1
ThreeConceptsofAgnosticism
InthispaperIwillarguethatdebatesregardingreligiousagnosticismhavesufferedfroma
failuretodistinguishbetweenthreepossibleconceptionsofagnosticism.Myhopeisthatpaying
attentiontothesedistinctionswillmakefuturedebatesaboutthejustificationofagnosticismmore
productive.
InPartOneIlookattheemergenceoftheterm““agnosticism””intheworkofT.H.Huxley.InPart
TwoIidentifyanddescribethreedistinctconceptionsofagnosticism.InPartThreeIexamineRichard
Dawkins’’sargumentagainstagnosticisminTheGodDelusiontoillustratehowafailuretorecognize
thesedifferentconceptionscanundermineargumentsregardingthejustificationofagnosticism.
PartOne:Agnosticism
In1889T.H.Huxleytookcreditforcoiningtheterm,““agnosticism,””todescribeaposition
distinguishedfromboththeismandatheism(1889a:183).Thereismuchtosayaboutthishistory,but
forthesakeoftimeIwillonlynotetwopointshere.
First,Huxleyviewedagnosticismasaguidingintellectualprincipleratherthanapositionorset
ofbeliefs.““Positively””hewrote,““theprinciplemaybeexpressed:Inmattersoftheintellect,followyour
reasonasfarasitwilltakeyou,withoutregardtoanyotherconsideration.Andnegatively:Inmattersof
theintellect,donotpretendthatconclusionsarecertainwhicharenotdemonstratedordemonstrable””
(1889b:186Ͳ87).Nevertheless,hestruggledtomaintainthedistinctionbetweenagnosticismasa
principleandagnosticismasaparticularposition.
Second,Huxleyviewedagnosticismasmorally,aswellasepistemologicallynormative.Inso
doingheechoedtheviewdefendedbyW.K.Cliffordasan““ethicsofbelief.””Cliffordappealedtothe
harmfulconsequencesthatresultbothdirectlyandindirectlyfromholdingbeliefsthatarenot
2
supportedbytheevidencetoconcludethat““itiswrongalways,everywhere,andforanyone,tobelieve
anythinguponinsufficientevidence””(295).
Inthe20thcenturythisnormativeattitudetowardsthejustificationofbeliefbecamewidely
knownas““evidentialism.””The““evidentialistimperative””accordingtoJeffJordan,isthenormativeassertion
““thatoneshouldbelieveapropositiononlyifitissupportedbyadequateevidence””(42).Unfortunately,
thenormativityexpressedcouldbeinterpretedepistemically,prudentially,ormorally.ThoughHuxley
andClifforddefendedaprinciplethatwasbothepistemicallyandmorallynormative,evidentialism
todayisdiscussedprimarilyintermsofepistemicrationality.
Thus,themeaningoftheterm““agnosticism””haschangedfromHuxley’’soriginalintent.The
normativeprinciplehasbeenabsorbedintoevidentialismanditsmoralimportdampened.What
remainsisthenotionofagnosticismasastanceorcognitiveattitudetowardaproposition.Exactly
whatsortofcognitiveattitude,however,islessclear.
PartTwo:ThreeConceptsofAgnosticism
Wecantakemanypossiblestancestowardanygivenproposition,p.Forinstance,wecan
desire,fear,doubt,assume,know,believe,oracceptthatp.Thelastthreeofthese,ormoreaccurately
theattitudescharacterizedbythefailuretotakethem,arecandidatesfordistinctconceptionsof
agnosticism.
Onewaytothinkaboutagnosticismisasalackofknowledge.Iwillcallthis““agnosticismasnot
knowing.””Accordingtothisview,oneisagnosticinregardtopif,andonlyifoneneitherknowsthatp
norknowsthat~p.TotheextentthatHuxleyconceivedofagnosticismasapositionopposedtoboth
atheismandtheism,itwouldhavebeeninthisway.Heintentionallychosetheterm““agnostic””tostandin
contrasttotheterm““gnostic,””thatis,someonewhoclaimstoknowsomesortofspiritualorreligious
truth(1889a:183).ThisalsoappearstobetheconceptadoptedbyAnthonyKenny.
