The Transformative Power
of Partnerships
Africa
Progress
Report 2011
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
about the africa progress panel
The Africa Progress Panel brings together a unique group of leaders under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan. The
Panel monitors and promotes mutual accountability and shared responsibility for progress in Africa. Its three
focus areas are economic and political governance, finance for sustainable development, and achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals. The work of the Panel aims to track progress in these areas and draw
attention to critical issues and opportunities.
While the Panel does not purport to be speaking for Africa, it can speak with an African voice, with the
continent’s concerns and priorities as its guiding principles, and with the combined expertise, experience and
knowledge of its members. It calls for the fulfilment of commitments to Africa, without ever forgetting that the
main responsibility for progress rests with the continent’s leaders and that they themselves have entered into a
series of commitments that they need to fulfil.
about the africa progress REPORT
Every year, the Panel, with support from the Secretariat, draws on the expertise of a wide range of institutions
and actors to compile a concise overview of the progress Africa has made over the previous year. The report is
divided into two sections. The first highlights progress as well as the main obstacles to it in seven areas, namely
economic growth, governance, peace and security, social development, food and nutrition security, climate
change, and development cooperation and finance. The second section looks at the year ahead and identifies
key trends and obstacles. On that basis, the report provides a series of practical recommendations for policy
makers to catalyze action and accelerate much-needed progress.
SECRETARIAT
This report may be freely reproduced,
in whole or in part, provided
the original source is acknowledged
Dawda Jobarteh, Acting Director
Violaine Beix
Sandra Engelbrecht
Benedikt Franke
Africa Progress Panel
Kwame Okyere
P.O. Box 157
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland
Temitayo Omotola
Carolina Rodriguez
2
WHAT ARE
PARTNERSHIPS FOR
DEVELOPMENT?
For the purpose of this report we define
partnerships as voluntary and collaborative
relationships between various parties, both state
and non-state, in which all participants agree to
work together to achieve a common purpose
or undertake a specific task and to share risks,
responsibilities, resources, competencies and
benefits.
The basic concept of partnerships is simple and
straightforward – to identify common ground
between different actors and to combine their
skills, resources and expertise. Partnerships for
development focus on the many areas where
actors, including private and public institutions,
companies and civil society organizations,
can engage in win–win relationships around
development objectives such as poverty
reduction, health, education, access to
opportunities and service delivery.
Effective cross-sectoral partnerships can make
it possible to overcome challenges that are
too difficult or complex for one organization
or sector to address alone. Partnerships can
also make efforts more effective by combining
resources and competencies in creative ways.
Collaboration
can
enable
governments,
companies and organizations to improve
achievement of their own individual objectives
through leveraging, combining and capitalizing
on complementary strengths and capabilities.
Source: Based on the definition used by the UN Global Compact.
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
table of contents
FOREWORD
6
INTRODUCTION
8
PART I: LOOKING BACK: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
9
10
Economic Growth
Africa’s Swift Recovery from the Economic Crisis
10
The Low Quality of African Growth
11
Growth Outlook and Economic Potential
14
20
Governance
National Governance
20
Regional Governance
24
Global Governance
26
Peace and Security
27
Social Development
28
Poverty Alleviation
28
Education and Skills Formation
32
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment
32
Health
33
Access to Water and Sanitation
37
Food and Nutrition Security
38
Volatility of Food Prices
38
Structural Barriers to Food Security
38
Agricultural Productivity
38
42
Climate Change
The Impact of Climate Change
42
Climate Change Politics
42
Climate Change Finance
42
Adaptation and Mitigation
43
46
Development Finance and Cooperation
Domestic Resource Mobilization
46
Traditional Bilateral Partners
46
Bilateral Partners from the Global South
47
Institutional Partners and Country Groupings
50
Philanthropy and Private Giving
51
Debt Relief
51
From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness
52
4
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
PART II: LOOKING AHEAD: PARTNERING FOR PROGRESS
53
How Partnerships are Already Contributing to Development
54
How Partnerships could be Driving Further Progress
57
Basic Service Delivery
57
Access to Opportunities
58
Access to Finance
58
Access to Health
58
Infrastructure
58
Agriculture
60
Low-Carbon Growth
60
61
Obstacles to Success
The Trust Gap
61
The Information Gap
61
The Imagination Gap
61
The Resources and Capacity Gap
61
The Perceived Benefits Gap
62
63
Who Needs to Do What
African Governments
64
International Donors
64
Private-Sector Actors
65
Civil-Society Actors
65
CONCLUSION
66
LIST OF ACRONYMS
68
NOTES
70
5
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
foreword
T
jobs, incomes and irreversible human-development
gains; that the continent’s enormous wealth will be used
to foster equitable and inclusive growth and generate
opportunities for all; that economic transformation
and social progress will drive further improvements
in democratic governance and accountability as
the middle classes grow and demand more of their
politicians and service providers; and hope that rulers
who abuse their power to enrich themselves at the
expense of the poor and of democratic processes
are, at last, seeing the writing on the wall.
he last year has been particularly eventful for the
continent, and the world as a whole. A growing
debt mountain in the United States, uncertainty
around Europe’s common currency and the
consequences of the earthquake in Japan are
reordering the industrialized world’s priorities. This and
the lingering repercussions of the global financial crisis,
accelerating shifts in the balance of economic and
political power, high food and fuel prices, and political
change in North Africa have transformed the policy
space in which African leaders and their partners
operate. By compounding existing challenges, but
also by creating new opportunities, these dynamics
are transforming prospects for ordinary Africans across
the continent.
That many of these hopes actually seem attainable
shows how far the continent has come. Hope,
however, is not enough. Positive trends are being
offset in too many countries by structural governance
deficits. Violence, political turmoil, and uncertainty still
scar too many parts of the continent and add to the
challenges already at hand. The slow progress towards
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the
difficult task of providing productive employment for
rapidly growing numbers of young people, increasing
inequalities and food insecurity, the risk of contagion
through increasingly interconnected systems and
the effects of climate change all threaten past and
future gains. Despite repeated promises of reform by
the world’s most powerful countries and institutions,
Africans also remain heavily marginalized in world
affairs, with little say in and control over how decisions
affecting their countries are taken. The continent’s
enormous potential remains constrained by unfair
global rules and the ambivalent behaviour of many
partners, particularly with respect to tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, distorting quotas and bloated
subsidy regimes.
The events of the last year have also accelerated
changes in how Africa is perceived – and perceives
itself. The broader aftershocks of the financial crisis,
including currency and price volatility, fiscal crises
and asset-price collapse, have proved that no region,
for better or worse, can be seen as exogenous to
the world economy. They have also highlighted the
need for new growth poles and markets to sustain the
economic order in the developed world. As a result,
countries and companies are increasingly shifting their
attention from Africa’s problems to its vast potential
and abundant opportunities. In the process, they are
redefining the continent’s image.
On the continent, these shifts in perception are
accompanied by a heightened appreciation of the
need for African self-reliance in an uncertain world,
and by a palpable spirit of optimism despite some
high-profile setbacks. The fast recovery and strong
growth rates of many economies, plus numerous
examples of social and political progress, are feeding a
remarkable “can-do” spirit. This is reinforced by events
such as the Football World Cup in South Africa, the
peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the adoption of
new constitutions in Kenya and Niger, and unforeseen
political change in Egypt and Tunisia.
Given these obstacles and challenges, it is all the more
remarkable that some countries in Africa have shown
such solid progress towards sustainable growth and
development. They offer clear proof that, with the right
combination of leadership, focused development
plans, and international support, enormous advances
are possible in even the most difficult circumstances.
However, all African countries face the increasingly
difficult task of mobilizing resources in an age of
austerity. As pressures on aid budgets increase, and
What was termed “the hopeless continent” ten years
ago has now unquestionably become the continent of
hope.1 Hope that strong growth rates will translate into
With the right combination of leadership, focused development plans,
and international support, enormous advances are possible.
6
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The core elements of effective partnerships are well
established, even though their combination may vary:
political leadership and vision from governments,
along with a supportive regulatory, legal and fiscal
environment; a private sector incentivized to invest
capital and ideas not just for immediate returns but
for longer-term change that will strengthen markets,
value chains and social stability; civil society afforded
the space by business and government to keep
both accountable for socially and environmentally
responsible behaviour; and international organizations,
African or otherwise, able to advocate global
standards and share best practices, especially from
other parts of the global South.
climate change adds new financing demands, African
leaders and international donors are realizing that
they cannot drive development on their own. Official
development cooperation remains vitally important
to build capacity, leverage other flows and achieve
specific results. Yet, there is also a growing need for
partnerships harnessing a broader range of actors and
their energy, creativity and resources to fill the gaps.
Such partnerships have already proven their
transformative power. Collaboration between the
private sector and international philanthropists
has led to significant reductions in malaria deaths.
Partnerships between mobile-phone providers and
governments have resulted in greater access to
credit in rural areas and transformed business across
entire regions. Partnerships between civil society
and intergovernmental organizations have led to
vastly improved agricultural methods and inputs for
smallholder farmers. By mobilizing resources, improving
efficiencies, or extending services, access and
opportunities to previously marginalized segments of
the population, partnerships can clearly complement,
expand and improve government-led development
efforts. If scaled up, they can even affect sustainable
structural change.
The idea of partnerships for development is hardly
new. For over a decade, MDG 8 has been calling for
stronger partnerships as a basis for achieving all other
goals. Despite the existence of many encouraging
examples, and valuable lessons learned, we are still not
seeing enough success stories replicated or brought
to scale to effect lasting structural change. Too many
actors still see the risks of engaging in partnerships
rather than the opportunities, and too many states
still fail to harness the developmental potential of
their civil society organizations or to provide the
enabling environment and incentive structures to
make partnerships attractive for private-sector actors.
This results in missed opportunities to tackle problems
and drive progress. Given the transformative power
of partnerships, it will be crucial to overcome these
blockages and convince all sides of the inherent
benefits of partnering for progress. This is the main
purpose of this report.
Current dynamics are highly favourable for
strengthening cross-sectoral collaboration. Over the
last years, new spaces have opened up for engaging
actors around their comparative advantages and
respective interests as the benefits of partnering
have become more obvious. The private sector
understands that it needs the access and knowledge
of local partners and national governments to
grasp the enormous commercial opportunities at
the bottom of the pyramid. Governments and civil
society organisations are recognizing the value of
the resources, capacities, and expertise the private
sector can bring to their development efforts. As the
interests of the various sectors continue to converge
and improvements in regulatory environments make
cooperating easier and safer, opportunities for
partnerships continue to grow.
Kofi A. Annan
Chair of the Africa Progress Panel
Partnerships have already proven their transformative power.
7
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Introduction
I
financial and political commitments to the continent.
The continent’s capacity to drive inclusive and
sustainable growth depends on the fulfilment of these
commitments, as well as on reformed global policies
and systems that support Africa’s special needs –
particularly in climate change, international trade
and technology transfer.
n last year’s Africa Progress Report, we called for
Africa’s resources to be turned into results for its
people. This continues to be an imperative as the
continent’s enormous wealth of human and natural
resources, strong economic growth, and windfall
from rising commodity prices are still not sufficiently
converted into socially productive ends such as
reduced poverty and inequality and the provision of
health, education and other public services.
As domestic resource mobilization and international
aid budgets fail to keep up with multiplying needs,
African countries and international donors must
look beyond traditional strategies and stimulate
development efforts additional and complementary
to their own. Partnerships for development are a prime
example of such efforts. Recent years have shown that
they can achieve tremendous results by pooling the
capacities, resources and expertise of various actors
around specific development challenges. If designed
and implemented carefully, such partnerships can
deliver more than the sum of every partner’s input
and bring much-needed versatility, creativity and
pragmatism to development efforts.
We also argued that Africa’s progress needs to be
measured in tangible improvements to people’s
lives, and not only in figures of GDP and the growth
of trade and foreign direct investment. We stand by
this, and renew our call for African leaders to convert
economic progress and natural wealth into social
and political progress, achievement of the MDGs and
greater accountability to their people.
The way to do this is well charted. We know that
peace, stability, and the rule of law are the basic
conditions for progress. We also know that growth
must lead to job creation and diversification of the
economic base; that greater regional integration
and better infrastructure provide the foundation for
trade expansion and private-sector-led growth; that
empowering women increases household incomes,
nutrition and education levels, as well as agricultural
productivity; that transparency helps to spread the
benefits of Africa’s natural wealth more widely; and
that good governance, strong institutions and political
leadership are central to all of the above.
Against this backdrop, we begin our report by looking
back to assess the progress Africa has made over
the last year, looking particularly at how partnerships
have contributed. We then look ahead to assess how
to replicate and scale up successful partnerships and
how to create the policy framework and incentives
needed to spur further collaboration for progress.
Given the diversity of Africa’s 53 states (soon to be
54 with South Sudan) and their economies, societies
and policy environments, these recommendations
are broad and must be adapted and adjusted for
each country. We are nonetheless convinced that, if
implemented, they will accelerate progress by filling
crucial gaps in existing efforts, increasing resources for
development, and spreading access to opportunities,
goods and services across the continent.
The revolutions in Northern Africa show that the
information age has changed the dynamics of
accountability and increased pressure on leaders
to deliver results for all their citizens. But, of course,
African leaders are not in this alone. They share some
of the responsibility for progress with their international
partners, many of whom have made extensive
Africa’s progress needs to be measured
in tangible improvements to people’s lives.
8
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
PART I
LOOKING BACK:
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Looking back at the last year, we note that
impressive progress, stagnation and discouraging
regression continue to coexist on the continent.
Widespread advances in economic growth and
social development contrast with a dangerous
erosion of democratic governance as well as
the increasingly evident reluctance of major
international donors to fulfil their commitments on
aid and climate finance. This section summarizes
major developments in the areas of (1) economic
growth, (2) governance, (3) peace and security,
(4) social development, (5) food and nutrition
security, (6) climate change, and (7) development
finance and cooperation.
9
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Economic Growth
population, unencumbered by legacy technology
and systems.4
W
The global financial and economic upheavals of
2008–2010 interrupted Africa’s impressive growth
spurt.5 While the impact through financial channels
was generally weak, given the continent’s limited
financial integration and low level of cross-border
lending, many African countries were badly
affected by declining exports and foreign direct
investment (FDI).6 However, most countries proved
more resilient than during previous crises and the
continent as a whole avoided recession due to
the prudent counter-cyclical policies of national
governments and well-targeted support from the
international community.
hen it comes to economic growth, three
issues stand out: Africa’s comparatively swift
and broad recovery from the global financial and
economic crisis, its continuing dependence on
narrow, commodity-driven growth that has had only
limited social benefits, and its positive growth outlook.
Africa’s Swift Recovery
from the Economic Crisis
I
n the 5 years before the financial crisis, Africa
grew faster than most other world regions, with
more than 40 per cent of its countries enjoying an
average annual GDP growth rate of 5 per cent or
more.2 While a favourable global environment of
strong external demand, ample liquidity, extended
concessional financing and higher commodity
prices accounts for much of this growth, structural
changes within the continent’s economies
are beginning to take effect and are helping
accelerate growth across countries and sectors.
Propelled by the strong performance of several
large economies, including Brazil, China, Germany,
France and India, most of Africa is now resuming its
growth spurt. While FDI inflows are recovering only
slowly from the global credit crunch,7 both total
exports and imports have picked up again, with
growth rates of 15.3 and 11.3 per cent respectively.8
Remittances, the continent’s second-largest source
of net foreign inflows after FDI, are also beginning to
recover from the slump in 2009, reaching nearly $40
billion in 2010.9 Not least because of the Football
World Cup in South Africa, tourism revenues have
also rebounded, with the continent receiving more
visitors over the last year than ever before.10
Among the most significant changes are a broadbased surge in domestic demand for basic
consumer goods as a result of growing middle
classes and rapid urbanization, lower public debts,
increased openness to trade and higher investments
into enabling infrastructure. Many African countries
have also continued with deregulation, privatization
and other structural reforms that have significantly
improved the business environment (notably
Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Liberia), the financial sector
(Nigeria), as well as administration and governance
(Sierra Leone). Dynamic private sectors have
appeared across the continent, including the
flower business in Uganda, leather processing
in Ethiopia and the film industry in Nigeria, which
have helped underpin growth driven by the export
of primary commodities.3 Encouragingly, African
as well as international companies are taking
advantage of the improving enabling environment,
and vantage points like direct access to natural
resources, a large labour force and a fast-growing
Based on these trends and global dynamics, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects SubSaharan Africa’s GDP to grow by 5.5 per cent
in 2011 and 5.8 per cent in 2012 (in real terms).11
However, this masks substantial differences
between countries. While the Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania
and Zambia are all expected to be among the
world’s ten fastest-growing economies, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea and Eritrea are projected to grow at rates
far below the average.12 There are, however, two
notable economic realities that seem to apply to
most of the continent: the low quality of recorded
growth, and the enormous untapped potential.
Most African countries proved more resilient than during previous
crises and the continent as a whole avoided recession.
10
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The Low Quality of African Growth
against Africa unbroken,18 the continent has little
opportunity to escape this pattern and drive muchneeded economic transformation through trade
diversification.19
A
frica’s current economic growth is not all positive.
It is generally not accompanied by muchneeded structural transformation and diversification,
and often does not translate into equitable human
development and public services.
The one-dimensionality of Africa’s global trade
is all the more harmful, because trade between
African countries remains too weak to offer sufficient
alternative incentives for economic diversification.
Slow regional integration, a lack of connecting
infrastructure, and insufficient resource and production
complementarities between countries currently limit
intra-African trade to a mere 10 per cent of total
exports. In comparison, trade within the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounts for about
60 per cent of the region’s total exports, and trade
within the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) accounts for 56 per cent of total exports.20
Without similar opportunities to profit from enlarged
markets, greater economies of scale and “prosper
thy neighbour” policies, African countries remain prey
to disadvantageous geographies and unfavourable
global dynamics.
Because of the immediacy of benefits, a lack of viable
alternatives and credit for long-term investments, as
well as distorted incentives, many African countries
continue to rely on export-led growth policies
focusing on the extraction of natural resources
and raw materials rather than value addition and
diversification.13 While natural-resource extraction
has accounted for only about a third of Africa’s real
GDP growth in the last decade,14 more than 80 per
cent of the continent’s export earnings come from
primary, generally unprocessed commodities. The
economies of several countries are geared towards
the export of single commodities, including copper
(Zambia) and aluminium (Mozambique). This has
resulted in unbalanced development, with weak links
between export-orientated and other sectors. With
the notable exceptions of Egypt, Tunisia and South
Africa, where manufacturing and services account
for 83 per cent of combined GDP,15 non-extractive
sectors and competitive industries remain heavily
under-developed in most African countries.16
The lack of economic diversification, in terms of both
export products and destinations, explains the high
volatility of African trade in recent years, and the
strongly adverse impact of the global economic
crisis through trade. It also explains why so little of
the continent’s high GDP growth translates into
social development and tangible improvements to
people’s lives. Driven by capital-intensive extractive
sectors, the current type of economic growth has little
positive impact on employment and income levels
and virtually no effect on employment-intensive
sectors such as agriculture.21 It is thus hardly surprising
that, despite a decade of strong economic growth,
poverty remains pervasive throughout the continent
and only one of Africa’s 34 Least Developed
Countries (Cape Verde) has managed to graduate
from this category since the adoption of the Brussels
Programme of Action in 2001.
The problem is caused, driven and compounded by
the poor quality of Africa’s economic relationships,
with both African and other countries. Despite the
increasing prominence of non-European partners,
and China in particular, the disadvantageous pattern
of Africa exporting unprocessed commodities and
importing manufactured goods persists. In fact, it is
becoming ever more entrenched as the resource
thirst of emerging partners continues to grow.17
With FDI concentrating in extractive industries,
the Doha Development Round unresolved, and
protectionism and other discriminatory measures
Many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth policies
focusing on natural resources rather than value addition and diversification.
11
economic growth IN AFRICA
African annual real GDP, 2008
1,816*
USD billions
Compound annual growth rate, %
Compound annual
real GDP growth
2000-2008
%, constant exchange rates
1,684*
5.6
1,483
5.5
Emerging
Asia
1,561
1,464*
Africa
839
694
461
1970
1980
1,067
1,258
Latin
America
World
1,108
Developed
Countries
1990
2000
4.8%
4.0%
1,144
2.4
1.9
4.2
4.9%
Central and
Eastern Europe
1,191
3.6
5.2%
Middle East
1,400
1,323
4.9
8.3%
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009* 2010* 2011*
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2010); World Bank, World Development Indicators (2011); and McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move
*GDP figures for 2009-2011 are combined from actual, estimated and projected amounts from the IMF
AveraGE Projected Real GDP Growth for 2010-2011
(in per cent)
Below 0%
Between 0% and 2%
Between 2% and 5%
Above 5%
Insufficient data
Source: IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook: Rebalancing Growth
12
3.0%
2.0%
GDP per capita and Growth Rates 2000-2009 IN SSA
GDP Growth Annual %
GDP 2000
(USD millions)
2000
2009
GDP 2009
(USD millions)
GDP per capita 2009
(Current USD)
Angola
639
9,129
3.0
0.7
75,493
4,081
Benin
339
2,255
5.8
3.8
6,653
745
Botswana
3,270
5,632
5.9
-3.7
11,823
6,064
Burkina Faso
224
2,611
1.8
3.5
8,141
517
Burundi
110
709
-0.9
3.5
1,325
160
Cameroon
635
10,075
4.2
2.0
22,186
1,136
Cape Verde
1,211
531
6.6
2.8
1,549
3,064
Central African Republic
256
959
2.3
2.4
2,006
454
Chad
165
1.385
-0.9
-1.6
6,839
610
Comoros
374
202
0.9
12.3
535
812
DRC
85
4,306
-6.9
2.7
10,575
160
Congo
1,061
3,220
7.6
7.6
9,580
2,601
Côte d’Ivoire
603
10,417
-3.7
3.6
23,304
1,106
Equatorial Guinea
2,371
1,254
13.5
-5.4
10,413
15,397
Eritrea
173
634
-13.1
n/a
1,873
369
Ethiopia
125
8,180
6.1
8.7
28,526
344
Gabon
4,109
5,068
-1.9
-1.0
11,062
7,502
Gambia
323
421
5.5
4.6
733
430
26,169
1,098
Ghana
255
4,977
3.7
4.7
Guinea
371
3,112
1.9
-0.3
4,103
407
Guinea-Bissau
165
215
7.5
3.0
165.26
519
Kenya
404
12,691
0.6
2.6
29,376
738
Lesotho
395
746
5.7
0.9
1,579
764
Liberia
199
561
25.7
4.6
876
222
Madagascar
254
3,878
4.8
0.4
8,590
438
Malawi
147
1,744
1.6
7.7
4,727
310
Mali
230
2,422
3.2
4.3
8,996
691
Mauritius
3,861
4,583
9.0
2.1
8,589
6,735
Mozambique
233
4,249
1.1
6.3
9,790
428
Namibia
2,143
3,909
3.5
n/a
9,265
4,267
Niger
163
1,798
-1.4
1.0
5,383
352
Nigeria
368
45,984
5.4
5.6
173,004
1,118
Rwanda
218
1,735
8.1
5.3
5,216
522
São Tomé and Príncipe
n/a
n/a
n/a
4.0
191
1,171
Senegal
474
4,692
3.2
2.2
12,822
1,023
Seychelles
7,579
615
4.3
-7.6
764
8,688
Sierra Leone
150
636
3.8
4.0
1,942
341
South Africa
3,020
132,878
4.2
-1.8
285,366
5,786
Swaziland
1,380
1,490
10.1
1.2
3,001
2,533
Tanzania
307
10,186
5.1
5.5
21,368
503
Togo
253
1,329
-0.8
2.5
2,855
431
Uganda
253
6,193
3.1
7.1
16,043
490
Zambia
309
3,238
3.6
6.3
12,805
990
Zimbabwe
530
6,607
-7.9
n/a
5,625
449
13
Source: World Development Indicators Database (2011)
GDP per capita 2000
(Current USD)
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Growth Outlook and
Economic Potential
In the long-term, growth will increasingly reflect
interrelated social and demographic trends –
particularly the rise of the African urban consumer
and the growth of affluent middle classes. McKinsey,
for example, estimates that, as a result of strong per
capita growth and rapid urbanization, 221 million
additional Africans will enter the market for basic
consumer goods by 2015.25 While growth trajectories
will continue to differ substantially (especially between
oil exporters and diversified economies), Africa’s
collective GDP is estimated to reach $2.6 trillion in 2020,
and consumer spending $1.4 trillion.26 Based on this
positive outlook, more and more African countries are
now regarded as promising investment destinations,
including Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.27
T
he low quality of growth notwithstanding, Africa’s
pre-crisis boom and its surprisingly fast and strong
recovery have reiterated the continent’s immense
economic potential. While poor policies, conflicts,
natural disasters and other seismic events may
disrupt growth in individual countries and subregions and significant structural barriers remain to
be overcome, the fundamental trends and drivers
suggest a positive growth outlook for most of the
continent.
