WrittenStatementof
MaggieGarrett
LegislativeDirector,
AmericansUnitedforSeparationofChurchandState
Submittedtothe
U.S.HouseofRepresentatives
CommitteeonOversightandGovernmentReform
fortheHearingRecordon
“ExaminingaChurch’sRighttoFreeSpeech”
May4,2017
OnbehalfofAmericansUnitedforSeparationofChurchandState,thankyouforthe
opportunitytosubmitthisstatementfortherecordofthehearingtitled“ExaminingaChurch’s
RighttoFreeSpeech.”Foundedin1947,AmericansUnitedisanonpartisanadvocacyand
educationalorganizationdedicatedtopreservingtheconstitutionalprincipleofchurch-state
separation,whichisthefoundationoftruereligiousfreedomforallAmericans.Wefightto
protecttherightofindividualsandreligiouscommunitiestopracticereligion—ornot—asthey
seefitwithoutgovernmentinterference,compulsion,support,ordisparagement.Wehave
morethan120,000membersandsupportersacrossthecountry.
ThishearingwilladdresstheJohnsonAmendment,whichisaprovisioninthetaxcodethat
protectstheintegrityoftax-exemptorganizations,includinghousesofworship,byensuring
theydonotendorseoropposepoliticalcandidates.Thislaw,whichhasbeeninplaceforsix
decades,providesavaluablesafeguardthatpreventspoliticalpartiesandcandidatesseeking
powerfromusinghousesofworshipastheirtool.Atthesametime,faithleadersandhousesof
worshiphavetheabilitytofullyengageinfreespeechactivities.
ChurchesandOtherHousesofWorshipCurrentlyHaveRobustFreeSpeechRightsthatAllow
ThemtoEngageonPoliticalIssues.
Churcheshavestrongspeechrightsthatallowthemtousetheirpropheticvoicetospeaktruth
topowerandfulfilltheircalltoactforsocialjustice.Housesofworship,denominational
organizations,andfaithleadershavealwaysbeenactiveparticipantsintheAmericanpolitical
process.PassageoftheJohnsonAmendmentsixdecadesagodidnotchangethat.
Undercurrentlaw,tax-exempthousesofworshipandthefaithleaderswhorepresentthem
canspeaktoanyissuetheychoose,nosocialandpoliticalissueofthedayisofflimit.Pastors
canspeakoutonpoliticalissuesfromthepulpitorinBiblestudy.Theycanwriteaboutissuesin
bulletins,innewsletters,oronawebsite.And,withafewboundariesthatapplyequallytoall
nonprofits,housesofworshipcanlobbyonspecificlegislation.Whenitcomestoelections,they
canhostcandidateforums,holdvoterregistrationdrives,encouragepeopletovote,andhelp
transportpeopletothepolls.
Theonlylimit:theycannotendorseoropposecandidatesorpoliticalparties.
UndertheJohnsonAmendment,forexample:
• Apriestcanaddresshiscongregationfromthepulpitabouthisviewsonwhethersamesexcouplesshouldbepermittedtomarry;
• ApastorcanspeakorwritetoaMemberofCongress,expressingherchurch’s
oppositionorsupportforaparticularbillbeingconsidered;
• Achurchcanaddapagetoitswebsitethataddressesitspositiononthecountry’s
immigrationorabortionlaws;
• AsynagoguecanmarchasacongregationattheMarchforLifeortheWomen’sMarch
onWashington;and
2
•
ArabbicantestifybeforetheHouseOversightandGovernmentReformCommittee
abouthispositionontheJohnsonAmendment.
Inaddition,faithleaderscanendorsecandidatesintheirpersonalcapacityorrunforoffice
themselves.Forexample,SouthCarolinapastorMarkBurns,1Texas-basedpastorand
televangelistMikeMurdock,2Dallasmega-churchpastorRobertJeffress,3andFloridapastor
PaulaWhite4allendorsed,andinsomeinstances,campaignedforDonaldTrumpinthelast
election.BecausethesereligiousleadersendorsedandsupportedTrumpintheirpersonal
capacity,ratherthanaspastorsoftheirchurches,theydidnotviolatetheJohnsonAmendment
inanyway.Andofcourse,thereisnobaronfaithleadersrunningforandservinginpublic
office.RepresentativeJodyHice(R-GA),whoservesonthisCommittee,isjustoneexample.
