Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University
Master, Language and Communication
November 2010
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN COMPLIANCE
SHOWN BY MEMBER STATES OF
THE COULCIL OF EUROPE
By: Thit Robyn Strange Eyde
Supervisor: Amin Alavi
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Problem statement ................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 Methodology and Structure .................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Definitions of Terminology...................................................................................................... 7 1.4 Limitations ............................................................................................................................. 8 2. Theory ...................................................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Social Constructivism........................................................................................................... 12 2.1.1 Norms and Intersubjective Knowledge ................................................................................ 14 2.1.2 A Critique of Social Constructivism ..................................................................................... 17 2.1.3 The Theory of Compliance.................................................................................................. 20 2.1.4 Functional Text Analysis ..................................................................................................... 23 3. The Council of Europe ............................................................................................................ 25 3.1 Past and Present – in Brief .................................................................................................. 25 4. Analysis of Member States and Their Discourse with ECRI ................................................. 27 4.1. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance .............................................. 27 4.2 ECRI’s Reports .................................................................................................................... 29 4.2.1 The United Kingdom ........................................................................................................... 32 4.2.2 The Republic of Turkey ....................................................................................................... 36 4.2.3 The Russian Federation ..................................................................................................... 39 4.3 Functional Text Analysis ...................................................................................................... 43 5. Compliance Differences through Social Constructivist Eyes .............................................. 51 5.1 The United Kingdom’s Identity ............................................................................................. 51 5.1.1 History ................................................................................................................................ 51 5.1.2 Current Political Ideals ........................................................................................................ 53 5.1.3 Reputation .......................................................................................................................... 54 5.2 The Turkish Republic’s Identity ............................................................................................ 57 5.2.1 History ................................................................................................................................ 57 5.2.2 Current Political Ideals ........................................................................................................ 58 5.2.3 Reputation .......................................................................................................................... 59 5.3 The Russian Federation’s Identity ........................................................................................ 61 5.3.1 History ................................................................................................................................ 61 5.3.2 Current Political Ideals ........................................................................................................ 63 5.3.3 Reputation .......................................................................................................................... 64 6. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 65 6.1 Future Perspectives ............................................................................................................. 68 7. List of References ................................................................................................................... 70 Total number of key strokes:...............................................................................................135489
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Executive Summary
Several theories of international relations have been put forward in recent years to
explain the compliance of sovereign states with their obligations resulting from
membership of international institutions. Why do states comply? Why do some
comply more than others?
This thesis compares how three states with widely differing histories, identities and
motivations – the United Kingdom, Turkey and Russia – have complied, over the
same period, with an identical set of anti-racism standards laid down by the Council
of Europe, an established international institution which promotes democracy,
human rights and the rule of law in its 47 member states.
The thesis firstly undertakes a functional text analysis of the written discourse
between the Council’s anti-racism monitoring body, the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), and each of the three member states. The
more urgent ECRI’s recommendations, the stronger the terms it uses. The style and
content of each country’s written response is also analysed using the same
functional elements of field, tenor and mode.
Secondly, this thesis applies social constructivism to these findings in order to
explain the different levels of compliance shown by the three states. Drawing on
constructivism’s theory of how norms are established and enforced within
international society, as well as data from an online reputation survey and other
analytical tools, it is shown how each member state responds to the Council of
Europe’s anti-racism recommendations differently, in ways which are explainable by
social constructivist elements such as history, current political ideals and reputation.
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
1. Introduction
World politics can sometimes be quite a confusing matter; many decisions are made on a
daily basis, both by international agents such as institutions and organisations, as well as by
individual states. It is however often very difficult to see exactly why a state chooses a certain
course of action over other potential possibilities. Sometimes states, despite their sovereignty,
choose to co-operate on issues such as the environment, economics, judicial reform and human
rights. At the same time other states might choose not to co-operate on the very same matters. For
instance, the US has so far been hesitant regarding international co-operation on environmental
matters, while it has been heavily engaged in economic co-operation. Other states may have it the
other way around.
It is clear that states do not engage themselves without consideration; they are guided by
some sort of underlying motivation. Several theories of International Relations (IR) offer insight into
what could motivate states when they make decisions regarding their policies within international
society. Realism claims that states comply if it is in their own interest, and liberalism says that
states are interested in complying whereas the reason for non-compliance is not lack of interest but
the unsuccessful structure of the international institution or norm in question.1 Social constructivism
argues that compliance is dependent upon several factors such as a state’s past, its current
political environment, and the reputation it wishes to achieve, as well as the state’s ability to
internalise the norm in question.2
In this thesis I analyse and compare the courses of action taken by three states, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the United Kingdom or the UK), the Republic of
Turkey (Turkey) and the Russian Federation (Russia), in achieving compliance with the Council of
Europe’s standards and norms in the field of combating racism and intolerance, as defined in the
reports of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
It is presumed that the analysis will reveal a misalignment between what states ‘sign up for’
as members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the level of compliance actually observed. As a
member of any community one is expected to play by the rules, and since all three states are full
members of the CoE one might expect equal compliance from all three. Yet this paper will not only
1
Kingsbury, Benedict (1998): The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions of international law Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, The IO Foundations and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
highlight differences in each state’s levels of compliance to the chosen CoE norm, it will also
explain, from a social constructivist perspective, why such differences occur.
1.1 Problem statement
The hypotheses of this thesis are that:
1. There are differences in the way member states respond to and comply
with Council of Europe’s norms.
And that:
2. These differences are explainable through social constructivist theory.
These hypotheses will be proved or disproved through 1) a functional text analysis of the
written dialogue between ECRI and each of the three member states. This analysis results in an
indication of the differing levels of compliance of each member state with the norms upheld by
ECRI. 2) The application of social constructivist theory in explaining the reasons for these
differences in member state compliance.
1.2 Methodology and Structure
This thesis is divided into four chapters, not including the introduction, conclusion and this
part. The first chapter (point 2) accounts for the three theories used. As mentioned earlier, the main
theory is social constructivism which will lead into an account of the theory of compliance as well
as the social constructivist view on this theory. The social constructivist theory of compliance is
applied to explain the findings resulting from the application of one methodological theory, a
functional text analysis of the discourse between the Council of Europe’s European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance and the three member states. The functional text analysis is
applied to the discourse first to highlight what social constructivism can explain. The functional text
analysis is chosen because dialogue is a crucial part of explaining norm compliance. The relation
between social constructivism and the choice of this functional text analysis is elaborated further
below. The functional text analysis clarifies the attitude of each of the three member states towards
the CoE, as well as possible motivations behind and intentions of complying with ECRI’s norms.
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
The second chapter (point 3) briefly introduces the Council of Europe to provide sufficient
contextual knowledge about this international pan-European institution.
The third chapter (point 4) seeks to demonstrate the first hypothesis that member states of
the CoE behave differently when it comes to complying with the CoE’s normative standards,
conventions and treaties. Once again I emphasise the indirect parallel drawn between member
state compliance and member state response. I argue that differences in responses reflect
differences in compliance. The chapter is divided into two parts, one part for the analysis of each
member state’s dialogue with ECRI. For this purpose, it has been found appropriate to rely on the
CoE website and reports, as well as expertise from ECRI’s law department. Furthermore it is of
importance to emphasise that I have spent five months working at the Council of Europe for the
Parliamentary Assembly. The second part is a further discussion of the findings in the analysis of
ECRI reports and member state responses. Here the functional text analysis is applied to show the
different discourse elements chosen by the UK, Turkey and Russia.
The fourth and final chapter (point 5) of the thesis aims to establish the second hypothesis
that the differences in compliance are explainable through the application of social constructivist
perspectives on compliance. In using the conclusions drawn from the communicative intentions,
social constructivism explains the differences through an account of each member state’s history
and current political ideals. These two aspects are crucial in order to fully understand the
differences in compliance as well as motives for complying. According to social constructivism,
these two aspects are also influential on a third important factor in achieving compliance, namely
reputation; the desire of a state’s government to improve its reputation in the international arena as
well as the state leader’s need to enhance their own self-image and self-esteem are possible
motivations for complying with what society considers appropriate behaviour. Finally, in combining
all three aspects, one last condition is worth mentioning when explaining member state
compliance: the government’s ability to persuade politicians, civil society and the public to share
the international norm of what is considered appropriate behaviour, also referred to as the shared
“logic of appropriateness”. This persuasion and acceptance of the public is necessary for a norm to
be internalised, and internalisation is a stipulation for achieving full compliance.
The conclusion (point 6) will sum up findings from both hypotheses to enable a
generalisation about the social constructivist perspective on reasons behind differences in
compliance shown by member states of the Council of Europe. This part will be followed by a
section on future perspectives discussing how this research can be expanded to enable further
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
conclusions about more member states and other international organisations or institutions, as well
as compliance seen from the perspective of other theories of international relations.
1.3 Definitions of Terminology
International Institutions and Organisations
This is not a long discussion about the differences and similarities between these two
concepts according to various schools of international relations. It is a brief definition of the two and
an explanation of why the chosen definition is found most applicable for the analytical purposes of
this thesis.
Before the label institution was applied it was still defined, for example by Max Weber in
1978 using the concept “legitimate social order”.3 The broad definition of institutions describes the
term as an obligatory form of getting by and getting along in an established social setting through
“... sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each
other.”4 Institutions are obligatory insofar as failure to conform to such established ways of doing
things either entails some significant “cost” in resources, time or status, or provokes
marginalisation, sanctions or even exclusion from the community.5 International organisations on
the other hand are defined as formal constructions that may hold several institutions within them.
One important difference between institutions and organisations is that, according to Simmons and
Martin, institutions are explicitly normative. This criterion is very suitable for the theory of social
constructivism, hence the chosen definition of the Council of Europe as being an international
institution.
Norms
According to Chayes and Chayes, norms are defined as an extensive group of prescriptive
statements including examples such as rules, standards, principles and so on. These statements
are considered both procedural and substantive and the whole group is recognised by its
3
nd
Weber, Max, (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 Edition Simmons and Martin, 2007 5
Garcelon, Marc, (?) A Theory of Institutions 4
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
prescriptions for action in situations of choice, a choice that nevertheless is affected by the implicit
attributes of obligation, “...a sense that they [the statements] ought to be followed”6.
Compliance
Compliance is defined as the willingness and ability to follow the recommendations
proposed by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. However I am not able to
say: “either - or” and “on a scale from one to ten”, but rather establish differences in the compliance
shown by the United Kingdom, the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation and explain
why such differences occur, from a social constructivist perspective.
1.4 Limitations
Choice of Member States:
As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis analyses and compares the UK, Turkey and
Russia in relation to the norms drafted, upheld and monitored by the Council of Europe’s European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance.
This evaluated compliance is discussed and explained applying a social constructivist
perspective to the theory of compliance. The paper will therefore, for example, bear in mind that
the UK is a founding member of the Council of Europe and long-time member of the EU, whereas
Turkey aspires to become a member of the EU and Russia has no interest in becoming one. It is
for this particular reason that these three states have been chosen. They are found to be
geopolitically, historically and culturally different while still under the same obligation towards
Council of Europe norms, universal standards to which all three member states have signed up.
Choice of CoE Norms:
Although the Council of Europe sets international standards in many areas, it has been
necessary to choose only one, in order for the paper to stay sharp and focused. According to
Benedict Kingsbury, however, such an isolation “...of a particular rule [...] leaves [my study
6
Hurrell Andrew, (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 7: Norms and Ethics in International Relations, Sage Publications 8
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
incapable of taking account of] [...] the normative order which gives the norm its context and
meaning, and [...] the other legal and non-legal norms which color its operation.”7 I argue,
nevertheless, that such considerations need primarily be taken when the main objective of the
study is to compare member state compliance. However, as mentioned before, such a comparison
is only a step towards my main goal, which is to explain why compliance is different from member
state to member state. My study does therefore not only compare compliance, but instead aims at
explaining the differences in compliance in one area of the CoE’s activity: ECRI’s 12 normative
standards.
This domain of racism and intolerance is chosen as it is a frequent subject of cases before
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the most important mechanism of the Council of
Europe. This is practical as the European Convention on Human Rights, which the Court applies,
forms the basis for many of ECRI’s recommendations. The Court is the most significant apparatus
of the CoE – the rulings of the Court are binding on member states – whereas ECRI’s reports are
not. This invisible link between the domain of ECRI and the influence of the ECHR allows me to
take into account the overall context of ECRI’s norms. Furthermore, this particular round of ECRI
reports is relevant as it concerns the steps taken by the member state since ECRI’s second-round
reports. In other words, the “...focus [is] on “implementation”. They [the third-round reports]
examine if ECRI’s main recommendations from previous reports have been followed and
implemented, and if so, with what degree of success and effectiveness.”8 The differences in
ECRI’s third-round report is therefore a reflection of the differences in the member states’
compliance with ECRI’s norms.
ECRI’s 12 normative standards are furthermore chosen as their negotiations entail a written
regular discourse between ECRI and all member states. This dialogue plays a crucial role in
knowledge sharing among agents, the shaping of intersubjective ideas as well as development of
member state identity.9 In relation to this dialogue it is important to mention that the chosen ECRI
reports are from 2005, as the most recent monitoring round has yet to be finished. This involves a
small risk that some observations are outdated, yet this has been adjusted by including both the
current political ideals of 2005 and those of today in a section on the future perspectives of each
member state.
7
Kingsbury, 1998 See Appendix 9, Foreword 9
Simmons, 1998 8
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Choice of Theory:
Having clarified the choice of member states and Council of Europe standards, the
following touches briefly upon the choice of theory, before the theories in themselves are
discussed in greater detail under the headlines Theory and Social Constructivism page twelve. The
main theory chosen is social constructivism, for the following reasons;
1. Because social constructivism considers norms and rules where realism and liberalism
do not. Social constructivist theory considers aspects such as social constructs, history
and other motives for compliance, which are more elaborate and in-depth when dealing
with individual states and their differences. Other theories of international relations use
broader explanations concerning a state’s pursuit of sovereign power, short-term versus
long-term gains and self-interest, aspects which are less important in this research.
2. Social constructivism emphasises the importance of dialogue between agents in
shaping social constructs, such as shared and intersubjective knowledge as well as
member state identity. This is supported by Beth A. Simmons, she claims that
“...attitudes toward compliance are shaped by and reflected in this discourse.”10 These
arguments are not supported by any of the other IR theories.
3. This importance on dialogue between agents is the reason why the following functional
text analysis is applied to the discourse between the Council of Europe and the three
member states. The text analysis acts as a tool in reaching comparable data for further
application of the social constructivism perspective on compliance. I am aware that
there are many other angles to a functional text analysis, but to enable the application
of social constructivist explanations as to why members of an international institution
behave differently when expected to follow the same norms, I argue that it is suffice
only to look into the interpersonal relationship between ECRI and each member state.
This text analysis method does exactly that in focusing on field, tenor and mode,
whereas Vijay K. Bhatia’s interpretation of the same three elements of a functional text
analysis is based on analysing the differences between genres of written texts.11 This
thesis does not pursue Bhatia’s questioning, as the focus here is to differentiate
10
Simmons, Beth, A (1998) Compliance with International Agreements, p. 91, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 Bhatia, Vijay, K. (2004) Worlds of written discourse, Continuum 11
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
between the agents in a written dialogue. This is required to further explain agent
behaviour through social constructivism.
4. The social constructivist perspective on compliance can be questioned on the ground
that member states behaviour is affected by many factors other than the norms and
rules set by international institutions and organisations. In other words, it is difficult to
establish proof of a direct causal link between a formal engagement to reach the
standards set by a given norm and an observed change in behaviour.12 Nevertheless,
social constructivism seems one step ahead of the other IR approaches in this respect,
as it takes this lack of concrete proof into account by arguing that compliance can be
explained through indirect evidence, such as history, current political ideals, reputation
and the internalisation of norms.13 These factors result in compliance on different levels,
and this is why social constructivism has been chosen as the compliance theoretical
perspective for this thesis.
