PAKISTAN
Capital:
Islamabad
Population:
150,694,740
GDP:
$295.3 billion
GNI per capita:
$410
Scores:
Civil Liberties: 2.61
Rule of Law: 2.03
Anticorruption and Transparency: 2.12
Accountability and Public Voice: 1.89
(scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing
weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)
by Husain Haqqani
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For most of the years since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been
ruled directly or indirectly by the military. The country’s 1973 constitution and the fundamental rights guaranteed in its Articles 8 through 28
have remained suspended for long periods of time. Even during periods
of supposed constitutional rule, the executive branch of the government
is able to ignore or sidestep fundamental rights, often with the help of a
compliant judiciary.
The military and security services influence Pakistan’s politics and government even when power is ostensibly wielded by civilians, as was the
case between 1988 and 1999. During that time, weak and corrupt civilian
governments alternated in power while the military and its security arm,
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), set Pakistan’s ideological and international
agenda. In October 1999, the military, led by General Pervez Musharraf,
overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, ac-
2 Pakistan
cusing it of corruption and bad governance. General Musharraf declared
the creation of “true democracy”1 as his objective. Pakistan’s latest military
regime has mixed political and economic reforms with expansion of the
military’s role in government, consolidating Pakistan’s status as a semi-authoritarian state.
General Musharraf extended his presidency for five years through a
massively rigged referendum in April 2002, the official results of which
showed a 97.5 percent vote in his favor.2 Parliamentary elections were
held in October after the arbitrary introduction of 29 amendments to the
constitution as a package known as the Legal Framework Order (LFO).3
The LFO put in place an altered constitution, giving the president the
power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the legislature. It also
created a military-dominated national security council (NSC) as a constitutional body and introduced new qualifications for members of parliament aimed at excluding major opposition figures from the electoral
process. The positive aspects of the LFO include the restoration of reserved seats for women in parliament and the discontinuation of separate
electorates for religious minorities.
The October 2002 elections were described as deeply flawed4 by international observers but nevertheless failed to result in a parliament that
would bow to the military’s wishes. After the election, parliament was
not convened for over a month while the ISI created divisions among the
various parties, with a view to forming a submissive government. General Musharraf named Mir Zafarullah Jamali as civilian prime minister
but retained effective control of the government. Parliament’s refusal to
accept the LFO as part of the constitution has resulted in a virtual deadlock. With the exception of approving the budget for fiscal year 2003–04,
the new parliament has undertaken no legislative business, and the president continues to rule through decrees (known as ordinances).
The military regime’s cooperation with the United States in the war
against terrorism, coupled with successful propaganda against its civilian
predecessors, has resulted in limited international criticism of its worst
excesses. After abandoning Pakistani support for Afghanistan’s Taliban
regime, General Musharraf has presented himself as the only alternative
to an Islamic fundamentalist takeover of Pakistan. Western governments,
notably the United States, have been reluctant to criticize the Musharraf
regime’s record publicly. General Musharraf has been praised for trying to
curb religious extremism, attempting to reform the educational system, and
making efforts to increase the participation of women in social and political
life. In most cases, however, the impact of the reforms has been limited, and
Pakistan’s governance has not shifted in any fundamental way.
Pakistan 3
In a letter to General Musharraf on October 10, 2003, marking the
fourth anniversary of the military coup that brought him to power, Human Rights Watch summarized the state of civil liberties in Pakistan. It
expressed concern that “in the years since the coup, the Pakistani government has systematically violated the fundamental rights of members of
the political opposition and former government officials. It has harassed,
threatened and arbitrarily arrested them. Many have been detained without charge, mistreated and tortured, and otherwise denied their basic
due process rights.” The rights of Pakistanis also suffered as a result of
the removal of independent judges from the higher courts, the banning
of antigovernment rallies and demonstrations, and the diminution of the
role of political parties. Tribal and religious customs continue to be invoked to violate the rights of women, minorities, and children. Sectarian
and religious militias, in some cases trained by the ISI for militancy in
Afghanistan and Kashmir, also continue to threaten and kill rivals and
opponents.
CIVIL LIBERTIES – 2.61
Pakistan’s 1973 constitution envisaged a parliamentary democracy with
legal protections for civil liberties and against arbitrary arrest, detention
without trial, and torture. But an overwhelming executive has systemically
and routinely violated these constitutional protections. The judiciary is
either helpless or, in some cases, complicit in allowing the executive to get
its way.
After General Musharraf ’s coup d’etat in 1999 and the subsequent suspension of the constitution, 29 constitutional amendments were introduced,
known collectively as the LFO. Among the amendments in the package
was one that circumscribed freedom of association by allowing the government to proscribe organizations it deems detrimental to public order.
