“The acquirement of knowledge”: Prometheus as a Catalyst for Identity Formation in
German Sturm und Drang and English Romantic Literature
ABSTRACT
In the German Sturm und Drang Movement, as well as the English Romantic Movement, the
figure of Prometheus came to represent an ideal rebel. The popularity of this myth among the
Romantics originates from the Sturm und Drang, and for this reason, it is important to
compare the language and imagery of texts about Prometheus from both movements. This
paper looks at speech and symbolism in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s anti-hymn
“Prometheus” (1774), Lord Byron’s lyric “Prometheus” (1816), and Chapter 10 of Mary
Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (1831). These texts all demonstrate
that psychological development and self-realization stem from control over language. This
study argues that such control is frequently represented as the result of Promethean hubris, as
each text applies similar diction and imagery to its treatment of the same myth. Furthermore,
this paper uses a framework of Jungian psychoanalysis to theorize that (in the texts
examined) Prometheus is viewed as the catalyst for identity formation. In Sturm und Drang
and Romantic literature, humanity acquires the knowledge of language and speech through
Prometheus’ hubris, and is thus able to assert a fixed identity. The paper concludes that in
these texts the way the hubris synthesizes its own transgressive force with a tyrant’s arbitrary
power to create independence parallels the synthesis of the childhood self and the adult self,
which according to Carl Jung is needed in order to create a fixed identity.
KEY WORDS:
identity; Romantic literature; Jungian psychoanalysis; Sturm und Drang; hubris
1
“The acquirement of knowledge”: Prometheus as a Catalyst for Identity Formation in
German Sturm und Drang and English Romantic Literature
In the German Sturm und Drang Movement [storm and urge]1, as well as the English
Romantic Movement, the figure of Prometheus came to represent an ideal rebel, symbolic of
man “in his fight for liberty against oppression” (Thorslev 108). Peter Larsen Thorslev Jr.
states that the popularity of this myth among the Romantics originates from the Sturm und
Drang (108). For this reason, it seems logical to compare the language and imagery of texts
about Prometheus from both movements. This paper looks at speech and symbolism in
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s anti-hymn “Prometheus” (1774), Lord Byron’s lyric
“Prometheus” (1816), and Chapter 10 of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, or the Modern
Prometheus (1831). These texts all demonstrate that psychological development and selfrealization stem from control over language. This control appears to be the result of
Promethean hubris2, as each text applies similar diction and imagery to its treatment of the
myth. Thus Prometheus is viewed not simply as a “figure of identification … for the late
eighteenth [and early nineteenth] century” (Jølle 394-95), but as the catalyst for identity
formation.
Although critics have argued that the “Modern Prometheus” in Shelley’s
Frankenstein, or, the Modern Prometheus refers to Frankenstein himself, this paper interprets
Frankenstein’s Creature as representative of the Promethean role. Frankenstein appears as
“an ineptly negligent creator whose conduct towards his creation is callously unjust”
(Baldick 43). Thus, he rather resembles Zeus, and is viewed by the Creature as “father and
author of his being” and “a god” (Baldick 33; 43). His desire to “pour a torrent of light into
our dark world” echoes God in Genesis, as he declares: “Let there be light” (Shelley 43; Gen.
1.3). His connection to science also demonstrates his god-like position within the narrative,
as “the exclusion of the domestic from science” sets him in opposition with the Promethean
figure, whose language is saturated with images of domesticity (Jansson x). In contrast, the
eloquent language of the Creature’s emotional speech in Chapter 10, aligns him with Byron’s
“measured, dignified” Prometheus (Dennis 144).
