The Deliberative Rhetoric of The Federalist
T
hat so many academic scholars regularly change their views to conform to the latest intellectual fashion gives one hope that, if one
waits long enough, they will eventually hit upon a sensible idea. When I
was a graduate student in political science at the University of Chicago in
the early 1970s, one of my fellow students wrote a dissertation on " Deliberation in Congress. His claim that deliberation about the public
good was one of the primary functions of Congress provoked some of his
faculty advisors, particularly those who were specialists in legislative
studies. He finally convinced them that this position was somewhat defensible; and one professor, who had been an early skeptic, began to
praise him for discovering a new "model" for legislative studies based on
the startling premise that legislators sometimes deliberate about the
merits of public policy. It is unfortunate that his dissertation was not
published, because now some leading political scientists maintain that
American politics cannot be understood unless one recognizes the importance of political deliberation about public ideas. One can see this
new school of thought emerging in Steven Kelman ' s Making Public Policy and in The Power of Public Ideas, a collection of essays edited by
Robert Reich. (Most of these authors are affiliated with the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, where they have captured the
attention of Michael Dukakis, as indicated by his endorsement of their
books.) A few years ago, a similar point of view was set forth in William
Muir ' s Legislature: California 's School for Politics and Arthur Maass ' s
Congress and the Common Good. l This new idea about the primacy of
deliberation in politics turns out, as some of its current proponents recognize, to be an old idea (at least as old as Aristotle ' s writings) that has for
many years been denigrated by most political scientists.
This revival of academic interest in political deliberation manifests
the same shift in thinking discernible in the new attention given to
rhetorical argumentation. 2 Contrary to the Cartesian presumption that
1. Steven Kelman, Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government
(New York: Basic Books, 1987); Robert B. Reich, ed., The Power of Public Ideas (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988); William K. Muir, Legislature: California 's
School for Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Arthur Maass, Congress
and the Common Good (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
2. See, for example, Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities (Boston: D.
Re del, 1979); Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1982); Charles W. Anderson, "The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis."
American Political Science Review 73 (September 1979): 711-23; David C. Paris and
James F. Reynolds, The Logic of Policy Inquiry (New York: Longman, 1983);
Giandomenico Majone, " Policy Analysis and Public Deliberation, " in Power of Public
Ideas, 157-78; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides's Melian
Dialogue," American Political Science Review 82 (September 1988): 805-20.
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THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
any reasoning falling short of absolute certainty and rigorous demonstration must be dismissed as irrational, many scholars now look to the tradition of rhetorical studies for a grasp of persuasive argumentation, which
provides reasonable warrants for belief about subjects that are not amenable to indisputable reasoning. Some of the current students of rhetorical theory even go so far as to argue (rhetorically?) that all knowledge (including philosophy, science, and the arts) is rhetorical. 3
Deliberation and rhetoric require reasoning about indeterminate
subjects, which permit us to weigh pertinent evidence and arguments to
reach reasonable decisions, but which do not permit us to arrive at incontestable conclusions. Traditionally, beginning with Aristotle' s
Rhetoric, the primary form of political reasoning was understood to be
deliberative rhetoric-the art of discovering and employing the best
available means of persuasion to argue the expediency or inexpediency
of political proposals in serving the common good. Giandomenico
Majone, in his contribution to The Power of Public Ideas, appeals to this
Aristotelian tradition of rhetorical theory when he advises policy
analysts "to revert to the Greek notion of rationality: an action is rational
if it can be explained and defended by arguments acceptable to a reasonable audience. "4
Deliberative rhetoric presupposes a normative principle that most
political scientists would disparage-the idea of the public interest. Private interests are empirically observable, the reasoning goes, but the
public interest is not observable except as a symbolic fiction to
rationalize the use of public power for private ends. 5 For the Marxist this
is the starting point in a radical critique of American politics. For some
social scientists this must be accepted as an ugly but unavoidable reality.
But for many others this is the ground for the success of the American
political process.
The laudable aim of a democratic state like the United States, some
would insist, is to secure the freedom of people to pursue their arbitrary
preferences. Political life should be organized, therefore, to aggregate
and reconcile these individual preferences. According to pluralist
theory, this is done best when government functions as a neutral
mediator between competing groups. According to other theories influenced by neoclassical economics, government should allow the maximi3. See Brian Vickers, "The Atrophy of Modern Rhetoric, Vico to De Man, " Rhetorica 6
(Winter 1988): 21-56. Vickers criticizes the " general attitude to rhetoric in modern times,
which first reduces its scope, and then applies it to purposes that it never dreamt of' (35).
4. Majone, " Policy Analysis, " 177-78.
5. See, for example, the writings of Murray Edelman, particularly The Symbolic Uses of
Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). For a critical analysis, see Larry Amhart, "Murray Edelman, Political Symbolism, and the Incoherence of Political Science, "
Political Science Reviewer 15 (Fall 1985): 185-214.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
51
zation of utility by approximating whatever
would occur through
s
economic competition in free markets. According to the first view,
political decisions are legitimate if they emerge from a process of bargaining and compromising between all the private interests affected by
the decisions. According to the second view, political decisions are
legitimate if they conform to some rational analysis of costs and benefits
as measured hypothetically by what people would be willing to pay to
satisfy their preferences. In either case, it is assumed that those who
enter the political process already know what they desire, and their desires will not be influenced by the process itself. There should be no arguments about changing people ' s preferences, which are not open to rational argument in any case. The only issue for dispute is at least in principle a purely technical problem of how to accommodate the conflicting
private interests of individuals and groups. Consequently, from neither
point of view is there any need for, or possibility of, public deliberation
through political argument about the public interest.
In arguing against this account of American politics as founded wholly
on selfish interests and instrumental rationality, the new theorists of
public deliberation and political rhetoric could strengthen their position
by rooting it in American political thought. For that purpose, The
Federalist should be essential, not only because, as a masterpiece of
American deliberative rhetoric, it teaches by example, but also because,
as a commentary on the Constitution, it shows how the constitutional
framework can channel political controversy through rhetorical debate
as a deliberative process.
The problem, however, is that some of the scholars who want to
renew our appreciation of American politics as deliberative and rhetorical scorn The Federalist, believing that it proposed a scheme of government that would not depend on rhetorical deliberation about the public
good, because public decisions would emerge automatically from the
clashing of factional interests without any need for political debate about
social justice or the common good. Gary Orren, in his contribution to
The Power of Public Ideas, identifies The Federalist as an early statement of pluralism. And Kelman attacks the " Madisonianism " of The
of both pluralist and " public choice" theories
Federalist as a forerunner
7
of government. In his mistaken reading of The Federalist, and of American constitutionalism in general, Kelman follows the pattern of. many
6. A classic statement of pluralist theory would be David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971). For a recent statement of the economic view, see
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981).
"
7. Gary R. Orren, " Beyond Self-Interest, in Reich, Power of Public Ideas, 20-22; Kelman, Making Public Policy, 213-47.
52
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contemporary political commentators-from democratic socialists (like
Michael Walzer) to Tory conservatives (like George Will), from neoliberals (like Charles Peters) to neoconservatives (like Irving Kristol)-who
agree that the constitutional framers relied too much on individual selfinterest and thus failed to cultivate public-spiritedness. 8 Kelman sees
correctly that public-spiritedness does enter American public policymaking through deliberative rhetoric, but he fails to see how that deliberative rhetoric depends on the constitutional framework set forth in
The Federalist.
To support this reading of The Federalist, I will begin by applying
Aristotle's rhetorical theory to analyze the deliberative rhetoric employed in The Federalist. I will then show how the constitutionalism of
The Federalist is intended to promote deliberative rhetoric in the new
government, and I will argue that American political life today manifests
the partial success of this project. Finally, I will comment on Ronald
Reagan ' s " rhetorical presidency" as an indication of how departing from
the constitutional plan of The Federalist hinders public deliberation.
Publius as a Deliberative Rhetorician
I have no evidence that Aristotle' s Rhetoric influenced the authors of
The Federalist. But since Aristotle ' s book is still the most comprehensive, systematic, and subtle treatise on rhetoric, it can illuminate Pub'
lius ' s rhetoric. To simplify matters, I will employ some of Aristotle s
terms of analysis, but without defending my reading of the Rhetoric and
without giving extensive textual citations. 9 And although there are some
important differences in the rhetorical styles of the three authors, I will
speak only of "Publius 's rhetoric, " which respects the wish of Hamilton,
Jay, and Madison to fuse themselves into the pseudonymous unity of
that rhetorical persona. To the objection that Publius would not want to
be known as a rhetorician, as indicated by his disparaging use of the term
"
rhetoric " as suggesting sophistical artifice and deception (29:185;
'
41:255; 58:360), 1 ° I would say what Cicero said about Socrates in Plato s
"
8. See Michael Walzer, " Politics in the Welfare State, in Irving Howe, ed., Essential
Works of Socialism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), 809-34; George
"
Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Charles Peters, A Neo"
'
"
liberal s Manifesto, Washington Monthly, May 1983, 8-18; and Irving Kristol, When"
Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness-Some Reflections on Capitalism and the Free Society,
in On the Democratic Idea in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 90-106.
9. See Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the Rhetoric
(DeKalb; Northern Illinois University Press, 1981). My account of the Rhetoric has been
drawn from this book.
10. All of my parenthetical references to The Federalist will be by number of the paper
and page number in the edition of Clinton Rossiter-The Federalist Papers (New York:
New American Library, 1961).
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
53
Gorgias: his skill in attacking the rhetoricians proved that he was a more
clever rhetorician than they.