Givenallthewaysinwhichhousesofworshipandtheirleaderscanengageinpoliticsandeven
inelections,itisclearthatchurchesandchurchleadersalreadyhaverobustfreespeechrights.
TheJohnsonAmendmentProtectstheIntegrityandIndependenceofHousesofWorship.
TheJohnsonAmendmentensuresthatsanctuariesremainsacredandthathousesofworship
focusonfosteringcommunityandperforminggoodworks.Allowingchurchesandnonprofitsto
endorseandopposepoliticalcandidates,incontrast,wouldtransformhousesofworshipintoa
toolforpoliticalpartiesandcandidates,andsplitcommunitiesandcongregations.
Housesofworshiparespacesformembersofreligiouscommunitiestocometogether,notbe
dividedalongpoliticallines.Indeed,theyoughttobeasourceofconnectionandcommunity,
notdivisionanddiscord.Permittingelectioneeringinchurcheswouldgivepartisangroups
incentivetousecongregationsasaconduitforcampaignactivityandexpenditures.
Furthermore,changingthelawwouldmakehousesofworshipvulnerabletoindividualsand
corporationswhocouldofferlargedonationsortoapoliticianpromisingsocialservice
contractsinexchangefortakingapositiononacandidate.
RepealorWeakeningoftheJohnsonAmendmentWouldDismantlethe501(c)(3)Non-Profit
StructureAsWeKnowIt.
Therulesinsection501(c)(3)ofthetaxcodethatrestricttax-exemptorganizationsfrom
endorsingoropposingcandidatesapplyequallytohousesofworshipandsecularorganizations.
Taxexemptcharitiesaregrantedtax-freestatusbecausetheyservethecommunityand
performworkforthecommongood—theyarenotgrantedthisstatussotheycanendorse
candidates.
1
CandaceSmith,MeetthePastorsWhoSupportDonaldTrump,ABCNews(Apr.14,2016).
KevinCirilli,ProminentTelevangelistSaysHeWillEndorseDonaldTrump,Bloomberg(Feb.14,2016).
3
PastorRobertJeffressExplainsHisSupportforTrump,NPR’sAllThingsConsidered,(Oct.16,2016)..
4
KatieGlueck,DonaldTrump’sGodWhisperer,Politico(July11,2016).
2
3
UnderthereligiousfreedomprotectionsprovidedbytheFirstAmendmentoftheU.S.
Constitution,Congresscannottreathousesofworshipmorefavorablythansecular
organizations.5AnychangesmadebyCongresstothecurrentlaw,therefore,wouldhaveto
applytobothreligiousandsecularorganizations.Asaresult,anychangesCongressmakes
wouldaffectalloftheestimated1.5millionorganizations—bothreligiousandsecular—
currentlyregisteredas501(c)(3)organizations.6Changingthelawwouldhaveamassiveimpact
oncharitableorganizationsacrossthecountry.
RepealingorweakeningtheJohnsonAmendmentwoulddismantlethe501(c)(3)non-profit
structureasweknowit.HabitatforHumanity,theYWCA,FeedingAmerica,theArc,and
thousandsofothercommunityorganizationswouldsuddenlybeunderpressuretoendorseand
opposepoliticalcandidates.Inaddition,thereputationof501(c)(3)organizationswouldbe
tarnished—donorswillnolongerseetheseorganizationsasreputableorganizationsthat
performcharitableworkforthecommongood,butinsteadseethemaspartisantoolsusedby
politicalcampaignsandcandidates.
Campaignoperativescouldalsoanonymouslyfunnelunlimitedcampaignfundsthroughhouses
ofworshipandothertax-exemptorganizations,essentiallytransformingcharitable
organizationsintopoliticalactioncommittees(PACs).Thiscouldalsoresultindecreasingthe
amountoftimeandresourcestheorganizationscandedicatetogoodworks
Moreover,changingcurrentlawwouldinvitemanyorganizationstopopuptoservesolelyasa
mechanismtofunnelmoneytopoliticalcandidates.
ReservingTax-ExemptStatustoOrganizationsthatDoNotEndorseorOpposeCandidates
DoesNotViolateFreeSpeechRights.
Becausethegovernmentcanchoosewhatitwillandwillnotsubsidize,itcan,consistentwith
theFreeSpeechClauseoftheFirstAmendment,limit501(c)(3)tax-exemptstatusto
organizationsthatrefrainfromendorsingoropposingcandidates.And,asexplainedabove,
Congresshascompellingreasonstomaintainthislimitation.
