PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA
Prof. Subrata Mukherjee(retd)
Department of Political Science
University of Delhi South Campus
New Delhi 110021, India
Email id: [email protected]
Periodically a suggestion emanates in India either from a well-known political leader, a political
scientist or a political commentator about the desirability of introducing a presidential system
instead of continuing with the present parliamentary form. It was the Congress leader, R.
Venkataraman who first demanded the introduction of the presidential system in 1967 after the
Congress debacle in the polls. Since then and increasingly from 1990’s whenever there have been
similar demands it is usually in a situation when a political party fails or is sure that it cannot
muster a clear majority in the parliament of its own. The underlying assumption of such a
suggestion is that the parliamentary system that has been followed for last five decades has not
succeeded to the extent desired and this relative failure is enough reason for advocating an
alternative structure which is conceived as more effective and democratic than the existing one.
On a deeper analysis the parliamentary system is better suited looking to India’s diversity and
requirements.
The universal acceptance of representative liberal democracy after the collapse of communism
settles one major theoretical issue as the liberal democracies are broadly divided between
presidential and parliamentary systems. This vital question of choice assumes an unprecedented
significance in the contemporary world, as more and more countries are moving towards
democracy, which Huntington characterises ‘the third wave’. This has also intensified the debate
about the desirability of the two models. In countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India,
South Korea and Turkey, concerned citizens, policy makers, public figures and constitutional
experts have intensely debated related merits and suitability, in the specific conditions of their
countries about different constitutional arrangements.
Characteristics of a Presidential System
The presidential system has as its apex an independent chief executive who has the dual task of
executing and initiating policies. He is checked, assisted and supervised by an independent
legislature. The United States is an example of the presidential system. The other countries, which
follow different variants of the presidential system, are Costa Rica, France, the Philippines,
Uruguay and Venezuela. Normally in such systems, the chief executive is chosen for a fixed term
in a direct national election. He can be removed from office only in very exceptional circumstances
with extraordinary legislature or judicial procedure. The president wields enormous powers and
enjoys important privileges. He has the power to veto over legislative bills and also enjoys
important responsibilities of initiating budgetary legislation, foreign treaties and other crucial
policies. He enjoys emergency and war powers. He appoints major executive officials who hold
their offices at his will. With a concern for limiting the abuse of power in such systems where the
president enjoys considerable power, as exemplified by the well-known statement that except for
a few dictators, the US President is the most powerful elected head, there are special constitutional
provisions prohibiting presidential re-election. In the US the President can serve only two terms
whereas in Costa Rica and Venezuela the Presidents are prohibited to serve two terms in immediate
succession.
Some advocates of presidential system in India have the French model in mind. France is a semi
presidential system and not a pure one as there is a Prime Minister and a National Assembly, which
resembles more the British House of Commons than either of the two chambers of the US
Congress. The President has the power to dissolve the National Assembly but once dissolved it
cannot be dissolved again within a year. If the electorate returns the same old representatives, then
the president has to mend fences with those whom he crossed swords. It is equally significant that
Sri Lanka which had the French model till now is switching over to the pure parliamentary form
because the French model that it followed till now proved to be weaker since the President may
have to cohabitate with a parliamentary majority different from his own political background.
Characteristics of a Parliamentary System
The other major model is the parliamentary system, which is broadly classified into Majoritarian
Parliamentary systems (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, New Zealand, Sri
Lanka, United Kingdom and Germany) and the Representational Parliamentary system found
predominantly in Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and Turkey). In the parliamentary system the individual chief executive is the
leader of the majority party in the legislature and is accountable to the national legislature. Though
the Prime Ministership is the most important office yet there is collective responsibility of the
Cabinet. The Prime Minister continues to be in office as long as his party remains the majority
party in the legislature. The details vary widely from country to country but the most important
common point in all parliamentary democracies is the dependence of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet on legislature majority for their survival.
II
Parliamentary System in India
India opted for the Westminster model of majoritarian parliamentary system after Independence.
This was not an unexpected development as the Government of India Act of 1935 provided the
necessary grounding for the practice of the British model in India. The acceptance of the liberal
democratic framework was expected in India, as almost no other nation gaining independence in
the aftermath of the Second World War was ‘institutionally as well prepared as India for self-
government’ (Huntington 1968:85). This favourable situation was created by the existence of two
vital institutions: a well organised political party in the form of the Indian National Congress and
an experienced civil service.
