By Robert Gough
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
THE CASE OF PHILADELPHIA IN 1776*
H
ow important were economic factors in influencing the beH
ginning, direction, and results of the American Revolution? This has been an oft-studied question, with conflicting results.
These studies, however, generally have not examined the effect of a
specific economic attribute on a specified group of people. If such an
attribute, like wealth, poverty, slaveholding, or indebtedness, were
significant, then it would have tended to make the members of the
group who possessed it behave in similar fashion. If, on the other
hand, non-economic attributes were actually more significant, the
members of the group with the same economic attribute would not
have behaved distinctively. The group's behavior during the Revolution, rather, would have been fragmented on the basis of the significant non-economic attributes its members possessed.
Specifically, this paper will take an economic group-wealthy
Philadelphians-and identify their public behavior before and
during the American Revolution. It will seek to determine if they
behaved in a similar fashion. Such solidarity would suggest that these
wealthy men were indeed a "class."' The further implication of such
'This is a revised version of a paper read at the Duquesne History Forum, October
1978. Helpful criticism has been given by Rudolph Bell, Deborah Mathias Gough,
Owen Ireland, Jack D. Marietta, and Richard Ryerson.
1. The nature and functioning of "classes" has provoked a voluminous literature.
Useful works of synthesis and analysis include T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society,
(New York, 1966); Milton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (paper ed., New
York, 1963); and Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London,
1973). The present study proceeds on the assumptions that 1) "classes" are cohesive
Social groups, as I believe both Marx and Weber believed them to be, and not just
Statistical categories, for example, of men with a certain amount of property; and
2) behavior towards a major political event in a society is a useful way of seeing if
such social cohesion existed.
235
236
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
a finding, of course, would be that the American Revolution may
have been a "class conflict." Such was the view, of course, of the
Progressive historians of a half-century ago. Wealthy merchants in
the seaboard cities were specifically identified as having Opposed
independence. 2 More recent scholarship in late colonial and Revolutionary history has focused on lower socioeconomic strata. It has
tended to argue that these groups were under increasing "social
strain," which was somehow relieved by the Revolution. 3 Those at
the top of the social and economic structure have served as not-too.
closely-defined foils for the actions of impoverished sailors, urban
workingmen, and hard-pressed farmers in declining rural areas. It
has been suggested, for example, that in Pennsylvania specifically the
Revolution checked a "feudal reaction" by wealthy officials. 4
The group selected for this study consists of the 153 wealthiest men
in Philadelphia in 1775, about 2.5 percent of the adult males in the
city. These men have been identified primarily from the tax lists, with
the assumption that taxable wealth in the city can be taken as
broadly representative of the actual wealth that was held by eighteenth-century Philadelphians. S For analytical purposes, it should be
2. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution (New
York, 1918). The Progressive interpretation of the Revolution in Pennsylvania
originated with Charles Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776
(Philadelphia, 1901). The impact of this interpretation on subsequent scholarship is
summarized in George Athan Billias and Gerald R. Grob, American History: Retrospect
and Prospect (New York, 1971), pp. 34-84.
3. Recent studies which in one fashion or another, I believe, stress "class" tensions
as a precipitating, if not causal, factor in the coming of the Revolution include Richard
B. Morris, "We the People of the United States: The Bicentennial of a People's Revolution," American Historical Review 82(1977):1-19, esp. 5-6; James A. Henretta,
"Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston," William and May
Quarterly, 3d series, 22(1965):75-92; Kenneth Lockridge, "Social Change and the
American Revolution,"JournalofSocialHistory6(1973):403-439; Gary B. Nash, "Urban
Wealth and Poverty in Pre-Revolutionary America," Journalof Interdisciplinay Histoly
6(1976):545-564; David C. Skaggs, "Maryland's Impulse Toward Social Revolution,
1750-1776," Journal of American History 54(1968):771-786; Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit
of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Mayland (Baltimore and London,
1973).
