Obstacles to the Integration and Naturalization of Refugees
A Case Study of Ethnic Armenian Refugees in Armenia
Yulia Ghazaryan
American University of Armenia
Department of Political Science and International Affairs, Center for Policy Analysis
1
Abstract
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has had a significant
impact on the interstate and intrastate displacements of persons. From 1989 to 1993, more than 300,000 ethnic
Armenian refugees arrived in Armenia alone. Many of these refugees still face socio-economic hardship, are
unemployed and live in temporary shelters. After ten years of transition, the persistence of these socio-economic
difficulties demonstrates a critical need for a permanent solution. The Government of Armenia (GoA) considers
integration to be the only tenable long-term response to the refugee issue. At present, this process has reached the
phase of naturalisation, which has been unsuccessful. Ethnic Armenian refugees are not willing to forego their
refugee status and resist acquiring citizenship.
This paper explores whether a naturalisation policy will ensure the full integration of ethnic Armenian
refugees. The project is explorative and focuses on why refugees seem to postpone acquiring Armenian citizenship
and explores the question of whether refugees lose benefits in giving up refugee status.. In addition, the study reveals
serious obstacles to the integration process that are not addressed by naturalisation and provides recommendations
for future steps.
Abbreviations
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent states
DMR – Department of Refugees and Migration
GoA – Government of Armenia
IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons
IOM- International Organization of Migration
MSSEMR – Ministry of Social Security, Employment, Migration and Refugees
NA-National Assembly
NK – Nagorno-Karabakh
RA- Republic of Armenia
SU – Soviet Union
UNHCR – United Nation High Commissioner of Refugees
2
The Movement of Refugees
People have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other lands for eons. The Bible, for example,
describes places of asylum for persecuted individuals. The Greeks and Romans similarly set aside certain areas to
provide sanctuary for individuals fleeing for their lives. Despite the timelessness of this phenomenon, societal
responses to displaced persons have differed substantially during the past century.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, governments grew wary of refugees. The growth of “nation states”
and the strengthening of national identities led to the view that refugees threatened social security and cultural
cohesion by introducing disease, subversive ideas and foreign traditions (Fullerton, 1992). According to Adelman, the
twentieth century was the “century of refugees” because of the division of the world into nation-states with the
potential not only to abuse or protect rights, but also to determine the right of non-citizens entering their territory. By
acknowledging the role of the international community in shaping the actions of states, Adelman suggests that recent
evidence points to the “resolution of refugee crises stemming less from international agencies or abstract principles
and more from local actions and concrete pragmatic solutions” (Adelman, 1999:15). This indicates that the
responsibility for addressing the refugee issues is not placed merely on international agencies or a society, but on the
local infrastructures required to undertake more practical and reasonable steps in addressing the hardships of the
refugee “communities.”
International and National Protection of Refugees
In 1951, the United Nations General Assembly established the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
with the mandate of providing material assistance and legal protection to displaced persons. This institution later
played an enormous role in developing policies attuned to national and international concerns and in providing
support to individual refugee applicants (Fullerton, 1992). WWII gave impetus to the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (Convention), specifying five different bases for persecution rather than listing specific religious
and national groups at risk in certain societies. In other words, this definition rejected the group approach and led to
the determination of refugee status on an individual basis.1 The 1951 Convention and the subsequent Protocol on
Refugee Status, however, do not outline procedures for determining refugee status. Thus, it is the state’s
responsibility to work out its own procedures for assessing the validity of a refugee claim. Over half of the states that
ratified the Convention and the Protocol have not adopted domestic legislation to implement these agreements. At the
same time, the domestic legislation of nearly one-third of all member nations adopts the Convention’s definition of
refugees and entitles those individuals to official identification documents.
Refugee settlements
International experience has shown that settling refugees in the “country of first asylum” is a traditional
solution to the problem of displaced persons. From the international perspective, there are three basic approaches to
addressing refugees: integration, the voluntary return of persons to their former places of residence or repatriation to a
third country. If the last two alternatives are not feasible, then the most viable solution is considered to be the
integration of refugees into the receiving country. Forced migrants should be guaranteed access to accommodation,
medical assistance, food, education and professional and language training (Joppke, 1999).