In fact, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution showed considerable wisdom and foresight
in choosing the majoritarian parliamentary system for India. Their acceptance and near continuous
functioning of the parliamentary system is one of the positive aspects of India’s post independent
evolution. This has nullified the popular European perception of Oriental despotism and the
arrogance of Churchill and the like that the parliamentary democracy can be practiced successfully
only by the British. In 1947, before the declaration of India’s independence, Churchill remarked
that political power was being handed over to a few ‘men of straw’ who may not be able to
administer the country properly. But by 1959 one could find a noticeable change in this attitude
when John Stratchy commented that the institution of parliamentary democracy was ‘a remarkable,
if precarious achievement’ in India. However, in spite of the continued operation of the system for
the last five decades it does not mean that there are no problems or shortcomings. In fact, there are
a number of them.
First, there is the question of cost. In India when the parliament is in session the expenditure is a
staggering Rupees 2.5 lakh per minute according to 2015 estimates. Second concerns the quality
of parliamentarians. Third, the important role of interest groups and pressure groups which
undermine the very basis of representative democracy. Fourth, is the vexed problem of the
legislative relationship with the executive and with the judiciary especially in times of one-party
domination. Fifth, concerns the vital role and control of the media. Sixth pertains to the problem
of financing elections. Seventh, is the inability and the slackness of the system compared to the
Presidential system. Eighth, pertains to the weakness of the party system. Ninth, an important
factor, especially for the developing world, concerns the capacity of the parliamentary system to
bring about basic structural changes.
In order to remedy these problems, the presidential system is advocated as an alternative to the
parliamentary model as it is supposed to be free from the evils of the latter. But a close examination
of the system brings out a number of shortcomings and in a few key areas the problems from which
it suffers is as acute as they are in the parliamentary system. First, as far as the question of cost is
concerned the presidential system is as expensive as the parliamentary one as in it the legislative
organs are not abolished but separated from the executive and the other important components of
the parliamentary system like the Cabinet and the political parties continues, though in a much
more personalised form. The US primary system for the presidential candidates, which has
democratised the entire system to a very large extent, is also expensive and since legislative
aspirants operate at a different constituency at separate elections most of the time, the expenses
multiply. Similarly, the administrative expenditure for running the presidential system is similar
to that within a parliamentary system.
In the US, in 1840, the Federal judiciary employed a total of about 150 persons including the
judges. In 1994-95, it was about 26000. The legislative branch, the Congress has created its own
group of specialists, which is very large in number. The number of Senate employees per Senator
today exceeds the total membership of the entire US Congress. In 1840, a Congress of 223
Representatives and 52 Senators employed a total staff of 57, In 1994-95, 425 Representatives
employ over 12,000 and 100 Senators more than 7000. The sheer size of its employees makes the
Congress larger than 99% of all the business firms in the US. If this is the case in the US with its
philosophy of limited government, one can safely project a much larger number in countries like
India where the government plays and would continue to play a pivotal role. Besides the question
of costs and number there is also the role of specialists in a democratic country.
Whatever they may claim, however, specialists are not neutral, purely apolitical purveyors of knowledge; they are political actors with their own
views and agendas. To pursue their agendas, they need and usually acquire some measure of autonomy and authority. Because experts are difficult
to control without expertise, like lawyers, experts create a demand for the services of others experts. And so it goes (Dahl 1993: 451).
In the American presidential system both the nomination and election are a lengthy, time consuming
and expensive process and if this system were followed the cost would multiply in poorer countries
like India. Second, the operation of pressure groups and interest groups assumes a formidable
proportion in the presidential system as is evident from the campaign money, which comes from
particular interests. In the American context the interest group politics began with the establishment
of the Republic. Tocqueville took note of them as associations to achieve well defined goals
including political ones. These associations were interest groups (Dahl Ibid: 451). But whereas the
number and diversity of interest groups have increased there is no corresponding growth in the
strength of integrating institutions. The theory of separation of powers does not provide for any
constitutional process of resolving conflicts. Neustadt (1990) points out that the American system is
not a system of separation of powers but a system of separate authorities sharing power. An exclusive
authority to govern which is really accountable does not exist and this leads to inevitable divisions
and deadlocks even in the American system. There is a propensity to avoid dealing with difficult
issues resulting in parochialism, incoherent, inefficient and particularly targeted policies instead of
clear policy preferences. This lacuna may become a serious one in countries like India where the
contradictions are major and the strict separation of powers may lead to serious constitutional crises.
The president being directly elected can claim legitimacy in a plebicitarian or Rousseau’s sense. An
identical claim can be may made by elected members of the legislative organs as well leading to a
crisis situation.