Choice of Sources:
Finally, a brief justification of the selected sources: this thesis relies on the Council of
Europe’s ECRI reports and national authorities’ official responses. The text analysis of this
discourse is supported by elaborate information about ECRI’s reports from ECRI’s law department,
where a lawyer, who has asked to remain unnamed due to professional discretion, explained how
the choice of language used in a report – ranging from the weakest to the strongest – is directly
linked to the amount of compliance demanded by ECRI.14 These elaborations support my own
overall analysis of ECRI’s writing patterns when drafting its reports. Furthermore, a survey15 was
drafted and sent out purely for analytical purposes to give an overall impression of each member
state’s reputation. This self-obtained data is compared with the most recent reports on each
member state by two NGOs, the most relevant to ECRI: Human Rights Watch (HRW) and
Reporters Without Borders (RWB). The scientific articles employed are by some of the following
12
Simmons, Beth A., and Martin, Lisa L. (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 10: International Organizations and Institutions, Sage Publications 13
Wendt, Alexander, (1995) International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 14
Web link XXXI 15
See Appendix 1 11
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
respected researchers in international relations: Emanuel Adler, Beth A. Simmons, Martha
Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Bill Bowring and Alexander Wendt.16
2. Theory
The following pages account for social constructivism and the two supplementary theories
supporting it. As mentioned earlier, social constructivism has a particular perspective on the theory
of compliance and so it follows the account of social constructivism. The functional text analysis is
a methodological theory which is used as a tool to analyse the three selected reports, forming the
backbone of this thesis. The functional analysis also briefly employs Aristotle’s well known
rhetorical categories: Logos, Pathos and Ethos, as these are relevant to the type of persuasion
used by ECRI. The functional analysis enables the application of social constructivism, in
explaining the possible reasons behind the member states’ difference in compliance. The account
and discussion of social constructivism is therefore followed by a brief account of the other two
theories.
2.1 Social Constructivism
Social constructivism is the key theory in this thesis. It is applied to textly analysed findings,
which have been gathered and discussed through the chapter before its application. The aim is to
explain the different levels of compliance with Council of Europe norms shown by the UK, Turkey
and Russia, from a social constructivist perspective. The objective is to find out why member states
of the same international institution respond differently to its membership norms.
Social constructivism (in short, constructivism) is, according to Alexander Wendt, based on
the idea of three elements: shared knowledge, material resources and practice.17 The first element
of shared understandings, expectations and ideas are also referred to as the constructivist’s
intersubjective knowledge; the foundation upon which society’s social structures are based.18 A
social structure of states that are distrustful of one another will provoke an atmosphere of worst-
16
See the List of References for further information Wendt, 1995 18
Adler, Emanuel (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 5 17
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
case assumptions and actions motivated by self-interest. This is called a security dilemma,
whereas the Council of Europe would be described as a security community as its social structure
is based on shared knowledge and a trust that disputes are resolved without war.19
The second element incorporates Realism’s focus on material resources, but does so in a
socially structured way in arguing that material resources “...only acquire meaning for human
action through the structure of shared knowledge...”20 In other words, social structures can be
influenced by material resources such as gold and tanks but in an intersubjective sense. For
example, 400 Swedish nuclear weapons would be considered of little or no threat to the Council of
Europe compared to two North Korean nuclear weapons, as Sweden is a member state of the CoE
and North Korea is not. This example is also described by Anthony Arend, who in his paper follows
Alexander Wendt’s line of thought, adding that the “real world” is a ramification of the way in which
agents interpret its material resources.21 The social and political context of Sweden’s relationship
with the Council of Europe changes the significance of its weapons.
The third and final element defines how once again it all comes down to shared knowledge.
Social structures might be difficult to “see” as they are neither measurable material resources nor
concepts in agents’ heads but are to be found in agents’ practice and processes. One should
therefore not ask when do ideas, as opposed to power and interests matter, as the two latter only
matter because of the shared knowledge that constitutes them. As expressed by Wendt, “...social
life is ideas all the way down...”22
Constructivism is thus criticising other theories of international relations such as realism,
liberalism and rational functionalism for ignoring the importance of the social context when
analysing state behaviour.23 To a constructivist, the international structure of social reality is
determined by the distribution of these ideas. Shared knowledge and beliefs about appropriate
behaviour (accounted for later) are what give the world structure, order and stability.24 This
intersubjective knowledge is what shapes international norms and vice versa, and norms are what
inspire international law. Constructivist accounts of law as constitutive of social structures and
relations therefore treat norms as fundamental not only to the behaviour of states (or other agents)
but also to state identity.25 The following paragraphs look into and explain further this importance of
norms.
19
Wendt, 1995 Op.cit. p. 73 21
Arend, Anthony Clark (1998) Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics 22
Op.cit. p. 74 23
Simmons and Martin, 2007 24
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 25
Kingsbury, 1998 20
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
2.1.1 Norms and Intersubjective Knowledge
The theory of norms dates back to the 1930s but was abandoned when an academic
enthusiasm for measurement appeared and forced normative and ideational phenomena out, as
these concepts were considered impossible to measure. Norms have not become easier to
measure since, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, however the quality of sound empirical
research into them has improved dramatically, partly because today’s scholars use more indirect
evidence to establish the role of norms.26 The following section thus discusses the findings of this
indirect evidence in establishing norms and their importance within constructivism. The definition of
norms is fairly agreed upon as being a standard of appropriate behaviour for agents with a given
identity.27 It is the effect of norms established by international institutions and international
organisations on states and other agents that is disputed. Yet this dispute is not elaborated further
as I only apply the school of constructivism. Norms are therefore dealt with according to
constructivism when discussing what they are, where they come from and how not only they
themselves change but also how they induce change in the behaviour of other agents.
Arend identifies five different types of rules, whereas Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish
between three types of norms. I argue that the rules and norms are justifiable two terms for the
same concept. Arend differentiates between moral, legal and descriptive rules as well as rules of
etiquette and rules of the game.28 If applying Arend’s line of thought, the norms in this thesis can
be identified as rules of etiquette and rules of the game, as these two rules are of “...social
behaviour that are neither legally nor morally required”29 and “... rules that parties in a particular
setting generally observe and may feel a sense of obligation to observe...”30 respectively. It is
argued that these two rules encompass the third of Finnemore and Sikkink’s type of norm, as they
divide norms into the following three types: 1) regulative norms which are considered to order and
constrain behaviour, referred to as legal norms, 2) constitutive norms, which create new agents,
interests or categories of action, and finally 3) evaluative and prescriptive norms, the most
important of the three, categorised by their quality of “oughtness”31 explained below. According to
Finnemore and Sikkink, norms encompass standards of appropriate behaviour in the form of i.e. a
moral, ethical, or legal ‘oughtness’ to follow the appropriate behaviour.32
26
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 Ibid 28
Arend (1998) 29
Op.cit. p 91 30
Ibid 31
Ibid 32
Arend, 1998 27
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
This moral ‘oughtness’ explains why intersubjectivity and the evaluative aspect of norms
are crucial to fully understanding their effects on agent behaviour. The intersubjectivity also partly
explains why there can be no “bad” norms: since a norm only ever becomes one if the majority of
agents believe in its appropriateness, its content is irrelevant. This highlights moreover the
flexibility of norms and their ability to change over time. Norms of the past, such as accepting
slavery and the exclusion of women from politics, were considered appropriate behaviour then,
whereas both are considered unacceptable today.33 (The constructivist aspect of change is
discussed below.) Furthermore, this underlines the way in which the constructivist idea of “logic of
appropriateness” relates to norms and the role of international institutions.
Adler, Finnemore and Sikkink all argue that international institutions and international
organisations are able to transmit norms, and shape the identities of agents, through a process of
socialisation and learning.34 Finnemore claims that international institutions and international
organisations can help to constitute interests within agents through the “teaching” of norms.35 This
interdependent relationship between international institutions, international organisations and
agents is balanced because agents need “somebody”, such as an international institutions or/and
international organisations to recognise their actions, and international institutions as well as
international organisations are reliant upon the entrepreneurial efforts of agents to encourage the
emergence of norms. Norms to which all members of the particular international institutions or
international organisations will eventually conform, given that the norm becomes internalised.36
However, new norms of today are intended to replace existing norms, which is much harder
than to establish a norm where one did not exist before. New norms are thus promoted under
present standards of appropriateness and these are defined by previous norms, still in force. This
means that in order for new norms to challenge the existing “logic of appropriateness”,
entrepreneurs may need to use inappropriate behaviour explicitly to get the needed attention
required by agents to motivate interest in the new norm.37
As indicated above, norms go through three different influential stages: norm emergence,
norm cascade and internalisation. However the most crucial point in a norm’s “life” is the tipping
point where it develops from being a norm only promoted by entrepreneurs to a norm supported by
33
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 Adler, 2007 35
Ibid 36
Ibid 37
Ibid 34
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
a sufficient amount of agents who act as norm leaders.38 The following describes each of these
different stages in greater detail:
1. The emergence of norms is a result of entrepreneurial ideational work and effort.
Certain entrepreneurs, often initiated by agents, find a particular standard appropriate
and try through various channels to persuade other established agents to share this
point of view. These established agents are referred to by Finnemore and Sikkink as the
organisational platform. “All norm promoters at the international level need some kind of
organizational platform from and through which they can promote their norms.”39 In this
case the Council of Europe constitutes such an established platform.
2. The second stage of a norm’s “life-cycle” is that of cascading. This is a period of
dynamic imitation and socialisation as the norm-leading agents (most often states when
on the international level) work to convince other agents to agree with their ideational
intersubjectivity and adopt the norm in question.40 The specific motivations behind this
stage, where the norm cascades and spreads to other agents, are assumptive, but as
previously mentioned, the “oughtness” of norms to follow what is perceived by a
majority to be appropriate behaviour is likely to result in pressure for conformity, as well
as agents’ own self-interest in enhancing international legitimation and the state
leader’s self-esteem.41
3. The third and final stage is signified by a lack of continuous debate about the norm
which has been replaced by a “taken-for-granted” quality, where agents conform
automatically. The fact that there are three stages from the idea of a norm to its
internalisation does not mean that every proposed norm makes it through every stage.42
As mentioned before, new norms do not enter a normative vacuum but have to compete
with the already existing norms in a highly normative space. And some norms remain in
a cascading phase of continuous debate between the agents willing to conform and
those who are not. But once a norm is internalised, it becomes a guideline for
international practice and state behaviour. This is why motivations, according to
constructivism, are based on shared ideas and norms that constitute social identities
38
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 Op.cit. p. 899 40
Op.cit. 41
Ibid 42
Ibid 39
16
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
and form the basis of national interests.43 These three stages as well as their engaged
agents, agents motives for compliance and the dominant methods used by the agents
at each stage are comprised and illustrated in Table 1 just below.
Agents
Motives
Dominant
mechanisms
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Norm emergence
Norm cascade
Internalisation
Norm entrepreneurs
with
organisational
platforms
Altruism,
empathy,
ideational
commitment
Persuasion
States, international Law,
professionals
organisations
and and bureaucracy
networks
Legitimacy, reputation Conformity
and esteem
Socialisation,
Habit
and
institutionalisation and institutionalisation
demonstration
Table 1, Stages of Norms44
2.1.2 A Critique of Social Constructivism
Change according to Constructivism
Concerning change, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that constructivism has a theoretical
weakness in the fact that its macro-theoretical equipment is better at explaining stability than
change.45 However, contrary to this observation, Adler believes that constructivism is all about
change, as it incorporates history into its theoretical context of realising social reality. This leads to
“... the path-dependent processes involving structural and agent change, [as well as] ...
mechanisms involved in the explanation of change.”46 This is not discussed any further as it falls
outside the scope of this thesis. However the following analysis generally follows Adler, citing
historical factors to explain differences in member states’ compliance with Council of Europe
norms.
43
Adler, 2007, page 96 Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 45
Ibid 46
Adler, 2007, page 102 44
17
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
The important role of history within constructivism not only allows the theory to explain
change effectively, but is also crucial for understanding social relations and intersubjective
knowledge-sharing between agents, as well as being an element in shaping agent identity and
motives for compliance.47 This effect can be illustrated as follows:
History Æ Identity Æ Path-dependency Æ Consequence.
This pattern is referred to as the Constructivist Model on the Consequence of History.
Proving Change within Constructivism
Explaining normative change is one thing, but proving it definitively is another. As
mentioned above, this is a matter of interpreting and analysing the indirect evidence of norms. This
evidence is based on slices of agents’ everyday behaviour, which is then compared, analysed and
scanned for changes through time. This is possible because norms by definition embody one of the
previously-mentioned “oughtnesses”, be it moral, ethical or legal, of adhering to a shared “logic of
appropriateness”. Norms thus prompt action that “...leaves an extensive trail of communication
among actors...”48 This communication represents an important aspect of the indirect evidence.
According to Chayes and Chayes, it is this “...discursive interpretation, elaboration, application, and
enforcement of international rules, accomplished through mostly verbal interchange, [that] is at the
heart of the [constructivist] compliance process.”49
Another indirect form of evidence is the reaction of agents when a member of an
international institution or international organisation violates a norm. This immediately generates
disapproval and/or stigma, whereas agents conforming to norms receive praise.50 Finally, as
mentioned earlier, norms that have been internalised are characterised by the “taken for grantedness” shown by agents at the third stage of a norm’s “life-cycle”.
Domestic versus International Norms
A third element of discussion within social constructivism is the connection between
domestic and international norms. As they are both deeply entwined with one another, which
47
Adler, 2007 Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 49
Kingsbury, Benedict, 1998, p. 359 50
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 48
18
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
influences which? According to Finnemore and Sikkink, many international norms begin as
domestic ones, becoming international because of the entrepreneurial determination of certain
agents. These internationalised norms then filter their way back into the domestic structures of
those agents which were not among the original group of entrepreneurs. This process can often
consist of one domestic norm, A1, becoming international, A, before it is introduced to other
domestic structures and internalised in a modified form, A2, due to differences of interpretation and
compliance. “In other words, there is a two-level norm game occurring in which the domestic and
international norm tables are increasingly linked.”51 This element of re-interpretation at domestic
level is a factor conditioning member state compliance levels as the degree of re-interpretation will
depend on the state of intersubjective knowledge. In areas where these shared ideas are less
developed, a state’s interpretation of a norm will rely to a greater extent on its own experience,
shaped by its own history and identity. This is further discussed in the chapter Analysis of member
states and their Discourse with ECRI, page 27.
Constructivist Profusion
The many disagreements between various constructivist approaches are not considered in
this thesis for the following two reasons. Firstly, this is not the place for an intellectual history of
constructivism as this thesis employs one main theory to answer empirical hypotheses about real
life. Secondly these disputes are irrelevant to the analysis and explanation of compliance shown by
member states of the Council of Europe. Suffice it to say, in the words of Beth A. Simmons and
Lisa L. Martin, that: “Social constructivist approaches have been especially appropriate for
appreciating the ways in which international institutions create and reflect intersubjective normative
understandings.”52
Having accounted for and discussed the most relevant aspects of social constructivism,
intersubjectivity and norms, the following paragraphs introduce the theory of compliance and how
compliance is explained and measured through constructivism.
51
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 893 Simmons and Martin, 2007, p. 198 52
19
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
2.1.3 The Theory of Compliance
According to Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s article on International Law,
International Relations and Compliance, compliance is “...a state of conformity or identity between
an actor’s behaviour and a specified rule.” 53
Ever since the end of the Cold War, researchers have had a special interest in questioning
and analysing international organisations and international institutions. These bodies are of great
importance to the study of political and international relations as they had, and still have, significant
influence over the agendas set by states and also a potential socialising effect.54 International
institutions have come to be seen as much more than “membership clubs” and today they are
regarded as solution-providers for social, political and economic problems within their selected
domains. Nevertheless, the scholars of today’s IR-studies ask very different questions regarding
international institutions. There is no longer any doubt as to what international institutions are and
why they exist, but there is an ongoing quest to analyse the mechanisms by which they exert their
influence and the true extent of that influence.
The Cold War ended nearly 2055 years ago, and several schools of thought are still trying to
answer the two latter questions. Each school has its own theory on the effect of international
institutions on member states but most theories share in common the conviction that: “Institutions
are hypothesized to enhance cooperation by raising concern for the issue [dealt with by the
institution]; improving the contractual environment (...) and improving domestic capacity for
implementing agreements.”56
Most IR theories argue that there is indeed a direct link between international institutional
norms and member state behaviour, yet which reasons and elements are used to explain
compliance varies depending on the values of each different school. To social constructivists,
compliance is conditioned by several aspects which influence how norms come about and the
conditions under which they operate. Figure 1 below is an attempt to illustrate these aspects, in
53
Raustiala, Kal and Slaughter, Anne‐Marie (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 28: International Law, International Relations and Compliance, p. 539, Sage Publications 54
Simmons and Martin, 2007 55
The Cold War: 1947‐1991, the continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, propaganda warfare, and economic competition existing after World War II (1939‐1945), primarily between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the powers of the Western world, particularly the United States. 56
Simmons and Martin, 2007, p. 199 20
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
particular the importance for norm compliance of the Constructivist Model on the Consequence of
History, already mentioned.
As outlined above, social constructivism’s most important components are firstly the
socially-structured shared knowledge, based on experience, expectations and ideas, and secondly
the focus on the role of international norms.57 Figure 1 depicts all of these elements in relation to
one another, together with their underlying foundations, in an attempt to explain their
interdependency.