The “legal process of naturalization, pursued through the acquisition of citizenship” is among the various
factors supporting the integration of refugees.2 There is, however, a debate on whether citizenship is a sufficient
precondition for the integration of migrants into a society. Some scholars insist that citizenship remains indispensable
for the integration of immigrants,3 while others argue that citizenship is one facet of integration but that it does not
guarantee equal rights (Joppke, 1999).
Today, matters of citizenship have become increasingly complex. Traditionally, citizenship has meant full
membership in a polity. In the modern world, the polity is understood to be a nation-state, i.e., citizenship is integrally
linked to a territorial state and to the people belonging to that state. The historical and analytical distinctions between
1
A widely accepted definition (of the 1951 Convention, modified by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees) specifies that a refugee is: “any person who…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, ethnicity, or political opinions is outside the country of his/her nationality, and is unable, or owing
to such fear, is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his formal habitual residence, as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear is
unwilling to return to it” (Geneva Convention, Article 1, 1951).
2
See Joppke (1999: 629). Joppke compared the impact of post-war immigration on citizenship in the U.S., Germany and
the United Kingdom and showed how the institution of citizenship in modern states has been reaffirmed or altered by
immigration.
3
In general, there is a difference between migrants—who leave their home to escape poverty and do not wish to return
home—and refugees—who leave their home country to escape persecution or conflict—and cannot return. However,
occasionally these two definitions merge. Therefore, for purposes of this paper “immigrants” are considered to be people
who have migrated, either forcefully or voluntarily, to seek asylum in another country.
3
citizenship and nationality arise in the modern overlay of membership in the nation (nationality) and active
membership in the political state (Feldblum, 1997). Thus, the nature of the refugee issue has been transformed in a
fundamental manner over the past four decades. It has grown from a continental to a global problem, from one that
could be kept at a distance to one that can be too close for comfort. The world’s refugee population has expanded
tremendously, thereby multiplying demands for assistance. A crisis in any nation may now result in the displacement
of large populations. What is more worrisome about the current refugee burden is not only the number of displaced
people, but the lengthy period of time that they may spend in asylum without being integrated into a given society.
The lengthy presence of refugees in limbo has fundamentally altered the nature of the global refugee problem. Efforts
to find a solution continue, whether by returning refugees voluntarily to their countries of origin, settling them in
countries of asylum or resettling them in third countries (Smyser, 1985).
Refugees must be legally defined and institutions established to address the problems brought forth by this
century’s forced migrations. Indeed, states bear the responsibility of establishing mechanisms for assessing applicants
for refuge and for clearly specifying the rights and duties of these people in their domestic legislation. The search for
a longer-term solution to refugee problems hinges on specific migration cases that vary between different parts of the
world. Nevertheless, the most viable solution for refugee influxes at present is their integration.
Armenia: The History of the Refugee Problem
Throughout history, Armenians have been uprooted and subjected to forced migration.
Consequently, ethnic Armenians can be found in any part of the world. During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, Armenians were deported en masse by Iranian Shaihs and found their way to
Karabakh. In the 1920s, this mountain enclave, mostly inhabited by people of Armenian origin,
was placed under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction and was surrounded by Azeri-populated villages. The
Armenian enclave claimed to be an independent republic, which was strongly disputed due to
overlapping internal and external factors.4 In 1988, these disputes erupted into large-scale
violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although both republics continually proclaimed that
the conflict should be solved by peaceful means, the dispute became extremely violent. Because
of large-scale ethnic cleansing in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, thousands of people have died or
fled as refugees since 1988.
The ethnic strife that erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Soviet Union shattered quickly
turned quickly into war. Over a million people were forced to flee; from Nagorno-Karabakh to
Armenia, from Armenia to Azerbaijan, and from Armenian-occupied sectors of Azerbaijan to
other Azeri villages (CIS Report, 1996). In Armenia alone, there has been an influx of more than
300,000 ethnic Armenian refugees (CIS Migration Rep, 1996:18).
The first wave of refugees was spurred by massacres in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) in February 1988 and similar
events in Shamkhor and Kirovabad in 1989. These events culminated in a pogrom in Baku in January 1990.
Armenians living in Azerbaijan primarily fled to Armenia (Messina, 1996:18-9). The majority of these refugees
(nearly 80%) had an urban background, but most were resettled in abandoned villages with dilapidated housing.