Section501(c)(3)ofthetaxcodeprovidespreferentialtaxtreatmenttoorganizationsthat
performcharitableworkandservethecommongood:theseorganizationsmayoperatetaxfreeandindividualsmaydeductfromtheirtaxesanydonationtosuchanorganization.In
returnforthispreferentialtaxtreatment,organizationsmay“notparticipatein,orintervenein
(includingthepublishingordistributingofstatements),anypoliticalcampaignonbehalfof(or
inoppositionto)anycandidateforpublicoffice.”7
5
SeeTexasMonthlyv.Bullock,489U.S.1,11(1989)(findingthatbenefitsconferredonlytoreligiousorganizations
wouldconstitutestatesponsorshipofreligionandwouldlackasecularpurposenecessarytobeconstitutional
undertheEstablishmentClause).
6
HowManyNonprofitOrganizationsAreThereintheU.S.?,Grantspace(lastvisitedMay3,2017).
7
26U.S.C.§501.
4
InReganv.TaxationWithRepresentationofWashington,8theSupremeCourt,inaruling
writtenbyJusticeRehnquist,rejectedargumentsthatthelobbyinglimitsimposedon501(c)(3)
tax-exemptorganizationsviolatetheFreeSpeechClauseoftheFirstAmendment.TheCourt
explainedthat“bothtaxexemptionsandtaxdeductibility[underSection501(c)(3)]areaform
ofsubsidy”9andthatthegovernmenthastheauthoritytodeterminewhatactivitiesitdoesand
doesnotsubsidize.Thus,“CongressisnotrequiredbytheFirstAmendmenttosubsidize
lobbying.”10Inshort,theCourt,rejected“the‘notionthatFirstAmendmentrightsaresomehow
notfullyrealizedunlesstheyaresubsidizedbytheState.’”11
Indeed,theCourtnotedthattax-exemptorganizationsthatwishtolobbyinasubstantial
mannercanstilldoso,theyjusthavetoincorporateaseparate501(c)(4)organization.
Althoughnottaxexempt,501(c)(4)sarenotrestrictedbylimitsonlobbyexpenditures.12
RelyingonthisSupremeCourtprecedent,theU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbia
inBranchMinistriesv.Rossotti,13upheldtheJohnsonAmendmentagainstclaimsthatitviolates
theFreeSpeechClause.Inthesamewaythatthegovernmentmaychoosenottosubsidize
certainlobbyingactivities,itmayalsochoosenottosubsidizepartisancampaign
endorsements.Thus,thecourtheldthatCongressmaylimit501(c)(3)tax-exemptstatusto
organizationsthatdonotendorseoropposecandidates.
SomeclaimthatCitizensUnitedv.FEC,14underminestherulingsinTaxationWith
RepresentationandBranchMinistries.ButCitizensUnitediseasilydistinguishable.InCitizens
United,theCourtstruckdownacampaignfinancelawbanningcorporationsfrommaking
independentexpendituresinsupportofcandidates,eventhoughcorporationscouldpurchase
politicaladsbyformingaPAC.15CitizensUnited,however,wasnotatax-exemptorganization
and,thus,wasnotreceivingataxsubsidyliketheorganizationsinTaxationWith
RepresentationandBranchMinistries.16Therationaleinthosecases—thatthegovernmentcan
limitthespeechitsubsidizes—therefore,didnotapply.
8
461U.S.540(1983).
Id.at544.Subsequently,numerouscourtshavereiteratedthisunderstandingofpreferentialtaxtreatmentas
subsidy.See,e.g.,BranchMinistriesv.Rossotti,211F.3d137,144-45(D.C.Cir.2000);Dep'tofTexas,Veteransof
ForeignWarsofU.S.v.TexasLotteryComm’n,727F.3d415,424(5thCir.2013),onreh'genbanc,760F.3d427
(5thCir.2014).
10
TaxationWithRepresentation,461U.S.at540.
11
Id.at546(internalcitationomitted);seealsoCammaranov.UnitedStates,358U.S.498,513(denialoftax
deductiondidnotviolatespeechrightsbecausebusinessownerswere“simplybeingrequiredtopayfor[lobbying]
activitiesentirelyoutoftheirownpockets”).
12
SocialWelfareOrganizations,InternalRevenueService(lastvisitedMay3,2017).
13
BranchMinistries,211F.3dat142.
