Measuring the Effects of the 1997 -98
El Niño on Countries within the
Australian Aid Program
by
Philip Hughes
with
Bryant Allen, Mike Bourke, James Fox and Janette Lindesay
Submitted to
AusAID
by
ANUTECH Pty Ltd
15 June 1998
Table of Contents
Introduction
iii
Part 11
1.1
The ENSO Phenomenon
1.1.1 Ei Nino ENSO and La Nina "
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.2
1.1.1.3
E1 Nitío
La Nina
ENSO
1.1.2 Forecasting the ENSO Phenomenon and Predicting its Impacts 4
1.1.2.1 Variability in ENSO events
1.1.2.2 Forecasting ENSO
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
Part 211
2.1
2.2
Past ENSO Events.2.1.1 Patterns of Occurrence of ENSO Events
2.1.2 Typical Characteristics of ENSO Events
The Characteristics and Effects of The 1997/98 ENSO Event
2.2.1 Characteristics
2.2.2 Regional Effects
2 2 3 Impacts
2.2.3.1 Drought related impacts
2.2.3.2 Cyclone and flood related impacts
2.2.3.3 Other impacts
2.2.4 Effects on the Asian Financial Crisis
Part 327
3.1 Utilisation by AusAID of 1997/98 ENSO Early Warnings
3.2 Actions Taken by AusAID to Mitigate the Effects of 1997/98 ENSO ....28
3.3 Program Assistance to Recipient Countries by the Countries
Themselves, Bilateral, Multilateral and NGO Donors
3.3.1 Papua New Guinea
3.3.2 Indonesia
3.3.3 The Philippines
3.3.4 Other Countries
3.3.5 United Nations Agencies
3.3.5.1 United Nations Resolution on El Nine,
3.3.5.2 F AO Global Information Early Warning System
(GIEWS) on Food and Agriculture
3.3.5.3 Other activities
3.3.6 Multilateral Donors
3.4 Likelihood of a Major La Nina Occurring
3.5 Early Warning Strategies
12
12
14
16
16
17
18
18
24
24
25
28
29
30
30
32
32
33
33
33
33
33
34
34
3,6
Recommendations
3.6.1
Recommendation 1
3.6.2
Recommendation 2
3.6.3
Recommendation 3
3.6.4
Recommendation 4
36
37
38
38
40
Part 441
Annex 1: Scope of Services
Annex 2: Regional and Country Profiles
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Irian Jaya
The Pacific
The Philippines
Vietnam
China
Korea (DPRK)
South Asia
Southern Africa
45
49
50
63
85
89
94
98
101
103
105
108
ii
Introduction
The Scope of Services for this project is attached as Annex 1. The consultant was
required to produce a document of three parts:
Part 1 - a description of the ENSO phenomenon, means of forecasting and
monitoring it and of predicting its impacts.
Part 2 - a description and discussion of past ENSO events and the 1997/98 El
Niño, their characteristics, physical effects and social and economic impacts.
Part 3 - Responses by AusAID and other national and international agencies
to the 1997/98 El Nino and actions that can be taken by AusAID to improve
the effectiveness of its response to future ENSO events.
1
Part 1
ENSO
Forecasting the Phenomenon
And Predicting its Impacts
1.1 The ENSO Phenomenon
The following discussion of the ENSO phenomenon and means of modelling it and
thus predicting its impacts draws on data and ideas from a wide range of sources,
including the Internet (especially NOAA, WMO and BOM web sites), Allan et al.
(1996), Trenberth (1996) and Webster and Palmer (1997).
1.1.1 El Ninó, ENSO and La Nine
1.1.1.1 El Nirfo
El Nino is the everyday name now given to a complex set of interannual variations
which occurs in oceanic and atmospheric circulation across the tropical Pacific. In
`normal' conditions the atmospheric pressure is higher over the eastern Pacific Ocean,
causing the predominant winds (known as the trade winds) to blow to the west. These
winds push warm surface waters from the eastern side of the Pacific to the west, the
water being replaced by cold water welling up from the ocean depths along the South
American coast where the thermocline (which separates the warm surface waters from
the deeper cold water) reaches the surface (Figure I). Air moving over warm oceans
picks up water vapour and when this air rises, or is forced up over mountain ranges, it
cools and produces clouds and rain. In contrast very little moisture is picked up from
colder ocean surfaces. The result is that during `normal' conditions the western
tropical Pacific experiences relatively cloudy and wet weather compared with the
central and eastern Pacific (Figure 1).
At the beginning of an El Niño event the trade winds weaken and the warm surface
waters that are normally piled up in the western Pacific begin to move back towards
the east. With the full onset of El NiTio an extensive band of warm water, commonly
around 2 °C and as much as 5 °C warmer than usual, develops across the central and
eastern equatorial Pacific, suppressing any upwelling of deeper cold water across the
thermocline (Figure 1). The air above this band of water warms and rises and air
pressure drops, causing increased cloudiness and rainfall. At the same time ocean
temperatures in the western tropical Pacific are much lower than usual, and rather than
moist warm air rising over the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, cool dry air is
descending, resulting in much decreased rainfall (Figures 1, 2 and 3).
Although usually not as extreme or extensive as in the Pacific Ocean, warmer oceanic
temperatures and anomalous convection patterns also occur in the central tropical
Indian Ocean (Figure 2).
The duration of El Niño events can be highly variable and the effects may linger for
several years, as appears to have been the case during the early to mid 1990s.
Typically an El NiTio event lasts about 12 -18 months, starting in around March -April,
intensifying through June -August and peaking between December -February. The
decline in its effects is usually more rapid but effects may linger until June the
following year. There is evidence that some El Niflo events have lasted two years or
longer.
The effects of El NiTio events are discussed in detail below. Briefly, they typically
cause widespread drought across many parts of southern Africa, northern India,
Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and .northern and eastern Australia.
Abnormally wet conditions with floods can affect parts of South America, equatorial
East Africa and southern India and Sri Lanka (Figure 3).
1.1.1.2 La Nina
La Niña - the opposite set of anomalies to El Niio - is best thought of as an
amplification of `normal' conditions (Figure 1), with a tongue of cold water along the
equator in the eastern tropical Pacific and the water in the western tropical Pacific
being warmer than usual.
During . La Nina events impacts are generally the opposite to those described for El
Ni$o events, with very wet conditions likely in parts of southern Africa, northern
India, Southeast Asia and Australasia, and a low rainfall region covering the central
and eastern equatorial Pacific (Figures 2 and 3).
1.1.1.3 ENSO
The changes in sea surface temperature (SST) which most obviously characterise the
El Nino -La Ni$a phenomenon are linked with a change in atmospheric pressure
known as the Southern Oscillation (SO). This , is characterised by a see -saw in
atmospheric pressure between the western and central- eastern regions of the Pacific
Ocean, with one centre located in the vicinity of Indonesia and the other over the
eastern Pacific. The index that is generally used to measure the magnitude of the SO is
the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI), obtained by expressing in a standardised form
the difference in sea level atmospheric pressure between Tahiti and Darwin.
Normally the atmospheric pressure at Tahiti is higher than at Darwin, i.e. the SOI is
positive (the difference is greater, i.e. even more positive, during La Nina events).
During an El Nilio event the difference in pressure between the two centres reverses,
with atmospheric pressure being higher over Darwin than Tahiti, resulting in a
negative SOI. For example, in the 12 month period up until the end of March 1998,
during which the current El Nino Zvent peaked, the SOI varied between -9.1 and 28.5 (Figure 4) as measured by the Troup form of the Index. (It should be noted that
there are several different ways of expressing the SOI, the Troup form of the Index
being that used by the Bureau of Meteorology and other researchers in Australia,
whereby the SOI is expressed as the standard deviation of the difference from the
long -term average x 10).
Because the SO and El Ni?io are closely linked, they are collectively known as the El
Niño Southern Oscillation, or `ENSO'. In recent work it has been common for
researchers to refer to ENSO as the complete climatic entity (large -scale ocean atmospheric interaction) that embraces two distinct phases defined for the oceanic
component of the phenomenon, namely El Nine and La Nina:
Although the El Niños and La Ninas are often referred to as events which last a year
or so, recent modelling developments have tended to emphasise the oscillatory nature
of the phenomenon, as is implied in the term `Southern Oscillation'. It now appears
that the phenomenon is really part of an essentially self- sustaining cycle in which the
ocean is never in equilibrium with the atmosphere. The oscillations in the ENSO
system have a natural periodicity of roughly 3 -7 years between El Nino events. As
discussed below, the time interval between major El Nino events can be much greater
than this.
1.1.2 Forecasting the ENSO Phenomenon and Predicting its Impacts
1.1.2.1 Variability in ENSO events
One of the striking features to come out of research into past ENSO events (extending
back more than 100 years) is how different individual events are from each other.
These differences are well illustrated in the ENSO Impact Maps presented by Allan et
al. (1996, Chapter 8) for 16 major El Ni?ío events and 18 major La Nita events
between 1871 and 1994. These maps clearly demonstrate that no two events have
been the same. The variability among events is further illustrated in Figures 5 and 6,
which plot the evolution of the last six and last seven major El Nino and La Nina
events.
This variability is not surprising given the great variety and complexity of oceanic and
atmospheric parameters that influence the ENSO phenomenon. As Trenberth
(1996:163) points out, it is now clear that ENSO is dependent on three main factors:
the east -west variations in sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the Pacific,
the close links between SSTs and surface pressures and thus surface winds in
the tropics, and
the connections between the major areas of rainfall and direct thermal
circulations that dominate the tropical atmosphere on time -scales beyond a few
weeks.
There are positive feedback effects between these various elements so that, after an
ENSO event begins, the atmosphere and ocean act in harmony. Clearly the ocean, as a
source of moisture 'and with an enormous capacity to hold heat, is the engine that
drives the whole system. However despite recent advances in understanding ENSO
much remains to be understood, including fundamental issues such as how the
Southern Oscillation reverses or why ENSO changes from warm to cold conditions.
1.1.2.2 Forecasting ENSO
The Southern Oscillation Index
There are numerous approaches being used to monitor and/or forecast ENSO events.
Monitoring involves describing the event as it occurs, with the prospect that trends
can be used to a limited degree to forecast the progress of the event. The most
commonly used (and simplest) measure to monitor ENSO events is the Southern
Oscillation Index (SOI) (see above). When the air pressure in Tahiti is abnormally low
and that in Darwin abnormally high for a sustained period, there is an indication that
an El Nido event may be developing.
While the SOI is of use in monitoring the onset and progress of an ENSO event
(see for example Figure 4), it cannot be used to accurately predict the duration,
severity or the degree to which certain regions of the world will be affected.
From the mid -1980s applications of General Circulation Models (GCMs) began to be
developed which had the potential to make very useful forecasts several seasons
ahead. These models were able to describe the coupled dynamics of the ocean and
atmosphere of the tropical Pacific. More comprehensive coupled models have been
developed in recent years and these have been more successful in predicting the
current El NiTio event than earlier models. However Trenberth (1996:168) cautions
that at this time there are no comprehensive GCMs that can adequately simulate
ENSO events. The same positive feedbacks that give rise to the El Niño phenomenon
also cause run -away behaviour errors in models. It is important to have a model that
provides a good simulation of the basic climate, especially the monsoon, or else there
is little hope that interannual anomalies will be correct.
The various GCM models use standard climate station observations of air pressure,
temperature and rainfall; satellite -based remote sensing of sea surface temperature
(SST); sea level; ship -based description of surface winds and ocean currents, and
buoy -based sensing of sea temperatures and currents to 500 m depth. At present they
have a low predictive capability because most of the data have not been collected for
long enough. Only the standard climate measures and the ship -based observations go
back more than 25 years. The periodic low return of severe impact ENSO events
means that there have not been enough severe events for the data from satellites and
buoys to be developed into a reliable predictive model.
Recently developed models have not been particularly good at predicting the
characteristics and severity of the impact of individual ENSO events at a global level,
let alone regional and local levels. In 1991/92, for example, rather similar climatic
fluctuations to those that occurred in 1997 were observed in the Pacific but severe El
Milo impacts failed to develop in the Asia Pacific region (although the impacts were
severe in southern" Africa). In 1982/83 an El Mho event occurred that was almost as
extreme as that observed in 1997 on typical ENSO measurements, but the impacts in
Papua New Guinea were not nearly as severe as those in 1997.
Despite these problems, specialists in this field acknowledge considerable progress
has been made and argue that comprehensive coupled models are likely to provide the
most effective advances in forecasting in the future. The 1997/98 El Ni10 is providing
an excellent database against which to test the various models and hopefully improve
their ability to forecast future ENSO events. However they will need to be refined
further and tested against several future ENSO events before they are likely to be able
to provide longer term (say 6 -12 months) region- or country- specific forecasts.
Some countries such as Australia and the USA have relatively sophisticated
forecasting models in place (with variable success in their abilities to forecast).
However, there are no such models available specifically for developing countries
such as those of concern to AusAID.
As an indication of the kind of ENSO forecasts which are publicly available to
organisations such as AusAID, an edited example fróm the NO A A/National Weather
Service's Climate Prediction Centre issued on 11 May 1998 is presented in Box 1.
Other forecasts are accessible on the Experimental Long -Lead Forecast and QDPI
websites listed in Part 4.
Summary
At this stage of their development the models can forecast in general terms the likely
onset and development of ENSO events at a global scale. Despite their limitations,
this kind of information can be used by AusAID in developing and implementing
ENSO `early warning systems' to guide its program planning, especially potential
emergency aid for drought and cyclone relief.
These models however cannot be used to predict in detail the characteristics of
individual ENSO events or the nature and timing of their impacts at the, regional,
country or local level. In Part 3 of this report other practical measures which can be
used to assist in forecasting and monitoring the effects of ENSO events are discussed.
7
FIGURE 1 : Schematic diagram showing oceanic and atmospheric changes in the Pacific
Ocean due to ENSO (Reproduced from Allan et al. 1996, Figure 23).
Normal Conditions
Convective Loop
120 E
80'W
El Nino Conditions
-
Increased
Convection
80°W
120%E
FIGURE 2: Schematic diagram showing global physical ocean -atmospheric interactions in
the northern hemisphere winter (southern hemisphere summer) during strong El Nino and
La Niña phases (Reproduced from Allen et al. 1996, Figure 35).
El Niiio
ganiwr
-0,5pt
+1°C
e-VC
+0.5'C
FIGURE 3: Schematic diagram showing spatial and temporal responses of global hydro climatological variables during strong El Nino and La Nina phases (Reproduced from
Allen et al. 1996, Figure 36).
El Nino
July a0)
Nov 10)
;
Ud (Ui
Due u 01
Nov (0)
May
May(
Me, (01
Aprii ..
r
v# o» .
Nov (0)
May M
*j
Apm (S;
March .
mJDee. m I
Nov (01
Nov{O'
Feb M
La Niña
- Dry
M Wet
A Frost
ft Fire
Low river discharge
+
High river discharge
*
Floodedlake
FIGURE 4: Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) 1993 -1998. Monthly SOI values above the
zero line are positive, and those below the zero line are negative (Source: Bureau of
Meteorology).
Multivariate ENSO Index for the 6
strongest historic El Mho events vs. the current event
3
2
-91+
3
s
F
- 72+
e
82 +
86 +
E
hu
1
¡ 97+
2
f
d
k
r
1
-2
1
-1
75
c
Last uptime : 3 June 1998
2
j1 2,x_Tg7
a.
on
Climile diagnostics dealer (CDC)^ University jof Colorado Batflier
ln
C]
FIGURE 5: The evolution of strong historic El Nino events (Source: NOAA -CIRES
2
Climate Diagnostic Center, University of Colorado at Boulder).
71
F
2
0
vents (Source: NOAA -CIRES
der).
g Monthly SOI
-5 -month mean
(weighted)
-2
i
i
-2
Io
.
Multivariate ENSO Index for the seven
strongest
historic La Niña events since 1949
T HOAA-CIRtES ClunatePmioslns
1
64
-e- 70
-73+BoulAtr
-6- 75+
-0- 88
Part 2
Past ENSO Events and the 1997/98 El Ninó
Their Characteristics, Effects and Impacts
2.1 PAST ENSO EVENTS
2.1.1 Patterns of Occurrence of ENSO Events
ENSO events have been a feature of weather and climate for at least several thousand
years. Cores taken from coral reefs in Australia and other parts of the world show the
episodic effects of dramatic variations in monsoonal river discharge and in sea surface
temperature (coral bleaching) extending back at least 2,000 years. It is now realised
that these effects by and large reflect the influence of ENSO events on rainfall and
surface ocean temperatures. Historical records of major periods of drought conditions
and of flooding over the last 700 years for Southeast Asia and China have been
interpreted by Godley (1998) as reflecting the influence of major El Ninos and La Niffas.
Historical research, combined with data from direct measurements of a variety of
atmospheric and oceanic variables such as air temperatures, surface and deeper water
sea temperatures, atmospheric pressures, wind patterns, ocean currents and sea levels
have allowed the major ENSO events over the past 100 years or so to be
characterised. The results of this research are summarised in Allan et al. (1996),
especially their annotated maps of climatic events and fluctuations between 1871 and
1994. Relevant information is also available on a number of internet websites as listed
in Part 4. The years in which major El Niño or La N is events occurred (i.e. those
with significant global effects) were as follows:
El Niño
LaNiria
1877
1889
1898
1888
1899
1903
1905
1923
1908/09
1924
1925
1930
1938
1941/42
=
1949/50
1954/55
1955/56
1957/58
1964/65
1965/66
1972/73
1982/83
1986/87
1991/92
1997/98
1970/71
1973/74
1975/76
1988/89
provide a test of the perception sometimes held about the ENSO
, namely that a major El Nino event will be followed immediately by a
na event. This was indeed the case following the 1888, 1923, 1972/73 and
Ninos (27 %). However in most cases there was a delay of at least two
years or longer. Indeed, it is more likely that a major El Niño event will be
preceded immediately by a major La Niña, as was the case in 1899, 1925,
1957/58,1965/66 and 1972/73 (33 %).
Other features which are evident from this data set are:
Two or more major El Ninos can occur without an intervening La Nina, anff
vice versa.
The interval between major El Ninos Can be as much as 16 years, as was the
case in the late 1940s and 1950s, or as little as two years, as was the case in the
1920s. Major La Niñas appear to occur more regularly and intervals of only 12 years are reasonably common.
There is some debate as to which El NiTio event during the last century has been the
most severe. Taken globally, many authorities rate the 1982/83 event as being the
most severe, but in Papua New Guinea and eastern Indonesia the 1940/41 El Nino
event was much more severe than of 1982/83. In southern Africa the 1991/92 El
Nino- induced drought was arguably as serious as the 1982 /83 drought. What this
indicates is that whilst global trends are important, they often do not reflect what is
happening at the regional or national level. This has certainly been the case during the
current El Nitro, as discussed below.
In addition to the major events listed above there have been other milder yet persistent
ENSO events which arguably justify being called El Nifos or La Niflas but whose global effects have been relatively minor One such event was the 1994/95 El Niño,
which only became clearly evident in September 1994 and whose effects were largely
over by early 1995. Whilst this event had little impact on most of the Asia -Pacific
region, in parts of Australia it has been credited with prolonging the drought
conditions which began with the 1991/92 El Nil lo and which are still continuing
largely unabated in some areas such as the Monaro and East Gippsland.
For any given country there is a need to distinguish between the severity of the ENSO
effects at the global level versus the effects at the local or regional level. As an
illustration of this, the years of occurrence of major droughts in Papua New Guinea
are tabulated below and compared with the years of occurrence of El Niffos which had
major impacts at the global level. While there is generally a close correspondence
between the two, several major El Ni?io events had little or no impact in Papua New
Guinea. There were also several major Papua New Guinea droughts that did . not
correspond with major El Nino events. Some of these may not be ENSO -related, but
others (e.g. the 1914 event) also had widespread impacts in Indonesia and were almost
certainly linked to El Nino. These variations between global versus local impacts add
credence to the summary in Part 1 that there are severe limitations to the forecasting
of ENSO events at the regional, country or local level.
Drought in PNG Major El Nino
1877
1887/88
1888
1896
1899
1901/02
1905
1914
1905
1923
1925
1931
1941
1930
1940/41
1957/58
1965/66
1972
1982
1972/73
1982/83
1987
1986/87
1997
1997/98
1991/92
2.1.2 Typical Characteristics of ENSO Events
Allan et al. (1996) present excellent generalised global maps of annual rainfall for
numerous El Nino and La Nifla events over an almost 100 year period from 1887 to
1994. The major patterns that are evident are as follows:
1.
During ENSO events the following recurring regional patterns in annual rainfall
have been observed.
During most El Nino events a large core area consisting of the southern
Philippines, all of Indonesia except western Sumatra, Papua New Guinea and.
central and eastern Australia experiences average annual rainfalls which are as
much as 45% less than the long -term average. During some events this core
area expands north and northeast across Micronesia and southeast across the
southwest Pacific (Fiji, Vanuatu and the southern Solomon Islands). Although
not evident from the generalised maps, rainfalls in areas around the margins of
this zone such as western Sumatra, eastern peninsular Malaysia, southern
Vietnam, the northern Philippines and the Solomon Islands are also influenced
by ENSO.
Highland areas such as in Papua New Guinea ánd Irian Jaya commonly
experience severe frosts brought about by the absence of cloud over these
areas.
Annual rainfall in the central and eastern Pacific in a band straddling the
equator (and encompassing central and eastern Kiribati) is regularly up to 45%
higher than average. Countries to the south such as Samoa and (to a lesser
extent) Tonga are also usually influenced by these wetter conditions.
Over South Asia, annual rainfall is commonly lower by up to 15% over
Pakistan, Bangladesh and all but the southern tip of India. At the same time,
rainfall over Sri Lanka and southern India is higher by up to 30 %.
Over parts of inland northern China annual rainfalls are lower by up to 15 %.
Elsewhere in Asia there appears to be little correlation between annual
rainfalls and ENSO events. This includes the countries between archipelago
Southeast Asia and South Asia such as Thailand.
Southern Africa usually experiences widespread lower than average rainfall
during El Nifib events whereas in eastern equatorial Africa rainfalls are higher
than usual. This relationship does not always hold and in some events
equatorial Africa has low annual rainfall and, rarely such as in 1996, the
pattern is reversed with much higher than normal rainfall in southern Africa.
2.
During La Nir'a events these patterns are reversed with higher than average
annual rainfall over island Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, Australia and the
southwest Pacific. Similarly, in inland northern China rainfall tends to be higher
than average. The northern part of South Asia experiences higher than average,
and the southern part lower than average, rainfalls.
The pattern is more complex in the central and eastern Pacific. Generally average
annual rainfalls are low, but the affected zone is shifted much further west
towards the Solomon Island compared with its El Nino *counterpart.
In southern Africa rainfalls are generally higher than usual (a reversal of the El
Nilo pattern), but in equatorial Africa there is little change over average
conditions except in the interior where rainfalls are sometimes lower than
average.
In many of the countries of interest to AusAID (but not Papua New Guinea and Irian
Jaya) drought conditions brought about by lower than average rainfalls are the most
severe effects of ENSO events, especially El Niños. During El Niños the only regions
discussed in this report which experience appreciably higher rainfalls are the central
and eastern Pacific and the southern part of South Asia.
During La Nina events most of the countries of interest to AusAID generally
experience higher than average rainfalls and those which experience lower than
average rainfalls seldom suffer the effects of serious drought. Increased rainfall
associated with ENSO events brings with it the risk of increased flooding(which tends
to be localised and short- lived). It can also have major negative impacts on root crop
production, especially in countries such as Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya where
root crops such as sweet potato are staple foods, especially in the highlands. Sweet
potato cannot tolerate saturated soil conditions for long periods. Consequently, it is
the failure of sweet potato crops as a result of prolonged heavy rains and saturated
soils (such as may result from a major La Nina) that is the main cause of food
shortages in these areas, not drought (see for example Bourke 1988).
On the other had, increased rainfall can be beneficial for production of other kinds of
food crops and commercial agricultural products, for domestic, industrial and hydro
power water supplies, and for river transport. These benefits may well outweigh the
negative impacts such as those caused by flooding.
The links between ENSO events and cyclone activity are both complex and uncertain.