In the short-to-medium term, most African countries
will continue to profit from recovery in the global
economy, rising global demand for their resources,
growing interest in their markets and further
structural improvements in their business and
regulatory environments. The IMF expects to see FDI
rise further and demand for African bonds increase,
which should help governments to address crucial
infrastructure deficits.22 UNCTAD expects the dollar
value of remittances into Africa to grow by 4.5
and 6.7 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively,
which would further support the strengthening of
household consumption.23
Yet enormous risks remain. In the short-term, sovereign
debt defaults in advanced economies could affect
banking systems and economies worldwide and
threaten the continent’s fragile recovery. In the
medium-term, insufficient economic diversification
may thwart Africa’s chances to move towards a path
of sustainable, inclusive, and ideally green growth.
In the long-term, accelerating climate change,
environmental degradation and unsustainable
pressures on finite resources may reverse economic
and social progress.
In the medium term, most countries have enormous
potential for gains through targeting the informal
sector, easing labour-market rigidities, addressing
infrastructure
deficits,
promoting
regional
integration, enhancing fiscal systems, boosting
administrative capacity and harnessing international
cooperation to improve resource mobilization.24
Partnerships between public actors and with the
private sector offer enormous opportunities to
address some of the structural barriers that have
been constraining Africa’s growth for decades.
The overarching message from this brief review of
Africa’s economic growth is straight forward. In order to
make the most of the continent’s enormous potential,
and counter the risks in years ahead, African leaders,
with the help of their international partners, need to
accelerate economic diversification and structural
transformation.28 Without such transformation, growth
will remain inequitable jobless, volatile, and largely
inadequate for achieving the MDGs by 2015.
The fundamental trends and drivers suggest a positive growth
outlook for most of the continent.
14
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Partnering around Africa’s infrastructure deficit
Africa’s lack of energy, transport and communications infrastructure has given rise to a number of promising
partnerships between public actors, including the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), the Programme
for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the EU–Africa Infrastructure Partnership. Given the
identified need for as much as $93 billion a year to close the continent’s infrastructure gap and increasing
pressure on public finances, many of these partnerships focus on mobilizing complementary resources.
They provide incentives for the private sector through: leveraging public flows; identifying opportunities for
public–private partnerships; helping to remove technical, political and knowledge barriers to investment;
providing risk-mitigation instruments; reducing inefficiencies in resource allocation; and coordinating the
rapidly proliferating initiatives around infrastructure development. Thus, partnerships have helped to refocus
much-needed attention on the sector and contributed to the significant increase of commitments from $7
billion in 2005 to nearly $40 billion in 2010.
Sources: World Bank (2009), African Country Infrastructure Diagnostic; PEI and ICA (2011), Infrastructure Investor: Africa – An Intelligence Report.
15
diversification of african economies
CLUSTERS OF African economies
USD
USD
10,000
Libya
10,000
Libya
Equitorial
Equitorial
Gabon
Guinea
Guinea Angola Gabon
Angola
Algeria
Algeria
DRCDRC
1000
1000
Nigeria
Nigeria
Chad
Chad
100
100
Mauritius
Mauritius
Botswana
Botswana
Côte
d’Ivoire
Côte
d’Ivoire
Sudan
Sudan
Mali
Mali
Sierra
Leone
Sierra
Leone
4040
5050
Morrocco
Zambia
Zambia Morrocco
Senegal
Senegal
Kenya
Kenya
Mozambique
Mozambique
Tanzania
Tanzania Uganda
Uganda
Rwanda
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
1010
2020 3030
South
South
Africa
Africa
Cameroon
Cameroon
Ghana
Ghana
Madagascar
Madagascar
DRCDRC
Egypt
Egypt Namibia
Namibia
Tunisia
Tunisia
6060
7070
8080
9090
100
100
Economic
Ecomomicdiversification
diversification
Manufacturing
and
service
sector
share
ofof
GDP,
2008,
%%
Manufacturing
and
service
sector
share
GDP,
2008,
Clusters
(only select countries represented)
Clusters
(only select countries represented)
Oil exporters
Oil exporters Transition
Transition
Diversified
Pre-transition
Diversified
Pre-transition
GDP
perper
capita
GDP
capita
< $500
< $500
$500
- $1,000
$500
- $1000
$1,000
$1000$2,000
- $2000
$2,000
- $5,000
$2000
- $5000
> $5,000
> $5000
Size
ofof
bubble
Size
bubble
proportional
proportional
toto
GDP
GDP
Note: Selected countries include those whose 2008 GDP is aproximately USD 10 billion or greater, or whose real GDP
growth exceeds 7% over 2000-2008. 22 countries that account for 3% of African GDP in 2008 are excluded.
McKinsey’s framework illustrates four main clusters: diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies and
pre-transition economies. The framework highlights that despite important differences between the countries within
each category, they have similar economic structures and therefore share growth opportunities and challenges. This
framework, however general, provides insight for business and policymakers with a new categorization upon which
to make decisions.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move: The progress and potential of African economies.
Radial charts (opposite page) World Bank Development Indicators (2011)
16
ECONOMIC CLUSTERS AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: IS the DIVERSIFICATION OF
THE ECONOMY TRANSLATING INTO SOCIAL AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT?
0.6
Uganda Uganda
0.7
Tanzania Tanzania
0.8
gypt
Senegal Senegal
rocco
Mozambique
Mozambique
bia
Kenya
ica
Côte d'Ivoire
Côte d'Ivoire Tanzania Tanzania
600.0
Egypt
Morocco Morocco
0.2
30
0.3
40
50
0.4
60
0.5
70
0.6
80
0.7
90
100
0.8
at
a
Gabon Gabon
Libya
Côte d'Ivoire
Côte d'Ivoire
Egypt
Tunisia Tunisia
Egypt
Morocco Morocco
Namibia Namibia
Kenya
Ghana Ghana
CameroonCameroon
South Africa
South Africa
Tanzania
Tanzania Tanzania
600.0
1200
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
20.0
Zambia Zambia
Zambia
25.0
Uganda Uganda
Uganda
30.0
Côte
Côte d'Ivoire
d'Ivoire
Côte d'Ivoire Tanzania Tanzania
Tanzania
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Morocco
Morocco Morocco
35.0
World
av
Worl
Ethiopia
DRC
10.0
Zambia
Namibia Namibia
Namibia
South
South Africa
South Africa
Africa
Tunisia Tunisia
Tunisia
Mozambique
Mozambique
Kenya
Kenya
Ghana
Ghana
Cameroon
Cameroon
Improved
water
source
(%estimate,
ofinhabitants
population
with access)
Estimated
Internet
users
per 100
Maternal
mortality
ratio
(modeled
live births)
Mobile
cellular
subscriptions
(perper
100100,000
people)
Maternal m
World
average
OECD
average
(=99.0%)
World average
(=23)
OECD average
(=23.9)
World
average
(=260)
OECD
average
OECD
average(=24.8)
(=100.0)
World
average(=86.8%)
(=59.3)
Sierra Leone
Mali
Congo, Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
15.0
Ethiopia
DRC
Libya
Nigeria
25.0
Zambia
Uganda
30.0
Tanzania
Senegal
Senegal
Worl
ACCESS TO MOBILE TELEPHONY
20.0
Uganda
Tanzania
Tanzania
Egypt
Egypt
Sudan
Sudan Sudan
BotswanaBotswana
Botswana
Rwanda Rwanda
Madagascar
Madagascar
Rwanda Mauritius
Mauritius
Mauritius Madagascar
ACCESS TO INTERNET
nea
Zambia
Zambia
Côte
Côte d'Ivoire
Côte d'Ivoire
d'Ivoire
Morocco Morocco
Morocco
World average
(=857.1;
off(=260)
scale)
OECD
off scale)
World
average
OECDaverage
average(=4653.8;
(=24.8)
World
average (=59.3)
OECD
average
(=100.0)
5.0
Sier
Sier
Ma
Ma
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
DRCDRC
DRC
Uganda
Uganda
Kenya Kenya
Kenya
Ghana Ghana
Ghana
CameroonCameroon
Cameroon
Health ratio
Expenditure
perestimate,
Capita (Current
US$)
Maternal mortality
(modeled
per 100,000
births)
Mobile
cellular
subscriptions
(per
100live
people)
Chad
Nigeria Nigeria
Nigeria
Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique
Tunisia
Tunisia Tunisia
0.0
H
A
Egypt
Sudan Sudan
Botswana
BotswanaBotswana
Rwanda Mauritius
Madagascar
Rwanda Madagascar
Mauritius
Mauritius Madagascar
Sierra Leone
Mali
600
50.0
60
60.0
800
70
70.0
80
80.0
1000
90
90.0
100
1200
100.0
Senegal Senegal
Senegal
Namibia
Namibia Namibia
South Africa
South Africa
Algeria Angola
0.0
Ghana
Cameroon
HealthImproved
Expenditure
persource
Capita(%(Current
US$) with access)
Human
Development
(HDI)
water
ofIndex
population
Nigeria
Nigeria Nigeria
Kenya
Kenya Kenya
Ghana Ghana
Cameroon
CameroonCameroon
Kenya
World average (=857.1;
off average
scale)
OECD average
off scale)
WorldWorld
average
(=0.624)
OECD(=4653.8;
average
(=0.879;
off scale)
(=86.8%)
OECD
average
(=99.0%)
Algeria
Algeria Angola
Algeria Angola
Angola
Sierra
Sierra Leone
Chad Chad
00
0.0
Sierra Leone
Leone0.0
Chad
Congo,
Mali
10
Congo, Republic
Mali
Congo, Republic
Republic
Mali
10.0
5.0
200
20
Ethiopia
EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea
Ethiopia Ethiopia
Equatorial
Guinea
20.0
30
10.0
30.0
Gabon Gabon
DRC DRC
Gabon
DRC
DRC
400
40
40.0
15.0
Libya Libya
50
Libya (117)
500.0
1000
Mozambique
Sudan Sudan
BotswanaBotswana
Rwanda Mauritius
Rwanda Madagascar
Madagascar
Mauritius Madagascar
ACCESS
TO HEALTH
WATER
ACCESS
TOMOBILE
INTERNET
MATERNAL
ACCESS
TO
TELEPHONY
Uganda
Uganda Uganda
Senegal
Tunisia Tunisia
Algeria
Algeria Angola
Algeria Angola
Angola
0.0
Sierra
Chad
Sierra Leone
Leone
Chad Chad
0.0
Sierra Leone0
Congo,
Mali
Congo, Republic
Republic
Mali
Congo, Republic
Mali 100.0
10.0
200
Equatorial
Guinea
Ethiopia
EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea
Ethiopia Ethiopia
20.0
Gabon
200.0
DRC
30.0
Gabon Gabon
DRC DRC
400
40.0
Libya
Libya Libya (117)
300.0
600
400.0
800
Tanzania
South Africa
South Africa
ACCESS
HEALTHTELEPHONY
MATERNAL
HEALTH
ACCESS
TOTO
MOBILE
Zambia
Zambia Zambia
Zambia
Uganda
Mozambique
Mozambique
Kenya
Libya
Nigeria Nigeria
Senegal Senegal
Human
Development
Index(%
(HDI)
Improved
water source
of population with access)
Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique
Côte d'Ivoire
400.0
500.0
World average (=0.624)
OECD average (=0.879;
off scale)
World average (=86.8%)
OECD average
(=99.0%)
rocco
geria
Zambia Zambia
Namibia Namibia
Kenya
Senegal
Senegal Senegal
ica
300.0
Uganda Uganda
Egypt
gypt
bia
Libya
Sudan Sudan
BotswanaBotswana
Rwanda Rwanda Madagascar
MauritiusMauritius Madagascar
(117)
Côte d'Ivoire
Libya
Nigeria Nigeria
Ghana Ghana
CameroonCameroon
nea
geria
Gabon Gabon
Sier
Ma
Ethiopia
DRC
DRC
da
ta
Côte d'Ivoire
0.5
Zambia Zambia
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
H
Algeria Angola
Angola
Chad Chad
0
Congo, Republic
Congo, Republic
10
0.1
EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea
20
no
geria
0.4
Algeria
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone0.0
Mali
Mali
100.0
Ethiopia Ethiopia
200.0
DRC DRC
DRC
at
a
nea
ACCESS
TODEVELOPMENT
HEALTH
HUMAN
ACCESS
TO WATER
Algeria Angola
Angola
0
Chad Chad
Congo, Republic
Congo, Republic
10
EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea
20
no
d
Algeria
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone 0
Mali
Mali
0.1
Ethiopia Ethiopia
0.2
DRC
DRC
0.3
no
d
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
ACCESS
TO WATER
Côte d'Ivoire
35.0
Tanzania
Algeria Angola
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
Chad
Sier
Ma
Congo, Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
DRC
Gabon
Libya (117)
Nigeria
Zambia
Uganda
Côte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
gypt
Senegal
Egypt
Senegal
Egypt
Senegal
rocco
Mozambique
Morocco
Mozambique
Morocco
Mozambique
bia
ica
Kenya
Namibia
Ghana
Cameroon
Kenya
South Africa
Tunisia
Sudan
Botswana
Rwanda
Madagascar
Mauritius
South Africa
Tunisia
Sudan
Rwanda
Estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants
World average (=23)
Namibia
Ghana
Cameroon
World average (=59.3)
17
Ghana
Cameroon
Botswana
Mauritius Madagascar
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
OECD average (=23.9)
Kenya
OECD average (=100.0)
Maternal m
Structural barriers to economic growth
Despite the proliferation of programmes
to remedy Africa’s infrastructure deficit,
the continent remains plagued by a
crippling lack of energy, transport and
telecommunication infrastructure. Current
annual investment needs are estimated
at USD 93 billion, with more than one
third remaining unfunded and insufficient
maintenance creating additional needs
for expensive rehabilitation. The World
Bank estimates that if Sub-Saharan Africa
could improve its infrastructure to the
levels comparable with those in Mauritius,
its growth of real GDP per capita would
increase by 2.3 per cent a year.
The unbalanced global economic
system and its out-dated set
of rules heavily disadvantage
Africa. Bloated subsidy regimes,
quotas, as well as high tariff and
non-tariff barriers constrain its
potential to escape unfavourable
trading patterns and diversify its
economies.
Kilometers per 100 square
kilometers of arable land
ROAD DENSITY
500
461
Paved road density
Total road density
400
381
284
300
200
150
100
0
134
106
29
34
African
low-income
Other
low-income
African
middle-income
Other
middle-income
ELECTRICITY
Lines per thousand population
700
Generation capacity
Electricity coverage
600
648
500
400
326
300
293
200
0
41
39 14
African
low-income
African
middle-income
Per cent of population covered
80
91
82
61
53
53
34
40
20
African
low-income
Other
low-income
African
middle-income
600
Other
middle-income
557
Main line density
Mobile density
Internet density
500
400
277
300
200
252
Poor regulatory
environments
Despite notable reforms in some
countries, Africa remains a
difficult place for entrepreneurs
which face greater regulatory
and
administrative
burdens,
and less protection of property
and investor rights than in other
regions. Complex tax codes
and high compliance burdens
imposed by an inefficient tax
administration
are
powerful
incentives for small enterprises to
remain informal.
48
9
2
African
low-income
38
55
29
Other
low-income
Tanzania
Botswana
Namibia
Lesotho
SADC Regional
average
Malawi
41
44
44
DRC
Zambia
52
53
Angola
Zimbabwe
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Number of days
COST TO EXPORT
This graph compares the cost per
container to export. Malaysia as the
country with the lowest cost to export
is included as a benchmark.
450
Malaysia*
737
Mauritius
876
Seychelles
Mozambique
1,100
1,197
Madagascar
1,262
Tanzania
1,531
South Africa
Lesotho
1,680
Namibia
1,686
Malawi
1,713
Swaziland
1,754
Angola
(SADC) Regional
average
Zambia
1,850
1,856
2,664
Botswana
3,010
3,280
3,505
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
USD per container
With FDI concentrating in the extractive sectors of
a limited group of resource-rich countries, high
risk ratings driving the cost of credit, and poorly
developed financial markets, most Africans
have very limited access to finance. The
consequences are significant. Low rural
access to credit hampers agricultural
productivity, inadequate access to
finance by SMEs impedes private sector
development in industry or high-value
added services, and limited access to trade
finance constrains the diversification of exports.
By remodeling risk-weighted assets, Basel II, the new
framework for banking supervision and regulation, may
further adversely affect the cost of financing and inhibit crossborder financial flows to countries where public and private
borrowers are rated at a higher level of risk such as LDCs.
Bank loans per 1,000 adults
8.2
African
middle-income
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
235
142
100
Swaziland
Madagascar
Insufficient access to finance
82
72
60
0
The majority of African markets
are plagued by their small market
sizes,
ethnic
segmentation,
high-percentage of informal
activity, significant productivity
gaps, skill mismatches, and low
competitiveness.
Particularly
financial markets are still poorly
developed.
Other
middle-income
TELEPHONE
Lines per thousand population
Source: Yepes, Pierce and Foster in World Bank and the Agence
Francaise de Développment (2010) Africa’s Infrastructure
Improved water
Improved sanitation
13
17
18
21
23
24
28
29
30
31
31.2
Mauritius
Seychelles
DRC
WATER AND SANITATION
100
0
Poor market quality
37
Other
low-income
This graph compares the number of
days required before an entrepreneur
can export. Denmark as the country
with the least amount of time to
export is included as a benchmark.
5
Denmark
South Africa
88
100
TIME TO EXPORT
Other
middle-income
49 or fewer
50 - 299
300 - 799
No data
18
Source: World Bank 2011, Doing Business Report: Making a
Difference for Entrepreneurs. SADC Regional Profile
Unfavorable global
rules
This figure shows the worldwide
distribution of deposit accounts in
institutions per thousand adults.
Predicted values are used when data
are not available.
Source: Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce (2010) Measuring Financial
Access around the World
Source: World Bank 2011, Doing Business Report: Making a
Difference for Entrepreneurs. SADC Regional Profile
Widespread infrastructure
deficit
Structural DRIVERS to economic growth
Demographic change
Spread of technology
Renewable energy
In contrast to what is happening in much
of the rest of the world, Africa’s labour
force is continuing to expand. The
continent currently has more than 500
million people of working age. By 2040,
their number is projected to exceed
1.1 billion. Over the last two decades,
three-quarters
of
the
continent’s
increase in GDP per capita came
from an expanding workforce, the rest
from higher labour productivity. While
population growth can create intense
pressure on resources, public institutions
and social stability, it also provides an
enormous opportunity for the continent.
Whether by connecting people with
each other, linking rural areas to the
world, spreading knowledge, improving
healthcare delivery or providing a basis
for small businesses through mobile
banking, the rapid spread of information
and communication technologies has
changed how Africa’s people interact
and its economies function. But the
benefits of new technologies are in other
sectors, such as manufacturing, where
they are allowing African countries to
leap frog development stages.
Africa has enormous potential for
energy production from renewable
sources – solar, hydro, wind and
geothermal. Almost all Sub-Saharan
African countries have sufficient
renewable resources, exploitable
with current technologies, to satisfy
many times their current energy
demand. (See chart on page 45.)
THE GROWTH OF THE MOBILE NETWORK
Regional integration
500
examples of growing Population
70
Per cent of total population
450
Route kilometers (thousands)
(ages 15-59)
65
60
55
50
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
45
0
50
2005
Ghana
Namibia
2015
2025
2035
0
2045
1990
Madagascar
Uganda
2000
1995
Fixed-line operators
Note: Data through 2050 are based on the United Nations medium variant projection series.
Source: Ashford (2007) Africa’s Youthful Population:
Risk or Opportunity? Population Reference Bureau. USA.
2005
Mobile operators
Deepening regional integration holds
enormous potential for economic
growth and social development
across the continent. According to
UNCTAD, an investment of $32 billion
to improve the main intra-African
road network alone could generate
around $250 billion in additional trade
over a period of 15 years. As part of
a broader development strategy,
regional integration can enhance
productive
capacity,
intensify
economic
diversification,
and
improve competitiveness. Pooled
resources and economies of scale
would also allow African countries
to participate more effectively in the
global economy.
Source: Williams (2010), Broadband for Africa: Backbone
Networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, USA.
Rise in domestic consumption
Rise in global demand
By 2014, the number of households with income
of $5,000 or more is expected to reach 106
million. Africa already has more middle-class
households (defined as those with incomes
of $20,000 or above) than India. Africa’s rising
consumption will create more demand for local
products, sparking a virtuous cycle through
a growth in discretionary income. As a result,
consumer-facing sectors such as retailing,
banking, and telecom are set to grow fast.
Africa will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural
gas, minerals, food, and arable land. Fast growing demand for raw
materials has both positive and negative effects. On the negative
side, it may discourage or at least slow the build up of other sectors.
On the positive side, it will induce FDI not only to explore the resources,
but also to develop infrastructure to reach and transport them which
are bound to have positive spill-over effects.
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI IN AFRICA
North Africa
USD 24 billion
(slight decrease from 2007)
Increasing urbanization
The high urbanization rate of the African continent
which exceeds that of any other region can be
a great asset by boosting productivity, demand,
and investment by creating economies of scale.
There is a clear need to avoid urban crowding
and “slumification”.
West Africa
USD 26 billion
(increased from 2007)
East Africa
USD 6 billion
(increased from 2007)
1,200
50
1,000
40
800
30
600
20
400
10
200
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010*2020* 2030* 2040* 2050*
*Projections
0
Source: World Urbanization Prospects:
The 2009 Revision in UN-Habitat (2010)
The State of African Cities.