Pakistani governments in the past have routinely used the Maintenance of
Public Order Ordinance to detain political opponents without trial. This
new provision has enabled the state to further circumscribe this freedom,
which is also hampered by a preexisting ban on student unions and organizations as well as limitations on trade union activity.
Pakistan’s political parties were barred from holding public meetings or
rallies following the 1999 coup d’etat. This ban was removed for a short
election campaign period in September 2002, which left 39 days for electioneering. Restrictions on open meetings and requirements for permits
remained in force during the election campaign and continue to the present day. These restrictions were selectively used to deny opposition parties
the right to campaign fully during the election and have restricted their
4 Pakistan
ability to mobilize their supporters since the polls.5 The efforts to restrict
public protests and demonstrations have often involved denial of permits,
preemptive arrests of organizers, and denial of access to meeting locations.6
However, the regime has not, by and large, used excessive force against
demonstrations already in progress.
Pakistan’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to face legal
impediments. Although a large number of NGOs function in the country,
registration is used selectively to influence the areas in which they may
operate.
The absence of judicial enforceability of constitutional protections enables the Pakistani state to arrest and detain citizens indefinitely. In some
cases, opponents and critics of the regime are charged with other offenses,
such as corruption or terrorism, and then denied bail. A notable case is that
of Asif Ali Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto,
who has been in prison on corruption charges without a conviction for
seven years.
Pakistan’s police and other law-enforcement agencies are known to use
torture against prisoners, sometimes resulting in the latter’s death. During 2002, for example, the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners Aid
(SHARP) reported 38 deaths due to police torture,7 and Amnesty International estimates that at least 100 persons die from police torture each year.
Extrajudicial killings are also widely reported and documented, although
precise numbers remain unavailable.
Since the days of the anti-Soviet mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan,
Pakistan has been home to several Islamist militant groups. Pakistani authorities have been known to encourage the militants, especially in their efforts
to wage war against India in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
Some of these groups have also engaged in sectarian terrorism inside Pakistan.
The government banned five religious militant groups in January 2002, but
they reconstituted themselves under new names. Activists and leaders of the
banned groups arrested at the beginning of 2002 were released within a few
days. Maulana Azam Tariq, the leader of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a
banned terrorist group, was released from prison and elected to parliament,
where he voted for the government. [Editor’s note: Tariq was murdered on
October 6, 2004.] Sectarian attacks by members of these groups against Shia
Muslims, members of the Ahmadiyya sect, and Christians continued throughout the year.8
The state has generally failed to provide for the free practice of religion
by all citizens, despite constitutional and legal guarantees. Members of the
Ahmadi sect, which has been declared a non-Muslim minority under the
constitution since 1974, continue to face discrimination. Pakistani laws
Pakistan 5
forbid Ahmadis (who consider themselves a sect of Islam) from using Islamic religious symbols or rituals. Other religious minorities such as Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, do not face these legal restrictions. However, the
Blasphemy Law is often used by low-level officials to threaten or persecute
minority religious communities.
Gender equity and minority rights have not improved significantly, despite the government’s efforts to amend existing laws. Pakistan’s constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, caste, residence,
or place of birth, and the present government has created the National
Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), expanded women’s representation in senior government positions, and amended some of the laws
considered discriminatory. But systemic discrimination endures, as does
widespread abuse and violence directed at women and minorities. During
2003, members of the Women’s Commission publicly voiced criticism of
the government for ignoring their views and recommendations, and its
chairwoman acknowledged that laws relating to women were not being
implemented.9
One of the most significant sources of legal discrimination and oppression against women is the Hudood Ordinance, a law introduced in 1979
during the Islamization drive under previous military ruler General Ziaul
Haq. It equates rape with consensual sex, demands that rape victims support their charge with four male Muslim witnesses, excludes the testimony
of non-Muslim and women witnesses in certain cases, and treats a 10-yearold female child as an adult on the basis of her reaching puberty. Although
two government-appointed women’s commissions have recommended its
abolition, most recently in September 2003, the law has not been abolished
or changed. Several thousand women have been wrongfully jailed under the
provisions of the Hudood Ordinance and more than 2,000 are currently
estimated to be in prison.10
Rape, domestic violence, and honor killings (the practice of killing a
female relative for marrying against the will of the family or engaging in
premarital or extramarital sex) remain pervasive problems. In 2001 the Human Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP) estimated that at least eight
women, five of them minors, were raped in the country every day.11 The
authorities have failed to prosecute successfully an overwhelming majority
of the offenders involved in honor killings, and the practice continues to be
widely condoned. Conviction rates in most violent crimes against women
remain low, indicating a systemic bias against the victims.