14
558U.S.310(2010).
15
Id.at337.
16
SeeDep'tofTexas,VeteransofForeignWarsofU.S.,727F.3dat424(overthecourseoftworehearings,the
FifthCircuitthricereiteratedthatTaxationWithRepresentation’ssubsidydoctrinehadnotbeensupplantedby
CitizensUnited);Parksv.C.I.R.,No.7043-07,2015WL7280916,(T.C.Nov.17,2015)(distinguishingtheconditions
onthesubsidiesatissueinParksandTaxationWithRepresentationfromthecriminalbanonpoliticalspeechat
issueinCitizensUnited).
9
5
TheJohnsonAmendment,whichinsulatesthetaxpayerfromhavingtofundpolitical
endorsementsofnon-profitorganizations,doesnotviolatetheFreeSpeechClause.
ThePushbackAgainsttheJohnsonAmendmentHasComefromaHandfulofOrganizations
SeekingPoliticalPower.
PresidentDonaldTrumprecentlypushedtheJohnsonAmendmentintothespotlightbyvowing
to“getridofandtotallydestroytheJohnsonAmendment."17Hehasfalselyboastedthat
repealingthecurrentlaw“willbe[his]greatestcontributiontoChristianity,”becausewiththe
JohnsonAmendment,Christians“don’thaveanyreligiousfreedom,ifyouthinkaboutit.”18And
ithasbeenreportedthatheislikelytosignanexecutiveordertodaythatwouldlimittheability
oftheInternalRevenueServicetoenforceit.19
Itisnoteworthy,however,thatnotasinglemajordenominationhascomeoutinfavorof
repealingorweakeningcurrentlaw.Instead,99religiousanddenominationalorganizations
recentlypennedaletterurgingCongresstorejecteffortstorepealorweakenthelaw.20In
addition,4,500tax-exemptorganizationsjoinedaletterurgingthesame.21
RecentpollsshowtheAmericanpublicsupportstheJohnsonAmendmenttoo.Forexample,a
March2017IndependentSectorpollshows72%ofAmericanssupporttheJohnson
Amendment,including66%ofTrumpvoters,78%ofClintonvoters,and77%ofindependent
voters.22
Similarly,aMarch2017PRRIpollfoundthat71%ofAmericans—including62%ofRepublicans
and56%ofwhiteevangelicalChristians—opposeallowingchurchesandplacesofworshipto
endorsepoliticalcandidateswhileretainingtheirtax-exemptstatus.23AndaFebruary2017
surveyconductedbytheNationalAssociationofEvangelicalsconfirmedthat90%ofevangelical
leadersdonotsupportpoliticalendorsementsfromthepulpit.24Indeed,allmajorreligious
groupsinthecountrysupporttheJohnsonAmendment.25
17
Julie Zauzmer, Trump Said He’ll ‘Totally Destroy’ the Johnson Amendment. What Is It and Why Should People
Care?Wash.Post(Feb.2,2019).
18
Id.
19
E.g.,LouiseRadnofskyandIanLovett,TrumptoEaseRestrictionsonReligiousGroups,WallStreetJournal(May
3,2017);MichaelShear,LaurieGoodstein,andMaggieHaberman,TrumpIsExpectedtoRelaxTaxRuleson
ChurchesTakingPartinPolitics,N.Y.Times(May3,2017).
20
LettertoCongressfrom99FaithOrganizations(April4,2017).
21
LettertoCongressfrom4500NonprofitOrganizations(Apr.5,2017).
22
Poll:AmericansSupporttheJohnsonAmendment,IndependentSector(Mar.30,2017).
23
DanielCoxandRobertJones,MajorityofAmericansOpposeTransgenderBathroomRestrictions,PRRI(Mar.10,
2017)(PRRIpoll).
24
PastorsShouldn’tEndorsePoliticians,NationalAssociationofEvangelicals(Feb.2017).
25
PRRIpoll.
6
Furthermore,theIRShasnotinvestigatedasinglehouseofworshipforaJohnsonAmendment
violationsince2009,makingclaimsthatthelawisanimminentthreattothefreespeechof
housesofworshipevenlesscredible.
TheFreeSpeechFairnessAct(S.264/H.R.781)ThreatenstheIndependenceandIntegrityof
501(c)(3)Organizations.