Figure 1, Model of Constructivist Elements Constituting Compliance
Red circle = Member state sphere – Blue circle = International society/CoE sphere
The figure consciously leaves aside the question of the size of each circle relative to the
other since the importance of each can vary depending on the viewpoint of the observer. A
member state might regard the influence of the international institution as relatively small, whereas
the institution, including the international society it represents, might consider the member states
only to play minor roles on an individual basis and therefore draw the red circle smaller than that of
the blue. Yet this aspect is not further discussed as it diverts from the hypotheses of this thesis.
The only function of Figure 1 is therefore purely illustrational and is further explained below.
Constructivism argues that states comply with international norms because of these social
structures of moral, ethical and legal “oughtness”. These norms, however, are likely to have little
effect or be misunderstood if there is no shared knowledge or common ideas underlying them. It is
57
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 21
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
this shared knowledge which provides the link between international institutions and member
states, according to constructivist theory. But in order to explain why member states do not comply
in the same way within the same social construct, it is necessary to consider the underlying
building blocks that make up that shared knowledge, and indicate possible influences on member
states’ behaviour and compliance levels.
Social constructivism argues that member state compliance is dependent upon several
factors such as a state’s past, its current political environment and the reputation it wishes to
achieve, as well as the state’s ability to internalise the norm in question.58 The arrows in Figure 1
show how each of these elements can affect a state’s identity and therefore the degree of
knowledge it shares with other states. Now some elements are changeable through time, whereas
others are not.
History, heritage, culture and religion are elements that cannot be changed, yet they have a
profound consequence on the current social reality in any state. They influence a state’s state of
development, determine the extent of its material resources and are at the root of much state
practice. Material resources, for example – a state’s financial strength as well as its knowhow –
can determine its physical ability to comply with international norms, together with the current
political environment. Internalisation of norms, in other words, is not necessarily just a question of
political and/or moral will. I discuss this further after having analysed each ECRI report and the
responses of the three member states. Finally, although history, heritage, culture and religion
(referred to as history) are themselves unchangeable, a member state’s perception of all of these –
and therefore of its own identity – can change through interaction with international bodies. This is
however of less importance to my findings, as I only consider why states comply differently, and
not how complying or not complying with international norms may change a member state’s
identity.
History not only shapes a state’s identity, and therefore its input to the shared knowledge
pool, it also has a direct effect on its degree of compliance. One consequence of history are the
current political ideals in a state, reflected in its reputation, i.e. how its behaviour is judged by other
member states of the same social structure. Reputation therefore becomes directly connected to
state compliance, as lack of compliance is “named and shamed” while compliance is praised.59 In
other words, a second reason why states comply differently is their differing perceptions of the
need to improve their reputation in the eyes of others.
58
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 Ibid 59
22
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Last but not least, norm compliance affects not only reputation but also shared knowledge,
and shared knowledge influences state identity, which influences shared knowledge and
international reputation. This reiterates the circularity of constructivist arguments but also the
accuracy of the Constructivist Model on the Consequence of History. The elements elaborated
here are applied to the conclusions drawn on the basis of the functional text analysis of all three
dialogues in an attempt to explain the differences in member state compliance with ECRI’s
international norms. But before starting this analysis, it is necessary to know who exactly
communicates with whom, and from where the international norms come. The following chapter
contains a brief account of the functional text analysis applied to the written discourse between
ECRI and the three member states.
2.1.4 Functional Text Analysis
Analysing a text from a functional perspective can to some seem like stating the obvious,
but if the correct analysis is chosen and applied properly, the analysis can bring out more detailed
aspects than most think necessary in written texts. This analysis is applied to the written
communication exchanged between one monitoring body of the Council of Europe and the three
chosen member states. It mainly focuses on tenor, as the other two viewpoints, field and mode
have little relevance to the further use of the findings in this analysis. Nevertheless, all three steps
of this functional text analysis are briefly accounted for below.60
Field encompasses the experiential viewpoint as it deals with the subject of a text. It simply
answers the question: what is this text about? When analysing a text for its field, looking at the
lexical items can be an easy way of determining whether it is the domain of family life, science or
law. Texts can also include several domains. Another element of analysing field is the distinction
between specialised and general language uses.61
Mode refers to the communicative method used before its discourse is put on paper. The
mode of a conversation is oral, whereas the mode of any text is written. But even the written text
has different sub-modes, and these indicate the written text’s origin. These sub-modes can be
distinguished by the text’s use of spontaneity and interactivity levels as well as inverted commas
and exclamation marks.
60
Měchura, Michal Boleslav (2005) A Practical Guide for Functional Text Analysis, Web link VII Ibid 61
23
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Tenor is the most important aspect of the analysis made of ECRI‘s reports as well as
member state responses to these reports. Tenor analyses the interpersonal relationship between
the participants in the communication, which is crucial for establishing not only the member states’
perception of the Council of Europe, but also possible motivations for compliance with the CoE
norms. Tenor varies depending on the text in question, whether it is interactive, spoken or aimed at
the public.62 But common to all tenor analyses is that they study the interpersonal relationship
according to the following elements:
Interactive texts:
relative status and social distance
Non-interactive texts: personalisation, standing and stance.63
Finally, I include a few observations about the different persuasion appeals employed by
ECRI, as persuasion is a key instrument in achieving compliance.64 Checkel furthermore explains
that this is because “...norms (...) are carried by individuals and organizations (...) who actively
seek, through deliberation and arguments, to promote learning.”65 I argue that the use of
persuasion also applies to the Council of Europe, and especially through their dialogues with
member states, particularly the written discourse according to constructivism.66 I thus discuss
ECRI’s use, defined by Aristotle, as he argues that “... rhetoric is "the ability, in each particular
case, to see the available means of persuasion…”67 He distinguishes between three persuasion
types: Logos which encompasses logic and facts, Pathos which is the appeal to emotions and
Ethos which is an appeal emphasising the character of the speaker. These three appeals are also
often employed in marketing and negotiating. I draw on them in the text analysis to characterise
the appeals employed by ECRI and the three member states in their attempt to reach agreement
on the obligations of ECRI’s norms.
62
Web link VII Ibid 64
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999) Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions
65
Op.cit p. 11 (self count) 66
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 67
Fahnstock, Jeanne and Secor, Marie (2003) A Rhetoric of Argument: Text and Reader with Catalyst Access Card, Mcgraw‐hill Humanities/social Sciences/language 63
24
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
3. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (the Council or the CoE) is a pan-European institution, currently with
47 member states, which sets both regulative and constitutive types of norm, based on the three
principles in its charter: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The best-known part of the
Council is the European Court of Human Rights, which is the only one of its mechanisms whose
judgments are legally binding. The rest of the CoE’s mechanisms are established, operate and
enforced through the use of constitutive norms and prescriptive and evaluative methods. As
pointed out by Beth A. Simmons, the endorsement of international institutions legitimises certain
norms, heightening the shared sense of obligation among member states. One could argue that
this is why CoE conventions are still created today; not because they have formal powers of
sanction, but because they legitimise the process of holding member states’ governments
accountable for their behaviour when it violates the norms of a convention.68 Now before beginning
chapter three, entailing a thorough analysis of ECRI’s discourse with the three member states, the
following paragraphs provide further information on the Council of Europe and why it was chosen
as the subject of this study.
3.1 Past and Present – in Brief
Sixty-one years ago, the founding fathers of Europe created the Council of Europe. A
Council wherein representatives from each member state would come together to guide the region
in the aftermath of its biggest human disaster ever, the Second World War. The engineers of the
Council had realised that things over the preceding decade had gone terribly wrong; they were
determined to create a new order which would make it impossible for human tragedies of this
nature and scale to be repeated ever again.
The first ever treaty to be drafted is the Statute of the Council of Europe69 which entered
into force on the 3 August 1949 and still constitutes part of the accession criteria of today. “Every
member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment
by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate
68
Simmons, 1998 See Appendix 5 69
25
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in Chapter I.70 The
statute unites friends and foes around a set of common values and principles that are universal
and apply to every human being on earth. These values are as mentioned in the quote just above;
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. According to the founders of the Council, these
values underline the dignity of every human being, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or religion.
They are at the heart of the European Convention on Human Rights and they form the basis of the
Council of Europe corpus of legal instruments, standards, monitoring mechanisms, good practices
and means of international co-operation, which are offered to its member states and beyond
European borders.71
The Council of Europe has developed international co-operation through its two main
statutory bodies: the Committee of Ministers, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
member countries, and the Parliamentary Assembly, uniting parliamentarians from the national
parliaments of member states. Both will be further described below. But the Council also pursues
its goals through regular working contacts between other ministries, specialised bodies, partial
agreements, experts, NGOs and the public at large.72
On the day of Parliamentary Assembly’s first session back in 1949, its Vice-President, Mr.
Kasım Gülek, said in a speech to parliamentarians from the ten founding members: “Some day, all
the countries and peoples of Europe will be represented in this Assembly”73. Today, after sixty
years, this statement has become reality. The Council of Europe unites all European countries,
with only one exception: Belarus. All the diversity of political ideas, cultures, languages and
religions is represented in the institution, and the key to its success is precisely this unity in
diversity. Its diversity gives the Council of Europe a wealth of ideas and good practices unachieved
before, while its unity, deriving from shared values, gives it the strength to overcome differences
and tackle new challenges.
But there is another side to the coin, one not quite so “dreamy”, namely a reality of hard,
everyday work. The Council of Europe’s decision to embrace the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union was a courageous
political decision but it set the institution a huge challenge. Although few in Europe object to the
idea of democracy, some of the countries that applied to join the Council of Europe had never
70
Op.cit. chapter 2, page 3, article 3 Web link I ‐ CoE website 72
Web link II ‐ BBC website 73
Web link XXIIX – CoE website, Records 71
26
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
experienced democracy in their past, and very few of their people at the time knew what it meant. It
was not only a matter of reforming state institutions and changing legislation, but even more so of
changing mentalities and creating a democratic culture. What some countries had achieved in
centuries, others wanted to catch up with in a matter of a few years.74
There was only one way in which this could possibly happen – through constant dialogue
between “old” and “new” democracies, through a sharing of experiences, through creative thinking
and innovative solutions, through goodwill and political courage. This is not a one-way process, in
which “old” democracies decant some of their knowledge to the “new” ones. The solutions that
have worked for some are not necessarily applicable for others, because the entire context - the
legacy of the past and the geo-political reality of the present - is different.75
As mentioned in the problem statement, this thesis will use specifically chosen reports from
one of the Council of Europe’s monitoring mechanisms to analyse member state behaviour from a
social constructivist view on compliance, in order to discuss, evaluate and conclude on the
possible reasons for member state differences in compliance. This is done, firstly by pointing out
these differences. The following chapter applies functional text analysis to the written dialogue
between ECRI and the three member states respectively in order to establish their different levels
of compliance.
4. Analysis of Member States and Their Discourse with ECRI
4.1. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance was set up by the Council of
Europe following an international conference on racism and intolerance, held in Vienna in October
1993. ECRI is a non-judicial monitoring mechanism, creating results through its moral stature and
reputation. It consists of nationally-appointed independent and impartial experts, who have been
chosen because of their moral authority and recognised expertise in dealing with racism,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance. There is one expert for each member state, and the
respective expert does not participate in ECRI’s visits to their own country. ECRI operates as an
74
Web link XXX Ibid 75
27
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
independent human rights monitoring body specialising in questions relating to racism and
intolerance.
ECRI has several ways of steering member states in the right direction, the most important
one being its twelve General Policy Recommendations (GPR)76. They are addressed to all member
states and establish guidelines that it expects them to follow when drawing up national strategies
and policies in various areas. The entire compilation of General Policy Recommendations take up
141 pages, specifying how to best prevent and deal with existing racism and intolerance in all its
shapes and forms. They are often referred to in the individual country reports, where member
states are seen to neglect or be in need of more fundamental guidelines. A full list of these
guidelines, with brief descriptions of each, can be found below.77
Another of ECRI’s means of influencing member states is its country-by-country reports
which are published every 4 or 5 years, reviewing the situation as regards racism and intolerance
within each member state. The working process of preparing these reports involves gathering
information from many sources, documentary analysis, a contact visit to the country concerned and
finally a confidential written dialogue with the national authority concerned. ECRI’s reports are not
a result of inquiries or testimonial evidence, they are analyses based on large amounts of
information gathered from a wide variety of sources, both national and international. The contact
visit entails meeting with both governmental and non-governmental circles and the confidential
dialogue with authorities allows for the latter to be heard in the form of adding written amendments
to the draft report with a view to correcting any possible factual errors. Finally, the national
authorities can ask to have their viewpoints appended to the final report.
To sum up, these reports contain an overall analysis of the situation as well as suggestions
and recommendations as to how to overcome the problems identified. Though the
recommendations are not binding by law, governments that are represented on the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance are expected to follow them. ECRI visits every
member state of the Council of Europe on equal terms and at a rate of nine to ten countries per
year. Care is taken to gather information from all possible sources within the country and to allow
national authorities to comment, a method similar to the one used for the Council of Europe’s
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). ECRI’s first round of reports was completed in
1998. Work on the fourth round of reports has begun but only a few member states have been
visited.
76
See Appendix 8 Web link VIII 77
28
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
It has been decided only to base the following ECRI report analyses on the third round of
reports, as Russia and Turkey’s fourth report have not yet been completed. Additionally, the third
report focuses on the most relevant topic for this paper, namely implementation. “They [the 3rd
round of reports] examine if ECRI’s main recommendations from previous reports have been
followed and implemented, and if so, with what degree of success and effectiveness.”78 The third
round of reports covers the period January 2003 to December 2005, and therefore does not take
into account any subsequent developments.
4.2 ECRI’s Reports
As mentioned earlier, this analysis is based on ECRI’s third round of country reports, as the
fourth round of reports has not yet been finalised. The next report on Turkey is not due to be
concluded until December this year, meaning its publication in February/March next year.
Concerning Russia, the next official visit upon which the report is written will not take place until
2012, resulting in the publication of the fourth ECRI report on Russia in 2013.
The objective of this analysis is to compare the dialogue between member states and
ECRI, representing one monitoring mechanism of the Council of Europe, as well as to conclude on
the basis of such comparison the levels of compliance shown by each member state with ECRI’s
recommendations. For this analysis to be comparable, all three ECRI reports cover the same
period and target the same set of standards. The third round reports focus on implementation:
“They examine if ECRI’s main recommendations from previous reports have been followed and
implemented and if so, with what degree of success and effectiveness.”79 Yet I am aware of the
five year gap which is hindrance to the immediate topicality of the reports, however, the importance
here is moreover the ability to compare the level of compliance through the analysis of three
reports all from within the same year, than to discuss the relevance of 2005 data. The gap is taken
into account in Future Perspectives part of this thesis.
The analysis of each country report does not compare statements area by area, but draws
out comparable statistics on the basis of all areas with a focus on usage of verbs, as well as
78
ECRI’s 3rd report on the Russian Federation, Foreword p. 5, see Appendix 9 ECRI’s third report on the United Kingdom, p. 5, see Appendix 11 79
29
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
comment on the type of response given by each country, through the application of a functional
text analysis that clarifies the intentions of both parties participating in the exchange.
Table 2 below shows statistics extracted from the third round reports on all three member
states using functional text analysis. Each figure is a count of the number of times a given phrase
appears within the report. But before analysing further the content of each report, a brief discussion
of the writing style is given, as it is helpful to fully understand the nuances of ECRI’s tools when
wanting to influence member states’ behaviour. For this purpose, I rely on the information gathered
from my own experience working at the Council as well as the expertise of ECRI’s law department,
as explained earlier.
The following observations have been verified as she explained that, roughly speaking, the
verbs selected indicate the degree of urgency of the recommendation to which they relate. For
example, the terms used in the following sequence travel from strongest to weakest: from strongly
urges, urges, strongly recommends to recommends. The ECRI lawyer explained: “When
governments are already taking measures that seem promising, you may see a recommendation
beginning ‘ECRI encourages’. If ‘strongly encourages’ is used rather than simply ‘encourages’ it
tends to be a sign that ECRI thinks that the problem being addressed really needs to be addressed
as a matter of great importance, rather than a sign of stronger approval for the specific measures
chosen.”80 Building on this insight into ECRI’s drafting policy, the different verbs used in all three
country reports have been put into a table, enabling a detailed comparison from which conclusions
can be drawn about the degree of compliance expected of each member state.