3
IdonotmyselfknowofanyargumentfortheexistenceofGodwhichIfindconvincing;inall
ofthemIthinkIcanfindflaws.Equally,Idonotknowofanyargumentagainsttheexistenceof
Godwhichistotallyconvincing;intheargumentsIknowagainsttheexistenceofGodIcan
equallyfindflaws.SothatmyownpositionontheexistenceofGodisagnostic””(1983:84Ͳ85)
NoticethatagnosticismasnotknowingisperfectlycompatiblewitheitherthebeliefthatGod
existsorthebeliefthatGoddoesnotexist.Onecouldbereligiouslyagnosticinthissenseandstillhold
eitheroneofthesebeliefs.Theconceptionhingesonthedifferencebetweenknowledgeand““mere
belief””––i.e.,whatweimplywhenwesaythatwedon’’tjustbelievesomething,weknowit.
Agnosticism,however,isalsofrequentlycharacterizedasalackofbelief.Unfortunately,as
JonathanCohenhasarguedtheterm““believe””canbeusedtoexpressmorethanonecognitiveattitude
towardaproposition.Cohendistinguishes““acceptance””from““belief,””bothofwhichcanbeexpressed
usingtheterm““believe.””1AccordingtoCohen,acceptanceisamentalact.““[T]oacceptthatp””hewrites,
““istohaveoradoptapolicyofdeeming,positing,orpostulatingthatp––thatis,ofgoingalongwiththat
proposition(eitherforthelongtermorforimmediatepurposesonly)asapremiseinsomeorall
contextsforone’’sownandothers’’proofs,argumentations,inferences,deliberations,etc.””Incontrast,
believingisamentalstate.““Beliefthatp,ontheotherhand,isadispositiontofeelittruethatp,
whetherornotonegoesalongwiththepropositionasapremise””(368).
Itisworthnotingtwofurtherpointsregardingthisdistinction.First,acceptanceandbeliefare
related,butindependent.Weoftenacceptwhatwebelieveandbelievewhatweaccept,butweneed
not.Believingapropositionprovidesapresumptioninfavorofacceptingit,butitdoesnotrequirethat
weacceptit.Second,acceptanceisvoluntarywhereasbeliefisnot.Beliefisdeterminedbyevidence.
1
Thedistinctionbetweenbeliefandacceptanceanditsimplicationsfordoxasticvoluntarismismadeby
severalotherauthorsaswell.See,forinstance,““WhyisBeliefInvoluntary?””(Bennett1990)and““Acceptingand
DecidingtoBelieve””(Buckareff2004).Formoreondoxasticinvoluntarismsee““DecidingtoBelieve””(Williams
1973),““WillingBeliefandtheNormofTruth””(Funkhouser2003),““Truth,Reason,andtheRegulationof
Belief””(Railton1994),and““HowTruthGovernsBelief””(Shah2003).
4
Inthissenseitisstrictlyepistemic.Incontrast,acceptanceisnotdependentsolelyonevidence.
AccordingtoCohen,““thereasonsforacceptingthatpneednotalwaysbeepistemicones:theymightbe
ethicalorprudential””(369).2
Utilizinghisdistinctionallowsustoidentifytwofurtherconceptionsofagnosticism––““agnosticism
asnotbelieving””and““agnosticismasnotaccepting.””InregardtothequestionofGod’’sexistence,
agnosticismasnotbelievingwouldbeaninvoluntarymentalstateinwhichapersonhasnodisposition
tofeeleitherthatGodexistsorthatGoddoesnotexist.Itwouldimplythathetakestheevidencefor
andagainstGod’’sexistencetobecounterbalanced.3
Agnosticismasnotacceptingissomethingquitedifferent.Itisadecisionnottoaccepteither
theclaimthatGodexistsortheclaimthatGoddoesnotexist.Theagnostichasdecidednottoadopta
policyof““deeming,positing,orpostulating””eitherclaim.Shehasdecidednottouseeitherasapremise
inher““ownandothers’’proofs,argumentations,inferences,deliberations,etc.””Itisquitepossiblethat
shebelievesthatGoddoesnotexist,butdeemsfornonͲepistemicreasons,suchasabeliefinthe
benefitsofreligion,nottouseitaspremiseinherdeliberations.4
Thedistinctionbetweenthesethreeconceptionsofagnosticismisnotoftenrecognizedin
argumentsregardingthejustificationofreligiousagnosticism.Inthephilosophicalliteraturemost
debatesregardingagnosticismaredebatesaboutwhetherornotthepositioncanbeepistemically
2
Forthisreason,Cohenargues,peoplecanbeheldresponsibleforwhattheyaccept,butnotdirectly
responsibleforwhattheybelieve(Cohen1989:369Ͳ70).