In the Gorgias Socrates criticizes rhetoric in terms that are still heard
today. Rhetorical success, he claims, depends more on a pleasing style
than on substantive argument. In debates with those who are experts in
the subjects being considered, the rhetorician can win an audience to his
side despite his ignorance of the subject. The rational arguments of the
experts are too dry and complex to hold the attention of popular audiences. Speakers who are wise and virtuous often cannot please, and thus
cannot move, an audience. But a rhetorician can move his listeners by
playing upon their passions. He also flatters his listeners by telling them
what they think they want to hear, not what is truly good for them. And
insofar as he engages in argument, the rhetorician is not constrained by
logic and evidence, because he can trick his audience so that the weaker
argument appears to be the stronger. Consequently, Socrates suggests,
all rhetoric (or at least all popular rhetoric) is sophistical.
In contrast to the Gorgias, Aristotle ' s Rhetoric distinguishes
rhetoric and sophistry, and argues that rhetoric is a rational art that,
when properly employed, can promote truth and justice in political deliberation. The Socratic criticisms continue to influence the common
prejudice against " mere rhetoric" in politics, a prejudice that is strong
among the academic students of American politics. But if we are persuaded by Aristotle ' s defense of rhetoric as a genuine form of reasoning
appropriate to political deliberation, and if we can see how The
Federalist employs and promotes such rhetoric in American politics, we
can begin to appreciate the role of rhetoric in fostering the rule of reason
in public affairs.
Deliberative Rhetoric and Republican Principles
To identify Publius as a deliberative rhetorician, in Aristotle ' s terms,
is to recognize that he engages in one of the three forms of rhetoric corresponding to three rhetorical situations. The deliberative rhetorician
seeks to persuade his audience that some course of action for the future
will be either advantageous or disadvantageous. The epideictic rhetorician praises or blames the present deeds of men. The forensic rhetorician argues for the guilt or innocence of men in their past deeds.
From the first sentence of The Federalist, Publius addresses an audience engaged in deliberation. " After an unequivocal experience of the
inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to
See Bower Aly, The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton (New York: Russell and Russell,
1965). Aly studies Hamilton 's speeches at the New York State Ratifying Convention, and
he concludes that they satisfy the highest standards of Aristotle ' s rhetorical theory.
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deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America "
(1:33). Publius presents his series of newspaper articles as one long deliberative address. The first number serves as a prologue, the last as an
epilogue. He explains transitions from one part to another so that the
reader is reminded of the unity of the series as a coherent whole with one
deliberative end. He speaks of himself as one who has already decided'in
favor of the Constitution. He identifies his intended audience as those
who are neither predetermined supporters nor predetermined opponents of the plan, those who are undecided but can deliberate as " candid
men" capable of weighing the arguments fairly (1:25-37; 5:53; 37:225;
38:234; 41:255-56).
The deliberative speaker, Aristotle explains, must have a detailed
knowledge of the subjects most important for political deliberation: revenue, war and peace, the defense of the country, imports and exports,
and legislation. Except for the last subject, each pertains to the material
conditions of political life, specifically economic welfare and military
strength. But the "greatest and most ruling" means of persuasion for the
deliberative rhetorician is a knowledge of how the laws express the character of each regime. (Aristotle 's term "legislation " could be interpreted
as denoting what Americans would call "constitutional law.") Although
material conditions are obviously important, the ruling concerns are to
preserve the form of the regime so that it is neither relaxed nor strained
to excess and to maintain a harmony between the character of the regime
and the character of the people. The standard of judgment for deliberative rhetoric is "expediency, " but what is " expedient " varies according to
the nature of the regime. So, of the five subjects most important for deliberative rhetoric, those pertaining to the economic and military resources of a regime are essential; and yet the subject of legislation is in
some sense most critical. Legislation, which reflects and preserves the
character of the regime, regulates the lives of all those who live under its
authority.
The subjects that Aristotle thinks appropriate for deliberative
rhetoric are prominent in The Federalist. Publius argues for the adoption of the Constitution as necessary for increasing the military and
economic power of the nation. His more fundamental concern, however, is to prove that the regime to be established by the Constitution
conforms to the character of the American people. Since "the genius of
the people of America " requires a republican form of government, Publius must show that the Constitution is consistent with " the true principles of republican government " (1:26; 39:240-41).
Although the best deliberative rhetorician strives to rectify the intrinsic defects of the form of government under which he lives, he must justify his proposed reforms as being harmonious with the principles of his
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
55
regime. Publius favors the Constitution as a cure for the deficiencies of
republican government, but it will be rejected by the American people
unless he can defend it as "a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government" (10:84). The diseases that afflict republican government have a common source. " An over-scrupulous
jealousy of danger to the rights of the people " leads republicans to forget
"
that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty "
(1:35). Because the overriding aim of republicanism is to secure the liberty of the people, a republican government tends to be a weak government; but a weak government, Publius believes, is necessarily a bad
government. The rhetorical problem for Publius, therefore, is to justify
the powerful government established by the Constitution as serving republican liberty as well as the public good.
Because deliberative rhetoric must draw its fundamental premises
from the principles of the existing regime, Publius must begin with the
republican principles that define the political consciousness of the
American people; and he must prove that the adoption of the Constitution would be in accord with those principles. This feature of deliberative rhetoric manifests a general characteristic of all rhetoric: rhetorical
reasoning always begins with the opinions commonly accepted by the
audience. This leads us to wonder whether rhetorical argumentation can
be truly rational if it must always consist of reasoning from common
opinions.
Rhetoric and Common Opinions
According to Aristotle, enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms) differ
from demonstrative syllogisms in that the first premises of the latter are
drawn from the fundamental principles of the particular sciences, while
the premises of the former are drawn from the opinions of the audience.
Since the premises of the enthymeme are derived from common opinions, and since opinion surely differs from the truth, it might seem that
the enthymeme is a false form of reasoning, and therefore all rhetoric is
sophistical. But in fact Aristotle regards the common opinions that enter
the enthymeme as being for the most part neither completely true nor
completely false but at least partially true. Although this dependence on
opinions does impose certain limits on enthymematic reasoning, this
does not prevent the enthymeme from being a valid form of reasoning.
The reputable opinions on any particular subject are usually confused
and even apparently contradictory, but in most cases they manifest at
least a partial grasp of the truth, and therefore any serious inquiry into
moral or political subjects must start from them.
Rhetoric's dependence on common opinions distinguishes it both
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from science and from sophistry. Each science begins not with common
opinions, but with the primary truths that are fundamental to the science. Sophistry, on the other hand, consists either of arguing from what
appear to be common opinions but are not, or of making something appear to follow necessarily from common opinions when it does not. That
sophistical arguments cannot be truly derived from common opinions
confirms the solidity of those opinions.
Publius agrees with Aristotle that common opinions usually contain
some truth, as is evident in his reliance on the political opinions com"
monly accepted by the American people. Publius thinks that the
people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests" (3:41-42). (Of course one
should notice how carefully qualified this statement is.) It is important,
then, for Publius to present the Constitution as fulfilling the principles
that underlie the common political opinions (2:37-41; 6:59; 26:168-69).
Sometimes, however, the commonly accepted political maxims seem
to support the opponents of the Constitution. In these cases, Publius ex"
"
plains that even though proverbial sayings may be founded in reason,
"
they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend " (53:330). This is illustrated in the following four principles, each of
which Publius challenges: there ought to be an absolute prohibition of
standing armies in times of peace; the three departments of government
ought to be totally distinct; annual elections are essential to liberty; and
power is always safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single
man. The first principle is true with regard to the military powers of a
hereditary monarch, but not with regard to the legislative representatives of the people. The second arises from a misinterpretation of Mon
tesquieu, who actually understood the separation of powers to be consistent with a partial mixture of the three powers. Annual elections would
be a necessary restraint upon the British Parliament since it is unconfined by a written constitution, but it does not apply to American legislatures since they are prohibited from altering the Constitution. And finally, the assumption that it is safer to give power to a group of people
than to a single person does not hold for the exercise of the executive
power, which requires unity both for the efficient exercise of the power
and for enforcing a sense of responsibility to the people. The problem in
each case is not that the opinion is completely false, but that it has been
misapplied (26:168-70; 47:301-3; 52:329-30; 53:330-32; 70:429-30;
84:512-14). Common political opinions manifest a common-sense grasp
of political reality that citizens have from their direct experience. The
defects of these opinions usually arise from the limitations of the past experience on which they are founded. The mistakes of popular judgment
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF
THE FEDERALIST
57
commonly result from the human tendency to make unqualified
generalizations on the basis of limited experience, so that what is true in
some cases is falsely assumed to be true in ' all. This allows Publius to explain those popular opinions that run contrary to the Constitution.
People accustomed to protecting popular rights against infringements
by monarchic government do not easily adjust to the demands of republican government. They may wish to apply the sort of limits on governmental power that are appropriate for a monarchic but inappropriate
for a republican regime.
Although Publius concedes that the people are sometimes mistaken
in their political judgments, he believes public men can persuade them
to correct their errors if there is time for reconsidering the issues in
question. Sophistical politicians can deceive the people by appealing to
their passions and prejudices in ways that betray the public interest. But
if there are statesmen willing to resist " the temporary delusion " of the
people, this will give the people "time and opportunity for more cool and
sedate reflection. " What is required is "to suspend the blow meditated
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind. " Though political opinions
lend themselves to sophistical deception, they rest upon a commonsense awareness that is unlikely to be completely fooled for long (63:38485; 71:432-33; 78:469-70). As Publius says, "A bad cause seldom fails to
betray itself ' (41:260). Or as Aristotle says, "generally speaking, the
things that are true and better are naturally always easier to prove and
more persuasive. "11
Even if one were to conclude that common opinions can be a reliable
source of premises for rhetorical reasoning, one might still question the
logical rigor of the arguments constructed from such premises. One
might doubt the validity of the formal, logical structure of rhetorical argumentation. One must wonder about what canons of logical inference
govern rhetorical persuasion.