Although Pakistani law forbids trafficking in women and children, the
practice continues unabated. Between 100 and 150 women are estimated
to enter Pakistan illegally every day.12 These women, mainly from Bangla-
6 Pakistan
desh and Burma, are kidnapped or married to agents by parents in their
home countries. They are sold to brothel owners or for forced marriage
upon arrival in Pakistan. Underage Pakistani children continue to be sold
to Gulf Arab sheikdoms for use as camel jockeys. Corrupt police officials
receive commissions and bribes from traffickers in return for ignoring the
law. Political authorities have failed consistently to put prevention of trafficking in women and children on the list of priorities for improvements
in law enforcement.
Recommendations
The ISI’s role in supporting Islamic militant groups should be brought to
an end, making it possible to progressively eliminate sectarian and religious
militancy. The government should seek the cooperation of major political
parties to repeal the Hudood Ordinance and amend the Blasphemy Laws.
The ban on student unions and the limitations on political parties and trade
unions should be removed.
RULE OF LAW – 2.03
Pakistan’s judiciary is far from independent.13 Judges are appointed
by the executive on recommendations from the ministry of law, without
any checks or balances. The ministry also drafts new laws and decrees,
sometimes with retroactive effect. The superior judiciary, including the
Supreme Court and the provincial high courts, has sometimes been reshuffled arbitrarily so that the courts do not rule against the existing
executive in constitutional matters, especially under military rule.14
Sharia courts, established in 1979, continue to exist, but the government
has stopped referring cases to them. In the case of the federal Sharia court,
vacancies remained unfilled through September 2003.
After the military takeover of 1999, the military government insisted
that judges of the superior judiciary take fresh oaths pledging allegiance
to the Provisional Constitution Order—the military chief ’s proclamation
suspending the constitution. The chief justice of the Supreme Court and
five other justices refused and were replaced by other judges. The new
Supreme Court provided legal cover to the military takeover on grounds
of the doctrine of necessity. The courts rejected all subsequent legal challenges to military rule, including those against arbitrary constitutional
amendments. The courts have consistently ruled in favor of the government on issues relating to civil liberties and fundamental rights, often
ignoring the letter and intent of law as well as their own prior rulings. In
addition, there is widespread corruption in the judiciary, which influences
criminal and civil proceedings.
Pakistan 7
The executive branch of government in Pakistan retains full authority
over appointing judges and over the perquisites of their office. Judges are
legally trained before assuming the bench; the federal government also
maintains a judicial training academy. However, courts, especially at the
lower levels, are poorly equipped, with limited access to resources such as
books and computer databases.
In the absence of judicial independence at the highest level, there is little prospect of prosecutors being independent of political direction. Nor
is there any provision, in law or in practice, of state-provided attorneys
for citizens charged with serious felonies.
In 2002, the courts’ refusal to stop General Musharraf from arbitrarily
amending the constitution resulted in the ongoing showdown between
lawyers and the judiciary. In October 2002, the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) issued a statement declaring that arguing a case before
the present judiciary was a futile exercise because the judiciary had ceased
to be independent. In April 2003 the courts rejected all legal challenges
to the LFO, effectively accepting it as part of the constitution for judicial
purposes. This aggravated the relations between the bar and the superior
judiciary. Among other things, the LFO extended the tenure of superior
court judges by three years. Thus, the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) alleged, the superior court justices had held that the LFO was legal for
their own personal gain. The lawyers launched an unprecedented attack
on the judiciary’s role in an 83-page white paper, released to the media
on June 28, 2003, which declared, “The judiciary, due to its role and
performance for the last three years, has relegated itself to the position
of subservience to the military rulers. Its role has been to support the regime of General Musharraf without any regard for the [sic] constitutional
dictates.”15 The white paper also claimed that the government influenced
judges by maintaining personal dossiers on their conduct. The chief justice struck back at the lawyers’ rebellion by closing down the offices of
the SCBA in the supreme court building in Islamabad.
In July, the government issued a draconian Contempt of Court Ordinance,16 which made contempt of court punishable by imprisonment for
six months or a fine up to US$1,700, or both. Criticism of the conduct
of a judge in parliament has also been declared a punishable offense. No
one has been charged under the new law so far.
