
deviations associated with an appropriate reference group of leaders allows us to
draw more confident inferences regarding both the score differences among our
leaders and the degree to which a given leader is high or low on a certain trait
relative to a broader sample of leaders. We therefore use both approaches, comparing the selected leaders’ scores with each other and noting where these scores fit
relative to those of a reference group.
The Case of Iraq: Results
The overall results provide mixed support for our hypotheses. The trait scores
derived from scripted speeches (seeTables 1 and 2) have somewhat higher face
11
These speeches were obtained from comprehensive online speech archives of the White House (for Bush,
Cheney, and Rice), Defense Department (for Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz), and State Department (for Powell and
Armitage).
93
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
TABLE 1. Selected Officials’ Trait Scores (Scripted Material, Topic ¼ Iraq)
Powell
Belief in ability to control events
Conceptual complexity
Distrust
Ingroup bias
Need for Power
Self-confidence
Task emphasis
Number of speeches
Number of words
Armitage
Bush
Cheney
Wolfowitz
Rumsfeld
36.1
52.4
63.2
58.5
45.9
43.9
(32.1)
(50.2)
(62.2)
(57.0)
(43.0)
(40.7)
52.7
45.6
38.5
43.1
53.4
66.8
(47.1)
(39.1)
(31.0)
(36.3)
(47.9)
(63.1)
33.7
44.5
57.5
60.1
56.5
47.7
(47.9)
(66.2)
(88.2)
(92.6)
(86.5)
(71.6)
36.5
57.8
52.0
63.3
48.8
41.5
(19.6)
(43.3)
(36.9)
(49.4)
(33.2)
(25.1)
35.4
51.2
64.2
55.9
42.9
50.4
(40.7)
(59.0)
(74.1)
(64.5)
(49.4)
(58.1)
50.5
47.6
34.4
46.6
57.3
63.6
(35.1)
(32.5)
(20.4)
(31.6)
(41.3)
(47.0)
59.8
59.9
34.7
45.5
44.9
55.1
(61.4)
(61.6)
(25.3)
(40.8)
(39.9)
(54.7)
15
4
41
8
11
11
31,120
13,026
45,138
10,161
26,776
23,195
Main entries are standardized within this group only; entries in parentheses are standardized to Anglo-American
reference group. Condoleezza Rice gave no speeches focusing solely on Iraq from 9/02 to 9/03.
validity than the spontaneous scores (Table 3) and provide stronger support for our
hypotheses. While scores showed some variation across topics (see the discussion of
Iraq scores below), we did not find changes over time or across audiences that
would have implications for our hypotheses.12 In each of the following tables, scores
have been standardized for ease of interpretation: for each characteristic, the mean
is 50 and the standard deviation is 10 for the reference group (either the seven
leaders in our sample or the larger sample of 15 Anglo-American leaders, as specified).
As noted earlier, the disparity in topics addressed by our leaders (particularly for
the scripted material) suggests that leaders’ overall scores across all topics may be
less directly comparable than their scores when the topic is held constant. Hence,
we present the scores derived from prepared Iraq remarks in Table 1. As expected,
Colin Powell scores clearly lower than his colleagues on belief in ability to control
events, distrust, ingroup bias, and need for power. Richard Armitage is not nearly
as low as Powell on these characteristics, but he does fall below Bush and Cheney
on each of these traits except ingroup bias. Powell and Armitage are also higher
on conceptual complexity than Bush or Cheney (but not Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld).
On several characteristics, the differences between Powell, on the one hand, and
Bush and Cheney, on the other, are particularly striking. For instance, Powell scores
more than one standard deviation below the group mean on belief in ability to
control events (36.5), distrust (32.0), ingroup bias (37.1), and need for power (35.6),
while Bush and Cheney are consistently between half and one and a half standard
deviations above the mean on these characteristics. The results for self-confidence
and task emphasis do not fit expectations: Powell and Armitage score near the
mean on self-confidence and higher than their colleagues on task emphasis.