Rhetorical Logic
Aristotle explains the logic of rhetoric as consisting of two modes of inference comparable to deduction and induction in dialectic. Rhetorical
deduction is reasoning through enthymemes, and rhetorical induction is
reasoning through examples. Aristotle considers the enthymeme a true
syllogism, and hence it is not, as has been often assumed, an incomplete
syllogism. He distinguishes between "apparent " and "true " enthymemes and declares that apparent enthymemes "are not en11. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1355a37-38.
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"12
thymemes since they are not syllogisms.
Since the premises and therefore the conclusion of the enthymeme
are founded on common opinions and are usually probable rather than
absolutely certain, the enthymeme differs from the scientific syllogism.
And since the enthymeme must be simple enough to be understood by
the ordinary person, it differs from the dialectical syllogism. But neither
of these points entails that the enthymeme be an invalid or incomplete
syllogism. Enthymematic reasoning is popular because by providing listeners with " quick learning, " it satisfies their natural desire for learning.
For this reason, the enthymeme should be neither too superficial and
obvious nor too long and complex. One of the ways to make the syllogism
an instrument of "quick learning" is to abbreviate it by leaving unstated
whatever the listeners can be expected to add on their own. It should be
simple enough to be quickly grasped, but at the same time it should give
the listeners the pleasure of learning something new: it should be instructive without being esoteric.
The truth of enthymematic reasoning, like the common opinions on
which it is founded, is usually probable but not certain. Yet this does not
make the reasoning invalid. Both the things that happen always or by
necessity and those that happen as a rule or for the most part can be objects of knowledge. Probability must be distinguished from chance, because unlike probable things those things that happen only rarely or by
chance cannot be known. That rhetoric should depend on probabilities
conforms to the Aristotelian principle that one should demand only that
degree of certitude appropriate to the subject matter. The subject of
rhetoric is human action, and the regularities of human action can be
known with probability but not with certainty.
Enthymematic. argumentation can attain a high degree of certitude,
however, when it consists of reasoning from definitions in a rigorously
deductive manner. Aristotle provides examples of this type of reasoning
in his surveys of the specific topics of rhetoric. The chapters in Book One
of the Rhetoric organized around definitions display a similar pattern.
He begins with a definition or a set of definitions. If he gives a series of
definitions, he arranges them in the order of the their relative comprehensiveness from the more to the less comprehensive. He then lists
particular items in a manner that shows them to follow deductively from
the previous definition or set of definitions. The primacy of deductive argumentation for rhetorical logic is indicated by Aristotle ' s claim that
reasoning by examples should be considered subordinate to enthymematic reasoning. Enthymemes are more forceful than examples,
and examples should be understood as sources for, or as arising from, enthymematic inference.
12. Ibid., 1397a3.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF
THE FEDERALIST
59
Reasoning from examples is especially important, however, in deliberative rhetoric. " Examples are most suitable for deliberative speakers, for in divining things that will happen we judge from things that
have happened. "13 A rhetorician cannot be persuasive unless his arguments show a good factual knowledge of the subject under discussion.
The deliberative rhetorician must base his reasoning on the facts of political history; he must be able to infer from the natural course of human
events what things are possible and what are not, what things are likely
to happen in the future and what are not. Moreover, all reasoning, according to Aristotle, depends ultimately on induction, because the first
premises of deductive reasoning arise as generalizations from sense-experience, and reasoning from common opinions is reasoning from the
common experience of human beings.
Aristotle ' s explanation of rhetorical logic as combining deductive
reasoning through enthymemes and inductive reasoning through examples holds true for The Federalist. Publius draws his arguments either
from "reason " or from " experience. " Arguing from "reason " requires reflecting on the internal logic of the thing in question; arguing from " experience" requires surveying the relevant historical facts. With respect
to some questions, theoretical reasoning is too abstract to be a reliable
guide; and the lessons of experience are more dependable. But in other
cases, past experience is insufficient; and the dictates of pure reason are
decisive. Publius strives, however, to combine the two modes of inference as much as possible, since the most persuasive arguments are those
that show experience confirming the conclusions deduced from theory.
Hence it is common in The Federalist for an appeal to "reason " to be followed immediately by an appeal to "facts, " so that Publius can claim,
"
examples 14support the reasoning we have employed " (57:354-55;
63:387-88).
Publius ' s reliance on deductive inferences is particularly clear in
Federalist 31. Beginning with principles said to be as self-evident as the
axioms of Euclidean geometry, he argues by enthymematic deductions
that there should be a national government at least as powerful as that
established by the Constitution. That the powers of government must
be as wide as the ends they are meant to serve is self-evident. And since
the great ends of national government (particularly national defense) are
unlimited, the powers to pursue those ends must also be unlimited. The
American people must give the new government as much power as is
necessary for achieving the objects entrusted to it. If they were to grant
the ends without granting the means, they would be guilty of self-contradiction. Thus does Publius state one of the central arguments of his
13. Ibid., 1368a29-31.
14. See also Federalist 37:229-31; 43:276-77; 48:308; 66:403; 70:425; 76:458; 81:482-83.
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work as having the certainty of a geometric demonstration: " this is one of
those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own
evidence along with it " (23:153). 15 Sometimes Publius presents this argument as a deduction from a definition. It is implied in " the idea of government, " he claims, that government should have "a general discretionary superintendence, " because this distinguishes a government
from a league or alliance of states (15:108-9; 33:203 4; 80:476).
This same striving for the rigor of deductive demonstration is evident
in Publius's insistence that the proposed government should be judged
by reasoning from the internal structure of its powers as prescribed by
the Constitution (23:156-57; 31:196). Because human affairs are always
in flux, the future course of events cannot be known with certainty. But
the effects of a governmental structure can be known with great accuracy, at least to the extent that one can deduce with almost mathematical
certitude the consequences of the formal arrangement of offices and
powers. 16 For example, in answering the charge that the national government will prevent the states from passing amendments to the Constitution, Publius cites the provision of Article 5 that allows threefourths of the states to ratify amendments; and he describes this as "one
of those rare instances in which a political truth
17 can be brought to the
test of mathematical demonstration " (85:526).
In most cases, Publius must rely at some point on probable reasoning
grounded on experience. This is so even in Federalist 31. Although the
paper begins with the claim of self-evidence for unlimited powers as
commensurate to unlimited ends, the final aim of the paper is to argue
that the taxing power of the national government should extend beyond
requisitions upon the states, and this demands an appeal to the lessons of
experience. Publius summarizes his reasoning in four points; and while
the first three could reasonably be regarded as self-evident, the fourth
requires factual support. The fourth point is: " As theory and practice
conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing
when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the federal
government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of
taxation in the ordinary modes" (31:195). Morton White, commenting
on this passage, accuses Hamilton
of presenting this last point as self-evi18
But
White
fails to give enough attention to
dent, when in fact it is not.
15. See also Federalist 23:155; 30:190-91; 33:202; 34:210-11; 36:223; 38:238-39; 40:24849; 41:255-56; 44:283-84; 62:380; 80:476.
"
16. Compare David Hume, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in Essays:
Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics,
1985), 16, 24.
17. See also Federalist 77:460; 80:476; 81:483; 83:496-99; 84;513-15.
18. Morton White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 84.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
61
the phrasing of the fourth point- " As theory and practice conspire to
prove. " The final conclusion rests upon reasoning from "practice " as well
as from " theory. " The need for revenue sufficient for attaining the objects of the national government may be self-evident, but whether or not
this need can be met by requisitions upon the states is a practical question to be decided by experience. In the papers prior to Federalist 31, it
has been argued that the political history of America under the Articles
of Confederation evinces the failure of relying upon the states to provide
revenue for the national government: this " experiment" demonstrated
the need to " discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as
equally impracticable and unjust " (23:153-54; 30:188-92). 19 Here as elsewhere in The Federalist Publius supports the conclusions of theoretical
deduction with the facts of historical experience.
"
Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred" (20:138). 20 The lessons of experience are of two types: some come from the experience of
the past, others from the continuing experience of human beings in
novel situations. So one form of reasoning from experience is to study
history in order to understand the present by comparing it with the past.
This mode of inference is clear in Publius ' s frequent appeals to history. 21
Another type of reasoning from experience is to draw inferences from
the ongoing course of human affairs. Where past experience is insufficient for explaining novel circumstances, one must learn from "experiment" and "actual trial. " Publius relies frequently on " experimental instruction. "22 Unlike deduction from self-evident principles, reasoning
from experience does not provide absolute certainty; but it does attain
whatever certitude is possible from a "rational calculation of probabilities " (60:367). Despite the inherent mutability of political life, "the
natural and
experienced course of human affairs " is intelligible
23
(25:166).
Thus the rhetorical logic of The Federalist combines deductive
reasoning from first principles and inductive reasoning from experience,
which corresponds (in Aristotle's rhetorical logic) to enthymematic deduction from accepted principles and reasoning by examples. But some
scholars would argue that the logic of The Federalist is more Lockean
19. See ibid., 91-94.
20. See also Federalist 2:40; 6:54-57; 23:157; 25:164; 72:438.
21. See ibid.; 1:35; 4:49; 5:50-52; 8:67; 9:71-72; 18:124-28; 19:130; 20:137; 30:190; 34:208;
37:231; 38:231-32; 43:275; 45:289-90; 52:327; 58:359; 62:379; 63:384-85; 66:403; 70:425;
75:451-53.
22. See ibid.; 2:39; 16:117; 18:123, 126; 19:128, 131; 20:137; 22:144; 23:154; 24:159;
28:178; 29:185; 34:208; 35:213; 36:220; 37:231; 38:233-34, 237; 39:240; 40:252; 43:275;
46:300; 49:315; 50:318, 320; 57:356; 60:371; 61:375; 79:472.
23. See also ibid.; 6:54; 8:68; 34:207; 79:472.
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and Humean than Aristotelian. The influence of the modern theories of
logic associated with Locke and Hume is clear. The Federalist concludes
with a quotation from Hume, who distinguishes political reasoning
based on " reason and reflection" and that based on " experience, "
"
trials, " and "experiments " (85:526-27).