1,400
60
Population (millions)
Urban population share of the total
African population (%)
AFRICAN URBAN POPULATION TREND
70
Central Africa
USD 4 billion
(increased from 2007)
Southern Africa
USD 27 billion
(increase from 2007, mainly
driven by large inflows to South
Africa and Angola)
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009
19
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Governance
elections held over the last year were won by the
incumbents some of whom have been in power for
well over two decades.31 Unfortunately, this trend
appears set to continue as only four of the fifteen
countries holding elections over the next year (not
counting the planned elections in Egypt and Tunisia)
will not include the incumbent seeking re-election.32
As the Economist’s Democracy Index indicates, an
increased number of elections has not necessarily
translated into a greater choice of candidates or
more democracy for the majority of Africans.33
T
he last year has seen significant developments on
all levels of political and economic governance.
Nationally, democratic recessions and leadership
deficits are threatening to overshadow significant
improvements in economic governance in several
countries. Regionally, African states and their
organizations continue to pursue a growing array of
cooperative and integrative efforts despite capacity
constraints. Globally, the drive for much-needed
systemic reforms has stalled despite high hopes and
repeated declarations to the contrary.
O
This trend compounds the continent’s chronic
governance problems, including state fragility,
endemic corruption and widespread lack of basic
freedoms.34 With several leaders having extended
their tenures indefinitely, including by adjusting
constitutions and removing term limits, the disconnect
between rulers and their citizens as well as between
elites and the broader population remains an
unfortunate characteristic of many African countries.
The refusal of Laurent Gbagbo to relinquish power
to the recognized winner of last year’s presidential
elections in Côte d’Ivoire and the heavy-handed
response of Muammar al-Gaddafi to calls for political
change in Libya are cases in point. However, while the
attempt of some leaders to cling to power has been
the most visible expression of democratic recessions,
others, including the “dominance of the incumbent”,
are equally worrying. Six of the nine presidential
But there are also signs of hope. Last year has seen the
adoption of new and improved constitutions in Kenya
and Niger, a peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the
first democratic elections in Guinea, and the fall of
autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Together with
the popular uprising in Libya, these transitions highlight
new dynamics of accountability and increased
pressure on governments to deliver tangible results
to their citizens. Several countries, including Liberia
and Mauritius, have made remarkable progress in
improving accountability, and more countries are
implementing regional and global good-governance
initiatives, including the African Governance Platform.
By early 2011, 31 countries had acceded to NEPAD’s
African Peer Review Mechanism (one more than last
year), and 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (two
more than last year) and were slowly implementing
the review’s recommendations.
National Governance
verall, the quality of national governance as
measured by indices like the Ibrahim Index
of African Governance has remained virtually
unchanged this year.29 However, as with the
continent’s economic growth, the averages hide
significant variations and trends across various
components. While many countries have seen
impressive improvements in economic governance,
nearly two-thirds have also seen disconcerting
deteriorations in political participation, human rights,
physical security and the rule of law.30
South Sudan: Africa’s youngest nation
Following a peaceful referendum in January 2011, in which over 98 per cent of the voters endorsed
independence, South Sudan is set to become Africa’s newest nation on 9 July 2011. Governing the largely
undeveloped country will not be easy. Despite significant mineral wealth and great agricultural potential,
the new state will face challenges of public-service provision, economic governance, and peace and
security. It will also need to clarify important issues with North Sudan, particularly concerning demarcation
of the border (the longest in Africa), citizenship, and the sharing of oil revenues. While the government led
by President Salva Kiir and his successors will bear the main responsibility for tackling these challenges, it will
need significant support from within and outside the continent to ensure that South Sudan gets off to a good
start without further instability in the region.
20
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
M
of total revenues, leaving these nations vulnerable
to shocks.37
ost progress was undoubtedly made in the
area of economic and resource governance.
Many African countries significantly improved their
domestic resource mobilization by deepening the
tax base, strengthening tax administration and
formalizing the informal sector. While the trend of tax
revenues is positive, in some countries, like Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and
Guinea-Bissau, annual per capita taxes are still
as low as $11.35 Many countries still collect only
half of what would be expected given their living
standards and economic situation.36 Elsewhere, tax
revenues are still dominated by taxes related to
resource extraction, which can be up to 66 per cent
Many countries have made progress in curbing
corruption, particularly in the extractive sector. Twentyone resource-rich African countries have now joined
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
and adopted its stringent standards on the verification
and publication of private-sector payments. The
Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and
Nigeria are already fully compliant. Nonetheless, SubSaharan Africa continues to rank last in the Revenue
Watch Index, measuring governments’ willingness to
disclose information on their resource revenues.38
Partnering around transparency in extractive industries
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a partnership of governments, companies, civil
society groups, investors and international organizations that supports transparency and good governance
through verification and publication of payments and revenues from oil, gas and mining ventures. While
the responsible use of reported revenues naturally depends on national governments, EITI has already led
to improved investment climates, promoted economic and political stability for host governments, and
mitigated political and reputational risks for companies and investors. It shows how a partnership can help
define and advocate for sensible standards and then support their implementation. Given the importance
of commodity exports to many African economies, there is great scope to expand this type of initiative
beyond extractive industries.
A
countries. Empowered by advances in information and
communication technology including social media
(such as Twitter and Facebook) and crowdsourcing
platforms for social activism (such as Ushahidi), they
provide a crucial complement to governments and
the private sector, and keep both sides accountable
to each other and to the people.
frica’s international partners have continued to
make progress in controlling corruptive practices
of their companies operating on the continent. The
United States’ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of July 2010, for example,
requires all oil, mining and gas companies registered
with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
to report their payments to foreign governments by
country and by project. Hong Kong has recently
introduced similar conditions for companies listed on its
exchange, and France and the United Kingdom have
recently revised their national anti-bribery laws and are
pushing for improved transparency laws at European
level. At their November 2010 summit, G20 states
agreed an ambitious anti-corruption action plan.39
However, parliaments, opposition parties and civil
society organizations are still too weak in many
African countries to provide effective checks and
balances to entrenched political elites.40 According
to Transparency International, corruption also remains
widespread, costing the continent billions of dollars
a year.41 In many areas, the fight against “quiet
corruption” – the failure of public servants to deliver
goods and services paid for by governments – remains
an uphill struggle.42 Accelerating population growth,
organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade, as
well as climate change, are adding new pressures on
local and national governance systems, particularly
in fast-growing cities and remote rural areas.
Another encouraging sign is the growing role of civil
society organizations and independent oversight
institutions across Africa. While still unduly limited by
some governments, such organizations are becoming
an increasingly vocal and essential cornerstone of
democratization and anti-corruption efforts in many
Many countries have made progress in curbing corruption,
particularly in the extractive sector.
21
Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Voter Turnout Database, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), BBC Country Profiles, CIA Factbook,
African Election Project 14 Oct 2009 ‘Rights Group Encourages Responsible Voting’ and IFES Election Guide.
GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET
Country
Name of leader
(*incumbent president winner of last
election)
Years
in power
Year of last
Presidential
Election
(% won by)
Registered
voters (1)
out of total
population (2)
(million)
The leader
originally
came to
power
through a
coup
(year)
Constitutional
change in
the last 10
years that
favours the
incumbent (3)
(years)
Constitutional
change in the
last 10 years:
Qualitative
improvement
of constitution
(4)
(year)
Countries holding
presidential
elections 20112012
(*incumbent
seeking
reelection)
Algeria
President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA*
12
2009
(90.2%)
18.1 / 35
2008
Angola
President Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS*
31
1992
(49.6%)
4.8 / 13.3
2010
Benin
President Thomas YAYI BONI*
5
2011 (53%)
4.3 / 9.3
Botswana
President Seretse Khama Ian
KHAMA*
3
Burkina Faso
President Blaise COMPAORE*
23
2010
(80.2%)
3.9 / 16.7
Burundi
President Pierre NKURUNZIZA*
5
2010
(91.6%)
3.5 / 10.2
Cameroon
President Paul BIYA*
28
2004
(70.9%)
4.7 / 19.7
Cape Verde
President Pedro Verona
Rodrigues PIRES*
10
2006
(51.2%)
0.3 / 0.5
Central African Republic
President Francois BOZIZE*
8
2011
(64.4%)
1.3 / 4.9
2003
2010
2011 (*)
Chad
President Lt. Gen. Idriss DEBY
ITNO*
20
2006
(64.7%)
5.7 / 10.8
1990
2005
2011 (*)
Comoros
Ikililou DHOININE
Will take
office
May 2011
2010
(61.1%)
0.3 / 0.8
Congo
President Denis SASSOUNguesso*
13
2009
(78.6%)
1.7 / 4.2
DRC
President Joseph KABILA*
10
2006 (58%)
25.4 / 71.7
Côte d'Ivoire
President Alassane OUATTARA
>1 year
2010
(54.1%)
5.5 / 21.5
Djibouti
President Ismail Omar GUELLEH*
12
2011 (80%)
0.2 / 0.8
Egypt
Former President Mohamed Hosni
MUBARAK*
29
2005
(88.6%)
31.8 / 82.1
Equatorial Guinea
President Brig. Gen. (Ret.)
Teodoro OBIANG NGUEMA
MBASOGO*
31
2009
(95.8%)
0.2 / 0.7
Eritrea
President Isaias AFWORKI
18
1993 (95%)
n/a / 5.9
Ethiopia
President GIRMA
WOLDEGIORGIS*
9
2007 (79%)
n/a / 90.9
Gabon
President Ali Ben BONGO
ONDIMBA
1
2009
(41.7%)
0.5 / 1.6
Gambia
President Yahya JAMMEH*
14
2006
(67.3%)
0.7 / 1.8
Ghana
President John Evans Atta MILLS
2
2008
(50.2%)
12.5 / 24.8
Guinea
President Alpha CONDE
>1 year
2010
(52.5%)
5 / 10.6
Guinea-Bissau
President Malam Bacai SANHA
1
2009
(63.5%)
0.5 / 1.6
Kenya
President Mwai KIBAKI*
8
2007 (46%)
14.3 /41.1
Lesotho
King LETSIE III
15
Prime Minister Pakalitha MOSISILI
13
2007
(National
Assembly
election)
0.9/ 1.9
Liberia
President Ellen JOHNSON SIRLEAF
5
2005
(59.6%)
1.3 /3.8
Libya
Revolutionary Leader Col.
Muammar Abu Minyar ALQADHAFI
41
Madagascar
Andry RAJOELINA
2
Malawi
President Bingu wa MUTHARIKA*
7
2012 (*)
2011 (*)
0.7 / 2.1
2009 (66%)
22
1987
2005
2008
2011 (*)
2011
2001
1997
2002
2011
2011 (*)
2010
2011 (*)
2011
1979
1994
2010
2010
2011 (*)
n/a / 6.6
1969
n/a /21.9
2009
5.9 /15.9
2002
2010
2011 (*)
Country
Name of leader
(*incumbent president winner of last
election)
Years
in power
Year of last
Presidential
Election
(% won by)
Registered
voters (1)
out of total
population (2)
(million)
The leader
originally
came to
power
through a
coup
(year)
Constitutional
change in
the last 10
years that
favours the
incumbent (3)
(years)
Constitutional
change in the
last 10 years:
Qualitative
improvement
of constitution
(4)
(year)
Countries holding
presidential
elections 20112012
(*incumbent
seeking
reelection)
Mali
President Amadou Toumani
TOURE*
9
2007
(71.2%)
6.9 /14.2
Mauritania
President Mohamed Ould Abdel
AZIZ
1
2009
(52.6%)
1.1 /3.3
Mauritius
President Sir Anerood JUGNAUTH*
7
2008
n/a / 1.3
Morocco
King MOHAMMED VI
11
Prime Minister Abbas EL FASSI
3
Mozambique
President Armando GUEBUZA*
6
2009
(76.3%)
9.9 / 23
Namibia
President Hifikepunye POHAMBA*
6
2009
(76.4%)
1 / 2.2
Niger
President Mahamadou ISSOUFOU
>1 year
2011 (58%)
5.2 / 16.5
Nigeria
President Goodluck JONATHAN
1
Rwanda
President Paul KAGAME*
11
2010
(93.1%)
3.9 / 11.4
São Tomé and Príncipe
President Fradique Bandiera
Melo DE MENEZES*
9
2006 (60%)
0.1 / 0.2
Senegal
President Abdoulaye WADE*
11
2007
(55.9%)
4.9 / 12.6
Seychelles
President James Alix MICHEL*
7
2006
(53.7%)
0.1 / 0.1
Sierra Leone
President Ernest Bai KOROMA
3
2007
(54.6%)
2.6 / 5.4
Somalia
Transitional Federal President
Sheikh SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED
2
2009
n/a / 9.9
South Africa
President Jacob ZUMA
2
2009 (69%)
23.2 / 49
Sudan
President Umar Hassan Ahmad
AL-BASHIR*
17
2010
(68.2%)
7.6 / 45
Swaziland
King MSWATI III
25
Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso
DLAMINI
2
Tanzania
President Jakaya KIKWETE*
5
2010
(61.2%)
20.1 /42.8
Togo
President Faure GNASSINGBE*
6
2010
(60.9%)
3.6 / 6.8
Tunisia
Former President Zine El Abidine
BEN ALI*
23
2009
(89.6%)
4.9 / 10.6
Uganda
President Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta
MUSEVENI*
25
2011
(68.4%)
10.4 / 34.6
Zambia
President Rupiah BANDA
2
2008
(40.1%)
3.9 / 13.9
2011 (*)
Zimbabwe
President Robert Gabriel
MUGABE*
23
2008
(85.5%)
5.6 / 12.1
2011 (*)
2012
2008
n/a / 32
2010
n/a / 155.2
2011
2011 (*)
2003
2011
2001
2012 (*)
2011 (*)
2008
1989
2012 (*)
2005
2005
n/a / 1.4
1986
2002
2011
2005
2011 (*)
(1) Year of latest available data: Algeria 2004, Angola 1992, Benin 2006, Botswana 2009, Burkina Faso 2005, Burundi 2010, Cameroon 2004, Cape Verde 2006, Central African Republic 2005, Chad 2006,
Comoros 2006, Congo 2002, DRC 2006, Cote d’Ivoire 2000, Djibouti 2005, Egypt 2005, Equatorial Guinea 2002, Gabon 2005, Gambia 2006, Ghana 2008, Guinea 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2005, Kenya 2007, Liberia
2005, Madagascar 2006, Malawi 2009, Mali 2007, Mauritania 2007, Mozambique 2009, Namibia 2004, Niger 2004, Rwanda 2003, São Tomé and Príncipe 2006, Senegal 2007, Seyschelles 2006, Sierra Leone
2007, South Africa 2009, Sudan 1996, South Sudan 2011, Tanzania 2010, Togo 2005, Tunisia 2004, Uganda 2006, Zambia 2008, Zimbabwe 2008.
(2) Total population 2011 estimate.
(3) Constitutional change includes the removal or extension of term limits, or the modification of their age limits.
(4) Constitutional change includes the decentralization or devolution of power, shortening or the creation of presidential term limits, the creation of anti-corruption or reconciliation mechanisms, and the
restoration of civilian rule.
Notes: Algeria: Constitutional amendment removed the presidential two-term limit in 2008. Angola: In 2010, the parliament approved a new constitution abolishing direct elections of the president.
Botswana: Parliamentary election in 2009, President elected by National Assembly. Burkina Faso: In 2002, constitutional amendment reduced the presidential term to five years. This has not been applied to
the incumbent president. Burundi: 2005 constitution guarantees representation of main ethnic groups, by setting out the share of posts they will have in parliament, government and in the army. Cameroon:
2008 constitutional amendment enables the incumbent president to run for a third term in 2011. Central African Republic: The 2010 constitutional amendment extended the terms of the President and
the National Assembly when it became apparent that, for technical reasons, elections could not be held in time. Chad: 2005 referendum removed constitutional term limits. Comoros: 2001 constitutional
referendum granted the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan, Moheli greater autonomy within the federation. Congo: 2002 constitutional referendum approved amendments aimed at consolidating
presidential powers. The presidential term was increased from five to seven years and the post of Prime Minister was abolished. DRC: January 2011 constitutional amendment eliminates the second round
of presidential elections. Djibouti: 2010 constitutional amendment allows the president to run for a third term. Egypt: Following Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in early 2011, the military caretaker government
dissolved the constitution on 13 February 2011. Guinea: The 2008 coup was followed by the country’s first democratic elections and a new constitution in 2010. Kenya: Government of national unity. The new
constitution approved through a referendum in 2010 is set to reduce the power of the president, devolve power to the regions and abolish the position of prime minister. Lesotho: Parliamentary constitutional
monarchy. The Monarchy is hereditary with no legislative or executive powers. The leader of the majority party in the National Assembly is appointed Prime Minister. Madagascar: In 2009, elected President
Marc Ravalomanana was toppled by opposition leader Andry Rajoelina. In November 2010 voters approved a new constitution which lowers the minimum age for the president, allowing Rajoelina to
run for president. Mauritius: President was unanimously elected by National Assembly. Morocco: Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch following legislative
elections. Niger: Coup in 2010 led to 2011 democratic transition. The 2010 constitution, approved in referendum, designed to restore civilian rule and return democracy after ousted President Mamadou
Tandja had changed the constitution to stay in power. Nigeria: President Jonathan assumed the presidency after the death of President Yar’Adua. Elections took place in April 2011, at time of print (18 April
2011) results were yet to be officially confirmed. Rwanda: 2003 constitution adopted through referendum is aimed at reconciliation and bans the incitement of ethnic hatred. It established a presidential
system of government with separation of powers between the three branches of government. Senegal: 2001 new constitution approved by referendum, which shortens presidential term, limits holder to
two terms (but also gives president power to dissolve parliament). Sierra Leone: 2008 constitutional amendment grants the Anti-Corruption Commission the power to prosecute offenses involving corruption.
Somalia: Somalia has a transitional, parliamentary federal government. The Transitional Federal President was elected by the expanded Transitional Federal Assembly in 2009. Sudan: Total population
includes population of Sudan and South Sudan. Interim National Constitution of 2005 is part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the conflict in southern Sudan. Swaziland: Swaziland is a
monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch from among the elected members of the House of Assembly. Constitution signed by the King in 2005 took effect in 2006 cementing the rule of the
King. Tunisia: President Ben Ali stepped down in Jan 2011. Interim President Fouad M’Bazaa was appointed in January 2011. 2002 Constitutional referendum included changes that abolished the three-term
limit for incumbent presidents and raised the age limit of a sitting president from 70 to 75, paving the way for the fourth term of former President Ben Ali. Uganda: 2005 constitutional amendments removed
presidential term limits and legalized a multiparty political system. Zimbabwe: Government of national unity. Zimbabwe’s 2011 election is set to take place after a constitutional referendum planned for 30
June 2011.
23
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Regional Governance
services and capital; peace and security; energy
and infrastructure; agriculture; trade; industry; and
investment and statistics).43 A growing number of
regional and trans-regional initiatives, including the
Short Term Action Plan of the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Programme
for Infrastructure Development in Africa, as well as
innovative partnerships, are targeting the continent’s
serious deficit in connectivity infrastructure to drive
increased physical integration through market
expansion and trade creation. Even though the East
African Community had to postpone its plans to
create a common currency by 2014, the creation of
regional customs unions, free trade areas and other
means of converging macroeconomic policy, as
stipulated in the Abuja Treaty, is progressing in many
RECs.
A
frican states are increasingly acting on the
economic and political imperative of greater
regional integration. Over the last year, they have
continued to expand their cooperative and
integrative efforts in several areas and increasingly
rely on the political steering mechanisms of regional
organizations for the coordination and pursuit of
collective interests. Remarkably, these mechanisms
are moving beyond mere geographic compositions
in the form of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
to encompass functional cooperation on topics
ranging from reform of the United Nations (Committee
of Ten Heads of State on the UN Reform) to the
impact of and responses to the global economic crisis
(Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and
Central Bank Governors). Such functional and issuebased cooperation has the potential to increase
Africa’s bargaining power on the international stage.
At the same time, Africa’s organizations remain
plagued
by
widespread
capacity
deficits,
fragmentation of efforts, lack of harmonization
and a tendency to concentrate on the formulation
of cooperation agreements rather than their
implementation.44 Many African states are struggling
with the competing demands and agendas of their
various, often overlapping, memberships in regional
initiatives. Consequently, many decisions are not
being implemented at national level.45
At the 16th African Union Summit in January 2011,
the continent’s leaders reaffirmed their commitment
to greater unity and integration through shared
values, and pledged to accelerate efforts in the
seven priority areas of the AU’s Minimum Integration
Programme (free movement of persons, goods,
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the economic development programme of the
African Union which aims to provide an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic
cooperation and integration among African countries. It was set up in 2001 and integrated into the AU
structures in 2010. Focusing on six areas (agriculture and food security, climate change and natural resource
management, regional integration and infrastructure, human development, economic and corporate
governance, and cross-cutting issues such as gender and technology) it has helped to harmonize the policies
of African states. Through its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which encourages conformity to an
agreed set of governance standards through periodic reviews it has also begun to institutionalize a spirit of
self-monitoring. While severe problems remain with regard to the implementation of some of its programme,
NEPAD clearly shows the value intergovernmental partnerships can add to individual development efforts.
Functional and issue-based cooperation has the potential
to increase Africa’s bargaining power on the international stage.
24
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Africa’s international and
intra-regional flight connections
Air traffic to and from Africa accounted for 4.1% of
the global scheduled air traffic in January 2011.
egypt
best connected internationally
Comparing January 2005 and January 2011, weekly
number of flights has increased by 10.2% globally
while weekly number of flights to/from Africa has
increased by 84.9%.
The weekly number of intra-Africa flights grew
by 49.9% between January 2005 and January 2011.
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Mali (20),
Côte d’Ivoire (14),
Morocco (8), Gambia (8)
Connected to: 14 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Mali (17),
Côte d’Ivoire (14),
Morocco (14), Gambia (14)
Connected to: 16 countries
International top
destinations*: France (21),
Italy (8), Spain (8), USA (7)
Connected to: 8 countries
International top
destinations*: USA (15),
Spain (10), France (8),
Italy (4)
Connected to: 9 countries
GUINEA BISSAU
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Senegal (4)
Connected to: 1 country
International top
destinations*: Portugal (2)
Connected to: 1 country
International top
destinations*: Portugal (3)
Connected to: 1 country
International top
destinations*: Saudi Arabia
(75), Germany (63), United
Arab Emirates (55), United
Kingdom (29)
Connected to: 38 countries
International top
destinations*: Saudi Arabi
(214), United Kingdom
(113), United Arab Emirates
(103), Germany (97)
Connected to: 44 countries
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Kenya (17),
Djibouti (14), Nigeria (10),
Sudan (5)
Connected to: 18 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Kenya (24),
Djibouti (19), Sudan (16),
Nigeria (13)
Connected to: 25 countries
International top
destinations*: United Arab
Emirates (10), Italy (9),
India (6), Thailand (3)
Connected to: 12 countries
International top
destinations*: United Arab
Emirates (21), India (15),
Thailand (10), Italy (9)
Connected to: 16 countries
Kenya
least connected country
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Senegal (3)
Connected to: 1 country
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Libya (40),
Sudan (40), Nigeria (13),
Morocco (12)
Connected to: 15 countries
ethiopia
senegal
2005
2005
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Sudan (22),
Libya (17), Morocco (8),
Nigeria (4)
Connected to: 12 countries
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Tanzania
(53), Uganda (29), South
Africa (24), Sudan (6)
Connected to: 25 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Tanzania
(102), Uganda (64), Sudan
(45), South Africa (30)
Connected to: 29 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Arab Emirates (24), United
Kingdom (18), Netherlands
(14), India (10), Qatar (1)
Connected to: 12 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Arab Emirates (26), United
Kingdom (24), Netherlands
(15), Qatar (15), India (7)
Connected to: 15 countries
SOUTH AFRICA
best connected within africa
nigeria
democratic republic of congo
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Ghana (32),
Ethiopia (10), Côte d’Ivoire
(7), South Africa (4)
Connected to: 17 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Ghana (48),
South Africa (14), Egypt
(14), Ethiopia (13)
Connected to: 18 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (27), France (11),
Netherlands (11), United
Arab Emirates (6)
Connected to: 8 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (33), United Arab
Emirates (16), Germany
(14), France (7)
Connected to: 11 countries
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: South Africa
(7), Kenya (7), Congo (7),
Ethiopia (1)
Connected to:
7 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: South Africa
(17), Ethiopia (10),
Kenya (9), Congo (3)
Connected to:
17 countries
International top
destinations*: France (3),
Belgium (2)
Connected to: 2 countries
International top
destinations*: France (3),
Belgium (2)
Connected to: 2 countries
2005
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Mozambique
(109), Botswana (89),
Namibia (87),
Zimbabwe (55)
Connected to: 28 countries
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Zimbabwe
(99), Botswana (90),
Namibia (89),
Mozambique (71)
Connected to: 28 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (55), Germany
(25), United Arab Emirates
(14), Australia (9)
Connected to: 23 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (55), United Arab
Emirates (42), Germany
(25), Australia (14)
Connected to: 22 countries
* The number of flights is a rounded average of the total number of departing flights per week for a selected country.