12
There was considerable stability in trait scores over time; changes that did occur appeared to be relatively
random fluctuations rather than systematic shifts. Audience effects were more difficult to discern, given the similarity in audience for most of the spontaneous remarks (e.g., nationally televised interviews on Meet the Press and
similar shows) and many of the speeches. In short, these contextual shifts were insufficient to affect the overall
results.
94
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
TABLE 2. Selected Officials’ Trait Scores (Scripted Speeches, All Topics)
Powell
Armitage
Bush
Cheney
Rice
Wolfowitz Rumsfeld
Belief in ability to control events
Conceptual complexity
Distrust
Ingroup bias
Need for power
Self-confidence
Task emphasis
Number of speeches
Number of words
53.4
46.8
66.8
54.9
46.5
47.6
34.0
(47.2)
(42.3)
(56.8)
(48.2)
(42.2)
(43.0)
(33.2)
46.9
53.0
39.2
39.6
45.7
60.5
65.1
(39.0)
(44.5)
(32.0)
(32.4)
(37.8)
(51.3)
(55.4)
31.3
44.6
63.5
50.7
52.0
55.0
52.9
(40.6)
(57.1)
(80.6)
(64.8)
(66.4)
(70.0)
(67.4)
45.5
42.4
55.7
53.5
47.7
67.7
37.4
(34.1)
(32.6)
(38.7)
(37.7)
(35.1)
(44.2)
(30.4)
54.7
40.2
64.5
58.9
47.7
47.3
36.7
(59.4)
(47.8)
(67.2)
(62.7)
(53.8)
(53.6)
(45.1)
47.8
60.7
39.5
50.9
34.9
60.3
56.0
(27.0)
(37.0)
(20.6)
(29.4)
(17.0)
(36.7)
(33.4)
60.1
63.6
34.1
53.1
43.5
47.7
47.9
(47.6)
(50.2)
(28.3)
(42.4)
(35.3)
(38.4)
(38.5)
53
25
75
39
15
41
41
137,264 61,292 106,873 77,963 35,029 130,000 68,453
Main entries are standardized within this group only; entries in parentheses are standardized to Anglo-American
reference group.
n
A comparison of our leaders’ scores with a reference group of 15 Anglo-American leaders (in parentheses in Table 1) should be interpreted cautiously, as our
leaders’ scores here are associated with a single topic. Nevertheless, such a comparison provides some interesting context. For instance, on Iraq Powell scores
nearly two standard deviations (32.1) below the Anglo-American mean on belief in
ability to control events, while Bush (62.2) and Cheney (57.0) are roughly
one standard deviation above it. Armitage (50.2) is right at the mean, while
Wolfowitz (43.0) and Rumsfeld (40.7) are below itFalthough not as low as Powell.
On need for power, Powell scores one standard deviation below the Anglo-American mean (40.7) while Bush (74.1), Cheney (64.5), and Rumsfeld (58.1) are far
above it. As Wolfowitz is at the mean (49.4), the only notable outlier here is
Armitage, who scores above the mean (59.0). All leaders’ distrust scores appear
elevated relative to the overall Anglo-American mean when the topic is Iraq; however, the variation among U.S. leaders is noteworthy. Powell and Armitage scored
below the rest, who all scored an astounding two to four standard deviations above
the mean. Somewhat surprisingly, all of these leaders score below the Anglo-American mean on ingroup bias (although Powell scores much lower than the others)
and, as before, the scores on self-confidence and task emphasis are contrary to our
expectations.
Trait scores derived from speeches across all topics are shown in Table 2. Given
the aforementioned disparity in speech topics across leaders, these scores may not
be as directly comparable and should perhaps be given less weight. The strongest
results involve distrust and ingroup bias: on these characteristics, Powell and
Armitage score clearly below their colleagues. As before, there are also differences
in the expected direction between Powell and Armitage, on the one hand, and Bush
and Cheney, on the other, on belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and need for power. Condoleezza Rice fits our expectations on some, but
not all, characteristics: specifically, she scores lower than Armitage and Powell in
conceptual complexity and higher in distrust and ingroup bias.