4. Rowland Berthoff and John M. Murrin, "Feudalism, Communalism, and the
Yeoman Farmer: The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident," in
Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel
Hill and New York, 1973), pp. 256-288, esp. 271. See also Stephen Brobeck, "Revolutionary Change in Colonial Philadelphia: The Brief Life of the Proprietary Gentry,
William and Mary Quarterly 3d series 33(1976):431-435.
5. The tax lists used for this identification were the County Tax Assessment Ledger,
Philadelphia County, 1775, City Archives, Department of Records, City of Philadelphia; the Provincial Tax, City of Philadelphia, 1774, State Archives, Harrisburg
(microfilm, City Archives).
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
237
assumed that these men share only one thing in common-wealth.
The point of this analysis is to see how significant this one attribute
was; that is, did the possession of wealth produce political solidarity,
or at least co-vary with one particular political position. 6
Like virtually all British colonists in America, wealthy Philadelphians almost universally opposed the imposition of the Stamp
Tax in 1765. 7 John Penn, a member of 1775 elite and then Governor
of the Province, reported from Philadelphia to the British authorities
that "dissatisfaction" with the Stamp Act "is almost universal" and
"prevails among all ranks and orders of men." Wealthy Philadelphians took the lead in organizing the resistance to this legislation in
Philadelphia. Their public behavior shows that, in all, sixty-five
wealthy Philadelphians of 1775 publicly opposed the Stamp Act in
1765. As a Philadelphian recalled in later years, at this time "a great
proportion and perhaps a great majority of the most wealthy and
respectable . .. was arrayed in opposition to the ministerial claims." 9
There was a similar initial response to the Townshend Acts in
1768. 1 After some initial reluctance, Philadelphia traders adopted a
6. The political behavior of other groups of wealthy persons in the Revolutionary
period has not been studied closely, particularly in comparison with that of the general
population. But for some suggestions see Robert Michael Dructor, "The New York
Commercial Community: The Revolutionary Experience (Ph.D. diss., University of
Pittsburgh, 1975); Robert Francis Oaks, "The Philadelphia Merchants and the
American Revolution" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1971). More
attention has been given to this subject in the 19th century. See Lee Benson, The
Concept ofJacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, 1961), pp. 64-84;
Frank Otto Gatell, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look
at New York City's Men of Quality," Political Science Quarterly 82(1967):235-252;
Alexandra McCoy, "The Political Affiliation of American Economic Elites: Wayne
County, Michigan, 1844-1860 as a Test Case" (Ph.D. diss., Wayne State University,
1965); Edward Pessen, Riches, Class, and Power Before the Civil War (Lexington, Mass.,
1975); Robert Rich, "Politics and Pedigrees: The Wealthy Men of Boston, 1798-1852"
(Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1975); Burton W. Folsom, "The Politics of Elites: Prominence
and Party in Davidson County, Tennessee, 1835-1861," Journal of Southern History
39(1973):359-378.
7. Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy 1740-1776
(Harrisburg, 1954), pp. 108-111; Lincoln, Revolutionay Movement, pp. 126-135;
Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution, new
rev. ed. (New York and London, 1962), pp. 301-324.
8. John Penn to Secretary of State Conway, 19 February 1766, Minutes of the Provincial
Council of Pennsylvania .
.
.
(16 vols., Harrisburg, 1851-53), 9:299.
9. Alexander Graydon, Memoirs . . . (Harrisburg, 1811), pp. 104-105.
10. William Allen to Thomas Penn, 12 October 1768, Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics, pp.
141..157.
238
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
boycott of British goods. But as other seaboard cities began dropping
this boycott, pressure mounted for Philadelphia to resume importa.
tion as well. This agitation climaxed at a meeting at Davenport's
Tavern on 30 September 1770; amid claims of irregular parliamentary procedure, the Philadelphia merchants voted eighty-nine to
forty-five to resume importation of all items except tea. The minority
of the group promptly walked out, and the merchant community
quickly began to split into groups engaging in or denouncing trade
with Britain.
This divisive pattern became more pronounced during the following years. Although some wealthy Philadelphians continued to be
active in resistance to Britain, and a few who had not been active
joined in the resistance, many others withdrew from open opposition.