In the study area the only close link between the two occurs in the central and eastern
Pacific region where there appears to be a direct relationship between the occurrence
of El Mhos and increased frequency of occurrence of severe tropical storms and
cyclones (see the Pacific Islands regional profile in Annex 2). During El Nido events
there is a widespread tendency (especially by the news media) to attribute the cause of
all cyclones to the El Nino. In the western Pacific where SSTs are cooler during El
Milos there tends to be a reduced Trequency of tropical cyclones affecting northeast
Australia, for example
Available information about past ENSO events for each country or region is presented
in the detailed country profiles (Annex 2).
It is clear from the evidence that no two ENSO events are the same or even closely
similar in their global characteristics or effects, let alone at the regional or national
level.
2.2
The Characteristics and Effects of the 1997/98 ENSO
Event
Characteristics
There is general acceptance that the current El Nino globally is the most severe this
century. Its characteristics are evident in Figure 5, where the progress of the event (as
measured by NOAA' s Climate Diagnostic Center's Multivariate ENSO Index) up
until 3 June May 1998 is compared with previous events. It developed very rapidly
during early 1997 and reached a peak by about August 1997. The intensity then
declined a little but rose again to another peak in February -March 1998. During May
2.2.1
1998 the Index declined rapidly.
During its initial phases, up until the end of 1997, the pattern was very similar to (but
very much stronger than) the 1957/58, 65/66 and 72/73 events, but different from the
last three events (1982/83, 86/87 and 91/92) which took longer to mature and peaked
in first quarter of the following year or even later. The intensity of the current event Figure 5) then remained very strong until May 1998 and the pattern changed to one
which closely resembles the pattern in 1982/83, although not quite as severe.
The pattern as indicated by the more simple SOI is similar to that evidenced by the
CDC's Multivariate ENSO Index (compare Figures 4 and 5). As measured by the
SOI, the 1997/98 El Ni ?o episode began between March and April 1997. The SOI
declined sharply from +13.3 in February to -8.5 in March and then declined even
further in April to -16.2, reaching its first deep trough during May ( -22.4) and Jule
1997 (- 24.1). Thereafter the SOI rose briefly to -9.5, but declined again and remained
significantly negative through November. In December 1997 the SOI rose to -9.1,
suggesting (at least to some observers) that the El Niño might be easing, but then it
once more declined sharply to -23.5 and remained deeply negative for the duration of
Indonesia's west monsoon: January 1998: -23.5, February: -21.1; March: -28.5 and
April: -24.1. During May 1998 the SOI increased rapidly and had reached +4 by
9 June 1998.
During May 1998 sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies in the eastern equatorial
Pacific declined dramatically and this, along with the return of the SOI to positive
values appears to mark end of the current event. According to the International
Research Institute for Climatic Prediction (IRI) website bulletin of 3 June 1998,
coupled and statistical models are now. nearly unanimous in suggesting moderately to
substantially below normal SSTs in the eastern Pacific by spring 1998, with many
suggesting further cooling during subsequent months, i.e. near -La Nüía to full La
Nina conditions. The IRI note that while some El Niño events with rapidly declining
temperatures quickly developed into major La Niñas (e.g. the 1972/73 and 1986/87
events), others which showed similar periods of rapidly declining temperatures did
not develop into cold events (e.g. the 1957/58,1965/66 and 1991/92 events). Mild La
Nina conditions developed following the 1982/83 El Nino, the most similar warm
event to the 1997/98 El Niiio. Hence the likelihood of a major La Niña event
developing after this 1997/98 El Nin171 remains uncertain.
As a cautionary note, it must be pointed out that the forecasting models rely heavily
on the pattern of events followed by the most recent El Niños, namely that they tend
to end in the middle of the second year or shortly thereafter. However historical
research undertaken by Dr Rob Allan (pers. comm ), Professor James Fox (pers.
comm ) and others has shown that in the 1920s to 1940s major El Nino events
sometimes persisted for more than two years. Hence although it is probable that the
current event has ended and that colder than normal rather than normal SSTs will
develop in the eastern equatorial Pacific, there is no guarantee that the effects of this
El Nino will not linger on in Asia and the western Pacific for some months.
Regional Effects
Despite being probably the most severe event this century, its effects on regions and
countries of interest to AusAID have been highly variable, with some unexpected
2.2.2
patterns. These are described in detail in the country and regional profiles in Annex 2.
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have been very hard hit by widespread, severe and
prolonged drought conditions which started in March 1997 and which were only
partially relieved by the onset of monsoonal rains from about November 1997.
Further north in the Philippines, Vietnam and China the onset of the drought (which is
having severe impacts) occurred much later and is only peaking now in May -June
1998, hopefully to be relieved by rains expected from June onwards. Drought has also
affected much of the western Pacific throughout 1997 and 1998, but patchily with Fiji
being the most affected. Samoa normally experiences wetter than usual conditions
during El Milos and up until recently rainfall had been average or even higher than
usual. However there has been a late onset of drought conditions which has the
potential to cause serious problems later in the year, given that the wettest season of
the year has now ended.
In contrast, in southern Africa, which was severely drought affected during the
1982/83 and 1991/92 El NiTios and where it was anticipated that there would be
widespread and severe drought associated with the El Nino, disaster failed to
eventuate. Indeed, rainfall patterns were generally normal with above average totals in
many areas. By early March 1998 the probability of widespread drought was being
assessed as very remote. Some areas had been adversely affected by drought, but
those that were had sufficient food reserves to be able to mobilise enough food
without recourse to food aid. It seems that in what is being called the most severe
global El Niño event in the last century, southern Africa has escaped relatively
unscathed compared with impacts experienced there during the two preceding El Niño
events.
The same applies to southern Asia, where the 1997/98 ENSO event has been weak
and has had little impact on the countries in the region.
In Thailand there has been a widespread perception that the country has been
adversely affected by El Nit() induced drought, however if so, there were no overall
adverse effects on crop yields. In fact, the rice harvest produced an even greater than
usual rice surplus.
In the central Pacific there appears to have been increased tropical cyclone activity
associated with this El Nino event.
2.2.3 Impacts
A summary of the range of impacts experienced during ENSO events, with emphasis
on the present El Nrho, is presented in this section. Again, the impacts are described
in detail in the country and regional profiles in Annex 2.
2.2.3.1 Drought related impacts
Village food supply
Drought (and associated frosts at higher altitudes) begins to have a major impact on
food gardens and rice paddies once the soil dries out and there is insufficient moisture
for growing crops to mature fully or for further crops to be 'planted. Where alternative
food supplies are available and people can afford them they can buy their food
Otherwise, as garden food supplies are exhausted or become
requirements.
unaffordable, food shortages become acute and people are forced to supplement their
diminishing supplies With `famine' or bush foods. Livestock also suffer from lack of
feed and may need to be slaughtered or sold to meet their owners' subsistence needs.
It is in these contexts that emergency food aid can be vital.
During the 1997/98 ENSO event widespread and serious food shortages have been
reported from Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines (especially in the south)
and central and southern parts of Vietnam. By inference, the shortages are likely to be
more widespread than so far reported in Vietnam, and in those parts of China for
which there are only sketchy reports.
The extent of impact has not just been determined by the severity of the drought.
Factors such as people's financial capacity to purchase food (both locally produced
and imported), the effectiveness of the transport systems for delivering food (both for
sale and as emergency aid) and the organisational abilities of governments, NGOs and
the private sector in facilitating the supply, delivery and distribution of food supplies,
have all had a critical effect on how people have fared. All of these factors have been
shown to have had an important influence on the way rural people have been
impacted by, and have coped with, the effects of drought in Papua New Guinea, Irian
Jaya, the rest of Indonesia and the Philippines. In summary, those communities with
the lowest cash incomes and financial resources, especially where they live in areas
with poor transport and communications systems, have been the most affected.
Food shortages have also been reported from parts of the Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu and by inference they will have occurred widely. in the drought- stricken
western half of Fiji. In southern Africa, although the effects of drought have been
widespread, they have tended to be slight and food shortages have been able to be met
by existing reserves without recourse to food aid.
In many areas the worst of the current El Ni?io is over and there have been sufficient
rains to allow the planting of crops. However, until these are ready for harvesting in
the coming weeks and months food shortages are likely to remain critical. In Papua
New Guinea, for example, widespread rains in late 1997 allowed the planting of
quick -growing leafÿ vegetables and the processing of sago. However the supply of
staple root crops remained restricted until at least April 1998 and it is anticipated that
in some areas food supply will not return to normal until June or July 1998. Past
experience (Bourke 1988) indicates that there may be a boom in food production in
the second half of 1998, followed by another smaller food shortage in 1999 (see
Papua New Guinea country profile in Annex 2 for detailed discussion).
ilarly dependent on staple root crops
s will continue to be at risk of famine
inuing (China, Vietnam, the Philippines and
these areas have yet to be able to plant the
hem to food self sufficiency.
arge proportion of the population relies on a
sses as a result of the 1997 -98 El Nino have
ly operations and emergency aid programs
least February 1999. The major problem
t their livelihood and have probably drawn
any of their assets, such as livestock, in the
ed seeds to replant and there will inevitably
this stage that the Lull impact of the 1997/98
In summary, even where subsistence food supplies return to normal over the next few
months, there will be communities in most of these countries which will continue to
be affected economically and socially by the loss of income they have incurred from
cash crop losses and the depletion of their cash and other financial resources in coping
with the drought.
One important lesson to emerge from an analysis of the 1997/98 El Niño is that even
small differences in the timing of anomalies in rainfall can have very serious
consequences for food production if they occur at critical points in the food
production cycle. For example, in eastern Indonesia if heavy rain had occurred one
week earlier during January 1998, serious failure of the com crop might not have
eventuated. Had the rains come when the com was beginning to tassel, much of the
crop might have been saved (see Indonesia country profile in Annex 2 for detailed
discussion).
Urban food supply
Much of this is normally supplied from excess production at the village level or from
commercial agriculture which suffers the same effects of drought. Where food
becomes scarce or unaffordable, urban people similarly experience the acute effects of
food shortages.
Few details are available on how urban food supplies have been affected by the
1997/98 ENSO event, but it can be inferred that the impacts the drought has had on
small- holder cash crops and on commercial agriculture will have led to both shortages
of, and higher prices for, foods in urban areas. Again, it will be months before
supplies of locally produced foods (and their prices) return to normal. In Asian
countries without price subsidies there will be increased reliance of more costly
imported staples such as rice.
The cash incomes of the urban poor (and indeed the middle class) have been and will
continue to be disproportionally used to purchase relatively expensive foods, with less
being available for other requirements such the purchase of consumer goods and for
health and educational requirements.
Export crops
In 1997/98 Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, China and Fiji have all suffered
major declines in agricultural commodities available for export, either because of crop
failures or because much if not all of the reduced output has been diverted to supply
domestic food needs (see the country profiles in Annex 2 for details). Vietnam, Asia's
second largest rice exporter, may restrict or even stop exports this year in order to
maintain domestic stocks at required levels. The Philippines and Indonesia will be
major importers of rice which, because of reduced availability, is likely to be higher
priced than in previous years. Fiji is facing a massive loss of export revenue because
the sugar crop will be down by at least 60% this year (and at a time when world prices
are rising). In Papua New Guinea oil palm production is predicted to decline in 1999
and 2000 because of the 1997/98 drought.
Village water supply
Most rural communities in the countries severely affected by drought during the
1997/98 ENSO event rely on rivers, streams,. springs and wells rather than rainwater
tanks, small dams or weirs. Water from these sources is used not only for drinking but
for domestic uses such as food processing (e.g. sago), cooking, washing clothes and
ablutions. Such sources are commonly contaminated with health -threatening
microorganisms, often derived from human wastes, but these are maintained at low
concentrations when water flow is adequate. During severe droughts many of these
sources become reduced in flow or dry up completely, forcing people to severely
ration water usage and to seek water from sources from further afield. These sources
commonly become very much more polluted and, where stagnant, breeding grounds
for malaria and dengue fever carrying mosquitoes.
Evidence from Papua New Guinea, Irian Jaya and the Philippines presented in
Annex 2 shows that during the 1997/98 ENSO events villages in areas severely
affected by
drought
suffered
severely
from
water
shortages
and from
the
contamination of the diminished water supplies they were forced to use. It is certain
that similar effects were experienced in other drought affected areas such as China,
Vietnam and the western Pacific. Once the rains, begah local water supplies generally
quickly recovered in terms of both their quantity and quality, thus relieving some of
the most severe effects of the drought.
Dams and reservoirs
Many countries rely heavily on dams and reservoirs for urban water supply (domestic,
commercial and industrial), irrigation and hydro -electric power generation. As water
levels fall during severe droughts, rationing of water (and electric power) has to be
introduced, or in the case of power generation, alternative (and usually more
expensive) methods such as diesel generators have to be used.
During 1997/98 dams and reservoirs in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the
Philippines and Vietnam have been reduced to critically low levels, resulting in the
rationing
of water for urban
(domestic and industrial), hydro- electric power
generation and irrigation use (see country profiles in Annex 2). Despite reasonable
rains during the 1997/98 wet season in Papua New Guinea and southern Indonesia,
reservoir levels remain low and rationing is likely to continue until at least the next
wet season starting in late 1998. In northern Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam
the outlook also remains uncertain. If wet season rains which normally start in the
middle of year and continue through to the 4th quarter are heavier than normal,
reservoir levels may rise to adequate levels. If they do not, rationing is likely to
continue through into 1999.
River transport
Throughout the Asia -Pacific region river transport is very important for the movement
of goods and people. As rivers dry up the movement of boats may become restricted
or impossible.
The only specific reports on river transport ceasing or being restricted because of
drought- induced low water levels come from Papua New Guinea (where production at
the Ok Tetii stopped from August 1997 to March 1998 because ships could not sail
along the Fly River) and China (specifically the Yangtze River). Given that river
levels were very low throughout much of the drought - affected regions for long
periods during 1997/98, it is likely that restrictions on river transport by both
commercial craft and village boats were widespread.
Institutions
In Papua New Guinea during the 1997/98 ENSO -induced drought many institutions
such as schools, hospitals, health centres and corrective institutions were forced to
closed or to restrict their operations because of problems such as a lack of water for
drinking and sanitation, malnutrition and illness amongst staff, lack of cash by users
of these facilities to pay for them, or wages to pay the staff. These kinds of effects on
institutions have not been documented in countries other than Papua New Guinea, but
it is possible they were widespread throughout drought - affected regions.
Bushfires
Bushfires had major impacts in a number of regions including the Philippines,
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. By far the most extensive fires and serious
associated impacts were in western Indonesia, especially East Kalimantan, but also
Sumatra. Smoke from forest and grass fires, exacerbated by the fires spreading to
extensive peat and coal deposits, has episodically blanketed large parts of Southeast
Asia with smoke and smog for period of weeks or even months. Malaysia has been
worst affected.
These fires have had widespread, prolonged and serious effects on forestry operations
(including plantations), food and commercial crops and nature conservation values. At
least 1.5 million hectares of forest, scrub and grassland throughout Southeast Asia
have been burnt out. Estimates for Indonesia range from 0.6 million to 1.7 million
hectares. The blankets of smoke and smog they have created have had even more
widespread effects on health, with one estimate that as many as 20 million people
suffered respiratory problems.
The smoke and smog also forced the closure of factories, schools and other
institutions for extended periods throughout Borneo. Aircraft flight schedules were
also severely disrupted and there has been a marked downturn in tourism in affected
areas.
It is extremely difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the direct and indirect costs of
the bushfires and the related smoke and smog haze. Environmental groups (including
the World Wide Fund for Nature) have calculated the total cost to be at least US$4.5
billion, of which US$3.8 billion was incurred by Indonesia (fire -related damage at
US$2.8 billion and haze -related impacts at US$1 billion).
Health
A myriad of interrelated heath problems arise from, or are exacerbated by major
droughts. People who are affected by hunger malnutrition due to food shortages are in
any case more prone to sickness and disease than are people with an adequate, healthy
diet.
Health problems are compounded by the fact that their diminishing water
nt of hundreds
ly affected by
e high altitude
In addition to
the large -scale
at such large turbation. The
ed from remote
le did not have
ovince. Even in
the population
oroka, Lae and
recorded from
ggamugl areas
throughout the
supplies often become contaminated, resulting in greatly increased rates of water
borne diseases such as dysentery, hepatitis, cholera and typhoid. When normally
flowing streams and springs are reduced to stagnant ponds they provide breeding
grounds for mosquitoes who carry vector -borne diseases such as malaria and dengue
fever, the incidence of which in the already weakened population can increase
dramatically. These health problems are likely to result in greater usage of health
facilities which themselvés may be under direct pressure because of the lack of water
for drinking, cleaning and sanitation.
Formerly flowing streams in many parts of Asia and the Pacific are now, or were until
the rains came, stagnant and have become breeding grounds for disease - carrying
mosquitoes. Reports of dramatic increases in malaria and dengue fever have come
from parts of Papua New Guinea, Irian Jay a and the southern Philippines.
Migration
In Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya widespread out -migration from severely
drought - affected areas has been documented. In just two highland localities in Irian
2.2.3.2 Cyclone and flood related impacts
Cyclones and floods commonly devastate food and water supplies, commercial crops
and directly and indirectly cause a wide range of health problems. Hence their impacts
in many ways are similar to those of major droughts which are described above. The
major impact that differs from drought is the physical destruction that they can cause
to infrastructure, both private (such as housing and commercial buildings, equipment
and material stocks) and public, such as roads and bridges, offices, schools, health
facilities and power supply. Water supply and sanitation systems are also commonly
damaged or destroyed, leading to shortages of water, especially uncontaminated water
for drinking
There have been no reports of flood damage resulting from heavier than normal rains
-
but not associated with cyclones - which can be attributed confidently to the
1997/98 El Niïio. Several cyclones (and associated flooding) which have been
ascribed with varying degrees of confidençe to the 1997/98 El NiTo hit Vietnam, the
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands (as described in the country profiles).
Each of these cyclones had locally devastating effects, including loss of life.
2.23.3 Other impacts
Sea level changes
The patterns of sea level change which occur as a result of ENSO events are poorly
known, with detailed data existing for only the last five years or so, and less detailed
data for the past 20 years (Allan et al. 1996:67). During El Niños sea levels are
usually higher than normal in the equatorial central and eastern Pacific region, lower
than normal in the southern Pacific (in a region encompassing Samoa, Tonga and the
Cook Islands) and normal to lower than normal in the western Pacific - Indonesia
region. During La Nit' las the pattern is broadly reversed with lower than normal sea
levels in the equatorial central and eastern Pacific region, around normal levels in the
southern Pacific, and higher than normal levels in the western Pacific
Indonesia
region. ENSO events normally have no appreciable effects on sea level in the Indian
Ocean region.
When sea levels lower than normal by up to 15 cm or even more prevail for -weeks or
months, widespread coral death is often caused through repeated exposure of reefs to
the atmosphere and excessive ultra- violet light. For example,- such deaths were
reported from parts of Papua New Guinea during the 1982/83 El Nit() event when sea
levels were reduced by as much as 20 -30 cm in some areas.
When higher than normal sea levels prevail -particularly for long periods - they can
cause coastal inundation and salt contamination of coastal ground water supplies,
especially on small, low lying islands such as atolls. A similar salinisation of estuaries
and coastal inland water bodies can occur when freshwater river flows are reduced to
the point where sea water can flow further inland than normal.
Higher than normal sea levels can also result in increased property damage if coastal
storms occur in the affected areas.
During the 1997/98 ENSO event sea levels have been lower than normal throughout
the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, as is to be expected with major El Nino
events. There have, however been no reported impacts of this lowering of sea level
from those regions. In Samoa sea levels over the past two months have been
considerably lower than normal. The Samoa Post reported that this has potential
effects for coral health which is already poor following the 1990 and 1991 cyclones
and destructive fishing practices.
There have been no reports of impacts caused by higher than normal sea levels.
Coral bleaching
During major El Nino phases, prolonged periods of surface water warming, together
with salinity changes, causes coral bleaching and subsequent death. In coral bleaching
the symbiotic algae which normally inhabit the corals and which are responsible for
their colouring are expelled. Coral bleaching is especially prevalent during El Niflos
in the eastern equatorial Pacific region where between 70 and 90% of corals were
reported to have died in many areas during the 1983/83 event.
Coral bleaching and mortality can also occur in the eastern Pacific during La Nina
phases due to strong upwelling events and ocean temperature reduction, as happened
in 1985. Although this such damage is apparently more frequent than that due to El
Niño events it is less damaging overall.
During the 1997/98 El Nino there have been reports of extensive occurrences of coral
bleaching from several parts of the Pacific, but no specific details of the locations of
affected areas have been provided in these reports (except for the Great Barrier Reef).
2.2.4 Effects on the Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial crisis has coincided with the extraordinarily strong 1997/98 El
Nino event, which has without doubt exacerbated the financial crisis, and will
continue to in the short and medium term. The current El Nino has had devastating
effects, particularly in eastern and Southeast Asia (especially the archipelagic nations
of Indonesia and the Philippines) and Papua New Guinea. It is likely that the direct
and indirect costs to Asia and the Pacific will be measured in the billions of dollars.
The main economic impacts have resulted from the low levels of production from
subsistence farming, cash cropping, plantation agriculture and timber. Urban -based commercial and industrial enterprises have also been impacted through the lack of
water for power generation and for a wide range of industrial uses such as food
processing and light and heavy manufacturing factories. These economic impacts
have adversely affected the production of food and other commodities for both
domestic consumption and export markets, with the latter leading to serious declines
in the inflow of foreign exchange to these countries. The loss of government income
will weaken the ability of governments to address the social and environmental effects
of the El Ni6o.
Income levels have been reduced at the community and individual levels and people
have been forced to spend what limited cash they have (often their savings) on
increased purchases of essential food, much of which they might otherwise have
produced themselves. Spending on non -essential items such as `luxury' foods,
clothing, other household goods, education and health services and travel all but
ceased in many areas.
The monetary costs of the widespread and often serious impacts on health caused by
the drought will be more difficult to quantify in part because many of their effects will
be felt for years to come Similarly, the costs of many of the impacts of the bushfires
and the associated smoke and smog hazes (some of which will be long term) are
difficult to quantify. For example, scientists predict that it will take many years for the
fire - affected fragile ecosystems to recover from this disaster.
Part 3
Responses and Future Action
3.1 Utilisation by AusAID of 1997/98 ENSO Early Warnings
The work programs of only three sections in AusAID have been appreciably affected
by the 1997/98 El Niîio: the Humanitarian and Emergencies Section (HES), the Papua
New Guinea Desk and the Indonesia Desk. The effects on these sections have been
substantial, as indicated by the levels of financial and material support provided by or
channelled through them (see Section 3.2 below).
HES utilised a wide range of early warning sources (especially the Internet) in
preparing for the 1997/98 El Niflo, as did the Papua New Guinea and Indonesian
Desks. These sources have included information received from the AusAID Posts,
international agencies such as the FAO, NGOs, and for particular situations,
Australian -based scientists with a wide range of expertise and experience in this area.
In the case of Papua New Guinea, although AusAID's reaction was swift once the
enormity of the disaster became apparent by August -1997, the Agency probably could
have been alerted 1 -2 months earlier to provide assistance if a more formal early
warning system had been in place of the kind specified in the recommendations
below.
In the other countries of concern to AusAID the effects of the El Nido have either
been minor or late in coming There appears to have been little awareness of the
global development of the ENSO event during 1997/98 at the desk level and no
specific early warning mechanisms seem to have been utilised by them.
3.2 Actions Taken by AusAID to Mitigate the Effects of 1997/98 ENSO
The Papua New Guinea and Indonesia Desks, working with HES, have mounted
major relief efforts as described in the country' reports. Details of the responses made
and expenditure analysis for these countries are attached. In the case of Papua New
Guinea, Australia has been providing assistance totalling about A$20 million, and to
Indonesia up to about A$50 million.
Apart from the major assistance with drought relief in these two countries, and
A$50,000 to the Solomon Islands for emergency food and water supplies for the
people of Bellona Island, HES has not received requests for drought relief assistance
from any of the other countries. Aid and emergency assistance has been provided to
the victims of cyclones in Vietnam, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Cook
Islands, however it is not clear to what extend which of these cyclones were directly
caused by the 1997/98 ENSO event.
In some countries where the drought has been late but still severe - especially in the
Philippines but also Vietnam and Fiji - AusAID has not provided any relief assistance
as requests have not been received from the governments concerned. The reasons why
assistance has not been requested are not known. In the Philippines the drought
coincided with the national elections and it appears all the major parties -took the
stance that it was better to cope with the drought using internal resources rather than
calling for international assistance. It is possible that requests for assistance may yet
be forthcoming, given that drought conditions still prevail in all three of these
countries.