Table 3 shows the seven officials’ trait scores as derived from spontaneous remarks. Main cell entries show scores when the topic is Iraq, while entries in parentheses indicate scores across all topics (while there are some score differences, the
relative positions of each leader along each trait dimension remain fairly constant
95
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
TABLE 3. Trait Scores (Spontaneous Remarks)
Powell
Belief in ability to control events
Conceptual complexity
Distrust
Ingroup bias
Need for power
Self-confidence
Task emphasis
Number of answers
Armitage
Bush
Cheney
Rice
Wolfowitz Rumsfeld
53.0
29.7
57.4
41.4
35.8
35.8
(48.6)
(30.7)
(47.4)
(44.9)
(40.2)
(34.2)
57.4
50.1
52.1
55.1
50.9
60.2
(55.3)
(54.3)
(49.1)
(57.0)
(52.6)
(63.2)
40.6
34.6
69.1
48.8
50.0
68.2
(41.8)
(39.4)
(58.5)
(53.5)
(49.4)
(81.5)
26.3
19.3
33.3
22.6
24.1
26.3
(26.7)
(24.4)
(31.9)
(21.5)
(23.7)
(26.3)
56.8
43.1
57.3
49.8
37.5
38.3
(55.8)
(39.3)
(51.0)
(55.8)
(45.3)
(38.0)
56.1
63.4
42.0
49.2
53.9
64.9
(51.3)
(58.9)
(38.9)
(44.4)
(54.8)
(66.2)
66.2
61.5
39.7
75.6
57.0
43.7
(63.7)
(60.6)
(47.1)
(73.8)
(58.3)
(47.5)
117
78
74
68
79
170
(275)
(187)
(366)
(217)
(246)
(315)
40.0
(50.9)
65.3
(65.8)
50.6
(62.9)
27.4
(26.3)
36.5
(54.3)
58.5
(57.3)
49.4
(56.5)
99
(238)
Standardized to Anglo-American Reference Group. Main entries: scores for Iraq topic; entries in parentheses:
scores for all topics.
n
across these different topic categories). These spontaneous results do not provide as
strong support for our hypotheses as the scripted results.
For instance, Powell scores as high or higher than most of his colleagues on need
for power, belief in ability to control events, and task emphasisFall traits expected
to be predictors of a willingness to challenge normative constraints. Armitage conforms to expectations somewhat better, scoring clearly lower than his colleagues on
belief in ability to control events, distrust, and ingroup bias. However, conceptual
complexity and self-confidence also do not align with policy preferences as anticipated. Comparison of the selected leaders’ scores with the mean scores of the
reference group indicates that Bush and other strong supporters of the Iraq war do
not stand out as clearly higher or lower than the typical Anglo-American leader on
most characteristics in ways that would suggest a tendency to violate normative
constraints. The fact that Bush scores higher than his colleagues on ingroup bias is
worth noting, however.
Among the spontaneous scores, the characteristic that emerges as the strongest
predictor of leaders’ positions on the Iraq war is distrust. Note that the scores in
Table 3 are standardized to the Anglo-American reference group. With all topics
included, Wolfowitz scores higher than all colleagues on distrust (81.5), followed by
Rumsfeld (62.9) and Bush (58.5)Fwhile Powell (41.8) and Armitage (39.4) score
the lowest. Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld are more than one standard deviation above
the Anglo-American mean on distrust, and Bush is close to this threshold, while
Powell and Armitage are close to one standard deviation below it. When only Iraq
responses are included, Bush (69.1) and Wolfowitz (68.2) score clearly higher on
distrust than everyone elseFnearly two standard deviations above the AngloAmerican meanFfollowed by Rumsfeld (50.6), Rice (50.0) and Cheney (48.8),
while Powell (40.6) and Armitage (34.6) score well below the rest. In short, distrust
is the one characteristic that demonstrates robustness in its relation to policy preferences across both spontaneous and scripted verbal materials. (See Figure 1).