Some general preliminary remarks about the style in which ECRI reports are drafted are
necessary. Firstly, the term notes only figures in the analysis of the situation but never in the actual
recommendations. The verb to note tends to be used as a neutral verb, but may be modified by the
addition of with concern or with satisfaction/interest. In the analysis section it is quite clear that
ECRI allows itself to be blunter, i.e. more personal and direct, using verbs such as is concerned by
or even worse is deeply concerned by or particularly concerned. Another general tendency is that
“pairs” of terms often recur in the analysis (ECRI’s assessment of the situation) and in the
recommendations (the action it expects), again indicating the degree of importance ECRI attaches
to its comments.
80
See Appendix 11, p. 5 30
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Number of Occurrences of Terms used in ECRI Reports
ECRI Negatives:
Russia Turkey the UK Recalls
2 Calls on the … authorities
1 Underlines
1 1 Wishes to stress
2 Stresses
2 4 1 Notes with regret
2 Notes with concern
2 5 2 Notes with serious concern
1 Reiterates
4 1 5 11 ‐ 22% 26 ‐ 38,8% 57 ‐67,9% 3 1 1 Encourages
6 15 13 Strongly encourages
8 3 1 Particularly encourages
1 Deeply regrets
1 Is particularly worried by
1 Recommends
Strongly recommends
Is concerned by
5 7 8 Expresses its deep concern
3 1 Urges
7 7+1 1 Deplores
1 2 Positives:
Notes with interest
2 8 1 Notes with particular interest
1 Is pleased to learn
3 2 Is pleased to note
2 4 7 3 6 2 1+1 2 Welcomes
Hopes
Neutrals:
Feels
1 1 Notes
21 ‐ 27,3% 27 ‐ 39,7% 50 ‐ 64,1% 3 1+2 1 Particularly emphasises
2 5 1 Understands
6 1 In ECRI’s view
Believes
Realises
Considers
1 1+1 1 3 Acknowledges
1 2 Draws the attention of
3 3 4 Is aware
2 None of the above
Total: 8 Analysis 77 68 78 Recommendations 50 67 84 Table 2, Number of Occurrences of Terms used in ECRI Reports
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
For example, most instances of the phrase notes with satisfaction/interest in the analysis
are followed by the verb encourages in the recommendation, notes is generally followed by
recommends, and notes with concern (or similar) is generally followed by strongly recommends or
strongly urges. This pattern clearly indicates the internal consistency of ECRI’s drafting policy, and
the value of applying the functional text analysis to it.
Table 2 on the previous page is drawn in two colours. The blue represent terms used only
in the recommendations, and the red is only those terms used in the analysis. Reasons follow after
the table. This has been done to emphasise how ECRI aims at steering member states in a certain
direction while avoiding offending them or provoking unwanted resistance. It can be said that the
only binding words are those written in the recommendations. Binding, here, does not mean by
law, but nevertheless these recommendations are binding to ECRI and expected followed,
whereas the text analysis is a two-way communication, providing the member state with a chance
to better understand the circumstances under which ECRI has reached its conclusions and chosen
its recommendations, and for ECRI it is a chance to point out situations and areas of great
importance to ECRI values but with more personality and less diplomacy. The following will use the
table to analyse what ECRI reported on the UK in 2004.
4.2.1 The United Kingdom
The third-round ECRI report on the UK81 was adopted on December 17th 2004 and contains
42 pages and 134 paragraphs. Once again, to secure proper comparability with the ECRI reports
on Turkey and Russia, only the standard areas, in this case meaning the first 107 paragraphs, are
analysed. In other words; the Specific Issues will not be considered in any of the three reports as
they are individual to each member state and vary depending on the circumstances in that state.
The standard areas are as follows: International Legal Instruments, Constitutional
Provisions and other Basic Provisions, Criminal Law Provisions, Civil and Administrative Law
Provisions, Specialised Bodies and other Institutions, Education and Awareness-raising, Reception
and Status of Non-citizens, Access to Public Services, Access to Education, Employment,
Vulnerable Groups, Media and Monitoring the Situation. In each report’s standard area there are
one or a few points specific to the member state, but standard to every report on that member
state. In the case of the UK, the specific topic is that of Northern Ireland.
81
See Appendix 10 32
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The recommendations used in ECRI’s third-round of reports constitute 14 different verb
constructions (referred to as terms) in total, occurring 78 times, while the 84 verbs used to express
ECRI’s findings throughout the analysis is a combination of 38 different possible verbal
constructions.
The term used most often in the analysis, occurring 57 times, is notes which, as mentioned
by the ECRI lawyer, often leads to recommends in the actual recommendations, found 50 times.
These two verbs, notes and recommends, are considered to indicate violations of ECRI’s
standards, but violations of less importance than others. This can be because the violations have
only a minor effect on the public, or because in general they cause less damage to individuals.
ECRI points out nine positive developments since its last visit, but calls for several
improvements in areas that have been more than just noted. For example in the section on
Reception and status of non-citizens, ECRI urges the authorities of the UK - using one of the more
serious verbal phrases - to ensure that all civil servants offer non-discriminatory services, a goal
that according to ECRI can be reached by repealing Section 19D of the Race Relations
(Amendment) Act82.In the area of Civil and administrative law provisions, certain amendments
were approved in 2003 that according to one of ECRI’s many sources in the non-governmental
sector have had little effect. ECRI strongly recommends the authorities of the United Kingdom to
review the anti-discrimination provisions in force while keeping in mind ECRI’s General Policy
Recommendation No. 7.83 The need for ECRI to refer back to its general policy recommendations
is a clear sign that the current legislation is far from meeting ECRI’s standards as spelled out in
that relevant recommendation. ECRI furthermore draws attention to its GPR No. 5 on combating
intolerance and discrimination against Muslims and No. 9 on the fight against anti-Semitism. ECRI
finds the need to reiterate previous recommendations five times throughout its third round report
which could indicate a certain UK resistance towards the recommendations of the second-round
report. Nevertheless ECRI also encourages the work of the UK authorities thirteen times, which,
following this line of thought, equals a pat on the shoulder for appropriate initiatives, promising
progress or interesting problem-solving ideas.
To sum up, it is clear that ECRI follows a pattern of critique, praise and discussion through
its analysis. It is important to have a balance between all three to ensure continuous good relations
with the state concerned and mutual respect while also maintaining its authority. No matter how
82
Web link XIV See Appendix 10, p. 13 and Appendix 8 for ECRI’s 12 GPR. 83
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
well established a democracy there will always be room for improvement, which is the overall
intention of ECRI reports: to increase awareness of ongoing racism and intolerance issues in need
of improvement in all member states.
However, member states respond to ECRI’s reports very differently and having accounted
for the content of this third-round report from ECRI’s perspective, the next paragraphs will discuss
the response of the authorities of the United Kingdom. This response is considered a sign of the
Council of Europe’s importance to the UK and a possible indicator of its compliance levels.
In the following, four examples of different response mechanisms used by the United
Kingdom authorities are highlighted. But first a few observations about the UK writing style in
general. The UK authorities make a point of appending a response84 which is as long as the
original report itself, and they comment on all of ECRI’s recommendation paragraphs individually.
When views on topics are expressed, they follow the same line of thought concerning ECRI’s use
of a verbal scale. Most comments from the UK authorities entail detailed descriptions of how a
particular measure is intended to function, or how conditions are in general in the UK. There is
almost always in each area an account of the UK’s goals and values such as, for example: “The
UK aims to develop integration policies that ensure migrants are welcomed into their local
communities.”85 Even though this statement does not answer a point raised by ECRI, nor does it
object to one, its function remains, as the reader will ultimately feel reassured that the UK
authorities, despite its violations, have the right aims.
One common way of responding is the following, where “The government notes ECRI’s
comments about...” x but after further explanation of its policy concludes that the “...Government
therefore believes it has minimized any risk of direct or indirect discrimination....” In other words,
this is a polite refusal to follow one of ECRI’s many ‘light’ recommendations. The term ‘light’ refers
to the seriousness scale of verbs in Table 2, where recommends is less serious that strongly
recommends or urges.
A second example, where the outcome is less dismissive, is on page 48 of the UK
authorities’ response to ECRI86, where they acknowledge that: “One of the key recommendations
84
See Appendix 11 Op.cit p. 46 86
Op.cit 85
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
to be taken forward is the establishment of a racist incidents helpline.”87 Here, the authorities
clearly accept ECRI’s recommendation and indicate that they intend to follow up on it.
A third example is that of a direct refusal by the UK authorities, in the form that they once
again take note of the contents of ECRI’s GPR No. 7, “... but does not accept them. We regret that
in framing General Recommendation No.7, ECRI did not take sufficient account of the importance
that is placed on freedom of expression and association in the legal traditions of some member
states.”88 This type of refusal occurs four times in the UK’s response to ECRI.
The final example is also a refusal, concerning a topic briefly mentioned before,89 and which
will be dealt with further. It relates to Section 19D of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.
Already in 2004, the UK was given a hard time about this measure and ECRI recommends in its
report that Section 19D be repealed and possibly also Section 8 should it become evident that its
operation leads to discrimination. But the UK authorities defended Section 19D in 2004 “It is
needed because of the tough nature of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act.” - “It is not a blank
cheque to discriminate.”90 This attitude is still held today, which will be discussed further. The 2004
response from the UK also simply states that: “There are no current plans to repeal Section 8.”91
Other reactions are examples of the intention to comply before the fourth round of ECRI
reports, and on some areas the government even “...welcomes ECRI’s encouragement...”92
Having given some examples of the content of ECRI’s report and the UK response, the next
step is to apply functional linguistic analysis to arrive at conclusions concerning the field, mode and
tenor of this discourse. However, in order to provide a better overview and comparison of each
member state, this step is only taken after an analysis of the reports of all three states is
considered. The following is therefore, firstly an analysis of the communication between ECRI and
Turkey, and secondly between ECRI and Russia. The fourth and final part of this chapter is the
execution of a functional text analysis on all three separate discourses.
87
See Appendix 11, p. 48 Op.cit p. 49 89
As pointed out by HRW, see Reputation p. 52 90
See Appendix 11 p. 55 91
Ibid 92
Op.cit p. 51 88
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
4.2.2 The Republic of Turkey
The third-round report on Turkey93 was adopted on 25 June 2005 and it contains 36 pages
and 126 paragraphs. However, as mentioned in the analysis of the UK, only the comparable
paragraphs are analysed, meaning the first 111. The standard areas are the same as those
mentioned above for the UK with one exception; the section on Northern Ireland is replaced by a
discussion on the area of Antisemitism. The analysis of Turkey’s response94 to ECRI’s report, as
well as the report itself, draws out comparable statistics on the basis of all areas. In the 111
paragraphs, the selected terms or phrases expressing ECRI’s findings appear 68 times in the
recommendations, and 67 times in the analysis.
The verb used most often in this analysis is also notes Constructivist Model on the
Consequence of History, as in the case of the UK analysis, however in the report on Turkey the
occurrence is almost halved, with only 27 instances of this term, and 26 instances of the “paired”
term recommends. ECRI points out fourteen positive developments which in general deal with
amendments to various articles of the Turkish Constitution95 and ECRI is even pleased to learn
about changes to article 312 of the Criminal Code.96 ECRI also welcomes the amendment of article
6 of the Criminal Code as well as new provisions to the Labour Code.97 Paralleled to these positive
verbs are seven instances of concern expressed by ECRI in its analysis along with seven
recommendations where ECRI urges the Turkish authorities to take action, for example in the area
of Asylum-seekers: to “...withdraw their geographical reservation concerning the origin of asylumseekers...”98 and “... to pursue and strengthen their co-operations with the UNHCR and NGOs
working on behalf of asylum-seekers.”99 ECRI strongly recommends that the Turkish authorities do
more to address the situation of the Kurds “...who have been displaced by armed conflict in the
South-East of the country.”100 This recommendation was following the first of two instances where
ECRI uses the verb deplores to describe its analytical findings. Nevertheless ECRI only strongly
recommends once during the 41-page report. Instead ECRI stresses certain actions taken four
times and encourages the Turkish authorities thirteen times. Only once does ECRI find it
93
See Appendix 12 See Appendix 13 95
See Appendix 12, p. 8 96
See Appendix 12, p. 9 97
See Appendix 12, p. 10 and 11 98
See Appendix 12, p. 16, paragraph 51 99
See Appendix 12, p. 17, paragraph 53 100
See Appendix 12, p. 21, paragraph 76 94
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
necessary to reiterate a prior recommendation from its second round of reports, which could
indicate an overall satisfaction with the progress achieved.
A final point worth mentioning before looking into the response of the Turkish authorities is
that ECRI refers back to these listed General Policy Recommendations a total of five times:
Recommendation No. 9: The fight against anti-Semitism, No. 7: National legislation to combat
racism and racial discrimination, No. 3: Combating racism and intolerance against Roma/Gypsies,
and No. 1: Combating racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance.
As mentioned earlier, member states respond to ECRI’s reports in different ways. Following
this brief account of observations made about the general writing style of the Turkish authorities is
a discussion of the response mechanisms used by the Turkish authorities highlighted through four
examples. But first the observations about the Turkish writing style in general.
The Turkish authorities have formulated a response101 rather different to those of the UK
and Russia. They have chosen only to attach very few remarks concerning areas within the draft
report where they believe the situation has been misrepresented by ECRI. Nowhere do they
indicate openly that they disagree with ECRI’s recommendations, but objection is made when they
feel that ECRI’s analysis has given a false impression of the situation in Turkey. Another
characteristic of the Turkish response is that, although it formally represents the view of the Turkish
Government, it frequently makes use of the personal pronoun ‘I’. This is also different from the two
other member state responses, and brings a more personalised touch to the response.
The response consists of two main points, the second point expanding to cover another five
areas, but taking up a total of only 1½ pages. The first paragraph is a reassurance to the reader
that “The Turkish Government has devoted itself to creating and sustaining a societal environment
that is free from discrimination and built upon social peace.”102 This introduction method has been
chosen by all three member states and consists of confirming the state’s belief in, and dedication
to, the values held by ECRI. However, from here on, the Turkish authorities continue in what can
be argued amounts to a monotone voice of self-defence throughout the rest of the response. While
the Turkish authorities may not have intended to send this signal, it can be detected due to the
following factors:
101
See Appendix 13 Op.cit p. 1 (39) 102
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
1. The short length of the answer.
2. The response only addressing the ten paragraphs where Turkey disagrees with ECRI’s
wordings/findings.
3. The omission of any recognition by Turkey that it has made progress on the basis of
ECRI’s reports, as well as the lack of expressed agreement with the recommendations
made in the remaining 101 paragraphs.
These three factors can be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation would be that Turkey
has an overall lack of interest in what ECRI has to report. A second would be that Turkey in its
response only wishes to get to the point, while leaving out all the self-advertising that one can
argue is employed by the UK authorities throughout their 38-page response. A third and final
interpretation may be more obvious; that the Turkish authorities intend to comply fully with what
ECRI recommends and have no objection to ECRI’s recommendations, however they consider it
important that the wording of ECRI’s report is ‘fair’ and that the recommendations are based on
accurate findings.
It is interesting to note that four out of the five points raised by Turkey concern ECRI’s
choice of words rather than disagreements about the substance of its findings and
recommendations. This is in complete contrast to the response of the UK, where the authorities
blankly disagree with ECRI about issues, findings and recommendations. The Turkish response is
accounted for through the following four examples:
1) The Turkish authorities call it an overstatement that ECRI has found certain ethnic groups
to be deliberately discriminated against by the Turkish government.103 This is without doubt
a direct disagreement with ECRI’s findings, but it is not a refusal to comply with the
subsequent recommendations104.
2) Another example of what Turkey considers to be a misrepresented situation is ECRI’s
account of the armed conflict with the PKK which has resulted in a large number of
displaced Kurds. The displacement of the Kurds is not disputed by the Turkish authorities,
but the term ‘armed conflict’ is. According to the Turkish authorities this terminology is
incorrect as the PKK is recognised both by the US and Europe as a terrorist organisation
103
See Appendix 13 See Appendix 12 p. 22 104
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
and so the displacement of the Kurds is a consequence of the Turkish authorities’ struggle
against terrorism and not an armed conflict.105
3) Similarly the Turkish authorities find ECRI’s wordings in paragraphs 95, 96 and 107 give a
“false impression”106 of that particular situation in Turkey.
The fourth and final example is the Turkish reply to the findings in ECRI’s paragraph 78 where: “It
notes that parents are now permitted by law to give their children Kurdish first names, even though
a circular prohibits them from choosing names incorporating the letters Q, W or X, which exist in
the Kurdish language but not in the Turkish alphabet.”107 Here the Turkish authorities refer to all EU
countries and their official alphabets, indicating that similar laws exist elsewhere. However ECRI is
not a comparable monitoring mechanism, and discriminatory rules are not left untouched simply
because several member states employ them. Secondly, the Turkish authorities seem to fail to
realise that other European countries do not face the same large minority group as that of the
Kurds, hence ECRI’s indication that the circumstances are different in Turkey.