They could have had numerous reasons for such action. Quakers,
who comprised one-half of the wealthy group, were officially admonished to do so by the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting as the
resistance turned to violence. Wealthy persons who were also political leaders began to fear that the disorder just beneath the surface in
Pennsylvania politics would be unleashed if resistance to Britain
went too far." Proprietary office-holders, in particular, feared losing
their positions either to a royal authority bent on suppressing rebellious Pennsylvanians who could not be controlled by the present
forms of government, or to a new set of men who were leading the
resistance.
Few members of the economic elite of any persuasion actuallyfavored the British position; even Joseph Galloway, one of the few
persons anywhere to defend the legality of British actions as late as
1775, denied their wisdom.' 2 In April of that year an observer reported that in the city "all ranks of men, even the Quakers, were
dissatisfied and displeased with the measures of administration."' 3
Those members of the elite who withdrew from public opposition
11. For the official position of the Quakers see Pennsylvania Gazette, 25 January 1775.
The political instability of colonial Pennsylvania is suggested in Patricia U. Bonomi,
"The Middle Colonies: Embryo of the New Political Order," in Perspectives in Early
American Histogy, ed. Alden T. Vaughn and George A. Billias (New York, 1973), pp
63-94; James M. Head, A Time to Rend: An Essay on the Decision for American Independence
(Madison, Wisc., 1968):
12. John Ferling, "Joseph Galloway: A Reassessment of the Motivations of a Pennsylvania Loyalist," Pennsylvania History 39(1972):163-186, esp. 176-178.
13. George Cuthbert to John Dalling, April 1775, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 66(1942):206-215; John Adams to William Tudor, 29 September 1774,
Papersofjohn Adams, ed. RobertJ. Taylor, 2 vols. to date (Cambridge, Mass., 1977- )
2:176-177.
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
239
to the British did so, rather, out of concern about the propriety and
implications of certain resistance measures, and the people who were
going to lead them.
This hesitation on the part of some interacted with the eagerness
of the resistance leaders to draw as much of the population as possible
into a revolutionary struggle. The result was that increasing numbers
of "new men"-who had not been previously involved in public
affairs-became active by joining voluntary committees. ' These
committees aroused and managed the anti-British resistance effort in
the years immediately preceding the Revolution.
While they were doing so, however, a declining percentage of their
membership was drawn from the economic elite. A majority of the
men on the committees opposing the Townshend Acts in March
1769 and October 1770 were wealthy in 1775. On the other hand,
less than twenty percent of those chosen to the Committee of Inspection in February 1776 and the Third Provincial Conference of June
1776 were wealthy. 5 Correspondingly, a declining percentage
of the elite was active in the resistance movement: only thirty-two
wealthy Philadelphians are known to have favored independence
in July 1776. These thirty-two men comprised less than half of the
number of wealthy Philadelphians who participated in the opposition to Britain sometime between 1765 and 1776.
This declining militancy within the economic elite paralleled the
general pattern in the city of hesitation regarding an open break with
Britain.' The wealthy, it would seem, behaved like the general
population. As the members of the Continental Congress, meeting in
the city, were all too well aware, Pennsylvania in general and Philadelphia in particular was one of the laggards in deciding on independence in 1776-"a damned slow quakering nag" that ought to be
"flogged and spurred" wrote one New Englander."l
When the final decision had to be made, most wealthy Philadelphians did not favor independence. But they did not actively oppose
14. Richard Alan Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776 (Philadelphia, 1978).
15. For membership of these committees, see Pennsylvania Gazette, 4 October 1770,
21 February 177 6;journalof the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
1776-1781 . . . ed. Michael Hillegas (Philadelphia, 1782), pp. 34, 49.
16. On the slowness with which Philadelphia as a whole approached independence
see David Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution (Philadelphia, 1961).
17. Charles Lee to Robert Morris, 27 January 1775, The Confidential Correspondence of
Robert Morris (Philadelphia, [1916]), p. 128.
240
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
it either. Caution was their watchword; reconciliation was their hope.