Many still live in conditions of extreme poverty without adequate access to water, and their children do not attend
schools because of poverty and travel distances. The remaining twenty percent of the refugees live in extremely
cramped quarters in communal centers (e.g., dormitories or hotels) or in abandoned basements and apartments in
Yerevan or other large towns (UNHCR, 1998). According to recent estimates, seventy-five percent of the refugees are
highly skilled people who are educated as physicians, engineers, etc. Obviously, there is an urgent need to develop a
policy for these refugees and to mitigate the psychological, economic, social and political difficulties that they
encountered in their country of origin.
As previously discussed, there are three basic approaches to addressing refugee problems: integration, a
voluntary return to places of former residence or repatriation to a third country. The latter two alternatives are not
feasible for the number of reasons. Although the 1994 cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan is still in effect,
the peace talks between the conflicting parties conducted under the Minsk Group and the OSCE have not made
progress in providing a permanent solution for the conflict. Therefore, the prospects for the repatriation of these
refugees are bleak. Moreover, the mass resettlement of these refugees is complicated as they are ethnic Armenians
and have essentially returned to their homeland. Second, the refugees usually have neither adequate finances nor
appropriate travel documents. Moreover, a major obstacle to establishing refuge in a third country is the fact that no
other country is willing to provide land for a refugee settlement. Obviously, this frustration with refugees is due to the
4
For a more detailed overview on obstacles to ethnic reconciliation for the NK conflict see Gabrielian (1998).
4
sheer number of displaced persons, and no one state is able or willing to take on the costs of providing protection,
food or shelter for them (Ager, 1999).
Thus, the most promising option is integration and naturalization (the acquisition of citizenship). However,
to achieve the integration of refugees, the government of Armenia must overcome a number of legal/political,
economic, social, and psychological obstacles. The primary institutions investigated with regards to implementing
refugee policy are the state Department of Migration and Refugees (DMR) and the United Nation High
Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), both of which seek to facilitate the integration and naturalization processes of
Armenian refugees.5
Armenian Government
POLICY
INTEGRATION
Naturalization
DMR
UNHCR
Refugees
In recent years, several international and non-governmental organizations have attempted to support the
integration of the refugees in Armenia. Given the slow pace of social and economic development, high
unemployment and a lack of job prospects, this disadvantaged population has continued to emigrate from Armenia in
large numbers (UNHCR, 1997), usually to Russia or other CIS countries. According to 1998 estimates, 310,000
refugees still reside in Armenia, of whom 72,107 live in Yerevan (see Table 1). The refugees largely comprise
women, children and the elderly as many adult males have left to find work or to avoid conscription (UNHCR, 1997;
Steering Group Meeting Report, 1999).
Table 1
Number of Registered Ethnic Armenian Refugees as of May 19996
Total Number of Registered Refugees
310,000
Temporarily Abroad
Male Refugees
Female Refugees
Refugees under 16 years of age
Refugees over 60 years of age
Disabled Refugees
Refugees without Permanent Housing
64,000
136,000
174,000
65,000
92,000
12,000
42,000
5
There are a variety of institutions in Armenia that are directly or indirectly involved in refugee affairs. The International
Organization of Migration, Mission Armenia, the Armenian Red Cross Society and the Norwegian Refugee Council are examples
of agencies involved in different spheres of refugee-related programs focused on social, legal, psychological and humanitarian
assistance. These organizations, however, are considered to be the implementing partners of such major actors as the Department
of Refugee and Migration (a state entity) and the UNHCR (an international organization with the direct mandate of refugee
protection). These two have signed a memorandum of understanding outlining the framework for a joint strategy (UNHCR, May
1999) on refugees.
6
Source: “Background Information UNHCR Armenia,” May, 1999
5
150,000
Total
From 1994 to 1999, the government of Armenia implemented a complex program to
address the socio-economic needs of refugees, predominantly focusing on their integration. Other
major components of the government’s efforts to address refugee issue included providing shelter,
education, medical services and psychological counseling. At present, however, the majority of
refugees remain unemployed and live in dormitories, hotels, resorts and makeshift shelters (CIS
Migration Report, Armenian Case, 1996:11-21).
The Legislative Base
The refugee presence in Armenia led to the establishment of several institutions and the
adoption of national legislation for managing population movements and migration. As a
consequence of the Soviet block’s lack of experience with forced migration, these agencies
largely reacted to events, and this led to the need to create an appropriate legislative framework..