3.3 Program Assistance to Recipient Countries by the
Countries Themselves, Bilateral, Multilateral And NGO
Donors
Papua New Guinea
As explained in the country profile, for a host of reasons the national and provincial
government administrations within Papua New Guinea were unable to respond
adequately to the El Nifio drought crisis. Once the severity of the drought had become
apparent (by August 1997), the central government announced that it would open a
3.3.1
publicly audited trust fund for public donations, into which it would deposit KI2
million. However no funds were forthcoming from the government for almost eight
weeks between the beginning of September and the end of October 1997. During that
period the government did provide K3 5 million for drought relief to be distributed by
members of parliament. The amounts allocated to the members were directly
proportional to the numbers of electors in each electorate. When funds did become
available through the trust fund, both these and the hinds distributed through members
of parliament appear to have been either misused, misdirected or unduly slow in
reaching the affected people. An audit of the trust fund in May 1998 by the Papua
New Guinea Government Auditor found numerous cases of a lack of proper
accounting procedures and some cases of outright fraudulence.
Provincial drought relief committees were poorly organised and were by their own
assessments ineffective. AusAID contracted CARE Australia and World Vision to
provide assistance to provincial drought relief committees in the highlands provinces
and they proved to be generally effective. The NGOs provided `shadow' drought
relief coordinators to work along side their provincial counterparts. The four NGO
coordinators were all very experienced in Papua New Guinea field conditions. Their
effectiveness was in part due to the fact that they were able to avoid becoming
embroiled in local political issues.
Organisations which were functioning well before the drought and which continued to
function during the drought were the Christian missions. Resident missionaries wrote
reports on the condition of local people, used radio networks for communication, and
transported relief supplies by aircraft at cost. Mission operated schools and aid posts
services were also maintained during the drought.
AusAID funded six NGOs to provide food relief and other assistance to the most
vulnerable communities accessible by road or river at a cost of A$3.5 million Mining
and oil companies (Porgera Joint Venture, Ok Tedi Mining Ltd and Chevron Niugini)
contributed to the relief effort in the areas around their projects by providing staff to
carry out assessments of food needs, helicopter support and air and road transport for
food.
AusAID also funded the `Papua New Guinea Drought/Frost Rehabilitation Project.
Matthew Kanua, Team Leader at the Highlands Agricultural Experiment Station at
Aiyura, wrote the first draft of this project in September 1997. The early draft
proposed urgently buying Irish potato seed in Australia and elsewhere in order to
assist people in badly frosted areas to replant as soon as sufficient rain had been
received. It also proposed establishing a number of places where irrigation would be
used to grow `sweet potato vines to replace those lost in the frosts. As AusAID was
apparently unable to rapidly make funds available to purchase seed without going
through a tendering process, it took almost four months before approval was given.
Australian suppliers of certified seed were, as a result of past experience, unwilling to
make shipments without prior payment. Thus the chance to get adequate amounts of
seed potato to Papua New Guinea early in 1997 was lost. Seed potato and other seed
supplies were shipped to Papua New Guinea later in 1997 and in 1998.
Bilateral donors initially responded with caution. A number of governments,
including France, the USA, the European Community and Japan, expressed concern
that donations to the Papua New Guinea government would be diverted or lost. They
agreed to donate funds only into the publicly audited trust fund described above.
Following the establishment by the government of the fund in October 1997, some
payments were made. The bilateral donors were right to be cautious, given the
revelations in May 1998 audit that the fund had been mismanaged at best and
defrauded at worst.
The World Bank was unable to contribute funds directly
to
the drought relief
program. The Bank did send a senior officer to Papua New Guinea and he travelled to
a number ' of provinces in the company of Dr Mike Bourke from the Australian
National University. The Bank proposed to loan Papua New Guinea $US5 million for
the purposes of strengthening the capability of rural communities to deal with
drought. The proposed project included a rural water supply program, a community
development program which included low -wage work to enable rural people to earn
money with which to buy food, and an agricultural research program aimed at
selecting drought resistant varieties of staple crops, together with a project
coordination component. The loan documents were negotiated in January 1998.
3.3.2 Indonesia
Nationwide (excluding Irian Jaya)
Several components of Australia's drought relief program as detailed in the attached
response document have as one of their aims the provision of assistance to the
Indonesian government and local government authorities to enable them to carry out a
variety of drought relief projects. Most other components of the program have
involved some government input into their implementation (especially in the areas of
relief food distribution, community health and firefighting).
NGOs have played a major role in the drought relief program in Indonesia. A total of
A$4 million has been channelled directly through five Australian NGOs and a further
A$1.5 million through Indonesian NGOs. Ongoing assistance in the form of drought
relief, agricultural rehabilitation and employment generation activities will be
channelled through NGOs. The Australian Red Cross, and its Indonesian counterpart,
are providing assistance to communities affected by bushfires and smoke/haze.
The World Bank is undertaking an Australian- funded drought relief /employment
creation technical assistance project in eastern Indonesia. Professor James Fox funded by Australia through the World Bank Consultant Trust Fund - prepared a
detailed report for the World Bank on the effects of the El Nino on Indonesia,
especially crop production (Fox 1998a).
The World Food Program (WFP) is coordinating and implementing a major
Emergency Operation (EMOP) which will continue into 1998/99. Under WFP
supervision, Indonesian government line agencies will distribute food either directly
to weak and malnourished people or through food - for -work schemes. Support will
also be provided for a major extension of the UNICEF supplementary infant- feeding
program.
Irian Jaya
The Indonesia authorities were slow to realise the nature and extent of the unfolding
drought crisis in Irian Jaya and it was not until after reports were received from
provincial authorities in late September 1997 of the deaths of hundreds of people that
the national government and international community began to respond. Between
October 1997 and the end of the year aid funds began arriving, especially following
an international appeal by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). In
addition to aid from Australia, money and material support of about US$1 million
was received from the USA and the European Community, along with smaller
donations from Denmark, Ireland, Germany and Japan.
By mid- December 1997, former President Suharto had ordered the State Minister of
Planning to co- ordinate a national response to the famine crisis, with funds to be
guaranteed irrespective of further developments in the national financial crisis.
However, it was not until mid- January 1998 that the government finally committed
US$25.5 million to be spent over the following 2.5 months. At the end of January
1998 the government stated that the draft budget for 1998/99 contained an.allocation
then the equivalent of US$36 million to assist drought - affected areas in Irian Jaya.
The current status of this guarantee is not known.
From the outset of the relief effort starting in early September 1997 NGOs (ICRC and
World Vision Indonesia), working with the UN Department of Humanitarian Aid,
have played a major role in organising the aid effort, especially donor assistance.
Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) undertook much of the actual delivery of aid
and committed most of its modest resources to the tasks of both ferrying food and
medical aid by aircraft, and coordination their distribution. A significant proportion of
the aid delivery effort has been assumed by WVI, whose staff has had extensive
experience in the province.
3.3.3 The Philippines
In the Philippines, responses to the drought are being coordinated through the El NiIo
Task Force, established in December 1997 and chaired by the Environment and
Natural Resources Cabinet Secretary. In April 1998, when the severity of the drought
in Mindanao became apparent, the national government established the Presidential
Action Centre (PAC) headed by the Presidential Assistant for Mindanao. The relief
efforts of the national government -especially in Mindanao
-
were deemed by
UNICEF and a range of private sector groups and churches working through the Task
Force: Tabang Mindanao to have been inadequate. However these same organisations
considered that efforts by a wide range of local government authorities in distributing
food aid, providing health services and providing water through the construction of
wells had been much more effective.
UNICEF, the Philippines National Red Cross, the Catholic Church and a range of
private sector groups have been working together and with government agencies to
provide short-term assistance.
The UNDP in Manila formerly convenes regular meetings of the donor's Disaster
Information Sharing Group, of which AusAID has been an active member. This
Group met on 8 May 1998. The general view was that there was sufficient rice in
storage to cope with the emergency, but that the poorest people (especially indigenous
upland farmers in Mindanao) could not afford to buy the rice.
he countries in Southern Africa which "*
have been able to provide assistance to
tocks without the need for large scale
ter Management Office (NDMO) has
oordinating drought relief. Through the
assess and to pro-vide expert advice on
However it lacks the financial resources
ood and materials. In addition to drought
rch 1998 Taiwan provided funds for the
drought.
eviate the impacts of Cyclone Linda in
mber 1997 to provide. resources for
in education, health and rural roads, (b)
oration of mangroves, (c) utilisation of
ulture and other marine enterprises, and
network.
3.3.5 United Nations Agencies
3.3.5.1 United Nations Resolution on El Nine
The UN General Assembly has requested action, within the framework of the
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNRD) 1990 -2000, for the
development of a strategy for the prevention, mitigation and rehabilitation of the
damages caused by the El NM() phenomenon. The IDNRD Secretariat has established
an Inter- Agency Task Force on El NiMío that will take a dual approach: scientific on
the one hand, and social, economic and operational development on the other.
The World Meteorology Organization (WMO) has agreed to lead the first half of the
Task Force's activities, with respect to science and technology of understanding,
observing and predicting the El Nino phenomenon and related meteorological and
hydrological impacts. WMO is preparing a scientific and technological retrospective
of the 1997/98 ENSO event (the S &T Retrospective) that will provide comprehensive
scientific and technical input into the second part of the Task Force work directed
towards social, economic and development aspects at the country level.
It is proposed that the final report on the `1997 -98 ENSO S &T Retrospective' be
published at the end of 1998. It is anticipated that this report will be of considerable
use to AusAID in planning its future responses to ENSO events. The Bureau of
Meteorology is coordinating Australian input to the study.
3.3.5.2 FAO Global Information Early Warning System (GIEWS) on Food and
Agriculture
Through GIEWS, the F AO provides regular updates of the actual and likely effects of
serious weather anomalies (including ENSO events) on crop production in all of the
developing countries, including those of interest to AusAID (see Part 4 - Sources of
Information).
3.3.5.3 Other activities'
The UN's World Food Programme (WFP) is having an ongoing major and direct
input into alleviating the impacts of the 1997/98 ENSO event in Indonesia. Australia
has provided substantial support to the WFP EMOP, as described in Section 3.3.2
above. UNICEF is also providing major assistance to drought relief in countries such
as the Philippines (see Section 3.3.3 above) and Indonesia (see Section 3.3.2 above).
3.3.6 Multilateral Donors
The contribution of the World Bank to drought assistance in Papua New Guinea,
Indonesia and Vietnam has been described in earlier sections.
In its Annual Report for 1997 presented at the 31st Annual Meeting on 29 April - 1
May 1998 the Asian Development Bank stated that it had undertaken the following
steps in relation to the El Ninó crisis. (ABD 1998:58).
1.
In 1997 the ADB fielded several missions to Indonesia to determine the need for
Bank support in relation to the land and forest fires and associated smoke and haze
pollution. The bank is considering a two -pronged prevention and control approach
I
in tackling the environmental consequences of these fires. This approach
comprises provision of US$1 million through a regional technical assistance
(RETA) grant to assist ASEAN in strengthening its capacity to prevent and
mitigate transboundary pollution, including haze.
2. Because of the social, environmental and economic impacts associated with the El
Nino phenomenon,, the Bank is also undertaking an internal study in the
Philippines and Indonesia, in particular Irian Jaya Province. The emphasis of the
study is on the
effects
of the El Nino phenomenon at the local level in
socioeconomic terms. The information generated will be organised, analysed and
presented in a form that will enable the Bank and other donors to develop a clear
view of current and future development options to address the socioeconomic and
environmental impacts associated with El Nino..
3.4 Likelihood of a Major La Nina Occurring
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, there is generally a likelihood of less than 30% that a
major El Nino event will be followed by a major La Nina event.' However, as
discussed in Section 2.2.1, there are indications from the way in which the current El
Nino has ended so rapidly that a La Nina may develop in the second half of this year.
Even if La Nita conditions do develop, their likely severity remains uncertain.
Careful monitoring of the evolution of atmospheric, ocean surface and deep w'ater
conditions in the tropical Pacific region over the next few months will be required to
resolve this uncertainty.
Even if a La Nita occurs (especially if it is not particularly severe), the negative
impacts of increased local and regional rainfalls and localised severe flooding may
well be balanced by the benefits that heavier than usual rains could bring. Such rains
would saturate moisture -depleted soils and runoff would fill reservoirs used to store
water for irrigation, hydroelectric generation and urban domestic and industrial water
supply.
The Philippines appears to be the only country specifically preparing for a possible La
Nina. The meteorological authorities are forecasting a 30% probability of a La Nina
occurring, the Department of Agriculture is implementing a range of measures
(including a disaster management plan) to cope with such an eventuality, and the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government has instructed local
government units to undertake disaster preparedness and prevention measures.
In the context of the recommendations presented in Section 3.6 below, AusAID
should monitor carefully any evidence pointing to the development of a La Nina, but
no specific planning actions are warranted, apart from the prudent maintenance of
contingency plans for emergency flood relief.
3.5 Early Warning Strategies
There is no doubt that severe climatic and weather fluctuations resulting in droughts,
floods and cyclones will continue to require often major and unforeseeable relief
efforts from AusAID. The temptation must be avoided however to attribute all such
impacts to the effects of ENSO events. Cyclones, floods and major droughts can and
do occur without any ENSO influence.
No great reliance can be placed on the SOI or forecasting models, except. at the global
or perhaps gross regional level. No models will be available in the foreseeable future
that can predict with certainty the nature and timing of the effects of ENSO events at
the regional or country level.
Nevertheless, the SOI and these models have great value in alerting agencies at a
broad scale to the likelihood that a major ENSO event is coming and they certainly
should be utilised.
Australian National University scientists Drs Bryant Allen and Mike Bourke in the
case of Papua New Guinea argue that the forecasting and monitoring of ENSO events
on the basis of the SOI or the more sophisticated computer models should be
supplemented by a suite of other methods such as those outlined below. A
fundamental point they stress is that the magnitude of an ENSO event is not directly
associated with the magnitude of the impact on food and water supply in Papua New
Guinea. Therefore, it would be better, (at least while predictive models are so
unreliable) if efforts were made to monitor food and water supply, rather than seeking
to rely solely on poorly predictive models. Their arguments are specific to Papua New
Guinea, but have wider relevance to other countries with a _heavy reliance on
subsistence food crops.
Within Papua New Guinea two basic observations can predict a coming problem with
food and water, whatever the cause.
1.
Rainfall observations and soil moisture calculations: most Papua New Guinea
food production systems are either root crop systems or are sago producing
systems. At any particular time, both systems have food in the ground or in the
palm. With the onset of drought, food supply is not be immediately affected.
However, with the passing of consecutive months with lower than normal rainfall,
the probability increases of a food shortage occurring within about four months
from the beginning of the drought. In 1997 rainfall fell significantly below normal
in March and April in many places and stayed down until late December. By June
and July 1997 it was clear that a shortage of food from agricultural activities was
inevitable in many places.
However the number of rainfall observation stations in Papua New Guinea have
fallen by at least 50% over the last 20 years and more over the last 30 years.
Furthermore, records from many stations are broken by missing observations.
Although many records are now held on computer at the National Weather Service
(NWS), data are not always easily obtainable, with long delays following a
request and relatively high cash payments demanded per record for a 'simple print
out of monthly rainfall records.
Another obvious source of good predictive information is the water levels of dams
and lakes. In 1997 the level of Sirinumu Dam inland of Port Moresby fell steadily
from April. Whilst Electricity Commission staff were concerned about the fall in
the dam supply and the consequent declining ability to supply Port Moresby with
electricity, no action was taken at a national level until October 1997 when the
dam had fallen to 20% of total capacity.
2. Food prices: it has been shown that the prices of staple foods in urban and rural
fresh vegetable markets throughout the country reflect the supply of that food in
the market catchment. Because foods are sold in `bundles' rather than by a unit
weight or volume, market price surveys tend to be labour intensive. Nevertheless
weekly observation of prices and supply in local markets can predict a coming
food shortage in the area surrounding a market. The National Statistical Office
has, from time to time, collected market prices in a few main centres in order to
create cost of living indices. However these data are presently unusable and even
if they were reliable, they are very difficult to obtain from the NSO.
There is not a single predictor of coming food shortages in Papua New Guinea, but
there are a number of diverse observations, which when taken together, could provide
an early warning of approaching problems.
At present in Papua New Guinea there is no single organisation responsible for
monitoring food supply. With the recent establishment of the National Agricultural
Research Institute (NARI), there is now an organisation that could take on this
responsibility.
If information
was
collected from the
NWS,
the
Electricity
Commission, the Ok Tedi mine (for levels of the Fly River), in association with
regular food price surveys at selected markets, coming regional or national food or
water shortages could be predicted possibly up to four months in advance.
Recommendations
3.6
The overall conclusion of the consultants is that AusAID has generally coped well in
responding to requests from recipient countries for assistance to mitigate impacts
caused by the 1997/98 El Ni71o. The relief efforts undertaken in Papua New Guinea
and currently underway in Irian Jaya are the largest emergency aid operations ever
undertaken by the Agency. A detailed review of the effectiveness of the aid delivery
operations in Papua New Guinea has been undertaken in a separate study
commissioned by AusAID.
The following recommendations are aimed at strengthening AusAID's ability to
provide early warnings of impending ENSO events, to implement its emergency aid
strategies and to assist recipient countries (especially rural communities) cope more
effectively with the impacts of such events.
3.6.1 Recommendation 1
It is recommended that AusAID establish formal mechanisms for monitoring ENSO
indicators and projecting the likely course of development of ENSO events as they
occur, and establish -within HES or another location at least one officer with this
specific responsibility.
Such mechanisms are informally already in place, but they need to be formally
instituted AusAID, with the provision of appropriate staff and other resources.
One or more persons (the 'ENSO Group') should be delegated to collate,
analyse and disseminate to relevant sections within AusAID information about
the current
Sourcesand
of information
projected status
which
of should
the ENSO
be utilised
phenomenon.
include: the Internet websites
fisted in Part 4; scientists with ENSO -related expertise in the Bureau of
Meteorology, at the Australian National University and in CSIRO; the NGO
network and country- specific information provided by the Posts (which itself
might
During
draw periods
on sources
between
such as
ENSO
thoseevents
outlined
thein
workload
Section should
3.5.1 above).
be no more than
1 person day per month. When ENSO events (especially major events) are in
progress the workload may increase to 2 -5 person days per month
During major ENSO events, the Group should maintain close contact with
Post officers in vulnerable recipient countries to ensure awareness of
developing crisis situations, and to warn the Posts that they should commence
negotiations with recipient governments to advise them that other projects may
need to be delayed or deferred.
,
As well as liaising directly with key AusAID staff as and when warranted, the
Group should produce and disseminate on the AusAID Intranet an ENSO
newsletter. This would normally be prepared every 3 to 6 months, but could be
produced monthly or bimonthly if deemed warranted during the progress of a
major ENSO event.
The Group, through or in association with the Bureau of Meteorology should
keep abreast with developments in the work programs of the IDNRD's Inter Agency Task Force on El Nino, specifically the WMO's 1997 -98 ENSO S &T
Retrospective, but also the proposed second part directed towards social,
econoinic and development aspects at the country level.
3.6.2 Recommendation 2
nded that AusAID formally establish and maintain a register of
o have specialist expertise and experience in the provision of
d services of the kind required to cope with the impacts of serious
ther anomalies.
be established by advertising for an `emergency response' period
and maintaining such a contract list in order to avoid delays in
g.
y, the ENSO Group (see recommendation 1 above) could, in
tion with HES and Desk officers, compile a list of `pre -qualified'
cy response consultants. Once established, the list could be updated
by telephone checking and maintaining contact with
ers /contractors working in the key vulnerable countries.
mendation 3
nded that terms of reference for project identification and appraisal,
plementation should include consideration of whether the project will
country's ability to cope with adverse climatic and weather anomalies
O events).
he tasks which the monitoring unit would carry out as recommended
D should consider what indirect actions to help cope with the effects of
ould be undertaken in its country programs
is recommended that, where appropriate, AusAID's procedures for
cation and appraisal, design and implementation include assessment of
oject will strengthen the country' s ability to cope with adverse climatic
omalies (including ENSO events), and whether the project is designed
uch climatic variations. This is particularly the case for agricultural,
ealth and rural development projects.
inds of project that, on the basis of the 1997/98 ENSO event, would
untry' s ability in this regard are projects that, for example, achieve the
4r
mes.
opportunities
for
cash income
generation, particularly
in
rural
s. It is clear from the experiences in Papua New Guinea, Irian Jaya and
ines that there were direct relationships between the levels of cash
communities and their abilities to cope with the effects of severe
hose communities which had adequate levels of income and savings
o cope much better because they could purchase food from markets and
the work of organisations whose role is to observe, analyse and
e weather and hydrological observation. AusAID has a number of
he Pacific that may help in preparing for and mitigating the effects of
her conditions. These include the recently completed A$1 million
Pacific Meteorological Services Project and the A$13.6 million Sea Level and
Climate Monitoring Project. A feasibility study on this topic was undertaken by
Brook et al. (1991) and their findings and recommendations continue to be
relevant in view of the impacts the 1997/98 El Nind`has had.
3. Extend or improve existing road and footbridge access to isolated communities.
Remote communities invariably suffer disproportionally because their poor access
to markets reduces their ability to participate in the cash economy, and when
droughts or floods occur their remoteness from food distribution centres again is a
major disadvantage to them. In Vietnam, Tra My Rural Infrastructure Project is a
.
good example of the kind of project that has the potential to help local
communities and provincial authorities cope better with both drought and floods.
The project will provide ethnic minority communes in poor mountainous areas
with improved access to transport, education, health care, markets and agricultural
extension. These communities have been hard hit by the present drought, with
their plight being exacerbated by their poor access to relief food distribution
centres (involving walking for up to three days).
4.
5.
6.
Undertake and encourage small-scale rehabilitation and maintenance projects
(possibly through NGO windows or SAS) to reestablish roofing, guttering,
downpipes and water tanks on government buildings including schools and health
centres and government offices. Such actions would greatly improve the
availability to communities of emergency water supplies during droughts. Such
projects should include training in constructing such facilities, especially
ferrocement tanks and bamboo pipes etc.
Similar projects should be undertaken and encouraged with respect to the
provision of drainage and sanitation facilities.
Strengthen or establish organisations whose role it is to monitor national and
regional food supply (see the Papua New Guinea example of NARI in Section 3.5
above).
There are already several other ongoing and proposed projects that will help the
recipient countries deal more effectively with future ENSO events, even though this
was not a specified objective of the projects. For example, AusAID has provided
training in irrigation skills through one of Fiji's agricultural projects, the Soil and
Crop Evaluation Project.
AusAID has also provided A$2.5 million funding to the Global Change Impacts
Centre for Southeast Asia (GCIC), based in Bogor, Indonesia (see website listed in
Part 4). One of the functions of this Centre is to serve as a resource base of technical
expertise, data and analytical and interpretive skills in the area of climate change for
the Southeast Asian region. GCIC is involved in a project examining the impacts of
climatic variability on rice production in northeast Thailand, and how seasonal
forecasting of ENSO may help improve the tactical decisions made by rice farmers. In
August 1998 GCIC will be organising a science -policy workshop that will déal
specifically with the interaction between fire management, land use policies and El
Nino. GCIC has developed strengths in undertaking capacity building and policy
support activities directed at assisting countries adapt to ENSO and related climate
variability.
3.6.4 Recommendation 4
HES has recently undertaken a review of its Disaster Preparedness activities in the
Pacific. Consideration should be given to applying the recommendations from the
review across AusAID's functions where appropriate.
Recommendations 3 and 4 are complementary, with the latter being aimed more
directly at strengthéning recipient countries' abilities to cope with adverse climatic
and weather anomalies (including ENSO events), along with other natural disasters
such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. '
Disaster preparedness assistance to recipient countries could include, for example, the
provision of stockpiles of water containers and other emergency materials, capacity
building for indigenous disaster response agencies, meteorological training for
government officials and assistance with establishing secure water storage /supply and
sanitation systems.
AusAID already funds training programs in the Pacific in Disaster Management and
Preparedness, with an emphasis on cyclones.
Part 4
Sources of Information
1 Published Books and Articles
_Allen, B. 1989. Frost and drought through time and space, Part 1 : the climatological
record. Mountain Research and Development P(3):252 -278.
