Analysis
June 2, 2015
Summary: Turkey’s electionfatigued public will cast their
ballots in a pivotal general
election on June 7, 2015. Even
a cursory look at what is at
stake in this election reveals
that its outcome will have
significant ramifications for
Turkish politics. The adoption
of a new constitution, the
changing of Turkey’s political
system, and the evolution of the
Kurdish peace process are just
some of the issues that will be
considerably affected by this
election result. In addition, the
run up to the election has also
brought to light some major
and long-term transformations
that Turkey’s political scene has
experienced: the transformation
of Turkey’s political fault lines,
the repositioning of Kurdish
politics and its implications
for the governing AKParty
and Turkish politics at large,
and the formation of a new
political center. Irrespective of
the election outcome, these
developments will have major
mid- to long-term impacts on
Turkey’s political scene.
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From the Transformation of Turkey’s Political
Fault Lines to the Construction of a New
Political Center
by Galip Dalay
The Transformation of Turkey’s
Political Fault Lines
During the republican period, Turkey’s
two most enduring fault lines have
been about ethnic — Kurdishness
versus Turkishness — and religious
— Islamism versus official laicisim
— identities. These two identity
clashes were the major sources of
tension in the political sphere. Yet
the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKParty), whose founding
cadres come from a political Islamic
background, have now, uninterrupted, ruled the country since 2002.
During this time, the state has gradually ceased encroaching on the rights
and liberties of the Islamic sections of
society, which has in return lessened
their grievances vis-à-vis the state.
Likewise, Turkey has travelled a long
way in recognition of the cultural and
political rights of the Kurds during the
same time period. The state has gradually shifted the Kurdish issue to being
more of a political than a security
concern. The Kurdish Movement has
increasingly become a key player on
Turkey’s political scene, the process
of which has taken some pressure off
these groups.
Over the same time period, but
especially in recent years, the longsuppressed Alevi religious minority
has gained increased political salience
and significance. This trend can easily
be discerned from a look at political
parties’ candidate lists and election
manifestos. The Republican People
Party (CHP) and People’s Democratic
Party’s (HDP) candidate lists feature
a large number of Alevi individuals.
Almost all parties, in one way or
another, have given space to Alevis’
demands in their election manifestos.
Previously, political parties did not
feel comfortable openly embracing
the Alevi community’s demands and
identity, fearing a political backlash from the conservative Islamic
majority. But as the state normalized
its approach toward other contentious
groups, the Alevis acquired enhanced
social and political acceptance. This
transformation is closely linked to
the political transformation of the
Islamist and Kurdish identities. The
increasing assertiveness and acceptance of these groups has encouraged
those of other disadvantaged identities to be more forthcoming in their
demands in the public and political
Analysis
spheres. This transformation is also a harbinger of what to
expect in the post-election period. The political manifestation of the Alevi identity is set to gain steam going forward,
and political parties will increasingly need to respond to
that community’s demands. If handled well, this process will
prove healthy for Turkey’s democracy and politics as it will
deactivate one of Turkey’s most active contemporary fault
lines.
Kurds and Islamists’ Politics of Expansionism
and its Possible Implications
The Islamists and Kurds are proving to be the most dynamic
socio-political forces shaping contemporary Turkey, but
increasingly in opposition to each other. In this election, the
rival that the governing AKParty is taking most seriously is
the pro-Kurdish HDP. No other party’s election result will
have as much impact on the AKParty’s post-election strategies as the HDP’s. Both factions, as they have matured, have
set forth expansionist visions for their socio-political reach.
The governing AKParty has already experienced more than
a decade of such expansionism. Despite the fact that its
core founding group was largely made up of ex-political
Islamists, it swiftly incorporated a large chunk of the center
right, and even a fraction of the center left, as well as liberals
and Kurds into its constituency. The HDP seems to be
looking to pursue a similarly expansionist political vision.
It wants to go beyond its core Kurdish cadres and social
constituency by incorporating Alevis, Turkish liberals and
leftists, and conservative/pious Kurds, a portion of whom
for one reason or another has grown disillusioned with the
AKParty. These HDP policies illustrate that the party, at
least for the time being, has resolved its dilemma of whether
to pursue an enlargement or a deepening strategy.
No other party’s election result
will have as much impact on the
AKParty’s post-election strategies
as the HDP’s.
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An enlargement strategy would go beyond targeting the
Kurds and break into more broad Turkish constituencies. In other words, an enlargement strategy means that
the HDP will attempt to fill the vacuum on the left of the
political spectrum, evolving from being a Kurdish party to
being a left-wing party in Turkey. A deepening strategy, on
the other hand, would mean that the HDP would cease its
efforts to reach out to the Turkish left and liberals, instead
solely focusing on enhancing and deepening its reach
among the Kurds. This strategy would require the HDP
to put extra emphasis on and effort into reaching out to
conservative/pious Kurds, adopting a more Islam-friendly
approach.
