KentTestimony
April12,2016
WrittenTestimonyofAndrewKent
ProfessorofLaw,FordhamUniversitySchoolofLaw
HearingbeforetheCommitteeonNaturalResources,U.S.Houseof
Representatives,
April13,2016
OntheDiscussionDraftofthe“PuertoRicoOversight,Management,and
EconomicStabilityAct”
_____________________________________________________________________
ChairmanBishop,RankingMemberGrijalva,anddistinguishedmembersofthe
Committee,
Thankyouforinvitingmetotestifytoday.IamaprofessoroflawatFordham
UniversitySchoolofLaw,whereIteachconstitutionallawandothertopics.
AsIunderstandthenewdraftlegislationjustreleasedpublicly,TitleIcreatesa
FinancialOversightandManagementBoardforPuertoRico,andgivesthelegislaturesof
otherU.S.territoriestheoptiontochoosetohavesuchanoversightboardcreatedfor
them.TitleIIsetsouttheresponsibilitiesofanyoversightboardcreatedunderTitleI.
TitleIII,section302,allowsaU.S.territoryorterritorialinstrumentalitytobeadebtor
andfollowspecifieddebtadjustmentproceduresifitissubjecttoanoversightboard
createdunderTitleI,thatboardhasallowedtheterritoryorterritorialinstrumentality
toenterintoadebtadjustmentprocess,andtheterritory“desirestoeffectaplanto
adjustitsdebts.”
I.
TheUniformityRequirementoftheConstitution’sBankruptcyClause
TheConstitution’sBankruptcyClauseprovidesthat“TheCongressshallhavepower
to...establish...uniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptciesthroughouttheUnited
States.”U.S.Const.,art.I,§8,cl.4.Caselawaboutthisuniformityrequirement
establishesthat,althoughitrequireswhattheSupremeCourtcallsgeographic
uniformity,theclauseneverthelessgrantsCongressgreatleeway.“Theuniformity
requirementisnotastraitjacket....”RailwayLaborExecutives’Ass’nv.Gibbons,455U.S.
457,469(1982).Congressmaytreatdifferentclassesofdebtorsdifferently;may
incorporatestatelawinwaysthatwillleadtodifferentresultsindifferentstates;and
mayaddressgeographically‐isolatedproblemsaslongasthelawoperatesuniformlyon
agivenclassofdebtorsandcreditors.Seeid.at465‐69;Blanchettev.ConnecticutGeneral
Ins.Corp.,419U.S.102,156‐61(1974);Schultzv.UnitedStates,529F.3d343,350‐52
1 KentTestimony
April12,2016
(6thCir.2008).TheSupremeCourthasstruckdownalawasnon‐uniform,however,
whereitappliedtoonlyasingledebtor,onenamedrailroadcompany.SeeRailwayLabor
Executives’Ass’n,455U.S.at465‐69.
Inlightofthiscaselaw,aquestionmightberaisedaboutwhetherthedraftlegislation
couldbesubjecttochallengefornon‐uniformity.Thefactthatlegislationconcernsdebt
adjustmentforcertainclassesofdebtorsonly—territoriesandterritorial
instrumentalities—isunlikelytobedeemedobjectionableundertheBankruptcyClause
uniformityprovision.TheSupremeCourthasheldthatCongressmaytreatdifferent
classesofdebtorsdifferently.ButtotheextentthatthelegislationsinglesoutPuerto
Rico(anditsinstrumentalities),becauseonlyPuertoRicohasanoversightboard
createdforitbythebill,uniformityquestionsmightberaised.
Nevertheless,myviewisthattheseconstitutionalconcernscanbeavoidedinthis
case,becauseCongressmayenactdebtadjustmentlegislationforPuertoRicoundera
differentclauseoftheConstitution,aclausethatdoesnotrequireuniformity.That
clauseistheTerritoriesorTerritorialClauseofArticleIV,asreferencedin§101(b)(3)of
thenewdraftofthebill(settingoutthe“ConstitutionalBasis”).
II.
TheTerritoriesClauseAllowsNon‐UniformLegislation
TheConstitutionempowersCongressto“makeallneedfulrulesandregulations
respectingtheterritoryorotherpropertybelongingtotheUnitedStates.”U.S.Const.,
art.IV,§3.Congress’spowertousethisclausetomakerulesfortheterritorieshasbeen
calledan“absoluteandundisputedpower,”byChiefJusticeJohnMarshall.Serev.Pitot,
10U.S.332,336‐37(1810).