The average was computed using a representative week for each month over a whole year.
Number of flights to/from Africa
Percentage increase of the number
of flights per week to/from Africa
per week and by region
January 2008 - January 2011
7,000
50
40
35
4,000
30
Per cent
5,000
3,000
20
10
1,000
Europe
33,0%
25
15
2,000
0
46,2%
45
6,000
13,7%
5
Jan 2005
Middle East
Jan 2008
Asia
0
Jan 2011
North America
Europe
South America
Source: Innovata LLC, IATA.
Source: Innovata LLC, IATA.
25
Asia
Middle East
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Global Governance
At the same time, the broad-based consensus on
the need to adapt global governance to changed
political and economic realities has not disappeared.
At their summit in Seoul in November 2010, the G20
nations agreed to a series of measures addressing
global imbalances and pushing for further changes to
governance structures of the IMF and World Bank.48
The French G20 Presidency has vowed to implement
these measures as part of its ambitious reform agenda
focusing on the modernization of the international
monetary system. Also in November 2010, the EU
pledged to support Africa in its efforts to gain a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.49
D
espite repeated declarations, the public reexamination of global governance triggered by
the recent financial and economic crisis has not led
to significant changes to out-dated arrangements for
representation and decision-making. Also because
of the inadequate diplomatic capacity of many
governments, Africa remains heavily marginalized in
world affairs, with little control over how these affairs
affect its people.
In fact, the recent crisis seems to have complicated
Africa’s bid for a louder voice and greater
international representation. The inclusion of big
emerging economies like Brazil, China and India,
with their own (legitimate) concerns and priorities,46
risks further marginalizing less economically
powerful players. The G24, the intergovernmental
group representing developing countries in the IMF
and the World Bank, has calculated that the lion’s
share of the promised 6 per cent shift in IMF voting
power is actually a shift from developing countries
to emerging economies, thus further reducing
Africa’s say in these organizations.47 The crisis has
added weight to specialized bodies such as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the
Financial Stability Board, on which Africa has very
little representation even though its countries are
directly affected by the decisions taken.
South Africa’s membership in the G20 and the
increasingly institutionalized participation of the AU
and NEPAD in the group’s meetings are important
steps towards ensuring that Africa’s concerns and
priorities are taken into account in the proposed reform
efforts. They may also encourage greater African
representation in other decision-making fora. It is
unrealistic to expect individual representation of most
African countries in every important organization, and
also unrealistic to expect single countries to set aside
their own national concerns in order to represent the
entire continent. Therefore, continental and regional
representation may prove the most effective way to
include African perspectives. Crucially, this may also
help to improve the legitimacy of organizations like
the G20.
Africa remains heavily marginalized in world affairs,
with little control over how these affairs affect its people.
26
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
PEACE AND SECURITY
the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda,
can all be traced to the continuing existence
of ungoverned spaces and high state fragility
throughout Africa.54
P
ervasive conflict and insecurity continue to slow
Africa’s progress. More than one fifth of the
continent’s population remains directly affected by
conflicts which continue to destroy socio-economic
infrastructure,
erode
institutional
capacity,
aggravate poverty and human suffering, and make
it even more difficult to achieve the MDGs.50
Many of these problems are further exacerbated by
increasing external stresses relating to accelerating
climate change, global economic dynamics and
increasingly volatile food prices. These raise the
likelihood of destabilizing large-scale population
movements and conflict over scarce natural
resources, including water and arable land.55
With at least nine countries experiencing major
conflicts within their territories (two more than last
year) and the highest number of peacekeeping
missions (five UN, three regional and one hybrid),51
Africa continues to rank as the world region least
at peace.52 The seemingly intractable conflicts
in the Great Lakes Region, Darfur and Somalia
continue, while democratic recessions, including
the protracted electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire,
demographic change, increasing food and oil
prices, and growing inequalities have raised tensions
throughout the continent.53 The revolts in North
Africa, and particularly the civil war in Libya and
the international cooperation around the no-fly
zone, have added yet another dimension to Africa’s
complex security situation.
But the last year has also seen positive developments:
the peaceful referendum in South Sudan, strides
towards democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, and the
great progress Guinea and Niger have made towards
restored constitutional order and consolidated
peace. At intergovernmental level, operation
continues of the African Peace and Security
Architecture and the Regional Mechanisms for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In
November 2010, the AU began to assess procedures
for deploying its African Standby Force, and three of
the five regional brigades have now been declared
fully operational.56
However, enormous capacity and harmonization
problems persist at all levels of inter-African security
cooperation, as most states have been reluctant to
free resources for the new institutional architecture.
As a result, the AU remains dependent on
international support to finance, equip and sustain its
growing array of security initiatives. It is also subject
to internal disagreements on central political issues
and principles, including the legitimacy of outside
intervention in African affairs.
Most security challenges in Africa continue to
be a direct result of weak or poor governance,
including the absence of effective state institutions.
The ongoing spread of terrorism and organized
crime includes drug trafficking and illicit trade, the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and
the pervasiveness of piracy around the Horn of Africa.
Residual transnational militancy and fluid forms of
cross-border violence, such as that perpetrated by
Most security challenges in Africa continue to be a direct result
of weak or poor governance.
27
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
social development
MDG Acceleration Framework, are under way to
identify, replicate and scale up success stories and
accelerate progress across the continent.61
A
little over a decade after the Millennium
Declaration, many African countries remain
off-track to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals by 2015. 57 While increasing numbers of
success stories highlight the possibility of rapid
improvements in all key sectors and some
countries are on track to achieve most of their
targets, overall progress continues to be slow.
It is hampered by exogenous trends such as
accelerating climate change and by inadequate
policies, unmet commitments, lack of focus and
accountability and insufficient dedication to
sustainable development by both African states
and their international partners.
Poverty Alleviation
T
o the detriment of hundreds of millions of Africans,
the continent’s strong economic growth has not
translated into widespread job creation and poverty
reduction. While there is still considerable controversy
around both the method of computation and the
actual level of Africa’s poverty rate,62 it is certain that
many African countries will not reach their povertyreduction goals by 2015 despite strong GDP growth.
UNCTAD projects that income per capita will grow at
only 2.7 per cent in 2011, and 2.8 per cent in 2012,
which is below the threshold of 3 per cent considered
as the minimum rate to make a substantial dent in
poverty and far below the rate needed to achieve
the MDGs in most countries.63
A particularly worrying development is the increase
in inequality – both within and across African
societies.58 The UNDP’s new inequality-adjusted
Human Development Index (HDI) shows that the
human development ratings of African countries
are substantially lower if adjusted for inequality in
the distribution of wealth. This adjustment reduces
ratings of some countries, including the Central
African Republic, Mozambique and Namibia, by
up to 40 per cent.59
The need for greater progress is urgent. According
to the 2011 Rural Poverty Report of the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), SubSaharan Africa is home to nearly one third of the
world’s poor. While their share in the continent’s
total population is declining, their absolute numbers
have increased from 268 million to 306 million over
the last decade.64 The UNDP’s Multi-dimensional
Poverty Index, which complements money-based
measures by considering multiple deprivations and
their overlap, even puts the number of poor Africans
as high as 458 million.65
The global financial crisis has also clearly shown
the importance for African countries of creating
mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable
segments of their populations against unexpected
shocks. Despite the efforts of some countries to
implement the AU’s Social Policy Framework, basic
social security remains beyond reach for most
Africans, with less than 5 per cent of the workingage population in Sub-Saharan Africa covered
by contributory pension schemes, unemployment
benefits or other social safety nets.60 As a result,
economic contraction and price volatility continue
to have a disproportionate effect on the poor.
While poverty remains a predominantly rural
phenomenon throughout Africa, rapid urbanization
is adding an increasingly important dimension.66
The continent already has the highest incidence of
slums – over 62 per cent of the urban population
lives in such informal inner-city settlements – and
accelerating rural flight is bound to swell the ranks
of the urban poor.67 Increasingly volatile food prices,
the uncertainties and effects of climate change
and a range of natural-resource constraints will also
complicate efforts to reduce poverty.68 At the same
time, positive trends include increasing agricultural
productivity, growing international interest in bottomof-the-pyramid business and the spread of mobile
and affordable technology. These offer new and
exciting opportunities for tackling poverty.
But it is not all bad news. There is plenty of evidence
that with the right policy mix and international
support, African countries can still achieve many of
their MDG-based targets, particularly in the areas
of education and health. At the Review Summit
in September 2010, world leaders reaffirmed their
commitment to achieve the goals by 2015 and a
number of promising initiatives, such as the UNDP’s
There is evidence that with the right policy mix and international support,
African countries can still achieve many of their MDG-based targets.
28
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Partnering around mobile technology to tackle poverty
The mobile money transfer service M-Pesa (M stands for “mobile”, Pesa means “money” in Swahili) is one of
the best examples of the transformative power of partnerships. With the initial support of the UK Department
for International Development (DfID) through a matching fund, the Kenyan mobile-phone service provider
Safaricom has created a service which allows users to make and receive payments, transfer money to other
users and non-users, and deposit and withdraw money without needing to visit a bank. By relying solely on
the ubiquitous mobile phone, M-Pesa has significantly expanded financial access among Kenya’s poor. By
bringing the unbanked into the market it has also created new markets for goods and services tailored to
mobile banking. Already serving more than 14 million users in Kenya, this type of service is being replicated in
other African countries including Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. It clearly demonstrates that
partnerships for development can mature into self-sustaining and profit-making ventures with transformative
effects.
29
MDG SCORECARD
… No data
Millennium
Development Goals
Source: Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, African Economic Outlook 2010 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org
Country
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Republic
DRC
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Satisfactory
performance ratio
l Achieved l On-track
l Off-track/slow l Regressing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Eradicate
extreme
poverty and
hunger
Achieve
universal
primary
education
Promote gender equality
and empower
women
Reduce child
mortality
Improve
maternal
health
Combat HIV/
AIDS, malaria
and other
diseases
Ensure
environmental
sustainability
l
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44%
52%
69.8%
44.2%
13.5%
35.3%
28.3%
30
Tracking MDG Progress
Tracking progress on MDG
achievement is an immense
challenge due to a lack
of sufficient, reliable, and
updated data. There are
also inconsistencies between
national and global tracking
efforts that make it difficult
to compare progress across
countries and regions but
commendable efforts have
been made.
This infographic illustrates
overall MDG progress as
seen in the African Economic
Outlook 2010 Report.
2009 and 2010 data from
other progress reports
highlight the following:
GOAL 1: POVERTY AND
HUNGER
Despite progress in
many countries, the number
of people suffering from
hunger on the continent has
increased.
Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Ethiopia, DRC, Angola,
Mozambique and Malawi
made the most progress in
GDP growth rate per person
employed. Many countries
increased labour productivity
but Comoros, Rwanda,
Equatorial Guinea, Chad,
Mali, Namibia, Tunisia, Eritrea,
Botswana and Lesotho
showed a decline between
1992 and 2008.
In Burkina Faso, Comoros,
Djibouti, Lesotho, Zimbabwe,
Morocco, Libya and
Madagascar the prevalence
of underweight children
increased.1 Undernourished
population decreased in
Nigeria and Ghana, but
increased in Gambia.
Liberia,and Sierra Leone.2
According to IFPRI, African
countries that achieved the
most progress in combatting
hunger are: Angola, Ethiopia,
Ghana and Mozambique.
The largest deterioration
between 1990 and 2010 is
seen in the DRC and Burundi,
which together with Chad
and Eritrea have the most
alarming 2010 Global Hunger
Index scores.3
1 Data not available for Burundi, Cameroon,
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland Tunisia, Sao
Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde
2 FAO 2009 The State of Food Insecurity in
the World Economic Crisis
3 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2010) Global Hunger Index
GOAL 2: EDUCATION
African countries
continue to show
overall progress in
net enrollment in primary
education where Ethiopia,
Guinea, Malawi, Mali,
Madagascar, Mauritania and
Morocco showed significant
improvement as did Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Djibouti,
Gambia, Ghana, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland
and Togo. DRC and
Equatorial Guinea reversed
progress (1991- 2007).
GOAL 3: WOMEN’S
EMPOWERMENT
The gender parity index
in primary education
(1991-2007) shows that
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Madagascar, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland and have
regressed. Mauritius is the only
country that has managed
to maintain gender parity
for the same period. Other
countries have only marginally
increased gender parity.
Women’s representation in
African parliaments has made
significant progress. Of 37
countries only six– GuineaBissau, São Tomé and Príncipe,
Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Egypt and Cameroon – show
that parliamentary seats
held by women decreased
between 1990 and 2009. The
most progress was seen in
Rwanda followed by Angola,
Mozambique, South Africa,
and Uganda.1
Guinea, Morocco,
Mauritania, Tunisia, Malawi,
Madagascar, Tanzania and
Togo have made significant
progress in improving primary
completion rates while
Burundi and Mauritius were
the only two countries to
register a setback.1
1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010) Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium
Development Goals, MDG Report 2010
1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
GOAL 6: HIV/AIDS,
MALARIA AND OTHER
DISEASES
Africa has sustained the
progress made in tackling HIV/
AIDS. Namibia and Rwanda
made remarkable increase
in knowledge about HIV
prevention between 2000 and
2008 but most countries will
not meet the 95% knowledge
target by 2010 set by the
UN. Condom use has also
gained acceptance in some
countries such as Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Kenya,
Mozambique, Namibia and
Nigeria. As of December 2008,
some 3 million Africans were
estimated to be receiving
antiretroviral therapy (44% of
the estimated need).1
Malaria mortality has dropped
in Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Zambia and the
Zanzibar region of Tanzania.
Between 2000 and 2008/2009
there was significant increase
in the use of insecticidetreated bed nets (ITN)to
protect from malaria. The
proportion of children under
five sleeping under ITNs rose
considerably in Gambia,
Kenya, Madagascar,
Rwanda, São Tomé and
Príncipe, and Zambia.2
The TB prevalence rate has
been rising in Algeria, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo
and Tunisia. It declined
2 UN (2010) The Millennium Development
Goals Report
1 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update 2009
Mixed progress in africa
100
80
Per cent (%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Goal 1
Achieved
Goal 2
Goal 3
On-track
Goal 4
Goal 5
Off-track-slow
Goal 6
Goal 7
Regressing
Source: Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals,
African Economic Outlook 2010 .
90
31
GOAL 4: CHILD MORTALITY
Overall African underfive mortality rate
(U5MR) declined at an
insufficient rate to attain the
MDG target between 1990
and 2008.U5MR progress has
been most striking in Eritrea
and Malawi, Ethiopia, Malawi,
Mozambique and Niger.1
Progress remains slow in
Mauritania, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Central African
Republic and Swaziland.
Between 1990-2008, there was
no change in DRC or Somalia.
while in Chad, Congo, Kenya,
South Africa and Zimbabwe,
the U5MR increased.
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
declined between 1990 and
2008. Mozambique recorded
the greatest reduction,
followed by Malawi, Niger and
Ethiopia. Kenya was the worst
performer, followed by Chad,
Congo, Lesotho, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe.
Between 2000 and 2008,
16 countries increased their
measles immunization:
Angola, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo,
DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Guinea,Madagascar, Niger,
1 UN (2010) The Millennium Development
Goals Report
in Egypt, Nigeria and
Morocco.3 Nine countries
are still classified by WHO as
TB high-burden countries:
DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe.
3 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
GOAL 7:
ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY1
Many countries are yet
to include environmental
sustainability in their national
development plans. Most are
failing to honor commitments
made at the World Summit
on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) and NEPAD’s
Environment Initiative.
Africa is the lowest emitter
of carbon dioxide as a
global region. CO2 emissions
between 1990 and 2006
decreased in most countries
1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
GOAL 5: MATERNAL
HEALTH
DRC, Ethiopia and
Nigeria, account for
50% of all maternal deaths
globally. Although the
Maternal Mortality Ratio has
fallen in both Nigeria and
Ethiopia, it needs to fall at a
much faster rate for the overall
picture to change1.
Most African countries are
unlikely to achieve the
target as only ten countries
have reached an over 50%
contraceptive prevalence rate:
Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria,
Cape Verde, Egypt, South
Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe,
Namibia, and Swaziland.
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and
Morocco report the lowest
adolescent birth rates on the
continent. It is highest in Chad,
Mali, Mozambique and Niger.2
1 The Lancet (Hogan et al., 2010)
2 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
Nigeria, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra
Leone and Sudan. Benin,
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,
Egypt, Somalia, South Africa,
Swaziland and Zimbabwe
reported a setback over the
same period.2
2 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
except Algeria, Botswana,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Mauritius, Morocco,
Namibia, and the Seychelles.
Libya is the highest emitter of
CO2 per capita in Africa.
Many countries showed an
improvement in access to
safe drinking water. In 2008,
Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti,
Egypt, Gambia, Mauritius,
Namibia, South Africa, and
Tunisia reached over 90%
coverage. DRC, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Niger, Sierra
Leone and Somalia had less
than 50% coverage.
Progress in sanitation is still
slow. Only Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, and Mauritius have
90% of their population
with access to improved
sanitation. Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,
Madagascar, Mozambique,
Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo
have less than 20%.
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Education and Skills Formation
and other serious shortfalls. However, the spread of
information and communication technology offers
chances to bridge some of the gaps in innovative
ways, including through web-based education and
testing platforms, e-learning, and long-distance
mentoring.
P
rimary education continues to be one of Africa’s
greatest success stories. According to the latest
figures, the majority of African countries are on track
to achieve the goal of universal primary education
by 2015, with Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique and Tanzania having made notable
progress.69 This has been achieved through abolition
of school fees, greater public investments and
improved donor support, particularly through the
World Bank’s Education for All Fast Track Initiative.
Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment
T
he empowerment of Africa’s women is critical to
the achievement of all MDGs, not just the goal of
gender equality. Fortunately, awareness of the link
between women’s empowerment and development
continues to grow. Although gender-disaggregated
data remain patchy, the results of increased efforts
are beginning to show.
There is less success in other areas such as the
quality of education, completion rates, enrolment in
secondary and tertiary education, basic education
reform, and teacher recruitment.70 Meeting the
relevant targets will be an enormous challenge.
More than 31 million African children, most of them
girls, remain out of school and the number of new
teachers needed between now and 2015 alone
equals the continent’s entire current teaching
force.71 With an enrolment rate of merely 6 per cent,
low female participation, and over 40 per cent of
faculty positions vacant, higher education remains a
particularly serious stumbling block in the continent’s
quest for strong and sustained growth. This is despite
the growing engagement of international donors
and collaborative initiatives like the Partnership for
Higher Education in Africa or the Association for the
Development of Education in Africa.72
In October 2010, the AU launched African Women’s
Decade, and there are encouraging signs of progress
to come.74 Last year showed a continuing upward
trend in the political participation of African women,
who now hold 18.5 per cent of parliamentary positions
(from 15 per cent in the previous year). Women’s
representation in parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa
is now higher than in South Asia, the Arab states or
Eastern Europe.75 Most countries are also on track to
achieve gender parity in primary education by 2015. A
growing number, including Senegal, Benin and Burkina
Faso, have integrated gender concerns into their
national development plans and poverty-reduction
strategies, also because international partners like the
Millennium Challenge Corporation have made gender
reform a prerequisite for grant disbursement.76 Lesotho
has even achieved the greatest overall improvement
of any nation in the World Economic Forum’s Global
Gender Gap Index over the last five years.77
There is still a notable lack of strategic planning for and
access to skills development as part of the broader
education curriculum. The acquisition of skills linked
to market-needs plays an essential role in human
development, employment generation, poverty
reduction and sustainable economic growth. While
the share of secondary school students enrolled in
technical and vocational programmes has increased
to 13 per cent in Mali, 16 per cent in Rwanda, and
18 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it
remains below 2 per cent in Niger, Chad and Sudan.73
Despite these encouraging signs, Africa remains
plagued by substantial and debilitating gender
gaps in health, employment, and wages.78 For every
headline success, thousands of women continue to
find their talents and aspirations blocked by formal
and informal barriers. If adjusted for gender equality,
human development ratings drop substantially
across the entire continent.79
Crisis-induced spending cuts in both African and
partner countries, quickly growing youth populations
and the prevalence of armed conflict in many parts
of the continent complicate efforts to address these
The empowerment of Africa’s women is critical
to the achievement of all MDGs.
32
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
For reasons ranging from labour-market conditions
to access to education to social barriers, cultural
values and attitudes in the household, the vast
majority of women in Sub-Saharan Africa continue
to face income and job insecurities.80 The economic
crisis has further increased both the informalization
of jobs held by women and their share of vulnerable
employment.81 Even though women make up the
majority of the agricultural workforce, producing as
much as 80 per cent of the continent’s food, they still
own less than 1 per cent of Africa’s land. They are
still the first, along with their children, to suffer under
economic contraction, food insecurity and violent
conflict.
While Africa as a whole is unlikely to meet the goal
of reducing infant mortality by 2015, some countries
have achieved outstanding reductions, including
Mozambique (over 70 per cent), Malawi (68 per
cent) and Niger (64 per cent).84 Although maternal
mortality remains unacceptably high across the
continent, the limited available evidence indicates
that some countries, including Burundi, Cape Verde
and Egypt, are achieving substantial reductions.
This suggests that current efforts to reduce maternal
mortality are working but need to be further scaled
up and complemented by increased investments in
information systems and accessible and affordable
services. Africa’s leaders agreed at the AU Summit
in July 2010 to increase financial and political
support for female and child health, and to intensify
cooperative efforts through partnerships like the
Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal
Mortality in Africa (CARMMA).87
This is not only a personal tragedy for millions of
women and their families, but a major brake on
Africa’s development. Failing to use women’s energy
and skills slows progress towards achievement of the
MDGs, weakens governance and accountability,
and hampers the implementation of much-needed
reforms. Empowering women, on the other hand, is
proven to increase household incomes, nutrition and
education levels, and agricultural productivity, and
to decrease fertility, population growth and carbon
emissions.82 Africa still has a long way to go in realizing
the enormous potential of its women.