By late 2003, lawyers’ protests against the judges included boycotts of
court proceedings and wearing black protest armbands when they appeared before judges. On September 5, police had to be called to control
a scuffle between lawyers and court clerks on the premises of the Lahore
High Court. Police charged 20 lawyers under the 1997 Anti Terrorism
8 Pakistan
Act for allegedly threatening the Lahore High Court chief justice. The
lawyers passed a resolution demanding psychiatric examination of the
chief justice.17 The resolution was a symbolic gesture against the chief
justice’s refusal to pay attention to the lawyers’ criticism of lack of judicial
independence and his insistence on trying to stop the lawyers’ substantive criticism with criminal charges. The conflict was reportedly resolved
through negotiations later, and lawyers agreed to continue appearing before the judge, but clashes between judges and lawyers have not ended.
The dispute reflects a growing concern among lawyers about the judiciary’s independence.
Concepts such as equal treatment under the law and accountability
of security forces and military to civilian authorities are mentioned in
Pakistan’s constitution but are not, in effect, practiced. The state’s respect
for and enforcement of property rights is also selective.
Soon after assuming power, General Musharraf ’s military regime created monitoring teams of military officers to oversee the functioning of
all civilian officials, including law-enforcement personnel. The national accountability bureau (NAB), which prosecutes corruption cases, is
headed and largely staffed by military officers. Special courts created to
deal with terrorism and corruption cases also operate in close cooperation with military authorities. The LFO allows General Musharraf to
combine the offices of president and army chief of staff for an indefinite
period, thereby entrenching the military’s institutional domination of
Pakistan’s political life.
Recommendations
The independence of Pakistan’s judiciary should be restored through appointment of judges of good repute. The process of appointments to the
superior judiciary should be made more transparent, possibly involving the
Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) and open hearings before a parliamentary
committee. The present confrontation between the bar and the judiciary
must be brought to an end. The military’s interference with law enforcement and judicial proceedings should be rolled back, and parallel courts
and prosecution bodies should be abolished. For example, military officers
should not serve as prosecutors in NAB, nor should there be special courts
for specific offenses, as is the case with terrorism and corruption-related
offenses. The duplication in the jurisdictions of the federal investigation
agency (FIA) and NAB should be eliminated. Funding and training for
law enforcement and the judiciary should be increased. Security and intelligence services should not be allowed to remain above the law. More judges
should be appointed to clear the extensive backlog in lower courts.
Pakistan 9
ANTICORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY – 2.12
Corruption persists at almost all levels of government in Pakistan. Protections against conflict of interest are inadequate and even less adequately
enforced. Separation of public office from the personal interests of public
officeholders is not always maintained. Bribes are common in the higher
education system, for both admission and good grades. General Pervez
Musharraf, however, claims credit for introducing “corruption free governance”18 in view of the government’s efforts at eliminating kickbacks and
no-bid contracts at higher levels.
Although government regulation of the economy has progressively declined over the last several years, lack of transparency in government decision making still provides opportunities for corruption. There is rampant
corruption at lower levels, where government officials demand bribes and
gratuities for performing even routine functions. Low salaries and minimal
compensation for government employees are often major factors in perpetuating the graft. Pakistan’s score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2003 stood at 2.5 out of 10 (highly clean), a
decline from the previous year’s 2.6.19
The NAB spearheads the government’s anticorruption drive. It operates under the National Accountability Ordinance of 1999, which was
repromulgated in September 2002 with some modification such that it
will remain in force after the election of a new parliament. The ordinance
gives broad powers to the NAB chairman to “provide for effective measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of
cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or abuse of power or
authority, misappropriation of property, taking of kickbacks, commissions
and for matters connected and ancillary or incidental thereto.” It allows
investigation and prosecution of cases dating back to 1985.
NAB has, so far, selectively targeted politicians and civil servants from
preceding civilian governments in a politically motivated campaign aimed
at discrediting civilian administrators.20 Judges and military officers have
been virtually exempt from any accountability. Almost all of NAB’s investigations and prosecutions were directed against politicians, civil servants,
and businessmen. During four years of military rule, NAB has prosecuted
560 cases of high-level corruption; 705 investigations were reportedly in
progress at the end of September 2003.21 Only 8 involved armed forces personnel, even though military officers head several public sector enterprises
and hold more than 1,000 positions in the civil service.
The most draconian provision of the Accountability Ordinance is its
requirement that the burden of proof that authority was used in the public
10 Pakistan
interest lies with the accused. This means that NAB officials can blackmail
or coerce public servants for political or personal advantage, opening a new
door for corruption. The jurisdiction of the NAB chairman and, by extension, his subordinates is unfettered, as is his discretion in plea bargains or
even withdrawal of pending proceedings.