Allen, R., J. Lindesay and D. Parker 1996. El Nino "Southern Oscillation and climatic
variability. CSIRO Australia, Collingwood, Victoria.
Brookfield, H., L. Porter and Y. Byron 1985. In place of the forest: environmental
and socio- economic transformation in Borneo and the Eastern Malay Peninsula.
United Nations University Press, Tokyo.
Downer, A. 1998. Australia's overseas aid program 1998 -99. Commonwealth of
Australia.
Fox, J.J. 1991. Managing the ecology of rice production in Indonesia. In J. Hardjono
(ed) Indonesia: Resources, Ecology and Environment, pp.61 -84.
Fox, J.J. 1997. Harvest of the palm: ecological change in Eastern Indonesia. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Godley, D. 1998. ENSO and inland Southeast Asia: I 100 -year record of flood and
drought regimes based on Pacific rim proxies. In P. Bellwood (ed) Indo- Pacific
prehistory: the Melaka papers. Volume 1 : pre -Congress issue. Bulletin of the IndoPacific Prehistory Association 17:40.
Nicholls, N. 1993. ENSO, drought and flooding rain in Southeast Asia. In H.
Brookfield and Y. Byron (eds): South -East Asia's environmental future: the
search for sustainability, Oxford University Press and United Nations University
Press, Kuala Lumpur.
Trenberth, K.E. 1996. El Niño- Southern Oscillation. Chapter 6 in Giambelluca, T.W.
and A. Henderson- S ellers (eds) Climate change: developing southern hemisphere
perspectives. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, UK.
Ward, R.G. and P. Ashcroft 1998. Samoa: mapping the diversity. Institute of Pacific
Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva and National University of Samoa,
Apia.
Webster, P. J. and T.N. Palmer 1997. The past and the future of El Nino? Nature
390:562 -64.
Wohlt, P. 1989. Migration from Yumbisa, 1972 -1975. Mountain Research and
Development 9(3):224 -234.
2 Unpublished Reports
Allen, B. and Bourke, R. M. with J. Burton, S. Flew, B. Gaupu, S. Heai, P. Igua, S.
Ivahupa, M. Kanua, P. Kokoa, S. Lillicrap, G. Ling, M. Lowe, R. Lutulele, A.
Nongkas, M. Poienou, J. Risimeri, R. Shelton, J. Sowei, K. Ukegawa, N. Willson,
D. Wissink and M. Woruba 1997. Report of an Assessment of the Impacts of
Frosts and Drought in Papua New Guinea - Phase 2. Department of Provincial and
Local Government Affairs, Port Moresby.
Allen, B. J. and R.M. Bourke 1997. Report of an assessment of the impacts of frost
and drought in Papua New Guinea. Australian Agency for International
Development, Port Moresby.
Asian Development Bank 1998. Annual Report 1997. Board of Governors 31St Annual
General Meeting, Geneva, 29 April - I May 1998.
Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre 1998. El Ninoand its impacts in Southeast Asia:
lessons from the past and challenges ahead. A ADPC Working `Position Paper'
presented at the Asian Regional Meeting on El Ninoorelated crises, 2 -6 February
1998, Bangkok, Thailand
Brook, R.R., R.E. Brasher, J.P. Bruce, S.A. Parsons and M.E. Sullivan 1991. The
changing climate in paradise: feasibility study on climate monitoring and impacts
in the South West Pacific. Bureau of Meteorology, Australia.
Bourke, R.M. 1988. Taim hangre: variation in subsistence food supply in the Papua
New Guinea highlands. Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University,
Canberra.
Byron, N. 1998. Indonesia's fire problems require long term solutions. Unpublished
paper, 28 January 1998. Copy held by Professor J. Fox, ANU.
F AO 1997. FAO Global Early Warning System (GIEWS) on Food and Agriculture.
Special report: the impact of El NinI3 and other weather anomalies on crop
production in Asia. 25 September 1997, FAO, Rome. Available on Internet on
http / /www.fao.org /giews /english
FAO 1998. FAO /GIEWS -Food Crops and Shortages No. 2, 2 May 1998. FAO,
Rome. Available on Internet on http / /www.fao.org /giews /english
Fox, JJ. 1998. El NinóReport: Indonesia. Report Prepared for the World Bank, 25
February 1998.
Fox, JJ. 1998a El Nine report: Indonesia. Prepared for the World Bank,
UNICEF 1998. A preliminary report on the effects of El Ninon the Philippines and
efforts to mitigate the crisis. Prepared by UNICEF Manila, 7 May 1998.
3
Internet Websites
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
http: / /www.eInino.noaa.gov/ (General with numerous links)
http: / /www.cdc.noaa.gov/ (Climate Diagnostic Centre)
http: / /www.cdc. noaa .gov / -.map /maproom/text/climate _pages /sst_oIr/
eI_nino_anim.shtml (Climate Diagnostic Centre)
http: / /www.pmel.noaa.gov/ toga- tao /el -nino /dial -a- scientist.html
http : / /www.p,el.noaa.gov /toga- tao /eI -nino (Pacific Marine Laboratories)
Other Agencies
http : / /www.wmo.ch/nino /ntnol.html
Error! Bookmark not defined. (World Meteórological Organisation)
http: / /www.bom.gov.au/cIimate /ahead/ (Australian Bureau of Meteorological)
http: // iri.uscd.edu/hot_nino /sst_fcst/ (International Research Institute for Climatic
Prediction)
http:// www. dnr. gld.gov.au /longpdjk/findex.htmi (Queensland Department of
Primary Industry Climate Information)
http: // www .coaps.fsu.edu /lib /elninolinks/ (Centre for Ocean -Atmospheric
Prediction Studies)
http://topex-www.jpl.nasa.gov/enso97/el_nino_1997.html (NASA Jet Propulsion
Laboratories)
http: / /grads.iges.org /ellfb/ (Centre for Ocean -Atmospheric Prediction Studies - the
Experimental Long -Lead Forecast Bulletin)
http: // www .disastercenter.com /elnino.htm
http: / /whyfiles. news.wisc.edU /050e1_nino /2.htm1
http : / /www.abc.net.au/ra/newsrael (Radio Australia World News)
http: / /www.bogor.indo.net.id/ic -sea/ (Global Change Impacts Centre for Southeast
Asia)
Food and Agriculture Early Warning Systems
http: / /www.fao.org /giews (Food &. Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Global
Information Early Warning System (GIEWS))
http: / /www.info.usaid.gov /fews (USAID Famine Early Warning System (FEWS))
http : / /www.zimbabwe.net/sadc -fanr (Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC) Food Security Program)
Annex 1
Scope of Services
Desk Study Measuring the effects of the 1997/98 El Ninö
on countries within the Australian Aid Program
Duration
It is expected that the tasks encompassed within the Terms of Reference below will
require the services of a Contractor for a period of 7 weeks. The Contractor must be
able to begin the study immediately upon the awarding of the contract.
Background
In early 1997 world climactic experts predicted the onset of an El Nit() Southern
Oscillation Event. As many of the countries expected to be affected were included in
AusAID's portfolio, country desks developed contingency plans based on the specific
situations within their areas of responsibility. Some of these plans have focused upon
short-term disaster mitigation and have included the provision of emergency food aid,
water and medical supplies to prevent starvation, combat an increase in disease and
slow drought and flood induced migration.
In some cases projects which focus on longer -term assistance have been initiated.
Such assistance has included an increased focus on the provision of water supply and
sanitation, agricultural rehabilitation programs and other forms of drought mitigation
and management. As El Nino and La Niña events are expected to reappear every 2 -7
years, AusAID has begun to focus its attention upon improving the global predictive
systems currently in use and AusAID's own responses to those warnings.
The purpose of this study is to outline the nature and effects of the 1997/98 El Nino,
examine the extent to which early warnings were utilised by AusAID posts and
country desks and make recommendations on how AusAID can better utilise early
warning systems in the future.
Objective
The objective of the study is to:
1. measure the impact of the 1997/98 El Ninotpon countries for which AusAID has
portfolio responsibility, through an analysis of technical data being gathered by
experts in the field, discussions with AusAID desk and posted officers, and review
of multilateral reports; and
2. contribute to the improvement in effectiveness and efficiency of AusAID efforts,
current and future, to plan for and implement programs to mitigate the impacts of
this and future El Nine and La Nina events.
Terms Of Reference
The consultant hired under the terms of this contract will be required to produce a
document of three parts:
Part One
The first part of the document should be about 5 pages long and contain a short
description of a typical El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and a La Nita event and
the existing predictive systems in use. This should include, but is not limited to:
a) a description of current predictive systems used to warn of impending ENSO
and LNSO events globally;
b) an identification of the weaknesses and strengths of the systems identified; and
c) an analysis of the systems' reliability.
Part Two
The second part of the document should be about 10 pages long and contain details of
the typical effects of an ENSO on the following countries /regions: regional Africa;
China; India; Korea (DPR); Pacific Islands; the Philippines; Thailand; and Vietnam.
Special attention needs to be paid to detailing the effects of the ENSO on Indonesia
and Papua New Guinea. The information required will include, but should not be
limited by, the following:
1. Details of past ENSO and LNSO events occurring in the last two decades, their
severity, the countries most seriously affected, the types of complications/
anomalies experienced and where they were experienced.
2. A description of the 1997/98 ENSO providing:
d) a list, and graphic map, of which countries are experiencing the effects of the
event and what those affects are;
e) an analysis of how long the primary climatic anomalies are expected to
continue;
f) an identification of infrastructures affected by El Nino within those countries,
and an assessment of the social and physical impacts;
g) an identification of the prime users of these infrastructures and the likely flow
on effects to them; and
h) an analysis of the effects of the interaction between El Nino and the Asian
Financial Crisis.
Part Three
It is intended that the final section of the document should be around 10 -15 pages and
provide both an analyses of AusAID's efforts to prepare for and mitigate the effects of
the 1997/98 ENSO and provide recommendations for improving AusAID's
effectiveness in this area. This part of the document should do the following:
1 examine and comment upon the extent to which early warnings of the 1997/98
ENSO has been utilised by the AusAID posts and country desks identified in part
two;
2. detail the actions taken by AusAID posts and country desks, following the onset
of the ENSO, to mitigate the more severe effects of the event;
3. advise on the weaknesses and strengths of AusAID's planning, on the basis of the
warnings, and provide recommendations on how the early warning can be better
utilised;
4. identify existing and intended programs, of recipient governments, multilateral,
bilateral and NGO donors, aimed at assisting the countries identified in part two,
to mitigate the immediate short term, and longer term, negative impacts of the
1997/98 ENSO;
a) discuss whether local networks have been consulted, and their views reflected,
in the development of these programs.
5. advise for the likelihood of an LNSO following the ENSO of 1997/98 and identify
existing and intended programs of the recipient government, as well as
multilateral, bilateral and NGO donors, aimed at assisting the countries identified
in part 2, to plan for and mitigate the effects of an LNSO;
a) discuss whether local networks have been consulted, and their views reflected,
in the development of these programs.
e
Reporting Requirements
At a date, four (4) weeks from the commencement of the contract the consultant will
submit, to the Director of the Infrastructure and Environment Group (IEG) AusAID,
two (2) unbound copies of the DRAFT report and present the findings to a Peer Group
Review approximately one (1) week later.
One (1) week following the receipt of comments from AusAID, four (4) copies of the
final report (3 bound and 1 unbound) should be submitted to the Director of IEG,
AusAID.
All documentations submitted to AusAID, in fulfilment of this contract, must be in
Microsoft Word or Excel format and be provided in a form that can be easily
understood by the general public. The Contractor's logo should not appear on the
cover of any report submitted to AusAID.
Annex 2
Regional and Country Profiles
Papua New Guinea
Past ENSO Events
Overview
An analysis of rainfall records for Papua New Guinea from 1910 to 1982 suggests that
severe droughts have occurred across the whole country in 1914, 1931, 1941, 1965,
1972 and 1982. There is a reasonable but far from perfect association between these
droughts and four different SOI -based measures of ENSO discussed in Section
1.1.2.2. Nevertheless, it is safe to say they were all associated with ENSO activity to a
greater or lesser extent. Thus in the 90 years from 1910 to 1997 there have been seven
periods of drought, a frequency of around one every 13 years.
It is clear that not all of these droughts have been of a similar severity, and it is
difficult to compare them using oral historical and press reports as evidence. The
attitudes towards hungry village people by those responsible for governing have
changed over time. While sympathetic, most early administrators seem to have
viewed the droughts and food shortages in a matter -of -fact way. This was the lot of
`the natives', and the suffering had to be borne by them. Before the Pacific war,
people who were provided with food relief by colonial governments were later taxed
in order to pay for it. From 1972 however, the impacts of the droughts became
increasingly mediated by political and economic circumstances.
Chronology of Events
On the basis of official reports, there was a `terrible drought' in 1887 in Papua and
1888 in New Guinea. In 1896 drought destroyed the German cotton and tobacco
plantations at Madang and in 1901 and 1902 drought is reported from the whole
country then colonised, with `famine' along the southeast coast and in Milne Bay and
fires in sago swamps in Northern Province. On New Ireland taro `withered' and
people survived on sago and coconuts. People starved again in 1905 in southeast
Papua.
The 1914 drought was possibly of similar severity to that of 1997. In New Ireland
populations were `scattered' and were said to be `wandering about in desperation'.
Another report stated, `a large section of the population simply died' Papuan villagers
.
were described as being `destitute'. Forest fires were widespread in Papua New
Guinea and Indonesia in 1914 and smoke haze at sea created a hazard for ship
navigation.
In 1931 the drought began in April and conditions deteriorated steadily until in
September they were described as `causing a good deal of distress among natives'.
The towns of Rabaul and Port Moresby ran out of water.
Smoke from widespread forest fires again caused problems with shipping in 1941,
sago swamps burned along the Sepik River and food supplies in the interior were said
to be `critical'. Observers in the Eastern Highlands at that time reported food
shortages. When Australian patrol officers first entered the high altitude valleys of the
western highlands in the early 1950s, they collected numerous stories of deaths and
migrations brought about by the frosts of 1941. These were the first reports by
outsiders of frost in Papua New Guinea except for a report of `snow' falling in the
Asaro area of the Eastern Highlands in what was probably 1914, and reports from
Wau in 1931.
The drought and frost of 1941 were associated with reports of hunger and migration
from the high highlands valleys. The 1972 drought was characterised by a series of
frosts, which completely disrupted food supplies in the high valleys. Elsewhere the
impact was not as serious. The frosts occurred on the eve of self- government, when a
coastal Chief Minister was about to take power against the wishes of a substantial
minority of conservative highlanders. It was assumed the migrations that began to
take place would result in widespread social unrest and conflict in the destination
areas. Under these political circumstances, the Australian government saw no
alternative other than to mount a major food relief program that fed 150,000 people
for about four months from November 1972 to March 1973 and a lesser number until
the following August. This program was later criticised for its lack of understanding
of migration as a traditional means of coping with frost and its potential to undermine
this response. Elsewhere the Fly River fell below trafficable levels, but food shortages
were relatively mild.
By 1982 Papua New Guinea was an independent sovereign nation. Frosts occurred in
the high valleys in 1981. However the first the national government heard of them
was an offer to supply food for a `famine' telexed from Rome by the UN World Food
Program, via the UN Disaster Relief Organization. The offer was based on a report
from a UNDP representative who was shown frosted gardens in the Tambul area by
highlands politicians, who told him a famine would follow. This offer was turned
down following a national government survey of the affected areas that found
although food was short, people were not in danger of starving. The 1982 drought
affected all parts of the country except the Islands. Ok Tedi mine traffic on the Fly
River was interrupted by low river levels and food supplies were widely affected. The
government response was influenced by the 1981 false alarm and financial
difficulties. Despite requests from some provinces, politicians and the Defence Force,
only small amounts of cash for relief were released. Press and other reports accused
the Defence Forces and politicians running for election of trying to get funds or food
under false pretences. Villagers were no longer portrayed as helpless victims, but as
cunning tricksters and liars.
A drought in 1987 affected parts of Papua New Guinea, including the Markham
Valley and parts of the Eastern Highlands. This was not as severe as the 1982 drought.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
Characteristics
The Drought
The 1997/98 drought in Papua New Guinea, in terms of impacts on the natural
environment and rainfall deficits, appears to have been the most severe since 1914.
Whether this is the worst drought in 100 years is largely irrelevant however, because
the physical impacts of the drought will be mediated through the social and political
conditions of the time, and these are very different between 1914 and 1997.
Rainfall deficits began to occur in some places in March 1997 but in other places not
until August. Between April and October at places as distant as Port Moresby, Mt
Hagen and Lae, rainfall wàs 70% below normal. Throughout the highlands, small
areas existed which received rain from thunderstorms once or twice during this
period, and food supply was maintained. Elsewhere however almost no rain was
received for up to eight months. In parts of southeast Papua including Milne Bay, low
rainfall conditions continued into 1998. In general, conditions increased in severity
with distance from the Equator. Frosts occurred right across the highlands in areas as
low as 1,450 m. Repeated frosts above 2,200 m completely destroyed food production
in the high valleys.
In the Sepik and Ramu River areas the situation has now reversed with heavy rains
and serious flooding in April and May 1998 causing extensive damage and some loss
of life. This change should not however be interpreted as the onset of La Nina
conditions, because at the time they were occurring the SOI was still strongly
negative.
Fires
The 1997 drought was accompanied by widespread and extensive fires, in both settled
and uninhabited areas. Many houses were destroyed by accidental fires driven into
villages by high winds. Fires were observed burning in lowland and montane forest,
long distances from .occupied areas. Sago swamps were said to be badly damaged in
parts of Western Province by fires lit by people hunting crocodiles. Smoke haze
closed many airstrips and some major airports, like Goroka. Pine plantations in the
Eastern Highlands were destroyed by fire.
Effects
Food and water
Two rapid assessments of the food and water situation were undertaken in 1997 and
another in restricted areas in 1998. In October 1997 it was estimated that 150,000
people were eating `bush' foods and another 175,000 faced a similar situation within a
month. Food supply in many other places was diminished and of very poor quality
due to insect damage. By December 1997 it was estimated that 260,000 people were
reduced to eating `bush' foods and 980,000 were eating garden foods in very much
reduced quantities and quality. In October 1997, reports of deaths and ill health
caused by a lack of food were restricted to the inland parts of Gulf, Central and Milne
Bay Provinces, but by December 1997 reports of unexpected deaths, of children and
adults fainting and of people suffering from stomach pains and severe vomiting after
eating `bush' foods were widespread in the worst affected areas. It is possible that
some of these deaths were due to 'pig-bel', which is caused by high levels of meat
consumption, in the absence of other foods.
Following rain in many places in November and December 1997, green leafed
vegetables quickly became available. Sago production became possible again.
However the supply of root crops remained restricted in April 1998. While it is
expected that full production will have been restored by June 1998, there are reports
of problems with suberisation in sweet potato. In the high valleys, where sweet potato
takes up to 10 months to produce, food supply will not return to normal until June or
July 1998.
An unexpected outcome of the 1997 drought was the drying of small streams and
local springs over a widespread area. This firstly restricted the ability of people to
make sago, which requires large amounts of water, and secondly reduced drinking
water to critical levels in some places, and in most places required drinking water to
be carried long distances. By December 1997, an estimated 47,000 people had access
to extremely limited amounts of contaminated or brackish water. A further 363,000
were carrying water of doubtful quality over lóng distances. Local water supplies
recovered quickly following rail in December 1997, except in southeast Papua and
Milne Bay. In most small centres, schools and health centres, tank water supply ran
out in October 1997, a situation brought about in many places by badly maintained
guttering and leaking tanks. As a result, many schools and aid posts were abandoned
by their staff.
Village responses
People made a number of responses to the conditions imposed by the drought. First
and perhaps most important, they used salary and savings to purchase imported food,
mainly rice and flour. Rice sales during 1997 -98 increased over sales in 1996 -97 by
60,000 tonnes, or 35 %. This amount includes purchases by the Australian and Papua
New Guinea governments. Of the 60,000 tonnes, 49,836 tonnes or 83% were
purchased through retail outlets, 5500 tonnes by the Papua New Guinea National
Disaster and Emergency Service, 2,314 tonnes by AusAID, 1,800 tonnes by Papua
New Guinea provincial governments and 450 tonnes by missions and Members of
Parliament, who were given a national government grant based on the numbers of
persons in their electorates, whether or not they were drought affected.
Another response was for people to purchase food with savings from cash crop sales
and with cash raised from a wide range of enterprises, such as selling very small
numbers of items like cigarettes and cooked food in roadside markets. Pigs were
killed and cooked, and pigs that died as a result of the drought were cooked and sold,
items like string bags and artefacts were manufactured and sold. Spending on luxury
items such as beer, frozen chicken and travel was greatly reduced. Some third level
airlines found themselves in financial difficulties.
Foods that are not normally eaten were consumed. They included the basal part of
banana plants, the edible root of the Pureria plant, `wild' yams that grow
spontaneously in local fallows and forest and tree leaves and fern roots. Common
fruits such as pawpaw were harvested green and boiled. Many instances were
observed of people suffering diarrhoea and stomach pain, possibly from eating too
much green leaf in the absence of any other foods, or eating too much meat.
A feature of the 1997 event was the large scale migration from rural villages to urban
locations. This is the first time that such large -scale migration has occurred in
response to a climatic perturbation. The rate of out - migration was uneven. Few or no
people migrated from remote locations where villagers had few relatives in urban
locations and people did not have the means to pay for transport, such as Karimui
District in Chimbu Province. Even in more accessible areas, migration was uneven.
For example, 20 -25% of the population in a group of villages south of Mt Elimbari in
Chimbu migrated to Goroka, Lae and Port Moresby to stay with relatives. In contrast,
no out - migration was observed in the villages visited in the Dom or Yonggamugl
areas of the province. Numerous observers who know Port Moresby well commented
on the influx of villagers in September- December 1997. Some observers associated an
increase in crime in the city with this influx. This widespread but uneven movement
of people from the countryside to urban and peri-urban areas was under way during
October 1997. By December 1997 this migration had slowed. These people lived with
relatives many of whom purchased food for them with wages and salaries. By
December 1997 it was apparent that some people "who had not moved into towns were
being supplied with food by urban dwelling relatives on a fortnightly basis.
In the ,badly frosted areas, up to 70% of the population migrated to other rural areas in
lower altitude valleys where they maintain long term social and economic
relationships as an insurance against the situation they found themselves in 1997. This
is a traditional response following frosts at very high altitude locations whereby
people migrate to lower altitude valleys where they maintain relationships through
provision of pigs and wild karuka pandanus nuts (Wohlt, 1989). During the 1997/98
event, for example, there was large -scale outmigration from the high altitude Kandep
District in Enga Provinces, with some estimates as high as 70% of people migrating.
Villagers were reported to have gone to the Tsak Valley and Lai Valley (in Enga), the
Porgera area, and particularly to the settlement schemes near Mt Hagen in the Wahgi
Valley.
Sickness and death
The drought almost certainly raised mortality and morbidity rates in Papua New
Guinea, but the condition of the health services means there are no reliable statistics
on which to base an estimate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an epidemic of severe
malaria occurred in mid - altitude areas, that deaths from typhoid and pneumonia
increased and that the general level of illness increased. However an epidemic of
dysenteric diseases which might have been expected as a result of drinking
contaminated water did not eventuate. Reports of unexplained deaths increased and
included death following severe stomach pains and vomiting and deaths of children
accompanying parents on arduous walks across high mountains passes.
In general, there were many more reports of an increased death rate from inland,
remote locations where cash income was limited than from coastal villages or
highland villages. These locations include the Goilala mountains of Central Province
and Angan speaking locations in inland Gulf Province. By November 1997, villagers
in some of the badly frost affected locations, such as the Kandep Basin in Enga, were
reporting a higher death rate. Health professionals interviewed stated that people died
of common diseases such as pneumonia, malaria and dysentery, although there were
reports of apparently healthy, but weak people dying while in the forest looking for
wild pandanus nuts or while migrating to lower valleys.
The crude death rate from drought related causes was quite high in some places. For
example, 16 deaths (4 adults and 12 children) were reported between July and
February in Ikundi village in inland Gulf Province out of a population of 380 people
(P. Lemonnier, pers. comm ) At Kagai Rest House in Yonggamugl CD in Chimbu
Pro.vince, there were nine reported deaths (2 boys, 2 girls, 2 women and 3 men) up to
November. It is not possible to determine the number of additional deaths associated
with the drought, but they are likely to number thousands rather than hundreds for all
Papua New Guinea.
