DESCARTES’ COGITO, THE EGO, AND FREEDOM
Halil Turan
In the Second Meditation Descartes holds that the statement „think‟ is true whenever it is put
forward by him. In holding that „I think‟ is true whenever it is put forward by himself, Descartes
seems to beg the question: given the restraints imposed by the arguments of the First Meditation, it
cannot be beyond doubt that the meditator himself is thinking. Descartes argues that it may not
„necessarily‟ be the case that the thoughts he is aware of are put into his mind by God or by some
powerful being, the existence of which he has not yet demonstrated. It follows that it is not
necessarily the case that the meditator himself thinks. The Cartesian cogito then, is not grounded in
any way other than as a possibility. When Descartes opts for „I think‟ rather than „it thinks‟—as he
must in order to be able to show that there cannot be an omnipotent deceiver—he postulates at the
same time his freedom of will. Holding that he himself is active in putting forward arguments,
Descartes does not, as he alleges, make a discovery but only introduces a disguised axiom in what
he called the „analytic‟ disposition of his philosophy.
*
Everything Descartes perceives by or through his senses may be spurious, his memory may
be reporting him things which have never happened, shape, extension, movement and place as well
as colour and the like may be nothing more than „fictions‟, „chimeras‟ or „delusions of dreams‟, but
his statement that „I exist‟ is necessarily true whenever he conceives it:
I must finally conclude that this proposition, „I am‟ or „I exist‟ is necessarily true whenever it is put
forward by me or conceived in my mind....1
It seems that the meditator‟s conception of himself as existing is beyond any reasonable
doubt. But the same cannot be said of his supposed „activity‟. We must notice that here Descartes
does not simply argue that „there is a process of putting forward‟ this proposition, or „conceiving‟ it,
but holds that this process depends on him, that these thoughts are „his‟ thoughts. There is a great
difference between these two modes of speech: the expression “there is a process of putting
forward the proposition „I am, I exist‟ ” does not imply that the meditator himself is the author of
the thought, whereas that “„I am‟ or „I exist‟ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or
conceived in my mind” certainly does. By means of this sentence Descartes asserts that he himself
thinks.
Descartes‟ statement “ „I am‟ or „I exist‟ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me
or conceived in my mind” is indeed true, but trivial — here the question is being begged. If there is
no decisive argument on the issue of authorship of the thoughts in question, then the formula „ego
cogito‟, „I think‟, (which we consider as equivalent to „I conceive‟ and to „I put forward‟) must be a
hidden postulate.
*
Could there be a non-trivial statement which both conforms to the restraints of the
experiment and is capable of putting an end to Cartesian doubt? The well known Lichtenbergian
objection to cogito, later echoed in Bertrand Russell‟s and Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s critical remarks,
says that Descartes could have said nothing more than „there are thoughts‟ or „it thinks‟. This
attitude implies that an impersonal statement of the presence of thoughts could have been an
evidence that Descartes was looking for.
1
The formula „ego cogito‟ was first criticized from the point of view the authorship of the
thoughts by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. Lichtenberg held that Descartes was not justified in
saying „I think,‟ „ego cogito‟. Lichtenberg‟s main point was that the „I‟ in the Cartesian formula is
metaphysically redundant:
We know only the existence of our sensations, representations and thoughts. One should say, it
thinks, just as one says, it lightens. It is already too much to say cogito, as soon as one translates it
as I think. 2
The main idea of the comments of Russell and Wittgenstein is the same with that of
Lichtenberg. Russell argued that Descartes was unjustified in employing the statement „I think‟, and
held that he ought to have formulated his principle without having recourse to the first person
pronoun:
Here the word “I” is really illegitimate; … [Descartes] ought to state his ultimate premise in the
form “there are thoughts.” The word “I” is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum.
