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Political Conspiracies in China
Jan. 5, 2017 The Chinese president is becoming more direct in his accusations against his
opponents.
By Jacob L. Shapiro
On New Year’s Eve, a translation of a speech President Xi Jinping gave to the sixth plenum of the
Chinese Communist Party (CPC) on Oct. 27, 2016 appeared in the Qiushi Journal and was picked
up by news agency Xinhua and various other news sources in China. Qiushi describes itself as
both an “organ of the Central Committee” of the CPC and “the most influential and authoritative
magazine devoted to policy-making” in China. The speech was notable because Xi accused
some Chinese officials who have been felled by his anti-corruption campaign of engaging in
political conspiracies. These officials, according to Xi, were “not only greedy financially and
corrupt in their lifestyles, but were also politically ambitious, often agreeing in public but
opposing in secret, and forming cliques for personal interests and engaging in conspiracy
activities.”
Those familiar with our writing know that we believe China is fundamentally unstable. The CPC
has to walk a tightrope between authoritarian dictatorship and regionalization that is far more
tenuous than is generally appreciated, or than the Chinese government wants to admit. Our
forecast for China in 2017 is that Xi will solidify his dictatorship and win another term as
president at the 19th Party Congress in late 2017. The publication of his speech on New Year’s
Eve is powerful evidence indicating that this forecast is on track. It is also a subtler confirmation
of our take on China’s underlying political challenges. Xi is not behaving like a dictator just
because he wants to; he is doing it because he believes he must.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping toasts the present and past leaders, together with other guests at the National Day reception in the
Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Sept. 30, 2014. STR/AFP/Getty Images
Among those singled out in Xi’s speech were four figures who Xi said were guilty of engaging in
these so-called political conspiracies: Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. We
have written about most of these characters previously, but it is helpful to rehash some of the
details to understand Xi’s intentions. All four except Guo served as members of the CPC’s central
Politburo at one point, with Zhou making it as high as the 17th Politburo’s Standing Committee.
Zhou was arguably the most powerful of the four, a former secretary of the Central Political and
Legal Affairs Commission and, before that, minister of public security. The others were also
powerful men in their own right. Guo and Xu were important military figures, serving as vice
chairmen of the Central Military Commission. Bo was a princeling, the son of one of the “Eight
Elders” who dominated Chinese politics in the 1980s and ’90s, and served as a secretary of the
CPC in Chongqing, an important city of almost 10 million people in southwest China.
Xi felt he needed to eliminate these men before he could take the next step in solidifying his
power, and each in his own way presented a unique challenge to Xi’s rule. Zhou’s power at one
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point extended into many aspects of internal security in China, including the police forces and
the courts, which would be powerful allies for any group that could make a move against the
president. Guo and Xu were representatives of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the guarantor
of the CPC’s rule. Xi pushed through a series of reforms to the PLA last year, reordering the
command structure and pledging to cut the number of soldiers by 300,000. Xi also had himself
designated commander-in-chief of the PLA last year and set up an internal disciplinary
commission for military-related corruption offenses. These would all be dangerous moves if
there was potential for discontent in the lower ranks and pushback against Xi’s directives at the
upper level of leadership. Bo was a significant player in the political structure, but his real crime
was that he was charismatic and expressed his opinions. He was an advocate of focusing
economic development on China’s interior, in contrast to China’s traditional model focused on
the export-oriented coastal regions.
Notably, none of this new “Gang of Four” were originally convicted of engaging in political
conspiracies. Zhou was given a life sentence for bribery, abuse of power and intentional
disclosure of state secrets. The lurid circumstances around Bo’s case made his conviction
particularly memorable; he was convicted of bribery, abuse of power and corruption. Guo was
given a life sentence after being found guilty of bribery, specifically of taking money in return for
helping his associates secure promotions. Xu was accused of the same, though he died from
terminal cancer before the legal proceedings against him were completed. All four were
convicted in the last three years. But in many instances the crackdowns focused not just on
specific individuals but also their families and associates.
What is especially notable is that Xi now feels powerful enough to accuse these potential rivals
of being involved in political conspiracies. The anti-corruption campaign, which is overseen by
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has always maintained that it is focused on
eliminating corruption from the CPC’s ranks. Many knew that “corruption” was a euphemism for
potential or actual resistance to Xi’s power, but Chinese sources would not say this openly, as
there was value in keeping up appearances. Xi evidently feels this is no longer necessary. He is
now not only willing to use phrases like “political conspiracies” in a speech to influential party
cadres, but he is also willing to have those two-month-old remarks highlighted in an influential
CPC publication.
What makes this different than past episodes in Chinese history, such as the 1957-1959 AntiRightist Movement or the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, is that Xi has moved against his
political rivals first. He is not relying on the masses for his legitimacy or targeting intellectual or
ideological countercurrents. Comparing Xi to Mao Zedong is inaccurate for many reasons, and
this one can be added to the list: Whereas Mao depended on the masses to rise to the top, Xi
fears being overrun by them. Xi has maintained his power by carrying out an anti-corruption
campaign and having his opponents prosecuted. But though Xi is more methodical and technical
with his moves, he has the same goals as Mao: to maintain power over China and to keep the
country together. He has gone down the path of authoritarianism to accomplish these goals and
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he can’t turn back now, especially since he has signaled that he is doubling-down by identifying
those who oppose him as political conspirators. Xi believes he is now powerful enough to do this,
though ironically that also means China is weak.
Xi will not stop these purges. This is likely just the beginning of a campaign that is about to get
significantly wider. Xi has eliminated what he saw as his key sources of opposition by weakening
the internal security apparatus and the PLA and ousting a populist leader. In other ways, such as
by attacking the Communist Youth League and seizing control of much of the economic and
financial machinery of the state, he has also added to his power. Xi will continue to eliminate his
rivals while branching out into new areas where his writ must be imposed as the year
progresses. Mao directed his Cultural Revolution against the bourgeoisie, which he defined as
those who “hang up a sheep’s head but sell dog meat, wave the red flag to oppose the red flag.”
At a meeting last week where Politburo members pledged fealty to Xi, Xinhua noted that the
meeting stressed the necessity of “passing on the red regime generation by generation.”
China’s politics have matured, but their essence hasn’t changed.
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