Here Hume may be simply a
24
conduit for the work of Locke.
But what is there here that cannot be explained according to Aristotle 's rhetorical theory? Wilbur Samuel Howell has maintained that modern rhetoric, under the influence of modern science, gives more importance to inductive reasoning than is the case for traditional rhetoric,
which is more concerned with deduction from authoritative opinions. 25
To speak of inferences from " experience " through " trials and experiments " does suggest the influence of Baconian science. (Just as to speak
about deductions from the internal structure of powers in the constitutional system suggests the influence of Newtonian science?) And yet, as
we have already seen, Aristotle's Rhetoric does stress the importance of
empirical knowledge as the source of arguments, particularly for the deliberative rhetorician. Howell acknowledges this, and he concedes that
the depreciation of factual reasoning in traditional rhetoric
may show the
26
distortions of Aristotle's teaching by later interpreters.
Another characteristic attitude of modern logicians and rhetoricians
is the suspicion of traditional rhetoric as relying too much on irrational
appeals to the audience. 27 Aristotle does not limit rhetorical persuasion
to logical argument through enthymemes and examples; he also considers how a rhetorician can persuade an audience by presenting himself as
having a certain type of character, by controlling the emotions of the audience, or by speaking in a pleasing style as in the use of metaphors.
Such techniques are denounced by many modern thinkers as impediments to rational discussion. A glance at The Federalist might lead one
to think Publius also scorns such methods. He asks in the first paper that
his work be judged not by his personal motives, which "must remain in
the depository of my own breast, " but by his arguments, which " will be
open to all, and may be judged of by all " (1:36). He also warns against
those passions that deprive men of that candor necessary for properly
24. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding I. i.6-10, 18; IV. ii.1, 913; iii.18-20, 28-31; vi.16; xii.9-10; xv-xvi; xvii.14-17.
25. Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 259-63; 441-47, 695-717; idem, " Renaissance
"
Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric: A Study in Change, in Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975), 141-62.
"
"
26. See Howell, British Logic, 70-71, 381, 446; idem, Renaissance Rhetoric, 155, 157.
Understanding
III.
x.34;
and Im 27. See, for example, Locke, Essay Concerning Human
manuel Kant, Critique ofJudgment, sec. 51.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
63
28
judging his arguments. And he does not seem to rely much on
metaphorical ornamentation. But I would argue that Aristotle ' s account
of the rhetorical techniques just mentioned shows that they can contribute to rational argumentation. And I would argue as well that these elements of rhetoric are present in The Federalist.
The Character of the Speaker
A speaker' s character will be most persuasive, Aristotle believes, if he
shows himself to possess prudence, virtue, and goodwill. Audiences regard speakers without these three traits as untrustworthy. Without prudence (or practical wisdom) a speaker is unlikely to have sound opinions.
But even if his opinions are correct, he cannot be trusted to deliver his
views sincerely if he lacks virtue. And even if he is both prudent and virtuous, he might still mislead his listeners if he is not well-disposed towards them. Consequently, a speaker wins the trust of his audience by
showing that he is a good man, that he knows what he is talking about,
and that he wishes to do what is best for his listeners.
These three qualities correspond to the qualifications for good political rule. Aristotle lists in the Politics the following three traits as requisite for those in high offices: "first, friendship for the established regime;
next, a great capacity for the functions of rule; thirdly, virtue and justice-in each regime that with reference to the regime." 29 Similarly,
Publius describes the framers of the Constitution as " highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom; " and he hopes the legislators in the new government will possess " wisdom ... patriotism and
love of justice" (2:39; 10:82).
The persuasiveness of a speaker ' s character cannot be dismissed as irrational. For is it not quite rational to judge a rhetorician ' s reliability as
proportional to his prudence, his virtue, and his goodwill? Moreover,
that audiences make such demands upon speakers is surely a serious
constraint upon sophistical speakers. This explains why sophistical
teachers of rhetoric, according to Aristotle's report, try to deny the persuasiveness of the speaker ' s character.
Publius presents himself in The Federalist as one who possesses the
sort of character described by Aristotle as most persuasive. He warns in
the first paper that both supporters and opponents of the Constitution
will display "angry and malignant passions" that will distort their understanding of one another. Thus, the deliberations will be hindered by
base passions springing from self-interest and ambition. Even those of
28. See Federalist 1:33-36; 3:44-45; 10:78-79; 7.111-12; 24:158-60; 31:193-94; 37:225-26,
231; 83:508-9; 85:522.
29. Aristotle, Politics 1309a33-38.
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THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
"
upright intentions " will be found on the wrong side of the issue due to
honest errors of judgment. And those on the right side may be moved by
mean passions. Publius believes this should furnish a "lesson of moderation. " He concludes this first paper by addressing his readers as "my fellow-citizens " and "my countrymen" and warning them that a decision so
important to their interests should be made through cool, rational deliberation. In one of the later papers, Publius addresses his arguments
neither to the "predetermined patron " nor to the " predetermined adversary, " but to those "who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of
their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it" (37:224-25). In the last paper, he concludes by insisting that
he has appealed to the judgments of the readers without resorting to indignant denunciations of his opponents. He admits, however, that like
any decent man of sensibility he has had to struggle against a justified
disgust with the deceptive maneuvers of some of his opponents. Thus
does Publius portray himself as a rhetorician concerned with the welfare
of his country who has both the virtue and the prudence required to advise his countrymen properly in promoting their common interests. 30
By trying to persuade his readers with rigorous argumentation supporting measures for the public good, Publius also tries to persuade them by
exhibiting the character of a rational, patriotic, and fair-minded man.
Even if the persuasiveness of a speaker ' s character is rationally defensible, what should one say about appeals to the passions of the audience?
How can that be justified as contributing to rhetorical argument? Since
Publius warns against the distortion of reason by passion, does he refuse
to engage in rhetorical persuasion through the passions?
The Passions of the Audience
Aristotle begins the Rhetoric by condemning those sophistical
rhetoricians who rely exclusively on exciting the passions of their listeners and thereby preventing them from making a rational judgment about
the issues at hand. He criticizes them for ignoring the primacy of the enthymeme for rhetorical persuasion. But in Book Two he carefully delineates the passions with which the rhetorician must deal, and thus he
seems to throw into doubt the rationality of rhetorical argument by introducing the same techniques for moving audiences through their passions that he initially condemned. A closer examination will reveal that
Aristotle' s emphasis on the enthymeme is consonant with his treatment
of the passions, because the enthymeme combines reason and passion.
Aristotle condemns the sophistical rhetoricians not because they appeal
30. A similar presentation can be found in Hamilton' s speeches. See Aly, Hamilton, 16566, 189-90.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
65
to the passions of the audience, but because they do this in a defective
manner. Their solicitation of the passions would be acceptable if it were
an integral part of an enthymematic argument pertinent to the subject
under examination. As it is, their exclusive reliance on the passions with
no connection to any form of argument only distracts the listeners with
things irrelevant to the matter at hand. The sophist excites the passions
to divert his listeners from rational deliberation, but the Aristotelian
speaker controls the passions of his listeners by reasoning with them.
Aristotle assumes that the passions are in some sense rational, and
that a rhetorician can talk an audience into or out of a passion by convincing them that the passion is or is not a reasonable response to the circumstances at hand. Since a passion is always about something, since it
always refers to some object, it is reasonable if it represents its object
correctly or unreasonable if it does not. Although men ' s passions are not
always reasonable, they must always believe they are: they have reasons
for their passions, though their reasons are not always good ones. The
passions may often arise from false judgments about reality, but that passions require judgments, whether true or false, suffices to show the rational character of the passions. A rhetorician who understands this can
change the passions of his listeners by changing their minds.
The rationality of the passions distinguishes them from purely physical sensations and appetites. It would be ridiculous to judge an itch or a
pang of hunger as true or false, reasonable or unreasonable; it would be
absurd to argue with someone who felt an itch or a sensation of hunger to
try to convince him that his feelings were unjustified. It would not be
'
ridiculous, however, to judge a person s anger as reasonable or unreasonable, or to try to argue with the person when his anger seems unjustified. A person ' s anger depends upon his belief that anger is a proper
response to something that has occurred, but a person ' s sensations or
physical appetites do not require that he believe this or that.
The passions are rational in that they are founded on judgments of
what the world is like, but they are less than perfectly reasonable to the
extent that they are founded on short-sighted, partial, biased, or hastilyformulated judgments. Yet that the passions often depend on defective
reasoning should not obscure the fact that they do require some sort of
reasoning, and it is this element of reasoning that gives the rhetorician a
lever for controlling the passions.
That enthymemes are often directed to the emotions of the listeners
indicates again the difference between enthymematic and demonstrative reasoning. Emotions are irrelevant to theoretical demonstration;
but since enthymematic argumentation is a practical form of reasoning,
its aim is to move people not just to think, but also to act; and argument
cannot move people to act unless it somehow elicits the motivational
power of emotion.
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Publius seems to scorn emotional appeals that would detract from
cool rationality. He complains, for example, that some of the criticisms
of the Constitution give "the appearance of an intention to mislead the
people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings " (24:160). He does not think,
however, that the passions are simply irrational. He explains that a person ' s opinions and passions "will have a reciprocal influence on each
other" (10:78). By " reciprocal influence " he must mean that not only do
passions affect opinions, but also opinions affect passions: what one
thinks about things will influence one 's emotional response to them.
From this one might infer that it is possible for a passion to be reasonable
insofar as it arises from a correct opinion, which would allow a rhetorician to form the passions of his listeners as a consequence of reasoning
with them.
Does not Publius strive to create through his arguments a reasonable
fear in his readers of the dangerous consequences of rejecting the Constitution? After all, the only alternative to adopting the Constitution is " a
dismemberment of the Union " ; and "the certain evils, and the probable
dangers " of such a dissolution would be fearful indeed-anarchy, war,
and tyranny (9:71-75; 10:77; 15:105-7).