While the goals of reducing maternal and infant
mortality across all Africa remain distant, there
are several important milestones within reach. The
elimination of polio, measles, guinea-worm disease
and mother-to-child transmission of HIV is possible, but
requires a strong final push.88 The expansion of routine
immunization across the continent is progressing
and the introduction of several new vaccines,
including for meningitis and pneumococcal disease,
is already yielding substantial benefits.89 A promising
malaria vaccine is in the final testing stages and its
introduction may be only a couple of years away.90
Health
I
ncreased financing and a strategic scale-up
of effective interventions have led to some
remarkable results in health this year. For example,
enough insecticide-treated mosquito nets have
been distributed to protect more than 578 million
people at risk of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As a result of these and similar efforts, 11 African
countries have shown reductions of over 50 per cent
in the number of confirmed malaria cases, and the
majority of African states are now on track to halt the
advance of malaria by 2015.83
Many of these recent achievements were made
possible by effective partnerships between and
among governments, international organizations,
the private sector, philanthropic actors and civil
society. Particularly innovative funding mechanisms
such as the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and
Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight
Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria have helped to turn
international goodwill into results on the ground.
Eleven African countries have shown reductions
of over 50 per cent of confirmed malaria cases.
33
140
opportunities for WOMEN in africa
120
FEMALE Education & literacy
100
Moldova
Australia
(measured in percent ot total female population)
Namibia
Literacy rate, women
80
South Africa
Mauritius
Botswana
Iran, Islamic Rep
Kenya
Malawi Uganda
Algeria
Madagascar
Zambia
Cameroon
Ghana
Tanzania
Nigeria
60
Tunisia
Morocco
Côte d'Ivoire
40
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010)
Women’s Economic Opportunity Index.
Sudan
Pakistan
Togo
Egypt
Senegal
Benin
Burkina Faso
20
Ethiopia
Chad
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Primary and secondary education, women (total years of schooling)
100
WOMEN’S Access to finance in africa
90
Sweden
Belgium
Germany
80
Denmark
Mauritius
60
50
South Africa
Tunisia
Namibia
Venezuela, RB
Botswana
Tanzania
Benin Ghana Kenya
Algeria
Senegal
Zambia
Malawi
Nigeria
Uganda
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Cameroon
Ethiopia
30
Togo
Côte d'Ivoire
Pakistan
Chad
Morocco
40
20
Egypt
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010)
Women’s Economic Opportunity Index.
Overall Score
(Economic Opportunity Index (1-100)
70
Yemen
Sudan
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Access to Finance
Countries analysed in the Women’s Economic Opportuniy Index
Selected countries for reference
African countries
34
women’s opportunites in select african countries
Botswana
Chad
World average
Best in world
World average
Best in world
Labour Policy
General Business
Environment
General Business
Environment
Labour
Practice
Women’s Legal and
Social Status
Labour
Practice
Women’s Legal and
Social Status
Access to
Finance
Access to
Finance
Education
and Training
Education
and Training
Nigeria
South Africa
World average
Best in world
Labour Policy
World average
Best in world
Labour Policy
General Business
Environment
Labour
Practice
Women’s Legal and
Social Status
Labour Policy
Labour
Practice
General Business
Environment
Access to
Finance
Women’s Legal and
Social Status
Education
and Training
Access to
Finance
Education
and Training
Notes
On the radial charts:
Tanzania
Indicator scores are normalised to lie within a consistent range between 0-100, based on source
data. Section scores are the weighted sum of the underlying indicator scores. All scores 0-100
where 100=most favourable.
World average
Best in world
On the methodology:
The Women’s Economic Opportunity Index is a dynamic quantitative and qualitative scoring
model constructed from 26 indicators that measure specific attributes of the environment for
women employees and entrepreneurs in 113 economies.
Labour Policy
General Business
Environment
Labour
Practice
Five category scores are calculated from the unweighted mean of underlying indicators and
scaled from 0-100, where 100=most favourable. These categories are: Labour policy and practice
(which comprises two sub-categories: Labour policy and Labour practice); Access to finance;
Education and training; Women’s legal and social status; and the General business environment.
Each category or sub-category features either four or five underlying indicators.
The overall score is calculated from a simple average of the unweighted category and indicator
scores. That is, every indicator contributes equally to its parent category and every category
contributes equally to the overall score. This is the baseline score for the Women’s Economic
Opportunity Index.
Women’s Legal and
Social Status
The women’s access to finance programmes indicator assesses whether governments or the
formal financial sector have programmes aimed at providing fi nancial accounts to women,
improving both access to loans and financial literacy.
Access to
Finance
Education
and Training
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Women’s Economic Opportunity Index.
35
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Partnering for health I: The global initiatives
Global health partnerships have received great public attention, and have transformed the quality and
scope of health provision across Africa, saving millions of lives. Successful collaborations include advocacy
on a particular disease (UNAIDS), improving coordination between multiple initiatives (the Rollback Malaria
Initiative), or delivering much-needed services, financial and medical resources, and technologies to
national governments (the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI). GAVI and the
Global Fund in particular demonstrate how partnerships across sectors and between organizations can
achieve objectives that no single agency or actor could achieve alone.
Partnering for health II: Eliminating river blindness
The African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) is one of the longest-running partnerships for
health on the continent. Focusing on community-directed treatment, APOC involves a broad range of
financial, scientific and operational partners, including a network of 15 NGOs and 19 African countries.
Implemented by WHO, with financing managed by the World Bank, the partnership has come close to
eliminating river blindness. Besides reducing the number of infections by over 16 million cases and providing
regular treatment to over 50 million people, the partnership has helped to reclaim abandoned arable land
for settlement and agricultural production.
Source: WHO (2011).
Partnering for health III: SMS for life
The SMS for Life initiative is a public–private partnership harnessing standard technology to improve local
access to and availability of essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The Roll Back Malaria Partnership,
Novartis, Vodafone, IBM and the Ministry of Health in Tanzania jointly used a combination of mobile phones,
Short Messaging Service (SMS) technologies and easy-to-use websites to track and manage the supply of
malaria drugs. The initiative was built on a generic and highly scalable platform that could be used for other
medicines or products and could be replicated across the continent with minimal adaptation and high
impact.
E
These generous pledges, provided that they
materialize, contrast markedly with the reluctance of
African governments to fulfil their own commitments.
Many of them fall short of the Abuja target of
allocating 15 per cent of their public expenditure to
health; 19 countries spend less on health now than
they did when they signed the Abuja declaration in
2001.92
ncouragingly, this goodwill has been reconfirmed
over the last year. Leaders at the G8 Summit
in June 2010 pledged to mobilize $5 billion to
accelerate progress on MDG 4 and 5 as part of the
Muskoka Initiative to reduce maternal and new-born
deaths in developing countries.91 At the MDG Review
Summit in September 2010, world leaders, privatesector actors, philanthropic organizations and civil
society pledged a total of $40 billion for health over
the next five years. The Global Fund’s replenishment
in October 2010 yielded $11.7 billion for the global
fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for 2011–
2013 (up from $9.7 billion for 2008–2010); several
donors, including Australia and Norway, have
announced new commitments to GAVI ahead of the
forthcoming replenishment meeting.
Because of insufficient investments by national
governments and largely disease-specific efforts
of donors, most of Africa’s health systems continue
to be seriously understaffed, inefficient and
characterized by glaringly inequitable access.93
They remain largely inadequate to deal with many
of the continent’s health challenges. These include
36
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
both the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the
extremely poor, and the “silent epidemic” of noncommunicable diseases such as cancers, diabetes
and cardiovascular diseases expected to increase
significantly over the next 20 years. The number of
Africans with diabetes, for example, is expected to
rise from 12.1 million to 23.9 million.94
progress also compounds and widens existing
inequalities, as improvements in sanitation and
water access are largely bypassing the poor.101 These
inequities are becoming increasingly apparent in
Africa’s cities where almost half the poor population
suffers from at least one preventable disease caused
by lack of safe water and sanitation.102
n July 2010, the UN General Assembly declared
access to clean water and sanitation a human right.
Implementing this right will be a particular challenge
in Africa where more than 40 per cent of people
live in water-deprived areas. The amount of water
available per person in Africa is not only far below the
global average already, but is declining even further
as groundwater levels fall and precipitation patterns
change as a result of accelerating climate change.
At present, only 26 countries are on track to attain
the water-provision target to halve the proportion of
the population without sustainable access to clean
drinking water by 2015.95 Only nine African countries
(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Rwanda, Botswana,
Angola, South Africa and Egypt) are expected to
meet the MDG target of halving the proportion of
the population without sustainable access to basic
sanitation by 2015.96 At current trends, Africa will miss
this target by over 300 million people.97
Increased intergovernmental activism includes
the G8 Partnership on Water and Sanitation, the
G20 Working Group on Water and Sanitation and
the African Ministers’ Council on Water and its
African Water Facility. This has not yet translated
into national policies and investments necessary
to address the lack of progress. By investing only
an average 0.2 per cent of GDP in sanitation and
hygiene, most African countries have missed the
2010 targets of the eThekwini Declaration which
called for the sector-specific allocation of 0.5 per
cent of GDP.103 As a result, total investment in Africa’s
water sector remains far below the AfDB estimate of
$11 billion per year required to meet the continent’s
drinking water supply and sanitation needs.104 Other
obstacles to progress are poor governance of the
water sector, both nationally and with respect to
Africa’s 63 shared water basins,105 the growing
water needs of African agriculture, a lack of privatesector capacity in manual drilling, and limited
capacity of community-based maintenance of
water infrastructure.106
This slow progress is highly problematic because
improved access to safe water and sanitation is
essential to improve health.98 Currently, only 60 per
cent of people in Sub-Saharan Africa have access to
improved sources of drinking water and less than half
have access to basic sanitation facilities.99 More than
a quarter still have to practise open defecation, thus
protracting water- and hygiene-related diseases
such as diarrhoea and worm infections.100 The slow
At the same time, a number of innovative
partnerships, such the AfDB’s Rural Water Supply
and Sanitation Initiative, the CEO Water Mandate,
the Sanitation and Water for All Partnership and
Ecotact’s commercialized provision of affordable
sanitation in urban slums, have shown that rapid
progress is possible.107 There is also enormous
potential for expanding simple water-harvesting
techniques and savings from utility reforms.
Access to Water and Sanitation
I
Partnering around affordable sanitation services
With the support of partners like the United Nations Foundation, Ashoka, UNICEF, and the Coca Cola
Company, the social enterprise Ecotact provides affordable sanitation services in informal settlements and
urban slums in Kenya. By setting up pay-per-use toilet facilities, Ecotact has improved hygiene in targeted
communities, reduced pollution from human waste, generated employment opportunities for the urban
poor and restored dignity through the provision of sanitation services. It also delivers highly impressive
economic returns, especially if lower healthcare costs, reduced disruption to schooling and higher work
productivity are considered. Built on commercial viability, Ecotact’s model is highly scalable and, given the
rapid growth of urban slums across Africa, should be highly replicable.
Sources: UNDP (2011), Growing Inclusive Markets Initiative
37
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
food and nutrition
security
planning to host the first ever meeting of the Group’s
Ministers of Agriculture before the Summit. In addition,
there are attempts to create more transparency of
food stocks held by large exporters to avoid panic
caused by market uncertainty about the availability
of essential commodities.112
E
ven though several African countries are on the
verge of meeting their MDG targets for hunger
reduction, the continent as a whole continues to be
the world’s most food-insecure region.108 Hunger and
malnutrition remain pervasive in many countries, and
rising food prices are compounding the situation for
millions across the continent, particularly in zones of
protracted conflict and in fast-growing urban areas.109
Structural Barriers to Food Security
A
t the same time, the fact that the number of
Africans suffering from hunger had already been
on the increase well before prices spiked suggests
that chronic and structural problems rather than
mere price fluctuations continue to underlie much
of the continent’s food insecurity. These problems
include: disadvantageous international trade rules
and subsidy regimes; a debilitating lack of essential
infrastructure such as irrigation and storage systems;
inadequate agricultural research; a lack of improved
seeds, fertilizers, and plant protection material; poor
soil and water management systems; poor access to
credit and marketing services; as well as inefficient
and wasteful agricultural value chains. Agricultural
productivity is also affected by social realities such as
persistent poverty and insufficient access of women
to land and other essential resources.
Volatility of Food Prices
F
ood prices are higher now than at any time
since 1984.110 Even though the World Bank’s Food
Price Watch sees Sub-Saharan Africa less exposed
to risks related to soaring food prices as domestic
food production is increasingly replacing imports
and recent harvests have been good,111 the price
spikes have deepened existing macro and micro
vulnerabilities. On the macro level, countries with a
high share of food imports and limited fiscal space
like Burundi are driven deeper into current-account
deficits and the possibility of social unrest as they
become unable to use subsidies and price controls
to shield their populations from inflation. On the micro
level, higher prices make life even more difficult for
Africa’s poorest, who already spend between 60
to 80 per cent of their income on food. Faced with
reduced access to food and increased vulnerability
to the seasonality of local food prices and markets,
households are forced into unavoidable compromises,
such as choosing cheaper (often less nutritious) food,
selling productive assets, withdrawing children from
school, forgoing healthcare, or simply eating less than
they need.
These structural barriers are increasingly compounded
by global trends. In the short-term, the gap between
the continent’s domestic food supply and demand
will widen as global consumption patterns continue
to shift towards meat products, and more profitable
bio-fuels supplant food crops. In the mid-to-longterm, the continent’s food system will experience an
unprecedented confluence of pressures, including
through the reinforcing impacts of population growth,
climate change and environmental degradation.113
Agricultural Productivity
The recurrence of food-related crises over the last
few years has focused international attention on the
tragic state of food security in Africa and given rise
to a number of supportive initiatives such as the G8’s
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, the Global Agriculture
and Food Security Program, and the World Bank’s
Global Food Crisis Response Program. The French
G20 Presidency has also prioritized food security, and
especially the moderation of speculative trading in
food commodities, for the 2011 Summit in Cannes. It is
O
ver the last year, African countries and their
partners have increased their commitment
to raise agricultural productivity on the continent,
including through multi-stakeholder partnerships. For
example, the Comprehensive African Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) now has 25
signatory countries (seven more than last year)
committed to spending at least 10 per cent of their
national budgets on agriculture, to accelerate growth
Food prices are higher now than at any time since 1984.
38
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
pace with population growth, and a significant part
of that increase will have to come from Africa. There
is an urgent need to scale up successful interventions,
focus on Africa’s army of smallholder farmers and
increase emphasis on staple food crops. There is also
a need to ensure that the growing foreign investments
in Africa’s arable land, sometimes referred to as “land
grabs”, are transparent, add to the continent’s food
security, benefit local farmers and communities,
and avoid undermining social, environmental and
governance systems.114
in the sector to at least 6 per cent a year. Nineteen
countries have finalized Agricultural Investment Plans.
Practical efforts to boost agricultural production are
beginning to yield results in many countries, including
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania.
Focused international assistance and innovative
partnerships, like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA), have helped governments to intensify
production. Methods include: the introduction
of high-yielding varieties of crops and improved
techniques such as micro-dosing of fertilizers and
drip irrigation; increased accessibility of productionenhancing inputs, credit and other financial services
such as weather-indexed crop insurance; and
improved markets and information. The increasing
engagement of the private sector, including through
the promotion of agricultural growth corridors and
agro-industrialization, will help to increase resources
available for agricultural investments.
The dire social consequences of the recent food
crises have shown that efforts to improve agricultural
productivity and connectivity on the supply side need
to be complemented by better risk management,
efficient social safety nets and targeted nutritional
programmes on the demand side. As with the
implementation of agricultural development plans,
national governments ultimately bear responsibility
for this.
These successes remain too small to feed the
continent. Global food production will have to
increase by 70 per cent over the next 40 years to keep
Partnering around the potential of Africa’s smallholder farmers
A critical constraint to agricultural growth in Africa is lack of access to financing across the agricultural value
chain, particularly among smallholder farmers. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has
initiated financial partnerships and risk-sharing instruments with a number of institutions to mitigate the risk of
lending by commercial banks and other financial institutions to smallholder farmers and value chains that
support them. So far, AGRA and its partners have used $15 million in loan guarantee funds to leverage $160
million from commercial banks in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, benefiting more
than 85,000 smallholder farmers and helping to boost regional food security. AGRA is also cooperating with
the Central Bank of Nigeria to help leverage a $500 million governmental risk sharing initiative into $3 billion
in new lending from commercial banks to support agricultural value chains and farmers in Nigeria.
Practical efforts to boost agricultural production
are beginning to yield results in many countries.
39
FOOD securityAND HUNGER
Price volatility
Maize prices in East African countries and world price 2006-2009
Source: FAO (2009b) based on national statistical databases.
600
USD per metric ton
500
400
300
200
100
Uganda
Tanzania
A
Ethiopia
Maize
+74%
Wheat
+69%
Palm oil
+55%
Soybeans
+36%
Beef +30%
l0
9
Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group
Ju
09
09
pr
n
08
Ja
ct
O
l0
8
08
Ju
08
pr
A
n
07
Ja
7
ct
O
l0
07
Kenya
Ju
pr
07
A
n
06
Ja
6
ct
l0
O
Ju
pr
A
Ja
n
06
06
0
Food price changes
Q1 2010 to Q1 2011
International
Food Security Risk Index
FOOD SECURITY
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Chad
Afghanistan
Sudan
Ethiopia
Liberia
Country
Afghanistan
DR Congo
Burundi
Eritrea
Sudan
Ethiopia
Angola
Liberia
Chad
Zimbabwe
Eritrea
Burundi
DR Congo
Angola
Food Security Risk
Extreme risk
Zimbabwe
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
No Data
© Maplecroft 2011
This map is the visual representation of the Maplecroft Food Security Index (FSI). It provides a quantitative
assessment of the availability, stability and access to food supplies, as well as the nutritional outcomes that
result from food insecurity. Each country is assigned an index score based on its performance across 18 key
indicators, classified into four sub-indices: extreme risk, high risk, medium risk and low risk.
40
maplecroft
www.maplecroft.com
de
rat
Lo e
w
*
no data
*
no data
a
* indicates
value of
less than 5
*
*
no data
no data
no data
*
2000
2007
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
DRC
Congo, Republic
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0
Source: African Statistical Yearbook 2010 (UNECA, AUC, AfDB).
1990
2010
Sources: Food and nutrition security Source - IFPR Global Hunger Index 2010 Data underlying the calculation of the 1990 and 2010 Global Hunger Indices.
1999-2001 = 100
Mo
Se
rio
us
ng
rm
i
Ala
Ex
tr
Ala eme
rm ly
i ng
global Hunger index and FOOD PRODUCTION
0
IFPRI Global Hunger Index 2010
20
40
60
80
100 120 140 160 180 200
Agricultural and Food Production Index
41
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
CLIMATE CHANGE
negotiators and Heads of State and Government
with an improved communication and negotiation
strategy.121 The Cancun Summit did not result in
a comprehensive agreement or legally binding
treaty. However, it did anchor previous agreements
in the formal negotiation process, clarify details in
important areas, revitalize the multilateral process
led by the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and establish a Green Climate
Fund to help facilitate financial support to developing
countries. With COP 17 poised to take place in Durban
in November 2011, African states, supported by the
AU, AfDB and NEPAD, have an opportunity to push
for clarification and implementation of agreements
reached in Copenhagen and Cancun.
C
limate change is already placing enormous
burdens on African societies and economies,
and further complicating their development. At the
same time, international efforts to counter its effects
offer the continent new chances to profit from its vast
carbon sinks, leapfrog dirty technologies, and embark
on a path of green growth and clean development.
The Impact of Climate Change
F
or millions in Africa, the effects of climate change
are already manifest in increasingly frequent
storms, droughts and floods, changing weather and
precipitation patterns as well rising temperatures.115
In combination with existing environmental
degradation,116 this reduces agricultural productivity
and threatens food security,117 increases water stress,
facilitates the spread of vector-borne diseases
such as malaria, and erodes valuable human
habitat. Through the acidification of seawater, rising
sea levels and the spread of storm-surge zones,
climate change also directly threatens the lives and
livelihoods of millions of Africans dependant on the
oceans for food and income.118
Climate Change Finance
A
frican countries require substantial additional
resources to help them adapt to the unavoidable
consequences of climate change. For reasons
of design, sequencing, coordination, and lack of
absorptive capacity, they have been unable to
benefit from financing instruments of the Kyoto
Protocol, such as the Clean Development Mechanism
and the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation Programme. The Copenhagen
Accord includes the commitment to support
developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation
efforts with additional resources. This is in the form of
fast-start finance ($30 billion for 2010–2012) and longterm finance ($100 billion a year by 2020), with 40 per
cent of each fund earmarked for Africa.
By all indicators, African countries are among the
most vulnerable to the effects of sustained climate
change.119 According to Maplecroft’s Climate Change
Vulnerability Index, 12 of the 25 countries most at risk
are African, with high levels of poverty, population
density, and reliance on flood- and drought-prone
agricultural land.120 These countries are finding it
increasingly difficult to feed their people, protect them
from the vagaries of nature, grow their economies and
conserve their environments. The risk of resource-based
conflict and destabilizing mass migrations only adds to
these other multiple insecurities.
To date, most of the fast-start finance appears to
be coming from existing ODA budgets.122 The HighLevel Advisory Group on Climate Finance convened
by the UN Secretary-General and co-chaired by
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi concluded
that the long-term finance could be mobilized in
addition to existing ODA budgets by auctioning
emission rights, establishing a carbon-dioxide tax or
emissions-transaction fee for international carbon
trades, and relocating funds from fuel subsidies in
developed countries to adaptation activities in
developing countries.123
Climate Change Politics
A
pproaching the 16th Conference of Parties (COP
16) on climate change in Cancun in December
2010, the African Ministerial Conference on the
Environment (AMCEN) continued to develop the
continent’s common position and provided African
Despite persisting uncertainty about the sources and
disbursement of proposed financing as well as the
By all indicators, African countries are among the most vulnerable
to the effects of sustained climate change.
42
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
green policies such as fostering sustainable land and
watershed management, combating deforestation,
using taxes and market-based instruments to
shift consumer preference, and promoting green
investment and innovation. They have also continued
to engage in multilateral initiatives like the Congo Basin
Forest Fund, the Lake Chad Sustainability Programme
and the creation of Regional Climate Centres. The
Climate Information for Development in Africa (ClimDev) Programme aims to improve the continent’s
analytical capacity, knowledge management and
access to information on climate change.
level of political commitment, there are already well
over 20 bilateral and multilateral funds dedicated
to receiving and managing pledged resources.124
These include the Global Environmental Facility, the
World Bank’s Green Climate Fund and the AfDB’s
Africa Green Fund. This proliferation of funds runs
contrary to the Paris principles for aid effectiveness
by complicating the reporting, monitoring and
verification of financial commitments and will need
addressing at the forthcoming High-Level Meeting on
Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The proliferation of funds
also adds to the already heavy administrative burden
placed on recipient states – and to their growing
distrust in the willingness of richer countries to go
beyond the formulation of elaborate mechanisms.
Partners are also stepping up their supportive efforts
across Africa. The World Bank, for example, has
earmarked $7 billion for adaptation initiatives across
the continent and is already implementing its climate
change strategy for Africa in ten countries. This
includes a project to improve a congested publictransport system in Nigeria, and the “Lighting Africa”
initiative to provide carbon-free lighting to 250 million
Africans by 2030.126
At the same time, there is growing realization that
transfers of public revenue and carbon taxes in
developed countries can provide only part of
the solution. Reliance on carbon markets is also
problematic, given Africa’s insufficient access, the
low price of carbon and the uncertainty surrounding
international negotiations and market mechanisms.