The differences in spontaneous and scripted trait scores for our leaders should
be noted and, as Walker (2000, p. 600) observed, represent an important avenue
for further research. It is important to understand the sources of these differences
and to ascertain, if possible, which types of material (spontaneous or scripted)
96
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
70
65
60
55
50
Scripted
Spontaneous
45
40
35
30
25
20
Powell
Armitage
Rice
Rumsfeld
Cheney
Wolfowitz
Bush
FIG. 1. Distrust (Standardized Within Group, Iraq Topic).
The ‘‘scripted’’ bar for Rice is an estimate based on her only available Iraq speech.
provide a more accurate picture of leaders’ characteristics. In this case, the scripted
scores appear to have a somewhat higher face validity: Bush’s high scores on belief
in ability to control events, need for power, distrust, and ingroup bias, and low
conceptual complexity are consistent with scholarly and popular commentary
on Bush’s leadership style (Renshon 2003; Greenstein 2004; Woodward 2004;
Stoessinger 2005:278; Winter 2005:575–576). Those who prefer to code spontaneous material argue that speechwriters may contaminate the assessment process.
Those who favor prepared remarks counter that policy makers typically select
speechwriters who share (or at least understand) their views and stylistic inclinations and edit their own speeches to conform to their preferences.
One alternative explanation for the differences in scripted scores between Powell
and the other officials is that Powell was responding to role pressures as Secretary of
State, which encouraged him to speak in a moderate, trusting, nuanced, and diplomatic fashion. However, many of Powell’s speeches on Iraq were very tough and
uncompromisingFaccusing Iraq of violating UN Security Council resolutions and
spelling out the consequences that would result from noncompliance. Twelve of
these 15 speeches came before the Iraq War, suggesting that Powell’s more moderate scores are not a result of his discussion of postwar peace-building. There is
evidence that Powell was more of a ‘‘soft-liner’’ (even when he was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) than many of the civilian leaders in the Pentagon, lending
some face validity to his scripted scores. In short, it is not clear why there remain
key differences between our leaders’ scripted and spontaneous trait scores, and
scholars who seek to assess leadership style at a distance should give these issues
serious attention. For the present study, the face validity of the scripted scores
provides some reason to believe that the observed relationships between these
scores and policy preferences are meaningful. Belief in ability to control events,
need for power, distrust, and ingroup bias (and to a lesser extent, conceptual
complexity) may be important predictors of one’s willingness to challenge international opinion and normative constraints. Given its robustness across types of
source material and issue areas, distrust may be particularly important.
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
97
Conclusions
Existing explanations for norm violation typically identify situational factors (the
ambiguity of the norm and the nature of the situation) as the primary determinants
of norm violation. Such explanations remain indeterminate insofar as they provide
the opportunity but not the motive for the transgression of prevailing norms. A
minimally permissive situation is a necessary but insufficient condition for norm
violationFstates often adhere to norms even when they could violate them. Importantly, violation also requires the presence of decision makers who are willing to
act contrary to international opinion and to challenge normative constraints. And
work on political leadership provides strong theoretical guidance on the types of
leaders who are particularly likely to challenge or respect these constraints. We
therefore believe it is essential to include leadership style as a moderating variable
in any model that seeks to explain the policy impact of international norms. We
have brought together the literatures on norm violation and political leadership to
develop a set of propositions concerning the leadership traits that will incline one to
respect or challenge these norms. Leaders who are sensitive to the political context
and view the world as a benign international society structured by effective rules
and institutions are less likely to violate norms than leaders who are relatively
insensitive to the political context and view world politics as a threatening, anarchic
domain in which states must rely on self-help strategies and aggressively defend
their interests to avoid exploitation by adversaries. Distrust and ingroup bias reflect
one’s view of the political universe, while need for power, belief in ability to control
events, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, and task emphasis relate to one’s
sensitivity to the political environment.