In order to successfully question the authority of a tyrant, all three texts need to
emphasize that the creator abandoned his creation after it has come to life. Each depicts this
1
The Sturm und Drang was a Proto-Romantic movement in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. The
name is frequently translated as ’storm and stress’, however, translating it as ’storm and urge’ seems more
2
“Presumption … towards the gods; … excessive self-confidence.” (“Hubris”)
2
abandonment as the cause of “human wretchedness” (Byron l.37), a “miserable” life (Shelley
77), and “pain” (Goethe l.39)3. The diction frequently stresses feeling “miserably alone” and
“betrayed” (Shelley 78; Goethe l.36). As a result of the creator’s “betrayal of responsibility”
(Jansson xi), humanity experiences what the speaker of Byron’s lyric calls a “sad unallied
existence” (l.52). The misguided creator Frankenstein “will not hear” and “[does] not
answer” the Creature’s plea (Shelley 78-79); the divine authority in Byron’s “Prometheus”
displays a similar “deaf tyranny” (l.19). Frankenstein dismisses his quasi-parental duties by
referring to the Creature as something “I had created” (77; my emphasis) – here, the finality
of the past perfect tense signals his opinion that creation ends at the moment of life. In the
texts under examination, Prometheus’ rebellion demonstrates just the opposite. Prometheus
can become a positive “figure of identification” precisely because he is defined as ‘not a god’
(Jølle 394): to him “The sufferings of mortality, / Seen in their sad reality, / Were not as
things that gods despise” (Byron l.2-4; my emphasis).
The structure of Promethean language also reflects the negative consequences of
abandonment, in particular its negative effects on identity formation. The Creature in
Frankenstein declares, “I alone am irrevocably excluded” (78). Here, existential certainty (“I
am”) is in jeopardy due to being “alone” – the word “alone” literally separates “I” and “am”.
The result of being “excluded” and abandoned is the lack of a parental role model whose
presence would aid the process of self-realization. Goethe’s Prometheus is also looking
toward the absent gods for guidance before his identity is fully developed:
Because I was a child,
did not know where in and out were,
turned my lost eyes
towards the sun, as if above was
an ear to hear my complaint. (l. 22-26)
He is looking for help “above” the sun (l.25), yet line 14 has already established that the gods
are “under the sun”. This confirms that Goethe’s Prometheus is just as alone in his search for
a fixed identity as the Creature.
In lines 22-26 of Goethe’s poem (above), the change in line 22 from the present tense,
which Prometheus uses to address Zeus, to the past tense with the insertion of “was”, allows
a further exploration of the process of childhood development. In the second half of this
poem, Prometheus narrates his growth from “child” “into a man” (l.22; l.43). He emphasizes
3
All quotes from Goethe have been translated into English from the original by the author of this paper.
3
that he has completed this process on his own: “have you not completed all of this on your
own” (l.33; my emphasis). This confidence about his own identity allows Prometheus to
become an “educator” (Jølle 399). Psychologist Carl Gustav Jung – whose theories are
actively concerned with identity formation and “wholeness” (Fordham 76) – suggests that “if
teachers really want to be educators, … they will only be successful if they themselves have
sound personalities” (qtd. in Fordham 111-12). This need for a firm identity also manifests in
Frankenstein. The Creature develops from an abandoned “new-born” into an individual
(Jansson xi), through gaining control over language. Chris Baldick points out that his “most
convincingly human characteristic [becomes] his power of speech” (45). Baldick also
emphasizes that Mary Shelley was influenced by her mother Mary Wollstonecraft, whose
work “stress[ed] the influence of a character’s upbringing and early impressions” (38).
Through the addition of this “psychological dimension”, the texts illustrate that this
Promethean process of development leads to “emancipation” (Jølle 403-04).