Administration and the delivery of services
The stresses of the 1997 /98 drought fell upon administrative, health and educational
infrastructure which was in a poor state of repair. Papua New Guinea was under
considerable financial pressure brought about by an inability to control government
expenditure and the requirements of an IMF structural adjustment package. Recent
reforms in the constitutional and financial relationships between the national
government and provincial governments and in the structure of government were
untested and poorly understood.
The constitutional reforms had done away with provincial governments as institutions
separate from the national parliament. The former Regional Members who were
elected at a province level had become `Provincial Governors' and they are members
of the national parliament. The public service counterpart of the Governor is the
Provincial Administrator. Within provinces, Districts are now electorates of the
national parliament. At the District level the ordinary national parliamentary member
has a great deal of influence over who is appointed to the District administrative staff.
Political interests are mixed inextricably with day -to -day administrative functions,
and hierarchies of responsibility and leadership are confused and cross -cutting. Unless
provinces are very well integrated politically and are better than average
administratively, and some are, effective administration is extremely unlikely. The
first national election under the reforms had taken place. immediately before the
drought in early 1997.
Furthermore, working relationships between national and provincial administrations
were poor. The national Department of Finance is responsible for national fiscal management but the provincial administrations are responsible for spending on health,
education, agriculture, police, road maintenance and so on. The national government
requires that provinces account for the money provided from the centre, but provincial
administrations frequently do not have the capacity to manage the funds provided
effectively, let alone account for them properly.
An outcome of this situation was that when the additional stresses of the drought
began to be experienced, a number of already weak and only partly functioning
provincial administrations were unable to respond. For example, aid posts and schools
in some provinces were either not operating or were barely operating before the
drought. Buildings were not maintained, teachers and health staff were unpaid,
supplies were exhausted. The loss of drinking water, or the inability to purchase local
foods, was the last straw for teachers or health workers who were in their positions.
Just when the local villagers most needed the medicines of the aid post or the liaison
skills of the local teacher, they were lost to them.
Organisations which were functioning well before the drought and which continued to
function during the drought were the Christian missions. Resident missionaries wrote
reports on the condition of local people, used radio networks for communication, and
transported relief supplies by aircraft at cost. Mission operated schools and aid posts
services were also maintained during the drought.
Urban problems
The drought also had an impact upon urban areas through the influx of migrants (see
above) and restrictions in water and electricity supply. The town of Tabubil in
Western Province was largely isolated from the rest of the country because of the lack
of water in the Fly River. Tabubil, the dormitory town for the Ok Tedi mine, is not
connected by road to the coast and is normally serviced by shipping along the Fly
River. When river traffic ceased, the town had to be supplied by air.
Elsewhere, water supplies in two provincial capitals, Kerema and Kundiawa failed. In
many smaller centres reliant on tank water, the tanks were dry by September 1997 and
equipment like pumps, pipes and tankers to fill them from local rivers did not exist.
Although the chemicals needed to make river water safe for drinking was held within
the country, they were not available where they were needed, and few provincial
health staff knew how to use them.
Two major sources of hydro - electrical generation were threatened. The Yonki
reservoir in the Eastern Highlands that supplies power to seven provinces and Lae, the
second largest city in the country, was able to maintain supply despite shrinking in
volume considerably. In contrast, the Sirinumu Dam not only provides power to Port
Moresby, but also drinking water. Sirinumu fell to 20% of capacity by December
1997. To conserve the water supply, electrical generation was taken over by two very
expensive turbo- powered generators, which can only supply half the city's demands
Regular power cuts left government and private enterprise offices literally in the dark
and without air conditioning for eight hours at a time. Largt numbers of local diesel
powered generators were employed at a high cost. The wet season rains when they
finally came did little to replenish the Sirinumu Dam and with the onset of the dry
season waters and power water restrictions are likely to continue until at least the end
of 1998.
The economy
The drought had a major impact on the mining industry, which earns about 85% of
Papua New Guinea's export income. The cessation of traffic on the Fly River
prevented the Ok Tedi mine from exporting copper concentrate and importing
supplies to the mine and the town of Tabubil. Production stopped between August
1997 and March 1998. Staff were temporarily retired on `dry weather pay'. Low water
levels resulted in the concentrate storage and loading wharf at Kiunga collapsing into
the river. Payments to the Papua New Guinea government fell sharply and the
company made a major loss in 1997. At Porgera, the small dam, which provides water
for processing, dried up and prevented production for 45 days.
The drought coincided with the Asian financial crises, which resulted in the partial
collapse of the logging industry in Papua New Guinea and a sharp drop in government
income and locally paid royalties.
Then between September 1997 and April 1998, the value of the king lost 30% of its
fell against the Australian dollar. This
devaluation is said to have occurred because there are insufficient foreign reserves to
support the currency. The devaluation has resulted in a sharp increase in the costs of
imported goods, including food, which has impacted heavily on the cost of living in
value against the US dollar and also
urban areas in particular, where people eat mainly imported food.
In the commercial rural sector, the overall impact on production is not yet clear. Oil
palm production on New Ireland was reduced by 600 tonnes of fresh fruit and copra
and cocoa production were reduced during 1997 by an unknown amount. The main
coffee harvest in the highlands occurred from May to July 1997 before the drought
had become established. Although some coffee trees dropped their leaves, they have
recovered and a large harvest is being predicted for 1998.
Responses
Australian assistance
In August 1997 Australian newspapers began publishing disturbing pictures of frosted
gardens and allegedly starving people in the Kandep Basin in the highlands. One
headline asked `What are we doing while our neighbours die' Thesé reports alleged,
wrongly, that 500 people had already died of starvation. These reports brought
pressure to bear on the Australian government to `do something'. In September 1997
.
the Papua New Guinea government asked for assistance to carry out an assessment of
the rural food and water supply situation. The results of the first assessment was given
directly to AusAID representatives in Port Moresby. A decision was made that the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) would be employed to provide food to people
assessed to be either without food, or to be within one month of that condition, who
had no road access. This program used Blackhawk helicopters and Caribou fixed wing
aircraft to deliver over 2500 tonnes of rice, and 600 tonnes of flour, to over 100,000
people. A detailed breakdown of costs incurred by Australia is set out below.
Papua New Guinea responses
In September 1997 the Papua New Guinea Prime Minister established a Drought,
Relief Coordination Committee and appointed a former parliamentarian and Minister
of Health as chair Almost immediately this appointment was rescinded and a young,
inexperienced Provincial Governor was appointed as chair. He was defending a
challenge to his election in the courts. It seems as if this committee either never met,
or did not meet until November 1997. In the meantime, and before the assessment was
completed, the national government gave out K3.5 million to all members of
parliament on a pro -rata basis of the numbers of electors in their electorates. Much of
this money went to electorates that were not severely impacted by the drought.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that where it was spent on food, funds were not always
available to move it to the places where it was needed.
On the basis of the first assessment, the national government purchased rice directly
from the supplier and paid for delivery to provincial headquarters. However funds for
the onward movement of the rice were not immediately available from the national
government. This particularly disadvantaged people who were not accessible by road,
but who were not included in the Australian program because they were not
considered to be severely impacted in the September 1997 assessment, but were
identified as such in the December 1997 assessment. Provincial drought relief
committees were poorly organised and were by their own assessments, ineffective.
AusAID contracted NGOs to provide assistance to provincial committees in highlands
four provinces and they proved to be very effective.
Mining companies, Porgera Joint Venture in Enga, Ok Tedi Mining Limited in
Western and Chevron in the Southern Highlands, contributed to relief in the impact
areas of their projects by providing staff to carry out assessment, helicopter time and
air and road transport for food.
It seems likely however, that most rural people either kept themselves alive with food
purchased with savings, or were assisted by relatives who provided food and cash
from wages and salaries.
Broader issues
Poverty and Isolation
It is clear that the direct impact of the drought was ameliorated by people using cash
from saving, and wages and salaries, to purchase imported food. However there are
groups of people who, because of where they live, are relatively poor compared to
other rural people. These people live in what is known as the `highlands fringe' in
rugged mountainous country north and south of the main highlands valleys, in the
central mountains of Papua, extending into southern Eastern Highlands and Morobe
Provinces, in the centre of New Britain, in the mountains of Milne Bay or on small
offshore islands in many parts of Papua New Guinea. They frequently live across the
borders of two or even three provinces, such that no particular provinces accepts
responsibility for them. They are commonly an ethnic minority in a province and are
rarely represented properly in the political process.
It appears as if death rates and suffering were considerably greater in these places than
in more accessible and wealthier parts of the country. The Australian relief program
reached many of these people in Western, West Sepik, Gulf, Central and Milne Bay
Provinces, but others, particular those in the southern parts of Eastern Highlands and
in Enga and Southern Highlands probably received very little assistance.
Drought patterns and food supply
Drought in Papua New Guinea is a relatively rare but regular event. Papua New
Guinea is normally a high rainfall country and too much water is a greater problem in
many places than not enough water. At least one major famine that occurred in the
western highlands in the 1930s is said to have been caused by excessive rainfall.
Minor, local and regional food shortages occur relatively regularly in Papua New
Guinea and they are usually the result of too much rain. The excessive rain and the
food shortage occur some months apart, and as a result, the cause and the effect are
commonly not associated. In modem Papua New Guinea, these shortages are well
coped with in those places in which cash crops sales enable people to purchase
imported rice.
In the highlands, food shortages commonly occur as paired events. The first food
shortage is often caused by a climatic perturbation, such as too much or too little
rainfall. The second shortage occurs about two years after the start of the first. It is
caused by a cycle of very high and then very low crop planting rates, as well as
changes in the proportion of land cleared from fallow (Bourke 198S). Thus it is
possible that, following a period of particularly abundant subsistence food supply in
the highlands in the second half of 1998, there will be a second, milder, food shortage
in mid -late 1999. The solution to this problem is to advise villagers to maintain even
land clearing and planting rates.
The matter of domestic rice production needs to be mentioned. Strong political
pressure exists in Papua New Guinea for domestic rice production to replace imported
rice. Taiwan and the Republic of China are both involved in aid projects that have as
their objectives the domestic production of irrigated rice. However all reports written
since the 1960s on the domestic production of rice, from all sources including all
major international development and lending agencies, have advised against the
investment of capital into domestic rice production. These reports are sceptical of the
Papua New Guinea government's ability to produce sufficient rice at competitive
prices without massive subsidisation. They argue that the world market price of rice is
falling. and Papua New Guinea's major supplier, Australia, is a highly secure source.
All previous attempts to grow rice domestically, of which there have been many, have
failed due to problems of climate, technology and cost.
Australian Response to the Drought in Papua New
Guinea
In response to the worst drought in PNG's recorded history, Australia on request from
the Government of PNG, implemented an emergency relief operation. There were a
number of aspects to Australia's relief efforts which are outlined below.
Response to the Drought in Png
Drought Assessments
$300,000
In order to determine the extent of the drought AusAID funded two drought
assessments (in September and December 1997) undertaken primarily by PNG
government personnel. Both assessments were led by consultants Dr Bryant Allen and
Dr Michael Bourke. They were designed to assess the seriousness of food and water
shortages in PNG, especially in high altitude locations where serious frost damage
had occurred and in island regions were may be experiencing severe water shortages.
Technical Assistance to the Third Assessment
$40,000
A third drought assessment was carried out by GoPNG personnel, with logistical
support provided by AusAID consultant Joe Barr. The Third Assessment followed a
similar methodology to the first two but had a greater focus on rehabilitation.
Third Assessment Hospital Costs
$150,000
A helicopter crash involving several members of the third assessment team marred the
third assessment. As a gesture of goodwill the Australian Government offered to pay
for all reasonable medical costs associated with the injuries sustained by two PNG
nationals, Daniel Orei and David Kapi who were treated in Australia.
Hydrologist
$60,000
AusAID contracted water specialist Gerry Jacobson, through CARE Australia, to
develop an action plan for addressing the immediáte requirements of those people
severely affected by drought, in terms of their access to water.
Pharmaceuticals
$1,200,000
As the incidence of infectious diseases increased with the intensity of the drought,
AusAID made available a host of key' medicines, through its Commodity Assistance
Program.
Epidemiologist
$80,000
The epidemiologist (Michael Douglas) was contracted to work within the PNG
National Dept of Health (specifically in disease control and evaluation units) to
review processes and procedures currently in place for the surveillance and control of
a number of specified diseases such as vaccine preventable diseases; food and water
borne diseases; TB and vector borne diseases.
Nutritionist
$120,000
A nutritionist was employed to undertake rapid, nutritional assessments of people in
drought affected areas and to assess the adequacy of the National Drought Ration,
particularly in relation to the needs of people most affected by drought.
Water Driller
$16,000
Mr Kevin Prior of Markham Drillers was engaged by AusAID to survey possible
borehole sites in a group of islands in the Milne Bay area. Mr Prior also prepared
specifications and tender documents along with reviewing the availability of drilling
contractors in- country and overseas.
$120,000
Water Coordinator
Following on from the recommendations of Hydrologist, AusAID contracted a water
engineer to fill the position of PNG National Water Sub -Committee Coordinator. This
involved establishing recommended operational guidelines for the National Water
Sub -Committee (NWSC) and assisting in the coordination and overall operation of
the NWSC.
Public Relations Adviser
$48,000
In order to inform the Australia public as to AusAID' s role in the drought relief effort
a public relations adviser was engaged. As a part of her duties the consultant was
required to liaise with the Australian and PNG media on all matters regarding
AusAID' s drought related activities.
Post Emergency Fund(including food)
$3,100,000
Under the relief effort, Australia delivered over 3 5 million kilograms of food aid to
isolated areas. The food relief targeted people rated as Category 5 in inaccessible
,
areas.
ADF Costs
$12,000,000
The Australian Defence Force delivered 3.5 million kilograms of food relief (rice,
flour and cooking oil) into the most isolated areas of PNG. Blackhawk and Chinook
helicopters were used in those areas without landing strips and Caribous and Hercules
where suitable airstrips were available.
NGO Funding
$3,500,000
The Australian Government funded six NGOs to assist with the drought effort in
category 4 and 5 areas accessible by road or river.
CARE Australia
$395,000
CARE provided assistance to provincial authorities in planning, monitoring,
coordinating and assessing emergency relief operations in Simbu, Eastern Highlands
and Western Highlands. CARE also provided assistance to AusAID with the first
drought assessment.
$745,000
Christian Children's Fund
CCF provided food and water supplies and seedlings for longer term recovery in
Enga, Eastern Highlands, Gulf, Central and Morobe Provinces.
Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia
&the Pacific
$366,000
Provided food, water, medicines, medical equipment and temporary shelter to people
in three districts of Eastern Highlands Province.
Save the Children Fund
Provided food relief to three
Highlands Province.
$133,000
communitieswithinWonenara District of Eastern
World Vision A ustralia
$1,095,000
Provided food relief, seed distribution for food recovery, and personnel support to the
Southern Highlands Province.
Adventist Development and Relief Agency
$750,000
Provided water irrigation systems, training, eduction programs, and food relief in New
Ireland, Momase, Highlands, and Milne Bay provinces.
Technical Assistance to NDES
$200,000
Emergency Management Australia placed Phil Stenchion in the PNG' s National
Disaster and Emergency Service (NDES) to provide technical support for
management of the drought relief operations. This support essentially took the shape
of on the job training for NDES operations staff on the management of operational
information.
Agricultural Rehabilitation
$700,000
Australia has shipped around 400 tonnes of seeds of rapid growing crops to PNG. It
also assisted the PNG Government agencies to distribute the seeds in- country.
Indonesia
Past ENSO Events
Anomalies, such as the current El Nino, are not a recent phenomenon but form part of
a climatological pattern that has influenced development in the region over a long
period of time, possibly thousands of years. The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) can
be calculated back to 1876. Figure 1 shows the annual average SOI from 1900 to
1989. Any negative reading below -10 defines an `El Nincrevent'
.
FIGURE 1
Annual Average Southern Oscillation Index, 1900 -1989
SS
-15
20
:JII
1900
JIIJIIIIILL11111__11111!IIIIILILI
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
Source: NichoUs (1993)
Source: Nicholls (1993)
Since 1900, there have been many El Nito events of varying severity. Figure 1
records twenty such El Niño events. Particularly severe El Niño events occurred in
1905/6, 1939/41, and 1982/3. These El NiTO provide points of comparison with the
1997/98 El Niño.
The Succession of El Niño Events in the 1990s
El Niño events have a cumulative as well as immediate impact. It is possible to see
the 1997/1998 El Nido as part of a longer cycle that has been developing through
much of this decade. Since 1990, the SOI has been overwhelmingly in the negative.
Figure 2, based on data from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, shows the
Southern Oscillation Index for the past five years to April 1998.
FIGURE 2
Mcntrly SOI
Id
s mcnthmean
-
-30-
i99
-4V
1111
Jzn
i9
111111E11171111111
Ain
i99
1994
iggS
}1Fr717i11111 IIfi[11111Irr
Jin
Jan
Jan
9e
i997
J7rl
Jan
For more than five of the last seven years, Indonesia has experienced El Nino -like
conditions with the 1997/98 El Nino the most severe in this series. 1996 provided
only a brief respite from these conditions but not enough time for a full recovery from
previous conditions.
These conditions can be regarded as a significant factor in the leveling out of
increases in Indonesia's national rice production. Despite several El Nino episodes,
during the 1980s, Indonesia's rice production increased spectacularly. In 1979,
Indonesia's total rice production stood at 24 7 million tons; by 1989, it had reached
44.7 million tons, an increase of 20 million tons in a decade (Fox 1991:80). Since the
1990s, however, annual rice production increases have slowed. In 1997, as a result of
nine months of severe El NiYiO conditions, national rice production showed the first
decline since the New Order's rice intensification program began.
Rice production for 1997 was only 49.1 million tons. This amounts to an increase of
only 4.4 million tons a year during the period since 1989. The expectation is for a
further decrease of more than 2 million tons as a result of continuing El Niño
conditions in 1998.
The impact of continuing El Nino conditions has taken its toll on the capacity of local
farming communities to cope with continuing poor conditions. Many of these
communities have lost savings, livestock, seed resources and reserves of alternative
food supplies that can be called upon in a time of crisis.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
The Patterning of El Nino Events: the 1997/98 Episode
No two El Niño events are ever the same. They differ in intensity and duration. Yet,
as research continues on El Ní7io- Southern Oscillation phenomena, certain patterns
are discernible. One such significant pattern is that El Nino episodes are generally
phase -locked to an annual cycle. This means that if an El Nino (or its reverse, La
Nina) becomes established by the middle of a calendar year, it will not alter until
sometime early in the following year. As a consequence, most El Nino begin and end
during the period between March and June.
This `phase -locked' pattern is particularly critical for Indonesia since such patterning
has its effects on different seasonal monsoons. Indonesia is a large country and is
affected by different seasonal patterns. The most important period of rainfall for most
of the country occurs during four crucial monsoonal months - November, December,
January and February. The intensity of an El Nino episode during these months has a
considerable effect on cropping systems in virtually all areas of high production and
high population - much of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, all of Java, Bali, and
the islands of Nusa Tenggara Barat and Timur plus the scattered small islands in the
southern region of Maluku.
The northern regions of Indonesia experience a lesser monsoon that occurs between
May and June. An intense El Nino episode during these months has a pronounced
regional effect. Similarly, a strong El Nino can have a significant effect on the rains
that fall during these months in West Java, which is the single largest rice- producing
province in the country. In West Java, even small disturbances to rainfall produce
major effects on harvests.
As measured by the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI), the 1997/98 El Nino episode
began between March and April. The SOI declined sharply from +13.3 in February to
-8.5 in March and then declined even further in April to -16.2, reaching its first deep
trough during May ( -22.4) and June (- 24.1). Thereafter the SOI rose briefly to -9.5,
but declined again and remained significantly negative through November.
In December the SOI rose to -9.1, suggesting (at least to some observers) that the El
Nino might be easing, but then it once more declined sharply to -23.5 and remained
deeply negative for the duration of Indonesia's west monsoon: January: -23.5,
February: -21.1, March: -28.5 and April: -24.1.
Figure 3 charts the progress of the 1997/98 El Nine through April 1998.
In recent years, the only other El Nino episode to persist at this intensity (at or below
the critical level of -20) for more than four months during the period of the west
monsoon was the 1982/83 El Nifio, which began later (in June 1982) than the 1997/98
El Niño. This El Niño continued at a high level of intensity for seven months but then
came to an end in April/May 1983. Figure 4 charts the course of this El Niño to its
conclusion.
By comparison, based on SOI levels, the 1982/83 El Niño episode was shorter but
more intense. By contrast, the 1997/98 El Ni?io began earlier in the year, continued
longer and was characterised by two distinct periods of intensity (1 May -June 1997
and 2 January -April 1998). Compared to the 1982/83 El Niño, the 1997/98 El Niño
had the far greater impact. SOI index alone is thus insufficient to give an adequate
indication of actual impacts of these different El Nine events in Indonesia.
The Impact of the 1997/98 El Ninb
An El Niño produces a decrease in rain over a wide area in Indonesia. The effect is
never total but always scattered, with some localities far less affected than others.
Where the pattern of monsoons is dominant, an El Nilio tends to impede the onset of
crucial seasonal rains, resulting in the postponement of the soaking downpours needed
for initial planting. There is also, often, an increase in the intervals between periods of
heavy rain which can have serious consequences once planting has begun.
FIGURE 3
EL NINO -1997 -98
l
172 per May Aug
:Serie-s1s
-3 O
_
.1
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
-8.5 -16.2 -22.4 -24.1 -9.5 -19.8 -14.8 -17.8 -15.2 -9.1
-23.5
-21.1
-28.0
-24.4
An Ë1 Nino can produce frost at higher altitudes. Associated with El Niño conditions
is an increase of heavy winds without rain, which can have devastating effects on
standing crops. Although there may be fewer insect pest problems than in rainy years,
rat infestations are said to be more common and are invariably reported as severe.
Normal fishing patterns are also disturbed.
During a strong El NiTio, drinking water becomes scarce; rivers run dry; and
reservoirs fail to fill, resulting not just in a decrease in water for irrigation but also in a
capacity to generate electricity. Forest fires are more frequent and more widespread.
FIGURE 4
EL NINO -1982 -83
410
14.0
4.4 =
-5.4 -10.0
;
-15.0 -r
-20.4 1
-25 0
1=1. Ser
V
5
I
-2 per. Mov. Avg
(Series 1)
-
-30.0 -
-3i 0
-
-4ï1.0
Mar Apr May Jun
2.4
3.6
-8 -2 -20.1
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
. -19.3 -23.6 -21.4 -20.2 -31.1 -21.3 -30.6.-33.3 -28. L -17.0
All of these El Niño impacts occurred in Indonesia during 1997/98 but not
everywhere and not at the same time. It is appropriate therefore to consider these
impacts as a sequence of developments in different parts of the country.
Forest Fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra
Indonesia has approximately 100 million hectares of forest. Much of the land consists
of degraded forest; roughly 58 million hectares has been allocated to concessions of
various kinds. According to Indonesia's latest Five -year plan (REPELITA VI),
700,000 hectares are scheduled for clearing each year to increase oil palm and tree
crop plantations to 2.5 million hectares by the year 2000. A million hectares of peat swamp forest is also being cleared in Central Kalimantan for conversion to irrigated
rice planting.
Control over one third of Kalimantan and one fourth of Sumatra has been granted to
timber concessionaires, leaving the indigenous populations of these areas with few, if
any, rights to the lands that they traditionally cultivated. New migrant populations,
mainly from Java, have been brought into these areas, initially to live in designated
settlement areas where, for many, cultivation proved unsustainable. The relatively
low- density local populations have thus, in many areas, been overwhelmed by new
comers needing new land. Since the 1970s, government policies have created an
explosive mix of timber and plantation concessionaires, local populations and new
transmigrants, all competing, unequally, for resources. The result has been an orgy of
land clearing with fire as the main tool with concessionaires at the forefront of recent
burnings.
Clearing by fire can only occur in the dry season and is usually done in advance of
expected rains. When, during a strong El Niño, these rains are delayed and
significantly diminished, fires can rage out of control for months.