Congresshaswell‐establishedandlong‐exercisedpowerunderthisclausetotreat
territoriesdifferentlyfromeachother,andtotreatterritoriesdifferentlythanittreats
U.S.States.Inmyjudgment,thisclauseservesasanindependentandsufficientbasison
whichCongressmayenactthecontemplatedlegislation.Theremainderofmytestimony
willconcerntheTerritorialClauseandthenon‐uniformitythatitallows.
ThepowerofCongressovertheterritoriesisvastlydifferentthanitspoweroverthe
StatesoftheUnion.Congress’spowerislimitedinlegislatingfortheStatestocertain
enumeratedorimpliedtopicsofnationalconcern.Butwhenlegislatingforthe
territories,CongressisgivenadditionalpowerbytheTerritorialClause—broad,general
legislativepowerthattheSupremeCourtanalogizestothatofaStatelegislature.See,
e.g.,FirstNat.Bankv.YanktonCty.,101U.S.129,133(1879);Bennerv.Porter,50U.S.
235,242(1850).Overaterritoryordependency“thenationpossessesthesovereign
powersofthegeneralgovernmentplusthepowersofalocalorastategovernmentinall
caseswherelegislationispossible.”CincinnatiSoapCo.v.UnitedStates,301U.S.308,317
(1937).Thus,“[t]hepowersvestedinCongressby”theTerritorialClause“togovern
Territoriesarebroad,”ExaminingBd.ofEngineers,Architects,&Surveyorsv.Floresde
2 KentTestimony
April12,2016
Otero,426U.S.572,586n.16(1976),“plenary,”Binnsv.UnitedStates,194U.S.486,491
(1904),andeven“practicallyunlimited,”CincinnatiSoapCo.,301U.S.at317.
TheSupremeCourthasmanytimesemphasizedthatinterpretationofCongress’
abilitytolegislatefortheterritoriesundertheConstitutionmustbemarkedby
“flexibility,”CincinnatiSoapCo.,301U.S.at318,andconcernforCongress’spractical
abilitytogovern,seeTorresv.CommonwealthofPuertoRico,442U.S.465,470(1979).
PuertoRico,thoughitisnowformallyacommonwealth,isstillaterritoryofthe
UnitedStateswithinthemeaningoftheTerritorialClause.SeeTorres,442U.S.at468‐
70;Dávila‐Pérezv.LockheedMartinCorp.,202F.3d464,468‐69(1stCir.2000);
AmericanaofPuertoRico,Inc.v.Kaplus,368F.2d431,435(3dCir.1966).Inotherwords,
CongressmaystilltodaylegislateforPuertoRicopursuanttoitplenarypowerover
territoriallegislation.1
Thehistoryofcongressionalregulationoftheterritorieshasbeenoneoftailoring
legislationtothespecifichistorical,geographic,economic,legal,andpoliticalconditions
ofeachparticularterritory.ThehistoryhasalsoshownCongressusingtheTerritorial
ClausetoenactawidearrayoflegislationthatitcouldnotenactfortheStatesunderits
ArticleIpowers.
Congress’sfirstterritoriallegislation—enactedin1787bytheConfederation
Congress,andre‐enactedin1789bythefirstCongressorganizedunderthenew
Constitution—showsthispattern.SeeActofAug.7,1789,ch.8,1Stat.50.Thislaw,the
famousNorthwestOrdinance,announcedmanyrulesthatwouldapplyonlyinthe
NorthwestTerritory.Forexample,itannouncedrulesconcerningintestatesuccession
andconveyanceofrealestate,butthenalsoprovidedthat“theFrenchandCanadian
inhabitants”oftheterritorycouldcontinuetobegovernedbytheirown“lawsand
customsnowinforceamongthem.”AnOrdinancefortheGovernmentoftheTerritoryof
theUnitedStatesNorthwestoftheRiverOhio§2(July13,1787).