Not only will adoption of the Constitution avert these frightful evils, it
will also make the country worthy of respect in the world; and thus Publius can appeal to pride as well as fear. He stirs up the passion of pride in
his readers when he describes the prospect of America ' s being strong
enough to assert herself against the dominance of Europe. The superiority of Europe, he laments, "has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World; and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her
benefit. " Some Europeans speak seriously of how dogs stop barking after
they breathe the air in America. But Publius exhorts his readers: " It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion
will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the
instruments of European greatness! " (11:90-91).
The crucial point here, to repeat, is that persuasion through the passions is an integral part of persuasion through rational argumentation.
The purpose of deliberative rhetoric is to stir people to act in certain
ways, and a rhetorician does this by giving his audience reasons for
adopting the emotional attitudes favorable to the practical decisions he
seeks.
There remains now the subject of style-and particularly metaphoras another element of rhetoric that often seems contrary to truly rational
persuasion.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
67
Rhetorical Style: Metaphor
Matters of style and composition seem extraneous to the rational content of rhetoric since they seem unnecessary for the substantive argument of issues. Indeed, when Aristotle takes up these matters in Book
Three, he begins by complaining that a concern with such things is only
a concession to corrupt audiences. And yet in his treatment of these features of rhetoric, Aristotle shows their contribution to rational argument. For Aristotle good style is not mere ornamentation, since the
goodness of style is in satisfying the natural desire of listeners for learning through reasoning.
This is true for metaphor, the most important instrument of rhetorical
style, insofar as it provides listeners, in a manner similar to the enthymeme, with " quick learning. " Aristotle believes metaphor is an important, if not essential, tool of thought, although it lacks the certitude
and exactness of precise reasoning. Though metaphorical speech is always obscure, it does convey some knowledge of what it signifies
"
"
"
through "likeness. " As a metaphor reveals a "likeness or resemblance
of one thing to another, it gives us new knowledge. Metaphor is as much
a form of reasoning as the enthymeme, for it is characteristic of all rational inference to discover the likenesses among things and to view one
thing through the mirror of another.
Although the style of The Federalist does not show any great dependence on metaphor, interesting uses of metaphor can be found in the
work. One is the application of mechanical metaphors to the operations
of government. In commenting on the proposal for a court to handle impeachments that would be composed of persons completely separate
from the other departments of government, Publius objects that " it
could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to
add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be
questionable" (65:400). He also describes the arrangement of the states
into a union in terms of "orbits" governed by the laws of celestial
"
"
mechanics (9:73; 15:111; 18:124). Whether or not political mechanics
provides the appropriate metaphor for the fullest account of political life
is open to dispute.3 1 But the point here is that such a use of metaphor can
be judged by rational standards, the question being whether or not the
metaphorical " likeness " enhances or limits one 's insight into the
phenomena.
31. See Colin Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1962), 5-7, 34-53; and Martin Landau, Political Theory and Political Science (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), 84-102. For a useful survey of the extensive
litera"
"
ture on metaphor, see Eugene Miller, Metaphor and Political Knowledge, American
Political Science Review 73 (January 1979): 155-70.
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THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
As a counterpoise to his mechanical metaphor, Publius also uses a
biological or medical metaphor. The entire structure of the argument in
Federalist 10 depends on this metaphor. " The instability, injustice, and
confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the
mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished " (10:77). The claim of Number 10 is that an extended, representative republic offers "a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government " (84). This metaphor recurs throughout
the book (28:178; 38:234-35).
Far from being a matter of verbal decoration, this metaphor conveys a
complex argument in a vivid manner. Publius is a friend of popular governments, but a friend who sees the inclination of such governments to
debilitating and even deadly vices. Like a good doctor he wants to control the patient ' s proclivity to disease but without using cures that are
worse than the disease. Has Publius correctly diagnosed the diseases? Is
his prescription a cure or a poison? His metaphor is a line of reasoning
that invites rational analysis and criticism.
The reliance of rhetorical style upon metaphor can contribute, therefore, to a rational examination of political issues. Through a metaphor we
simplify a complex problem by considering its likeness to something
else. Metaphor is a way of thinking about the world. And it can be a powerful tool for thinking about the political world.
Aristotle ' s account of metaphor sustains the general theme of the
Rhetoric: rhetoric is a genuine form of reasoning to be distinguished
from sophistry, though rhetorical reasoning is often less exact and less
certain than scientific demonstration or philosophic inquiry. Measured
by the modern standards of empirical methodology and formal logic, the
political argumentation of citizens does not usually qualify as genuine
reasoning at all. But such argumentation can be seen to be quite rational
if it is judged according to the standards of rhetoric. Aristotle 's theory of
rhetoric rests on the assumption that one should judge political arguments by their relative cogency or reliability without demanding indisputable certainty or exactitude. Only in this way can we make sense of
the logical practice of citizens, who can judge the relative solidity of
political arguments despite the controversial character of all political
reasoning. The Federalist is an outstanding example of such rhetorical
argumentation, and it shows by its example the success of American deliberative rhetoric as political reasoning about the public good.
Even if one concedes that The Federalist is a superb exercise in political rhetoric, one might still maintain that the deliberative rhetoric of this
book served to advance a new form of republican government that would
not require deliberative rhetoric. Unlike the republics of the past, one
might argue, the republic supported by The Federalist was expected to
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
69
tame the selfish passions and interests of human beings without having
to engage either the rulers or the ruled in public deliberation or noble
rhetoric. Furthermore, it would appear that contemporary American
politics confirms Publius ' s expectations, because it seems that American
political institutions function as means for securing private interests
without anyone having to deliberate about the public good. For some
people this is a reason to praise The Federalist, for others a reason to
condemn it.
I believe both those who praise and those who condemn are wrong,
because they are mistaken both in their reading of The Federalist and in
their assessment of American politics. Publius rightly foresaw, and the
subsequent course of American government confirms, the necessity for
continual deliberation about the public good through a constitutional
process of rhetorical debate.
How the Constitution Promotes Deliberative Rhetoric
General Principles
The constitutional principles of The Federalist-such as the extended sphere, federalism, representation, and the separation of powers-foster rhetorical deliberation about the public interest. They do
this by shaping a political process that cultivates breadth of view in a continuing public discussion of what citizens want for their common life. If
the public interest is understood as breadth of view, then its content can
be left open to discussion, so long as the process of discussion stresses
the general and remote interests of the community rather than the mere
aggregation of the private and immediate interests of individuals and
groups, 32
One example of how this is done is Publius ' s commentary on the legislative process. Requiring that national legislation win the concurrence of
three bodies-the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the executive-with each institutionally disposed to judge the public good from a
distinctive perspective, improves deliberation because it forces a
"
rhetorical controversy between conflicting points of view. The oftener
"
"
the measure is brought under examination, he writes, the greater the
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be
the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or
of those mistakes which proceed from the contagion of some common
passion or interest " (73:443).
Someone elected to participate in legislative debate is not likely to
32. I have drawn this idea from Maass, Congress, 18-19.
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succeed if he merely expresses his selfish preferences. He must persuade the other elected participants, who see the issue from different
points of view, that his proposals will serve the common good, knowing
that the others will seek to detect and expose any unjust or unwise
scheme. Through such a clash of diverse opinions about the common
good, the "deliberate sense of the community " can rule in public affairs
(71:432).
The success of this rhetorical process of deliberative reasoning about
the public interest demands that, although the American people " are yet
remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue, "
they " have wisdom and virtue enough " (6:49; 36:224). The officers of
government must be wise enough to understand and virtuous enough to
promote the public good. And the citizens must be wise enough and virtuous enough to judge the wisdom and virtue of those who rule them.
"
Justice, " understood as protection for individual liberty, "is the end of
government," because it is the purpose for which people originally enter
civil society (51:324). Yet this is only the minimal standard for government. "The public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people,
is the supreme object to be pursued " (45:289). To achieve this, government must be designed "to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society" (57:350).
It is wrong, therefore, to claim, as many commentators have, that
Publius wanted a government that would work without any moral virtue
in the citizens or the rulers.
This supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an
error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude.
The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of
virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. (76:458)
Publius identifies himself as a man " disposed to view human nature as it
is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices " (76:458).
This sensible balance-assuming neither universal rectitude nor universal venality, neither flattering human virtues nor exaggerating
human vices-is lost in the common view of The Federalist as presuming the utter depravity of human beings in their sordid selfishness.
Steven Kelman adheres to this mistaken view of The Federalist, although he quotes one of Madison 's comments (at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention) about the importance of civic virtue: "To suppose that any
form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue
in the people is a chimerical idea. "33 This should have suggested to Kel33. Kelman, Making Public Policy, 222.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
71
man that Madison thought human beings were moved by a complex mixture of selfish and public-spirited motives. In fact, Madison would agree
with Kelman ' s rejection of the assumption that human beings are utterly
selfish, and with his alternative view " that not just personal
self-interest
"34
but also concern for others can motivate behavior.
Kelman has been misled by Robert Dahl 's reading of The Federalist,
according to which the aim for Publius was not to foster governmental
activity for the public good but only to prevent governmental interference in private life. This ignores the often repeated concern in The
Federalist to secure both "the public good and private rights " (10:80).
The problem with factions is that they are adverse not only to " the rights
of other citizens" but also to "the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community " (10:78). David Epstein
is one of the few commentators
35
to see the significance of this point.
Epstein rightly emphasizes that Publius shows a republican devotion
to the public good as well as a liberal devotion to private rights. The goal
is to hinder governmental action that would threaten individual security, while still encouraging governmental action that would promote
the public interest. And when Publius speaks of legislative representation, the public good is at least as important as private rights. It is wrong
to concentrate, as many interpreters have, on Madison's argument for
the extended sphere as the antidote to majority factions contrary to individual rights, because this ignores Madison ' s equally critical argument
for wise representation as the way to "refine and enlarge the public
views " in deliberating about the public good.