The appointment of the NAB chairman, previously the sole prerogative
of the president, must be made by the president “in consultation with the
Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition in the National
Assembly.”22 Under the ordinance, the tenure of the NAB chairman is
fixed at four years and is nonrenewable. All three chairmen of NAB since
its inception have been serving army generals. The amended law opens
the way for future appointees to come from among retired chief justices
or judges of the Supreme Court, chief justices of the high court, retired
lieutenant generals and retired federal government officers in the highest
grade in the civil service.
NAB claims that its efforts have eliminated high-level corruption, improving transparency in the awarding of major government contracts and
financial dealings. There have hardly been any reports of massive kickbacks
on large projects similar to the widely reported instances of such corruption
under civilian rule. But this could also be a reflection of greater control over
the flow of information within a military government. Opposition politicians and disgruntled civil servants are often the source of leaks to the media about charges of corruption under civilian rule; the spirit of camaraderie
among military officers and the fear of reprisals by security services prevent
such widespread leaks under the present administration.
In October 2002, the government approved a new national anticorruption
strategy (NACS).23 The NACS, contained in a 147-page report, describes
corruption as “a systemic problem, representing a persistent failure of governance” and outlines an action plan for eliminating corruption from the political system, the executive and judicial branches of government, and even the
media. Once again, this document contains no recommendations for dealing
with corruption by military and security personnel. There was little reported
progress in implementation of the strategy during the course of the year.
At the time of parliamentary elections in October 2002, the government
required all candidates for elective office to file declarations of their assets.
Cabinet members, civil servants, and military officers are required by law
to file asset declarations as well. However, enforcement of laws in this respect is weak and selective at best, and no visible improvement took place
during the year.
Pakistani laws provide for open and competitive bidding in awarding
government contracts, but information on government expenditures and
Pakistan 11
governmental decision making is not always public. A Freedom of Information Ordinance,24 promulgated in September 2002, fell far short of the
proposals of the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE). It excluded minutes of meetings and intermediary opinions and recommendations from the records government departments and agencies are required
to make public. In addition, it allowed the federal government to withhold
information at will.
Administration and distribution of foreign assistance through government bodies is not always transparent, particularly as most donors no longer
station large numbers of personnel on the ground due to the security situation. The government also periodically attempts to interfere in the flow of
assistance to nongovernmental organizations.
Recommendations
The military and the judiciary must be held accountable in order for Pakistan’s efforts against corruption to bear fruit. NAB should not be used for
the political purpose of discrediting politicians and civilian administrators.
Appointment of its personnel should be subjected to checks and balances
and its jurisdiction should be extended to the military and the judiciary.
Improvements in pay scales for civil servants and judges are necessary to
discourage the environment for corruption. Secrecy in government should
be minimized. The scope of the Freedom of Information Ordinance must
be expanded and an enforcement mechanism provided. The broad powers of NAB should be restricted in accordance with the normal penal and
criminal procedure codes.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC VOICE – 1.89
Pakistan is currently governed by the military, with some civilian participation in government following the parliamentary elections of October
2002. General Musharraf ’s 1999 coup d’etat and suspension of the constitution was endorsed by Pakistan’s Supreme Court under the doctrine
of necessity. The court, however, required the holding of general elections
and return of constitutional rule within three years. The military regime
complied with this requirement by holding the October 2002 elections. But
prior to the elections, the LFO, comprising 29 amendments to the constitution, was promulgated. The courts did not entertain legal challenges to
these arbitrary amendments to the constitution.
The LFO enhanced the president’s powers at the expense of the legislature
and changed the constitutional scheme of parliamentary democracy by making the president, as opposed to parliament or the prime minister, the center of
executive and legislative authority. General Musharraf was assured a five-year
12 Pakistan
term as president by the LFO, without the contested election required by the
constitution. The NSC, dominated by military officers, was created that is
intended to “serve as a forum on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty,
integrity, and security of the state; and the matters relating to democracy, governance, and inter-provincial harmony.” Opposition politicians see this as an
attempt to offset the authority of a civilian cabinet formed after elections and
grant the military an institutional say in political matters. Article 58(2)(b) of
the constitution was restored, giving the president the unilateral authority to
dismiss the government and the national and provincial legislative assemblies.
This article had originally been inserted in the constitution by the military
regime of General Ziaul Haq when he similarly restored the constitution after
eight years of martial law in 1985. It had been repealed by act of parliament
in 1997, after being used repeatedly by military-backed presidents to dismiss
elected governments.
The right of individuals to stand for elected office was limited by the requirement that only those with a bachelor’s degree could run. Several career
politicians who had entered politics after high school or with non-degree
professional qualifications were disqualified. This included the head of the
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), Nawabzada Nasarullah
Khan, an octogenarian politician whose political career spanned six decades.