Consequently, there is increasing focus on the
potential of the private sector and international capital
markets to complement the compensatory activities
of developed countries through leveraging public
flows, financing large-scale infrastructure projects and
promoting market-based adaptation activities.125
None of this, however, is enough to spark and
drive the required transformation towards green
growth and environmental sustainability.127 Much
more is needed, from both African states and their
development and business partners, to ensure
that the continent has the resources, mechanisms
and technologies necessary to adapt to the
effects of climate change. This requires investment
in transformative mitigation measures such as
increasing renewable-energy generation and
transmission capacity, and promoting sustainable
land management. Given Africa’s low rate of
electrification and deficient power grids, there is
great opportunity for the deployment of alternative
sources of energy for personal consumption.
Adaptation and Mitigation
S
everal African states, including Ethiopia and
Rwanda, have made notable progress in
implementing their National Adaptation Programmes
of Action. They have incorporated adaptation
into their development agendas, and are pursuing
Partnering around clean household technology
Worldwide, nearly three billion people use polluting, inefficient stoves or open fires for indoor cooking and
heating. This causes significant health problems and contributes to climate change through the emission of
greenhouse gases. Several partnerships involving public and private actors, including the Global Alliance
for Clean Cookstoves, are successfully promoting the use of fuel-efficient stoves. These can save up to three
tons of carbon per year (per stove) and have significant economic and health benefits. For Africa, the aim is
to convert 100 million homes to clean-cooking technology by 2020, saving as much as three hundred million
tons of carbon a year. Progress to date is encouraging, with millions of improved stoves already distributed
across the continent and markets for clean household-cooking solutions emerging in many countries.
43
Climate change Vulnerability
Health
Country Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Republic
DRC
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Year 2010
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
2030
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Weather
Disasters
2010 2030
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Low* l Moderate
Habitat Loss
2010
2030
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l High
Economic
Stress
2010 2030
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Severe l Acute
Overall
Vulnerability
2010
2030
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
* No African countries fall under the “Low” category for any of the indicators.
Source: Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis, DARA & Climate Vulnerable Forum. http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/
44
africa’s Green Growth Potential
Technical potential for renewable energy power generation and
electricity markets by 2050 (exajoules a year)
12000
North America
Transition Economies
8000
Latin America
6000
Rest of Asia
4000
OECD Pacific
2000
Middle East
Africa
(Source: REN21,
Figures from
Renewable Energy
Potentials 2008.)
Oc
e
En an
erg
y
E le
ct
Po Prod ricity
ten uc
tia tion
l To
ta
E le l
Co ctric
nsu ity
mp
tio
n
rm
E le a l
c tr
ic
oth
e
Ge
W
Off ind
sho
re
W
On ind
sho
re
Hy
dro
po
we
r
CS
P
So
lar
So
lar
PV
0
MAIN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION FUNDS
A - Adaptation M - Mitigation REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
Fund - name and acronym
Type
Adminstered by
Africa Green Fund
Adaptation Fund
Amazon Fund (Fundo Amazônia)
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
African Development Bank
Adaptation Fund Board
Brazilian Development Bank
Clean Technology Fund
Congo Basin Forest Fund
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
Forest Investment Program
GEF Trust Fund - Climate Change
focal area 4 + 5
GEF Trust Fund - Climate Change
focal area 5
Global Climate Change Alliance
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
World Bank
African Development Bank
World Bank
World Bank
Global Environment Facility completed
Global Environment Facility
Multilateral
European Commission
Global Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy Fund
Green Climate Fund
Hatoyama Initiative - private sources
Hatoyama Initiative - public sources
International Climate Fund, Formerly
ETF
International Climate Initiative
Multilateral
European Commission
Multilateral
Bilateral
Bilateral
Bilateral
Bilateral
World Bank
Government of Japan
Government of Japan
Government of the United
Kingdom
Government of Germany
International Forest Carbon Initiative
Least Developed Countries Fund
MDG Achievement Fund –
Environment and Climate Change
window
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
Scaling-Up Renewable Energy
Program for Low Income Countries
Special Climate Change Fund
Strategic Climate Fund
Bilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Strategic Priority on Adaptation
UN-REDD Programme
Areas of
Date
focus operational
A
2011*
A
2009
A, M,
2009
REDD
M
2008
REDD
2008
REDD
2008
REDD
2009
A, M
2006
Pledged
(USD mn)
no data
216
1,027
Deposits
(USD mn)
no data
202
51
Approved Disbursed Share to
(USD mn) (USD mn) Africa
no data
no data
100%
34
9
36%
7
7
0%
3,792
83
221
559
1,032
1,493
83
174
102
1,033
1,453
17
12
3
934
227
12
10
3
735
42%
100%
26%
no data
15%
A, M
2010
1,156
339
7
0
no data
A, M,
REDD
M
2008
226
225
187
21
62%
2008
170
60
60
60
no data
A
A, M
A, M
A
2011*
2008
2010
2011
no data
4,000
11,000
4,717
no data
1,360
3,960
40
no data
1,360
3,960
no data
no data
0
0
no data
no data
no data
no data
no data
2008
519
516
504
504
14%
Government of Australia
Global Environment Facility
UNDP
A, M,
REDD
REDD
A
A, M
2007
2002
2007
216
262
90
67
219
90
48
144
90
48
92
71
0%
66%
27%
Multilateral
Multilateral
World Bank
World Bank
A
M
2008
2009
972
307
306
24
287
no data
8
no data
40%
no data
Multilateral
Multilateral
Global Environment Facility
World Bank
2002
2008
149
0
134
0
99
no data
74
no data
29%
no data
Multilateral
Multilateral
Global Environment Facility
UNDP
A
A, M,
REDD
A
REDD
2004
2008
50
126
50
95
49
76
49
51
20%
21%
* Operationalization envisaged for 2011
Source: The Climate Fund Update, http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/ 45
Source: Renewable Energy Potentials (2008)
OECD Europe
10000
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Development Finance
and Cooperation
Encouragingly, aid already represents less than 10
per cent of tax revenue in 14 countries.
Traditional Bilateral Partners
A
s African states are improving their domestic
resource
mobilization,
and
becoming
increasingly attractive investment destinations,
the overall share of assistance from international
partners in their development finance continues to
decline, having now fallen to an average of about
10 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI).128 The
importance of this assistance, however, remains high
as predictable, concessional and targeted aid helps
to lubricate the ability of governments to respond to
the needs of their people, leverage other flows and
ensure that they achieve developmental results. This
having been said, several states, including Burundi,
Guinea-Bissau and Mali, remain almost wholly
dependent on international aid.129
A
id flows are only one measurement of partners’
commitment to development, but they remain
an important one.131 For both the promises to double
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa
made by the G7 at their 2005 Summit in Gleneagles,
and the intermediate goal of the EU Roadmap to
deliver 0.56 per cent of EU GNI in aid, 2010 was the
target year. The most recent figures show that only
three G7 countries (Canada, Japan and the US) have
met their 2010 spending targets for Africa.132 While
all others have fallen short of their promises, there
are some important differences between them. The
UK has made a more ambitious pledge, and has
shown commendable increases in ODA to Africa
since Gleneagles, particularly over the last year,
and has fallen just short of its target. By contrast, Italy
made an ambitious commitment but is delivering
less aid now than it did at the time of the Gleneagles
Summit, raising further doubts about its credibility
at top decision-making tables. Both Germany and
France are somewhere in between. While they have
made ambitious pledges and have shown notable
increases in ODA to Africa, they have fallen far short of
their promises. Preliminary figures suggest that OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors
overall have met just over half (52 per cent) of the
increases in aid promised between 2004 and 2010.133
Domestic Resource Mobilization
I
n 2002, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development highlighted the need for African states
to complement, and ultimately replace, external aid
flows with domestic resources for development. Since
then, many states have significantly strengthened
their capacity to mobilize domestic resources
through improving tax administrations, deepening
the tax base, segmenting taxpayers and reducing
widespread tax exemptions, particularly in the
extractive industries. Thirty-one countries have joined
the African Tax Administration Forum to promote
and facilitate cooperation among revenue services.
However, in many states revenue performance
remains weak and too little of the mobilized resources
are invested in social development.
The
consensus
on
increasing
development
assistance has undoubtedly been tested by the
global economic crisis. Although some traditional
donors such as Germany have already returned to
strong growth, policies of fiscal austerity will continue
to put significant pressure on aid budgets for some
time. The last year has already seen a noticeable
decrease in new commitments to Africa, and the
OECD predicts a further reduction in the growth rate
of aid, with the most marked deceleration in aid to
Africa.134 The US administration has already agreed
significant cuts in its foreign affairs and aid budgets
in recent congressional negotiations.
For many countries, aid continues to represent a
significant proportion of development finance.
According to the African Economic Outlook 2010,
of the 48 African countries with data available, 12
receive more aid than tax revenues, 24 receive
aid equal to at least half the tax revenues, and 34
receive aid exceeding 10 per cent of tax revenues.130
Aid flows are only one measurement of partners’ commitment
to development, but they remain an important one.
46
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The G8 Muskoka Summit
In June 2010, the G8 met in Muskoka, Canada. Development issues on the agenda included maternal,
newborn and child health, food security and accountability. As in previous years, several African leaders
were invited to participate in selected aspects of the Summit, but there were very few noticeable outcomes
for Africa beyond a slightly improved accountability framework, and the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal,
Newborn and Child Health which commits G8 members to spend an additional $5 billion between 2010 and
2015 to accelerate progress towards MDGs 4 and 5 in developing countries.
I
transactions or international transport to cover the
increasing need for such resources.
t is doubtful that most donors will achieve the target
of dedicating 0.7 per cent of GNI to development
assistance by 2015. While Denmark, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden continue to
exceed the target, the most recent DAC figures show
that most donors would have to almost double current
ODA disbursements to reach it.135 Nonetheless, the
announcements by France, Germany and the UK of
sticking to the 0.7 per cent target, and in the case of
the UK to reach it as early as 2013, leave some space
for hope, even though current budget freezes mean
that spending will need to increase drastically in a
short amount of time.
Bilateral Partners from
the Global South
A
lthough it remains difficult to separate their
provision of technical and financial assistance
from trade and investment activities, emerging
economies like Brazil, China and India are undoubtedly
providing an increasingly important share of Africa’s
development finance.137 Their growing willingness and
ability to provide grants and concessional finance
has increased the resources available to African
states. It has also helped African states to reduce
their dependence on OECD DAC aid, with its inbuilt
policy conditionalities, high administrative costs and
underlying Western development models.
The financial climate has accelerated several trends
in how aid is viewed, managed and delivered.
There is renewed interest in ways to increase the
developmental impact of aid without necessarily
increasing its volume, such as results-based
financing, cash-on-delivery aid, the consolidation
of engagements to reduce aid fragmentation, and
bringing in the private sector.136 Increasing pressures
on public finances have also led to renewed
attempts to include expenditures for peacekeeping,
climate finance and even the schooling of
immigrants in ODA budgets. Repackaged and
recycled commitments are increasingly opaque
and difficult to monitor. The same pressures have
sparked a search for complementary, if not
alternative, sources of development finance,
including market-based instruments. Several states
including France, and the European Parliament,
are investigating the use of levies on financial
Most emerging partners are styling their commercial
engagement in Africa as South–South cooperation,
complementing it with increasingly comprehensive
development initiatives including financial assistance,
infrastructure provision, and training and education.
More Southern partners are emulating China’s biennial
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which
has evolved into an important platform for ambitious
pledges and commitments to the continent. More of
them are also recognizing the political and commercial
benefits of sharing their own development experiences
with African countries, sometimes in triangular
partnerships with traditional donors.
Emerging economies are undoubtedly providing an increasingly important
share of Africa’s development finance.
47
development finance
Tracking the Gleneagles Commitments
total 2010 oda as volume of total 2010 oda commitment
Canada
USD 1.9 Bn delivered
USD 1.5 Bn target
Italy
USD 1.2 Bn
USD 5.0 Bn
Japan*
USD 38.2 Bn
2010 target
USD 28.9 Bn delivered in 2010
USD 1.6 Bn
USD 1.4 Bn
UK
USD 5.1 Bn
USD 5.5 Bn
Germany
USD 3.4 Bn
USD 6.7 Bn
US
USD 9.6 Bn
USD 8.8 Bn
Notes: * Japan figures for ODA and targets tracks bilateral ODA net of debt relief only, but G7 totals are based on Japan's total ODA (with 2010 targets
incorporating a Japan flatlined multilateral estimate from 2009 onwards.)
At Gleneagles, three G7 countries set 'volume targets' (Canada, Japan and the US). Four G7 countries set ODA targets as a per cent of GNI.
TOTAL G7 ODA AND ODA TO SSA
(2010 prices, excluding debt)
20
(excluding debt)
0.6%
104%
10
20
GLOBAL G7 ODA AS % OF GNI
Total ODA SSA
Change 2004-2010
UK
Source for all data on ODA: ONE/DATA Report 2011
G7
France
USD 4.4 Bn
USD 8.0 Bn
0.56%
France
UK
0.5%
43%
10
EU target for 2010
France
Germany
USD BIllions
20
Canada
81%
10
40
US
71%
20
20
Japan
92%
10
20
Per cent of GNI
25%
10
Note: These charts are based on actual values. Please note that
targets are based on smoothed multilateral for 2004 and 2005
Source: ONE/DATA Report 2011
20
Italy
36%
10
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
represents portion of ODA to SSA
48
0.4%
Germany
Canada
0.3%
G7
0.2%
US
Japan
Italy
0.1%
0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NET CAPITAL INFLOWS, NET PRIVATE AND
OFFICIAL INFLOWS TO SSA 2001-2009
EXTERNAL DEBT, SSA 2005-2010
80
350
35
300
30
250
25
200
20
150
15
20
100
10
10
50
70
60
USD Billions
40
30
0
5
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
-10
Worker remittances
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total debt in $ billion
Net private and
official inflows
Total debt service $ billion
Net debt flows (includes official creditors, private
creditors, net medium and long-term debt flows and net
short-term debt flows)
Percent %
USD Billions
50
2009
0
2010
Total % of GDP
Total debt service
% of GDP
Source: ECA and AU (2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011, Governing development in
Africa
- theECA
roleand
of the
in economic
Source:
AUstate
(2011)
Economic transformation
Report on Africa 2011, Governing
development in Africa – the role of the state in economic transformation
Net equity inflows (includes net FDI and net portfolio
equity inflows)
TOTAL OFFICIAL AND TOTAL PRIVATE
FLOWS FROM OECD DONOR COUNTRIES
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD
Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD
500
450
DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
TAX SHARE, 1990 - 2007, SSA
400
35
350
355
USD Billions
30
20
250
200
15
150
10
100
5
50
0
0
19
9
19 0
9
19 1
9
19 2
9
19 3
94
19
9
19 5
9
19 6
97
19
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
04
20
0
20 5
0
20 6
07
Per cent (%) GDP
25
300
121
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Official Flows
Total Private Flows
(philanthropy, remittances
and investments)
Upper Middle Income
Lower Middle Income
Lower Income
Source: African
Economic
Outlook
2011Outlook 2011
Source:
African
Economic
Note: Based on GNI per capita, economies are classified as lower income,
Note: Based on
GNImiddle
per capita,
are classified as lower income, lower middle and
lower
andeconomies
upper middle.
upper middle.Classification
Classificationby
bythe
theAfrican
AfricanEconomic
EconomicOutlook.
Outlook.
More Complete CGP
Total Private Flows
Sources: OECD,
Hudson
Institute’s
Center
for Global
Prosperity
(CGP)
index
includes
Source:
Hudson
Institute’s
Center
for Global
Prosperity
(CGP)
index
calculations includes
of numerous
other private
flows from
charities,
calculations
of numerous
othercorporations,
private flows foundations,
from corporations,
individuals, universities
religious
organizations.
foundations,and
charities,
individuals,
universities, and religious organizations.
49
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Partnering around development experiences I: South-South cooperation
South–South cooperation (the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between countries of
the global South) has become an important form of development partnership. While there is a tendency
to style purely commercial deals with this label, the development effects of South–South cooperation are
beyond doubt. The sharing of relevant experiences and best practices, in particular, has helped African
countries avoid mistakes, leapfrog technologies and practices, and accelerate progress. Examples include
Brazil and India sharing experiences in the rural health sector, Malaysia providing assistance in banking
and legal issues, Indonesia sharing experience on sustainable rice production, and South Korea providing
expertise on access to low-cost technology and education.
Partnering around development experiences II: Triangular partnerships
Triangular partnerships combine the resources of traditional development partners with the development
experiences of emerging economies from the global South around specific development objectives in
Africa. Encouraging examples include the Feed the Future Programme through which the US cooperates
with Brazil to bolster Mozambique’s agricultural productivity. Specifically, the US funds and helps to organize
targeted education activities based on Brazil’s agricultural-extension experiences. Some Brazilian seed
varieties are well suited to Mozambique’s climate, offering higher yields and better resistance to disease
and pests.
Institutional Partners and
Country Groupings
and adopted an action plan to 2013, explicitly based
around partnerships for development.139
W
In November 2010, the G20 joined the ranks
of intergovernmental groupings engaging in
international development by adopting the Seoul
Development Consensus on Shared Growth and
its Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. To
avoid overlap or competition with the G8, the G20
focus is on growth-related (rather than social or
humanitarian) aspects of Africa’s development,
including infrastructure development, job creation
and financial inclusion. While many of the proposed
initiatives and actions are encouraging, it remains to
be seen whether the current French presidency can
enthuse more sceptical group members.
ith bilateral aid budgets under increasing
pressure, intergovernmental institutions like the
World Bank, the IMF, and the AfDB, as well as country
groupings like the EU and OECD, have consolidated
their central role in Africa’s development. Given their
wealth of expertise and resources, and experience with
some of the earliest success stories, they have become
crucial champions of partnerships for development,
adapting their strategies to reflect their growing
support. In February 2011, for example, the World Bank
launched its new, partnership-based Africa strategy,
to guide the Bank’s work in the region through 2016.138
At the 3rd EU–Africa Summit in Libya in November 2010,
the EU presented a Green Paper on Development
50
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The G20 Multi-Year Action Plan for Development
The Multi-Year Action Plan is part of the Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth agreed at the
2010 G20 Summit in South Korea. It specifies concrete and time-bound actions to be taken up to the end of
2014, including on infrastructure, human resources and development, private investment and job creation,
food security, growth resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge sharing.
Collective action through partnerships and accountability form the core principles of the Plan, some
aspects of which have already been implemented, including the establishment of a High-Level Panel on
Infrastructure Investment which is chaired by APP member Tidjane Thiam.
Philanthropy and Private Giving
flexibility and reach of other development
actors. They also often prove more willing to take
calculated risks.
P
rivate capital flows have become a widely
recognized source of development finance.
Even throughout the global economic downturn,
such flows have outpaced official development
spending. They are also recovering faster than most
other flows.140 Reasons for this quick recovery include
the arrival of new philanthropic actors, such as
philanthropic investment firms that attract socially
minded investors and intermediaries as well as the
accelerating spread of innovative ways of giving
and lending, such as web-based platforms like McC4
or Kiva that allow for the effective accumulation of
small-scale contributions. There is a notable increase
in “home-grown” philanthropy, with some of Africa’s
richest individuals establishing private foundations to
help address social and environmental problems in
their countries.
Debt Relief
D
espite the enormous progress made in
recent years through bilateral debt relief and
multilateral efforts like the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative, massive debt burdens
continue to constrain the development prospects
of many African countries. On average, they still
have to spend 4.8 per cent of GDP on servicing their
(collective) external debt of $300 billion.141
The repercussions of the global economic crisis,
increasing extension of concessional loans by
Southern partners and the efforts of several countries
to tap international markets to fund ambitious
public-spending
programmes
have
renewed
concerns about debt sustainability and the possibility
of a new debt crisis. According to the IMF and the
World Bank, 28 African low-income countries are
now rated as having a high or moderate risk of
experiencing debt distress – more than at the time of
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) six years
ago.142 Moreover, 13 Sub-Saharan African countries
that have reached their HIPC completion points and
consequently received billions of dollars in debt relief
are seeing renewed risks of debt distress.143
By providing catalytic funding, leveraging resources,
supporting long-term research and implementing
partnerships, philanthropic actors are increasingly
important in overcoming crucial obstacles to
progress. Whether by driving the development of an
effective malaria vaccine (Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation), increasing smallholder agricultural
productivity with better seeds, soils and markets
(Rockefeller Foundation) or improving the climate
resilience in rural communities (Ford Foundation),
they fill important gaps left by insufficient resources,
Massive debt burdens continue to constrain the development prospects
of many African countries.
51
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
From Aid Effectiveness to
Development Effectiveness
aid architecture. Many of these problems also
hamper the implementation and spread of effective
partnerships.
T
here is widespread agreement that aid is not
the answer to Africa’s problems and that it must
be used not only to save lives in the short-term, but
also to strengthen systems and increase countries’
capacity to drive their own development through
economic growth and transformation in the longterm. There is also agreement that the available
resources must be used effectively and efficiently to
maximize their developmental impact. Unfortunately,
progress in implementing the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action
remains slow.
Aid effectiveness, as defined by the Paris Declaration,
also places obligations on the recipients of aid, which
many African states have yet to fulfil. They have
been particularly slow when it comes to increasing
the transparency of aid usage and the establishment
of joint mechanisms for reviewing progress on their
commitments. Recent surveys suggest that only 15
per cent have such a review mechanism in place.145
Even though several studies predict significant
efficiency and effectiveness gains from increased
transparency, African nations have also been slow
in endorsing the International Aid Transparency
Initiative, through which 18 donors have agreed
common reporting standards.146
With OECD donors failing to meet their 2010
implementation benchmarks, a significant proportion
of aid remains plagued by inefficiencies in delivery,
management and disbursement. More than half of
OECD DAC aid, for example, is still delivered behind
schedule, causing an estimated deadweight loss
of as much as 20 per cent of total aid.144 Other
problems include unnecessarily high transaction and
administrative costs due to a proliferation of initiatives
and lack of coordination, burdensome conditionality,
medium- and long-term unpredictability, a lack of
alignment to country systems, and a fragmented
Positive developments include the African Platform
on Development Effectiveness, created by
African states before the 4th High-Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011. The
European Union and other institutional donors have
made further progress in harmonizing initiatives
and increasing coherence of their efforts, including
by involving the private sector in aligned and
complementary activities.147
Available resources must be used effectively and efficiently
to maximize their developmental impact.
52
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
PART II
LOOKING AHEAD:
PARTNERING FOR
PROGRESS
The last year has shown that the state of progress
in Africa is almost as diverse as the continent
itself. While enormous challenges remain in
many sectors and countries, there are also
encouraging signs of progress. The next few
years will be critical as African countries attempt
to translate this progress into tangible results and
sustained transformation for their people ahead
of the 2015 MDG deadline. Given the proven but
heavily underutilized potential of partnerships for
development, the second part of our report is
dedicated to them.
53
A
MAIN PARTNERSHIP
lthough the idea of partnership for development
is hardly new, it is currently experiencing a well
deserved renaissance – as development needs
continue to multiply, governments increasingly
struggle to meet them, and a growing number of
exemplary partnerships are showing what is possible.
Attention is focused particularly on the potential of
such partnerships to catalyse the energy, creativity
and resources of nongovernmental actors, such as
the private sector and civil society.