Indeed, it was precisely the hesitance of the economic elite to align
themselves as a group for or against independence that hindered the
movement of Pennsylvania towards independence by depriving the
Revolution of either an important source of support, as in Virginia,
or a prominent focus of opposition to rally against. The price the
economic elite was to pay for this ambivalence came after independence: more so than in any other former colony, the new state constitution in Pennsylvania upset the established political culture."
As a sage observer commented a few weeks before independence:
"The gentlemen of the province were much to blame, when they
should have been industrious. The people thinking inactivity in time
when they were surrounded with as many dangers as the hairs of their
heads, a base desertion, chose governors among themselves."'
The activity of wealthy persons during the actual war years of the
Revolution adds another dimension to the analysis of their behavior.
Increasing age, and in eleven cases before the end of 1776 death,
meant that some rich Philadelphians would retire from public activity. But for more than three-fourths of the wealthy, the "exposed"
position of the rich as prominent members of the community made
it difficult for them to become inactive. Their wealth, seemingly,
could have worked to make them support the newly independent
state of Pennsylvania in its struggle against the British; they would
have good reason to avoid providing an excuse for their property to
be confiscated. But at the same time, they could have perceived the
Revolution as threatening the social stability which their property
required for its security; this belief could consequently have led them
to support the restoration of British authority. In any event, the
fighting actually served to confirm most wealthy Philadelphians in
positions they had adopted before 1776. A few who had not previously been active in public affairs decided after the beginning of
hostilities to show their support for the Revolution, while a few others,
supporters of the resistance up to the point of independence, now became foes of the struggle against the British.
18. On events in Pennsylvania after independence see Robert Brunhouse, The Counter
Revolution in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1942); Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats
(Chapel Hill, 1955), pp. 214-286; George Geib, "A History of Philadelphia, 17761789" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1969).
19. Diary of James Clitherall, entry for 13 May 1776, PMHB 22(1898):469.
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
241
Thirty-two rich Philadelphians-twenty-one percent of the eliteopenly favored independence in July 1776. They included such wellknown people as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Cadwalader, George
Clymer, Henry Hill, Christopher Marshall, Samuel Mifflin, Samuel
Morris, Jr., John Maxwell Nesbit, William Shippen, and John
Wharton. As patriots, they were joined by three other men who, like
John Dickinson, opposed the timing-not the substance-of independence, and subsequently supported the American cause during the
Revolution. Fifty-six rich Philadelphians-thirty-seven percent of the
elite-chose to be "neutralists;" these men are classified both positively, such as by being known to have remained in Philadelphia
during the British occupation, and negatively, in residual fashion, by
being found to have been active politically before the Revolution, but
not after 1776. Joshua Howell, for example, a wealthy Quaker merchant, is among this group. Howell was a signer of the 1765 and 1769
non-importation agreements, and a delegate to the First Provincial
Conference in July 1774; however, he withdrew from politics as
independence approached and remained in the city during the
British occupation. His wife's niece described him aptly-"Uncle
Howell . . . is neither Whig nor Tory." 2 0
Another fifteen percent of the elite-twenty-two men-demonstrated that they were "mild loyalists" by cooperating with the
British, such as by serving in the civilian administration of the city
during the occupation. Some of these men found themselves placed
under surveillance, harassed, and even arrested by the patriot authorities. None, however, suffered serious material or physical persecution. While willing to cooperate with the British, these men do not
appear particularly to have desired a British victory.
Thirteen of their colleagues, representing nine percent of the
wealthy, were pro-British and found themselves arrested, imprisoned,
and even exiled. Quakers predominated among this group, and it is
difficult to separate truly pacifistic sympathies from pro-British
beliefs. Contemporaries far too often did not even attempt to make
such distinctions. In this case, at any event, it does appear that proBritish sympathies predominated among this category of loyalist. For
example, when Thomas Fisher's wife received word that the British
were approaching Philadelphia in September 1777, she told her diary
that "it was an event I had so long wished to take place."
20. Diary of Anna Rawle, entry for 22 October 1781, PMHB 35(1911):3 1.
21. Diary of Sarah Logan Fisher, entry for 25 September 1777, PMHB 82 (1958):449-
242
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
There was a third category of loyalists among wealthy Philadelphians. These five men were "high tories," who took strenuous action
to assist the British cause, often by joining the King's forces, and suffered serious retribution. This group included such prominent individuals as Joseph Galloway, Samuel Shoemaker, and Andrew Allen.