When he goes on to say “I am a thing which thinks,” he is already using uncritically the apparatus of
categories handed down by scholasticism. He nowhere proves that thoughts need a thinker; nor is
there any reason to believe this except in a grammatical sense.3
In a similar vein, Ludwig Wittgenstein, held that the „I‟ is not given, that it cannot be said to
refer to or denote something in the same sense as words one uses to denote persons:
When I say „I am in pain‟ I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no
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idea who is.
It seems that the common point in the objections of Russell and Wittgenstein is that the „I‟ is
a grammatical residue which secretly imports an unjustified assumption into the Cartesian
discourse.
Apparently, the criticism that the „I‟ cannot be given rests on the assumption that some other
formula than „I think‟ could perform the epistemological function required to stop the Cartesian
doubt. Lichtenberg and Russell seem to think that an „impersonal‟ statement of the presence of
thoughts could have been an evidence that Descartes was looking for. But does this criticism take
the true setting of the First Meditation into account?
As far as the context of the First Meditation is concerned, employment of certain personal
pronouns does not seem illegitimate. The world after the First Meditation is constituted by two
beings, the meditator and the deceiver, or the putative „cause‟ of the thoughts and perceptions of the
meditator. The meditator attests to the presence of certain perceptions, thoughts, and these are in
„him‟, although it may be that they are mere reflections from some source other than himself. It is
indubitable that these thoughts are taking place in „his‟ mind, that the meditator — and not someone
else, not the deceiver — is having these experiences. Descartes, therefore, was not committed to a
position where he could say nothing more than „there are thoughts‟; he could have employed the
pronoun „I‟ without transgressing the limits determined by the hypotheses of the First Meditation,
provided that he abstained from asserting that he is an autonomous being, that he contented himself
with the statement „I am conscious of thoughts‟ or some equivalent of it.
The proposal of removing the „I‟ from the Cartesian formula, therefore, seems to stem from
an overestimation of the constraints of the doubt experiment. Furthermore, a formula like „it thinks‟
can hardly constitute an evidence—it leads to an impasse. The evidence formula, amended in the
Lichtenbergian manner cannot serve as an epistemological foundation, simply because it cannot
refute the deceiver hypothesis. For, the expression „it thinks‟ automatically refers to a process of
thinking which is not caused by the meditator, and becomes a support to the alternative that the
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deceiver may be producing those thoughts. A similar argument applies to the expression „there are
thoughts‟ which leaves the issue of the „cause‟ of these thoughts undetermined.
*
Descartes did not consider the possibility that his thoughts, as well as his sensory
experiences may all be produced by a deceiver as totally meaningless. Just a few lines before
concluding that he is the author of the thought in question, he asks whether a God may be putting
thoughts into his mind:
Yet apart from everything I have just listed [i.e. apart from the things his memory, his senses report,
apart from body, figure, extension, movement and place], how do I know that there is not something
else5 which does not allow the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may
call him, who puts into me6 the thoughts I am now having?7
But he refuses to see a difficulty in recognizing himself as the author of those thoughts he is
having and evades a serious question:
But why do I think this8, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts?”9
Given the constraints of the First Meditation, the meditator cannot decide whether the
thoughts he is having are put into his mind or they are produced by him, for the conclusion of the
First Meditation is that nothing is certain. According to the deceiver hypothesis, a being of unknown
attributes may be producing my sense experiences. Descartes assumes the deceiver as the source,
and therefore as the „cause‟ of his perceptions. Could there be a ground for him to privilege his
„thoughts‟10 and to hold that he himself puts them forth? Thoughts, that is, sentences, statements,
propositions, inferences, as well as the perceptions, imaginations may all be being „put‟ in the mind
of the meditator.