A preliminary test of these hypotheses in the context of the 2003 Iraq war provides suggestive evidence that several of these characteristics are indeed important
predictors of one’s orientation toward normative constraints. When trait scores
derived from scripted material (particularly on the Iraq topic) are considered, Colin
PowellFand to a lesser extent, Richard ArmitageFgenerally scores lower on belief
in ability to control events, need for power, distrust, and ingroup bias than those
Bush administration officials who demonstrated a greater willingness to use force
without UN authorization and in the face of considerable international opposition.
DistrustFthe only characteristic that shows a striking correlation with our officials’ Iraq war positions across both spontaneous and scripted materialFmay be
particularly important. Driver (1977:340) notes that distrust acts as a filter in the
perception of threat. A high state of trust reduces the credibility of any threat and as
a result reduces the necessity for aggressiveness. A low level of trust, on the other
hand, tends to increase threat credibility and, in turn, increases the incidence of
aggressive behavior.
Our findings regarding distrust help to explain President Bush’s insistence that
Saddam, his WMD stockpiles, and his links to terror constituted a severe threat to
America’s security in a post-9/11 world, when others were more skeptical (despite
believing that Iraq possessed WMD) and amenable to the notion that Saddam could
be successfully contained, deterred, or perhaps disarmed through UN inspections.
Ingroup bias plays a different role in norm violation: those high in ingroup bias will
carefully guard the sovereignty of the ingroup (often their state) and will be reluctant to submit to external constraints viewed as harmful to the ingroup’s interests.
Hermann (1999), writing before the George W. Bush era and not focusing on
norm violation, contributes some fitting insights to our discussion. She observes
that for leaders who are high in both distrust and ingroup bias:
International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as
‘‘evil’’ and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the
98
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront
these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly
aggressive and assertive behavior. (Hermann 1999:29)
In contrast, for those leaders who are low in both distrust and ingroup bias:
[The] world is not a threatening place . . . leaders recognize that their country, like
many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and
call for flexibility of response . . . [Their] focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships. (Hermann 1999:28)
The logical conclusion for those who are high in distrust and ingroup bias is that
norms and multilateral institutions are ineffective if not dangerous. Upon coming
into office in 2001,
Bush and his advisers rejected the notion, popular with many in the Clinton
administration and in Europe, that committing good words to paper would create
international norms able to shape state behavior. In Bush’s view, such agreements
constrained only the United States and other law-abiding countries, not rogue
states bent on harming American interests.’’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:108)
Their conclusion was that America should refuse to submit to such constraints.
Daalder and Lindsay (2005:108) trace the intellectual heritage of this ‘‘policy of the
free hand’’ to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s critique of the Versailles Treaty, and
suggest that it rests on the crucial assumption that ‘‘the benefits of flexibility far
outweigh the diplomatic costs of declining to participate in international agreements popular with others.’’
Leaders high in distrust and ingroup bias are also likely to interpret ambiguous
intelligence data in a more threatening light (e.g., Iraq WMD) and to view adversaries as unlikely to abide by their commitments or be swayed by diplomacy. Leaders scoring low on these characteristics are more likely to give adversaries the
benefit of the doubt when their intentions are unclear and to rely on diplomatic
instruments and positive inducements as methods of influence. It is worth noting
that each of these leadership styles has key strengths and weaknesses: leaders fitting
these divergent profiles are prone to different kinds of errors, and may be better
suited for dealing with different types of international situations.
It is interesting that the other two characteristics that showed some evidence of
correlation with officials’ Iraq positionsFbelief in ability to control events and need
for powerFare precisely the two characteristics Hermann (1999:11–12) singles out
as determinants of one’s orientation toward environmental constraints:
Political leaders who are high in their belief that they can control what happens
and in the need for power have been found to challenge the constraints in their
environments, to push the limits of what is possible. . .[whereas] Those. . .who are
low in these two traits appear to respect, or at the least accede, to the constraints
they perceive in their environments and to work within such parameters toward
their goals.