This emancipation is transferred from Prometheus to humanity by connecting
Prometheus’ hubris to the domestic. As stated above, such domestic images are in opposition
to everything that god or Frankenstein are associated with. Prometheus’ “rebel[lion] against
God” centers around fire4 (Thorslev 115), which is associated with the warmth of home and
domesticity. The end-words of lines 8-11 of Goethe’s poem connect domesticity to fire by
juxtaposing “hut”, “built”, “hearth”, and “embers”. Line 8 and 9 also stress that Prometheus’
home the “hut” is the product of his own efforts (“built”). The exclusion of the gods from the
domestic is emphasized, as well: they envy the embers of Prometheus’ hearth (“hearth that’s
embers you envy from me”; l.10-12). Frankenstein’s Creature also discovers fire on his own
(Shelley 81); even Baldick, who supports a reading of Frankenstein as the “Modern
Prometheus”, acknowledges that “in this episode … it is the monster rather than Victor who
is the modern Prometheus” (46). The connection between the Creature’s tale and fire – “by
the fire which … [he] had lighted, he thus began his tale” (79) – implies an interdependence
between hubris, domesticity, and speech. In Byron’s lyric, though hubris is never explicitly
connected to fire, it is related to domestic bliss, as the speaker tells Prometheus that “thy
Godlike crime was to be kind” (l.35). Here Promethean language and imagery, as Ian Dennis
argues, “reconfigur[e] … Prometheus’ gift to us from the actively useful fire to the more
passively inspiriting prophecy” (149). Jonas Jølle similarly concludes that the “domestication
4
In the most commonly known version of the Prometheus myth, the demi-god Prometheus steals fire from the
gods and gives it to humanity. Zeus sentences him to eternal punishment for his hubris.
4
of fire … allow[s] humans to carve out an existence for themselves” (398), to embrace their
individuality.
Goethe, Shelley and Byron all use the domestication of the hubris to portray the
“reversal of a very fundamental hierarchy” between oppressor and oppressed (Dennis 145).
This positive, intimate view on hubris suggests that the psychological development and selfrealization of humanity is not only aided by, but stems from such a “Godlike crime” (Byron
l.35). Hubris appears as the point of origin for identity formation. This is easiest to
demonstrate if considered in light of Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus’ threefold system of
‘Hegelian dialectics’5. In the Prometheus myth, as well as the texts discussed here, creation
appears as ‘thesis’, and implies the creator’s superiority. Hubris, then, appears as ‘antithesis’
– a transgression designed to invalidate the ‘thesis’, to make “the lightnings (sic) tremble” in
Zeus’ hand (Byron l.34). The ‘thesis’ and the ‘antithesis’ form a ‘synthesis’, based on
Prometheus’ legacy of language and identity. This ‘synthesis’ is the emergence of the
individual, the breaking free from (divine) authority. Considered from the perspective of the
Romantic Movement “self-assertion … is the basis of all heresy and hubris, … [but] is also
the basis of Romantic and humanist self-reliance” (Thorslev 110). This means that humanity
is not afraid to voice its opinions against a tyrant anymore. It is able to become independent
with the help of the Promethean knowledge it has acquired.
The synthesis reaches its purest form in Byron’s lyric. It is in this variation on the
myth that humanity seems to have fully absorbed the Promethean legacy of self-realization
and independence. Prometheus’ legacy is summarized by the speaker as “making Death a
Victory” (l.59) – this implies that humanity has learned not to desire immortality, because
they have witnessed the immortal Prometheus’ eternal suffering (Dennis 149). This, then,
signifies the utter dismissal of the allure of the divine. The speaker also emphasizes this by
rhyming “mortality” with “reality” (l.2-3), confirming his lack of interest in an omnipotent,
eternal existence. In Jungian psychology, “if the ego can relinquish some of the belief in its
own omnipotence … a new centre of personality can emerge”; this center of personality is
what Jung calls “the Self” (qtd. in Fordham 61). Similarly to the way Goethe’s Prometheus
and the Creature in Frankenstein assumed their independence through hubris, “hubris [in
Byron’s lyric]… is the hero’s enviable assumption of centrality” (Dennis 156). This
5
I use the term ’Hegelian dialectics’, as this has been commonly accepted to denote the threefold system of
thesis-antithesis-synthesis. However, I emphasize Chalybäus, since scholars of Hegelian philosophy have
stressed that Georg Hegel did not coin these terms, and that Chalybäus has reinterpreted Hegel’s ideas after his
death. (Verene 18; Wood 3)
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“centrality [shifts] upon the audience” because the speaker represents the perspective of
“Man” (Dennis 158; Byron l.38).