*
What are the implications of the statement „God may be putting the thoughts I am having
into my mind‟? The locution „I am having‟ implies passivity, a state of receiving. But, even if I may
only be said to be receiving thoughts, does not my statement that „I am having thoughts‟ imply that
„I am conscious of thoughts‟, and should not this be sufficient to prove that I exist? Although some
being may be giving me all those images or thoughts, it is beyond doubt that „I‟ perceive, that „I‟
follow them. I am conscious that there are thoughts, I understand, therefore I must be justified to
hold that I am something if I am conscious of these events, of these thoughts. I must be something
even if I am nothing but merely an auditor, for this very process of attending to thoughts implies my
consciousness, my existence, and I cannot possibly doubt that I am present, that I am conscious. All
that I seem to conceive as when I seem to think myself that these thoughts may be some other
being‟s thoughts, or all that I seem to put forth concerning these primary thoughts (as when it occurs
to me that these very thoughts may be God‟s thoughts) may all be coming from a source other than
myself. Nevertheless, it must be beyond doubt that I am conscious of all these thoughts.
The statement „I am conscious, I exist‟, however, like the Lichtenbergian „it thinks‟ or the
Russellian „there are thoughts‟ is no argument against the deceiver hypothesis, it cannot be
employed to show that these thoughts cannot be coming from an evil genius or a deceiving God.
The crucial question which comes to the fore after the doubt experiment is not whether there is
anything, it is trivially obvious that there are at least these thoughts, rather the issue is whether there
is an evidence, a piece of thought whereby the meditator, confined within a context determined by
the sceptical hypotheses of the First Meditation, can justify to himself that he is not deceived. By
means of the statement „I am conscious of thoughts‟, the meditator cannot justify to himself that he
Ø and not the deceiver Ø puts forward this thought.
3
As far as the context of the doubt experiment is concerned, employment of certain personal
pronouns was legitimate; Descartes‟ postulation of freedom of will through his peculiar use of the
pronoun „I‟, however, is problematic. Although it is possible to move from „God puts thoughts into
my mind‟ to „I am conscious‟, this last statement, which falsely seems to be capable of serving as
evidence, cannot perform the epistemological function of „I think‟. Nor can „it thinks‟ or ,„there are
thoughts‟. These statements have nothing to say against the possibility that there may be an
omnipotent deceiver and therefore they cannot be employed to show that the deceiver has a limited
power, that the domain over which it may be holding sway cannot cover the sphere of thoughts
which appear to the meditator as „his‟ thoughts.
*
It may be held that the conception of the Cartesian doubt experiment implies freedom from
the very start, that the experimenter has a certain aim in view, he makes himself disbelieve in order
to achieve certainty, and that therefore it must be natural for him to encounter his own activity as an
undeniable fact as he proceeds with the experimental mechanism he himself designed. Could
Descartes disremember that he himself had conceived of a deceiver, that he himself fabricated this
epistemological tool in order to render his position against the common but erroneous belief that
external things exist as they are perceived through the senses, as having shape, colour, etc. as
conspicuous as possible? If the experimenter is the author of the experiment he decides to perform
on himself, why should not he deem himself the author of the thoughts which seem to be his own
thoughts? Should not the very act of conceiving the experiment of doubt lead Descartes to the
rediscovery of his freedom of will? Does not the act of carrying out an experiment ab initio imply
the existence of an independent inquirer and his freedom of will?
Given the hypotheses employed in the doubt experiment, however, it cannot be said that „I
think‟ must necessarily follow from the conception of, or from the act of carrying out the
experiment. I cannot justify to myself that I am free in my volition by bringing forth what „seem to
me‟ to be acts determined by my will alone, and in general my so-called act of choosing between
alternatives can hardly constitute a decisive argument for the perennial problem of freedom. The act
of conceiving of any idea, does not imply that the person who conceives is an autonomous being.
No doubt the same argument applies a fortiori to the Cartesian case.