Third, the most important argument in support of the presidential system is that it provides for and
indeed achieves executive stability. One major argument in favour of the presidential system is the
fixed term of the Chief executive. “Following British political thinker Walter Bagehot, we might
say that a presidential system endows the incumbent with both the ‘ceremonial’ functions of a head
of state and the ‘efficient’ functions of a chief executive, thus creating an aura, a self- image, and
a set of popular expectations, regardless of the victory margin, that are all quite different from
those associated with a prime minister, no matter how popular” (Linz 1991: 13) But in reality this
has plenty of drawbacks. It breaks the continuity of the political process. In case of an unexpected
happening like death or impeachment of the incumbent the succession is automatic and the
successor may be temperamentally very different leading to lot of uneasiness. Moreover, in a
presidential system, by and large the Vice President-ship is insignificant and may not be very
attractive to many ambitious and competent politicians and their opportunities would be lost in a
situation of automatic succession. It can also be pointed out that in the volatile political situation
of the late twentieth century the fixed term may be detrimental to the democratic process itself
where change and adaptability are the important qualities of a successful statesman which is denied
by this theory of a fixed term.
Perhaps the biggest drawback of the presidential system is that it reduces the political process to a
zero sum game in which the winner takes all even when he may be polling a minority of votes. It is
detrimental to the ideals of democracy, which lays emphasis on sharing power. This is more so for
the modernising and developing societies where the distinction is pronounced between classes,
gender, educated and the uneducated, rural and urban, the regional differentiation with uneven
development, in a situation of which a strong president would be able to represent only a few
interests and would divide and polarize rather than unite and strengthen the political process. With
growing ethnic, tribal and linguistic consciousness a charismatic leader or a strong symbolic
presidential authority may become ruinous. In the mass societies of today which are inherently plural
a successful political process is to be accommodative and participatory and in this crucial area the
presidential system is grossly inadequate as it restricts politics instead of expanding it. It polarises
politics rather than accommodate even regional aspirations, extreme ideological parties and minority
organizations. In the Indian context it is often argued that the British parliamentary system was
adopted “without adequately realising that in a heterogeneous society like India’s a strong central
authority is needed to hold the people and the territory together” (Pathak 1993: 36). The greatest
advantage of the presidential system is the preservation of national unity in a vast state with large
ethnic, religious, regional and linguistic diversities in which the president along becomes the
embodiment of the national outlook (Ibid: 36-37). One can refute these arguments along these lines.
One general recommendation that can be made concerns the traditional categories of constitutional engineering. While
consociational plurality electoral systems, and unitary forms of government, a better institutional framework is offered
by their opposites: parliamentary systems (or semi parliamentary systems with a plural executive such as in
Switzerland), list systems of proportional representation, and, in case of societies with geographically concentrated
segments, federal systems (Lijphart 1989: 224).
The proponents of the presidential system often forget that the only successful example of the
model is the United States. Its very uniqueness exhibits its serious limitations as both in political
evolution and societal formation the United States is a nation without a parallel. But even there it
is generally conceded that the political process is not integrative. As a result, some even advocate
a switch over to the parliamentary system. As the Canadian Ambassador to the United State, Alan
Gotlieb remarked,
Washington is a mass of moving charged particles, some more powerful than others but all with power of some kind.
Even the president is just another particle, though one with a charge that changes its magnitude from time to time.
Senators, representatives, columnists, congressional staffers, lobbyists, lawyers, even hostesses are all a part of a
‘system’ that seems to lack any well-defined systemic properties (cited in Dahl 1993: 448).
An equally important is the fact that separate elections of the president and the legislature creates
a situation of minority presidents. A survey in the 1970’s by G. Bingham Powell, Jr. reveals that
in a majority of the presidential systems there was a situation of divided legislature/executive for
over two years in the decade. This same survey points out the interesting fact that the majoritarian
parliamentary systems “were the most effective at avoiding minority governments as well as
providing for executive stability” (1982: 63). In the presidential systems the average durability
was 36 months as compared to 33 months in the majoritarian parliamentary systems and 22 months
in the representational parliamentary systems. On balance the majoritarian parliamentary system
emerges the strongest if both the indicators of executive stability and avoidance of minority
governments is taken into account. Added to these is the important fact that in the presidential
system there is considerable violence and in sharp contrast representational parliamentary systems
reflects the least average violence followed by the majoritarian system.