4.2.3 The Russian Federation
The ECRI report on Russia108 was adopted on 16 December 2005 and contains 42 pages
and 164 paragraphs, of which 123 are directly comparable with the ECRI reports on the UK and
Turkey. This third and final member state analysis is conducted, as for the previous two, by
drawing out comparable statistics on the basis of all areas. The concluding remarks are seen
through a functional text analysis of both texts clarifying the intentions of ECRI and all three
member states in their communicative exchanges.
As mentioned before, ECRI’s recommendations contain a spread of 14 different verbal
constructions whereas the actual analysis entails a mix of 38. The difference between these two
ranges of verbs is explained by the fact that ECRI finds only some verbs to be appropriate for
recommendations, whereas the analysis sections have fewer restrictions when it comes to
expressing ECRI’s opinions. ECRI uses 50 verbal constructions to recommend improvements in
Russia and expresses its findings in the analysis with a total of 77 verbal phrases. Comparing all
105
See Appendix 13 p. 1 (39) Op.cit p. 1(39) and 2 (40) 107
See Appendix 12 p. 22 108
See Appendix 9 106
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
three member states, this is the lowest amount of verbal recommendations, which is peculiar
considering the fact that the report on Russia contains the highest number of paragraphs. Possible
reasons for this are further discussed at a later stage.
The term used most often in this analysis, as with the two others, is notes, which occurs 21
times, most often leading to the term recommends in the subsequent recommendations, as
discussed previously. The latter term occurs 11 times, the second highest occurrence. These
occurrences are rather low compared to the other two reports where notes occurs 50 times in the
report on the UK and 27 times in Turkey’s report. Yet because of the big difference in ECRI’s use
of verbal phrases in the three reports, the actual numbers are not comparable. The occurrence of
notes out of the total terms used by ECRI in its analysis is therefore converted into percentages to
enable a more fair comparison.
UK:
50 out of 78 = 64.1%
Turkey:
27 out of 68 = 39.7%
Russia:
21 out of 77 = 27.3%
The above figures illustrate the different percentages of notes out of the total use of terms
in the analysis of each member state. The interpretation of these figures is as follows: having
established that notes followed by recommends are the two most frequently used neutral terms in
ECRI’s reports, the fact that notes constitutes 64.1% of the terms used to analyse the UK and only
27.3% of the terms used by ECRI to analyse Russia’s situation is a clear indication of a much
higher occurrence of other terms to analyse Russia than the UK. These other terms are not
neutral, which again indicates the greater seriousness of issues raised with Russia and Turkey
compared to the UK.
To fully pursue this line of calculating conclusions, I convert the occurrences of
recommends to be absolutely sure, as the paired terms are not always a pair.
UK:
57 out of 84 = 67.9%
Turkey:
26 out of 67 = 38.8%
Russia:
11 out of 50 = 22%
There is only a very small percentage of cases where notes is not followed by
recommends, but even more importantly these figures show that only 22% of Russia’s
40
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
recommendations entail the phrase ECRI recommends whereas this happens 38.8% of the time
for Turkey and 67.9% for the UK. This means that even though Russia has a much lower amount
of verbal constructions involving notes and recommends the percentage of terms used, likely to be
of a more serious degree than neutral notes, is 45.9% higher in the report on Russia compared to
the UK and 16.8% higher compared to Turkey. Further conclusions on what these percentages
mean follow.
Returning to the report on Russia, ECRI points out ten concrete areas of positive progress,
one of the areas being a change in Russian passports ending the previous practice of listing the
Russian citizen’s nationality.109 Another example of progress that ECRI welcomes is Article 3 of the
Labour Code containing detailed provisions for combating racism in the workplace.110 ECRI also
welcomes the increase in the number of regional Ombudsmen now appointed in 31 out of Russia’s
89 regions.111
Having mentioned a few of the ten positive developments in Russia, it is pointed out that
ECRI strongly encourages Russia eight times throughout the report, for example in the area of
Immigration where “ECRI strongly encourages the Russian authorities to take all necessary steps
to facilitate the legalisation of the situation of non-citizens working illegally in the country.”112 In the
area of Education, “ECRI strongly encourages the Russian authorities to conduct an in-depth
investigation into the allegations that segregation is practiced on the ground of ethnic origin in
some schools...”113 The use of strongly encourages is eight times more frequent than in the report
on the UK and more than double the frequency for Turkey. The same is prevalent when
considering how often ECRI strongly recommends something of the three member states. For the
UK and Turkey that only happens once, whereas for Russia it happens three times.
Furthermore, ECRI finds it necessary to reiterate four of its previous recommendations,
which -
as established during the analysis of the UK, which had five ‘reiterates’ - can be
considered an indication of a lack of compliance. It is also noted that Russia is urged by ECRI to
take action on specific areas six times (UK: 1 and Turkey: 7+1 – see the table above). The first
example is found on page 19 of ECRI’s report, where: “ECRI urges the Russian authorities to take
109
See Appendix 9, p. 8 paragraph 6 Op.cit. p. 12 paragraph 25 111
Op.cit. p. 13 paragraph 29 112
Op.cit. p. 17 paragraph 52 113
Op.cit. p. 21 paragraph 74 110
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
steps as soon as possible to resolve the problems encountered by asylum seekers due to the
precariousness of their status...”114
A final observation before moving on to the response of the Russian authorities, an
observation which is further discussed below, is that ECRI refers to its GPR a total of nine times,
the highest proportion of all three member states: General Policy Recommendations Nos. 1,2,3,7,8
and 9.115
Following this account of observations made on the content of ECRI’s third report on
Russia, the next section contains a brief note on the general writing style of the Russian authorities
in analysing their response to ECRI’s report and thereafter a discussion of the different response
mechanisms employed by the Russian authorities. These mechanisms are highlighted through four
examples, but first the notes taken on Russia’s writing style.
As expected, the response116 from the Russian authorities is different again to those of the
UK and Turkey. Russia responds over ten pages, in which the aspects it considers most important
are highlighted from the Russian authorities’ point of view. The first page constitutes an executive
summary where Russia too begins with a subtle reassurance of its efforts to combat racial
discrimination and intolerance. Throughout the rest of the response, the comments have been
divided into sections following the paragraphs of ECRI’s report, however the way in which the
Russian authorities argue their points is rather different to that of the UK. Letting the examples
speak for themselves, the following is an account of Russia’s response to ECRI’s third report.
An example of what could be interpreted as willingness to comply with ECRI’s
recommendations is in the area of Instrumental and Legal Instruments where it is stated that the
Russian Federation state bodies continue to work towards the ratification of a number of treaties
mentioned by ECRI as in need of ratification. Nevertheless the Russian authorities feel that: “It
should be taken into account that the preparation to ratification means, first of all, necessity of
incorporating changes and amendments to the national legislation, and this entails the long-term
character of the process.” 117 Such positive intentions are expressed three times throughout the
response, the other two instances being when it is reported that: “The Russian Ministry of Regional
Affairs is studying the issue...”118 recommended by ECRI, and a remark concerning paragraphs 48114
See Appendix 9, p. 19 paragraph 61 See Appendix 8 116
See Appendix 16 117
Op.cit. p. 46 (2) paragraph 2 118
Op.cit. p. 47 (3) paragraph 35 115
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
49 of ECRI’s report, where the Russian Federation says that it “...intends to take (...) appropriate
measures aimed at solving the problem.”119 These, however, are the only comments indicating cooperation and understanding between Russia and ECRI. The remaining sections of the Russian
response, apart from the odd explanatory paragraph, are dominated by a tone of dissatisfaction,
hard feelings and mistrust. The Russian authorities use terms such as groundless, erroneous
assumptions, far-fetched, beneath criticism, biased, distorts the existing reality, contrary to fact and
absolutely false when referring to the findings of ECRI. The response also claims that certain ECRI
recommendations are based on irrelevant details.120 Finally in the area of Vulnerable Groups under
the sub-area of Chechens and other Caucasians and Muslims, the Russian authorities accuse
other actors - such as foreign countries’ special services and Chechen fighters - of worsening the
criminal situation in the North Caucasus region.
These response mechanisms can be seen as an inexperienced, distrustful self-defence
strategy presumably employed by the Russian authorities unintentionally. It seems unlikely that the
Russian answer intends to deliberately offend ECRI or degrade its work. A few more comments on
this aspect are given below, after a brief functional text analysis of both the ECRI report and the
Russian response.
4.3 Functional Text Analysis
Having analysed the different communication mechanisms used by ECRI in its dialogue
with the United Kingdom, the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation respectively, all three
member states are analysed applying functional linguistics and compared. There are three main
aspects of functional text analysis, but as mentioned before, the aspect described as tenor is of
greatest importance. Field and mode are therefore only briefly covered.
The field of the communication between ECRI and each of the three member state
authorities is of specialised language and within the domains of law and human rights.121
The mode is a non-interactive written dialogue with no spontaneity, which means that the
reports and responses have been written ‘off-line’ – not on the spot of an ECRI visit. The wording
has been carefully chosen and corrections are made until the text is satisfactory.122
119
Appendix 16 p. 48 (4) paragraph 48‐49 Op.cit. p. 46 (4) paragraph 47 121
Web link VII 120
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Analysis of the tenor of these written discourses is more interesting, as it helps to clarify the
interpersonal relationship between ECRI and the authorities of each member state. This aspect of
the functional text analysis reveals differences in each relationship that ECRI has, which is also
why this section is much more comprehensive. It not only analyses the interpersonal relationship
between ECRI and each member state, it also compares them. The differences are interpreted and
argued to be a clear sign of different levels of compliance with ECRI norms. These established
differences pave the way for the fourth and final chapter, where social constructivist views are
applied in discussing and explaining compliance levels shown by member states and the
differences herein.
But before going into detail with the analysis and comparison of member states, it is
important to distinguish three aspects of tenor relevant for a written, non-interactive and planned
communication:
1. “Personalization” refers to the amount of attention within the text that is given to the author
and/or reader as well as the related techniques used to deliberately impersonalize the
text.123
2. The “standing” refers to how much expertise the author appears to have on the domain in
question.124
3. “Stance” entails several aspects, but its overall analytical purpose is to find out how much
the author allows the reader to disagree with the content. In order to determine this, stance
looks at attitude and modality:
a) Attitude concerns the mood of the author and whether the communication comes
across as positive or negative. This is evident through the use of asserted attitude,
assumed attitude or triggered attitude. Asserted attitudes are obvious and subjective
opinions, assumed attitudes and opinions are presented as truths and triggered
attitudes are hidden, but picked up by the reader through the decoding of the
authors’ use of syntax.125
b) “Modality” splits into two aspects; epistemic and deontic modality. The epistemic
modality refers to how much the content comes across as being true, while deontic
122
Web link VII Ibid 124
Ibid 125
Ibid 123
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
modality refers to how much obligation the author seems to put on the reader of the
text.126
Regarding the personalisation of ECRI’s reports, this is deliberately kept at the same level
when addressing all member states, as ECRI must be seen to be an objective and neutral
monitoring mechanism which treats all of its member states the same. The level is knowingly
personal despite the fact that ECRI is a large commission and is not represented by only one
person. Nevertheless the intention is to make ECRI appear as such, a person to whom states have
committed themselves, enabling an appeal to the people ‘behind the state’. This means that even
though states have signed up to a norm, convention or treaty, the signature belongs to an
individual and the norms oblige in a personal way. This deliberate choice has its roots in the
application of a particular persuasion technique, one of three much known rhetorical forms of
Aristotle, briefly introduces earlier. He points out three main forms; Ethos, Logos and Pathos. It is
argued that ECRI employs primarily Logos as ECRI’s reports appeal to reason and logic in
analysing the circumstances in each member state, however there is also a hint of Pathos in that
ECRI ‘feels’, ‘hopes’ and ‘encourages’ relying on an emotional reaction to the ongoing violations of
peoples’ rights. These emotions are appealed to of the people ‘behind the state’. Such
personalisation is only employed when wanting to bring about a personal relationship, whereas
intentional im-personalisation entails the use of “it” and passive sentences. ECRI does phrase
some sentences in its reports using the “It is recommended that...” but the vast majority starts out
with ECRI ‘acknowledges’, ‘realises’ or ‘considers’. It is argued that the more pathos and
personality ECRI can induce without losing its Ethos: professionalism and credibility, the higher the
will of member states to comply with these unenforceable norms.
However the personalisation level presented by each member state varies, as they do not
have one common goal of getting ECRI of their backs, or persuading ECRI that racial
discrimination and intolerance is not the fault of the state. Furthermore states are almost expected
to be subjective rather than objective and will therefore often see a situation differently to ECRI.
The United Kingdom’s response for example can be said to be personal to the extent that
the UK too refers back to itself as an entity: the UK authorities feel, find and disagree. This is
different when looking at the response of the Russian Federation, where even though the noun is
sometimes the Russian authorities, the Russian State or the Russian Ministry of Regional Affairs
most paragraphs entail only ‘it’ or the use of passive phrasing such as “Acknowledging existence of
essential problems of migrant-workers in Russia, the Government of the Russian Federation
126
Web link VII 45
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
intends to...”127 Finally Turkey employs a third and different technique in reaching the highest level
of personalisation. The Turkish response is even found higher than the level attained by ECRI, as
the author not only expresses opinions on behalf of the government of Turkey, but also uses the
pronoun ‘I’. “I regret...”, “I would like to state...” and “I believe that...”128 This personalisation is
argued inappropriate as it is clear in ECRI’s reports that ECRI does not address one person over
the authorities of Turkey. The personal pronoun also encourages questions such as whether this
one person has consulted all possible authorities in speaking on their behalf and whether he/she is
thoroughly informed about every aspect of ECRI’s reports. Instead, the use of the ‘Turkish
authorities’, even though the response might still be written by only one person, instils a greater
level of respect and authority, which an anonymous person cannot. And even though the person
might not be anonymous to ECRI due to a history of collaboration, the author remains unknown to
the public.
The “standing” of ECRI’s reports is once again the same for all three states, understood in
the sense that ECRI’s members and secretariat are regarded as experts in the domain of racial
discrimination and intolerance. However the manner in which this expertise is exercised is not the
same. In the report on the UK, ECRI’s level of expertise is displayed in the same confident way as
in the report on Turkey: arguments are made on the basis of information gathered from reliable
sources, facts which have been verified are presented as ECRI’s own findings. However the UK
and Turkey do not respond in the same way.
The UK employs a similar tone and verbal techniques as ECRI itself has done. In other
words, the UK presents its level of expertise as equal to ECRI’s. The UK authorities respect the
knowledge of ECRI and expect ECRI to respect the UK authorities’ knowledge about the UK. The
Turkish authorities, on the other hand, do not come across as experts, which is once again due to
the use of personal pronouns as well as the content of its response. The Turkish authorities use
their one opportunity to discuss, dismiss and refute ECRI’s findings to disagree with ECRI’s
choices of wording. Their great focus on the “false impressions” of Turkey prevents a proper
discussion and disagreement with ECRI’s findings which would most likely prevent such a false
impression from materialising in the first place! Concerning the dialogues between ECRI and the
UK, and between ECRI and Turkey, it is furthermore clear that neither of them attempts to put one
expertise above the other. Both parties in each dialogue are aware of each other’s expertise and
intentions, which allows for obvious and subjective opinions to be shared in an equally polite tone.
127
See Appendix 16, p. 48 (3) See Appendix 13 p. 1 (39) and 2 (40) 128
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Having established such difference between the standing of the UK and Turkish responses,
analysis of Russia exhibits a third type of standing within ECRI dialogue. The report on Russia
emphasises that quite a few of ECRI’s findings are supported by NGOs and other secondary
sources such as the European Court of Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or
the Commissioner on Human Rights of the Council of Europe. It is stated sixteen times throughout
ECRI’s report on Russia that the information put forward is from NGOs, and it is also indicated five
times that ECRI has: ‘been informed’, ‘received consistent reports’, or ‘received disturbing
information’. This does not indicate that ECRI’s expertise in the previously mentioned domain is
somehow less, but it is argued that this can be an indication that the Russian authorities have
shown insufficient co-operation with ECRI in giving access to information and agreeing with the
findings of other sources. This assumption is further supported by ECRI’s mention in the section on
Religious Groups that it is concerned that “...the statements of the Russian authorities starkly
contrast with information provided by local, national and international NGOs...”129 These two
aspects, different from the reports on the UK and Turkey, suggest that the report on Russia has
been written with the same amount of expertise yet presented differently by ECRI. The dialogue
between ECRI and Russia seems to entail sentences where each tries to display its superiority.