1997/1998 was not the first occasion of severe fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra. In
Kalimantan, recurrent fires are part of the ecological pattern of the island and have
contributed to the tree species configuration of present -day forests. Historical
evidence, including observations in Portuguese and Dutch records as early as the 16th
century, indicate a pattern of El Nino events. Dutch colonial records show that
1878/79 and 1914 were major dry periods that produced extensive forest burning
(Brookfield et al 1995: 158 -178).
The largest forest fires in recent history occurred during the 1982/83 El Niflo when an
estimated area of 3.5 million hectares burnt. There were less extensive fires in 1987
and recurrent fires during the 1990 -1995 El Nina years, particularly in 1991 and 1994.
1997 fires began in June in Sumatra, primarily in the provinces of Jambi and Riau,
and throughout most of Kalimantan. These fires continued, on a large scale, until
November when there were sufficient rains to dampen and extinguish many of the
fires above ground. Underground fires in deep peat deposits continued to bum. At the
height of these fires, an acrid smoky haze covered the area and extended as far as
Singapore and West Malaysia. This hazardous smoke was caused especially by the
burning of peat and of the still green vegetation deliberately piled in mounds as part
of the clearing of plantation land. When the El Nino rénewed in strength in January
1998, many fires were rekindled and went on burning, in spot fires, for several more
months.
Estimates of the extent of these fires vary enormously. The Indonesian government
initially claimed that only 170,000 hectares were burnt; others, using government
data, estimated the area burnt at over 600,000 hectares; while some environmental
NGOs maintained that 1.7 million hectares may have been burnt (Byron 1998).
The extent of significant damage to the forest is even harder to estimate at this stage
and will take time to assess properly. Because dipterocarp forests are adapted to
recurrent fire outbreaks, most trees can survive if burning is at ground level and does
not spread through the crowns of the trees.
Damage done to fruit trees affects wildlife as does heavy suffocating smoke. The
drying of rivers and lakes as a result of drought conditions and their subsequent
pollution with fire debris also has a major affect on forest inhabitants. Cities, towns
and even smaller settlements throughout Kalimantan that were dependent on river
water suffered water supply problems during this El Nina.
The El Nino Impact on Indonesia's Rice Crop
Rice is Indonesia's most important single crop. According to government figures, the
1997 rice crop declined from 51,101,506 tons of unhusked rice (gkg: gabah kering
giling) to 49,134,035 tons (gkg). This constitutes an overall decline in annual national
rice production of just under 4 %.
Analysis of production figures, by province, indicates where the greatest crop losses
have occurred. In most cases, one can attribute much of this crop loss to the impact of
the current El Nino. In general, the percentage of local rice crop loss can also be
regarded as an indication of the extent of other crop losses in the province. Percentage
loss, however, gives no indication of the actual amount of rice lost since provinces
differ in the amount of rice they normally produce. Even a small percentage loss in a
major rice -growing province, such as West Java, can have a large impact on the
overall rice crop.
All other provinces in Indonesia reported relatively little rice crop loss that could be
attributed to the impact of the El Nino. The fact that the 1997 El Nino gained intensity
after the main rice crop was harvested may account for some of this lesser impact.
Inexplicably, according to official figures, East Kalimantan reported only a minor loss
of rice whereas local observers indicate significant rice crop loss in this drought
affected province.
Impact of El Niño on Indonesia's 1997 Rice Crop
Province
Percentage
Loss
Rice Crop Loss
Amount (Tons)
Maluku/Irian Jay a
North Sulawesi
Southwest Sulawesi
Lampung
Central Sulawesi
West Sumatra
Jambi
32%
19%
16%
13%
12%
10%
10%
25641
45419
48387
257927
70571
200066
66089
Riau
Central Kalimantan
8%
8%
7%
37071
30454
36127
6%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
2%
84174
52423
48884
66023
19802
66434
390956
82921
Nusa Tenggara Timtir/
East Timur
Aceh
West Kalimantan
Bali
South Kalimantan
Bengkulu
South Sumatra
West Java
South Sulawesi
.
In January 1998, the El Nino began to increase again in intensity and this had a major
effect on the first rice crop of the year. The first and most notable effect was to delay
the onset of the rice planting season. This postponement of planting shifted the time
of normal harvest by as much as two months.
Figure 5, based on harvest data from the 1980s, shows how the 1982/83 El Nino
shifted the harvest in West Java from its normal peak at the beginning of April to an
extended period of more than two months from April through May. A similar shift in
harvest occurred in 1998 in a wide area from South Sumatra through West Java and
on to Lombok.
There is as yet no available data on the size of the first harvest. There are various
estimates of this first season harvest and of the crop loss because of the impact of the
El Nino. One early estimate prepared at the end of February (Fox 1998) calculated the
possible rice crop loss for this first season at between 3.9% and 4.4 %. This would
amount to a loss of rice of between 1,967,471 and 2,161,717 tons.
Because the intensity of this El Nino event remained high through April and into
May, the impact will continue to be felt on the subsequent rice crop in 1998. It is
therefore too early to arrive at an assessment of the full impact of the 1997/98 El Nino
_ on Indonesia's national rice production.
FIGURE 5
West Java Ft be Harvest
-------
igig15
191;t6
182
I
I
2
3
I
4
1
£
(
I
.
1.
7
3
6
40
Movh
The El Nirïo Impact on other Crops: Effects on Eastern Indonesia
aa
i
The greatest impact of the 1997/98 El Nino was on single -crop com farmers in eastern
Indonesia who are dependent on rains in December and January. The worst affected
islands are those in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and in the southern
part of the province of Maluku. East Timor was also badly affected. The coastal
regions of the large islands of Sumba, Timor, Flores and Alor lost more, than 50% of
their com crop. At higher elevations, there was enough rain in patches for a com crop
but yields were severely reduced.
Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) is Indonesia's driest province. With a present population
of over 3.4 million, it is considered the poorest of Indonesia's provinces. A recent
Agricultural Survey Review of the Ministry of Agriculture lists NTT as the province
with the greatest proportion of poor farmers. 43.9 % of the population is classed as
`poor, rural, self- employed farmers'. This comes to 1.44 million persons within NTT.
Although there are pockets of rainfed, as well as some irrigated, rice in many areas of
NTT, the primary form of agriculture consists of a combination of shifting fields and
semi -permanent dryland gardens planted predominantly with com or with a mix of
millet, sorghum, and beans, particularly mung beans. Cassava and sweet potato are
planted everywhere as important reserve foods. Most cassava planting is done after
there has been rain, to be harvested in the dry season beginning, if necessary, in June
or July. Taro and yams are also planted on a lesser scale, for the same purpose, where
it is possible.
The rainy season normally occurs between December and April followed by a long
dry season. Most crops are dependent on irregular rains during the rainy season and
these rains are regularly distributed by El Nin3 events.
The relatively high population density in parts of this province, the heavy dependence
on forms of traditional agriculture and the irregularity of the rains on which all
farmers are dependent make Nusa Tenggara Timur the most vulnerable of Indonesia's
provinces.
The Pattern of Drought in Nusa Tenggara Timur
Within the province, only two districts -kabupaten, Manggarai in West Flores and
West Sumba, consistently produce a food surplus. Kabupaten Ngada produces a
surplus in most years. Much of the surplus of Manggarai (and of Ngada) goes to
support the various poorer kabupaten of Flores; just as the surplus in West Sumba
supports East Sumba. The poorest areas of the province are those with the lowest
rainfall. Even in good years, the islands of Solor, Adonara and Pantar - as well as
parts of the north and south coasts of Flores - suffer regular crop failures. Similarly,
the north and south coasts of Timor - large areas of Timor Tengah Selatan , Timor
Tengah Utara and Belu - are regularly affected by crop loss.
Throughout the province, com is planted in late November, December or early
January and harvested from February through March; rice and also mung beans are
planted later, usually in January, after soils are well saturated with rain. In El Nino
years, farmers are frequently misled by initial rains, which offer promise but then
cease. Because rains are locally variable, most farmers try to plant several different
fields to increase their chances of at least one successful harvest. Most farmers keep
some seed reserves in case they are forced to plant a second time during the wet
season. Rarely do farmers have sufficient seed reserves for a third attempt at planting
and by the time such a third planting seems necessary, there is little likelihood of
success. By mid -March the rains begin to diminish and it is no longer possible to
plant com with any expectation of a good harvest.
The period prior to the com harvest is known as the time of `ordinary hunger' (lapar
biasa). During this period, the poorer segments of the population survive on `reserve
foods', primarily cassava, some sweet potato and forest yams. Various populations
have developed special adaptations to weather these ordinary hunger periods. The
populations of the small islands of Rote and Savu depend upon sugar supplies from
tapping lontar palms. Some Florenese groups and almost all Alorese gather foods and
other products from their foresfs.
In drought years, when the planting and subsequent harvest of the com crop is greatly
delayed, the period of ordinary hunger is extended and conditions turn more critical.
`Ordinary hunger' becomes `extraordinary hunger' ,( lapar luarbiasa). Most families
manage on one meager meal a day. Livestock, suffering from the same conditions as
the human population, are consumed or sold to buy emergency foods. In the driest
areas, people turn to green papaya, eaten as a vegetable, and tamarind seeds. In Timor,
a sago gruel, known as putak, made from soaking the pith of the gewang palm
(Corypha elata Roxb) is eaten as a food of last resort. In Flores, the population eats
raut, a kind of forest yam, and in Sumba, a plant called polubolo. All of these foods
are normally only fed to pigs but in times of drought, they become a source of human
sustenance.
Drinking water becomes difficult to obtain and is often polluted by animals seeking
water. Women and younger girls spend more time than ever carrying water for their
families A strong indicator of the `extraordinary hunger period' is a sharp increase in
gastro- intestinal diseases. Children are particularly vulnerable.
El Nino Episodes in Nusa Tenggara Timur
Nusa Tenggara Timur is the province most prone to suffer serious impacts during an
El Niño. As such it provides a critical area for the assessment of such effects. A strong
monsoonal pattern dominates agriculture in the province. Most rain falls during the
months from November through March with far less rain during the rest of the year.
In the outer arc of islands, these conditions are pronounced with little or no rain from
August to October. 82% to 94% of all rain in the outer arc falls during the west
monsoon.
Mean annual rainfall varies from a few areas of relatively high rain at the western end
of the province to less than 1000 mm of rain, mostly at the eastern end of the
province. Generally, the elevated and often mountainous interior areas of the larger
islands receive more rain than coastal areas. Small, relatively low -lying islands, such
as the isolated island of Savu, are particularly prone to drought.
The province can be considered in terms of two island chains: an inner chain of
islands stretching from Flores in the west to Alor in the east and an outer arc
extending from Sumba in the west to Timor in the east. Selected mean annual rainfall
figures illustrate this variation across the province.
It is possible to compare available rainfall figures for the critical rainy season months
of 1997 -98 with those of previous El Nino episodes. The two other El Nino of this
century that were seemingly as severe as he 1997/98 El Nino were the 1939/41 El
Nino (particularly its first year) and the 1982/83 El Niio. Colonial weather stations
have provided reasonably good data for 1939/41; unfortunately for the 1982/83 El
Nit lo many stations kept only intermittent records. At present, local data on the
1997/98 El Niio is still incomplete and therefore it is not yet possible to carry out a
detailed comparative analysis of the 1997/98 El Nino and the 1939/41 El Nii o.
During the 1939/40 monsoon season, Waikabubak in West Sumba suffered a 54%
decrease in average rainfall; Seba on the island of Savu a 33% decrease; Atambua on
the north coast of Timor a 26% decrease, whereas Namodale on the island of Rote at
the western tip of Timor recorded only a 14% decrease in rain. A somewhat similar
pattern may have occurred in 1997 -98. (Since present data are too limited for reliable
analysis, available figures are simply attached as an appendix to this country report.)
Islands: Flores to Alor
Average Annual Rainfall
(mm)
Ruteng (Kabupaten Manggarai)
Lengkoajang (Kabupaten Manggarai)
Bajawa (Kabupaten Ngada)
Maumere (Kabupaten Sikka)
Wai Werang (Adonara Island, Flores Timur)
Lamalerap (Lembata Island, Flores Timur)
Kalabahi (Kabupaten Alor)
Islands: Sumba to Timor
3512
3307
1886
977
777.
822
1171
Average AnnualRainfall
(mm)
Waikabubak (Sumba B arat)
2115
Waingapu (Sumba Timur)
819
Seba (Savu Island, Kabupaten Kupang)
1019
Ba'a (Rote Island, Kabupaten Kupang)
1237
Kupang (Kabupaten Kupang)
1452
Soe (Kabupaten Timor Tengah Selatan)
1481
Kefamenanu (Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara) 1343
Wini (Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara)
773
Atambua (Kabupaten Belu)
1445
To assess the impact of the current El Nino, it is not enough to know the amount of
rain that fell in various locations in the province. It is also necessary to have some
idea of days of rain and the interval between heavy rain. Data on the daily rainfall
pattern is only available for the immediate area around the provincial capital of
Kupang, which appears to have been less affected by lack of rain than many other
parts of the province. These data nonetheless provide some glimpse of the intervals
between heavy rainfall on Timor.
According to these data there were only brief storms in November; the first significant
rains of the season began around the 5th of December and lasted for about six days
(105 mm); there was then a break in rainfall until about 21st of December when a
second spell of heavy rain (117 mm) fell. These (Christmas /1 El Niño ') rains lasted for
five days; but were followed by another long pause, punctuated by only occasional
light rain, until the 18th of January when heavy monsoonal rain fell. These rains
continued to the end of the month with a succession of days that produced over 500
mm of rain. The north coast of Timor and large stretches of the south coast as well are
reported to have received little rain at all. For the interior area of Timor, however, the
pattern of rains was not unlike that of Kupang. Farmers reported that it was not so
much a lack of rain that affected their crops as the long interval between rains and
especially the lack of rain when the com crop was at the point of tasseling.
Farmers invariably try to `catch' the onset of the early rains. Reports indicate that
some farmers - in Sumba, Alor and parts of West Timor - began planting com with
the early rains in November; others - in Flores and parts of West Timor - began their
planting in December. Much of this crop dried up and died during one or another of
the long interruptions to the rain. This left farmers short of seed for a third attempt at
planting later in January. The result was both a significant loss of the com crop and a
delay of over a month for most of the harvest.
Most farmers planting rice could only begin to plant toward the end of January. Rice
planting requires heavy rains to soak the mixed clay soils on which planting occurs.
This planting was delayed by a month or more and in some areas, there was
insufficient rain to be able to plant rice at all.
Predicting and Preparing for an El Ninb Event
No El Niño event in history has been given the international attention of the 1997/98
El Nino. This El Nino was predicted well in advance of its onset and considerable
attention was given to its likely severity and potential impact. Its course was
monitored closely and information about its course was abundantly and widely
available through the international electronic media.
This information was, however, not available to farmers in Indonesia who had to
determine their own particular planting strategies. Even if better meteorological
information had been available, it may not have been useful to the majority of
farmers. Forecasts provide probabilistic statements about rainfall. In Java, such
forecasts might allow farmers to alter cropping patterns in the face of a delay in the
monsoonal rains, thus inducing them to plant com or soybeans before planting their
.
main rice crop. In many cases, this is precisely what farmers decided to do in the face
of a lack of good rains.
For single crop com farmers, this option is not possible. They must seize the best
opportunity afforded by a particularly good period of rain to initiate planting. Their
success is determined not by the conditions at the time when they begin planting but
the conditions that prevail several weeks after planting. The interval between heavy
rainfall periods is thus a significant factor.
Local rainfall patterns for the period from December to February need to be examined
carefully, but indications for several locations (in NTT) are that if heavy rain had
occurred one week earlier during January, serious crop failure might not have
eventuated. Had these rains come when the com was beginning to tassel, much of the
crop might have been saved.
On the other hand, it is precisely those areas that in past years have been most prone
to crop failure where the timing of the rains was so critical. The evidence of the
impact of past El Niño events thus appears to provide the best indications of where
potential food crop vulnerability is greatest. For this reason, detailed rainfall data is
essential to creating a reliable model of likely impacts.
Because of the diversity of local rainfall patterns and because of the importance of
rainfall interval on crops, it is not surprising that reliable and well- trained observers
were unable to provide a clear picture of the impact of the 1997/98 El Niño until as
late as February 1998. Without better and more timely monitoring of local rainfall and
of farmers' cropping strategies, it will continue to be difficult to assess impacts even
in the midst of another severe El NinT.
The Indonesian Response to the 1997/98 El Ninô
For decades, it has been Indonesian government policy to maintain a large rice reserve
to meet all contingencies. The reserve is managed by the Badan Urusan Logistik
(BULOG). It is stored in hundreds of warehouses in all provinces of the country
where it is managed by the province branch of BULOG, referred to as DOLOG.
Procurement for this reserve generally begins shortly after the peak of the rice harvest,
generally in April, and continues throughout the year. Despite El Niño conditions,
BULOG began its procurement in April 1997 and, by the end of the year, had
obtained for its warehouses 1,367,551 tons of rice. 69.2% of this rice (946,211 tons)
was purchased in Java and the remaining 30.8 % (421,340) was purchased outside of
Java. For the equivalent period (1996/97), BULOG procured 1,806,351 tons of rice.
Thus 1997 procurements were almost 25% down on the previous year largely because
of El Niño conditions.
BULOG made up for its shortfall in local procurement by importing rice from abroad.
It was BULOG's stated intention to have imported 840,000 tons of rice by the end of
January with an additional 900,000 tons reported to have been contracted for delivery
by the end of March 1998 and a further 915,000 tons contracted for delivery in April
and May, bringing BULOG' s total intended procurement (purchased in the fiscal year
from April 1997 through March 1998) to approximately 2.65 million tons. BULOG
indicated that it intended to import another 2.86 million tons in the fiscal year
beginning in April 1998.
These amounts of rice constitute very large imports over a two year period and placed
strains on Indonesia's ports and on its capacity to distribute rice throughout the
country. During the months of February and March before the main harvest, BULOG
had to maintain its `market operation' disbursements at between 350,000 - 400,000
tons but expected to be able to reduce these operations to a level of 200,000 - 250,000
tons for the period from July to November when it expected that it would again have
to increase operations to at least 350,000 tons a month.
In all of these operations, especially since the local economy was under such severe
economic strain, the price of rice was critical. BULOG' s goal was to try to maintain a
`real' price in rupiah at Rp 1400 per kg by March or April 1998 as the first harvest
began to come in. Its market operation `release' price for rice was intended to be set at
Rp 1200 per kg from the beginning of April. In fact, because of food shortages, it had
to `release' at Rp 950 and Rp 750 per kg in `special market operations' in many areas
of the country.
For much of eastern Indonesia, where a large proportion of the population relies on a
single cropping season and where crop losses as a result of the 1997/98 El Niño have
been heavy, local DOLOG operations need to continue at a high level until at least
February of 1999. The major problem facing such farmers is that they have lost their
livelihood and have probably drawn upon their reserves to survive, selling many of
their assets, such as livestock, in the process. What is needed is not just food aid but
programs to employ those most affected by the drought so that they have the means to
obtain food, medicine and clothing until the next harvest. By December, they will
need seeds to replant and there will inevitably be a critical shortage of good seed. It is
at this stage that the full impact of the 1997/98 El Niio will be most acutely
experienced.
Appendix
Comparison of Local Rainfall in Nusa Tenggara Timur: 193940 and 1997 -98
Comparable data for a comparison of the 1997 -98 El Nino and 1939 -40 El Niño come
from 1) two adjacent stations in Kabupaten Manggarai, normally the area of highest
rainfall in the province, 2) a rain- station in Kabupaten Sumba Barat, another area of
relatively high rainfall, 3) a rain- station on the island of Savu, between Sumba and
Timor, one of the areas of lowest rainfall in the province, 4) a station on the island of
Rote, another low -lying island with relatively low rainfall (Kabupaten Kupang), 5) a
set of incomplete data from a station in central Flores (Kabupaten. Ngada), 6) a station
in the mountains of South -central Timor (Kabupaten TTS), and 7) a station on the
north coast of Timor (Kabupaten Belu).
Local Rainfall Figures for 1939 -40 and 1997 -98, Compared with Average Monthly Rainfalls
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
Set I
Lengkoajang (Kabupaten Manggarai)
Lengkoajang: El Nido 1939-40
Ruteng (Kabupaten Manggarai)
Ruteng : El NON) 1997-98
321
489
555
528
520
172
403
228
394
455
476
457
252
444
500
222
334
281
314
123
318
105
263
342
171
121
63
189
235
238
196
117
123
52
103
166
111
58
240
210
328
54
124
456
416
489
293
148
341
Set 11
Waikabubak (Sumba Barat)
Waikabubak: El Nido 1939 -40
Waikabubak: El Nid! 1997 -98
Set III
Seba (Savu Island, Kab. Kupang)
Seba: El Niño 1939 -40
Savu: El Niño 1997 -98
223
84
21
47
194
149
48
Set IV
Ba'a (Rote Island, Kab. Kupang)
93
Ba'a: El Nino 1939 -40
Le Kunik (Rote): El Niiib 1997 -98
99
22
220
121
255
287
211
279
180
263
257
Set V
Bajawa (Kabupaten Ngada)
80
287
374
227
300
152
Bajawa: El Nitro 1939-40
Bajawa: El Nido 1997-98
84
93
243
346
28
353
313
236
251
240
136
295
227
117
211
115
248
234
325
127
63
Set VI
Soe (Kabupaten Timor Tengah Selatan)
Soe: El Niño 1939 -40
Soe: El Nino 1997 -98
Set VII
Atambua (Kabupaten Belu)
Atambua: El Nido 1939 -40
Atambua:El NiiTo 1997 -98
137
120
260
215
14
510
134
242
223
153
40
15
178
158
292
184
226
The first line in each set of rainfall figures is the average monthly rainfall for that site. The
second line, in bold, are the figures for the monsoonal months, November through April, of
the 1939 -40 El Ni$o year. The third line, also in bold, show the available figures for rainfall
during the same monsoonal - months in 1997 -98.
Australian Response to the Indonesian Crisis
An unprecedented financial' crisis and one of the most severe droughts this century
have combined to seriously undermine Indonesia's food security, erode the impressive
gains made in the eradication of poverty over the last 25 years and threaten growth
and social stability. Australia is a close neighbour and friend of Indonesia with a vital
national interest in Indonesia's stability, prosperity and growth. Australia also has a
strong humanitarian concern for the welfare of the Indonesian people.
Australia has provided significant diplomatic, technical and humanitarian support for
Indonesia's efforts to address its present problems.
Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis
IMF Commitment
$US1 billion
Australia's primary response to Indonesia's economic crisis is its commitment (made
in October 1997) to provide, if needed, a loan equivalent to $US1 billion as part of an
IMF -led international program to stabilise the rupiah and fünd economic reforms. In
April 1998 Australia agreed to an IMF request to bring forward $US300 million of
that commitment, on condition that the IMF program is fully supported by Indonesia,
and that the agreement between Indonesia and the IMF is effectively negotiated.
Export Insurance Cover
up to $900 million
The Australian Government has undertaken to consider, on a case -by -case basis, the
provision of export insurance cover on the national interest account for exports of
essential commodities to Indonesia. To date it has authorised its Export Finance
Insurance Corporation (EFIC) to offer cover totalling up to $900 million, including
for Australian wheat ($500 million) and cotton exports
($384
million) to Indonesia.
Diplomatic Efforts
Australia has worked assiduously and successfully, at the most senior levels, to
improve understanding of the important humanitarian dimensions of Indonesia's
situation amongst the international financial institutions (the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank) and the governments of key bilateral players (the USA,
Japan, the Europeans).
World Bank Public Expenditure Review (PER)
$340,000
Australia is funding this 6 -month World Bank/Government of Indonesia (GOI)
Review through the Bank' s Australian Consultants Trust Fund (ACTF). The Bank is
using an Australian accounting firm (HLB Mann Judd of Melbourne) and Professor
Gannicott of the University of Wollongong to implement the Review. PER coverage
includes the development budget under BAPPENAS (The National Development
Planning Board), off -budget items, strategic industries and state -owned enterprises.
Completion of the Review is part of the policy conditionally associated with GOI's
IMF - supported economic stabilisation and reform program.