Fourth, the more ethnically divided countries are likely to have majoritarian legislatures, which
makes the presidential system inappropriate for countries like India. “The experience of India and
of some English speaking countries in the Caribbean show that, even in greatly divided societies,
periodic parliamentary crises need not turn into full blown regime crises and that the ousting of a
prime minister and cabinet need not spell the end of democracy itself” (Linz 1991:12). Fifth, the
argument of the weaknesses of the party systems in the parliamentary democracies is also not
vindicated as the party system has an independent dynamic of its own and is not linked closely with
either of the system. The two classic examples of the stable party systems, the United States and
Britain, follow two different models vindicate the fact that the weaknesses can be combated in either.
Moreover, it is generally conceded that in the more personalised politics of the presidential system
the party system is likely to be weaker than the parliamentary model. The argument that the endemic
problem of defections can be checked under the presidential system also comes from an erroneous
understanding of the policies and decision making in the presidential system. An organised group of
legislators in a divided house can stall the entire proceedings and can always demand their price. As
Neustadt (1990) mentions in his classic study of the presidential powers in the United States that to
be in that high office need not mean power as in the American context power flows from
manipulative skills in the Congress and other areas of interest group activity. Such manipulative
skills ensure that the policies of defection will be more prominent in the presidential type than the
parliamentary one with its fixed tenure of office.
Sixth, the important point that functional differentiation is a part of the modernisation process in
which the United States presidency combining the functions of a head of the state as well as of the
government is an anachronism amongst the modern constitutional practices. “The Presidency is
indeed, the only survival in the contemporary world of the constitutional monarchy once prevalent
throughout Medieval Europe” (Huntington 1968: 65). In the modern state the theoretical assumption
is that a large representational assembly performs governmental functions constitutionally. But in
actual practice the leadership and direction comes from a small body like the cabinet, the presidium
or the collective executive. In contrast the divisions in the United States system with three clearly
distinguished organs followed by further sub-divisions, which is more like the division that existed
in pre-modern medieval Europe. The only person who unites all the three functions is the president,
a combination which “is a major source of his power, but also a major limitation on his power, since
the requirement of one role often conflict with the demands of another” and that this “combination
of roles perpetuate ancient practice” (Huntington Ibid: 67). In this context it may also be pointed out
that whereas the United States constitutional set-up faces little challenges and strains as it deals with
a society of minor contradictions the Indian political scene reflects major conflicts and contradictions
which further weakens the case for the presidential system here.
Another major argument in favour of the presidential system is that it would enable the infusion
of able persons for the services of the nation, which we lose because the parliamentary system is
unable or unwilling to accommodate them. This leads to the triumph of mediocrity. However, this
in itself is an elitist idea inappropriate for the democratic age and it may also be added that for elite
accommodation the parliamentary system with a much larger legislative and executive arena offers
a more plausible alternative than the presidential one. It is no accident of history that in all the
plural societies like that of India there is parliamentary democracy. Even the special form of
presidentialism recommended by B. K. Nehru for ethnically heterogeneous societies makes the
model more complicated and cumbersome than the existing parliamentary system. Broadening of
the societal base and increase in people’s participation is more easily achieved in the parliamentary
than the presidential system (Nehru 1992:138).
India with its diversity and plurality is a nation in making. For its orderly, balanced and peaceful
development and for creating trust amongst the people, there is no substitute to parliamentary
democracy in India. The working of parliamentary democracy has disapproved J. S. Mill’s
contention that representative democracy is only possible only in a small homogenous state. It has
also nullified predictions of India breaking up including that of Selig Harrison’s observations in
the 1960’s. The parliamentary system has enabled India to have a peaceful transition in power and
has allowed all the different ideologies and points of view to be represented in the decision making
process. In the larger context it is now generally admitted that India is just one of the few
developing countries that has become both stable and viable. Moreover, compared to other
contemporary democracies under the parliamentary system India has fared well in the context of
ensuring popular participation, stability and in containing violence. Here it may also be pointed
out that the American occupation army administration in Japan opted for the parliamentary system
as being more appropriate for Japan rather than recommending their own model of presidential
system (Robinson 1996: 193).