3
Thisepistemicconceptof““counterbalance””isadoptedfromChisholm.““Apropositioniscounterbalancedif
thereisasmuch,oraslittle,tobesaidinfavorofacceptingitasthereistobesaidinfavorofacceptingits
negation””(Chisholm1977:10).Itshouldbenoted,however,thatChisholmisnotusingtheconceptof
““acceptance””inquitethesamewaythatCohenusesit.
4
HowlikelyoneistodothismightdependagreatdealonhowoneconceivesofGod.Forinstance,ifone
believesthatGodinteractsonaregularbasisinourworldandpunisheshumansfornotworshippingGod,then
onewouldbeunlikelytobelieve,butnotaccept.Ontheotherhand,ifoneconceivesofGodasabeingwho
createdtheworld,butdoesnotcontinuetointeractwithit,thenbelieving,butnotacceptingismorelikely.See
America’’sFourGodsbyFroeseandBaderforainterestingdescriptionofconceptionsofGod(FroeseandBader
2010).
5
justified.5Thismaycausefewproblems.However,whenamoralagendaimplicitlyorexplicitly
motivatesthedebate,failingtomakethedistinctioncanhaveimportantconsequences.
PartThree:Dawkins’’s““PovertyofAgnosticism””
RecognizingthesethreeconceptionsofagnosticismhelpsexplainhowDawkins’’sargument
againstagnosticismfallsshortofhisintent.Dawkinsemphasizesthatheisnotagainstagnosticismin
general,butonlyagainstagnosticisminregardstotheGodHypothesis,thepropositionthat““thereexists
asuperhuman,supernaturalintelligencewhodeliberatelydesignedandcreatedtheuniverseand
everythinginit,includingus””(52,emphasisintheoriginal).Hebeginshisargumentbydistinguishing
betweenTemporaryAgnosticisminPractice(TAP)andPermanentAgnosticisminPrinciple(PAP)(69Ͳ70).
TAPistheappropriateresponseinsituationswhereitwouldbepossibletoansweraquestionifwehad
adequateevidence,butwedon’’tyethavethatevidence.Incontrast,PAPistheappropriateresponseto
questionsthatcannotbeansweredbecausethe““veryideaofevidenceisnotapplicable””(70).6
HavingmadethisdistinctionDawkinsstructureshisargumentaroundtwoprimaryclaims.The
firstisthattheGodHypothesisisascientifichypothesisaboutwhichevidenceisrelevantand,thus,
takingthepositionofPAPinrelationtoitisnotappropriate.Thesecondistheclaimthatthereis
sufficientevidenceagainstthehypothesistomaketheTAPunwarranted.
Iwillnotchallengethesetwoclaimshere,butinsteadfocusonathirdclaimsthatDawkins
invokes,aclaimregardingtheepistemicrequirementsforagnosticism.Dawkinsclaimsthatfor
agnosticismtobejustifiedtheevidenceforandagainstahypothesismustmakeitstruthorfalsityat
leastroughlyequiprobable.Hedoesnotdefendthisclaim,butinsteadjustassumesthatitisthe
5
Seeforinstance““Agnosticism””(Dore1982),““TheReasonablenessofAgnosticism””(Brinton1984),
““NecessaryAgnosticism””(McLaughlin1984),““Agnosticism””(Morris1985),““AtheismorAgnosticism””(McGrath
1987),““AgnosticismandAtheism””(Brinton1989),and““IsAgnosticismUnreasonable?””(Jacoby1991).
6
AsanexampleDawkinscitesthequestionofwhetheryouseeredasIdo.Thisquestionbelongsintherealm
ofPAPbecauseitisnotclearwhatevidencecouldpossiblyanswerit.
6
definitionofagnosticism.Thisfailuretorecognizethatthereareotherconceptionsofagnosticismleads
himtoargueagainstanagnosticismthathisagnosticopponentsmaynothold.
Considertheargumentheattributestothosewhoclaimthatourinabilitytoproveordisprove
withcertaintythatGoddoesordoesnotexistjustifiesagnosticism.Itakethefollowingsummarytobe
afairreconstructionoftheargument.
1. WecannotproveconclusivelyeitherthatGoddoesorthatGoddoesnotexist.
2. IfwecannotproveconclusivelyeitherthatGoddoesorthatGoddoesnotexist,thenthe
hypotheses““Godexists””and““Goddoesnotexist””areroughlyequiprobable.