Their wishes during the war were expressed well by Samuel Shoemaker's step-daughter when, hearing the rumor that "some people
begin to think it probably that the British will be here in the fall,"
she exclaimed "How delightful such a prospect" would be.2 2 Exile
and attainment were inflicted on the wealthy Philadelphians whose
views and actions placed them in this category.
It is difficult to compare the positions adopted by the members of
the economic elite towards the Revolution with those of the population at large. We have only the most general idea about what the
divisions were among the entire population. However, it would seem
that the percentage of patriots among the Philadelphia economic
elite was impressive. We do know that cities in general were strongholds of loyalist strength; that Philadelphia in particular was slow
to support independence; and that about two-thirds of the residents
of Philadelphia remained in the city when it was occupied by the
British. 2' Given this environment, it is revealing that twenty-one of
the Philadelphia economic elite saw active military service during
the Revolution in the patriot cause; this figure represents about fifteen percent of the elite, compared with a total of perhaps thirty
percent of all the adult males in Pennsylvania who served in the
patriot military forces. 24 The percentage of wealthy Philadelphians
fighting for independence becomes really impressive, however, when
it is realized that, as a group, their age structure was considerably
450. See also Henry Drinker to Robert and Nathan Hyde, 16 September 1774, Henry
Drinker Foreign Letterbook, 1772-1788, Drinker Papers, HSP; and James Hamilton
toJohn and Robert Barclay, 18 April 1783, James Hamilton Letterbook, 1749-1783,
James Hamilton Papers, HSP.
22. Elizabeth Rawle Journal, 17 March 1781, Pemberton Papers, XXX, HSP.
23. On loyalism in Pennsylvania see Wallace Brown, The GoodAmericans: The Loyalists
in the American Revolution (New York, 1969), pp. 233-234; and Wilbur Siebert, The
Loyalists of Pennsylvania (Columbus, Ohio, 1920). On loyalism in the cities see Brown,
Good Americans, pp. 68-69.
24. The percentage of all Americans who fought in the Revolution is difficult to
determine. The figures here are calculated from those in Cornelius C. Vermeule,
"The Number of Soldiers in the Revolution," New Jersey Historical Society, Collections, 5th series, 7(1922):222-227.
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
243
higher than normal for military service. Their median age in 1775,
for instance, was fifty-two years.
Wealthy Philadelphians were not strongly overrepresented in the
loyalist categories, either, when compared to the rest of the population. Four wealthy Philadelphians (2.7 percent of the elite) were
formally attainted. This figure is somewhat higher than the 0.5 percent of the entire adult male population which was attainted, but
is not great in absolute numbers. 25 Nor is it striking when we consider
that wealthy Philadelphians were more likely to be attainted than
other Philadelphians because of their public prominence and greater
property holdings. In general, the last two varieties of loyalists just
identified comprised fourteen percent of the members of the economic elite whose position on the Revolution is known; this percentage should be compared with Wallace Brown's estimate that somewhere between thirteen percent and thirty percent of all Americans
were "active loyalists." 26
Furthermore, it seems that wealthy Philadelphians left the city
during the occupation, and thus displayed at least some degree of
hostility to Britain, at the same rate as the general population, about
thirty-five percent. Finally, it seems that the economic background
of all outright loyalists in Philadelphia was broadly similar to the
entire population. Specifically, the distribution of the tax assessments
of attainted persons from Philadelphia and the suburbs whose
property was sold by the state, when compared with the distribution
of the tax assessments of the entire population, shows only a slight
bias in favor of people with moderate amounts of property, as opposed
to wealthy or poor Philadelphians."2
What caused wealthy Philadelphians to adopt these positions?