*
Lastly, Descartes could be seen to have set before himself the task of refuting the hypothesis
that some being of limited power may be deceiving him and not to have considered the hypothesis
that he may be under the domination of an omnipotent being. But Descartes never clarified his
position regarding this point.11 Evidently, the possibility that a being of limited power may be
deceiving him constitutes a much less serious problem for the Cartesian meditator than the
possibility that an omnipotent being may be putting everything he is conscious of into his mind. The
hypothesis that I may be under the influence of some being of limited power which deceives me
gives me the liberty of assuming without getting involved in insurmountable difficulties that I am
free in my acts, that I can think and look for expedients to overcome deception. As long as I do not
put freedom into dispute by an omnipotent deceiver hypothesis, I can see myself as capable of
„convincing‟ myself of something, and of „thinking‟ in the ordinary sense of the term. If Descartes‟
argument for evidence in the Second Meditation is problematic as we hold it to be, then, it is only
because the hypothesis of an omnipotent deceiver which pervades the Cartesian discourse makes the
meditator‟s „convincing‟ himself, or his „thinking of anything‟ contestable.
Halil Turan
Middle East Technical University
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NOTES
1
Second Meditation: AT VII, p. 25; CSM II, p. 17. I will refer to Descartes‟ works by volume and page numbers of the
Adam & Tannery edition (Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam & Paul Tannery [Paris: Vrin, 1996]: AT). I will
quote Descartes in English and refer to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, (3 vols.) trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990): CSM.
2
The quotation is from Guenter Zoeller, “Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking”, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 30 (1992), p. 418. For the German see Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, ed. Wolfgang
Promies (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1967-1974), Vol. 2, p. 412).
3
A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p.567.
4
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 122e, (article 404); see also
G. E. Moore, “Wittgenstein‟s Lectures in 1930-33,” Mind, 64(1955), p.13: “Just as no [physical] eye is involved in
seeing, so no Ego is involved in thinking or having a toothache. ...”
5
… some other thing different from those I have just considered to be doubtful… [… quelque autre chose différente de
celles que je viens de juger incertaines …]; French version: AT IX, p. 19.
6
…who puts into my mind … [… qui me met en l'esprit …]; French version: AT IX, p. 19.
7
Second Meditation: AT VII, p. 24; CSM II, p. 16.
8
French version puts a stress on the idea that God may be putting thoughts into my mind is not necessarily true: “Cela
n’est pas nécessaire; car peut-être que je suis capable de les produire de moi-même. ... (AT IX, p. 19).”
9
Second Meditation: AT VII, p. 24; AT IX, p. 19; CSM II, p. 16.
10
Descartes, in defining himself, the discovered „I‟, says that he is “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is
willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. … (AT VII, p. 28; CSM II, p. 19).” Here Descartes
does not distinguish between sensory perceptions and thoughts, but we must note that this definition of the „thinking
being‟ is posterior to the discovery (or the postulation) of the „I‟. We hold that Descartes‟ conceiving or putting forward
„I think, I exist‟ must be „cogitatio proper‟ in the sense of „reflective awareness‟ as professor Cottingham put it, and
hence must be distinguished from perceiving and other forms of thinking he later enumerated under the general term
„thought‟ (John Cottingham, “Descartes on Thought”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 28[1978], pp. 208-14). Descartes‟
approach to thought and thinking in his argument for evidence differs from his approach in his investigation of the
thinking being.
11
H. Gouhier in his Essais sur Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1949) argued that Descartes tacitly or even unconsciously
differentiated between the hypothesis of a deceiving God and that of an evil genius and that he made use of the evil
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genius hypothesis as a methodological counterpart of that of the omnipotent deceiving God. Upon this construal,
Descartes may be seen to be thinking of the omnipotent deceiver God at the moment when he encountered the idea that
thoughts may be put into his mind and be thinking of the evil genius, the “pantin méthodologique” when he refuted the
possibility of deception by an assertion of his own activity or freedom. This analysis would have seemed completely
justified had Descartes explicitly referred to the evil genius in the passage under consideration (AT VII, p. 25). In any
case, it seems obvious that Descartes here confronts a being with a limited power.
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