The first legal regulated related to refugees was the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of
Refugees (passed in 1993) and the 1967 Protocol (passed in October 1993). There was still,
however, a need for national legislation in accordance with international standards. Armenia only
undertook its next official step six years later, in March of 1999, by passing the Law on Refugees,
which determined the legal status of refugees and defined their rights and responsibilities. At this
point, Armenia again offered citizenship to ethnic Armenian refugees (Law on Refugees of the
RA, Article 23, 1999) in hopes of integrating them. In September of 1999, the National Assembly
passed an amendment to the Law on Citizenship, prolonging the deadline for refugees to apply
until December 31, 2001 (Novoe Vremya, 1999). However, these refugees are still waiting to
receive refugee certificates and travel documents as prescribed by the Law and appear not to be in
any hurry to become citizens.7 According to a report of the Armenian delegation at the CIS
Conference held in Geneva in June 1999, by the end of May, 1999 only 6,300 out of 310,012
refugees living in Armenia (2% of the refugee population) had given up their refugee status and
acquired Armenian citizenship.8
Methodology
A. Definitions
Prior to introducing the methodology employed for this research project, it is important to define the
following concepts.
7
The first refugee certificates were provided by the Refugee Committee from 1991 to 1994 and were identical for all
refugees. In 1994 this document was divided into two light and dark blue versions to distinguish between refugees
with a place of residence and those who lived in dormitories, hotels, etc. The primary reason for this change was the
UNHCR Shelter Program’s requirement to determine the numbers of refugees who required shelter in order to
construct cottages and apartments. As a result, those who had certificates indicating that they had some form of
residence “(even illegally occupied),” were denied aid provided to refugees living in cramped settings. At present, the
certificates should be exchanged again for new ones without any difference in color according to the Refugee Law
(this information was provided by a public official of the DMR during an interview). However, for a number of
reasons, this process has been postponed artificially. This appears to be related to the perception that prolonging the
process of acquiring citizenship is preferable for “some.” Hence, the current situation seems to be beneficial for
several major “actors” in the field.
8
This data was provided by the UNHCR (see Peterson, 1999). However, there are also other estimates as to how
many refugees became citizens, ranging from 7,000 to 12, 000. Nonetheless, this does not change the scale of the
problem as even considering the higher estimate of 12, 000, 96% of refugees refuse citizenship.
6
1.Refugee
If one consults a dictionary to define the word refugee, one finds an array of synonyms such as alien, stranger,
foreigner, immigrant, and newcomer. None of these definitions corresponds to the concept of refugee relevant to this
paper. In this study, the term refugee refers to an ethnic Armenia (generally a highly-skilled Russian speaker) who,
for political reasons (predominantly as a result of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh), was persecuted on the basis
of his/her nationality and was forced to leave his/her previous residence, or has lost his/her home because of a
physical threat to his/her survival and fled from Nagorno Karabakh or Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1993.
2. Integration
The phenomenon of a migrant group adjusting to a host culture is called acculturation. This process may lead to a
conflict between attitudes and behaviors, and later may include the need to negotiate between two systems of beliefs
and behaviors (Palinkas and Pickwell, 1995). This theory may not appear relevant to ethnic Armenian refugees, as
they do not have explicit cultural differences with the host country. Nevertheless, this multidimensional phenomenon
is important in an exploration of the refugee population (Dona & Berry, 1999).
In the Armenian case, integration does not equal the assimilation of a target group by suppressing their
identity and group characteristics. These refugees are ethnic Armenians who have almost the same features and group
characteristics as Armenian citizens, but who have some differences in their views, lifestyles, perceptions, behavior
and accent. These differences are typical among other groups living in the country as well. Integration does not imply
the need to counteract the separation phenomenon (isolation; when there is no desire to relate to a larger society) or
marginalisation (the loss of contact with both dominant and refugee groups).9 These people were and are not
discriminated or isolated from the society from the first days of their arrival. They were given almost equal rights as
compared to ordinary citizens and are in close contact with both dominant and “minority” groups. As an integration
strategy may be considered to be present when an individual wants to maintain his or her heritage identity but, at the
same time, also to become part of larger societal framework. More specifically, for the particular group under study,
integration means their natural incorporation into the social, political, economic and cultural environment of
Armenia without any “transformation” of their heritage identity.
3.
Naturalization
Among the many factors affecting the feasibility of real integration, let us highlight the political
and legal aspect of naturalization, the acquisition of citizenship. This necessarily implies giving
up refugee status with all its advantages and disadvantages, and becoming full members of
Armenian society, enjoying the rights and responsibilities specified in the Law on Citizenship
adopted in 1995.