Even if one chooses to concentrate on the idea of the extended sphere
with its proliferation of clashing factions, one should recognize how the
constitutional structuring of factional controversy can cultivate political
deliberation through rhetorical debate. Factions must form because
human beings are naturally diverse in their opinions, passions, and interest (10:78). But as Publius explains this, it becomes clear that factional
conflicts in politics are ultimately conflicts of opinion. 36 Purely intellectual disagreements produce some differences of opinion that give rise to
political factions. The diverse passions and interests of people also be34. Ibid., 240.
35. David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of "The Federalist " (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984).
36. As on so many other points, Madison ' s thinking here may reflect the influence of
Hume. In his "Of the First Principles of Government, " Hume argued that all governments
are founded on the opinions of the ruled as to the authority of the rulers. Three opinionsof the public interest, of the right to power, and of the right to property-are the original
principles of government. Self-interest, fear, and affection act only as secondary principles, because they are politically important only in their bearing upon political opinions.
Essays, 32-36.
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come politically relevant by influencing political opinions. Opinions and
passions have a " reciprocal influence" on each other. And the interests of
people influence their " sentiments and views " in ways that create factions.
Even when citizens act from self-serving emotions and appetites,
they give reasons for what they do. They persuade themselves and
others that their actions are good and just. Not even the most Machiavellian person relies simply on brute force; he makes justifying arguments
for what he does, arguments that evince his grasp of moral principles: his
hypocrisy pays tribute to morality.
The political goal, therefore, is to arrange political life in such a manner that people must improve their justifying arguments by confronting
and answering competing arguments, which makes it likely that people
will develop some shared conception of the public good. Unanimity is
not to be expected. When fundamental decisions must be made in a republic, the majority must prevail. But if the majority is forced to take account of opposing views before a decision is made, and if the decision
rendered by the majority is open to future revision in the light of objections offered by opponents, this does not eliminate the possibility that
the majority will sometimes act foolishly or unfairly, but it does make it
less likely that such foolishness or injustice will prevail or prevail for
long.
This kind of reasoning is implicit in Publius ' s claim, contrary to what
is asserted by commentators like Robert Dahl, that the extension of the
sphere does not impede the formation of any majority will, but it does
obstruct the emergence of unjust and unwise majorities. " In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, " he contends, "a coalition
of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on-any other
principles than those of justice and the general good " (51:325).
How does the extended sphere make it likely that the only successful
majority coalitions will be those founded on "principles . . . of justice and
the general good " ? In Federalist 58, Publius offers an instructive example. If the representatives of the small states resist a reasonable increase
in the number of representatives in the House of Representatives, a coalition of a few large states could overrule them, " a coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it
on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely
prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution " (357). He goes on to speak of the political advantage in being conscious that one ' s position is supported " by right, by
reason, and by the Constitution, " while one's opponents are conscious of
opposing these "solemn considerations " (358). In the extended republic
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
73
of the United States, a majority coalition, which would normally be broken up by selfish rivalry, can form around causes supported by equity,
right, reason, and the principles of the Constitution, because such
causes tend to be more persuasive than those founded only on base passions and interests.
Federalism
Publius ' s comments on federalism provide more illustrations of how
the Constitution establishes a process of rhetorical deliberation. When
the national government can act directly on individuals without the interposition of the state legislatures, it becomes less likely, according to
Publius, that any state can unjustly resist execution of the national laws.
If the state governments can obstruct a national law by simply refusing to
enforce it, the injustice of their inaction is easy to disguise. But when the
execution of the national laws does not depend on the intervention of the
state legislatures, the states cannot impede the national government
"
without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power "
(16:117). Such open resistance would require not only a factious majority
in the state legislature, but also the support of the state courts and of the
people of the state. Thus does the Constitution arrange things so that a
factious group usually cannot succeed except by acting openly and with
the concurrence of other groups, which forces the faction to justify its actions in public debate.
State resistance to the national laws
would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree
competent to its own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to
distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. . . . Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity
or rashness, because they could seldom be made without danger to the
authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority.
(16:117)
This illustrates the interaction of self-interest and civic virtue in public
deliberation. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was presumed that
"
a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith,
would be found sufficient pledges " that the states would fulfill their
duties to the national government (23:154). The failure of this " experiment" shows that the laws of the national government must be extended
to the individual citizens. But notice that Publius still depends on "a
people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and
an illegal usurpation of authority, " who will not therefore support state
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resistance to national law, " unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the
federal authority. " Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution structures political power so that factious groups cannot conceal or
disguise their schemes, and therefore they must justify themselves publicly, so that the good sense of the people is elicited from a deliberative
process.
This process will not always work, Publius admits, and in rare cases, it
will not even prevent a civil war. Disobedience of the national laws by a
few individuals or groups can usually be suppressed. But as to those
"
mortal feuds, " in which the whole nation or a large part of its rebels
against the national government, " they do not fall within any ordinary
rules of calculation, " and no constitution could prevent such revolutionary upheavals. A constitution can promote deliberation, assuming that,
generally and in the long run, as Aristotle said, the true and the just tend
to be more persuasive with the people. But where the judgment of some
substantial part of the community has been distorted by some violent
passion, persuasion can fail; and if the question at issue is fundamental to
the regime, the dispute must be settled by force of arms.
In his First Inaugural Address, Abraham Lincoln restated his arguments for preserving the Union, thus appealing to the good judgment of
the American people. " Why should there not be a patient confidence in
the ultimate justice of the people?" He insisted that if the people of the
South took time for long and calm deliberation, truth and justice would
prevail. But when he failed to convince them of the need for delay, and
the Southern states withdrew from the deliberative institutions of the
Constitution to resort to violent resistance, Lincoln was quick to shift
from rhetorical argument to military force. At critical points, good government depends on compulsion where persuasion has failed. But to the
extent that political rule rests on the rule of reason through rhetorical
persuasion, legislative deliberation is supreme.
Congress
Of all the branches of government, the institutional structure of Congress is best adapted for " deliberation and wisdom " (70:424), although
each branch contributes to deliberation its distinctive point of view. This
is clear, for example, in what Publius says about military appropriations
and the danger of military despotism.
Rather than constitutionally forbidding a standing army in time of
peace, which might have to be violated to secure the national defense,
Publius defends the constitutional provision that military appropriations
cannot be made for a term longer than two years.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
75
The legislature of the United States will be obliged by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of
keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the
point; and to declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the
face of their constituents. . . . The provision for the support of a military
force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. (26:171)
The president will find it difficult to establish a military despotism
through his authority as commander-in-chief, because he will have to
persuade Congress at least every two years to supply his military needs.
He might try to conspire with a majority of the legislators, but his legislative opponents could be expected to expose the plot to public view.
Moreover, those in the state legislatures could also be stirred by the national legislative debate to warn the people of any danger. Publius ' s ex"
pectation that "the spirit of party " will "infect all political bodies sustains his plan for public deliberation (26:171). The partisan passions and
interests of the party in opposition will be channeled into a periodic debate over military matters, which will force the party in power to persuade the citizens that it is acting for the public good. The majority can
rule, but not without taking into account the views of the minority and
responding persuasively to them. Forming a military dictatorship in
time of peace would suppose "not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and the executive, but a continued conspiracy for a
series of time, " which is likely to fail if even a single member of Congress
is able and willing to expose the plot. " It is impossible that the people
could be long deceived " (26:173).
When Madison writes, in Federalist 51, about the need for ambition
to counteract ambition, thereby "supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, " many readers regard this as a pluralist
conception of government founded on a peaceful accommodation of selfish interests, without anyone having to reason about the public interest.
But in the case of military appropriations, we see how factional conflict
can be transformed through the constitutional framework into a rhetorical controversy, in which ambitious participants offer conflicting arguments about what would best serve the public good.
Of course, Publius has no doubt that the work of Congress will reflect
the special interests of various constituencies. Any member of the
House of Representatives will respect the interests of the people in his
district. He " should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and
inclinations and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of
"
"
influence upon his conduct" (35:216). The proper degree of influence,
however, leaves him great freedom to deliberate about the public good.
With respect to many public issues, a representative ' s constituents will
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not have clear preferences. Or even if they have preferences, they may
not know how best to satisfy them. Or the preferences may be too confused or contradictory to offer a clear direction for policy-making. In all
of these cases, the representative must deliberate about the merits of
public policy.
For instance, Publius expects that the Congressman who is a landholder will "know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest
of landed property " (35:216). Nevertheless, he can be persuaded by the
merchant who argues for commercial development, because the landholder can be taught that commercial prosperity benefits agriculture as
well as commerce (12:91-92). In considering taxation, he may have to acquire " extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles
of political economy, " from which he might learn " that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome " (35:217).
Thus does a representative of one group interest find himself learning
about the national interest.
Publius also foresees that some representatives will not be loyal to
any special interest. Those of the "learned professions, " who " truly form
no distinct interest in society, " will be elected (35:215). Such a representative " will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, " which will permit him to act as " an impartial arbiter
between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him
conducive to the general interest of the society " (36:216). Such a man
might be attracted to the Senate, the presidency, or the Supreme Court.
In contrast to the House of Representatives, the government ' s " more
permanent branches " (52:330) are designed-longer terms, smaller
number of members, special powers-to motivate their officers to elevate the level of deliberative rhetoric in distinctive ways. They can accumulate experience and become better informed. And their position is
secure enough so that they can use their experience and knowledge to
oppose ill-considered measures. The stability of the Senate, the energy
of the president, the independence of the Supreme Court-each constitutes a special quality of rhetorical reasoning, and each tends to favor a
more refined and less mutable form of deliberative judgment than one
can expect of the House of Representatives.