Temperament, chance, and other such highly individualistic factors
must account for much of the explanation of why Americans, including wealthy Philadelphians, took the position they did on the Revolution. However, various social background characteristics had such
sharp influence among the wealthy that it is possible to examine an
25. See the data on Seibert, Loyalists of Pennsylvania, p. 58. It is assumed that about
eighteen of the seventy-six persons attainted in Philadelphia County were residents
of Southwark and the Northern Liberties, suburbs that are considered part of the city
for the purposes of the present study.
26. Brown, Good Americans, p. 227.
27. This estimate is calculated from data in Anne M. Ousterhout, "The Forgotten
Antagonists: Pennsylvania Loyalists" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1972),
pp. 261 278.
244
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
individual's characteristics and predict with a high degree of accuracy whether he was a loyalist, neutralist, or patriot. The social
background characteristics provide weights for an equation which,
in this instance, correctly predicts the behavior of almost sixty percent
of the 1775 Philadelphia economic elite. Religion, father's socioeconomic status, previous political affiliation, and birthplace contributed most of the power to the equation that did this predicting.
They associated opponents of the Revolution with Quakerisrn,
fathers of high socioeconomic status, supporters of the Assembly
Party in colonial Pennsylvania politics, and individuals not born in
Philadelphia. 2 8
Religion was probably the most important characteristic influencing the position of the wealthy towards the Revolution. As Table I
indicates, not surprisingly, Quakers were disproportionately numerous among the neutralist and loyalist categories. Upstanding
Quakers comprised forty-three percent of the economic elite, but
only seventeen percent of that part of the elite which was patriot.
Correspondingly, wealthy Baptists and Presbyterians tended to
support the Revolution. Within these two denominations support
for the Revolution was over fifty percent, compared to just nine
percent within the Quakers. On the other hand, wealthy Anglicans,
members of the most socially amorphous and least religiously demanding denomination in the city, displayed' no particular trend
in behavior during the Revolution.
Ethnicity was a factor related to religion. Wealthy Presbyterians,
for example, had their tendency toward the patriot position reinforced by the Scotch-Irish background most of them shared. The
most clear-cut preference for the Revolution, however, was found
among wealthy Irishmen, forty percent of whom supported the
28. The saliency of various independent variables in predicting whether a wealthy
person was a loyalist, neutralist, or patriot was done by discriminant function analysis,
based on eighty cases for which sufficient information was known, using Rao's method.
The resulting discriminant function had a canonical correlation of .49; a WilksLambda statistic of .61; and a chi-square which was significant at the .04 level. The
group centroids were -. 81 for loyalists, .43 for neutralists, and .27 for patriots.
Standardized discriminant function coefficients were -.70 for religion (coded on a
sect-church scale), -.59 for father's socioeconomic status (coded from high to low), .55
for political affiliation (coded from unaffiliated to Proprietary to Assembly), and -.87
for birthplace (coded from far-to-near-Philadelphia). Of the reduction achieved in
Wilks-Lambda, 27.2 percent came from political affiliation, 19.9 percent from religion,
12.6 percent from father's socioeconomic status, and 15.6 percent from birthplace.
Age, ethnicity, and officeholding added 16.1 percent more, and occupation (merchant
vs. non-merchant), education, residence, and year of immigration another 8.7 percent.
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PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
patriot cause, and wealthy Germans, thirty percent of whom were
patriots. On the other hand, no wealthy Scotsmen were patriots
and forty percent were loyalists. Among the English, the largest and
most amorphous nationality group in the city, no particular trend
emerged.
That religious and ethnic factors were most important in dividing
wealthy Philadelphians during the Revolutionary years is not surprising when it is understood that they had been the most important
factors in political divisions in colonial Pennsylvania politics on both
the mass and elite levels. 2" Quakers, with some other pietistic groups
and some Germans, squared off against Anglicans and Scotch-Irish
Presbyterians. The Revolution highlighted the pre-existing tendency
for divisions to be along ethno-religious lines, rather than producing
new lines for division. The pull of these traditional loyalties may
even have been increased by the uncertainties and upheavals associated with the revolutionary conflict.