4. Refugee Status
Refugee status in this study denotes the standing assigned to persons who fled to Armenia
between 1989 and 1993. Refugee status is defined by the domestic legislation of the country, with
clear specifications of refugee rights and duties as defined in the 199 Law on Refugees.
5. Citizenship
Citizenship is a legal status constituting full membership in Armenian society with both rights and
duties: civil, political, social and cultural.
B. Research Purpose and Methodology
Purpose: The goal of this research is to explore why the refugee population postpones acquiring citizenship. What
does refugee status give them that citizenship cannot? Are there any benefits to acquiring citizenship?
Policy Analysis Models
An analysis of the refugee policy has been conducted utilizing both the rational and institutional models. The first
approach provides a clear picture of the overall problem in the major institutions in charge of policy implementation
(the Department of Migration and Refugees and the UNHCR). Based on identified variables, refugee behavior has
been analyzed by conducting interviews with the refugees residing in the dormitory.
Methodology and Research Design
Qualitative research methods have been employed to undertake an analysis of the problem at hand, since the
concern of this study has been to explore the driving forces of the prolonged naturalization process. Because of the
9
For more details these concepts see Dona and Berry in Ager (1999).
7
persistent nature of this problem (the refusal to give up refugee status), the focus is on understanding the phenomenon
rather than generalizing it to a broader level.
To collect data, a pre-test was given and in-depth interviews were conducted using open-ended questions.
Interviews were conducted with representatives of both the target group and officials involved in refugee affairs from
DMR and UNHCR to obtain insight into the problem from a variety of perspectives.
Sampling and Data Analysis
The study targeted 13 refugees, who were selected from the Yerevan refugee dormitory. Interviews were
structured around an open-ended questionnaire that was designed with a preliminarily determined logic. The issues
addressed in the questionnaire primarily touched upon issues such as:
(1)
an interest in/awareness of politics of the country, which would—to some extent—reveal their level of
concern with and desire to participate in the political processes of Armenia10;
(2)
the desire or a lack of desire to acquire citizenship with justifications including compensation,11
privatization, emigration (the last has been viewed as an expectation for the future), entitlements and
humanitarian aid;
(3)
the degree of dependency on aid and satisfaction based on two different periods–pre-1996 (when
humanitarian aid was extensive) and post-1996 (when aid from abroad was reduced significantly);
(4)
awareness of legislation related to refugees, refugee rights and experience with any public opinion records in
order to measure the effectiveness of public consciousness campaigns held by UNHCR;
(5)
policies to identify the attitude of refugees’ attitude towards the Armenian government;
(6)
the degree of demonstrated patriotism, including attitude towards the country and the local population.
The factors mentioned above were analyzed as “gains and losses” that explained the rationale of refugees.
Furthermore, they constituted the primary set of evaluation criteria for the data analysis strategy. The analysis of the
findings was conducted through recording interviews, coding written notes and otherwise reducing data. The data
processing phase was carried out as follows:
a) a display of all research data, listing specifics of each case next to each other;
b) an assessment of patterns aimed at identifying relevance to the purpose of the study for further
grouping,
c) the reduction of data into manageable quantities, crystallizing the patterns into a groups.
Finally, the responses of the interviewees were grouped based on general characteristics, behavioral patterns and
future expectations.12
General trends that allowed some preliminary generalizations were identified, including: (1) an interest or lack of
interest in politics in the country, (2) whether or not the interviewees were affected by not having the right to
participate in the political life of country, (3) the desire of the interviewees to acquire citizenship. The responses to
questions within these three broad categories fell clearly into two groups. In cases where there was a slight difference
in some patterns, reasonable explanations of the control questions have been enforced to clarify any inconsistencies.
Later, this led to a more structured data reduction process, during which time the general background on refugee
interviewees were filtered out, more clearly revealing the division of the target group in their behavior patterns and
factors contributing to them. Finally, the outcome of the interviews revealed a perspective that was analyzed in light
of institutional influence and refugees’ rationale explaining their behavior. The results of the survey in the
institutional model—which should be considered as background—and the rational model’s framework depicts the
overall scenario.
Refugee Policy Analysis:
Institutional and Rational Frameworks
10
One of the major benefits of citizenship is the right to present refugee candidacy to the Parliamentary Elections and
to participate in Presidential and National Assembly elections.