The Senate ' s contribution to public deliberation is evident in
Federalist 63. Publius explains that the extension of the sphere is insufficient to secure justice and the common good. When the judgment of the
people has been distorted by irregular passion, or improper interest, or
artful deception, there will be a need for " some temperate and respectable body of citizens " to act as " a defence to the people against their own
temporary errors and delusions. " The word " temporary" is important.
The Senate can only delay the satisfaction of popular demands, assuming
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
77
that in the long run, "the cool and deliberate sense of the community"
will prevail. The Senate can only " suspend the blow meditated by the
people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind " (63:384).
By forcing the people and their representatives to justify their proposed actions against public-spirited objections, the Senate makes it
more likely that "reason, justice, and truth" will triumph. Ultimately the
power of the Senate to obstruct the House of Representatives is the per"
suasiveness of the Senate ' s appeal to the common good: Against the
force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be
able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but
such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good,
as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves " (63:390).
The President
Congress occupies the institutional center of American public deliberation, as suggested by the fact that the legislative article of the Constitution is the first and the longest article. But the executive article is
the second and the second longest article. The president contributes to,
and sometimes even leads, the deliberative process. Publius might
seem to deny this when he contrasts the single executive as adapted to
energy and the numerous legislature as adapted to deliberation. " Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch " are more likely to characterize the
proceedings of one man (70:424). But in the legislature, "promptitude of
decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and
the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though
they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority "
(70:426-27).
As the president's supporters so often tell us, the president must act
while Congress debates. Nevertheless, the energetic activity of the executive is in a sense deliberative, because every executive action implies
an opinion about what serves the public good. When the president believes the people or Congress or both are driven by some momentary
"
i mpulse contrary to the public good, and he sees the need to withstand
the temporary delusion in order to give them time and opportunity for
more cool and sedate reflection," he " should be in a situation to dare to
act his own opinion with vigor and decision " (71:432-33).
The most important situations in which the president must "dare to
act his own opinion " come in " the conduct of war, in which the energy of
the Executive is the bulwark of the national security " (70:427). But even
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here, as with his other powers, he depends upon the actions and decisions of other officers, and particularly Congress, which has unlimited
discretion in controlling military appropriations and in the raising and
regulating of fleets and armies. This is one of many points of difference
between the American executive and the British king, as set forth in
Federalist 69. And in each case the king can perform alone what the
president either cannot do at all or can do only with the concurrence of
Congress. In short, the president cannot do much without persuading
Congress to support him. He can " dare to act his own opinion, " but Congress and the people will judge the reasonableness of that opinion. The
power of the president is37determined largely by the persuasiveness of
his deliberative rhetoric.
In making treaties, the president must persuade the Senate. By this
means, the Constitution " provides that our negotiations for treaties shall
have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information,
integrity, and deliberative investigations, on the one hand, and from
secrecy and dispatch on the other " (64:393). The Senate ' s capacity for
slow deliberation will introduce " system" into treaty-making (64:391).
The president's capacity for acting quickly and secretly will allow for appropriate responses to momentary opportunities- "the loss of a battle,
the death of a prince, the removal of a minister " (64:393). We might say,
then, as Epstein does, that the executive introduces " quick deliberation. "38 I would stress, however, that even when the president makes
quick and sometimes secret decisions without prior consultation with
Congress, he can be forced to justify his decisions in the " deliberative investigations " of Congress.
The rhetorical skill of the president is also tested in vetoing legislation. Publius expects that the veto power is likely to be exercised in only
two kinds of cases-when a law threatens the constitutional authority of
the executive, and when a law clearly violates the public good (73:44546). In the first case, the president ' s personal interest will motivate him.
In the second case, he will act to win the favor of the people, as he hopes
that the injustice or foolishness of the law is so evident that he can persuade the public to see the wisdom of his opposition. The effectiveness
of the veto power is increased by its being qualified rather than absolute.
Since the president ' s veto can defeat a law only if his "argumentative objections " persuade at least one third of one house of Congress, a successful veto will be supported by a substantial number of Congressmen,
which increases the likelihood of winning public acceptance.
37. For a sensible assessment of the limited powers of the president and of the modern
tendency to exaggerate his importance, see George Anastaplo, The Constitution of1787: A
Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
38. Epstein, Political Theory, 174.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
79
This improves the quality of legislative deliberation, because "it will
not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion
as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time "
(73:446). The veto power will also have "a silent and unperceived,
though forcible, operation" insofar as legislators will be restrained by the
mere anticipation of executive objections. Here again, as we have seen
throughout The Federalist, a constitutional process of rhetorical debate
forces people to give persuasive reasons for their view of a public question, in the face of objections from others who see the issue differently;
and consequently people must reason about the merits of public policy
in promoting the common good.
This process of deliberative rhetoric does not require that the participants be utterly selfless in their devotion to public service. Rather, it appeals to the self-assertive passions characteristic of political people:
the
39
ambitious love of power and the glory-seeking love of fame. This is
surely true of the presidency, for which re-eligibility to election is essential because of its proper appeal to the president ' s "love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and
undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit "
(72:437). For reasons of pride, the president will want to assert and defend his own opinions about public policy, with the hope of winning repute as a wise and virtuous advocate of the public interest.
We should not disparage the virtues of the president by charging
that, since he wants to be praised for his virtues, he is not truly virtuous,
because he loves praise more than virtue. As David Hume noticed,
those who love praiseworthy actions for their own sake will almost always love to some degree the fame of praiseworthy actions. " To love the
glory of virtuous deeds, " Hume observed, "is a sure proof of the love of
virtue. "40 Aristotle, who also understood the importance of praise and
blame for forming moral character, commented in the Rhetoric that
honor and repute are goods, not only because they are pleasurable and
productive of other goods, but also because "for the most part " they are
accompanied by the possession of the things for which men are honored.
This suggests that the general opinions of human beings with respect to
honor and dishonor are usually true. Or perhaps we should say that
those who are honored become worthy of their honors through their
"
39. Consider Epstein, Political Theory, 124: Not the expectation that political life will be
an arena of selflessness, but the attractiveness of political life as an occasion for an honora'
ble self-assertion underlies The Federalist s defense of republican government.... In
's account, men' s political nature consists fundamentally not in an instinctive
Aristotle
sociability but in a capacity to think and speak, i.e., to express and act upon disputable
opinions about good and bad, just and unjust. "
40. Hume, "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature, " in Essays, 86.
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desire to appear worthy of them. 4I
A sense of honor of a special sort can be cultivated among the judges of
the Supreme Court, whose permanent tenure will foster an " independent spirit " essential to the performance of their duties (78:465). The
judges contribute to public deliberation by guarding the Constitution
and individual rights against those " ill humors " that infect the people.
But like the Senate and the president, the judges can only temporarily
withstand public opinion until there is time for " better information, and
more deliberate reflection " (78:469).
A Contemporary Assessment
We must wonder, however, whether the Constitution has succeeded
in establishing a government in which people desire " information " and
"
deliberate reflection" about the public good. The theorists of pluralism
'
and "public choice " would say that, if this was Publius s goal, he failed.
Most citizens are apathetic and ignorant in matters of public policy.
Those who vote do so based on poorly informed impressions about what
they think serves their selfish interests. The most influential political activity is that of pressure groups organized to advance their special interests with no regard for the national interest. The elected representatives
do whatever is necessary to be re-elected or otherwise to further their
personal power, wealth, and prestige. The legislative process does not
promote genuine deliberation, because it serves the self-seeking inclinations of Congressmen, staff members, lobbyists, and others who lack
any appreciation for the broad and permanent interests of the nation.
This cynical view of American government is at least partially true. Of
course, self-interest is powerful in politics as it is in human life generally.
Publius went further than most political observers in recognizing the
pervasive political influence of personal passions and interests adverse
to private rights and the public good. Yet Publius also insisted that
exaggerating the vices of human nature was as foolish as exaggerating the
virtues. In the absence of " perfect wisdom and perfect virtue," there is
"
wisdom and virtue enough" for good government. Those political scientists who are now trying to revive the idea of public deliberation seek to
restore this sensible view of human nature in politics.
William Muir, in his study of the 1975-76 session of the California
State Legislature, took his standard of legislative excellence from
"
Federalist 10, in which legislative representation is said to refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
41. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1362b21-23, 1378a8-23, 1388b2-7.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
81
their country, and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary and partial considerations " (82). Muir found
that a legislature as well designed as California 's did indeed promote the
patriotism, love of justice, and wisdom of its members. The committee
system taught legislators a patriotic sympathy for the diverse concerns of
their constituents. The managing of bills taught them to negotiate fairly
so that all interested parties had some influence. And the need to
specialize in particular fields of public policy taught them to become
well-informed about certain issues and to respect the judgment of others
who were experts in their chosen fields. Muir derived from The
Federalist the idea that government has a teaching function. Good political institutions teach people the habits and skills necessary for them to
serve the public good. A good legislature must teach its members the
patriotism, love of justice, and wisdom required for them to "refine and
enlarge the public views" in promoting the public interest.
The success of the California legislature depended not only on institutional incentives for being good legislators, but also on personal incentives. Stated generally, the most important personal incentive, according to Muir, was that " legislators needed to feel meaningful and valuable, to have a sense that they had done something that would endure. "42 The best legislators were those who took pride in supporting
legislation that they thought would improve the public welfare long after
they had left the legislature.
In response to David Mayhew ' s Congress: The Electoral Connection,
which describes what a legislature would be like if legislators desired
only to be re-elected, Muir argues that this assumes an impoverished
view of human nature, which would distort one ' s understanding of politics. Of course, human beings are moved by selfish desires for personal
pleasure and success, and for legislators this means they will desire to
preserve their power through re-election. But to assume this is their
only motive is to ignore the yearning of mature human beings to devote
themselves to dutiful work and noble causes that give moral weight to
their lives.