ECRI depicts this through the example above, where the Russian authorities are questioned about
the validity of their facts. The Russian authorities do likewise several times throughout their
response, discrediting ECRI’s findings. This is why the response from the Russian authorities is
found to be slightly below the standing of ECRI. The Russian authorities’ argumentative skills seem
lacking, and their response seems to be based on a policy of “an eye for an eye”, which bears little
resemblance to demonstrating real expertise. Nevertheless, when Russia feels offended, the
response offends ECRI right back. This is evident for example when looking at the Russian reply to
paragraphs 79-107 of ECRI’s report, on Vulnerable Groups, when half of the 18 verbal
constructions used by ECRI in its analysis are negatively charged, and seven of the nine terms
used in the recommendations are considered the most serious. In their response, the Russian
authorities state that: “As a whole, this issue is drawn up on a biased basis and distorts the existing
reality...The idea of overall intolerance towards national minorities by ethnic Russians is absolutely
false.”130 The expression of such subjective views is the right of any member state responding to
ECRI’s reports. However, the use of allegations instead of hardcore evidence and reasoned
arguments does not make the Russian authorities appear very expert on ECRI areas. The Russian
response attempts to put its own expertise above ECRI’s in discrediting its findings.
129
See Appendix 9 p. 28 paragraph 110 Op.cit p. 49 (7) paragraph 105 130
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
The stance of all three dialogues is divided into two parts, one briefly analysing and
discussing the stance of ECRI through the two aspects of attitude and modality, and the second
part doing the same for all three member states.
Regarding attitude, ECRI often states in the reports that certain recommendations are
based on observations, which in other words is a way of asking member state authorities to
comment, confirm or dismiss. Nevertheless there is no doubt that ECRI uses an asserted attitude
of open, honest and objective opinions which reveals no indication of mood, as ECRI is neutral
when drafting member state reports. Of course it can be argued that the reports have a tendency
to be negative as they concern situations in need of improvement, or criticise existing conditions
and offer only little praise. Nonetheless, the mood of ECRI is neutral in the sense that there are
very few adjectives describing every little detail.
It is also clear that concerning modality, the deontic levels are similar in all three reports as
well as their respective responses, as the only party with an actual objective and right to request
action is the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. By encouraging, reiterating,
recommending and urging in its reports, ECRI is guiding and influencing member state behaviour.
The member states may also have objectives with their responses, however as individual states
represented on ECRI they have no right to command ECRI to take any action.
Concerning the level of epistemic modality, small variations are observed as a result of the
differences in sources relied upon in the reports. The report on Russia, with its emphasis on these
secondary sources, has a decreased level of perceived truth to ECRI’s findings compared to the
two other reports.
The attitude of the United Kingdom is rather similar to that of ECRI’s: professional yet
subjective through asserted attitude. Turkey however can be said to use a combination of the two
attitudes, asserted and assumed, as parts of Turkey’s response are negatively charged in the
sense that the Turkish authorities almost feel misrepresented by ECRI’s use of inaccurate
language. Having said this, the Turkish opinions are still honest and open. The attitude within
Russia’s response is in line with those of the UK and Turkey, namely asserted, however the
Russian response is by far the most negatively charged, airing only four times the Russian
authorities’ agreement with and intention to follow up on an ECRI criticism.
48
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
The epistemic modality of ECRI’s reports is, as just mentioned above, approximately the
same level for all three member states. However the UK’s response makes ECRI’s assertions
seem rather subjective, as the UK authorities often emphasise their expertise on UK matters,
letting ECRI know, that only the UK authorities know best about UK legislation. This is the exact
opposite when looking at the Turkish authorities’ response to ECRI’s report, here it is found that
the epistemic modality is much higher in ECRI’s report, as the Turkish authorities hardly question
ECRI’s findings. ECRI’s upper hand when it comes to the truth of its assertions is also clear in the
case of the Russian response, as the technique of mud-throwing and conspiracy theorising
illustrated in earlier examples does not enhance the credibility of its arguments.
To conclude this brief functional text analysis, a few more general observations are made
about the relationship between ECRI and each member state. The following is therefore divided
into three parts; one paragraph for each member state.
Regarding the United Kingdom, it is established that the interpersonal relationship between
ECRI and the UK is based on mutual respect for each others’ expertise, nevertheless exercised
differently. As stated earlier, ECRI’s recommendations are only binding as far as the member state
perceives them to be. In other words, if a state has chosen to become a member of the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, then there are certain standards to be met, and if
they are continuously unmet, ECRI has sanctions it can impose on the member state in question.
But before it gets this far, peer pressure from other member states, ECRI itself and other CoE
monitoring mechanisms, as well as NGOs, is likely to result in some sort of compliance.
Nevertheless, this non-legal element means that ECRI’s reports do not demand action from a
member state through the use of modal verbs such as must, shall and ought to, but instead wraps
these requests into politely phrased sentence structures such as recommends, encourages, or
urges. This shows that even though ECRI’s standard-setting abilities are not enforced with binding
powers, ECRI follows up on every member state and will continue to publish its reports no matter
how many unmet standards it contains, or how the member state chooses to respond.
In knowing this, the UK also wraps its answers in language indicating a certain level of
politeness, that will live up to the standards expected by ECRI, NGOs and the public who may
have access to both report and response (if this is agreed to by the authorities). This ability to show
mutual respect for ECRI’s work can be interpreted as a minor inferiority which is shown through the
UK’s use of modal verbs such as will, shall and would when explaining lack of progress on problem
areas pointed out by ECRI. Having stated this, however, five times in their 38-page response the
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
UK authorities directly disagree with ECRI’s recommendations or question the observations which
have led to certain findings. These objections can be interpreted with regard to culture and history,
the UK being by far the most diplomatically, democratically and politically experienced member of
the three chosen here. The aptitude of the UK authorities to respond to criticism from ECRI in a
diplomatic, neutral and almost cocky way - three adjectives so far away from the attributes of
Turkey and Russia’s responses! - is a clear sign of the country’s vibrant democratic culture and
experience of international politics. The objections can also be considered an indicator of how
much importance the UK authorities ascribe to the Council of Europe as a whole.
Elements of culture and history are also found in the response from the Republic of Turkey,
where it is shown that the interpersonal relationship between ECRI and Turkey is much the same
as that constructed between ECRI and the UK. Both relationships are based on mutual respect,
however the Turkish authorities employ a very different strategy in showing this. The Turkish
authorities’ response is first of all very short, amounting to a few remarks that the authorities
wished to be included in ECRI’s draft report before it was adopted. In abstaining from criticising
ECRI’s findings further, Turkey is implicitly agreeing to most of ECRI’s recommendations with the
exception of the ten mentioned in their response. Additionally, those ten remarks are requests to
ECRI to reconsider the wording of particular terms in order to avoid giving the wrong impression of
Turkey. This can also be interpreted as a characteristic of Turkey’s culture and history where giving
a good impression to outsiders, “saving face”, might be considered as extremely important. Turkey
is also a culture where authorities are rarely questioned, which explains two aspects of the
response: 1) why there are no direct challenges of ECRI’s findings and 2) the underlying humility of
the tone in the Turkish response. Finally, the lack of protest can be considered an indicator of how
important the Turkish authorities perceive the Council of Europe to be, as well as their overall wish
to comply with the standards of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.
Finally, it is shown that the interpersonal relationship between ECRI and the Russian
Federation is unbalanced, strained and affected by Russia’s mistrust and need to feel superior.
Had the Russian authorities employed the same tactics as the United Kingdom’s authorities, they
might have come out seeming less offensive and inferior. However, here it is also argued that the
approach of the Russian authorities is culturally and historically consistent. One of Russia’s biggest
problems, according to most Europeans131, is corruption, which tends to undermine trust in the
authorities. The discrediting of ECRI and the Russian authorities’ lack of belief in ECRI’s objectivity
can be partly explained through these historical aspects. Another element, discussed further
131
Assumption on the basis of survey, see Appendix 1 50
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
below, is the overall Russian motivation to comply with the recommendations of the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance.132
These member state specific conclusions as to the differences of responses to ECRI’s
third-round of reports introduce this next chapter, where social constructivist theory is applied in
explaining why there are differences in the compliance levels shown by member states of the
Council of Europe.
5. Compliance Differences through Social Constructivist Eyes
There are several elements in social constructivist theory that can explain different
compliance with the same international standards, but as mentioned before, I only look at three of
them, as I argue that the ones chosen are the most relevant for demonstrating my second
hypothesis. These three elements constitute member state identity, and identity forms the basis for
intersubjectivity which again is the fundamental building stone upon which international shared
knowledge is shaped. The three elements are; history, current political ideals and reputation. All
three elements are discussed, drawing on examples extracted from the discursive analysis of
ECRI’s reports and member state’s responses. Social constructivism has already been defined and
is applied here in the interpretation and discussion of these three member state’s identities.
5.1 The United Kingdom’s Identity
5.1.1 History
The analysis of the UK authorities’ response reveals a certain experience in dealing with
ECRI reports. As mentioned above the UK authorities reply in a balanced way, showing respect for
the findings they acknowledge, while being very blunt about areas where ECRI is found to be
wrong. The UK authorities openly disagree with ECRI on several occasions, yet not because the
basis for ECRI’s findings is doubted, as it is by the Russian authorities, but because the UK
authorities, in their view, simply know best. This argument is a good indicator of the strong and
established identity of the UK. A self-confident member state with a history filled with power,
132
Statement further substantiated in chapter 5 51
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
influence and leadership. The UK was for example the first country to industrialise in the 18th
century, inspiring the rest of the western world to follow suit, and the 19th century saw the British
Empire grow and grow.133 The twentieth century meant a redefinition of the United Kingdom’s place
in the world; having gone from comprising one fourth of the world’s population in the year of 1922
as well as one fourth of the world’s surface, the UK handed over independence to its last remaining
colony in 1997.134
This legacy of rule and leadership, being a front-runner of European development, is a
large part of the political identity of the UK, hence the high self-esteem and certainty exhibited
throughout its response to ECRI. Today, the UK economy remains one of the largest in the world,
relying on service industries throughout the past many years. The country has always been a
major player in international affairs, particularly as a founding member of the Council of Europe
and long-standing, if slightly reluctant, member of the EU as well as being a member of NATO.135
The UK is one of the CoE’s five so-called “grand payeurs”, contributing 12.5% of its annual budget,
along with Russia, France, Germany and Italy. This contributes to the UK’s sense that its position
within the club is guaranteed, a sense that has existed for a long time. This is obvious from the fact
that the UK was one of the first member states to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights
in 1953, but one of the last to implement it into its domestic law, in 2000.136
Another consequence of the UK’s history is its attitude towards disagreement and outside
authority. The UK has a long experience of deplomatic debate, with differing points of view
welcomed. British politicians know that the UK’s position within the Council of Europe is secure
despite disagreements over, for example, its unwillingness to comply with some aspects of ECRI’s
twelve General Policy Recommendations. This conviction is a product of shared knowledge based
on history and identity, a democratic self-assurance that Turkey and Russia do not yet seem to
have acquired in the international arena of the CoE. Turkey and Russia are argued further below.
A final aspect of the UK’s history that, according to constructivism, influences its approach
to ECRI norms is its material resources. As one of the world’s biggest economies, the United
Kingdom is in a position to implement Council of Europe recommendations – and in particular,
ECRI recommendations – because it has the finances to do so. The UK authorities are confident in
133
Web link IX Ibid 135
Web link X 136
Keller, Helen and Sweet, Alec Stone (2008) A Europe of Rights, The impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, Oxford University Press 134
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
their own “social” resources too, both the ones already established, such as their judicial system
and legislative process, and those future ones needed to improve things and make the necessary
changes. Nevertheless, it may only be the changes the UK government, rather than ECRI or any
other CoE mechanism, finds beneficial.
5.1.2 Current Political Ideals
Along with the UK’s history, the element of current political ideals plays a role when
explaining compliance through a social constructivist perspective. The political situation in 2005
was coloured by the Labour Party’s third consecutive term in government.137 This was despite
Tony Blair’s falling popularity, mainly over the labour party’s handling of the war on terror and due
to a growing dissatisfaction with the party’s immigration policies. Already in 2006 at the party’s
annual conference, Tony Blair and John Prescott announced leadership changes. In May and June
2007 the party held its first leadership election for thirteen years. At this conference Gordon Brown
was declared Leader of the Labour Party.138
Despite the various leaders, it being Tony Blair, Gordon Brown or David Cameron, there is little
doubt in UK politics that EU law – with its binding directives – is considered of higher standards in
most fields than the Council of Europe’s non-binding norms. These assumptions are supported in
the UK authorities’ response to ECRI, as their reply, out of political courtesy and experience, is
drafted and submitted, yet the content represents a primarily ‘salted cake with a sugared coating’.
The salted cake represents a solid relationship between the UK and the CoE, where they might not
agree on every detail, but agree on the main direction. How long the UK takes to comply with
Council of Europe standards may be finally decided by the UK, but it knows how to use the sugarcoating to cover gaps and slide over the bumps to keep the CoE “happy”. This allows the UK
authorities to appear as independent and confident while meeting the expectation of international
bodies for expressed dedication and willingness to comply. This confidence is further discussed
below as I look at one final element of social constructivism; that of the impact of reputation and
self-esteem.
137
Web link XXV Ibid 138
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
5.1.3 Reputation
This paragraph includes a scan of the most relevant web articles, recent reports from
relevant NGOs as well as the overall result of the survey in Appendix 1. The element of reputation
constitutes one of constructivism’s important motivations for compliance, as it is a decisive aspect
of state and state leader identity. To be member of a club it is important to fit in, and if one does not
obey the rules, one gets a bad reputation which in the run of time can have even more noticeable
consequences in the form of unpopularity, group-pressure to adapt and sanctions if behaviour is
not adjusted accordingly.
According to Reporters Without Borders (RWB) the UK is not considered a high-risk
country when it comes to the freedom of information and expression. However back in 2007, the
Labour government under Blair did try to change the only two-year-old ‘Freedom of Information
Act’ (FOI), claiming its daily operational costs were more expensive than anticipated and too
demanding on the state budget. The proposed legislative changes included a limitation on the
spreading of information by the public authorities while restricting the media’s ability to make
requests under the Act. Furthermore the suggestion to exempt parliamentary correspondence from
the provisions of the ‘Freedom of Information Act’ was put forth by a group of parliamentarians.
This made RWB voice instant concern and several journalists and freedom-of-information groups
protested loudly during the consultation period.139 The FOI was one of Blair’s own initiatives back in
1997, even though it was not adopted till 2000 and did not come into force until 2005. Its main
purpose is to make all information held by state bodies, unless confidential, available on request by
individuals or news organisation. Three years ago these proposed changes posed a threat to UK’s
freedom of expression and information. Fortunately, and partly thanks to RWB the legislative
changes were not supported by the public and they were never adopted.
Another more recent case deals with information going the other way. In 2009, Suzanne
Breen was asked by police authorities to hand over valuable insider information about the IRA. But
she refused as it would compromise her sources and in June 2009, she won her court case in
Northern Ireland, as her life “would be at risk [if] she was made to hand over her information to the
police.”140
139
Web link XII Web link XIII 140
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
According to Human Rights Watch’s report of July 2010 there are still certain areas of the
UK legislation that violates human rights. The most recent report called “Without Suspicion”141
criticises the UK government of passiveness. In 2000 when the American war on terror was
starting to spread across Europe, the British parliament approved a new section to the powers of
police involving the right of authorities to “stop and search” without any suspicion of terrorist
activity. This section 44 was implemented as a preventive measure to interrupt terrorist plots, but
has proven to be a bigger threat to youngsters, railway enthusiasts and photographers as well as
relations between the police and ethnic communities, than an actual antiterrorist tool. In its ten
years of operation, not one single terrorist charge has been brought against a stopped and
searched individual, which brought the ECHR, January 2010, to rule the use of section 44 a
violation of the right to privacy and the right to liberty. HRW and other organisations including some
local law enforcement counties have also declared section 44 either useless or used improperly.
One county, the Police of Hampshire has decided to suspend use of section 44 all together.
As is indicated through the issues mentioned, the UK’s reputation among NGOs is that of a
democratic country with only minor human rights violations. In general, it is argued that the UK is
seen as a multicultural and vibrant democracy with strong and independent media, and a very
active civil society including many NGOs free to lobby on any issue. This estimate is also shared
by the majority of the respondents. The survey’s question eight covers this in greater detail by
giving an interesting insight into what a small but representative sample of Europeans think about
the UK.