Time of settlement in Philadelphia also affected political behavior
at the time of the Revolution. However, the standard belief that
recent immigrants were more likely to be loyalists seems to be only
partially correct in this specific situation." Immigrants who were
wealthy Philadelphians did indeed tend to be disproportionately
loyalist-28.2 percent versus 25 percent among the native born. However, they were disproportionately patriot in orientation as well-30.4
percent to 23.1 percent. Accounting for this pattern was the strong
tendency of native-born Philadelphians to be neutralists; 42.3 percent of the Philadelphia-born became neutralists, compared to 28.2
percent of the immigrants. While the ties to the mother country may
have been strong enough among more recent immigrants to tilt them
toward Britain in the revolutionary struggle, at the same time these
men would be less "established" in Philadelphia and less fearful of
the local consequences of a revolution.
The source of a man's wealth also affected his position on the Revolution. Individuals with inherited wealth tended to be loyalists; newness to wealth, on the other hand, as with newness to the city, seems
to have encouraged support for the Revolution. As Table 2 suggests,
29. The best appreciation for the ethno-religious division in colonial Pennsylvania
can be found in Dietmar Rothermund, The Layman's Progress (Phila., 1962), and
Bonomi, "Embryo of the New Political Order," pp. 63-94. See also Gary B. Nash,
"The Transformation of Urban Politics, 1700-1765," Journal of American History
60(1973):626-628.
30. Brown, Good Americans, p. 46; James G. Leyburn, "Presbyterian Immigrants and
the American Revolution, Journal of Presbyterian Histoy 54(1976):23.
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PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
there seems to have been a distinction in late eighteenth-century
Philadelphia between established and arriviste wealth. But when
religion is held constant by examining each denomination separately,
this pattern exists among Anglicans, but not among Quakers. It
would seem that Quakerism was strong enough to affect an individual despite a material consideration, such as father's socioeconomic
status, but Anglicanism-where a looser community existed-was
not. When time of settlement is held constant, on the other hand,
this distinction in behavior based on source of wealth is always present. "Age" of wealth had the same effect on newcomers as longtime Philadelphia residents. The time of settlement analysis actually
testifies to the strength of religion, which could show influence while
time of settlement could not.
Partisan affiliation in colonial Pennsylvania politics also made a
difference in how a wealthy man would react to the Revolution. As
Table 3 indicates, adherents of the Assembly Party tended to oppose
the Revolution. Their opponents in the Proprietary Party were less
likely to be loyalists. This factor of political allegiance was complicated by the influence of officeholding in colonial Pennsylvania.
Wealthy men who had held public office before the Revolution
tended to be either loyalists or patriots, but not neutralists. Overall,
over forty percent of the wealthy non-officeholders were neutralists,
compared to less than thirty percent of the officeholders. From
temperament and the exposed position of their offices, public officials
found themselves taking a stance on the struggle, one way or the
other. The type of office a wealthy man held also made a difference.
Among individuals who held office on the proprietary patronage, for
example, sixty-five percent were loyalists; among those who sat in the
Assembly or held Assembly-controlled offices, fifty percent supported
the crown; and of the local officeholders, only thirty-nine percent
favored the British.
It seems that in both parties in colonial Pennsylvania politics, but
especially among the Proprietary group, political leaders, as represented by officeholders, were somewhat out of step with the rank-andfile. It is no wonder, then, that after 1768 the traditional party structure in Pennsylvania dissolved, and was unable to channel the rise
of opposition to British colonial policies. Among the wealthy, the
politicians who most strongly opposed British policies were the
younger adherents of the Proprietary Party, who were mostly nonofficeholders. Of the wealthy Proprietary supporters under age forty-
CAN A RICH MAN FAVOR REVOLUTION?
249
TABLE 3
EFFECT OF PREVIOUS POLITICAL AFFILIATION ON BEHAVIOR
TOWARD THE REVOLUTION, 1775 ELITE
(Percentages)
REVOLUTIONARY
POSITION
Patriots
Neutralists
Loyalists
Died and Unknown
n-
ASSEMBLY
PARTY
PROPRIETARY
PARTY
UNAFFILIATED
TOTAL
25.0
18.8
50.0
6.3
25.0
29.5
34.1
11.4
21.5
43.0
18.3
17.2
22.9
36.6
26.1
14.4
16
44
93
153
five, fifty-seven percent were patriots; among their political comrades
over forty-five, only twelve percent supported the Revolution.