InJanuary2017,RepresentativesSteveScalise(R-LA)andJodyHice(R-GA)andSenatorJames
Lankford(R-OK)introducedthe“FreeSpeechFairnessAct.”Thebilldoesnotfullyrepeal
currentlaw,butsignificantlyunderminesit.
TheBillWouldAllowVastAmountsofEndorsementActivity
Thebillwouldallowtax-exemptorganizations—bothhousesofworshipandsecular
nonprofits—tomakestatementsendorsingoropposingcandidatesforpublicofficesolongas
thosestatementsaremadeinthe“ordinarycourse”ofcarryingouttheirtax-exemptpurpose
anddonotincurmorethan“deminimisincrementalexpenses.”
Uponfirstglance,thisappearslikeanarrowexemptiontocurrentlaw,butitwouldactually
significantlygutcurrentprotections.Infact,ahouseofworshipcouldendorseacandidatein
anyactivityitcarriesoutormaterialsitsharesaslongasthereisostensiblyanotherpurposefor
engaginginthoseactivitiesorcreatingthosematerials.
Permissibleactivitieswouldinclude:
• Whilepreachingtohiscongregation,apastorcouldendorseapresidentialcandidate.
Thechurchcouldthenpostavideoofthatsermononitswebsite,emailitto
parishioners,anddistributeitpubliclyonsocialmedia.
• Achurchcouldincludeawrittenendorsementofacandidateineverychurchbulletin,
email,ornewsletter,onitswebsite,andineveryothercorrespondenceordocumentit
planstocreateordistribute.
• Thepresidentofmajoruniversitycoulduseitsweeklynewslettertoemailcurrent
studentsandamassivealumninetworktoendorseacandidate.
• Arabbicouldendorseacandidateduringthewelcomingmessageprovidedtothose
attendingacommunityserviceevent.
Alloftheseactivitiescouldeasilytakeplaceinthe“ordinarycourse”ofcarryingouttheirtaxexemptpurposeandlikelywouldnotincurmorethan“deminimisincrementalexpenses”;yet
theycouldprovideaninvaluablebenefittoacandidate.Inaddition,evenwiththestatedlimits
inthebill,endorsementscouldinvadeeveryactivity,writtendocument,correspondence,and
eventheldbythehouseofworship,ultimatelydominatingthehouseofworship’sactivities.
TheBillWouldOpentheChurchtoGreater—NotLess—IRSscrutiny
OpponentsoftheJohnsonAmendmentclaimthecurrentrestrictiononcandidate
endorsementsisvagueandopentoIRSinterpretation(eventhoughtherestrictionisactually
7
quiteunambiguous).Thisalternativeproposal,however,createsevenmoreambiguityand
invitesanevengreaterlikelihoodofIRSinvestigationsandentanglementwiththechurch.To
determinewhetherhousesofworshiparecomplyingwiththelaw,theIRSwillhaveto
determinebothwhetheranendorsementoccurredduringthe“ordinarycourse”ofcarryingout
theirtax-exemptpurposeandwhetheritamountedtoa“deminimisincrementalexpenses.”
ChurcheswouldhavetoopentheirbookstotheIRS.AndtheIRSwillbeforcedtomake
judgmentsaboutthechurches’activities.Invitingthattypeofscrutinyofchurchdocuments,
thisbillactuallythreatens,ratherthanupholds,theautonomyandindependenceofhousesof
worship.26
Forexample,todeterminewhetherthechurchonlymadedeminimusexpenses,theIRSwould
havetoinquireintohowmuchtimeandmoneywasspentoneachendorsement,aswellas
lookintothechurchesoverallexpenses.Thenitwouldhavetomakeadeterminationof
whetherthatcostwasdeminimus.
TheIRSwouldalsohavetomakejudgmentsastowhattheorganization’stax-exemptpurpose
wasandwhethereachactivityperformedbythechurchfellinlinewiththatpurpose.
Conclusion
Inadditiontobeingaplacetoworship,pray,andpraisefortheircongregations,churches
provideaspaceforcommunity,engagement,andinteractiononissuesimportanttomanyin
thecommunity.Openinguphousesofworshiptopoliticalendorsementswouldbedetrimental
totheirabilitytooperateoutsideofthepoliticalfrayandwouldruncountertothewishesof
congregants.Inaddition,repealingorweakeningtheJohnsonAmendmentwoulddismantlethe
non-profitstructureasweknowit.
26
SeeHosanna-TaborEvangelicalLutheranChurchandSchoolv.EEOC,565U.S.171(2012).
8