The PER will analyse GOI public expenditures in light of new constraints and
possible priority changes resulting from the current economic crisis and reform
program. It will set out the extent of GOI expenditures in each area addressed and
analyse their contribution to achieving stated objectives. The intent is to make
information available to GOI decision -makers in the context of a coherent framework
that includes resource constraints and some analysis of the effectiveness of alternative
uses of resources. This should improve GOI decision -making by providing greater
clarity and transparency of the extent of public expenditures, their impact on the
economy and optipns for adjustment, to assure more efficient and effective use of
public resources. It should also help restore confidence that GOI's public expenditure
program is under control, and inform the preparation of REPELITA VII and other
decisions GOI will have to make
World Bank Drought Relief /Employment Creation
$715,000
Technical Assistance (TA) in Eastern Indonesia
Australia is funding this 6 -month World Bank BAPPENAS TA through the ACTF.
The TA will assist GOI and local governments design, implement and monitor
village -level labour intensive works program in the four eastern provinces of NTT,
NTB and Central and Southeast Sulawesi. In these provinces, as well as in Maluku
province, the TA will also (i) strengthen the targeting and quality of GOI's drought
relief efforts, and (ii) monitor drought impact, including through the conduct of basic
studies and data collection and analysis with local government and NGOs. The Bank
will be using three Australian experts - an engineer and two community participation
specialists - to implement the TA.
Employment Creation Program Coordination TA to BAPPENAS
BAPPENAS has requested at least 3 months Australian technical assistance to help it
stocktake and coordinate the large range of donor - supported and other padat karya
programs being implemented at national, provincial and district levels. Preparations to
provide the requested TA are in progress.
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
RBA has close ties with all central banks in South East Asia. It provides technical
assistance on an as required basis. RBA has assisted and will continue to assist the
Bank of Indonesia in the management of their floating exchange rate.
Response to the Food Security Crisis
Irian Jaya Drought Relief 1997
$3.3million
In later 1997 Australia contributed a total of $3 3 million to appeals launched by the
following
International
organisations
Committee
to provide
of the assistance
Red Crossto the victims of drought
$2 5million
in
UN
Irian
Dept
Jaya:
of Humanitarian Affair
Irian Jaya Drought Relief 1998
up to $10million
Australia will provide up to an additional $10 million for drought relief operations in
Irian Jaya (Up to $1.5 million from AusAID and $8.5 million from the Australian
Defence Force (ADF). In a joint exercise between the ADF, AusAID and ABRI, the
following support will be provided:
Funding to maintain the civilian chartered air services currently distributing
foodProvision
A coThe
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ordinating
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and
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andengineering
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A total of $
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Package of Humanitarian Assistance
up to $30 million
This package, announced by Foreign Minister Downer on 4 May 1998, will assist
Indonesia to address emergency food security and health needs. $10 million will be
provided in Australian financial year 1997/98 and $20 million in 1998/99. The
package includes:
World Food Program (WFP) Emergency Operation (up to $16 million):
Australia will support WFP's EMOP with up to $5 million in 1997/98 and up
to $11 million in 1998/99. This support will be mostly in the form of wheat
(up to 40,000 tons). WFP will negotiate with BULOG to swap this wheat for
rice. GOI line agencies, under WFP supervision, will distribute this rice either
as relief food for the weak and malnourished, or through food - for -work
schemes in the areas worst affected by the drought.
emergency medical supplies to be channelled through existing
Indonesia/Australia health projects in the provinces of NTT, NTB, Maluku and
South
support
and
further
South
for assistance
a East
supplementary
Sulawesi.
throughinfant
non -government
feeding program.
organisations (NGOs) and/or
multilateral agencies to support drought relief, agricultural rehabilitation and
employment generation activities.
technical assistance and logistical support focussed primarily on two areas:
: assisting Indonesia to design, implement and monitor village -level padat
karya (labour intensive) works programs in the four drought - affected
eastern provinces - see the `World Bank Drought Relief/ Employment
Creation Technical Assistance (TA) in Eastern Indonesia' entry on page 1
: technical advice to the national planning agency, BAPPENAS, to assist
with the co- ordination and planning of all padat karya programs across the
country.
$2.1 Million
Australia provided $1.8 million of support to assist Indonesia combat its 1997
Response to the 1997 Fires Crisis
bushfire emergency, as follows:
NSW Rural Fire Service Management Team ($110,000): The Team
participated in a GOI- organised fires assessment emergency field visit to Irian
Jaya led by the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Mission (UNDAC).
It also supported Australian aerial water bombing operations in the southern
Sumatran province of Lampung by assessing the province's ground -based fire
fighting resources and identifying emergency training and equipment needs to
improve the effectiveness of the province's support for the operations.
Australian Red Cross Health/Medical Assessment Team ($60,000): The Team
assessed health/medical supply needs and the field capacity of the Indonesian
Red Cross to address health needs related to the fires.
South Australian Country Fire Service Aerial Water Bombing Assistance
Package ($1 million): This assistance helped to prevent and contain the
potentially disastrous spread of newly emerging, smaller scale spot fires in
NSW Rural
Fire Service Ground Fire Fighting and Equipment Training
Lampung
province.
Project ($360,000): This project provided training in ground fire fighting
.
techniques for - and supplied basic fire fighting equipment to -180 fire
fighters
in Lampung
province
1997.Affected by
Australian
Red Cross
(ARC)during
HealthNovember/December
Education for Communities
Haze/Pollution ($280,000): Indonesian Red Cross volunteers were trained,
and a health education program implemented, on the health impacts of
prolonged exposure to smoke haze /smog. An early warning system was also
established to ensure rapid resource mobilisation in futñre bushfire events.
In addition, $300,000 was provided to CSIRO to monitor the pollution levels in
Malaysia emanating fröm haze created by the Indonesia bushfires.
Response to the 1998 Fires Crisis
$20,000
Kutai National Park Forest Firefighting Support
Australia is providing 80% of the funding needed to support the training and
mobilisation of hundreds of villagers to fight fires in Kutai National Park in East
Kalimantan The program is being implemented by GOI with support from the
Irian Jaya
Past ENSO Events
Geographically Irian Jaya, the eastern -most province of Indonesia, is the western half
of the island on New Guinea and the pattern of past ENSO events is likely to have
closely parallelled those experienced in neighbouring Papua New Guinea to the east.
THE 1997/98 ENSO EVENT
This description of the 1997/97 ENSO event and its effects on Irian Jaya draws
heavily on information drawn from unpublished notes provided by Dr Chris Ballard,
from the Australian National University.
Characteristics
Several locations in Irian Jaya began to experience unusually dry weather as early as
January 1997; by May 1997 the drought had begun in earnest and by August 1997
most of the province was experiencing at least some problems with the supply of food
and water. At altitudes above 2,200 m a series of frosts devastated the garden crops
and destroyed most of the tree crops.
Between August and November 1997 a heavy pall of smoke haze created by bushflres
obscured much of the central range and its southern slopes. Vast areas of alpine scrub
and lower montane forest in the Lorentz National Park were burnt out in August and
September 1997.
Rain finally fell in many parts of Irian Jaya during November and December 1997,
relieving water supply problems and allowing crops to be planted for the first time in
up to seven months. However localised climatic variation in the highlands has seen
rainfall and water supply problems persist into 1998 in certain areas. Although heavy
rains continued to fall until at least late April 1998 in many parts of the province,
some of the most seriously drought affected areas such as Jayawijaya in the highlands
around Wanema had received very little rain. In much of Irian Jaya the dry season
starts between May and July, meaning that in some areas the 1997/98 wet season rains
have effectively failed.
Effects
Unlike neighbouring Papua New Guinea, where severe drought and famine was
widespread, the worst effects of the drought were experienced in a relatively
circumscribed area of Irian Jaya, consisting of the eastern half of the central range and
its southern slopes, as far east as the border with Papua New Guinea and as far west as
Ilaga Valley. The worst affected areas (other than those hit by frosts) were the mid
altitude areas (ie. 500 m - 1,400 m) along the southern slopes of the main range
between the Papua New Guinea border and Noemba in the west. There was a clear
gradation in increasing severity towards the Papua New Guinea border. The northern
side of the central range was relatively little affected. As in Papua New Guinea to the
east and the eastern Indonesian archipelago to the west, the drought had a greater
impact at locations south of 5 °S than at locations north of this latitude, but there were
exceptions.
Three high altitude areas in the worst affected zone' were also severely affected by
frost. These were the Ilaga Valley, and the Agadugume and Kwiyawagi áreas in the
Upper West Baliem Valley.
Food supply
Food crops in the affected areas were devastated by the combination of drought and,
at higher altitudes, frost. No food aid was forthcoming for months after the drought hit
and there were no locally available reserves stocks of food (including rice) which
could be distributed free of charge or even purchased by people even if they had had
the financial capacity to do so. This was one respect where the impacts in Papua New
Guinea and Irian Jaya differed dramatically. As a result, drought- related deaths
reached at least 265 by the end of September. The number of confirmed deaths in the
five most affected regencies had climbed to above 500 by the end of October and to as
many as 673 by the end of 1997. People were still dying in 1998, but from diseases
such as dysentery and malaria rather than directly from starvation. Little information
has been received from remote locations along the southern fall of the central ranges
and it is likely the death total will be shown to have been much higher than so far
reported.
Village communities are heavily depended on root crop such as sweet potato, which
take several months after planting to mature (as much as 10 months at high altitudes).
Hence even though rains began falling in many areas at the end of 1997, allowing
planting to begin, crops will not be ready for harvesting until the second half of 1998.
Because of this, and because in some areas people did not have sufficient stocks of
tubers for planting to meet all their food requirements, many communities will
continue to be at risk of famine until well into the second half of 1998.
Water supply
The almost universal lack of adequate supplies of drinking water (both quantity and
quality) compounded the effects of the widespread food shortages. The widespread
onset of wet season rains in late 1997 has largely alleviated this problem in most
areas.
Health
The decreased resistance of people to diseases brought about by malnutrition and
starvation, combined with the dramatic increase in water -borne and vector borne
diseases caused by the drying up and contamination of streams and other water
sources, resulted in greatly increased incidences of sickness and death. Probably most
of the people who have died did so from disease rather than directly from starvation.
The incidence of malaria in particular has risen considerably, especially in the
highlands where people have had little previous exposure to it and are therefore
particularly vulnerable.
Forest fires
Between August and December 1997 there were widespread forest, scrub and grass
fires which were only extinguished with the onset of wet season rains at the end of the
year. There were reports that 80,660 ha of National Parks were burnt out.
Several people were caught and killed in houses which burnt during these fires. MAF
relief aid flights in some areas were adversely affected by the haze caused by these
fires.
Responses
Within Indonesia
Early warnings issued in July 1997 by the Department of Meteorology in Jakarta of an
exceptional ENSO event affecting Indonesia in general and Irian Jaya in particular
went unheeded. By late September 1997, the death of hundreds of people was being
reported by provincial authorities. Offers of aid by Australia, the USA and Japan were
made in October, in early December the International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) launched an international appeal for aid and by mid -December President
Suharto had ordered the State Minister of Planning to co- ordinate an national response
to the famine crisis, with funds to be guaranteed irrespective of further developments
in the national financial crisis.
From the outset of the relief effort starting in early September, Missionary Aviation
Fellowship (MAF) undertook much of the actual delivery of aid and committed most
of its modest resources to the tasks of both ferrying food and medical aid by aircraft,
and coordination their distribution. The military provided Hercules aircraft to fly rice
and other materials into the major highland centre of Wamema. The further
distribution of this aid relied heavily on the light Cessna planes of the MAF, together
with up to four helicopters, two supplied by the army, one by MAF and one by PT
Freeport Indonesia. The relief efforts are being coordinated by a central government
body, Satkorlak, established at a provincial level in Jayapura and matched by several
regency -level committees for the most affected areas.
Towards the end of 1997, the international appeals launched on behalf of Irian Jaya by
the ICRC, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and World Vision Indonesia
(WVI) had raised substantial sums of money. A
significantproportion of the
aid
delivery effort has been assumed by WVI, whose staff have
hadextensive experience
in the province.
AusAID
In late 1997 Australia contributed a total of AUDS3 3 million to appeals launched by
the aid organisations to provide assistance to the victims of drought in Irian Jaya as
described above.
International Committee of the Red Cross
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
World Vision Australia
$2 5million
$0 5million
$0 3million
During 1998 Australia will provide an additional $9 million for drought relief
operations. In a joint exercise between the ADF, AusAID and ABRI the following
support
Funding
is being
to maintain
or will be
theprovided:
civilian chartered air services currently distributing
food.
Provision
A coThe
ordinating
ofThe
provision
medical
locating
and
supplies
of of
amonitoring
small
fixed
and
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aircraft
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element
inand
Jayapura
helicopters
to improve
advisers.
and Wamena.
to support
airfieldsfood
in the
and
area.
other
aid distribution.
The Pacific
Past ENSO Events
Over such a large spread of ocean, both north -south and east -west, we can expect
considerable variation in the El Nina signature for any given event.
The Central Pacific (Eastern Kiribati (the Line Islands) Tonga,
Samoa and the Cook Islands)
Generally, El Niño results in anomalous cloudiness and convection across the central
to eastern Pacific equatorial areas. As a consequence, widespread rainfall develops
over much of the equatorial Pacific, and tropical cyclone tracks and genesis regions
tend to be displaced to the northeast of their normal average locations in the
southwestern Pacific. Because of the lower than normal atmospheric pressure, sea
levels remain higher by as much as much as 0.4 m for long periods (weeks or
months). Surface ocean temperatures are also higher by as much as 2 -5 °C.
In the absence of impacts of severe tropical cyclone and flood damage, El Nil lo can
result in net benefits to water supply (including recharge of groundwater aquifers on
small islands) and agricultural production.
The heavier rainfall can result in increased flooding of lowlands (especially when
combined with higher sea levels) with attendant increases in vector borne diseases
such as dengue fever. Coral bleaching because of high water temperatures associated
with El Nino has been noted in localised areas in the past. Prolonged periods of higher
sea levels associated with El Milos can have severe effects such as coastal flooding
and the contamination by sea water of aquifers on small low islands.
Tonga and Samoa are in a transitional zone between the eastern Pacific, where El
Ni$o conditions are wetter, and the western Pacific, where conditions are usually
drier. Hence while during most El Niños conditions tend to be wetter in these two
countries, sometimes they experience little or no change and occasionally even drier
conditions, like their neighbours to the west.
Increased cyclone activity is seen as the major negative effect of El N?ho. Taking
Samoa as an example of the effects cyclones can have, Ward and Ashcroft (1998)
have argued for a close correlation between the El Mho conditions and the occurrence
of more than 30 cyclones or severe tropical storms extending back 100 years to 1890.
Cyclones Ofa (February 1990) and Val (December 1991) caused massive damage to
Samoa's infrastructure, including housing, and to its food and export crops. Forests
and their associated bird and animal life suffered severe damage, especially from
Cyclone Val.
The total cost of damage from Cyclone Val was about $US368 million, and though
aid arrived promptly (including from Australia), the task of reconstruction took many
months. Much of the rebuilding was financed by remittances froth Samoans living in
Australia, New Zealand and the USA to their kin in Samoa. The Samoan economy (as
measured by GDP levels) only returned to pre -cyclone levels in 1996/97.
La Niña events, with their cooler water temperatures and decreased cloudiness and
rainfall, have the opposite effect, with increased likelihood of droughts occurring, but
greatly decreased chances of the region being affected by cyclones
Western Kiribati and Tuvalu
Western Kiribati (the Gilbert Islands) and Tuvalu lie along the northwestern
transitional zone between the areas which are normally wetter (central and eastern
Pacific) and drier (western Pacific) during El Nidos. Because of this, the effects of El
Niio in this vast area of ocean and small islands can vary highly from event to event.
When drought conditions do occur, they can have extremely severe impacts on water
supply from low island aquifers and on rain fed agriculture.
Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands
Progressively further west, northwest and southwest the pattern changes from one of
increased rainfall to one of decreased rainfall and drought associated with cooler than
average sea surface temperatures during El Niiios. Severe tropical storms and
cyclones are common in the summer in this area, however during El Nino events their
frequency is normally lower in part because of the lower sea temperatures.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
Characteristics
A severe El Nino, the influence of which is gradually waning, has affected the Pacific
region. Consistent with the broad geographical spread of this region, the effects have
been highly variable. An important difference between this event and a `normal' El
Niño is that the western part of the region has not experienced the usual cooler surface
sea temperatures, rather temperatures have remained at about the average levels for
non -El Nitro years.
Effects
Cyclones
There does appear to have been increased cyclonic activity (in terms of the number,
intensity and spread of cyclones), especially in the central and eastern Pacific.
Between November 1997 and the end of January 1998 there had been eight cyclones,
with three of them active at one time.
In the Cook Islands, Cyclone Martin caused substantial damage to three northern
atolls in early November 1997. As well as causing considerable loss of life (up to 19
people killed or missing), on the island most affected (Manihiki) most of the private
and public infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged. A major long term threat
to self- sufficiency has been posed by the degradation of the lagoon, which threatens
not only fishing but. also the main income generating activity (and a major export
from the Cook Islands), black pearl cultivation:
In early January 1998 Cyclone Ron struck several northern islands in Tonga, again
with major impacts to infrastructure as well as food and tree plantation crops. Food
supplies were reduced to 2 -3 week supply and as replanting programmes would take
6 -8 months food aid has been an urgent requirement
The western Pacific has been struck by four cyclones, which is about average and may
in part reflect the fact that the normal reduction in numbers to be expected due to
cooler sea surface temperatures during an El Ni$o did not happen this time. In late
December 1997, and again in early January 1998, Cyclone Katrina affected parts of
the southern provinces of the Solomon Islands, as did Cyclone - Susan (also in early
January 1998). There was widespread but relatively minor damage to houses and food
gardens. The cyclonic rains, which were widespread over much of the country,
slightly eased the drought situation (see below).
Cyclone Fergus passed close to Vanuatu in November 1997 and Cyclones Susan and
Katrina also affected the country, bringing heavy rain and causing some crop damage.
In late March - early April 1998, Cyclone Zuman hit much of northern and central
Vanuatu, with locally severe impacts on housing, other infrastructure, food gardens
and tree plantation crops.
Drought
In Tonga and the Cook Islands in the central Pacific rainfall appears to have been
average to high (as anticipated) and there have been no reports of water shortages. In
Samoa rainfall was initially average or even higher. However since early 1998 the
country has begun to experience drought conditions, brought about by lower than
usually rainfall during the wettest season of the year, which has now ended.
The AusAID Post reports that while not yet affecting agricultural production
significantly, the drought has the potential to be a serious problem. The main dam
which provides hydroelectric power for Apia is very low (probably less than half full).
The water supply for Apia comes from intakes directly off a number of rivers and
streams and not from major storage dams. Some of these rivers and streams have
stopped flowing or are experiencing abnormally small flows and the water authorities
are already imposing water restrictions in Apia.
This unusual change to drought conditions has been 'accompanied by the onset over
the past couple of months of abnormally low sea levels (see below). Together the
drought conditions and prolonged lower sea levels indicate that high atmospheric
pressures (and associated dry air) have prevailed over the area in recent months
In Kiribati, for most of 1997 there was higher than average rainfall in the Gilbert and
Line Island groups. However in the early months of 1998, rainfall in Tarawa had
decreased from the levels received in 1997. In recent months there have been rains.
No information has been forthcoming for the rest of the country.
In Vanuatu as of mid -April 1997 the southern islands and some isolated northern
islands had been affected by unusually dry weather conditions extending back into
1997. Cattle were dying on a number of islands and food crops had been severely
affected by the lack of rain. Although these islands received heavy rain during early
March 1998 the effects on food production were expected to last for some time yet
(AusAID Post)
Drought has severely affected parts of the Solomon Islands during this El Niño. In
October 1997 there were reports to AusAID concerning severe droughts in Western
Province, in response to which AusAID provided assistance through two projects
without disrupting their project goals. The major problem was with water supply to
Gizo township on Gizo Island because the normal supplies from local groundwater
sources and the main catchment area had dried up due to unseasonally low rainfall.
With the late onset of the rainy season in March 1998, the water situation at Gizo
eased. The provincial authorities are going ahead with arrangements to access
alternative sources of water.
In early December 1997 Bellona Island was declared a disaster area due to drought.
Potable water sources had become brackish and contaminated by bacteria, and food
gardens had failed. Australia provided A$50,000 in assistance to purchase three
months food for the inhabitants of Bellona Island, as well as providing pumps and
containers for holding water. There was also severe drought impact in Makira,
Choisel and parts of Guadalcanal, Western and Malaita Provinces. The drought
caused crop losses and problems with propagating new food plants. Assistance of
51$ 180,000 rrom Taiwan in March 1998 provided funds for the purchase of seedlings
for areas recovering from drought following the late arrival of the rainy season in
March 1998.
Much of Fiji has not had substantial rain since September 1997 and the western towns
of Nandi and Singatoka are experiencing their worst drought since the 1930s. In early
1998 drought conditions had begun affecting both domestic water supply and
agricultural production in western Viti Levu in Fiji. Water levels in reservoirs had
become low and water was being trucked in at appreciable additional costs. By late
April 1998 water supply problems had spread to the normally wetter eastern side of
the island where water reserves in the main reservoir serving Suva had reached
critically low levels. Fiji's sugar industry is facing a massive loss in revenue because
the harvest in 1998 will be down by about 60% compared with a normal season (and
at a time when world prices are rising). This is the smallest harvest in more than 30
years and Fiji may not be able to meet its sugar export commitments to Europe in
1998.
-
In contrast, there are no indications from the islands in the northeast of the country of
drier than normal conditions. Rather, reports from Taveuni Island that in November
1988 there was an outbreak of dengue fever might possibly indicate wetter than
normál conditions.
The drought in the western Pacific has been reported at a very general level and there
are no readily available detailed analyses of the social and economic impacts of the
kind prepared for this report concerning Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.
Other Effects
The AusAID Post has reported that increased sea water temperature around Kiribati
led to more migratory tuna stocks passing through the Kiribati EEZ. In 1997, fishing
license fees collected by Kiribati from Distant Fishing Nations was A$29.5 million,
up from the budget estimate of A$16 million.
There have been general reports from the central and eastern Pacific of widespread
and often serious coral bleaching. The AusAID Post in Samoa has reported extremely
low tides over the past two months, with both high and low tides being lower than
normal. This has potential effects for coral health which is already poor following the
1990 and 1991 cyclones and destructive fishing practices. In the region encompassing
Samoa, the change from the higher sea levels normally associated with El Nilios to
low sea levels as the effect of the El Nrno has progressively declined-is clearly evident
from the TOPEX/Poseidon satellite graphical presentation of data on the NASA/JPL
Internet website.
The Philippines
Past ENSO Events
The southern Philippines is part of the island Southeast Asian region that regularly
experiences drought conditions (sometimes severe) associated with El Nino events.
The northern Philippines tends to be less severely or regularly affected. Severe
droughts occurred during the last three El Ninos in 1982/83, 86/87 and 91/92.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
This description of the characteristics and effects of the 1997/98 El Nino is based on
information provided by the Post in Manila, or extracted from a variety of Internet
web sites (especially Relief Web) and a UNICEF report dated 7 May 1998.
Characteristics
El Nino conditions were evident by March 1997 and the northern Philippines suffered
a drop of 40% in rainfall during the core `rainy season' between June and September.
Most of the southern half of the country similarly experienced sharply decreased
rainfall towards the
end of
1997. According to the Philippine Atmospheric,
Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), rainfall across
the country during the July to December 1997 wet season was about 50% of normal.
Much of the rain normally comes with tropical cyclones and PAGASA attributes the
decreased rainfall in large part to the decreased number of cyclones (13 compared
with the average since the 1980s of 23 a year).
As the period January to June is the `dry season' for much of the country, drought
conditions were expected to worsen, with the situation becoming dire during March to
June 1998. This has now eventuated, with drought conditions in May 1998 becoming
widespread across the southern Philippines, including Palawan and Mindanao and
showing no signs of abating. Drought conditions continue to prevail in the north of
the country.
Relief is not expected until June 1998 at the earliest, which is when the wet season
rains normally begin. As drought conditions appear to be still peaking in May 1998, it
may take some time 'after the rains start (and assuming the wet season starts on time)
for the effects of the drought to be fully relieved.
Effects
Water supply
By early December 1997 in Luzon, in the northern Philippines, severe drought
conditions had set in, raising concerns that there would be severe water shortages
affecting urban and rural areas. For example, the Angat Reservoir in Bulacan
Province, Central Luzon, provides 96% of Metro Manila's water supply, yet its
catchment received only 60% of its normal rainfall during July to September and the
feeder rivers produced only 50% of their usual flow. For the first time ever, the
reservoir' s water level actually fell during the `rainy season'. The Water Resource
Management Board stated that the reservoir could be technically empty by March
1998.
