dergo some modification before it is found acceptable
to Sadat, Hussein, the Arab residents of the West
Bank and Gaza, and even the United States. A major
criticism of the plan is that it does not appreciably
alter the situation on the West Bank except to relieve
Israel of the administrative and bureaucratic burden.
Secondly, it does not deal with the Palestinian issue
in its entirety, but only with those Palestinians presently living in territory under Israeli administration.
One must, however, view the Begin plan from a longer range perspective. On one hand, Begin really
means it when he says that Judea and Samaria are an
integral part of Israel, but his readiness to suspend decision over ultimate sovereignty represents a significant departure from his long-held ideological views.
His self-rule proposal ends with the statement that
"these principles will be subject to review after a five
year period." It leaves open the possibility that in a
reasonable period of time which allows for at least a
limited degree of Palestinian self-expression, during
which such a Palestinian "entity" could demonstrate
its peaceful intentions, a final formula will be-found
for satisfying Palestinian national aspirations for their
own national identity, while simultaneously providing
specific assurances for Israel's security.
"Self-determination" as ideology
Hans J. Morgenthau
The principle of national self-determination can only
be understood and rationally applied within a particular political context. Thus Woodrow Wilson justified
the liberation of the central and eastern European
nationalities from foreign domination by the principle
of national self-determination. Theoretically the principle was opposed not only to the status quo of empire, but also to imperialism of any kind, either on
the part of the old imperial powers — Germany,
Austria, and Russia — or on the part of the liberated
small nations. Yet the destruction of the old imperial
order at once called forth, still in the name of selfdetermination, new imperialisms. Those of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia are as outstanding as they were inevitable; for the power vacuum
left by the breakdown of the old imperialism had to
be filled and the newly liberated nations were there
to fill it. As soon as they had installed themselves in
power, they invoked the self-same principle of national
self-determination in defense of the new status quo.
This principle was their most potent ideological weapon from the end of the first to the end of the second
world war.
125
It was by a stroke of propagandists genius that Hitler
hit upon the principle of national self-determination
in order to disguise and justify his policies of territorial expansion. The German minorities of Czechoslovakia and Poland, under the banner of national
self-determination, were now to play the same role in
undermining the national existence of Czechoslovakia
and Poland which the Czech, Slovak, and Polish nationalities, under the same ideological banner, had
played in undermining the national existence of the
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O Q O O d Q Q O a O D Q D O O O Q a
Austrian-Hungarian Empire. With their own ideological weapon turned against them, the benefactors of
the status quo of Versailles had no ideology, except
the one of law and order, with which to defend that
status quo. Thus Austria and Czechoslovakia were
surrendered, and Poland was exposed to mortal danger.
After the settlement of Munich granted the German
demands with regard to Czechoslovakia, the London
Times, of September 28, 1938, making the German
ideology its own, declared: "Self-determination, the
professed principle of the Treaty of Versailles, has
been invoked by Herr Hitler against its written text,
and his appeal has been allowed." Rarely, if ever, has
modern history offered a more striking example of
the importance of ideologies in international politics
and of the confounding effect of an ambiguous ideology aptly employed.
Palestinian "Self-Determination" is Also a Guise
When Germany joined the League of Nations in 1925,
it pursued a policy of undermining the status quo of
Versailles, mainly using the principle of national selfdetermination as the dynamite with which to crack
the foundations of the territorial status quo. This
policy was at odds with the policies of France and its
Eastern allies and was aimed, first surreptitiously and
later openly, at the termination of their preponderance
on the continent of Europe. In addition to the principle of national self-determination, Germany used the
dual fear of Bolshevist revolution and Russian imperialism, which obsessed the Western powers, as a weapon with which to strengthen its own position. While
alternately offering itself as a bulwark against Bolshevism and threatening to ally itself with the Soviet
Union, Germany was able to wring concessions from
the Western powers, to isolate Poland from France,
and to paralyze the League.
Similarly, the Arab claims of national self-determination, in order to do them justice, must be put in the
political context from which they have risen and
within whi.'.h they are supposed to operate. The Arab
claims for Palestinian self-determination, raised in the
aftermath of the 1967 war and supported by the confinement of a sector of the Arab population of Palestine in refugee camps, must be seen in the context of
the continuous opposition of large masses of Arabs to
the existence not only of the state of Israel but of
Jewish settlements within the territory of Palestine.
In other words, the recognition of the legitimacy of
the state of Israel is incompatible with the claim to
national self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs.
For that claim is territorially based not only upon the
so-called West Bank of the Jordan but, as innum Mrable pronouncements of the P.L.O. claim, upon the
territory on which the state of Israel has been erected.
Thus the principle of national self-determination on
behalf of the Palestinian Arabs reveals itself as the
ideological disguise of the unchanging aspiration of
large masses of Arabs: the destruction of the state of
Israel and the establishment as its substitute of an
Arab state.
Israel's security and arab self-rule
Don Peretz
Will Israel be less secure and will it realize less of its
historical destiny if it attains peace by returning all
or parts of the occupied territories? There is certainly
great risk in withdrawal, perhaps as much as there is
in remaining in the West Bank and Gaza. But occupation offers the risk of more wars, periodic insurrection
by the indigenous Arab population, and subverting
many positive values of the Jewish State.
Security is a dynamic and relative concept. As weapons technology becomes more sophisticated the
areas required to assure the safety of Jewish settlements constantly expands; as the number of Jewish
settlements in Arab or former Arab territories in126
creases, the amount of land under Israel control ne,
cessary to defend them must become more extensive
or they will cease to be secure. Much less territory
was required for security in 1948 than in 1967; it
was less in 1967 than in 1973. Today, with Jewish
settlements in Sinai, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and the
West Bank, even more territory is required for security..
Arab armies of 1948 could inflict less damage on Jewish populations in 1948 than in 1967, and the armies
of 1967 were less of a threat than those of today.
Arab planes, artillery, rockets, and even small arms a
third of a century ago could wreak less damage than
today's weapons whose range has increased dangerously since the first war with Israel in 1948. If Arabs
acquire even more sophisticated weapons with greater
range, and there is no peace settlement, additional
Arab lands will be vital to Israel's security. Israel will
be forced to continue acquiring Arab lands to keep
up with ever escalating security demands until there is
a peace settlement. Because of the nature of weapons
development and technology, constantly becoming
more dangerous for countries crowded into small
territories, security demands are irreversible; they can
not be deescalated as long as security depends on
maintaining superior tactical and strategic advantages,
with territorial outposts to balance the enemy's advantages in weaponry. This may require additional
wars with the Arab states; it certainly will require not
merely continuation of the present high level of military expenditure, but constantly escalating additional
expenditures to reenforce the security provided by
the territories.
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The Historical Reason for Adding Territory
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The logic of continued expansion is supported also by
claims of those who base their perceptions of Israel
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on its ancient boundaries. Any historical atlas shows
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that boundaries of the ancient Jewish states reached
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far beyond those of Mandatory Palestine whose borders had little relevance to events in the Bible.
Eretz Israel in the Hellenistic period, under the Kingdoms of Alexander Jannaeus, Herod and Agrippa ex,
tended far beyond the Jordan River, well into what _
are now the countries of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.
David's kingdom was even more extensive, from the
Gulf of Elat to the banks of the Euphrates River.
True, throughout ancient history the Gaza region was
seldom if ever included within the borders of Eretz
Israel, but the presence of a large hostile Philistine
population within the region of the Jewish state always presented a serious security risk.
In modern times, Israel's claims to larger territories
than those allocated by the United Nations partition
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