Clearly, more work on the micro-level foundations of norm violation is necessary.
Case studies that explore the decision-making processes of leaders who chose to
adhere to or violate normative constraints in key cases would be exceptionally
valuable. Future work utilizing at-a-distance trait assessment techniques would also
appear to be fruitful, particularly if these studies combined a broader sample of
world leaders with data on militarized interstate disputes or international crises.
Such research could control for features of the situation and the normative
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
99
environmentFif such factors could be reliably quantifiedFto isolate the individual
and interactive effects of leadership style and situational pressures on norm violation. The addition of more cases and more leaders would also aid in disentangling, with greater confidence, the individual effects of the leadership traits
examined here.
This study was motivated by our conviction that existing models dealing with the
influence of international norms tend to overemphasize structural constraints and
are thus unable to account adequately for deviation from these norms’ prescriptions. Norm violation constitutes an important puzzle for theorists of international
norms and a particular problem for those models that take for granted the uniform
constraining impact of norms. First-generation constructivism positing global effects of norms needs greater sensitivity to agent differences. Second-generation
constructivism has responded to this critique by locating variation of norm internalization and compliance at the level of state and society. We hope to initiate and
encourage a ‘‘third generation’’ of constructivism that recognizes intrastate differences based on decision-maker variations, making ideational allies with political
psychology in pursuit of a better understanding of how the subjective and intersubjective ‘‘world in their minds’’ shapes international relations. Taking leaders’
beliefs, perceptions, and decision-making styles seriously as a set of explanatory
variables, and empirically examining how these characteristics interact with the
structures that leaders confront is an important step in sharpening our analytic
power and gaining insight into the defining events of our times.
Appendix A
TABLE A1. Leadership Characteristics and Coding Procedures (Source: Hermann, 1999)
Characteristic and
Conceptualization
Distrust of others
involves a general
feeling of doubt,
uneasiness,
misgiving, and
wariness about
othersFan
inclination to suspect
the motives and
actions of others
Ingroup bias is a view
of the world in
which one’s own
group (social,
political, ethnic, etc.)
holds center stage.
There are strong
emotional
attachments to this
ingroup and it is
Coding Procedures
In coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun phrases
referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with
whom the leader identifies. Does the leader distrust, doubt, have misgivings
about, feel uneasy about, or feel wary about what these persons or groups are
doing? Does the leader show concern about what these persons or groups are
doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, or detrimental to
himself/herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to the leader? If either of
these conditions is present, the noun or noun phrase is coded as indicating
distrust. A leader’s score on this trait is the percentage of times in an interview
response that he or she exhibits distrust toward other groups or persons; the
overall score is the average of these percentages across the interview responses
being studied
In coding for ingroup bias, the unit of analysis is a word or phrase referring to
the particular leader’s own group. Of interest is ascertaining when the leader
makes a reference to his or her own group; are the modifiers used favorable
(e.g., ‘‘great,’’ ‘‘peace-loving,’’ progressive,’’ ‘‘successful,’’ ‘‘prosperous’’); do
they suggest strength (e.g., ‘‘powerful,’’ ‘‘capable,’’ ‘‘made great advances,’’
‘‘has boundless resources’’); or do they indicate the need to maintain group
honor and identity (e.g., ‘‘need to defend firmly our borders,’’ ‘‘must maintain
our own interpretation,’’ ‘‘decide our own policies’’)? If any of these modifiers
are present, the phrase indicates ingroup bias. The score for ingroup bias is
the percentage of times in an interview response that a leader refers to
100
Leadership Style and International Norm Violation
TABLE A1. (Contd.)
Characteristic and
Conceptualization
perceived as the best.