3. Oneshouldbeagnosticifandonlyifthehypotheses““Godexists””and““Goddoesnotexist””are
roughlyequiprobable.
4. Thus,weshouldbeagnosticinregardstoGod’’sexistence.
Dawkinsbelievesthisisabadargumentbecausepremise#2isfalse.Thefactthatwecannot
proveconclusivelythatsomethingdoesnotexist,doesnotmaketheoddsofitsexistenceandnonͲ
existenceequiprobable.7BecauseitisimpossibletoprovethenonͲexistenceofanythingconclusively,
acceptingpremise#2wouldleadustobeagnosticabouttheexistenceofallsortsofentitiesthatwe
havenogoodreasontobelieveexist––e.g.,thetoothfairy,unicorns,orDawkins’’sfavorite,theFlying
SpaghettiMonster.Huxley’’sapparentacceptanceofpremise#2,Dawkinsclaims,leadhimtomistakenly
adoptagnosticism.
Dawkinsiscorrectinhisassessmentofpremise#2,butheiswrongtoassumethatthosewho
justifyagnosticismneedtorelyonit.Indeed,theaccusationthatHuxleydoessoisamisrepresentation
ofhisview.HuxleymayverywellhaveagreedwithDawkins’’sclaimthatthelackofabsoluteproof
regardingGod’’sexistenceornonͲexistencedoesnotmaketheclaimsequiprobable.However,hedidnot
7
““ThatyoucannotproveGod’’sexistenceisacceptedandtrivial,ifonlyinthesensethatwecannever
absolutelyprovethenonͲexistenceofanything.WhatmattersisnotwhetherGodisdisprovable(heisn’’t)but
whetherhisexistenceisprobable.Thatisanothermatter.Somedisprovablethingsaresensiblyjudgedfarless
probablethanotherdisprovablethings””(77,emphasisintheoriginal).
7
arguethatoneshouldadoptagnosticismonlywhentheevidencefororagainstahypothesismadethe
hypothesisequiprobable,butinanycasewheretheevidenceisinconclusive.Inotherwords,hewould
nothaveacceptedpremise#3intheargument––i.e.,Dawkins’’scriteriaforagnosticism.8
ThepointhereisthatDawkinsassumesaconceptionofagnosticismasnotbelievingwhereas
Huxleyseemstohaveassumedaconceptionofagnosticismasnotknowing.Dawkins’’sfailureto
recognizethatheandHuxleydonotsharethesameconceptionleadshimtowronglychideHuxleyfor
makinganerrorinreasoning,ormoregenerouslyfor““bendingoverbackwardstoconcedeapoint.””
ThedistinctionalsohelpsusunderstandKenny’’sresponsetoDawkins.Kennyagreeswith
DawkinsthatargumentsfortheexistenceofGodareinconclusiveandthattherearegoodreasonsto
believethatGoddoesnotexist.Theconclusionhedrawsfromthis,however,isthattheappropriate
responseisagnosticismratherthanatheism.ThisisbecauseKenny,likeHuxley,understands
agnosticismasnotknowingratherthannotbelieving.
Toseehowthedifferentconceptionsofagnosticismplayout,itwillbehelpfultolookatthe
spectrumofpossibilitiesregardinghumanjudgmentsabouttheexistenceofGodthatDawkinsprovides
(seefigure1).Dawkinsreservesagnosticismforcategories3,4,and5wherethereisagreatdealof
uncertaintyabouttheexistenceofGod.Thisexpressestheconceptionofagnosticismasnotbelieving.
However,sincebothHuxleyandKennyutilizetheconceptionofagnosticismasnotknowing,theywould
allowpeoplefallingintocategories2Ͳ6tobeagnosticsaswell.
8
Huxley’’sargumentmighthavegonesomethinglikethis.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
WecannotproveconclusivelyeitherthatGoddoesorthatGoddoesnotexist.
Ifwecannotprovesomethingconclusively,thenweshouldnotclaimtohaveknowledgeofit.
Thus,wedonothaveknowledgeofGod’’sexistence.
Ifwedonothaveknowledgeofsomething,thenweshouldbeagnosticinregardstoit(Huxley’’s
principleofagnosticism).
Thus,weshouldbeagnosticinregardstoGod’’sexistence.