Manyotherexamplescouldbegivenofcongressionallegislationthat(1)couldnot
havebeenenactedunderArticleItoapplyintheStatesand(2)appliedtooneterritory
onlyandprovidedspecificallytailoredrulesforthatterritory.AftertheLouisiana
Purchase,Congress’slegislationundertheTerritorialClauseprovidedspecialrulesfor
thatterritoryconcerningtheportofNewOrleans.SeeActofFeb.24,1804,ch.13,§§6&
8,2Stat.251,253.AftertheUnitedStatesacquiredFloridafromSpain,Congressenacted
specificrulesregardingrevenuecollectionforSpanishvesselstradingwithFlorida.See
ActofMarch3,1821,ch.39,§2,3Stat.637,639.WhenCongressorganizedthe
TerritoryofOklahoma,itprovidedthatcertainspecifiedchaptersofthelawsoftheState
ofNebraskawouldapplythere,concerningmortgages,corporations,railroads,real
1SeealsoCincinnatiSoapCo.,301U.S.at319(holdingthatCongress’legislativepowerover
thePhilippinesundertheTerritorialClausehadnotchangedasaresultof“theadoptionand
approvalofaconstitutionfortheCommonwealthofthePhilippineIslands”).
3 KentTestimony
April12,2016
estate,andothertopics.SeeActofMay2,1890,ch.182,§11,26Stat.81,87.Afterthe
UnitedStatesannexedHawaii,Congressimposedcapsontheamountofrealestatethat
corporationscouldpurchaseinthatterritoryonly.SeeActofApril30,1900,ch.339,§
55,31Stat.141,150.AfterthePhilippinesbecameaU.S.territorythroughthe1898
TreatyofParis,Congressenactedadetailedsetofprovisionstogovernminingand
miningclaimsinthatterritoryonly.SeeActofJuly1,1902,ch.1369,§§20‐50,31Stat.
691,697‐704.
EarlyonCongressrecognizedtheutilityofextendingmanygenerallawsoftheUnited
Statesovertheterritories,butalsorecognizedthatnotalllawsapplicableintheStates
wouldworkwellinsomeorallterritories.Asaresult,Congressdevelopedapracticeof
providingintheorganicactsforterritoriesthat“alllawsoftheUnitedStateswhichare
notlocallyinapplicable”shallapplyintheterritory.ActofSept.9,1850,ch.49,§17,9
Stat.446,452(TerritoryofNewMexico).SeealsoActofMarch3,1863,ch.117,§13,12
Stat.808,813(TerritoryofIdaho);ActofMay26,1864,ch.95,§13,13Stat.85,91
(TerritoryofMontana).Thisstatutoryprovisionwas,ineffect,adelegationfrom
CongresstothecourtstotailorthelegislationoftheUnitedStatestothespecificlocal
requirementsofeachorganizedterritory.Theubiquityoftheseprovisions,andthelack
ofsuccessfulconstitutionalchallengestothem,evidencesCongress’plenaryauthorityto
tailorlegislationtotheneedsandcircumstancesofanindividualterritory.
TheSupremeCourttookupCongress’sdirectiontodeterminewhichgenerallaws
werelocallyapplicableorinapplicableinspecificterritories.WhenCongressspecifiedin
astatutethatitwouldapplyto“territories”aswellasStates,theSupremeCourt
examined“thecharacterandaimoftheact”todetermineifaparticularterritorywas
covered.PeopleofPuertoRicov.ShellCo.,302U.S.253,258(1937).
TheForakerAct,theorganicactforPuertoRicopassedin1900,containedthissame
“notlocallyinapplicable”tailoringprovision,andspecifiedalsothatCongress’internal
revenuelawswouldnotapply.SeeActofApril12,1900,ch.191,§14,31Stat.77,80.2
CongressfurthertailoredlegislationspecificallyforPuertoRicobyalsospecifyinginthe
ForakerActthatpreexistinglawsfromtheperiodofSpanishrulewouldcontinuein
forceunlesstheywererepealedbytheUnitedStates,inconflictwithU.S.statutes,or
determinedtobe“locallyinapplicable.”Id.§8.
2Today48U.S.C.§734provides:
“ThestatutorylawsoftheUnitedStatesnotlocallyinapplicable,exceptashereinbeforeor
hereinafterotherwiseprovided,shallhavethesameforceandeffectinPuertoRicoasinthe
UnitedStates,excepttheinternalrevenuelawsotherthanthosecontainedinthePhilippine
TradeActof1946[22U.S.C.A.§1251etseq.]orthePhilippineTradeAgreementRevisionAct
of1955[22U.S.C.A.§1371etseq.]:Provided,however,ThatafterMay1,1946,alltaxes
collectedundertheinternalrevenuelawsoftheUnitedStatesonarticlesproducedinPuerto
RicoandtransportedtotheUnitedStates,orconsumedintheislandshallbecoveredintothe
TreasuryofPuertoRico.”