11
The issues of compensation relates to the reimbursement of the price of lost property for Armenian and Azeri
refugees. From the international perspective, there is no requirement for this compensation, although there are some
international norms according to which upon the agreement of conflicting parties, compensation may be addressed.
To date, any attempts to “put the issue on the agenda” have failed. Nevertheless, some refugees still hope for
compensation, and this is perceived as one of the barriers to their acquiring citizenship.
12
For more information on conducting in-depth interviews, including a detailed description of the interview process,
the role of the interviewer, data management and analysis methods see Sherraden, (1995). For an in-depth interview
questionnaire model see Beverly & Sherraden, (1995) and Burgress, (1991).
8
1. Institutional Perspective
An analysis conducted from the institutional perspective, which was employed in
consideration of external factors that might contribute to the unsuccessful implementation of
policy, proves the existence of institutional interests that affect the behavior of the target group.
The explorative approach of this study revealed that “the policy is decided deductively and
unilaterally, with little input from refugees themselves” (Indra, 1993:234), and there is no
indication of an opinion poll having been conducted within this target group. Therefore, “this
creates a ‘non-reciprocal casual epistemology’ among practitioners in which cause and effect…is
self-evident, in which refugeeism is constructed as a social problem and where there is a
standardized prescription of how experts should act in order to ensure their clients’ salvation”
(Indra, 1993:234).
Each agency approaches the target group differently despite standardized routines on how
to act with “clients.” In addition, research illustrates a number of different perspectives on the
public policy that each institution pursues under the umbrella of “integration and naturalization.”
There is also a difference in how institutions interact with the target group. The analyzed
institutional settings, including their structures, duties, organization, and documentation indicates
the impact of institutional characteristics on policy output.13 The way each institution deals with
refugee problems, with particular reference to the validity of information that is or is not provided
to refugees, displays the interest of these agencies in prolonging the implementation of policy.
Department of Migration and Refugee (DMR)
After the massive influx of refugees, the need for an institution that would register and address the needs of the
deported was an essential priority. In 1990, the committee dealing with returnees established the Division on
Refugees Affairs, which became the Committee on Refugee Affairs at the end of the 1990. For the first time, the
government put the responsibility of the state regulation of migration on the Ministry of Social Security,
Employment, Migration and Refugees (MSSEMR). From 1995 until April 1999, the MSSEMR dealt with the socialeconomic and legal issues of refugees and migrants. There were two departments in charge of these matters: the
Department of Refugees and Department of Migration.
From April, 1999 the government established a separate Department of Migration and Refugees with the
responsibility to regulate migration. This institution currently is considered to be the main governmental organization
acting on behalf of refugees by pursuing the integration of ethnic Armenian refugees and seeking their naturalization.
In cooperation with UNHCR and other organizations involved in refugee affairs, it has also carried out relief projects
and offered free legal protection, material support, aid distribution, etc.
Eventually, the fact that the DMR (especially on a grass root level) was not propagating the “virtues” of
citizenship became clear. Personnel interacting regularly with refugee representatives were not clear in stating all the
advantages and disadvantages of citizenship. Dormitory residents, those illegally occupying apartments or basements
and those living in cottages built with UNHCR financial support were generally advised to “think twice” before
relinquishing their refugee status and accepting citizenship.
As one of the staff members stated, “…these people have no idea what they really will lose by gaining nothing.
We support them for free by providing legal protection, material support (which was 2-3, maximum 5 thousand
drams (~$10) for the last time14), and many other advantages.” Thus, as it was clearly explained by the DMR
representative, while applying for citizenship (upon request, since there is no mechanism available to disseminate this
information), refugees acquire advice that encourages them not to do so. However, what are the reasons of this
openness?
First, it has to be noted that most of the DMR staff who have direct interactions with refugees are also refugees.
Thus, they explain their openness by the fact that they are in the same situation and will not “cheat” people in the
same position. From April 1999, the DMR has been reorganized into an independent institution dealing with issues of
migration and refugees within the Armenian government, rather than within the Ministry of Social Security.15
Therefore, it can be implied that this institution needs a “certain” number of refugees to continue its functioning.
13
Government institutions give three distinctive characteristics of public policy: legitimacy, universality, and coercion.