Since the California legislature in the session of 1975-76 was unusually excellent, perhaps even the best state legislature in the nation, we
should not expect the same level of deliberative virtue in other state legislatures or even in Congress and the other branches of the national government. But Kelman's Making Public Policy is a useful survey of the
evidence that serious public deliberation does occur in the national government. Kelman applies two standards in judging the success of the
American public policy-making process: whether it tends to produce
42. Muir, Legislature, 181.
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good public policy, and whether it recognizes human dignity and molds
moral character. Satisfying both standards, he argues, requires a high
level of " public spirit " or " civic virtue, " by which he means that those
participating in policy-making must to some extent intend to promote
the public good and not just their selfish interests. Although good intentions are not sufficient by themselves, when public-spirited people try
to promote the public good, we can presume this will tend to produce
good public policy. And, of course, public spirit is also necessary if government is to succeed in promoting dignity and shaping character.
I think Kelman is correct in claiming that this is how most citizens
judge government. They ask whether government serves the public
good, whether those who participate in government are public-spirited,
and whether the process of government reflects and fosters the appropriate moral traits. Yet I think he is wrong to assert that this view of government contradicts the " Madisonian " constitutionalism of The
Federalist. Since one of the major themes of Kelman ' s book is the critical
i mportance of institutional design in shaping decisions, it seems implausible on his own terms that public spirit would flourish in a constitutional system hostile to it. In fact, much of his description of how American political institutions elicit public spirit conforms to the description in
The Federalist of how the Constitution was expected to work.
For example, Kelman notes that the conclusion from the early voting
studies that most voters were irrational rested on an inappropriate norm
for the "rational voter. " Applying the standard of plebiscitary democracy, social scientists categorized as irrational those citizens who voted
without a detailed knowledge of public policy and of all the alternatives
offered by the candidates. But a representative democracy of the sort favored by Publius presumes that voters have only the most general
knowledge of political conditions, because the specific content of public
policy will be determined by the representatives.
As is evident in Jeff Greenfield 's book on the 1980 presidential campaign, 43 that election illustrates how certain general shifts in public
opinion can bring major political changes, even within the limited
knowledge and attention of most voters. It was easy to see that a vote for
Ronald Reagan was a vote for reducing federal taxes, slowing the growth
of federal social welfare programs, increasing military spending, curtailing federal regulatory activity, and moving some programs from the federal government to the states. What exactly should be done to pursue
these ends, how to overcome the possible contradictions between them,
and how to handle the undesirable side-effects (such as budget deficits)-these and similar questions were rightly left to the representatives for deliberation.
43. Jeff Greenfield, The Real Campaign (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981).
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
83
The 1980 election also illustrates the power of " retrospective voting ":
Are you better off today than you were four years ago? " Publius expected this, because he foresaw that voters would judge policies indirectly by their general effects (63:384; 72:436-37). It does not require
great knowledge of public policy to assess candidates and parties based
on one ' s general sense of whether the policies of the past have made the
country better off or worse off. And as Kelman indicates, the voter ' s
judgment is not a purely selfish one, because there is evidence that voters are influenced by their broad perception of how the whole nation is
doing, independent of their individual economic situation.
It is easy to cite examples of public decisions-a new highway, a military contract, a water project, a tax loophole-that serve only private interests. "As a general rule, however, " Kelman maintains, " the more important a policy is, the less important is the role of self-interest in determining that policy. "44 Increased spending for the poor and environmental protection in the 1960s and early 1970s, the move to deregulation in
the late 1970s and 1980s, the increasing use of formula grants to localities
rather than categorical grants-these and many other massive shifts in
public policy reflect changing views of the public good arising from political debate. We have seen how Publius expects the constitutional
framework to structure a process of rhetorical deliberation. Kelman
shows the continuing success of that rhetorical process. 45 "The need to
gain the consent of others means that political arguments inevitably
must be formulated in terms broader than the self-interest of the individual or the group making the claim, because there is no reason"46
for anyone to support a claim based simply on another ' s self-interest.
Nevertheless, the quality of political deliberation in American government is not as high as it would be if we were completely faithful to the
constitutional arrangements of The Federalist. The development of
what some scholars call " the rhetorical presidency "47 is one example of a
change that hinders deliberative rhetoric, as is clear in the presidency of
Ronald Reagan. We have seen that Publius expected that the president's
power would depend upon his persuading others to accept his view of
the public good. And we should acknowledge Reagan's success in formulating a broad vision of good public policy that shaped political debate
"
44. Kelman, Making Public Policy, 250.
45. See, for example, ibid., 22-23, 27-30, 34-35, 42-43, 60-66, 72-75, 109-10, 112-13, 13334, 209, 223, 228, 247-70, 293.
46. Ibid., 22.
47. See James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph Bessette, "The Rise of the
Rhetorical Presidency, " in Thomas Cronin, ed., Rethinking the Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); and Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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in the 1980s. 48 Yet in some ways Reagan 's rhetoric tended to be more
epideictic or ceremonial than deliberative, because he was more concerned with evoking patriotic symbolism to stir popular sentiment than
with arguing over the details of policy issues in Congress. 49 That is not
just a peculiarity of Reagan ' s style but a characteristic of the modern
presidency. We have come to rely too much on the personal, inspirational rhetoric of the president speaking directly to the people, which
weakens the process of deliberative rhetoric that requires the president
to address his rhetoric primarily to Congress and only indirectly to the
people. Although Congress is less deliberative than it could be and
should be, it is probably more deliberative than its harshest critics believe; and in any case, the action of the president alone is no substitute
for congressional deliberation. 5o
The Teaching Function of Government
Studying the deliberative rhetoric of The Federal ist, both as displayed in the argumentation of the book and as woven into the constitutional fabric it describes, helps us to understand how a government can
fulfill its teaching function. Through government, we decide the terms
of our common life. What we decide intimates some understanding of
our life together, and of human life in general. By living in a political community, as private citizens or as public officers, we must engage in a continual process of teaching and learning, with every individual and every
group offering some opinion, either by speech or by conduct, about how
we ought to live. Like any school, the institutional structure of government guides the teaching and the learning in certain directions, according to some conception of what should be taught and what can be
learned, given the needs and capacities of the teachers and the students.
The Constitution as interpreted by The Federalist designs a school in
which we teach and learn from one another through public deliberation
and rhetorical argument.
Our conflicting opinions, passions, and interests create endless controversies about the character of our public life. Our avarice drives us to
compete with one another for material gain. Our pride moves us to self48. See William K. Muir, Jr., " Ronald Reagan: The Primacy of Rhetoric, " in Leadership
in the Modern Presidency, ed. Fred Greenstein (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1988), 260-95; and George Will, " How Reagan Changed America, " Newsweek 113 (9 January 1989): 13-17.
49. This assessment of Reagan ' s rhetoric is well argued by Kathleen Hall Jamieson,
Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
"
50. See Anastaplo, The Constitution of1787, 109-23; Mickey Edwards, Of Conservatives
"
and Kings, Policy Review No. 48 (Spring 1989): 24-30; and Maas, Congress.
THE DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC OF THE FEDERALIST
85
assertive rivalry in the quest for status. Those who are ambitious pursue
the power of public office. Those who are glory-seeking strive for the
fame of public accomplishment. Those who are inquisitive ponder political questions that provoke perpetual disputes. Because we are selfish
beings, we care about ourselves and those close to us. Because we are social beings, we care about what others think of us. As both selfish and social, we demand the recognition of others as the only way we know to
recognize ourselves. From such natural motives, we are thrown into factional conflict.
The constitutional framework structures that conflict so that it becomes a rhetorical debate about the public good. In advancing our divergent points of view, we must give reasons that would justify the agreement of others, and to do this we must answer the objections of those
who see things from a different perspective. For many issues, we can
work out a mutually beneficial accommodation of the private interests
affected by a public decision. But for some issues, we must take a broad
view of the public interest, to which private interests must conform. In
the one case, we justify a policy as adjusted to the pre-established preferences of the people involved. In the other case, we justify a policy as
serving a conception of the common good that will shape our shared preferences. In either case-the adjustment of given preferences or the formation of new preferences-we agree upon a policy through public discussion.
In recent American political theory, it has been common for people to
argue one side or the other in the perennial debate between "individualism " and " communitarianism, " between personal liberty and social authority. 51 Each side represents only a partial view of human beings as either utterly autonomous or utterly social. Government by
rhetorical deliberation transcends this debate by incorporating both
principles. Individual liberty is secured because every individual is in
principle free to participate in the deliberative debates. And yet the deliberation is also a communal activity through which the individual' s
opinions, passions, and interests are influenced by the public exchange
of arguments. The standard of political legitimacy is not the predetermined will of the individual, but the deliberative process through which
the will of the individual is both expressed and formed. Since unanimity
is usually unattainable, the will of the minority will have to yield to the
will of the majority, so long as the decision of the majority has emerged
from a process of free argumentation. Legitimacy52requires not the general will of all, but the general deliberation of all.
51. See Larry Arnhart, Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987), 25-26, 229-30, 233-34, 257-58, 274-77, 297, 352.
52. See Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, " Political Theory 15
(August 1987): 338-68.
86
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
If our opinions were infallible, and if our passions and interests were
selfless, we might reach complete agreement in our public life, and deliberation would be unnecessary. But if our opinions were so diverse and
our passions and interests so antagonistic that no agreement was possible, deliberation would be impossible. In our governmental school for
rhetorical deliberation, we can learn much about our condition as beings
"
yet possessing "wisdom
lacking " perfect wisdom and perfect justice,
53
"
and virtue enough for self-government.
Northern Illinois University
LARRY ARNHART
53. Although I doubt that he would agree completely with my reading of The Federalist, I
am indebted to Leo Paul de Alvarez for introducing me to The Federalist when I was an
undergraduate at the University of Dallas.