It is clear that the UK is perceived as complying “with CoE standards most of the time” with
a percentage of 58.8%, against only 17.6% believing that the UK “Complies with CoE standards
only when forced”. 23.5% consider the UK to “Fully implement its ECHR judgements within the
time limit”. These impressions are based on what the respondents know about the UK, its history
and its present actions in international politics. Yet more importantly this knowledge is furthermore
dependent upon the identity, intersubjectivity and experiences of the respondent. While far from
definitive, since it is based on such a small sample, this survey highlights general perceptions of
the United Kingdom’s reputation, see Figure 2 on the following page.
141
Web link XXXI 55
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Member State Reputation Estimate
Russia
Turkey
The UK
8,60%
8,60%
Founding member of the CoE
11,40%
Population very interested in the EU
Few human rights violations
2,90%
0%
14,30%
26%
17,60%
58,80%
62,90%
60%
11,40%
25,70%
5,90%
Highest amount of court cases at the ECHR
Problems with corruption
82,90%
80%
2,90%
0%
14,70%
Complies with CoE standards only when "forced"
Fully implements the ECHR judgements within the time limit
55,90%
14,70%
Complies with CoE standards most of the time
Population considers that the CoE improves their national laws
42,90%
11,80%
Many human rights violations
Complies with CoE standards always
73,50%
31,40%
8,80%
0%
0%
65,70%
23,50%
14,70%
80%
94,30%
Figure 2, Member State Reputation Estimate142
142
Survey results from 35 respondents 56
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Finally it can be argued that it is because of this historical lead concerning democratic
development and this overall impression on the part of NGOs and the European public that the UK
is a “good player” within the Council of Europe, that the UK authorities in 2005 show a degree of
indifference towards ECRI’s third report findings. There is no need for the United Kingdom to
improve its reputation within Europe and no desire on the part of state leaders (2005 to 2010) to
perk up governmental self-esteem. This confidence is once again seen in the smooth way in which
the UK authorities disagree with ECRI recommendations yet manage to communicate respect in
agreeing with other recommendations. This balance between positives and negatives allows for
the UK to disagree with ECRI about issues, not because the UK does not have the resources to
implement the suggested improvements, and not because the UK authorities do not share the
values and ideals of ECRI about fighting racism and intolerance, but because the UK is the UK,
and only if the UK finds ECRI’s recommendations noteworthy will they be considered and possible
implemented.
5.2 The Turkish Republic’s Identity
5.2.1 History
The way in which the Turkish authorities respond to ECRI’s report signals a very different
attitude to the one of both the UK and Russia. Once again, this can be partly explained through a
brief but specific look into Turkish history. Turkey was once an important Empire (the Ottoman
Empire from the 14th century to 1923) like the UK, however the transition from religiously-inspired
autocracy to secularist multi-party politics began much later. Kemal Mustafa was the man behind
this secularist move and he founded modern Turkey out of the ashes of a weakened Empire in
1923. Today he is a national hero referred to as Ataturk143. Through authoritarian leadership he
introduced social, legal and political reforms that transformed the country, but meant a democratic
defeat for his party in 1950.144 After this party crunch, the young nation experienced several bumps
on the road of democratic development in the form of military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997.
This has meant that the Turkish public and politicians are accustomed to constant political unrest,
a political leadership of autocracy and a lack of overall stability. In 2002 this political unrest brought
143
The father of all Turks Web link XV 144
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
the country to the brink of economic collapse, however with the help from the International
Monetary Fund, Turkey got its economy back on track. 145
These experiences of failed political leadership and the need for outside help to solve
domestic issues can be extracted from the Turkish authorities’ response to ECRI’s report, as the
tone of voice is humble, appreciative of ECRI’s work and never in direct opposition to ECRI’s
findings.
Furthermore, this history of disrupted development, as well as the financial difficulties in
2002, are a definite factor when looking at the material resources available to the Turkish
authorities. Here I argue that Turkey needs the Council of Europe to a greater extent than the UK,
for example, as Turkey’s judicial and legislative branches are far from fully developed, but also in
other areas than those concerning ECRI. This need will almost certainly affect Turkey’s overall
attitude towards the norms with which the CoE requires compliance.
These constructivist elements of compliance theory enable me to argue that one
explanation for Turkey’s implicit willingness to comply with ECRI recommendations is to be found
in its history. The Turkish authorities know that the CoE brings stability, new knowledge and
practices that they need, as well as a promise for the future. It is because of its history that the
Turkish authorities do not consider compliance with ECRI’s norms a threat to Turkish politics,
culture, identity and authority, whereas for the UK authorities, they see full compliance with ECRI
norms as a loss of independence and international respect among like-minded member states. The
aspect of future promises for Turkey is explained further in the section called Reputation, below.
5.2.2 Current Political Ideals
Building further on Turkey’s history, the current political ideals around the time of ECRI’s
third report are also decisive. October 2005 saw Turkey, lead by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, take a crucial step towards one of its most dearly-held goals, as the accession process to
becoming a full member of the European Union was initiated, six years after Turkey’s application.
2005 was also the year of an ECHR judgement allowing Turkish Universities to ban the headscarf
145
Web link XV 58
Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
worn by religious women of a conviction seen to be “... hardly compatible with gender equality.”146
This ruling was criticised by Erdogan, who claimed it was a matter for religious scholars. Such
statement is in stark contrast to the attitude exhibited in the response to ECRI’s report published
that same year. As mentioned above, this response is characterised by its humbleness and
uncritical comments of ECRI. The fact that ECRI’s criticism concerns fundamental rights such as
racial equality, as opposed to the ECHR ruling which concerns religious freedom and the
separation of religion and state, plays a major role to the different attitudes exhibited in these
responses to the CoE. The AKP is known for its religious values that despite Turkey’s most recent
past of secularism have gained widespread support in Turkey. This results in a more defensive
response to the ECHR ruling on the headscarf, contrary to the deliberate choice to be meek in
Turkey’s response to ECRI.
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly ended its monitoring of Turkey in 2004,
concluding that Turkey had made more progress within the past two years than it had in the last
ten.147 Furthermore, it should be noted that despite the ongoing debate about whether the AKP has
a hidden Islamic agenda, a debate fiercely discussed by Turks around the world, the Council of
Europe has supported the AKP from the beginning. The Turkish authorities are aware of this and
are therefore showing appreciation of ECRI’s support and attention, as well as their clear intentions
and willingness to comply.
5.2.3 Reputation
The following paragraphs round off the social constructivist approach in explaining
compliance and respective compliance differences among member states, by looking into Turkey’s
reputation within the CoE and amongst its publics. This part relies on the same sources as the
estimated reputation results for the UK, being the two NGOs HRW and RWB as well as the survey
results.
According to Reporters Without Borders, Turkey is ranked 122nd out of 175 countries on
the world index when it comes to freedom of expression. The most known obstacle to improvement
is the Turkish authorities’ claim that any statement made insulting any type of law enforcer, be it a
soldier, police officer or a judge is a violation of article 301 of the criminal code. This article
146
Web link XXVI Web link XXIX 147
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punishes any damage to Turkish identity with large fines and/or prison sentences.148 But there are
many more legislative tools preventing the Turkish public from speaking its mind. There are even
laws against insulting the memory of Ataturk, or turning boys against military service. The ECHR
found that the Turkish authorities failed to protect Hrant Dink, an Armenian journalist reporting from
Turkey, and in doing so violated articles 2, 10 and 13 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The most widespread suppression of the public’s freedom of expression occurs every day
in the form of an alleged 3.700 blocked websites.149 The Turkish population has no access to
foreign media, be it news or videos on YouTube, which leaves the Turkish authorities with
enormous control when deciding what the public is allowed to know.
The resent reports from Human Rights Watch carry the same gloomy outlook on human
rights conditions in Turkey. Ongoing incidents of police corruption, violence, and even killings fill
headlines of this NGO’s website on Turkey. According to HRW: “Police and gendarmerie in Turkey
routinely use firearms during arrests without exhausting non-violent means and even when there is
no apparent serious threat of death or injury. Such practices violate international standards on use
of force by law enforcement officers.”150 However, one first important step has been taken as a
result of modern technology. In other words, because incidents of police violence are more often
caught on camera, they are given much larger news coverage, and this has forced the Turkish
authorities to react. This is a good example of Beth Simmons’ influential means to achieving
compliance: “Treaties of this kind [being human rights treaties, such as ECRI’s norms] have a
potentially dramatic impact on the relationship between citizens and their own government,
creating a huge pool of potential beneficiaries…151, which means that “individuals and groups […]
use the […] treaty commitments to leverage their rights claims [and to hold] […] governments
accountable for their human rights behavior.152 The first important step entails the suspension of
officers involved in incidents pending investigation. The next important step, according to HRW
researcher Sinclair-Webb, is to see whether the investigations will result in justification for the
victims and punishment of those guilty of committing the crime. In general terms, HRW’s
impression of Turkey is that the situation has worsened in the past two years. Despite having made
important changes to meet the European Union’s accession criteria in the past five.153
148
Web link XVIII Web link XIX 150
Web link XX 151
Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights – International Law in Domestic Politics, Cambridge University Press, p. 126 152
Op.cit p. 130 153
Web link XX 149
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Once again it seems that the public shares the views of these two cited NGOs, most likely
because the NGOs make up parts of the publics’ intersubjective knowledge-base, as mentioned
just above. Nevertheless, the survey’s question no. 9,154 where respondents are asked to apply
three out of eleven already stated descriptions to each member state, puts numbers on the public’s
view of Turkey as a member state of the Council of Europe. For example, out of the 35
respondents, 82.4% say that Turkey has “Problems with corruption”, and 79.4% believe that
Turkey has ‘Many human rights violations’. 58.8% think that Turkey “Complies with the CoE
standards only when “forced””, whereas only 8.8% consider Turkey a “Founding member of the
CoE”.
These impressions along with the overall take on Turkey’s reputation can, according to
constructivism, be one of the reasons behind the Turkish authorities’ rather humble response to
ECRI’s report. There is little doubt that Turkey is using its recognition by, and status within, the
CoE as a way of showing the EU that Turkey is ready for full membership. Acknowledging that
Turkey is not the most well-respected member state when regarding its human rights record,
Turkey is determined to learn as much as possible from ECRI’s reports, hence this very
appreciative and accommodating manner of responding. Implementation of ECRI’s norms
improves Turkey’s human rights conditions which again improve state reputation as well as state
leader self-esteem. These arguments are discussed further below, once the reputation of Russia
has been discussed.
5.3 The Russian Federation’s Identity
5.3.1 History
This final historic overview will reveal in part why the Russian Federation’s authorities
respond to ECRI the way they do. Like the other two member states, Russia too used to be a
superpower and regards itself still as a great power. As with Turkey, it is the transition from
superpower into sovereign, democratic state that is worth looking at, and in Russia’s case, this
process has only just begun. The Russian Federation did not become a member of the Council of
Europe until 1996,155 up until 1991 it was still part of the USSR, the world’s first constitutionally
154
See Appendix 1 Web link XXI 155
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socialist state. The USSR played a decisive role in the allied victory in World War II,156 and this
historical influence still marks the population today. This can be seen in Russia’s late interest in
Europe and also its rather superior attitude towards Council of Europe norms.
Just before Russia’s CoE accession in 1996, the accession process was suspended in
1995 because of the “indiscriminate and disproportionate” use of force by the military against, in
particular, the civilian population in Chechnya.157 But there were other obstacles such as the
Chechen war, and more importantly: two CoE expert opinions, one in 1994 and one in 1996, stated
that “...legislation in such important areas as criminal law and criminal procedural law was still
inadequate, the judiciary and the penitentiary system were not functioning properly, the rule of law
was not implemented in practice and that there was a big gap between law in the books and law in
action...”158 The last observation constitutes Russia’s biggest and ongoing struggle of today, and it
is argued that according to constructivism it is rooted in Russia’s history.
The Russian Federation’s most significant historical baggage is a result of several decades
of ongoing state dictatorship, widespread corruption and exclusion from international society in the
early years. Having had its trust of the western world thoroughly tested during the Cold War,
Russian politics cannot seem to shake past suspicions. Even among authorities there is little trust
of other authorities. This is obvious in the many questionings of ECRI’s findings. The Russian
authorities not only question, they accuse ECRI of being biased against Russia as well as accusing
other foreign secret services of conspiring against the Russian government. Such accusations are
not put forth by any other member states and the amount of suspicion is rarely seen. I argue that it
is a clear consequence of unaddressed corruption, the experience, at state level that the West
cannot be trusted and at personal level that the national authorities are unreliable. These
insecurities cause the Russian authorities to respond very defensively and in a slightly amateurish
way in accusing the CoE of being biased.
The final aspect furthermore supporting Russia’s very superior attitude is the fact that
Russia is rich on material resources in the very sense of the word. The Russian authorities are
aware that they can learn from the Council of Europe’s experience by having access to the pool of
shared knowledge, but they do not consider themselves financially dependent on or in need of the
CoE in the way Turkey for example does. This argument establishes a Russian ability to comply
with ECRI norms but a possible lack of knowledge, experience and in some cases willingness to
do so.
156
Web link XXI Keller and Sweet, 2008 158
Ibid 157
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5.3.2 Current Political Ideals
Having looked at Russia’s past, the following looks at the more recent years surrounding
ECRI’s third report. First however, it should be noted, that Russia is another of the Council of
Europe’s “grand payeurs”, which in itself does being a certain membership respect. The Russian
president, Vladimir Putin was elected in March 2000 and re-elected in 2004 with a landslide victory
of 71% of the votes. This had international observers alarmed, especially as Putin continued to
further tighten the presidency’s control over parliament, civil society and regional offices.159 Many
of Putin’s reforms were criticized by Western nations as un-democratic, with a clampdown on
media freedom and no outlet for a democratic opposition. The political opposition has therefore
always been weak under Putin, firstly because of a genuine ‘feel-good’ atmosphere among most
Russians, appreciating the restoration of stability and economic growth after the chaotic Yeltsin
years.
According to the OSCE, “The 2004 ballot result "reflected Mr Putin's consistently high public
approval rating,[…] but also talked of the contest's "dearth of meaningful debate and genuine
pluralism."160 The price for this increased state control has been a rise in violent attacks by
separatist groups, the most horrifying incident taking place in 2004 with the Beslan school seizure.
The Russian government continues to be frequently criticised by the Council of Europe, both in the
Parliamentary Assembly (particularly over Chechnya) and in other Council bodies such as the AntiTorture Committee (CPT). Russia is also losing a growing number of cases at the European Court
of Human Rights161, leading some officials to suggest that the Court was “biased” against Russia.
This led in turn to a Russian block – for several years – of the reforms to the Court designed to
speed up its procedures (Protocol 14), which caused strains in the relationship between Russia
and the Council of Europe round about the time of ECRI’s report. These factors all support the
previously identified attitude of Russian superiority and widespread tendencies to blame
international society for conspiring against Russia.
159
Web link XXVII Ibid 161
Web link VI 160
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5.3.3 Reputation
These following paragraphs include a scan of the most relevant web articles, recent reports
from relevant NGOs as well as the overall result of the survey in Appendix 1. According to Yelena
Shesternina, a reporter for Reporters Without Borders, one of the reasons for Russia having the
second highest amount of applicants to the European Court on Human Rights is that its population
has very little faith in the Russian judicial system; the “...chances of getting a positive decision in
the European Court are much higher than anywhere in Russia.”162 Russia is ranked 153rd out of
175 countries on the world index when it comes to freedom of expression. Continuous murders of
journalists and human rights activists and/or physical attacks, especially in the Caucasus republics,
make Russia one of the world’s most dangerous countries for independent journalists, according to
RWB. Most recently, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, since 2008, admitted that people
were being murdered for political reasons and that killers of journalists were not being punished.
He promised to RWB that he would take steps to make it easier for NGOs to operate. But not much
has happened in his two years as president, five journalists were killed in Russia in 2009 and the
country slipped 12 places in the Reporters Without Borders worldwide press freedom index.
Twenty-two journalists have been murdered in Russia since March 2000 because they were trying
to do their job.
According to senior researcher of Human Rights Watch, Jane Buchanan, the situation of
paying compensation to victims who have won a case at the European Court of Human Rights, but
not doing anything politically further to remedy the violations or to prevent similar crimes, is getting
more and more serious.163 In a report of 2009 entitled “Who will tell me what happened to my son”
Human Rights Watch164 calls on the Council of Europe to pressure Russia further, demanding that
they take the necessary and crucial steps towards fully implementing the judgements of the court.
This request is also based on the indications of a “...troubling new trend, [of] Russian investigative
authorities [having] flatly contested the Court’s findings of state responsibility for human rights
violations in Chechnya, even in cases in which those officials participating in the operations that led
to violations or their superiors are known and named in the Court judgement.”165 These
observations are characterised by the superior attitude detected in the Russian authorities’
response to ECRI at the time.