Jung also suggests that during the formation of identity “the place of the deity … [is]
taken by the wholeness of man”, and that the “quest for wholeness … [necessitates the]
finding of the God within” (qtd. in Fordham 76-77). In this respect, Byron’s “Prometheus“
depicts the process of self-actualization by directing the “attention of the poem inward upon
… [the] protagonist” (Dennis 145). This “God within” is also represented in Goethe’s and
Shelley’s work through the internalization of fire and thus of hubris (qtd. in Fordham 76-77).
In Goethe’s poem, Prometheus’ “sacred glowing heart” reaffirms that the “embers” of line 11
is the ‘heart’ of his existence (l.34). Likewise, the Creature’s soul in Frankenstein “glowed
with love and humanity” (78). Furthermore, the Creature’s tale is located at the middle of the
narrative, “literally at [the] heart [of the text]” (Jansson xv). In each text, fire binds the
“proud rebel” to the “Spirit” of humanity and functions as a catalyst for emancipation.
(Thorslev 121; Byron l.53).
After becoming emancipated and achieving “wholeness” (Fordham 76), Prometheus
and humanity are secure enough in their identity to not simply question authority, but also
claim superiority over it. This is demonstrated by the almost aggressive insistence on the first
person singular in Goethe’s and Shelley’s texts. Prometheus asserts that the domestic
(human) sphere belongs to him – “my hut” (l.8), “my hearth” (l.10) (my emphasis) – and
questions the rationality behind honoring Zeus at all, asking “Me honor you? What for?”
(l.38). The final line of the poem is also significant: Prometheus declares that the new
generation of humanity will mimic him (“Like me!”), and will not pay attention to Zeus
(l.57-58). Using the German “Ich” [I] as the last word of the poem, reaffirms its concerns
with identity and the self. Jølle refers to this phenomenon as the “insistent ‘Ich’” (395); it
also dominates the Creature’s speech in Frankenstein. This is most apparent in the frequent
repetition of syntactic units structured “you [verb] me”, such as “you … spurn me”, “you …
abhor me”, “you accuse me” (77-78). In these units the grammatical object (“me”) and the
object the utterance is aimed at (“you”) are in conflict with each other. This parallels the
conflict between Creature (“me”) and creator (“you”). However, it also redirects the readers’
attention onto the Creature, which helps strengthen his self-assertion.
Having firmly established his identity throughout Chapter 10, the Creature goes on to
tell Frankenstein that “I demand” to be heard (78). Frankenstein tries to insist that there can
be “no community between you and me” but he fails to successfully control language (78).
By using the connective “and”, his statement actually creates community between him and
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the Creature. The Creature is able to dominate Frankenstein because he is “more powerful”,
his “height is superior” (77), and his control over language is more secure. His articulate
voice is the “subversion of the category of monstrosity”; his command over the “godlike
science of speech” ultimately succeeds at persuading Frankenstein to listen to him (Baldick
45). At the end of the chapter Frankenstein even admits that “For the first time … I felt what
the duties of a creator towards his creature were” (79). In the course of one chapter the
Creature successfully subverts the hierarchy between himself and his creator through his use
of language. This subversion is represented in the final paragraph of Chapter 10, as The
Creature lights a fire to keep Frankenstein warm and alive (79). This implies that he is more
suited to the superior position of a caregiver.
Goethe’s Prometheus similarly overpowers Zeus. He achieves this by speaking in an
unconventionally informal tone. The poet “appropriates a form [the hymn] in order to undo
the work to which that form has traditionally been put” (Jølle 395). Instead of the
“worshipping admiration” that hymns traditionally display toward a deity (Johann Georg
Sulzer qtd. in Jølle 395), Prometheus trivializes Zeus’ authority by using the informal
German ‘Du’ form, for example “Die du nicht gebaut” [which you have not built] (l.9), “Hast
du die Schmerzen gelindert” [have you eased the pain] (l.39), “Hast du die Tränen gestillet”
[have you calmed the tears] (l.41), “Wähntest du etwa” [did you imagine] (l.47) (my
emphasis). In German, this form is strictly reserved for close acquaintances and friends.