In general, age was a secondary factor influencing position on the
Revolution. Like immigration, its relationship to position on the
Revolution was curvilinear-younger men tended to be patriots or
loyalists, but not neutralists. Of the men born after 1730, 33.3 percent
were patriots, and 33.3 percent were loyalists; overall, only 22.9
percent of the elite were patriots and 26.1 percent were loyalists.
Caution toward political activity in general, therefore, as indicated
by neutrality in the Revolution, quite understandably seems to have
accompanied increasing age.
Finally, the occupation of a wealthy man made some difference
in what position he took toward the Revolution. Wealthy merchants,
however, did not tilt in either direction-24.7 percent were patriots
and 23.4 percent were loyalists, almost identical to the percentages in
the entire elite. The greatest support for Britain during the Revolution came, rather, from wealthy Philadelphians who were lawyers or
who lived on unearned income. Among craftsmen and builders, on
the other hand, the preference was support for the Revolution.
In their response to the Revolution, wealthy Philadelphians were
influenced by the same pressures as was the rest of the population.
Among the general population of the middle colonies, at least,
Quakers tended to be loyalists, Baptists patriots, and Anglicans badly
divided. Irishmen were patriots, Scotsmen loyalists, and Englishmen fragmented in preference throughout all strata in all colonies.
Officeholders also tended not to be patriots. Prominent lawyers were
250
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
sympathetic to the crown everywhere. 3 Rich Philadelphians seemed
to have behaved just like anyone else with their particular social
characteristics, whether they were wealthy or not.
Each of these social characteristics played an independent role in
influencing the behavior of rich Philadelphians. When inheritance
is held constant by analyzing separately those men with fathers with
rich, moderate, and lower and unknown backgrounds, for example,
age is still significant in each strata; correspondingly, when age is
held constant inheritance continues to have an effect.32 For the
purposes of this study it is not necessary to identify all such factors
influencing behavior on this issue, measure their effect, rank order
them, and explain their origins. Indeed, it is impossible to do so.
What is significant, rather, in this analysis is the realization that
the members of the economic elite were deeply divided about an allimportant development in their society, and failed to act towards it in
a cohesive fashion. These wealthy men responded to the same pressures and influences, it seems, as did the rest of the population. Mere
knowledge about possession of wealth, therefore, would be a poor
predictor of behavior by a Philadelphian during the Revolutionary
years. He would have been influenced by a variety of factors, suggesting the lack of strongly developed class divisions in eighteenthcentury Philadelphia. Even such a soul-wrenching event as the American Revolution, it would seem, could not bring out such divisions.
An implication of the last finding, of course, is that the Revolution, in
Philadelphia at least, was not precipitated by class hostility or class
conflict.
31. Brown, Good Americans, pp. 46, 52, 47; Leonard Trinterud, The Forming of An
American Tradition: A Reexamination of ColonialPresbyterianism (Phila, 1949), pp. 242-257;
N.E.H. Hull, Peter Hoffer, and Steven L. Allen, "Choosing Sides: A Quantitative
Study of the Personality Determinants of Loyalist and Revolutionary Political
Affiliation in New York," Journal of American History 65(1978):344-366; David L.
Holmes, "The Episcopal Church and the American Revolution," HistoricalMagazine of
the Protestant Episcopal Church 47(1978):261-288, esp. 264; Graydon, Memoirs, p. 196;
Leyburn, "Presbyterian Immigrants and the American Revolution," pp. 23, 28-29;
Dennis Clark, The Irish inPhiladelphia: Ten Generationsof Urban Experience (Philadelphia,
1973), p. 9.
32. An exception already noted is when religion is held constant and father's socioeconomic status is examined. There was a similar pattern involving religion and
occupation. Also, when the effect of previous political affiliation is examined holding
age constant, Assembly-Proprietary divisions appear regardless of age among the
Assembly Party members, but not-as noted in the text-among Proprietary Party
supporters.