Retired military officers and clerics, on the other hand, were allowed to
run, as graduation from the military academy and Islamic seminaries was
equated with a university degree. Criminal convicts, defaulters on bank
loans and utility bills, and absconders from court proceedings were also
disqualified from elections. Some of these restrictions were clearly aimed at
excluding exiled former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif,
as well as several of their loyalists, from the electoral process.25 The LFO
also validated all decisions of General Musharraf and those serving in his
military regime, without recourse to judicial review.
On the more positive side, the LFO eliminated separate electorates for
religious minorities, thereby enabling them to vote alongside Muslims
and paving the way for their full political and civic participation. In addition, 10 seats were reserved in the new 342-member national assembly
(up from 237), the lower house of parliament, for religious minorities.
The LFO also reserved 60 seats in the national assembly for women.
Cabinet representation of women increased at both the national and provincial levels.
General Musharraf deviated from the constitution and his own “roadmap
for the restoration of democracy,”26 announced on August 14, 2001, when
he held a one-sided referendum on April 30, 2002, seeking endorsement
for an extension of his rule for five more years. The constitution provides
Pakistan 13
for the president to be elected by an electoral college comprising members of the national and provincial assemblies. According to the European
Union (EU), which sent an observer mission for the elections but not the
referendum, “Pakistan’s political parties, human rights groups and media
claimed that there were widespread electoral abuses including multiple
voting, stuffing of ballot boxes, lack of secrecy of the ballot and coercion of
public officials” during the referendum.27
The EU and other international observers described the legislative elections held in October 2002 as “seriously flawed.” In its final report, the EU’s
election observation mission complained that it did not receive adequate
cooperation from Pakistani authorities. It concluded that “polling day itself
had gone relatively smoothly and that any shortcomings were the consequence of inadequate training and administrative arrangements rather than
the consequences of intended abuse.” But it expressed “serious misgivings
regarding other aspects of the electoral process.” The EU mission, however,
expressed the hope that “all those who fully support the restoration of democracy will work together to ensure that good governance is permanently
established in Pakistan.”
The EU assessment of the election included “serious concerns regarding
the independence of the Election Commission of Pakistan.” It also listed
“restrictions on political parties and their candidates, the misuse of state
resources, some unbalanced coverage in the state media, deficiencies in the
compilation of the voting register and significant problems relating to the
provision of ID cards” as factors delegitimizing the election.
The EU election observer mission reserved its strongest criticism for
the LFO’s provisions for the election. It “acknowledged that there were
positive measures . . . such as the reduction of voting age from 21 to
18, the establishment of reserved seats for women in the national and
provincial assemblies and the introduction of a joint electorate.” But it
criticized the “restrictions placed on the nomination of candidates” and
“the enactment of legislation (whose legality is questionable) which was
designed to prevent certain candidates from standing in the election.”28
In the view of the EU, the LFO had institutionalized the role of the
army in the governance of the country and had departed from a parliamentary form of democracy to a presidential system, which is a major
deviation from the 1973 Pakistan constitution. That the president under
the new system is an army general who has not been elected by the
people led the EU observers to comment that “the holding of a general
election does not in itself guarantee the restoration of democracy.” They
questioned whether there would be a “full transfer of power from a military to civilian administration” after the election.
14 Pakistan
The EU’s findings were shared by the relatively smaller Commonwealth delegation. The Commonwealth ministerial action group, which
acts as the organization’s decision-making body, decided against lifting
Pakistan’s suspension from membership in the Commonwealth because,
it concluded, the elections had been flawed.29 Pakistan’s membership in
the Commonwealth of former British colonies was suspended after the
1999 coup d’etat. In May 2003, several months after the appointment of
a civilian prime minister, the Commonwealth reaffirmed the suspension,
maintaining that Pakistan’s progress toward democracy and civilian rule
was insufficient.
In addition to limiting opposition parties’ ability to reach out to the people, the military regime has propped up a splinter group of former Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML), known as the
Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA). Widely nicknamed
the “king’s party,”30 the PML-QA emerged as the single largest party from
the restricted elections of 2002 and was able to form the government with
the help of smaller parties and a splinter group from former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The ISI openly pressured
individual legislators to support the king’s party, denying them the right to
vote their consciences.
An alliance of Islamic parties, the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), dominated the provincial assembly in the Northwest Frontier province and
formed the provincial government. From the day the national assembly
was convened, the mainstream opposition parties (the PPP and the PML),
as well as the MMA, demanded the restoration of the constitution and
parliament’s right to review the LFO. The rejection of their demand by the
government led to boycotts and disruption of parliamentary proceedings.