Thus, the specificities of the German language allow Goethe to endow Prometheus with a
linguistically unique tool for the dismissal of hierarchy. Prometheus “immediately assumes a
superior position” in the first line of the poem by beginning his speech with an imperative
address directed at Zeus (Jølle 396): “cover your heavens, Zeus”. He confirms his disregard
for respect towards the gods in the line “Ich dich ehren? Wofür? [Me honor you? What for?]”
(l.38). His question dismisses honoring Zeus in meaning as well as form: by saying “dich
ehren” using the ‘Du’ form, the sentence actually performs the act that it describes (my
emphasis).
In contrast, Byron’s lyric establishes superiority over the deity through Prometheus’
“silent suffering” and the total exclusion of the ‘you/me’ dynamic portrayed in the other two
texts (l.6). Byron’s speaker represents humanity, and addresses Prometheus, not the creator.
Dennis argues that in this lyric “[Prometheus] and the sky-god have changed places” (148).
This is partially demonstrated by the dismissal of divine immortality (analyzed above).
However, it is also important to consider the way in which the speaker asserts that
humanity’s independence is based on Prometheus’ legacy. While this legacy of knowledge
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and language is significant for the formation of identity in Goethe and Shelley, as well, it is
in this Byronic take on the myth that society completely appropriates it. Through the rhyming
of “Spirit” and “we inherit” it becomes clear that Prometheus has left his “Spirit” of rebellion
and individuality to humanity (l.42; l.44). Line 44 also marks the only occurrence of a first
person pronoun in the entire lyric (“we”). Thus, as it is the only line uttered from a first
person point of view, “A mighty lesson we inherit” brings Prometheus’ legacy into focus
(l.44). Dennis argues that this suggest a “promise that is we imitate his response, thus
strengthening ourselves in our own mind, we can achieve … a similar triumph [to that which
Prometheus achieved]” (Dennis 148).
Even though Byron’s Prometheus is silent, humanity speaks in his place. He might
wish for his voice to be “echoless” in line 14, yet the first word of the next line repeats –
echoes – the speaker’s address to Prometheus from the beginning of the poem (“Titan”; l.1;
l.15) Paradoxically, the dactylic word “echoless” also produces an echo-effect through its
stressed-unstressed-unstressed foot. Moreover, the frequent insertion of the personal “you” to
address Prometheus creates an atmosphere of intimacy, which the gods, who are only
referred to with distancing third–person pronouns, cannot penetrate. This personal tone,
combined with the echo-effect, indicates that “in [Byron’s] ‘Prometheus’ … identification is
explicitly urged” (Dennis 158)6. This suggests that if humanity appropriates Prometheus’
legacy, it will be able to be “Triumphant where it dares defy” (Byron l.58).
This Promethean triumph over the oppressor can be summarized by Jung’s
observation that “knowledge can … make people look again at the things they have taken for
granted, and question them” (qtd. in Fordham 118). The legacy of Prometheus’ hubris poses
a clear ‘danger’ to the gods: the god-like Frankenstein acknowledges “how dangerous … the
acquirement of knowledge [is]” (Shelley 42). Through Prometheus’ hubris, humanity
acquires the knowledge of language and speech, and is thus able to assert a fixed identity,
and successfully dismiss hierarchical structures. This is why the strengthening of “Man with
his own mind” lies at the core of all three texts examined in this paper (Byron l.38). The way
the hubris synthesizes its own transgressive force with the tyrant’s arbitrary power to create
independence parallels the synthesis of the childhood self and the adult self to create a fixed
identity. In the texts examined here, it seems that Prometheus is the catalyst for both.
6
It is even possible to consider the “Drang” [urge] of the Sturm und Drang as equivalent to such an ‘urge’ for
identity and individual freedom.
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