Water restrictions were in place in Manila by early December 1997. Severe water
shortages in Manila during 1998 were expected to threaten public health, constrain
economic activity, cause electric power shortages, worsen already unsatisfactory
urban conditions and generally cause widespread hardship and inconvenience,
especially to the urban poor. It was expected that many smaller cities in Luzon would
similarly be affected, although probably to a lesser extent because of their greater
reliance on ground water sources.
By May 1998 many of the hydroelectic power plants in the country had céased
operating, including three of the four in Luzon. However, most electricity is generated
using fossil fuels or geothermal sources so the impact has not been as serious as it
would have been had their been heavy reliance on hydroelectricity.
The drying up of water supplies at the village level has led to widespread sickness and
death in the southern Philippines as people have been forced to drink stagnant,
contaminated waters in streams and springs. Dysentery, cholera and other water -borne
gastrointestinal diseases have been the main causes of sickness.
Agriculture and fisheries
By December 1997 rural areas were already feeling the direct effects of drought, both
in irrigated and rain -fed situations. The Philippines has limited surface water storage
and irrigation capacity, and it is likely if the shortage continues this water will be
directed to supplying Manila rather than for irrigation. Most of the agricultural sector
in the north (the food basket of the country) depends on direct rainfall and this sector
was expected to be especially badly affected. This has proved to be the case, with
major reductions in yields of all major crops occurring (see below).
In the north, the National Food Authority has adequate supplies of food and in general
people have the purchasing power to buy food so the effects such as starvation and
malnutrition are likely to be very limited.
During 1998 drought has increasingly affected large areas in the south, especially
Mindanao. Damage to farm crops and fish ponds is reported to be tremendous, with
more than 700,00 families being severely affected and dependent on relief assistance
to survive by late April. The situation continues to worsen, with the Red Cross
reporting at least 3.6 million people in the southern regions alone affected by the
drought. People are dying or becoming weak due to the direct effects of starvation and
to indirect causes such as increased susceptibility to disease or 'from eating poisonous
bush foods such as wild yams. UNICEF (1998) estimated that 42 of the 72 deaths
attributed so far to the drought were due to food poisoning.
The National Food Authority has sufficient rice in storage but the poorest farmers in
the upland areas (mainly indigenous groups) do not have funds to access such
supplies. Although the government is undertaking relief operations, getting supplies
to the most needy has proved to be logistically difficult. The problem in this case is
not one of food shortage but of food distribution and food security.
Earlier in the year official projections estimated that the output of maize in 1997/98
would drop to 3.92 million tons compared with 4.22 million tons in the previous
marketing year. With current demand, the shortfall is estimated to be in the region of
1.4 million tons. Rice crops have also been affected in many drought - stricken areas.
The predicted shortfalls continued to rise as the year progressed. By the beginning of
April, for example, FAO had concluded that the prospects for the secondary rice
paddy and maize crops for harvests in May -June 1998, with indicated reductions in
secondary rice paddy production of 13% (350,000 tons) and in dry season maize of
9% Imports of rice and maize in 1998 were expected to rise due in part to a weather -
related decline in production. By early April the NFA had placed orders for 0.65
million tons of rice for delivery in the first half of 1998. The rice shortfall is expected
to reach 0.8 million tons, nearly double last year's total rice imports of 0.43 nïillion
tons.
It is ' anticipated that these shortfalls may need to be revised upwards. It has been
predicted that the farm sector will experience negative growth during 1998 compared
with 3% growth during 1997.
Forest fires
In March serious forest fires started in several parts of Palawan, burning out 15,000
hectares with severe effects including the rendering homeless of 54 families Fires
continued to spread and by early April major new fires had occurred on Luzon in the
north and Mindanao and Negros in the south, destroying at least 25,000 hectares of
forest and grassland and killing three people.
Although locally very serious, .these fires and their effects have been minor in scale
compared with those occurring in Indonesia.
Health
There have been widespread outbreaks of water -borne diseases such as dysentery
gastroenteritis exacerbated by malnutrition. Contamination by human wastes of
sources of drinking water as they dried up has been the main cause of these diseases.
As formerly flowing streams have become stagnant, they have become breeding
grounds for mosquitoes with consequent major increases in the incidence of malaria
and dengue fever.
Social and economic consequences
In the poorest areas which have been hit hard by drought people even in the best of
times have little cash income. Not only have these people suffered the effects of
massive crop failure, and hence shortages of both subsistence crops and crops. they
can sell in the markets, they lack the money to buy food which is still readily
available in village stores. What cash resources they have are quickly exhausted
buying essentials commodities such as cooking oil and kerosene.
One consequence of the decline in rural incomes and the running down of cash
reserves is that some 0.5 million children may be prevented from attending school
because their families cannot pay tuition fees or for school expenses.
In their efforts to provide water for domestic and agricultural purposes, some farmers
have resorted to buying water from other farmers in irrigated areas or to drilling
additional wells, with attendant construction and operating costs (e.g. use of diesel
engines to pump water from wells). These have all increased farming costs.
Responses
In the Philippines, responses to the drought are being coordinated through the El Nino
Task Force, established in December 1997 and chaired by the Environment and
Natural Resources Cabinet Secretary. In April 1998, when the severity of the drought
in Mindanao became - apparent, the national government established the Presidential
Action Centre (PAC) headed by the Presidential Assistant for Mindanao. The relief
efforts of the national government -especially in Mindanao
-
were deemed by
UNICEF and a range of private sector groups and churches working through the Task
Force: Tabang Mindanao to have been inadequate. However these same organisations
considered that efforts by a wide range of local government authorities in distributing
food aid, providing health services and providing water through the construction of
wells had been much more effective.
UNICEF, the Philippines National Red Cross, the Catholic Church and a range of
private sector groups have been working together and with government agencies to
provide short-term assistance.
The UNDP in Manila formerly convened regular meetings of the donor's Disaster
Information Sharing Group, of which AusAID has been an active member. This group
could be re- convened in the event the Philippines government requests donor
assistance to cope with its ongoing drought crisis.
AusAID has continued to deal with the various Philippines Government agencies
involved in the Task Force and would have input to the UNDP- convened Donor's
Disaster Information Sharing Group if this were to requested to act. As of mid -May
1998,
the Government of the Philippines had not requested international assistance
and Australia cannot respond without such an appeal.
AusAID has been monitoring its agriculture and related projects funded under the
Philippines Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP) to get first hand
information of the impact of the current El Nino. The information obtained has
confirmed that the drought is having a social and economic impact. AusAID has been
favourably considering requests from PACAP project partners to reschedule or
restructure their business loans /credits for their crops or enterprises.
AusAID, through PACAP and under the Philippines Australia Special Assistance to
SZOPAD (Southern Zone of Peace and Development) - PASCATS for short - is
looking at targeting more NGO livelihood projects to the affected areas.
Vietnam
Past ENSO Events
Southern Vietnam lies close to the island Southeast Asian region which regularly
experiences drought conditions associated with El Nino events and might expected
similarly to have been affected by these events.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
Characteristics
Cyclone Linda, which struck Vietnam on 15 November 1997, was the strongest
typhoon recorded in the area for over 100 years. Although this cyclone and associated
heavy rains has been widely attributed to the current El Nino event, this was not
necessarily the case.
The rains during 1997 were beneficial to crop production and water supply, as
reflected, for example, by larger than expected harvests from early rice crops. At this
stage evidently there were no major concerns that drought conditions such as those
afflicting Indonesia might eventuate.
By late April 1998 conditions in central and southern Vietnam were extremely hot
and dry, with 1998 being the hottest year since 1912 and the driest in nearly a century.
At this time there were reports from the ABC that drought was creating potential
famine amongst minority communities living in remote areas in the central highlands.
By early May 1998 the ABC was reporting that severe drought conditions in the
country were threatening the country's power supplies.
The apparently late onset of drought conditions in Vietnam has been comparable to
the situation in the southern Philippines and southern China.
The rainy season normally begins in May and lasts six months. Meteorological
forecasts in early May 1998 were that start of the rainy season would be delayed by
up to one month. By early June 1998 is had still not started to rain, at least in the
Central Highlands, where drought conditions were particularly severe.
Effects
Stone damage andflooding
Cyclone Linda caused huge loss of life and property (including private and public
infrastructure as well as food crops and rice fields). Damage was estimated at US$200
million. AusAID channelled emergency assistance of $730,000 through Australian
NGOs to assist the victims.
Agriculture
In late April 1998 F AO reported the El Nino induced drought conditions may have
adversely affected the harvest of the northern hemisphere spring - summer rice crops
and that transplantation of the summer - autumn rice crop was reported to be facing
serious water shortages. In response, the government had placed a temporary halt on
fresh rice exports to guarantee food security.
Rice production during 1997 was higher than during the preceding five years and
exports reached 3.6 million tons, making Vietnam the world's second largest rice
exporter after Thailand.
However, during May 1998 the situation appeared to worsen with the drought
affecting minorities in the Central Highlands said to be the worst in 100 years, with
around 40,000 people lacking adequate food or other resources. According to reports
reaching the AusAID Post, drought conditions are widespread, especially in central
and northern provinces. The rice harvest has failed to reach expected yields and
consideration is being given to further restricting rice export until the situation is
clarified. This will have important ramifications for countries such a Indonesia which
will have major rice shortfalls which they were expecting to alleviate by importing
from local supplies such as Thailand and Vietnam. Fortunately, Thailand has had a
bumper rice harvest in 1997/1998.
The coffee crop has also been severely affected and there are predictions from coffee producing provinces such as Dak Lak in the Central Highlands that the harvest due
between October and December 1998 could produce yields 33% below normal.
By 12 May 1998 newspaper reports in Vietnam were estimating the cost of extensive
crop losses at US$385 million. In mid May 1998 the Meteorological Department was
warning that the food agricultural production situation would not improve quickly
despite possible rains across most of the country starting towards' the end of the
month. As of early June 1998 the rains had not come.
Water supply
The most recent reports (late May 1998) are that water levels in reservoirs supplying
the country's six hydroelectric power plants (including the Hoa Binh plant - the
country's largest) have dropped to dangerously low levels. Hydropower supplies
about 80% of the country's total electricity generating capacity and the situation is
expected to become critical by late May unless rain due any time in the now -overdue
wet season replenishes the reservoirs. The Hoa Binh plant was
still generating
normally, but the water level was falling at more than 3 m a week and at that rate the
plant would be forced to close in early June 1998.
Measures to
cut power consumption by up to 10% during May 1998 were
implemented, but unless runoff- producing rains begin filling the reservoirs in the next
few weeks there will be disastrous consequences for Vietnam's key production
sectors. By late May 1998 power cuts were occurring throughout the country (up to 10
hours a day in Ho Chi Minh City) and customers with generators were being urged to
use them, especially during peak demand periods.
Response
AusAID channelled emergency assistance of $730,000 through Australian NGOs to
assist the victims of Cyclone Linda. No request for drought assistance has been
received.
On 15 May 1998 AusAID Post officers were briefed by the Deputy Director of
Agriculture in Dak Lak in the course of a visit by him to Hanoi to report to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Planning and
Rural Development. The Deputy -Director's briefing broadly confirmed press reports
of the seriousness of the drought situation in Dak Lak.
China
Past ENSO Events
China is at the northern limits of the influence of the El Nino phenomenon and its
effects tend to be less harsh than other parts of the Asia Pacific region to the south.
The State Oceanography Bureau includes China in the `occasionally affected' group
of countries. Typically during an El Nino event the northern half of China, especially
inland areas, receives lower than normal rainfall (0 -15% less).
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
Characteristics and effects
1997
The drought in 1997 was considered to be China's worst in 20 years, with 23
provinces covering two - thirds of the country having been affected. Drought
conditions were at their most severe in July and August 1997, with serious effects on
crops in the provinces of Henan, Hebei, Shanxi, Hubei, Liaoning and Jilin in the
central and northeastern parts of China. Official estimates suggested that over six
million hectares of crops have been damaged. By September the Yangtze River had
become impassible to shipping in 137 places, an indication of the severity of the
drought on river flows in central China.
According to a February 1998 F AO food and Agricultural Organisation report, a
decline in wheat production is anticipated in China due to the decrease in sown area as
a result of insufficient rain during 1997. Maize output fell sharply in China in 1997 to
a below- average 105 million tons, some 22 million tons (or 21 %) below the bumper
crop in 1996. This was due to severe drought in northern parts of the country. China's
total coarse grain output in 1997 was approximately 122.6 million tons, some 23
million tons below 1996. However, rice production for the year was not affected and
the 1997 output was 1.5 million tons higher than forecasted.
1998
Drought conditions continued into 1998, and as a result in late April the F AO
anticipated that the output of the 1998 winter wheat crop, to be harvested beginning in
April, would decline. When the F AO report was prepared, sowing of the 1998 paddy
rice crop had begun. Overall, FAO considered China's food supply situation to be
favourable with satisfactory stock levels, following the previous year's bumper
harvest.
By May, however, the drought appeared to be becoming worse and was extending
south to threaten the country's main rice growing regions. In early May 1998 the
ABC reported the Flood Control and Drought Prevention headquarters as saying a
catastrophe is threatening China's next harvest. The lack of irrigation water in the
south had already prevented fanners from planting rice seedlings on more than 1.3
million hectares of paddy fields.
At the end of May the wet season rains began in central and south China, causing
extensive flooding. In addition, flash floods occurred in parts of the northwest of the
country, creating havoc. Conflicting reports of the effects of these floods have been
published. The Civil Affairs Ministry stated that 273 people had been killed by the
flood, 20,000 injured and 230,000 houses destroyed. About 200,000 ha of crops were
reported as having been lost and the direct economic losses were put at A$ 1.4 billion.
In contrast, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Agriculture said that while exact
figures
be verywere
large.
notThe
available,
onset of
thethe
decrease
rainy season
in cropand
production
related flooding
due to flooding
do not in
would
any way
not
reflect the onset of La Nina conditions.
Response
The AusAID Post in China have stated that they have not utilised information about
the current ENSO event in their work and that their program currently does not
contain activities explicitly aimed at addressing the impacts of this event, although a
number of their activities address related areas.
Korea (Dprk)
Past ENSO Events
The Korean peninsula is at the extreme northern limits of the influence of the El Niflo
phenomenon and its effects tend to be less harsh than other parts of the Asia Pacific
region to the south. Typically during an El Nino event the northern half of China and by inference the Korean peninsula - receives lower than normal rainfall (0 -15%
less).
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
Characteristics and effects
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has suffered the effects of three
consecutive years of natural calamities starting with severe floods and giving way to
drought. During the northern summer (i.e. starting in about May) of 1997, the DPRK
was affected by a severe drought. Given its geographic position vis a vis the core
areas normally affected, it is not certain that this drought is El Niño related. On the
other hand given that severe droughts have affected every country to the south - from
China, through the Philippines and Indonesia to Australia
it is reasonable to assume
that there is some link with El Nina.
Low rainfall during critical stages in the crop development cycle resulted in a
drastically reduced harvest, particularly from the rain -fed maize growing areas. In
additioñ to the drought, rice crops in coastal areas were damaged by tidal waves
brought about by Typhoon Winnie in August 1997. These calamities followed two
successive-years of extensive flooding that had already severely set back agriculture,
compounding the serious food supply problems which already existed in the country.
A joint food assessment mission undertaken in October -November 1997 by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Food Programme
(WFP) estimated DPRK's overall output of maize at 1.14 million tons, 50% lower
than would be expected under favourable climatic conditions. The mission also noted
that over half of the livestock had been culled to provide meat and to reduce demand
for feed grains. As this and other short-term coping mechanisms have been exhausted,
food shortages have become critical. WFP has issued a further international appeal to
seek 658,000 tons of food aid for the 12 months commencing April 1998. This appeal
forms 91% of a broader international appeal for US$415 million, the balance of which
addresses the priority sectors of health, water and sanitation, and infrastructure
rehabilitation.
In addition to food aid requirements, marginal lands on hillsides are increasingly
deforested to open up new land for cultivation. This land provides only low yields and
environmental damage is significant. Severe malnutrition has led to a requirement for
emergency essential care and targeted feeding programs for children, mothers and
hospital patients. The effects of economic difficulties compounded by natural
disasters are now also threatening access to cléan water and proper sanitation.
Early prospects for the next crop season due to begin in May 1998 are not especially
favourable. According to the FAO, the key fanning operations depend heavily on
irrigation and water levels in a large number of irrigation reservoirs remain inadequate
as a result and reduced snowfall in early 1998. Much will depend on rainfall in June to
September 1998 when the country receives most of its annual rainfall.
Response
Natural disasters exacerbated existing structural deficiencies, and together these
disasters and deficiencies have led to the ongoing food emergency in the DPRK. This
has now resulted in a humanitarian situation more akin to a complex emergency.
Australia has provided $9 5 million in humanitarian assistance, the bulk of which has
been delivered for food assistance through the WFP, targeting children, mothers and
hospital patients.
South Asia
Included in this group of countries are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Maldives.
Over such a large spread of land and ocean we can expect considerable variation in
the El Niñoo signature for any given event.
Past ENSO Events
It is evident from the annotated maps of climatic events and fluctuations from 1871 to
1982 presented in Allan et al. (1996) that the ENSO pattern varies considerably from
event to event. Generally the southern tip of India and Sri Lanka (and by inference the
Maldives) experience higher than average annual rainfall whereas the rest of India,
and less predictably Pakistan and Bangladesh, experience lower than average rainfall.
The northern and western parts of Pakistan appear to be little affected by El Niño.
Generally temperatures over South Asia are up to 1°C higher than normal during El
Nino years.
Monsoonal intensity in India is directly influenced by the extent of the contrast
between land and sea temperatures, as this affects the nature of atmospheric
circulation over the ocean. During an El Niño, a warmer than usual pool of water is
located off the coast of India which reduces the normal contrast between land and sea
temperatures. As a consequence, an El Nino is generally associated with weakened or
shortened monsoon seasons on all but the southern part of the Indian sub -continent.
ENSO events normally have no appreciable effects on sea level in the Indian Ocean
region and hence are unlikely to exacerbate the effects that higher sea levels caused by
other influences such as storm surges have on very low -lying countries such as the
Maldives.
Given the very large populations in this region, their low per capita disposable
incomes and their heavy dependence on subsistence agriculture and food production
for local rural and urban market, the potential of El Nito induced droughts to have
catastrophic socio- economic impacts is great.
The 1997/98 ENSO Event
The information summarised below indicates that in contrast to the South East Asia,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the western Pacific, the 1997/98 ENSO event has
been weak and has had little impact on the countries of South Asia.
India
Although the July 1997 monsoon was late no extreme weather anomalies were
experience due to a possible El Nit() effect. As of the beginning of April 1998, most
regions had experienced average or above average monsoonal rainfall for the tenth
consecutive year.
Wheat production in 1997 was officially estimated at a record 68.7 million tons as
against the previous year's harvest of 62 6 million tons and about 14% higher than the
average óf the preceding five years. In early April 1998 the F AO estimated that in
1998 wheat production would decline slightly due to heavy rains during the optimal
planting season of November and December 1997.
In the past, reduced rice yields have been attributed to El Nio, although rice output in
1997/98 was anticipated by the F AO to be 1 2 million tons higher than the previous
forecast at 123 million tons.
Bangladesh
The AusAID Post report that as of the beginning of December 1997 there had been no
perceptible impact from El Nino in the country. Weather conditions during the
monsoon - which included three cyclones - were considered to be normal in a
country which regularly suffers from natural disasters Rainfall was generally near to
above normal.
In 1996 /97 there was a record production of food grain of 20.34 million metric tons.
In early 1998 the forecast production of food grain for 1997/98 was even higher at
21.1 million metric tons. As of the end of April 1998 these forecasts of favourable
harvests were being maintained, albeit at the slightly lower level of 20.4 million tons.
Despite this, the F AO projected that the country would import some 0 9 million tons
of wheat and 0.5 million tones of rice as government -held stocks continued to fall.
Pakistan
Overall the 1997 monsoon had produced less than average rainfall up until August.
Monsoonal rains were heavier thereafter and in fact the northern half of the country
experienced more rain than usual. The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council
advised the Post that these good rains had contributed to a better wheat crop this
season, especially in northern Pakistan. At the end of April 1998 the FAO reported
that the harvest of wheat in 1997/98 was officially forecast at a record of about 18
million tons, up 9% on the previous year's harvest. Rice production in 1997 was 6.5
million tons, also up on the previous year's level. From an agricultural production
perspective, the effect of El Nina has been positive.
In late August 1997 floods and landslides in northern Pakistan caused by heavy
monsoon rains killed over 140 people and caused extensive damage to property and
crops, principally rice and sugar cane. In early March 1998, devastating floods caused
by unseasonably heavy rains in Balochistan Province in southwestern Pakistan killed
perhaps as many as 1,200 people and left 25,000 people homeless. The two main
crops - wheat and dates - were totally destroyed. This is the least populated and least
developed part of Pakistan and much of the limited infrastructure in this deprived area
was destroyed.
There is no obvious link between the occurrence of these floods and El Nino.'
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka had a particularly dry southwest monsoon (May to August 1997) but the
northeast monsoon (October 1997 to January 1998) appears to have been about
average. Although the northeast monsoon - starting in late September 1997 - brought
floods and landslides - rice production from the main crop was expected to be about
1.68 million tons, some 20% higher than the previous drought - affected year's crop.
As of the beginning of April 1998 the FAO reported that harvesting of the main paddy
rice crop was underway and that a sharp increase in production was expected due to
favourable growing conditions. Planting of the secondary paddy rice crop was
expected to start early since water reservoirs were full.
The overall food supply situation is satisfactory and adequate rice stocks are held by
the government and private traders.
The Maldives
There have been no reports of El Nina -related effects from the Maldives.
Summary
The El NiTio patterns appear to have been atypical with the northern parts of the
region receiving on average higher rainfalls - and Sri Lanka lower rainfall - than
might have been anticipated. However in most areas rainfall has been adequate to
ensure good harvests.
Southern Africa
Past ENSO Events
In the 100 years of climatic records analysed by Allan et al. (1996) there are clear El
Nino- related weather and climate patterns. The summer (October to March) rainfall
region of Southern Africa usually experiences widespread lower than average rainfall
during El Nino events, with maximum impacts in December to March. This is the
core of the rainfall season and a critical period for the staple maize crops
In eastern equatorial Africa (extending as far north as Ethiopia) rainfalls are higher
than usual during El Niños. This relationship does not always hold and in some events
equatorial Africa has low annual rainfall and, rarely such as in 1996, the pattern is
reversed with much higher than normal rainfall in southern Africa.
During La Nina events these patterns are largely reversed with southern Africa
receiving rainfalls which are generally higher than usual, with consequent above
average rivers flows. However, in equatorial Africa there is little change over average
conditions except in the interior where are sometimes lower than average.
The previous two strong El Nino events in southern Africa resulted in severe
droughts. In 1982/83 extreme drought conditions attributed to El Nino caused over
US$1 billion in damage. The region suffered the effects of the 1982/83 event for
several years, these effects being exacerbated by the moderate 1986/87 El Nifo. Partly
because of this, the 1992/93 El Ni to resulted in another devastating drought that
threatened some 18 million people with famine and resulted in a loss of 3 million tons
of grain. However credible early warning, on -the -spot assessments, rapid regional
response and large -scale international assistance were credited with saving many
lives.
The 1997/98 El Niño Event
Characteristics and effects
it was anticipated in November 1997 that there would be
widespread onset of drought conditions associated with the El Nino in a region
already hit by adverse weather in previous months (including both floods and
drought). In the event, rainfall patterns were generally normal with above average
In southern Africa
totals in many areas. By early March 1998 the probability of widespread drought was
being assessed as very remote. Some areas had been adversely affected by drought,
including, for example, southern Zimbabwe where most crops in communal areas had
failed. The countries with regions affected by drought (specifically Zimbabwe and
South Africa) have sufficient food reserves to be able to mobilise enough food
without recourse to food aid.
It seems that in what is being called the most severe global El Nino event in the last
century, southern Africa has escaped relatively unscathed compared with impacts it
had experienced during the two preceding strong El Nincfevents.
Much of eastern Africa has been afflicted by severe floods, which in most cases have
been attributed to El Níio. Countries affected include Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya,
Somalia and Ethiopia. The link (if any) between floods in the northern part of this
region are not clear because these areas normally experience drier than average
conditions during El Nine events.