8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Strongtheist:100percentprobabilityofGod.InthewordsofC.G.Jung,‘‘Idonotbelieve,Iknow.’’
Veryhighprobabilitybutshortof100percent.Defactotheist.‘‘Icannotknowforcertain,butI
stronglybelieveinGodandlivemylifeontheassumptionthatheisthere.’’
Higherthan50percentbutnotveryhigh.Technicallyagnosticbutleaningtowardstheism.‘‘Iam
uncertain,butIaminclinedtobelieveinGod.’’
Exactly50percent.Completelyimpartialagnostic.‘‘God’’sexistenceandnonͲexistenceareexactly
equiprobable.’’
Lowerthan50percentbutnotverylow.Technicallyagnosticbutleaningtowardsatheism.‘‘I
don’’tknowwhetherGodexistsbutI’’minclinedtobeskeptical.’’
Verylowprobability,butshortofzero.Defactoatheist.‘‘IcannotknowforcertainbutIthinkGod
isveryimprobable,andIlivemylifeontheassumptionthatheisnotthere.’’
Strongatheist.‘‘IknowthatthereisnoGod,withthesameconvictionasJung““knows””thereis
one.’’(Dawkins2008:73)
Figure1
Thespectrumalsosuggeststhepossibilityofagnosticismasnotaccepting.Incategories2and6
Dawkinsmakesaconnectionbetweenourassessmentofpropositionsandthewayinwhichwebring
themtobearinourlives.IneachcasethoughonedoesnotknowforcertainthatGoddoes(ordoes
not)exist,onebelievesstronglyenoughtoliveone’’slife““ontheassumption””thatGoddoes(ordoesnot)
exist.ThissoundslikewhatIhavebeenreferringtoas““acceptance.””
BecauseDawkinsdoesnotdistinguishbetweenbeliefandacceptanceitisnotclearhowwe
shouldinterpretthedescriptionsincategories2and6.Thereseemtobetwopossibilities,bothof
whichareproblematic.Ontheonehand,hemightarguethatthephrase““andIlivemylifeonthe
assumption””isjustawayoffurtherdescribingwhatitmeansto““stronglybelieve.””Itismerelythe
behavioralmanifestationofthedegreetowhichonebelievestheproposition.However,asIhave
argued,whenwecandistinguishbetweenacceptanceandbelief,theconnectionbetweenbeliefand
actionisnotsodirect.TheremaybenonͲepistemicreasonsforactinginacertainway.Thus,the
connectionDawkinsmakesmustbedefendedratherthanassumed.
Ontheotherhand,hemightarguethattheconnectionbetweenbeliefandbehavioris
normative,andthatwehaveanobligationtoactonwhatwebelieve.IfthisisthecasethatDawkinsis
making,heisstillonshakyground,blindedperhapsbyhisallegiancetoevidentialism.Theevidentialist
9
imperativetellsusthatthestrengthofourbeliefinapropositionshouldbeproportionaltotheevidence
insupportofit.However,evenifthisistrueitdoesnotfollowthatthesameobligationexistsbetween
theevidenceandouracceptanceofaproposition.Thequestionofwhatjustifiesouracceptanceofa
propositionisrelatedto,butnotidenticaltothequestionofwhatjustifiesourbeliefinaproposition.
ThispointwasmadepersuasivelybyphilosopherofscienceRichardRudnermorethan50years
agowhenheraisedthequestionofwhatmakestheevidence““adequate””tojustifyacceptinga
hypothesis?AsRudnerpointedout,thisisnotaquestionthatcanbeansweredbytheevidence
(Rudner1953:1Ͳ6).Itisnotastrictlyempiricalquestionatall.Sincenoscientifichypothesisisever
completelyverified,whatcountsasadequatejustificationforacceptancewilldependnotonlyonthe
strengthoftheevidencefororagainstthehypothesis,butalsoontheconsequencesofmakinga
mistake.9
Thepointhereisthatwhiletheevidenceforitiscertainlyrelevant,whatcountsasadequate
justificationfortheacceptanceofapropositionisnotexhaustedbytheevidence.TherearealsononͲ
epistemicfactors––i.e.,ethicalorprudentialfactors––toconsider.Butifthatisthecase,thenthestrength
ofouracceptanceshouldnotnecessarilybeproportionaltotheevidence.Therearemanycasesin
whichitisappropriatetowaituntilwehaveahighdegreeofcertaintybeforeweacceptaproposition.