162
Web link XXII Web link XXIII 164
See Appendix 18 165
Op.cit p. 1 163
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As stated in the 2009 Human Rights Watch report, the European Court of Human Rights
has decided 115 cases on Chechnya, and they all concern at least one of the following violations;
enforced disappearances, killings and torture between 1999 and 2004. The report only considers
33 cases in greater detail, but come to the same conclusions as the European Court of Human
Rights; that far from enough has been achieved in finding and prosecuting the responsible people.
The ECHR also finds that the Russian authorities fail “to effectively investigate even very strong
leads or evidence...”166 And finally the report points out, that the ECHR concludes a general
violation of article three of the European Convention167 regarding the Russian authorities’ lack of
information-sharing with victim’s relatives when investigations into Chechen cases take place.
These current observations are very much in line with the impressions of Russia held by the
35 respondents to the survey. Question ten reveals that 94.3% of the respondents consider Russia
to have “Problems with corruption” and 82.9% find that Russia has “Many human rights violations”.
One of the difficult adjectives to place is when needing to make the decision as to which of the
member states has the “Highest amount of court cases at the ECHR”, Turkey or Russia. Even
though the facts show that the correct answer is Turkey, twice as many of the respondents believe
that it is Russia, with a percentage of 65.7% for Russia and only 31.4% for Turkey.
The overall conclusions on Russia’s reputation are that despite being aware that Russia
could do with a better image in the international society, the Russian authorities believe that it is
partly because of international bodies that Russia’s reputation is so bad in the first place. If the
CoE and other member states were not biased against Russia, then the situation would be
different. These defensive tendencies are, as outlined earlier, the consequence of a Russian past
filled with power, corrupt dictatorship and chaos. This inexperience of international co-operation is
evident in the response, which comes across as hard-nosed yet unprofessional.
6. Conclusions
This thesis confirms that member states of the Council of Europe comply differently to
Council of Europe norms. It furthermore verifies that these differences in compliance can be
explained through social constructivism. These two hypotheses are proven through a functional
166
See Appendix 18, p. 11 See Appendix 7 167
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text analysis of the discourse between one monitoring mechanism of the Council of Europe, the
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI, and three very different member
states of the CoE: the United Kingdom, the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation. ECRI
monitors every CoE member state and recommends improvements on the basis of ECRI’s 12
normative standards, the General Policy Recommendations. After each country visit, a report is
drafted and sent for approval by the national authorities before being published – with the
authorities’ response in an appendix.
According to constructivism, this written dialogue plays a crucial role in knowledge-sharing
between member states and international institutions, the shaping of inter-subjective ideas as well
as development of member state identity and change in member state behaviour. It is on the basis
of this written dialogue that member state attitudes have been analysed. These attitudes and
different ways in which each of the three member states respond have been put into a social
constructivist context, where compliance is seen to exist as a consequence of social constructs.
Everything within social constructivism is based on this overall concept of the world being made up
of social constructs; relations are a reflection of them, compliance is a consequence of them and
norms as well as shared knowledge are based upon them. Social constructs determine the value
of material resources, be it knowledge or tanks, and they determine through shared ideas,
expectations and practice what is considered appropriate behaviour upon which the internationally
constructed society creates its norm.
These social constructivist criteria have been applied to the behaviour, interpreted and
extracted from the analysis of the written discourse between ECRI, the UK, Turkey and Russia.
This application confirms that the different compliance types shown by the three member states
are explainable using constructivist terminology.
It is therefore concluded that the UK responds in a superior yet respectful manner indicating
experience, self-confidence but also a slight indifference. This response indicates a certain
compliance, different to that of Turkey and Russia because the UK has a history of being a giant
Empire, European leader and democratic country. The UK is furthermore a long-standing member
of the European Union, as well as the UN and NATO. The UK authorities have an extensive
knowledge of how to deal with international institutions, about how to co-operate and how to
behave. The UK authorities feel sure of their position within the Council of Europe and know that
negotiating parties are allowed to disagree. Finally, the UK has a solid reputation within this social
construct, having ratified 115 of the 210 Council of Europe conventions. It is considered a
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respected democracy that obeys the rules. These three areas of identity - history, current political
ideals and reputation - are the reason for the United Kingdom’s compliance with ECRI norms.
These same three identity-shaping areas explain why the Republic of Turkey responds to
ECRI’s report in a very humble, rather insecure and inexperienced way. This response equals a
different degree of compliance with ECRI’s norms to that of the UK and Russia because Turkey’s
history is marked by authoritarian leadership, a constant battle between religion and secularism
and political unrest. Turkey was once an Empire too, for more than six centuries, however the
transition from Empire to the newly independent Republic of Turkey is considered a victorious war
of independence, as opposed to the transition of Soviet Russia, whose Empire was lost. Turkey
therefore sees no threat to Turkish identity posed by international society, and has more recently
begun to carry a deep and persistent wish to become a member of the European Union. The
previously-mentioned battle between the religious and secularist movements within Turkey’s
politics brings the current government closer to the CoE, as support here from has been given from
the beginning. These historic elements, along with the fact that Turkey’s reputation among Council
of Europe publics is in need of serious improvement, are seen partly to motivate Turkey’s
compliance with ECRI’s norms. Clearly stating its intentions in an implicit manner, Turkey’s lack of
experience as a democracy perhaps explains a slight nervousness about disagreeing with ECRI’s
recommendations. Nevertheless Turkey has ratified 98 of the 210 CoE conventions.
The twelve General Policy Recommendations concerning racism and intolerance are far
from agreed to by the Russian Federation authorities. They respond to ECRI’s report in a superior,
offended even accusing manner, exhibiting yet another approach to compliance compared to that
of the UK and Turkey. This is partly because Russia, unlike Turkey, has no interest in becoming a
member of the European Union. It sees itself as a global power on a par with the United States,
and considers most international large-scale players, such as the CoE and NATO, as a threat to
some of its interests. Even so, the CoE has won greater confidence of the Russian people and
politicians, which has meant a ratification of 56 out 210 CoE conventions. Nevertheless, Russia is
still going through a transitional phase where it, unlike the UK’s self-given CoE membership, has
had to come to terms with massive changes - economic, social and political - in a very short period
of time. Russia’s identity is influenced by historic events such as dictatorship, internal territorial
wars and the Cold War, and it is because of these harsh memories, particularly of the Cold War,
where Russia regarded the West with deep suspicion, that some in Russia to this day still harbour
suspicion of Western plots against Russia. This explains why Russia’s reputation is rather poor
among the CoE publics as well as why the Russian authorities are indifferent to this. Finally, and
despite its independence, Russia has managed to stay resourceful in the sense that compliance is
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
not a question of material ability, rather a question of knowledge. The Russian government is
accustomed to independent greatness and cares little for the outside world’s opinion. Its only need
for CoE membership is in the form of access to the pool of shared knowledge it represents, as
these experiences can make Russia even stronger.
These three paragraphs substantiate the two hypotheses chosen to gain insight into the
interesting and fast-moving theoretical field of international relations. World politics remain a matter
where decisions will continue to be taken on a daily basis by international institutions and individual
states leading to different types of compliance. Yet on this particular issue of racism and
intolerance, I conclude that the differences in compliance with ECRI’s recommendations shown by
the UK, Turkey and Russia are explainable from a social constructivist perspective and are the
results of history, current political ideals and reputation. I furthermore argue that if one were to look
at other CoE norms, standards and treaties, differences in compliance would similarly be evident.
All member states of the Council of Europe have a past of their own, however intertwined these
might be, and no matter how big the pool of shared knowledge becomes, agents cannot escape
their identities and the social constructs they are in, which from a social constructivist perspective
constitute compliance.
6.1 Future Perspectives
As the third round of ECRI reports was published in late 2005/early 2006, it can be
assumed that the fourth round of ECRI reports will provoke different responses from each member
state, as quite recent political changes have taken place.
Regarding the UK, 2010 saw an unpredictable and exciting election, resulting in the first
coalition government in 70 years. David Cameron, the youngest Prime Minister since 1812,
returned his centre-right Conservative Party to power after 13 years of centre-left Labour rule. This
change of government and politics constitutes a change in the UK’s current political ideals which
may bring a different approach to Europe. According to social constructivist theory, this can result
in a change in the UK’s approach to its compliance with the standards set by European bodies.
Turkey began 2010 with the announcement by the ruling AK Party of a public referendum
paving the way for further reforms including a new civilian Constitution. Further change took place
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
at the heart of the Council of Europe as the Parliamentary Assembly appointed as its president, the
42-year-old Turkish-born Mevlüt Çavusoglu. These changes are likely to improve Turkey’s
reputation among publics in the CoE’s member states.
Finally both these changes have taken place in Russia recently, where 2008 saw Dmitry
Medvedev elected president and 2010 heard him announce that Russia is interested in improving
its judicial system so as to make it more effective and to create an environment where Russia’s
citizens do not need to resort to international courts. Mr. Medvedev intends to improve the national
system of judges and courts, effectively ensuring justice in Russia.
Such current developments will, according to social constructivist theory, affect the social
constructs upon which the CoE is based. Changes within member states are arguably a result of
shared knowledge and international institutional learning. There are multiple opportunities for
expanding and taking further this research: 1) one approach could be to compare the different
responses by one member state only to all four of ECRI’s reports, examining how each response
reflects the identity of the member state at that moment in time, and that differences in the
responses are explainable through applying the principles of social constructivist theory. 2) Another
area of possible research could be to compare how different theories of international relations
explain the same set of circumstances in one particular instance of compliance, and 3) a third
direction for future research could undertake similar studies but covering more monitoring
mechanisms or more member states. I suggest that if all these directions were to be pursued and
their findings carefully compared and cross-referenced, theorists of international relations would
have a fairly detailed map of the invisible link between the norms set by international institutions
and the behaviour of their member state.
Finally, I admit to have left one interesting aspect out of this thesis, an aspect which can
bring further understanding of the differences in responses by member states: the opinions of each
member state’s permanent representative to the Council of Europe. These ambassadors have the
advantage of physically surrounding the CoE while representing the history, current political ideals
and reputation of their home country. My hypothesis is that national ambassadors to the CoE are
likely to be more pro-CoE compliance than the national politicians at home. I intend to confirm this
by conducting an interview with the permanent representative to the CoE of the UK, Turkey and
Russia in the near future.
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
7. List of References
Bibliography:
•
Adler, Emanuel (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 5: Constructivism and
International Relations, Sage Publications
•
Arend, Anthony Clark (1998) Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International
Politics
•
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999) Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of
International Institutions
•
Fahnstock, Jeanne and Secor, Marie (2003) A Rhetoric of Argument: Text and Reader
with Catalyst Access Card, Mcgraw-hill Humanities/social Sciences/langua
•
Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, The IO Foundations and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
•
Garcelon, Marc (unknown) A Theory of Institutions, see section on Further Information
•
Hurrell Andrew (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter 7: Norms and Ethics
in International Relations, Sage Publications
•
Keller, Helen and Sweet, Alec Stone (2008) A Europe of Rights, The impact of the ECHR
on National Legal Systems, Oxford University Press.
•
Kingsbury, Benedict (1998) The concept of compliance as a function of competing
conceptions of international law
•
Raustiala, Kal and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2007) Handbook of International Relations,
Chapter 28: International Law, International Relations and Compliance, p. 539, Sage
Publications
•
Simmons, Beth A. (1998) Compliance with International Agreements, p. 91, Annual Review
of Political Science, vol. 1
•
Simmons, Beth A., and Martin, Lisa L. (2007) Handbook of International Relations, Chapter
10: International Organizations and Institutions, Sage Publications
•
Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights – International Law in Domestic
Politics, Cambridge University Press
•
Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2nd Edition
•
Wendt, Alexander (1995) International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Appendixes:
1. Survey “Three Council of Europe Member States compared”
2. Survey Result
3. Survey numbers gathered in an Excel file - Recently omitted!
4. A Practical Guide for Functional Text Analysis – See web link 7
5. The statute of the Council of Europe
6. Speech by president about the CoE - Recently omitted!
7. The European Convention on Human Rights, article 3
8. ECRI’s 12 General Policy Recommendations, Overview
9. ECRI’s 3rd report on the Russian Federation
10. ECRI’s 3rd report on the United Kingdom
11. The UK authorities’ response to ECRI’s 3rd report
12. ECRI’s 3rd report on the Republic of Turkey
13. The Turkish authorities’ response to ECRI’s 3rd report
14. Without Suspicion, Human Rights Watch report 2010, UK - See web link 31
15. E-mail interview with ECRI law department
16. The Russian authorities’ response to ECRI’s 3rd report
17. The EU-Russia Centre, Review Issue 6 (2008) - See web link 33
18. Who will tell me what happened to my son, HRW report 2009, Russia - See web link 32
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
Web Links:
1. Council of Europe website: http://www.coe.int/ and http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp
2. BBC, country profile on the CoE:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/4816408.stm
3. CoE, about the CoE:
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=commenttravaillonsnous&l=en
4. CoE, brochure about the CoE: http://assembly.coe.int/Communication/Brochure/Bro01-e.pdf
5. CoE, objectifs: http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=nosObjectifs&l=en
6. CoE, the European Court of Human Rights: http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
7. A Practical Guide for Functional Text Analysis:
http://www.cainteoir.com/cainteoir_files/etc/FunctionalTextAnalysis.pdf
8. ECRI’s 12 General Policy Recommendations:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GPR/Compilations_en/Compilation%20des%2
0Recommandations%201-12%20anglais%20cri09-33.pdf
9. BBC, country profile on the UK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1102275.stm
10. CIA World Fact Book, UK: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/uk.html
11. Office of Public Sector Information, UK:
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1983/cukpga_19830002_en_2#pt1-pb1l1g3
12. Reporters without Borders article I about the UK - http://en.rsf.org/united-kingdom-freedom-ofinformation-faces-26-02-2007,21106.html
13. RWB, second article: - http://en.rsf.org/united-kingdom-belfast-court-ruling-a-victory-for-23-062009,33569.html
14. UK Race Relations Act, Section 19D: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74/section/19D
15. CIA World Fact Book, Turkey: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/tu.html
16. BBC, country report on Russia: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102275.stm
17. CoE public statement September 13th 2010:
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=5885&L=2
18. RWB, report on Turkey: http://en.rsf.org/report-turkey,141.html
19. RWB, article on Turkey: http://en.rsf.org/turkey-turkey-12-03-2010,36675.html
20. HRW, article on Turkey: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/20/turkey-combat-police-killingsand-violence
21. CIA World Fact Book, Russia: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/rs.html
22. Rianovosti, article: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071005/82651141.html
23. HRW, article on Russia: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/09/25/russia-complying-europeancourt-key-halting-abuse
24. HRW’s Concerns and Recommendations on Russia:
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/09/08/human-rights-watch-s-concerns-and-recommendationsrussiasubmitted-united-nations-hum
25. Labour Party Official Website: http://www2.labour.org.uk/history_of_the_labour_party_gb
26. Article on the Danish Information.dk: http://www.information.dk/234381
27. BBC profile on Putin: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/667749.stm
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Explaining Differences in Compliance Shown by Member States of the Council of Europe
28. CoE website, the verbatim records of the first PACE session 2010 :
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/records/2010/e/1001251130e.htm
29. PACE website, documentary records:
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/DocListingDetails_E.asp?DocID=12463 30. Turkish Policy Quarterly:
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:FA0P3ZrpCwAJ:www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/f
iles/1925.pdf+%22a+boat+called+Europe%22&hl=en&gl=fr&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShCsjY8der_AFVio
d4lI0I0Fa4pHty4mMUuOu7aKsq_wNy7bZErNw2cMh4tQvD1m9N83mqZcjiFQzsV4OrIRU8n_R6ilpy1SEfp1wkcbXiwvWhCsdg00mJM8pcM0MkgvTzmhe4&sig=AHIEtbRgkplbeiAu2A2xRXl
E-Y1dCdJ9cg
31. Human Rights Report 2010, United Kingdom, Without Suspicion:
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/07/05/without-suspicion-0
32. Human Rights Report, 2009, The Russian Federation, Who will tell me what happened to my
son: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/09/28/who-will-tell-me-what-happened-my-son-0
33. The EU-Russia Review, Issue 6, Russia and the Rule of Law, April 2008 http://www.eurussiacentre.org/assets/files/Review_FINAL16March_08.pdf
Further Information:
Garcelon, Marc: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology & Anthropology, 201
Munroe Hall, Middlebury College, Middlebury - Submitted for the American Sociological Meetings
Annual Conference, Philadelphia, PA.
Měchura, Michal Boleslav, language technologist and Lecturer at Fiontar, DCU
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