Moreover, there is an
emphasis on the
importance of
maintaining ingroup
culture and status
Task emphasis: Task
focus suggests the
relative emphasis a
leader places in
interactions with
others on dealing
with the problems
that face the
government as
opposed to focusing
on the feelings and
needs of relevant and
important
constituents
Need for power and
influence: Need for
power indicates a
concern for
establishing,
maintaining, or
restoring one’s
power or, in other
words, the desire to
control, influence, or
have an impact on
other persons or
groups (see Winter,
1973)
Belief in one’s own
ability to control events:
a view of the world in
which leaders
perceive some
degree of control
over the situations
they find themselves
in; there is a
perception that
individuals and
governments can
influence what
happens
Self-confidence
indicates one’s sense
of self-importance,
an individual’s image
of his or her ability to
cope adequately with
Coding Procedures
ingroups that meet the criteria just outlined. The leader’s overall score is the
average of these percentages across all the interview responses under
examination
In coding for task focus, just like in coding for conceptual complexity,
attention is directed toward counting specific words, in this case, words that
indicate work on a task or instrumental activity as well as words that center
around concern for another’s feelings, desires, and satisfaction. Examples of
the task-oriented words are: accomplishment, achieve(ment), plan, position,
proposal, recommendation, tactic. Illustrative of the group maintenance types
of words are: appreciation, amnesty, collaboration, disappoint(ment),
forgive(ness), harm, liberation, suffering. The score for task focus is
determined by calculating the percentage of task-oriented words relative to
the total number of task and group-maintenance words in a particular
interview response. The overall score is the average percentage across the
interview responses examined
Focus on verbs: Is the speaker with this proposed action attempting to
establish, maintain, or restore his or her power? Some of the conditions where
need for power would be scored are when the speaker (1) proposes or
engages in a strong, forceful action such as an assault or attack, a verbal threat,
an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not
solicited; (3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another person or group; (4)
tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long as the concern is
not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to impress or
gain fame with an action; and (6) is concerned with his or her reputation or
position. A score on need for power is determined by calculating the
percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the
speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies have engaged in one of
these behaviors. The overall score for any leader is the average of this
percentage across the total number of interview responses
The focus is on verbs or action words. A score on this trait is determined by
calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate
that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has taken
responsibility for planning or initiating an action. The overall score for any
leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview
responses being examined
In coding for self-confidence, the focus is on the pronouns ‘‘my,’’ ‘‘myself,’’
‘‘I,’’ ‘‘me,’’ and ‘‘mine.’’ When speakers interject these pronouns into their
speech, how important do they see themselves as being to what is happening?
Does the use of the pronoun reflect that the leader is instigating an activity
(e.g., ‘‘I am going to . . .,’’ ‘‘That is my plan of action’’), should be viewed as an
authority figure on this issue (e.g., ‘‘If it were up to me . . .,’’ ‘‘Let me explain
what we mean’’), or is the recipient of a positive response from another person
or group (e.g., ‘‘You flatter me with your praise,’’ ‘‘My position was
accepted’’)? In each of these instances, there is an enhanced sense of selfworth and a show of self-confidence. A score on this trait is determined by
VAUGHN P. SHANNON AND JONATHAN W. KELLER
101
TABLE A1. (Contd.)
Characteristic and
Conceptualization
objects and persons
in the environment
Conceptual complexity
is the degree of
differentiation that
an individual shows
in describing or
discussing other
people, places,
policies, ideas, or
things
Coding Procedures
calculating the percentage of times these personal pronouns are used in an
interview response that meet the three criteria. The overall score for any
leader is his or her average percentage across the total number of interview
responses collected for that particular person
In coding for conceptual complexity, the focus is on particular wordsFwords
that suggest that the speaker can see different dimensions in the environment
as opposed to words that indicate the speaker sees only a few categories along
which to classify objects and ideas. Words that are suggestive of high
conceptual complexity are: approximately, possibility, trend, and for example;
words indicative of low conceptual complexity include: absolutely, without a
doubt, certainly, and irreversible. The score for conceptual complexity is the
percentage of high- and low-complexity words in any interview response that
suggest high complexity. The overall score for any leader is his or her average
score across interview responses
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