However, some stable patterns of individual or group behavior may affect the content of public policy. Therefore, some
institutions may be structured to facilitate certain policy outcomes and obstruct others. For more details on this issue see
Dye, (1995: 19-21.)
14
See Poghosian (1999a). This material support was provided not to all refugees but to those who are in an extreme need.
This supports the fact that aid decreased in recent years.
15
The fact that the status of the DMR has been elevated was explored in an article of a daily newspaper in September 1999
(Poghosyan, 1999b). According to a government decree of April 21, 1999, the DMR was restructured as an entity separate
from the MSSE, and the head of the department (interestingly) is the ex-Minister of Social Welfare. The ex-Minister,
9
Secondly, as the refugee law of Armenia has been adopted, there is a need to authorize officially this
particular target population as refugees. In addition, based on the Geneva Convention and the specification of the
1967 protocol, a travel document should be adopted to permit the refugees to move. The initiation of this process is
both advantageous and dangerous for the governmental representatives as: (1) the process of distributing refugee
certification is beneficial since it will leave the ethnic Armenians as refugees in their home country for again
unspecified period of time, (2) this, in turn, will provide institutions with clients to “care for.” At the same time, this
process may lead to a huge wave of emigration, which presumably should be prevented by any means.
Thus, one thing has become clear: while the provision of travel documents implies a huge wave of emigration, to
what extent is this possible? The DMR does have well-justified reasons to artificially postpone citizenship
acquisition: it needs time to issue and distribute travel documents, and at the same time to keep certain number of
refugees in order to continue its mission. Otherwise, only residents from African countries—Lebanon, Syria, etc.—
would seek refuge in Armenia. Consequently, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, the DMR is interested in
distributing travel documents since it may benefit by creating refugee crowds “begging” for its services. At the same
time, this institution needs to act on behalf of those who are considered to be their clients, and, therefore, the DMR
needs refugees. Hence, a campaign to create obstacles to block the mass outflow of ethnic Armenian refugees is quite
understandable. The DMR’s recent announcement, which implies that there are already certain criteria for refugees to
be eligible for travel documents quite explicitly supports this fact. 16 A note published in the article of the Azg
newspaper “Travel Documents are Not for Everyone,” has finally clarified refugee concerns (Poghosyan, 1999b).
According to this piece, travel documents can be granted only to those refugees who have reached the age of 16 and
who have:
1) entry and exit visas from Armenia and another country;
2) financial means to leave Armenia and later, return to Armenia;
3) essential financial means enabling them to live in that country for a fixed period of time.
In addition, the announcement clarified that travel documents could not be considered as a basis for holding refugee
status in the other country. In this particular case, if ethnic Armenian refugees would leave Armenia, they will not be
considered refugees since they tend to migrate based on bare economic reasons: to seek better life, opportunities for
job, future for their children, etc. In accordance with the Geneva Convention’s definition of refugees, one must have a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or political opinion—which is not the case
with regard to ethnic Armenians (Geneva Convention, 1951). Thus, they cannot apply for asylum in another country
if have been granted refuge status by the country in which they first arrived. Even if ethnic Armenian refugees do not
have a right to participate in the political life of their adopted country, they are granted a chance to get involved. The
issue is only whether they need to enjoy this right. Perhaps that is why the article discussed earlier concluded that the
announcement on the ceiling for travel documents has had hardly any effect on refugees who are desperate to
emigrate.
Thus, it is quite beneficial for the DMR to have a crowd of refugees “asking” for travel documents, and at the
same time it needs refugees in order to have clients to deal with. Hence, there is no campaign to reinforce the
willingness of refugees to naturalize. Correspondingly, the present “frozen” situation with the citizenship problem
and the artificial uncertainty with regard to issues of great interest for refugees are quiet explainable. The DMR needs
refugees in order to continue to distribute aid (and possibly, in the future, the “selective” distribution of travel
documents) and to maintain its status as an independent and “purely refugee-oriented” institution. Thus, it seems
reasonable to keep the target group in uncertainty and to prolong both naturalization and the acquisition of real
refugee status. In fact, ethnic Armenians who fled to Armenia over ten years ago are neither officially recognized as
refugees (as they should be according to the Refugee Law) nor are they officially recognized as citizens (even though
they are de facto citizens). This uncertainty seems to ensure the future functioning of the DMR. At the same time,
however, the circumstances are not only favorable the DMR.