4 KentTestimony
April12,2016
Congressenactedthe“notlocallyinapplicable”provisiononlyforso‐calledorganized
territories,seeRevisedStatutes§1891(1878),3inwhichCongresshadcreatedalocal
territorialgovernment.Thus,Congressallowedevengreaterdis‐uniformityin
unorganizedterritories,wheregeneralrulesoftheUnitedStateswerenotextendedby
anysuchprovision.Evenwithinorganizedterritories,Congressdrewdistinctions.When
CongressorganizedagovernmentforthePhilippines,itprovidedthat§1891didnot
apply,seeActofJuly1,1902,ch.1369,§1,31Stat.691,692,indicatinganintentthat
generallyapplicableU.S.lawswouldnotautomaticallyextendtothePhilippines.
IntheInsularCases,theSupremeCourtheldthattheConstitutiondoesnotapplyin
fullinso‐calledunincorporatedterritories,amongwhichtheCourtincludedPuertoRico
andthePhilippines.Thereare“inherentpracticaldifficulties”with“enforcingall
constitutionalprovisions‘alwaysandeverywhere.’”Boumedienev.Bush,553U.S.723,
759(2008).ThusundertheInsularCases,notallstructurallimitationsoncongressional
powerapplytoterritoriallegislation,seeTorres,442U.S.at468‐69,and“[o]nly
‘fundamental’constitutionalrightsareguaranteedtoinhabitantsofthose
[unincorporated]territories,”UnitedStatesv.Verdugo‐Urquidez,494U.S.259,268
(1990).Congressionallegislationforan“unincorporatedterritory”likePuertoRicois
“notsubjecttoalltheprovisionsoftheConstitution.”Torres,442U.S.at469.“In
exercisingthispower[undertheTerritoriesClause],Congressisnotsubjecttothesame
constitutionallimitationsaswhenitislegislatingfortheUnitedStates.”Hooven&Allison
Co.v.Evatt,324U.S.652,674(1945).4
Incontrasttoitsallowanceofflexibilityandheterogeneitywithterritoriallegislation,
theConstitutionprescribesacertainamountofuniformitywhenCongressislegislating
fortheStatesoftheUnion.Territoriallegislationhassometimesbeenchallengedonthe
groundsthatitisdis‐uniformandhenceunconstitutional,butthesechallengeshavenot
succeeded.
TheConstitutionspecifiesthatthreekindsoflegislationshouldbe“uniform”
“throughouttheUnitedStates”:naturalizationlegislation,bankruptcylegislation,and
certaintaxes(“duties,impostsandexcises”).5Notwithstandingtheseclauses,itiswell‐
establishedthatnaturalizationandtaxlegislationfortheterritoriesneednotbe
3Thisstatuteprovides:“TheConstitutionandalllawsoftheUnitedStateswhicharenot
locallyinapplicableshallhavethesameforceandeffectwithinalltheorganizedTerritories,and
ineveryTerritoryhereafterorganizedaselsewherewithintheUnitedStates.”
4Hooven&AllisonwasoverruledinpartonothergroundsinLimbachv.Hooven&AllisonCo.,
466U.S.353(1984).
5SeeU.S.Const.,art.I,§8,cl.1(“TheCongressshallhavepowertolayandcollecttaxes,
duties,impostsandexcises,topaythedebtsandprovideforthecommondefenseandgeneral
welfareoftheUnitedStates;butallduties,impostsandexcisesshallbeuniformthroughoutthe
UnitedStates.”);id.§8,cl.4(“TheCongressshallhavepowerto...establishauniformruleof
naturalization,anduniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptciesthroughouttheUnitedStates.”).
5 KentTestimony
April12,2016
uniform—eitherwithrespecttolegislationforStatesoftheUnionorwithrespectto
legislationforotherterritories.ItstandstoreasonthattheBankruptcyClause,
employingidenticallanguageaboutuniformity,alsodoesnotbindCongresswhenit
legislatesfortheterritories.