Main Public Sector
Actors – Africa
National Governments and their Agencies
African Union (AU) and its Programmes (including NEPAD)
African Development Bank (AfDB)
Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*
• Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU)
• East African Community (EAC)
• Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS)
• Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS)
• Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA)
• Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD)
• Southern African Development
Community (SADC)
Despite the increasing attention, valuable lessons
learned and successes in Africa and elsewhere,
we do not see nearly enough of these successes
replicated or brought to scale across the continent.
We do not see effective partnerships in nearly
enough sectors. Consequently, many opportunities
to tackle problems and drive development are
being missed. So, what can we do to realize more of
the potential of partnerships for development, and
spur more collaboration for progress?
*Official partner organizations of the AU
How Partnerships Are
Already Contributing
to Development
Main International
Organizations
and Country Groupings
International Organizations:
United Nations (UN) and its Specialized Agencies
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
• International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• World Bank Group
• Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
• Asian Development Bank (ADB)
• European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
• Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) Group
• Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs)
• European Investment Bank (EIB)
• International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD)
• Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
• Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
T
he examples in the first part of this report show the
enormous contribution partnerships are already
making to development efforts across the continent.
They show that, under the right circumstances and
with the right leadership, partnerships can fill crucial
gaps in existing development efforts, mobilize
additional resources, and extend opportunities,
services and access to everything from infrastructure,
health and education to income, finance and
markets. They can also help to reduce risks and costs,
optimize the allocation of scarce resources, create
synergies, increase efficiencies, contribute to policy
development, and drive research and technological
progress by spreading knowledge and expertise.
Country Groupings:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Arab League
European Union (EU)
G8
G20
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD)
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
The examples also show that partnerships can
take many forms. As challenges and opportunities
multiply, and interests and motivations converge,
models have spread from small-scale cooperation
between the private sector and civil society at
community level, and public–private partnerships
around large-scale projects, to a vast array of possible
forms. However different, all these partnerships share
two characteristics. They allow actors to combine
54
MODELS and actors
Partnerships between:
African Governments
Public sector
partnerships
African Governments and Developed Country Governments
African Governments with Developing Country Governments (South-South Cooperation)
African Governments /Developed Country Governments/ Developing Country Governments (Triangular
cooperation)
African Governments and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)
African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)
African Governments and African Companies
Public-private sector
partnerships*
African Governments and Developed Country Companies
African Governments and Developing Country Companies
African Governments, Developed Country Governments and Developed Country Companies
African Governments, Developing Country Governments, and Developing Country Companies
African Governments, African Companies and African International Organizations (e.g. AU)
African Governments, Developed Country Company and Developed Country International
Organizations (e.g. EU)
African Governments, African Companies and Global International Organizations (e.g. UNDP)
African Governments, Developed Country Companies and Global International Organizations
African International Organizations (e.g. AU), Global International Organizations (e.g. World Bank),
and Developed Country Companies
African Governments and African CSOs
civil society (CSOs)
partnerships
African Governments, African CSOs, and Developed Country CSOs
African CSOs
African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs
African CSOs and African Companies
African CSOs and Developed Country Companies
African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs and Developed Country Companies
African Governments and Global CSOs
African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and African CSOs
* All combinations can also include CSOs.
LEGEND
REGIONAL SCOPE
ACTOR
Public sector
Multilateral/International Organizations
Private sector
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and Civil Socierty Organizations (CSOs)
55
African
Developing/Global South
Developed Country
Global
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
development efforts of African governments and
international donors, and bridge important gaps in
a results-oriented (because profit-driven) manner.
their capacities, expertise, resources, networks and
comparative advantages in a way that adds value
for each of them, and they allow them to engage
in areas and issues in which they would or could not
engage on their own.
Together with philanthropic organizations, businesses
have become the newest and arguably some of the
most important allies of traditional development actors.
Engaging them in partnerships has added muchneeded capacity, expertise and resources as well as
versatility, creativity and pragmatism to development
efforts across the continent and has created manifold
opportunities to accelerate progress.
Many of the examples underline the central role
of the private sector.148 They prove that businesses
have much to contribute to development efforts,
and that, with the right incentives, information and
enabling framework, they can deliver clear win–win
outcomes for themselves and wider society. They also
show that, built around commercial viability, privatesector approaches to development challenges are
often scalable.
At the same time, partnerships for development
are not without their risks and potential pitfalls. If not
coordinated with existing initiatives and closely aligned
to national development frameworks, partnerships
can complicate, dilute and even undermine other
development efforts. They can also lead to harmful
competition for resources and unnecessary duplication
of effort. Partnerships often have high transaction costs,
and complex decision-making processes can further
burden already overstretched governments and
cause problems of accountability and ownership. In
combination with the tendency of many partnerships
to develop in isolation, these well-known problems
make it imperative to integrate partnerships closely
into broader development strategies driven by African
governments.
Many businesses now consider engaging in
development as more than an issue of corporate
social responsibility or philanthropy. Increasingly,
they regard development activities as essential
to their core business and a promising avenue
towards growth, greater market share, increased
efficiencies and lower risks and costs.149 This
convergence
between
business
interests
and development objectives is changing the
traditional one-dimensional model of governmentled development.150 As businesses realize the
commercial opportunities and benefits involved,
they are increasingly willing to complement the
Businesses have become the newest and arguably some
of the most important allies of traditional development actors.
56
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
How inclusive business models help to spread development
According to recent studies, people living on less than $8 a day have a combined annual income of
roughly $5 trillion. More and more companies invest in understanding this segment of the population, often
called the “bottom of the pyramid”. As they redesign or invent products to fit the cash flow of the poor,
integrate them into their value chains, offer service rather than ownership models, and leverage existing
distribution and payment platforms, development cooperation is undergoing one of its most fundamental
transformations yet. Africa is at the centre of this change. Spurred by the success of business models like
M-Pesa, more and more companies are extending their business to Africa’s poor, whether as employees,
producers, suppliers, distributors, customers or sources of innovation. In the process, they are increasing
access and opportunities, creating jobs, raising living standards, developing functional markets, cultivating
entrepreneurship and spreading innovation. A number of donors, including Germany and the UK, have
already expressed a clear interest in fostering the spread of inclusive business models to complement and
expand government-led development efforts.
Sources: International Finance Corporation (2010), Inclusive Business 2010: Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; Business Action for Africa et al. (2010), Accelerating Progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals through Inclusive Business: Delivering Results: Moving to Scale.
How Partnerships
Could Be Driving
Further Progress
Basic Service Delivery
P
oor access to basic services and public goods
such as water, housing, healthcare and energy
is becoming an increasingly serious development
challenge for millions of Africans. Conventionally seen
as a concern for governments, there is increasing
evidence that partnerships for development can help
to improve access to basic services by increasing the
efficiency and scope of delivery, offering alternative
sources and methods of access, significantly reducing
operating and unit costs, and pioneering novel
methods of payment such as pay-as-you-go which
can cater to the cash-flow realities of Africa’s poor.
T
here is no doubt that effective partnerships
are already contributing to development
across Africa – but also that the number of
people benefiting remains too small to effect
systemic change. By whatever count, the number
of successful partnerships for development is
miniscule compared with both the potential and
the need for them. Too often, activities remain
small-scale, localized and isolated, as partners
lack the capacity, resources or incentives to scale
up their operations, replicate them elsewhere, or
deliver more than piecemeal change.
There is no shortage of encouraging examples from
Africa and beyond, including d.light’s production
of affordable solar-powered lamps for extremely
poor clients, Vestergaard Frandsen’s LifeStraw for
easy and cheap filtration of drinking water, and the
“Quality Public Services – Action Now” Coalition of
Trade Unions.
Of course, partnerships for development are not,
and will never be, a panacea for the continent’s
many problems. Even brought to scale, they
cannot solve governance deficits or conflicts, at
least not in the short term; they cannot prevent
refugee flows, droughts or crime. But they can help
to improve access to and quality of development
in many ways and, if scaled up, they can effect
sustained social and economic transformation,
particularly in the following key areas.
Partnerships can do more than just increase access to
services or improve their quality; they can also help to
curb the politics of patronage, corruption and lack of
transparency. For example, several service providers
have begun to work with mobile-phone companies
to develop direct-payment systems enabling users
to pay providers without recourse to intermediaries.
57
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
the rural economies that are so central to poverty
reduction still lack sufficient access to finance.
There is thus great scope to expand proven business
models such as micro-finance, micro-insurance,152
m-commerce, linkage and community banking,
remote distribution, and payroll-based lending.153
Efficient and affordable public services are central to
human development and economic activity. There
is also increasing demand for services, especially in
fast-growing urban areas. Therefore, there is great
scope for replicating proven and commercially
viable delivery models across places and sectors,
and for nurturing micro-economies of agglomeration
around these models.151
Access to Health
Access to Opportunities
L
ack of access to healthcare facilities, medical
practitioners and medicine is one of the biggest
and most fundamental challenges for Africa’s
poor and the continent’s development. It reduces
productivity, places enormous costs on society,
and prevents progress on every MDG. More
than in any other area, partnerships in the health
sector have proven their potential to complement
and expand on the efforts of the public sector.
Successes include raising awareness, developing
and distributing vaccines and treatments, reducing
costs, and increasing information on the availability
of treatments. There remains great scope to expand
partnerships further to strengthen health systems,
increase the number of skilled healthcare personnel,
and leverage the market size for investments in
research and development. There is also a need
to identify the reasons for the enormous success of
healthcare partnerships and replicate them across
other sectors.
P
artnerships have contributed significantly to
poverty reduction and social development
across Africa by extending opportunities to
previously marginalized populations. They have
contracted smallholder farmers to produce
sorghum for beer-making and helped women to
establish local distribution businesses for soft drinks.
Particularly partnerships built around the power
of modern telecommunication technology have
created valuable new platforms for development,
including through the low-cost provision of banking
and other enabling services previously inaccessible
to most Africans. Partnerships have also increased
opportunities by creating or strengthening markets,
integrating local populations into value chains,
reducing numbers of intermediaries, and promoting
skills formation. There is great scope to stimulate
further economic growth, employment and human
development by spreading access to affordable
connectivity, applications and services, as well as
economic opportunities, to more of Africa’s people,
particularly women.
Infrastructure
I
mprovements to Africa’s transport, energy and
communication infrastructure have particular
impact on economic development and efforts
to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.154 Evidence collected by the
World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic,
for example, has shown that improvements in
transport, energy and communications infrastructure
have contributed substantially more to African per
capita growth over the past decade than structural
policies, and that an improved infrastructure stock
could increase GDP growth rates in Africa by as much
as 1 per cent.155 Partnerships for development are
already contributing to infrastructure improvements
by helping to raise capital, accelerate project
delivery, reduce operating costs and improve
maintenance, but given the enormity of the
challenge there is great potential and need for
Access to Finance
I
nsufficient access to finance hampers the efforts and
ambitions of individuals, companies and countries,
and constrains entrepreneurship, innovation and the
expansion of markets. Collaborative initiatives such
as the mobile-phone-based money-transfer service
M-Pesa, the Partnership for Making Finance Work for
Africa or AGRA’s cooperation with Standard Bank of
South Africa and the Millennium Challenge Account
to increase commercial lending to smallholder
farmers, have already shown how to improve access
to finance by leveraging existing flows, mitigating
risks and facilitating the development of the financial
sector. But particularly the all-important small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are so central
to job creation and economic growth as well as
58
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Replicable models of increasing access to finance
Approach
Example/s
Comment
The Equity Bank model Equity Bank
The clearest proof that an exceptionally profitable business can
be built by providing appropriate and affordable banking services
dedicated to economically active low-income consumers in Africa.
Leasing for small
businesses
Burkina Bail
Small-business demand for alternative forms of finance, including
leasing, remains high.
Overdraft finance and
cash-flow smoothing
for small businesses
Equity Bank,
Mbinga,
Stanbic
Uganda
Unsecured overdrafts for small businesses are a fraught proposition
for conservatively inclined banks but Mbinga’s kifuku product
shows it can be done. Equity’s biashara imara product and Stanbic
Uganda’s warehouse-receipts product are both serious attempts
to address business cash-flow fluctuations with alternative forms of
collateral.
SME lending
Banque Misr
Banque Misr proves it is possible to lend money profitably to very
small businesses. Other organizations such as Access Holding and
ProCredit, both active in Africa, also demonstrate that it is possible
to replicate a standardized approach to small-business lending in
different jurisdictions.
Bundling insurance
through small loans
MLife,
MicroEnsure
If consumers start to experience the benefits of insurance by
seeing it pay off a microloan or compensate a farmer for weatherdamaged crops, this will reinforce perceptions of its value among
poorer consumers. Working through the continent’s burgeoning
commercial micro-lenders could be a significant growth opportunity
for insurers.
Paying social
payments through
bank accounts
Absa-David
Subsidizing banks to open basic bank accounts into which social
payments, such as an old-age grant, can be paid extends access
while also providing beneficiaries with safe and cost-free means of
receiving money.
The Mini ATM
FNB
As these devices are mobile-enabled, no landlines are required. The
small size of the terminals means they can be housed in very small
retail outlets and the retailer, not the bank, dispenses the cash.
Mobile payments
M-banking
The demographics of mobile-phone use, the early success of
M-Pesa and other models, and the continuing flux around evolving
business models all mean that this continues to be a space that will
repay careful monitoring. Although the operational complexities
and required investment are significant, the potential for large-scale
success is clear.
Source: Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa.
59
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
scaling up financing and operating models that have
worked. Also, current partnerships are concentrated
in a small number of African countries (such as South
Africa and Nigeria) and sectors (such as energy and
telecommunications), leaving significant scope for
both functional and geographical expansion.
growing global demand for food and other
agricultural products. There is particularly great
scope for partnerships to strengthen agricultural
value chains and improve access to rural credit,
including weather-indexed crop insurance, and
to productive inputs and markets.
Agriculture
Low-Carbon Growth
A
G
griculture is a key driver of economic growth,
poverty reduction, human security and
social development. Partnerships have already
helped to increase efficiency at all stages of
the agricultural value chain from production to
storage, trading, processing and retailing. They
have increased access to finance, inputs like
seeds and fertilizer, and weather information.
Partnerships have supported basic and advanced
research, and fostered a more holistic approach
to rural development by promoting agricultural
growth corridors and agro-industries. Nonetheless,
Africa requires even greater sustainable increases
in agricultural productivity to accommodate
population growth and changing consumption
patterns, achieve food security for its people,
and produce enough surpluses to help meet
iven its abundance of renewable resources
and the general absence of high-carbon
legacy industries, Africa is well placed to
embark on low-carbon growth. Partnerships
have proven their ability to enhance energy
and resource efficiency. Examples include the
distribution of more efficient and less polluting
cookstoves, increased access to mitigation
technology, and support for investment in lowcarbon infrastructure and renewable-energy
generation. 156 Inter national support initiatives,
particularly those agreed as part of the UNFCCC
process, offer real opportunities to finance,
scale-up, and embed such partnerships at
the heart of Africa’s development and growth
agendas on both the individual and industrial
levels.
60
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Obstacles to Success
The Information Gap
T
he lack of reliable, up-to-date and symmetrical
information and data across many parts of Africa
severely hinders the planning and implementation
of partnerships, particularly if the private sector is
involved. Even the most enterprising companies
are reluctant to scale up investment in partnerships
without full understanding, or at least a deeper
appreciation, of the needs, trends and benefits
involved. Partnerships are often also hampered
by insufficient information on the motivations,
capabilities, resources and comparative advantages
of potential partners.
U
nfortunately, the transformative potential of
partnerships remains constrained by several
obstacles. Specific operational and programmatic
blockages vary, but many relate to poor enabling
environments and governance deficits. These include
weak institutions, burdensome bureaucracies,
insufficient access to courts and other legal facilities,
and budgetary and human-resource limitations of the
public sector. Partnerships involving the private sector
are not scalable or replicable where governments
fail to remove such obstacles and cannot offer the
necessary legal guarantees or incentive structure
to underwrite a viable growth strategy. Endemic
corruption is another major challenge: many good
partnerships are impeded or even prevented by
corruption, such as when unnecessary intermediaries
pocket part of the benefits.157 In addition to such
hurdles related to poor regulatory environments and
weak governance, there are at least five structural
and often crosscutting gaps hampering the initiation
and spread of successful partnership models.
The Imagination Gap
T
he information gap feeds into a gap in imagination.
Without sufficient information, it is difficult for
many actors to escape institutional mindsets and
cultures, to envisage new partnership models and
pro-poor modifications of sourcing, production and
distribution. Even with the necessary information,
many actors struggle to see beyond traditional
dichotomies and overcome institutional scepticism.
Yet, this is often necessary to free the human and
financial resources to drive replication or scaling of
imaginative solutions – knowing the dots is one thing,
connecting them is another.
The Trust Gap
T
raditional suspicions remain one of the most
basic obstacles to new or larger partnerships.
Many governments and non-governmental
organizations continue to mistrust the privatesector profit motive. They continue to view it
mainly as a cause of social, environmental and
economic problems, rather than as part of a
potential solution. There is widespread suspicion
that many companies engage in partnerships
merely for reputation management, and that
the benefits are offset by companies’ harmful
behaviour in other areas. Many also fear
increased corruption and reduced control as
a result of companies’ growing engagement
in delivery of public goods and services.
Companies, on the other hand, often mistrust the
reliability of government commitments, and may
view attempts to address social weaknesses as
coming at their expense. This trust gap is caused
and compounded by transparency deficits, and
the resultant lack of information and clarity about
what each partner wants from the relationship.
The Resources and Capacity Gap
E
ven though new financing methods including
hybrid financing that uses a mixture of debt,
equity and other financial instruments, are constantly
being developed, there continues to be a notable
lack of resources to plan, implement and operate
partnerships for development. Given shareholder
pressure for short-term profits, many international
companies are reluctant to devote the necessary
resources and capacities to partnerships with distant
prospects of value creation. Many African actors,
particularly in civil society and non-governmental
organizations, simply do not have resources for upfront investments or capacities to staff and operate
scaled-up partnerships. Here, national governments,
international donors and multilateral development
banks can play a particularly constructive role
61
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
built around inclusive business models. By contrast,
large and populous countries like Nigeria or
South Africa can offer economies of scale, large
numbers of potential consumers and consolidated
markets. This highlights the enormous potential
for regional integration to increase perceived
benefits through market expansion. Another
obstacle to replication concerns the perceived
benefits of intellectual property and trademarks.
A partnership around an entrepreneur with a
good idea may resist the replication of that
idea by others, especially if the replication is
perceived to deny business opportunities to the
original entrepreneur.
by providing catalytic investments to meet initial
financing needs for scaling up or replication.
The Perceived Benefits Gap
B
usinesses are primarily interested in partnerships
with potential to generate benefits such as
future resource streams. Therefore, low ceilings
to perceived benefits, or insufficient scale, may
prevent private-sector companies from engaging
in a particular partnership. This may explain why
small economies like Niger or Mali have difficulty
in attracting public–private partnerships or those
62
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
WHO NEEDS
TO DO WHAT
The conditions needed to foster successful
partnerships and adapt them to other regions,
countries, and sectors are not a mystery. They
include: a viable growth strategy based on
realistic assessments of demand, receptivity, risks
and absorptive capacity; a clear delineation
of respective responsibilities and commitments;
sufficient resources, capacity and expertise; full
transparency; harmonized expectations and
a common vision among partners; and the
fulfillment of commitments. Naturally, the precise
ingredients vary from case to case and are
always firmly grounded in the local context, which
reduces the usefulness of general prescriptions
and recommendations. However, it is clear that
all actors can do more to remove blockages,
facilitate the spread of successful partnership
models across the continent, and increase their
developmental impact.
63
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
African Governments
A
frican governments bear the main responsibility for the continent’s progress. While they depend on
supportive global policies and agreements, it is up to them to provide the plans, frameworks and
conditions for their countries’ development and the realization of their peoples’ potential. Similarly, when it
comes to fostering partnerships and maximizing their developmental impact, it is up to African governments
to create the necessary conditions and incentive structures. They can do much to improve the attractiveness,
scalability and sustainability of partnerships, and to contribute constructively at all stages.
African governments can strengthen partnerships for development by...
• Clearly articulating, prioritizing and communicating development needs
• Providing an enabling environment, which includes clear policies, sufficient administrative capacities at
all levels of government, and supportive legal and regulatory frameworks
• Facilitating access to financial incentives, investment-risk-mitigation instruments and other benefits to
increase the attractiveness of partnerships
• Providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing gaps at all stages of partnerships
• Driving regional integration to increase market size and improve scalability and sustainability of
partnerships
• Coordinating local, national and regional authorities to minimize the administrative burden on potential
partners
• Leveraging the skills, resources and expertise of the African Diaspora to fill capacity gaps
• Raising awareness through gathering and disseminating information, highlighting best practices and
drawing attention to specific opportunities
• Ensuring full transparency of processes and accountability for results
• Improving liaison mechanisms with the private sector and civil society, including through dedicated
contact persons and clear responsibilities in the office of the Head of Government and social ministries.
international donors
I
nternational donors have made a series of commitments to Africa, which they need to keep. They share
responsibility for Africa’s progress, particularly when it comes to ensuring a level playing field, correcting
harmful global realities, particularly with respect to trade, climate change, the international financial
system and achieving the MDGs. Given their resources, expertise, networks and influence there is much
that international donors can contribute to initiating and supporting partnerships for development.
International donors can strengthen partnerships for development by...
• Leveraging their power to convene different types of stakeholders to facilitate and catalyze them
around specific development challenges
• Mobilizing resources for partnerships and providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing
gaps at all stages of partnerships
• Providing risk mitigation and other supportive guarantees, including by assuming some of the risks
• Building the capacity of actors to engage constructively in partnership
• Helping to collate information and guidelines by supporting the study of effective partnerships and the
dissemination of results
• Minimizing overlap of initiatives and ensuring maximal coordination between initiatives
• Providing forward-looking data on planned investments to facilitate partnership building around them.
64
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Private-Sector Actors
T
he private sector is increasingly important in Africa’s development. However, there are still too many
companies not adhering to fundamental principles of corporate responsibility, such as those articulated
in the UN Global Compact. While private-sector actors should at least “do no harm”, there is enormous
scope for businesses to add social, economic and environmental value. They can do so by modifying their
business models to target the poor or integrate local communities and producers into their value chains, but
also through cross-sectoral partnerships around specific development challenges. As providers of resources,
innovation and expertise, private-sector actors often hold the key to the success of such partnerships.
Private-sector actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Showing leadership and building in-company commitment for partnerships
Managing expectations within companies and among partners
Managing shareholder expectations for short- and long-term results
Freeing human and financial resources for the identification, planning and implementation of
partnerships
Mobilizing business networks and sharing knowledge, lessons learned and expertise
Fostering peer learning
Using social-investment budgets to facilitate entry into new places or segments that may not otherwise
meet the financial-viability threshold for core business activities
Examining their entire business model to identify potential contribution to and opportunities for collaboration
Contributing expertise in project design, management and implementation to the solution of largescale challenges
Helping shape policy through constructive input, preferably through harmonized business associations
Improving their relations and capacity to engage with governments and civil society
Clearly communicating support needs and requirements for engaging in partnerships.
Civil-Society Actors
C
ivil-society actors, including non-governmental civic and social organizations, citizen groups, trade
unions, the media and faith-based organizations, play a crucial function in the system of accountability
that underlies the success of all partnerships. Given the identified problems caused by lack of information
and misperception of benefits and risks, there is also great scope for them to mediate and broker partnerships
for development as well as draw attention to opportunities and need for such partnerships.
Civil-society actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...