Thesearecasesinwhichthecostsofmakinganerroraresignificant.Inothercases,whenwehave
muchtogainifthepropositionbetrueandlittletoloseifitbefalse,wemaybejustifiedinacceptinga
propositionuponmuchlessevidence.10
9
““For,sincenoscientifichypothesisisevercompletelyverified,inacceptingahypothesisthescientistmust
makethedecisionthattheevidenceissufficientlystrongorthattheprobabilityissufficientlyhightowarrantthe
acceptanceofthehypothesis.Obviouslyourdecisionregardingtheevidenceandrespectinghowstrongis‘‘strong
enough’’,isgoingtobeafunctionoftheimportance,inthetypicalethicalsense,ofmakingamistakeinaccepting
orrejectingthehypothesis””(Rudner:2).
10
Thisis,ofcourse,similartotheargumentthatJamesmakesregardingepistemicdutiesin““TheWillto
Believe””(17Ͳ22).Thiswouldbeaninterestinglineofthoughttopursue.Idonotdosoheremostlyduetothe
limitedscopeofthispaper.AnimportantquestionwouldbewhetherornotJameswouldacceptthedistinction
betweenbeliefandacceptanceonwhichmyargumentispremised.Hisdoxasticvoluntarismandtheclose
connectionhemakesbetweenbeliefandactionleadmetothinkthathemightnot.
10
Thoughhedoesnotseetheneedtoinvokethemwhenarguingagainstagnosticism,Dawkins
seemstorecognizetherelevanceofnonͲepistemicconsiderations.Thisisevidentinthewayheargues
notonlyagainsttherationalityofreligiousbelief,butalsoagainstthemoralityofreligiousbelief.He
arguesthatreligiousbeliefisaparticularlyperniciouscategoryofbeliefbecauseitisnotonlyirrational,
butextremelyharmful.HereonecanseeClifford’’sethicsofbeliefemergingclearly.11Unfortunately,
becauseheassumesaconceptionofagnosticismasnotbelieving,Dawkinstreatsthequestionofthe
justificationofagnosticismstrictlyasanepistemicquestion.Hisargument,evenifsuccessful,islimited
tothoseopponentswhosharehisconceptionofagnosticism.12
Conclusion
Mygoalinthispaperhasnotbeentodefendagnosticismperse,buttoidentifythreedistinct
conceptionsofagnosticismanddemonstratehowthefailuretorecognizethemconfoundsdebates
regardingagnosticism.However,Ibelievethisworksuggestspossibledirectionsfutureinvestigationsof
agnosticismshouldtake.Inclosing,Iwanttosuggestsomeissuestopursue.
First,thethreeconceptionsofagnosticismshouldbefurtherexploredwithparticularattention
paidtotheconceptionofagnosticismasnotaccepting.Thisconceptionhasreceivedtheleastattention
inthephilosophicalliterature,buttherearesomeparallelsindiscussionsofwhatcognitiveattitudebest
describesreligiousfaith.13WhatdoesitmeantonotaccepteitherthepropositionthatGodexistsorthe
propositionthatGoddoesnotexist?Canonefailtoacceptbothpropositionsordoesthechoice
betweenthemrepresentthattypeof““forced””optionthatWilliamJamesreferstoin““TheWillto
Believe””(3)?
11
Interestinglyenough,DawkinsneveracknowledgesCliffordinTheGodDelusion.
IthinkitmightbehelpfultolookatSamHarris’’sargumentagainstreligiousmoderatesinTheEndofFaith.
LikeDawkins,heoffersamoralargumentagainstreligiousbelief,butheextendsittoreligiousmoderatesina
moreintentionalwaythandoesDawkins.Itispossiblethatthiscouldbeextendedtoagnosticism.
13
Seeforinstance(Audi2008),(Bishop2002;2005),(Buckareff2005),(Hartman2010),(Kenny1992;2007),
(Mawson2004),(Scott2005),(Swinburne1981),and(Zamulinski2003;2004;2005;2008),
12
11
Second,howmightagnosticismasnotacceptingbedefendedorcritiqued?IfIamcorrect,
argumentsthatneglectthenonͲepistemicfactorswillnotbesufficient.Mysenseisthatthemost
effectiveargumentswillappealtotheconsequencesofagnosticismaswell.Itmaybepossibleto
extendtheethicsofbeliefargumentthatDawkinsemploys,14butthisisaquestionthatneedsfurther
exploration.
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