Taxuniformitynotrequiredfortheterritories:TheSupremeCourtheld,inthe
InsularCases,thatCongresswasnotboundbytheuniformityprovisionwithregardto
taxationwhenitenactedspecialrevenuelawsapplyingonlytoPuertoRico.AstheCourt
latersummarizedtherule:
“InDownesv.Bidwell,182U.S.244(1901),weheldthatCongresscouldestablisha
specialtariffongoodsimportedfromPuertoRicototheUnitedStates,andthatthe
requirementthatalltaxesanddutiesimposedbyCongressbeuniformthroughout
theUnitedStates,Art.I,§8,cl.1,wasnotapplicabletotheisland.”Torres,442U.S.at
468‐69.
AsTorresindicates,Downesisstillgoodlawonthispoint.
Thetaxuniformityrequirementhasalsobeenheldinapplicablewithregardto
incorporatedterritories.InorganizingandincorporatingtheAlaskaTerritory,Congress
“creatednolegislativebody”fortheterritoryandso“establishedarevenuesystemofits
own,applicablealonetothatterritory.”Binns,194U.S.at492.TheSupremeCourt
rejectedaclaimthattheseAlaska‐specificlicenseandexcisetaxesenactedbyCongress
wererequiredtobe“uniform”withthose“throughouttheUnitedStates.”Id.at487,494‐
96.AstheCourtnoted:
“ItmustberememberedthatCongress,inthegovernmentoftheterritories...has
plenarypower,saveascontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheConstitution;thattheform
ofgovernmentitshallestablishisnotprescribed,andmaynotnecessarilybethe
sameinalltheterritories.”Id.at491.
Naturalizationuniformitynotrequiredfortheterritories:TheSupremeCourthas
heldthatundertheTerritorialClauseortheclauseallowingCongresstoadmitnew
statesintotheunionCongresscanaccomplishthenaturalizationofalienslocatedin
certainterritoriesandadjusttheirstatustothatofU.S.citizens.SeeBoydv.Nebraskaex
rel.Thayer,143U.S.135,164‐66,168‐70(1892).TheCourtquotedwithapprovala
lowercourtdecisionthat“deniedthattheonlyconstitutionalmodeofbecominga
citizenoftheUnitedStatesisnaturalizationbycompliancewiththeuniformrules
establishedbycongress.”Id.at165‐66.The“plenarypowerofCongressoverthe
territories”canbeusedtocollectivelynaturalizespecificgroupsofpeopleontheterms
thatCongressdetermines.Id.at169.
Congresshaslongexercisedplenaryauthoritytodeterminewhetherresidentsof
insularterritoriesshouldbemadecitizensornot,andhasmadedistinctionsbetween
differentterritories.Hawaii,PuertoRico,Guam,andthePhilippineswereallacquiredby
6 KentTestimony
April12,2016
theUnitedStatesin1898,butCongresstreatedresidentsoftheterritoriesvery
differentlyforcitizenshippurposes.In1900,citizenshipwasgrantedtoessentiallyall
Hawaiians.SeeActofApril30,1900,ch.339,§4,31Stat.141,141.Notuntil1917did
CongressconferU.S.citizenshiponmanyresidentsofPuertoRico.SeeActofMarch2,
1917,ch.145,§5,39Stat.951,953.Congresswaiteduntil1940tocomprehensively
grantcitizenshiptoresidentsofPuertoRico.SeeNationalityActof1940,ch.876,§202,
54Stat.1137,1139.Notuntil1950didCongressextendcitizenshiptoGuamanians.See
ActofAug.1,1950,ch.512,§4(a),64Stat.384,384.AndCongressnevergranted
citizenshiptoresidentsofthePhilippinesenmasse,seeValmontev.INS,136F.3d914,
916‐17(2dCir.1998),thoughtheywereeligiblefornaturalizationiftheycamewithin
thetermsofgenerallyapplicablestatutes,see,e.g.,Balzacv.PortoRico,258U.S.298,308
(1922).Samoa,whichwasacquiredbytheUnitedStatesin1900,hasalsoseenits
residentsexcludedfromautomaticU.S.citizenship.SeeTuauav.UnitedStates,788F.3d
300,302(D.C.Cir.2015).