• Helping to identify and communicate development needs and partnership opportunities
• Playing a crucial intermediary role between companies, governments, local entrepreneurs and
communities, as well as national and international finance institutions and donors
• Collecting and sharing information on lessons learned and available supportive initiatives to help practitioners
• Providing crucial checks and balances through monitoring partnership implementation, highlighting
•
•
•
•
•
•
shortcomings and reporting mismanagement
Supporting project improvements through collecting and sharing feedback at grassroots level
Supporting the development and utilization of accountability tools
Helping to identify, inform and educate (potential) beneficiaries of partnerships
Harnessing and sharing their experience in cultivating change agents at grassroots and national levels
Identifying synergies between initiatives and formulating a common agenda
Helping to improve coordination between initiatives to minimize unnecessary overlap and inefficiencies.
65
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
CONCLUSION
D
demographic changes, complicate the achievement
of responsive governance around a shared economic
vision. But, as Africa’s growth and development
agendas continue to converge, new approaches and
solutions are becoming possible, and necessary. As
we have argued throughout this report, partnerships
for development are among the most promising, and
potentially most effective, of these new options. They
can complement, expand and improve governmentled development efforts and, if scaled up, can effect
positive structural change and sustained economic
and social transformation.
rawing broad conclusions from Africa’s raucously
diverse experience over the last year is not
easy, even though some things have not changed.
The continent remains marginalized at the top
tables of global decision making and vulnerable
to global economic trends. It continues battling to
achieve social progress against a backdrop of rapid
population growth, increasing urbanization and poor
management of its human and natural resources.
The most striking developments have been in the
political arena. Governance deficits are on display at
all points of the African compass, including Libya to
the north, Somalia to the east, Zimbabwe to the south,
and Côte d’Ivoire to the west, with political progress in
many other countries looking distinctly fragile.
Against this background, we have assessed how
to strengthen, replicate and scale up the many
successful examples of partnerships already evident
in Africa and how best to create the policy framework
and incentives needed to spur further collaboration
for progress. We have come to the conclusion that
all actors can do more to facilitate the spread of
successful partnership models across countries and
sectors – and that doing so is in their own self-interest.
National governments can do more to ensure the
regulatory conditions that allow partnerships to
mature beyond small-scale and localized projects.
International donors and institutions can do more to
initiate and provide seed funding, risk mitigation and
other supportive guarantees to innovative models.
Private-sector actors can do more to move beyond
traditional patterns of sourcing, production, and
distribution, and expand their operations to previously
marginalized segments of the African population.
And civil society organizations can do more to play a
constructive intermediary role and provide expertise
and access at grassroots and national levels.
And yet... there are strong grounds for hope, even
where there has been most conflict and political
turmoil. It is too early to say how things will turn out
in countries facing difficult transitions. But leaders and
people across the continent have not missed the
point: the role of the state is to serve its citizens, not
its rulers.
As we have argued before, the key ingredient for
progress remains good governance – by the global
community to ensure that Africa’s place and potential
are fully supported, and most importantly by African
leaders and people, to ensure that the continent’s
vast resources are geared to positive ends.
The lingering effects of the global economic and
food crises, as well as accelerating climatic and
Partnerships do not shift the responsibility for progress away from
the shoulders of African leaders and international donors,
even though they can help to spread the burden.
66
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Crucially, partnerships also do not shift the responsibility
for progress away from the shoulders of African leaders
and international donors, even though they can help
to spread the burden. Donors still need to fulfill the
extensive financial and political commitments they
have made to the African continent and it remains
up to African leaders to inspire processes and build
practical capacities to translate the continent’s
wealth and potential into tangible results for its
citizens. It also remains up to them to protect these
citizens from the vagaries of nature and the volatilities
of the global economy, provide them with adequate
public services and afford them the opportunities to
feed and educate their children and make a decent
living. For this they need to meet the interlinked
challenges of growing their economies, conserving
their environments, and achieving the MDG-based
targets they set themselves a decade ago.
The success of partnerships depends on clear
delineation of respective roles, the availability
of reliable information and, above all, the right
incentives. For the private sector, profit-seeking is at the
heart of the incentive structure, but brand validation
and corporate responsibility also matter. National
governments want access to networks, expertise and
resources. Civil-society organisations want to see their
specific issues addressed, and donors want to offset
demands and increase the impact of their activities.
Fortunately, understanding and acceptance of
these different motivations is growing among the
various actors. Together with the convergence of
development objectives and business interests, rising
pressures on international aid, as well as ample proof
that partnerships can mature into self-sustaining and
profit-making ventures with transformative effects this
makes collaboration an increasingly attractive option
for all sides.
This is possible. We have seen renewed proof that
rapid progress is achievable even in the most
resource-deprived and insecure circumstances. We
have seen that good governance, transparency
and accountability bring results, and that economic
growth can drive development if it leads to job
creation, structural transformation and the spread
of opportunities. And we have undoubtedly seen
that partnerships for development can help to fill
gaps, expand efforts and accelerate progress. We
therefore end by calling on African leaders and their
partners across regions and sectors to intensify their
collaboration for the continent’s progress.
However, in spite of the enormous value they can
add, partnerships for development are certainly not
a panacea for all of Africa’s problems. Even brought
to scale, there are many challenges they cannot
solve. As governments try to harness capacities and
resources that are additional and complementary
to their own, partnerships for development are only
one instrument in their arsenal – albeit an increasingly
powerful one. They do not replace good governance,
strong institutions and political leadership as the core
ingredients of progress. On the contrary, partnerships
depend on them to be able to fulfill their potential.
Partnerships do not replace good governance, strong institutions
and political leadership as the core ingredients of progress.
67
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
list of ACRoNYMS
AAP
Africa Action Plan
AEC
African Economic Community
AEO
African Economic Outlook
AfDB
African Development Bank
AFMI
African Financial Market Initiative
AGF
Africa Green Fund
AGOA
African Growth and Opportunity Act
AGRA
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AICD
African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
AMCEN
African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AMCOW
African Ministers’ Council on Water
AMFm
Affordable Medicines Facility – Malaria
APDev
African Platform for Development Effectiveness
APOC
African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control
APRM
African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA
African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN
Association of South East Asian Nations
ASF
African Standby Force
AU
African Union
AUC
African Union Commission
AWF
African Water Facility
C10
Committee of Ten
CAADP
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
CAHOSCC
Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CARMMA
Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa
CDI
Commitment to Development Index
CDM
Clean Development Mechanism
CEWS
Continental Early Warning System
COMESA
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC
Development Assistance Committee
EAC
East African Community
ECCAS
Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EDF
European Development Fund
EFA
Education for All
EPA
Economic Partnership Agreement
EU
European Union
FAAP Framework for African Agricultural Productivity
FAO
Food and Agricultural Organization
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FOCAC
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FSB
Financial Stability Board
FTI
Fast Track Initiative
FTT
Financial Transaction Tax
GAFSP
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GAVI
Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization
GEF
Global Environment Facility
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GNI
Gross National Income
HDI
Human Development Index
HIPC
IATI
ICA
ICC
ICT
IFAD
IFFIm
IFI IFPRI
IGAD
IHP
IIED
ILO
IMF
IPCC
ITUC
LDC MCC
MDG
MDRI
MIP
MPI
NAFTA
NEPAD
OAU
ODA
OECD
PCD
PEFA
PIDA
PSC
PSD
PPP
REC
REDD
SADC
SDR
SME UNCTAD
UNEP
UNESCO
UNFPA
UNICEF
UNIFEM
WBCSD
WEF
WDR
WHO
WTO
68
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative/
Programme)
International Aid Transparency Initiative
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
International Criminal Court
Information and Communication Technology
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Finance Facility for Immunization
International Financial Institution
International Food Policy Research Institute
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
International Health Partnership
International Institute for Environment and Development
International Labour Office
International Monetary Fund
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
International Trade Union Confederation
Least Developed Country
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Millennium Development Goal
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
Minimum Integration Programme
Multidimensional Poverty Index
North American Free Trade Agreement
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Organization of African Unity
Official Development Assistance
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Policy Coherence for Development
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (Partnership)
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
Peace and Security Council
Private Sector Development
Public–Private Partnership
Regional Economic Community
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Southern Africa Development Community
Special Drawing Rights
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
UN Conference on Trade and Development
UN Environment Programme
UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UN Population Fund
UN International Children’s Emergency Fund
UN Development Fund for Women
World Business Council for Sustainable Development
World Economic Forum
World Development Report
World Health Organization
World Trade Organization
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
notes
All data used in this report are drawn from official and readily available sources, which are referenced below.
Every effort has been made to cite the most recent figures, even though occasionally preference has been
given to older but more reliable data. As with every report, the reader should be aware of the inherent limitations
of the available data and projections as well as the considerable controversies around the prevailing methods
of measuring progress. To the best of our knowledge, the information and data presented in this report was
accurate and the most up to date available as of 20 April 2011.
Quoted averages may mask significant differences between individual countries and within regions. As far as
possible, all amounts are adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Unless stated otherwise, amounts are quoted in
United States Dollars.
Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce material from this report for educational, not-for-profit
purposes providing that they acknowledge the Africa Progress Report 2011 as the source.
1 The Economist (2000), The Hopeless Continent
2 IMF (2010), Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa: Weathering the Storm
3 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and
Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy
4 Boston Consulting Group (2010), The African Challengers: Global Competitors Emerge from the Overlooked Continent
5 UNCTAD and Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin (2011), The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008-2009 and Developing
Countries
6 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and
Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy
7 UNCTAD (2011), 5th Global Investment Trends Monitor
8 AUC and UNECA (2010), Economic Report on Africa
9 World Bank (2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments; see also World Bank (2011), Migration and
Remittances Factbook 2011; UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update – Regional Annex for SSA
10 UNWTO (2011), World Tourism Barometer 2011
11 IMF (2011), World Economic Outlook Update
12 The Economist (2011), Africa’s Impressive Growth; see also Steven Radelet (2010), Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading
the Way
13 AUC and UNECA (2011), Governing Development in Africa: The Role of the State in Economic Transformation
14 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
15 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
16 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared
Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy, p. 34; UNTAD and UNIDO (2011), Economic Development in Africa Report 2011
17 AfDB (2010), Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa, AfDB Policy Brief, Vol. 1, Issue 4
18 Experts Group convened by Germany, Great Britain, Indonesia and Turkey (2011), The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a
Final Deal, Interim Report
19 UN-OHRLLS, UNDP and UNECA (2010), Outcome Document of the Africa Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Review of the
Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action
20 AfDB (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010
21 ODI (2010), Economic Growth and the MDGs, Briefing Paper 60; see also AfDB, AUC, and UNECA (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa
toward the Millennium Development Goals
22 IMF (2011), Emerging Africa Expected to See Rise in Investment
23 UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update – Regional Annex for SSA
24 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa
25 McKinsey Quarterly (2010), Africa’s Path to Growth: Sector by Sector
26 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
27 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa
28 AUC and UNECA (2011), Economic Report on Africa 2011: Governing Development in Africa – The Role of the State in Economic
Transformation
29 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance
30 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance
31 Only elections that took place between April 2010 and April 2011 are considered
32 Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (2011)
33 Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat
34 Freedom House (2011), Freedom in the World 2011
35 AEO (2010), Database on African Fiscal Performance
36 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid
37 C-10 (2010), Domestic Resource Mobilization across Africa: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options
38 Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International (2010), Revenue Watch Index 2010
39 G20 (2010), Anti-Corruption Action Plan: G20 Agenda for Action on Combating Corruption, Promoting Market Integrity and
Supporting a Clean Business Environment, Annex III to G20 Seoul Summit Document
69
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
40 UNECA (2010), Opposition Parties in Africa: Fighting for Survival
41 Transparency International (2010), Corruption Perceptions Index 2010
42 World Bank (2010), Quiet Corruption: Undermining Development in Africa
43 AU (2011), Decisions and Declarations of the 16th Ordinary AU Summit
44 The Economist (2011), The African Union: Short of Cash and Teeth
45 Continental Advisory Research Team (2010), State of the Union Continental Report 2010
46 Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2010), Growth and Responsibility: The Positioning of Emerging Powers in the Global Governance System
47 G24 (2010), Communiqué of 7 October 2010; see also Ngaire Woods (2010), The G20 Leaders and Global Governance, GEG
Working Paper 2010/59
48 G20 (2010), The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration
49 EU (2010), Tripoli Declaration
50 World Bank (2011), World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development
51 Center on International Cooperation (2011), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011
52 Institute for Economics & Peace (2010), The Global Peace Index 2010
53 See Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen Hendrix (2010), Food Insecurity and Conflict: Applying the WDR Framework, World Development
Report 2011 Background Paper; Frances Stewart (2010), Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict, World Development Report 2011
Background Paper
54 Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer (2010), Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper
55 Alex Evans (2010), Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict, World Development Report 2011 Background
Paper; see also The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2010), Resource Scarcity in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation?
56 AU PSC (2011), Report of the Peace & Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa
57 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
58 There are substantial discussions on the effects of inequality. See, for example, The Economist (2011), The rich and the rest: What to
do (and not to do) about inequality
59 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
60 ILO (2010), The World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond
61 UN General Assembly (2010), Resolution A/65/L.1. For more information on the MDG Acceleration Framework see UNDP (2010),
Unlocking Progress: MDG Acceleration on the Road to 2015.
62 See, for example, Institute for Economic Affairs (2011), A New Understanding of Poverty
63 ILO (2011), Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery; see also UNCTAD (2011), World Economic Situation
and Prospects 2011
64 IFAD (2011), Rural Poverty Report 2011
65 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
66 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa
67 UN-HABITAT (2010), State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011: Cities for All – Bridging the Urban Divide. See also Ben Arimah (2010), The Face
of Urban Poverty: Explaining the Prevalence of Slums in Developing Countries, United Nations University Working Paper No. 2010/30
68 Emmanuel Skoufias et al (2011), The Poverty Impacts of Climate Change, World Bank Economic Premise no. 51
69 UNESCO (2011), EFA Global Monitoring Report: The Hidden Crisis – Armed Conflict and Education
70 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
71 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
72 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010), The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics
73 UNESCO (2011), Building Human Capacities in Least Developed Countries to Promote Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development
74 AU (2010), Nairobi Declaration on the African Women’s Decade
75 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
76 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
77 WEF (2010), The Global Gender Gap Report 2010
78 UN Commission on the Status of Women (2011), To Promote Women’s and Girl’s Access to Education, Training, Science and
Technology; UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 2010;
79 UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 2010
80 Agence Française de Développement and World Bank (2010), Gender Disparities in Africa’s Labor Market
81 ITUC (2011), Living with Economic Insecurity: Women in Precarious Work
82 FAO (2011), The State of Food and Agriculture; CGD (2010), The Economics of Population Policy for Carbon Emissions Reduction in
Developing Countries, Working Paper 229
83 WHO (2010), The World Malaria Report 2010
84 WHO (2010), World Health Statistics 2010
85 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; Also
see Margaret Hogan et al (2010), Maternal Mortality for 181 Countries, 1980–2008: A Systematic Analysis of Progress towards Millennium
Development Goal 5, The Lancet, Vol. 375, Issue 9730
86 APP (2010), Maternal Health: Investing in the Lifeline of Healthy Societies & Economies
87 AU (2010), Summit Declaration on Maternal, Infant and Child Health and Development
88 See Global Polio Eradication Campaign (2010), Annual Report 2010; WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Annual Measles Initiative Report
2010; Carter Center (2011), Guinea Worm Disease Campaign Nears Eradication Goal; WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and
AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 2010
89 GAVI (2010), Saving Lives & Protecting Health: Results and Opportunities
90 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2011),
91 G8 (2010), Muskoka Declaration
92 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing – The Path to Universal Coverage
93 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing – The Path to Universal Coverage; WHO and UN Habitat (2010),
Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings
94 UNSG (2011), Uniting for Universal Access: Towards Zero New Infections, Zero Discrimination, and Zero AIDS-Related Deaths, Report by
the Secretary-General; see also WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 2010; Whitaker Group
(2011), Africa Health News; World Diabetes Foundation (2010), Annual Review 2010; AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing
Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
95 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas
96 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas
70
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
97 WaterAid (2011)
98 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
99 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
100 WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Monitoring Report 2010: Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water
101 UNECA (2010), Equal Access to Basic Services in African LDCs: The Need for Coherent, Inclusive and Coherent Policy Frameworks
102 WHO and UN Habitat (2010), Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings
103 AICD (2010), Annual Report
104 AfDB (2010), Financing Investments in Water for Growth
105 AfDB (2010), Water Sector Governance in Africa
106 UNDG (2010), MDG Good Practices Report 2010
107 The Global Compact (2010), The CEO Water Mandate Guide to Responsible Business Engagement with Water Policy
108 International Food Policy Research Institute (2010), Global Hunger Index 2010
109 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; FAO
(2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises
110 The Economist (2011), The Future of Food: What is Causing Food Prices to Soar and What Can Be Done about It?
111 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch
112 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch
113 UK Government Office of Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability
114 IIED (2011), Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts?
115 WMO (2010), 2010 Equals Record for World’s Warmest Year, Press Release 96/2010
116 FAO (2011), The State of the World’s Forests 2011
117 The Economist (2011), Climate Change and Crop Yields: One Degree Over; see also UNDP (2011), Fast Facts: Climate Change and UNDP
118 UNEP (2010), Environmental Consequences of Ocean Acidification: A Threat to Food Security
119 DARA (2010), Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis; David Wheeler (2011), Quantifying Vulnerability to
Climate Change: Implications for Adaptation Assistance, Center for Global Development Working Paper 240
120 Maplecroft (2010), Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2010
121 UNEP (2010), AMCEN Gets New Tool for Communicating Climate Change and Promoting an Effective Response in Africa
122 WRI (2011), Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges
123 The Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010), Final Report
124 Development Initiatives (2011), Monitoring Climate Financing Architecture
125 WEF (2011), Scaling Up Low-Carbon Infrastructure Investments in Developing Countries, The Critical Mass Initiative Working Report 2011
126 World Bank (2009), Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa
127 UNEP (2011), Green Economy Report
128 OECD (2011), Statextracts
129 OECD (2011), Statextracts
130 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid
131 CGD (2010), Commitment to Development Index 2010
132 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011
133 ONE (2011), ONE/DATA Report 2011 (based on the figures released by the OECD DAC on 6 April 2011)
134 OECD DAC (2011), Development Aid Reaches an Historic High in 2010, Press Release
135 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011
136 OECD (2010), The OECD Fragmentation Index 2010
137 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), Africa’s Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners: Options
for Africa’s Development
138 World Bank (2011), Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It
139 EU (2010), EU Development Policy in Support of Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, Green Paper
140 Hudson Institute (2010), 2010 Index of Philanthropy and Remittances
141 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), External Debt in Africa, Policy Brief 3
142 IMF and IDA (2010), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) – Status of
Implementation
143 IMF and World Bank (2010), Preserving Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries in the Wake of the Global Crisis
144 OECD (2010), Indicators for Progress on the Implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
145 AfDB, AU and NEPAD (2010), Issue Paper on Ownership, Sustainability and Accountability for Results, 2nd Regional Meeting on Aid
Effectiveness, Tunis, 4-5 November 2010
146 Development Initiatives (2009), The Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency
147 OECD (2011), The Role of the Private Sector in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Consultative Findings Document Final Report
148 See, for example, IFC (2010), Inclusive Business 2010 – Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; APP and Concern Universal
(2010), Doing Good Business in Africa: How Business Can Support Development; WBCSD (2010), Doing Business with the World: The New
Role of Corporate Leadership in Global Development; UN Global Compact et al (2010), Innovating for a Brighter Future: The Role of
Business in Achieving the MDGs
149 Business Action for Africa et al (2010), Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals Through Inclusive Business:
Delivering Results: Moving to Scale
150 Accenture Development Partnerships (2011), Cross-Sector Convergence: A New View of Global Development; see also Michael
Porter and Mark Kramer (2011), The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value, Harvard Business Review
151 World Bank Institute (2009), A Way to Effective Service Delivery in Fragile States: Public-Private Partnerships
152 See Allianz Group (2011), Learning to Insure the Poor: Micro-Insurance Report; Swiss Re (2011), Micro-Insurance: Risk Protection for
4 Billion People
153 See Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa
154 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa
155 AICDS (2009), Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation
156 WBCSD (2007), Investing in a Low-Carbon Future in the Developing World
157 WBCSD (2005), Business for Development: Business Solutions in Support of the Millennium Development Goals
71
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Africa Progress Panel would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Gill Bates (SIPRI), Christoph
Benn (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), Timothy Brewer (WaterAid), Audette Bruce
(UNDP), Daniel Coppard (Development Initiatives), Wouter Deelder (Dalberg), Dustin Dehez (Freie Universität
Berlin), Shanta Devarajan (World Bank), Nicolas Douillet (UNDP), Hania Farhan (Mo Ibrahim Foundation), Ricardo
Fuentes (UNDP), Cosmas Gitta (UNDP), Richard Gowan (NYU Center on International Cooperation), Alan Hinman
(The Taskforce for Global Health), Aubrey Hruby (The Whitaker Group), Andreas Hübers (ONE), Michael Keating
(UN), Michel Lavollay (Public–Private Partnerships Europe), Franklyn Lisk (Warwick University), Carlos Lopes
(UNITAR), Aileen Marshall (World Bank), Jason McGeown (Maplecroft), Jonas Moberg (EITI), Benito Müller (Oxford
University), Kate Norgrove (WaterAid International), Warren Nyamugasira (African Monitor), Paatii Ofosu-Amaah
(AfDB), Patrick Osakwe (UNCTAD), Judith Randel (Development Initiatives), Alistair Rivers (Innovata LLC), Zahid
Torres-Rahman (Business Action for Africa), Elisabeth Sandor (OECD), Guido Schmidt-Traub (CDC Climat AM),
Lindiwe Sibanda (FANRPAN), Elisabeth Sköns (SIPRI), Tesfai Tecle (AGRA), Filippo Veglio (World Business Council
for Sustainable Development), Alyson Warhurst (Maplecroft), and Sharon Wiharta (SIPRI).
The APP would also like to acknowledge the generous support from the United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development, the French Government and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Cover design, infograhics, overall design and layout: Violaine Beix, Thad Mermer, Carolina Rodriguez and
Blossom Communications. Copy-edited by Nina Behrman.
Printed by Imprimerie Lenzi, Geneva Switzerland.
The Africa Progress Panel promotes Africa's development by tracking progress,
drawing attention to opportunities and catalyzing action.
PANEL MEMBERS
Kofi Annan
Chair of the Africa Progress Panel, former
Secretary-General of the United Nations and
Nobel Laureate
Graça Machel
President of the Foundation for Community
Development and founder of New Faces New
Voices
Tony Blair
Patron of the Africa Governance Initiative and
former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Linah Kelebogile Mohohlo
Governor, Bank of Botswana
Michel Camdessus
Former Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund
Peter Eigen
Founder and Chair of the Advisory Council,
Transparency International and Chairman of
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Bob Geldof
Musician, businessman, founder and Chair of
Band Aid, Live Aid and Live8, Co-founder of
DATA and ONE
Olusegun Obasanjo
Former President of Nigeria
Robert Rubin
Co-Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign
Relations and former Secretary of the United
States Treasury
Tidjane Thiam
Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Plc.
Muhammad Yunus
Economist, founder of Grameen Bank and
Nobel Laureate
Africa Progress Panel
P.O. Box 157
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland
[email protected]
www.africaprogresspanel.org
The Africa Progress Panel prints on recycled paper