Despite this consolidation of the parliamentary system there are some trends in recent years that
has caused anxiety in the mind of some about the feasibility of the system and its continued
relevance. First is the virtual collapse of the Congress system as the one party dominant system
with inner party democracy. Second, is the feature of coalition politics in view of the fact that no
single party has been able to win a majority. In this context it is important to point out that the
strength of a polity does not depend on the formal stability of the superstructure but on the efficient
and impartial functioning of the basic institutions. On this front we have not fared well. This is
because our political structure continues to remain oligarchic. The Westminster model has allowed
perpetuation of power by political parties who could not muster more than 50% of the votes. The
model has led to a disproportionate share of power, as it endorses the dictum ‘Winner takes all’
thereby giving the ruling party 70% of seats while securing 40-50% of votes. This asymmetry is
to be corrected by giving representation to the poor and the under privileged by a variety of
political groupings. With more and more elite accommodation of these relatively deprived sections
Indian democracy is being strengthened rather than weakened by the emergence of such a large
number of political parties at the national level. This in itself allows the possibility of power
sharing which is imperative in a pluralist democracy like India.
The need of the hour is to strengthen the existing parliamentary system rather than switching over
to the presidential system. The parliamentary system in India has ensured participation, stability
and minimal violence, which explain that with some reforms it could become more vibrant and
meaningful. These reforms include public funding of elections, checking electoral malpractices,
fixing a ceiling on election expenses and making political parties more democratic and accountable
in their functioning. Moreover, as Wolin (1986: 192) rightly points out ‘a democratic vision means
a genuine alternative’.
Since the mechanism of parliamentary democracy guarantees that
alternative our endeavour should be to make it the essence of our core political culture. As aptly
pointed out the Indian political system is “not just a system providing means of competition and
conflict but also a coalitional arena in which both ruling and oppositional groups can enter their
diverse claims” (Kothari 1972: 421).
The appropriateness of the parliamentary system for India becomes an example to the other
developing countries for a number of reasons. First, for stabilizing democracy the actualisation of
social and economic rights is a basic precondition. A comparative analysis of Costa Rica, India
and Turkey revealed that the least stable was Turkey, which also had the least egalitarian set up.
In contrast, India is more equalitarian both in terms of distribution of income and land. Her record
is also better than Costa Rica’s as the Indian Government has been able to maintain progressive
taxation and relative economic security by keeping inflation below 10%. This relatively better
performance is largely due to the continuance of the parliamentary system for more than five
decades. These are enough reasons for its adoption in other countries too. Second, Arat (1992) also
makes an interesting distinction between the early developers in the West, which successfully
followed a policy of gradual change both in the political and in the economic spheres. However,
for the late developers the gradualist strategy is not feasible as in the twentieth century the
governmental legitimacy largely depends on the creation of an egalitarian structure of society. Arat
also endorses Pateman’s (1980) critique of civic culture with its emphasis on a minimal role for
citizens especially in the context of the developing world and argues is that the stability of the
democratic system is threatened if the government fails to maintain parity between civil/political
rights and social/economic rights. The parliamentary system with its wider network of
participation and representation is more conducive to the realization of the social and economic
rights rather than the presidential one. Third, in sharp contrast to the consensual democracies of
the West, the democracies in the developing world would remain divided and polarised for a
considerable period of time and because of this key factor the parliamentary system would be more
stabilising than the presidential one as it would accommodate more divergent interests, aspirations
and regional groupings than the presidential one. The wide variety of state governments in India
is a good testimony to this and proves that for a healthy basis of state formation in the developing
world the parliamentary system has much to offer. Fourth, in the context of the developing world
it is often argued that they need strong states. But as Duodo (1994:8) has shown that the main
cause of alienation of Africans is the unitary structure of state power. This is because even the
civilian rulers spend more state money in the areas of their ethnic origin. Such monopoly of power
with advantages to few and disadvantages to many undermines the very concept of the strong state,
the inappropriateness of which in the developed world has already been demonstrated by
Fukuyama (1992). The solution to this problem calls for decentralisation, formation of effective
and financially independent local governments and wider participation of the people for all of
which the parliamentary system offers more opportunities than the presidential one.
In developing countries like India where no single authoritative voice is accepted as final in any
major segment of human activity a plural executive is always better than a singular one. It is
estimated that the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in spite of his tremendous popularity,
commanded only 25% of the electoral support. In such a scenario the presidential system is likely
to further erode the unifying basis of Indian state by increasing discord, disharmony, frustration
and alienation rather than ensure stability. Manmohan Singh, former Prime Minister in press
conference held in 2014 acknowledged that parliamentary system best suited for India, presidential
system will be counter-productive. A presidential alternative would widen the gap of credibility
and legitimacy, which already faces a crisis of governability (Kohli 1990). The idea of India as
described in the Indian Constitution within the framework of the parliamentary system of
government has stood the test of time and peaceful change in governments have blunted both its
critics and occasional sceptics about the efficacy and suitability of the parliamentary system of
government for India.
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