RecentlytheNinthCircuitconfirmedthattheuniformityprovisionofthe
NaturalizationClausecannotbeinvokedbyresidentsofunincorporatedterritoriesto
challengenon‐uniformcongressionalrules.SeeEchev.Holder,694F.3d1026,1031(9th
Cir.2012).
Otheruniformitycases:Whenlitigantsfromtheterritorieshaveusedindividual
rightsprovisionsoftheConstitutiontochallengecongressionallegislationunderthe
TerritorialClauseforlackofuniformity,theSupremeCourthasrejectedtheseclaims.
Forinstance,whenindividualrightschallengeshavebeenraisedtosocialbenefits
legislationthattreatedresidentsofPuertoRicodifferentlythanresidentsoftheStates,
theSupremeCourthasheldthatCongress“maytreatPuertoRicodifferentlyfromStates
solongasthereisarationalbasisforitsactions.”Harrisv.Rosario,446U.S.651,651‐52
(1980)(AFDCprogram,FifthAmendmentDueProcessClausechallenge);seealso
Califanov.Torres,435U.S.1,(1978)(percuriam)(SSIprogram)(holdingthatCongress
couldtreatPuertoRicodifferentlywithoutviolatingtheconstitutionalrighttotravel
“[s]olongasitsjudgmentsarerational,andnotinvidious”).Thiskindofrationalbasis
reviewisexceedinglydeferentialtothegovernment.See,e.g.,FCCv.BeachCommc’ns,
Inc.,508U.S.307,314‐15(1993).
III.
Conclusions
Asageneralmatter,Congressneedsonlyoneconstitutionalgrantofpowerupon
whichtoenactlegislation.Andifthelegislationmeetstherequirementsofonegrant,it
doesnotmatterifotherpossiblyapplicablegrantsdonotsupportthelegislation.See,
e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U.S.598,607,619(2000).
ItistruethattheSupremeCourthasheldthat,althoughgeneralprinciplesgoverning
thereachoftheCommerceClausewouldallowCongresstoenactbankruptcylegislation
onthatbasis,CongressshouldnotbeallowedtousetheCommerceClause“toenact
nonuniformbankruptcylaws,”becausethat“woulderadicatefromtheConstitutiona
7 KentTestimony
April12,2016
limitationonthepowerofCongresstoenactbankruptcylaws.”RailwayLabor
Executives’Ass’n,455U.S.at468‐69.
TheSupremeCourtwasnotaddressinganddidnotconsiderlegislationgoverningthe
territorieswhenitmadethatstatement,andthecaselawandlegalprinciplesdiscussed
abovesuggestthattheCourt’sconcernsaboutanendrunaroundlimitationson
congressionalpowershouldnotapplytothesituationathand,whereCongresscouldact
undertheTerritorialClause.
TheTerritorialClauseisnotanendrunaroundanything.Itisaspeciallycrafted
constitutionalpowerdesignedtoallowCongresstoflexiblyaddressthemyriadpractical
problemsofgoverningtheterritories,andtotailoritslegislationtotheunique
circumstancesofeachterritory.Inmanyways,theentirepointoftheTerritorialClause
istoallowCongresstodothingsthatitcannototherwisedounderArticleI.Thatishow
theclausehasbeenconsistentlyusedbyCongressandinterpretedbytheSupremeCourt
overthecenturies.
Inmyjudgment,thenewly‐releaseddraftlegislationiswithinCongress’spower
undertheTerritorialClause,whichisnotlimitedbytheuniformityrequirementofthe
BankruptcyClause.
ThatconclusionissupportedbytherecentdecisioninFranklinCaliforniaTax‐Free
Trustv.PuertoRico,805F.3d322(1stCir.2015),inwhichtwojudgesoftheFirstCircuit
opinedthatCongresscouldenactdebtadjustmentlegislationspecificallyforPuertoRico
underitsplenarypowerundertheTerritorialClause.Seeid.at337.Onejudgedisagreed
withthisconclusion,however.Seeid.at346‐48(Torruella,J.,concurringinjudgment).
TheSupremeCourthasgrantedcertinthiscase,seeAcosta‐Febov.FranklinCalifornia
Tax‐FreeTrust,136S.Ct.582(2015),butitisnotgenerallythoughtthattheCourt’s
decisionislikelytoaddressBankruptcyClauseuniformityissues.
Thankyouagainfortheopportunitytotestifyaboutthisbill.
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