The government initiated negotiations with the MMA, but the PPP and
PML, now united in the ARD, opted not to negotiate unless persecution
of their parties and exiled leaders ends. The ARD also protested against the
interference of the ISI in the political process. ISI operatives, particularly
the head of its internal wing, openly met with political leaders in attempts
to influence their decisions and to coerce opposition members into joining
the government.
Pakistan’s civil service is selected through competitive exams, but recruitment is carried out on the basis of provincial quotas, which does not
always ensure equal opportunities on merit for all candidates. In addition,
10 percent of civil service positions continue to be reserved for the military. During the past year, the military expanded its share of civil service
positions through direct appointment on contract of serving and retired
officers to 1,027 civilian jobs, including 15 ambassadors and 3 university
Pakistan 15
vice-chancellors.31 Currently, the heads of the federal and provincial public service commissions, which select candidates for the civil service, are
retired military officers.
The military and security services seek to continue governing Pakistan
with a veneer of constitutional democratic rule, to the detriment of political
parties and civil society.32 The authority of General Musharraf ’s government is not based on the will of the people, there is no opportunity for
rotation of power, and the military’s domination of the political process is
quite extensive. This has not changed despite the election of the federal and
provincial legislatures and the appointment of a civilian prime minister.
There are no effective means for citizens to obtain information about the
conduct of government in Pakistan. Legislation by decree or ordinance precludes the possibility of open debate prior to enactment of laws, although
groups do selectively comment on government policies in the media.
Article 19 of the Pakistani constitution guarantees freedom of the press,
but several laws partially circumscribe it. Although the government controls
most broadcasting and television, Pakistan’s print media remain diverse and
considerably independent. However, the security services, especially the ISI,
try to influence newspaper editors by advising them on how to report and
comment on certain subjects.33
The ministry of information, which controls public sector advertising,
attempts to coerce critics by reducing the flow of advertisements.34 As a
result, newspaper owners and editors exercise restraint in criticizing the
government and practice self-censorship. More significantly, three new
press laws were decreed in October 2002, including one on defamation,
which Pakistani journalists feared would restrict their freedom of expression.35 However, no case was reported to have been pursued under these
laws against the press until September 2003. The new defamation law increases the penalty for journalists and editors found guilty of defamation to
a minimum of Rs 50,000 ($900) in damages or three months in prison.
According to Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), “Gen. Musharraf publicly
accused [Pakistani newspapers] of belittling his political allies and of being in
the pay of the ‘opposition forces.’”36 Three investigative reporters in Islamabad
were harassed by the ISI in October and November 2002 for writing stories
that embarrassed the government. In November, the government published
a warning to newspapers against quoting reports from a U.S.-based online
investigative newspaper, South Asia Tribune, which had run a series of stories
about corruption in the Musharraf regime.37 Internet service providers were
instructed to block the Web site, a direct act of censorship.38
Several incidents of beating or harassment of individual journalists by
officials and non-state actors, especially religious groups, were reported
16 Pakistan
during 2002–03. The government failed to punish officials in most of these
cases. The editor of the Lahore-based weekly The Independent was forced
to resign his position in March 2003 under pressure from the ISI and the
authorities in the Punjab government.39
The government opened the electronic media to private ownership by
granting 22 licenses for FM radio stations in several cities across the country in October 2002.40 None of the private radio stations had, however,
started broadcasting as of September 2003.
Recommendations
Military intervention in politics must end in order for constitutional
governance to be restored in Pakistan. General Musharraf should adhere
to his roadmap for democracy and genuinely transfer power to the elected
parliament and government. The LFO should be submitted to parliament
and only those parts that receive parliamentary approval should be retained.
The legal and practical restrictions on major political parties should be
withdrawn. For their part, the political parties should reach agreement on
a political code of conduct that prevents the winner-take-all politics of
the past that has facilitated military intervention. The ISI’s internal wing
should not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of political parties or civil
society organizations. The government should withdraw the new press laws,
and legal measures should, instead, be introduced to protect journalists
and punish officials who intimidate them or otherwise interfere with the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. The Council of Pakistan
Newspaper Editors (CPNE) and the All Pakistan Newspapers Society
(APNS) should be involved in any new legislation relating to the media.
Husain Haqqani is a Pakistani columnist and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. He has served as an adviser to former
Pakistani prime ministers and as Ambassador to Sri Lanka.
Notes
“I Want a True Democracy,” interview with General Pervez Musharraf, Time, 6 December
1999, http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/1206/pakistan.musharraf.html.
2
“Pakistan: Entire Election Process Deeply Flawed,” Press Release (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW ], 9 October 2002), http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/10/
pakistan-bck1009.htm.
3
Legal Framework Order, Chief Executive’s Order of August 21, 2002 (Islamabad: Gazette
of Pakistan Extraordinary, 21 August 2002).