In this election, the HDP has adopted an enlargement
strategy or politics of expansionism. While doing so, it is
pursuing a separate political campaign in the Kurdish part
of Turkey that emphasizes Kurdish national aspirations
and adopts religion-friendly language. The HDP’s strategy
sets it on a collision course with the AKParty, as they are
both trying to appeal to the same constituency of pious
Kurds. But the HDP’s dual strategy is not sustainable in the
medium and long term. It will soon face tensions between
its nationwide strategy of enlargement and its separate and
local agenda toward the Kurds. It will have to sharpen its
left-wing credentials, which in return is likely to decrease
its appeal to conservative Kurds. And the more the HDP
goes down the left-wing path, the more it will appeal to
the CHP’s traditional political base: Alevis, the Turkish left
and liberals. Therefore, in the medium term, the HDP’s rise
might cost the CHP more than it does the AKParty.
In addition, much is heard about the need to reform
Turkey’s political system from President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan or through the governing AKParty’s demands for
a change from a parliamentary to a presidential system.
But the AKParty is not the only party demanding comprehensive reform and a restructuring of Turkey’s political
system. In fact, the Kurdish political movement has advocated the reform of Turkey’s political system for a long time,
raising the ire of Turkey’s previous military establishment
as well as the CHP and Nationalist Action Party (MHP).
In this respect, of the four political parties represented in
the parliament — the AKParty, HDP, CHP, and MHP —
the AKParty seems to be the most receptive to the HDP’s
demands for the restructuring of Turkey’s political system
Analysis
through decentralization, the devolution of power from the
center to the periphery, and the state’s accommodation of
different cultures and languages in public administration.
All in all, the pre-election process has demonstrated that
the HDP’s ideological/political repositioning motivates it to
pursue the role of a formidable opposition to the AKParty,
whereas its demands for the structural and systemic reform
of Turkey’s political system and state structure necessitates
it to work with the governing party, as there seems to be
no better candidate for the HDP to work with in the short
and medium term. This incompatibility between the HDP’s
political demands and its political positioning force it to
walk a fine line between them.
The pre-election process has
The Formation of a New Political Center?
The CHP’s understanding of its primary role has led the
majority of Turkey’s population to regard the party through
identity and class lenses, instead of seeing it for what it
claims to be: a center left or social democratic party. It has
been perceived particularly as the carrier of a top-down
modernist secularism, and hence the representative of the
state’s official ideology. Such a reading has driven a wedge
between the CHP and the majority of Turkish society, and
confined the party mostly to the coastal part of Turkey, the
section of society that is the most at ease with the Turkish
state’s founding modernist ideology. Yet, the CHP seems
to recognize the limits of its narrow political platform. Its
leadership, especially its chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has
repeatedly claimed that the CHP will no longer problematize religious themes and the people’s religious preferences.
He has claimed that previous restrictions on, for instance,
the headscarf in educational and public institutions have
no place in Turkey’s future. Moreover, a significant number
of the CHP’s more radical figures did not make it onto the
party’s candidate lists, so it has slashed some of its ideological excesses.
The pre-election process has also shown that the seeds of
the formation of a new political center are being sown. The
relative decrease in the significance of identity politics, the
increasing salience of the economy in the political programs
of all parties, and a growing recognition, especially by
the opposition, that Turkey’s previous status quo formed
around and mostly maintained by the civil-military bureaucratic alliance has been irreversibly shattered all pave the
ground for a new style of politics that is gravitating toward
the center.
The pre-election process has once again showed that the
political and social acceptance of Kurdish and Islamist
groups have significantly increased over the last decade.
As a corollary, these identities are losing their political
significance in relative terms. Cognizant of this change,
their political representatives, the HDP and AKParty, are
decreasing the relative dominance of these identities on
their political platforms, as reflected through the candidate
profiles and languages of these parties. The HDP is putting
less emphasis on its Kurdish credentials and more emphasis
on its left-wing credentials. The Kurdish issue constitutes
only a fraction of the HDP’s pre-election rallies agenda.
Similarly, the number of centrist (mostly from the center
right) candidates has risen on the AKParty’s candidate lists.
Likewise, Turkey’s main opposition CHP has historically regarded itself as the political guardian of Turkey’s
state-ordained strict identity, the main tenets of which
were laicism, Western orientation, and “Turkishness.”
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demonstrated that the HDP’s
ideological/political repositioning
motivates it to pursue the role of
a formidable opposition to the
AKParty.
As a corollary to the decreasing salience of identity-focused
themes, the opposition parties have recognized the value
of economic themes in this election. In almost all previous
elections since 2002, the opposition has bet on identityfocused themes and tried to convince voters of the danger
that the AKParty was purportedly posing to the Turkish
establishment’s self-conceived notion of identity, to no avail.
In all these consecutive general elections, the AKParty has
only increased its share of votes at the expense of the oppo-
Analysis
sition. The opposition has come to grasp the importance of
bread and butter issues in convincing voters.
Lastly, the formation of a new political center is contingent
upon the recognition by all parties that the previous status
quo has been shattered irreversibly. Even though it is hard
to gauge, the political parlance and election manifestos of
all major parties suggest that they have arrived at such a
conclusion. Irrespective of the outcome of the upcoming
elections, if the parties stick to this apparent conviction, this
will facilitate shift to a new political center.
The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone.
About the Author
Galip Dalay works as a research director at the Al Sharq Forum and
is a senior associate fellow on Turkey and Kurdish affairs at the Al
Jazeera Center for Studies. He previously worked as a visiting fellow at
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin
and as a political researcher at SETA Foundation in Ankara. He is
book-review editor of the quarterly magazine Insight Turkey. In addition, he is blogger for Huffington Post.
About GMF
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About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
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observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
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