4
“Election Process” (HRW).
5
“No Political Activity Planned on First Day,” The Dawn, 1 September 2002, http://www.
dawn.com/2002/09/01/nat9.htm.
1
Pakistan 17
World Report 2003 – Pakistan (HRW, 2003).
Pakistan, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 31 March 2003),
5.
8
“Sectarian Violence in Pakistan” (New Delhi: South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2003) http://
www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm.
9
“Implementation of Laws to Ensure Women’s Empowerment: Justice Rizvi,” The Dawn, 21
February 2003; “Women Commission Complains of Being Ignored,” The Dawn, 6 March
2003; Web site, National Commission on the Status of Women, http://www.ncsw.gov.pk.
10
“Govt. Panel Seeks Abolition of Hudood Ordinance,” The News, 3 September 2003,
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2003-daily/03-09-2003/metro/i1.htm.
11
“Current Human Rights Information – Women” (Lahore: Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan, 2003), http://www.hrcp.cjb.net.
12
Shafqat Munir, “Trafficking, South Asia and Pakistan,” Himal, September 2003, http://
www.himalmag.com/2003/september/report_2.htm.
13
Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
14
Ibid.
15
The Daily Times (Lahore), 25 November 2003, 7.
16
Contempt of Court Ordinance, Ordinance IV of 2003 (Gazette of Pakistan, 10 July
2003).
17
“Current Human Rights Information – Judiciary” (Lahore: Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan [HRCP], September 2003), http://www.hrcp.cjb.net.
18
“Pakistan: U.S. Ally at the Crossroads of Central, South and Southwest Asia,” speech
by Pervez Musharraf (Los Angeles: Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 10 January 2003),
http://www.lawac.org/speech/musharraf%202003.htm.
19
“IMF Asks Pakistan to Reduce Corruption,” The News (Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi), 29 October 2003, http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2003-daily/29-10-2003/main/
main5.htm.
20
Ian Talbot, “General Pervez Musharraf: Savior or Destroyer of Pakistan’s Democracy?”
Contemporary South Asia 2002, vol. 11, no. 3, 311–28; “Pakistan: Entire Election Deeply
Flawed,” Background Briefing (HRW, 9 October 2002).
21
See figures for prosecutions and investigations at website of National Accountability
Board, http://www.nab.gov.pk.
22
Ordinance Further to Amend National Accountability Ordinance, Ordinance XVIII of
1999 (Gazette of Pakistan, 23 November 2002).
23
Full text available at http://www.nab.gov.pk.
24
Freedom of Information Ordinance, Ordinance XCVI of 2002 (Gazette of Pakistan, 26
October 2002).
25
Talbot, “General Pervez Musharraf.”
26
Susannah Price, “Musharraf ’s ‘Roadmap to Democracy,’” British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), 14 August 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1490697.stm.
27
“Pakistan, National and Provincial Assembly Election, 10 October 2002, European Union
Election Observation Mission, Final Report” (Brussels: EU, 2002), 6.
28
Ibid., 7.
29
Ewen MacAskill, “Commonwealth Rebuffs Pakistan,” Guardian, 2 November 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,824565,00.html.
6
7
18 Pakistan
30
See, for example, “Jamaat Accuses Govt. of Backing King’s Party,” The Dawn, 8 September 2002; “Pakistan: Entire Election Process Deeply Flawed,” Press Release (HRW,
9 October 2002, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/10/pakistan-bck1009.htm; Susannah
Price, “Pakistan’s Democracy Test,” BBC, 9 October 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/2310527.stm.
31
Nasir Iqbal, “1027 Civilian Posts occupied by servicemen,” The Dawn, 3 October 2003,
http://www.dawn.com/2003/10/03/nat9.htm.
32
See Farhan Bokhari, “The Rise and Long-term Outlook for the MMA in Pakistan,”
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], January 2003),
http://www.csis.org/saprog/030117PKfuture.pdf.
33
“Pakistan – 2003 Annual Report” (Paris: Reporters Sans Frontieres [RSF], 2003), http://
www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=6480.
34
Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).
35
“New Defamation Law threatens Press Freedom,” Press Release (RSF, 4 October 2002),
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=3983.
36
“Pakistan – 2003 Annual Report” (RSF).
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
“Editor of Independent Resigns under Government Pressure” (Sterling VA: South Asia
Tribune), http://www.satribune.com/archives/jun15_21_03/P1_mirresigns.htm.
40
Javed Jabbar, “Community-based Radio and TV,” The Dawn, 19 September 2003, http://
www.dawn.com/2003/09/19/fea.htm.