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR)
To settle refugee problems “UNHCR gradually transformed from an agency dealing with the international
protection of refugees into one that took as its prime mandate the needs of refugees and IDPs within the boarders of
their own states” (Adelman, 1999:100). UNHCR has developed into the foremost single humanitarian agency “setting
priorities, raising and distributing resources, and coordinating emergency inputs in complex emergencies obviating
perhaps under some “pressure” from high-ranking officials is currently leading an intensive campaign to naturalization noncitizens, specifically targeting refugee populated rural (mares) areas. This implies that the government needs a significant
number to show progress to the international community. At the same time, the naturalization of the urban population living
in dormitories in Yerevan has largely stopped. Perhaps this part of the refugee population is considered to be the most
persistent in their decision to resist naturalization.
16
After this study was completed, it was decided officially to put artificial barriers on the free movement of refugees
through delaying the issuing of travel documents, which government officials think might motivate refugees to apply for
citizenship. It is clear that the government is seeking to prevent a huge wave of emigration, but that the government has to
issue these travel documents as prescribed by the newly adopted law.
10
the need to distinguish between refugees, IDPs, returnees, and war victims” (Adelman, 1999:100). Thus, it seems that
from refugee protection, the focus of this agency has shifted to refugee welfare issues.
UNHCR established its presence in Armenia in 1992, and has been closely involved in refugee protection
and relief activities over the years, including the construction of some two thousand cottages for refugees, the repair
of collective residences, the rehabilitation of irrigation and drinking water systems, the provision of self-help material
to renovate homes, etc. In light of the current situation, in Armenia, the UNHCR recently reduced its humanitarian
mission. At present it predominantly performs activities aimed at “building the capacity for central and local
authorities, as well as NGOs through technical assistance, joint training, by handing over the responsibility of
government and non-government partners engaging them in refugee and IDPs related matters,” which seems to be
excessively gradual (emphasis added) (UNHCR, 1999). In all likelihood, this organization’s mission in Armenia has
been expanded and prolonged for several years for justifiable reasons—to enable the authorities to establish
mechanisms on the asylum processes of the country, to train to manage assistance projects of refugees, to enhance
public (refugee population) awareness of the refugee-related issues of great interest and to facilitate the
implementation of integration policies. Ten years have passed, but although the legislation on refugees has been
adopted, it is actually not enforced. In other words, the issue is still on the agenda. This seems to indicate that the
implementing bodies themselves have no motivation to finalize the integration process. The “From Refugee to
Armenian Citizen” leaflet, for example, is designed to bring the advantages of citizenship to the public’s attention. It
seems, however, that there is no mechanism guaranteeing that the information this agency strives to disseminate
reaches to addressees, and no one seems to care for the fulfillment of the leaflet’s promises.
This organization tries to encourage the target population to acquire citizenship, to revise the scheme of
providing assistance and shelter and promises to prioritize those refugees who are willing to acquire or have already
acquired citizenship17 (UNHCR, 1998). In practice, however, refugees who have already acquired citizenship are
deprived from the assistance provided in recent years, let alone receiving apartments and compensation.18
Undoubtedly, the UNHCR has played a decisive role in addressing the needs of ethnic Armenian refugees.
Moreover, only seven national organizations have benefited from NGO funds19 and have become UNHCR
implementing partners. All of these agencies provide assistance to refugees, (mainly legal advocacy), thus
“facilitating” integration and naturalization. In accordance with its general mandate, however, UNHCR must only
support refugees during the period of their arrival and adaptation. Therefore, the time has come to reduce its current
humanitarian assistance role to a reduced presence in its branch office in the capital. Given the ten-year existence of
refugee problems, all of these efforts seem to be too gradual. Indeed, why not “promote” further public awareness on
refugee issues, hold seminars, train local authorities, etc.? No doubt all of this work is quite relevant and useful for
the Armenian government, including the central and local authorities, etc., but for how long? There has been little
accomplished for over ten years, and at present refugee issues still are not properly addressed; shelter and
unemployment issues are still unresolved, the acquisition of citizenship is not properly pursued; and while a refugee
law has been adopted, it is not enforced.
Like any organization, the UNCHR must be flexible enough to adjust to changes in environment.
Interestingly, however, with regard to the refugee situation, there has been almost no change: refugees are neither
officially recognized as such (as they should be according to the Refugee Law of the Republic of Armenia), nor are
they officially recognized as citizens. This uncertainty perhaps ensures the future operations of the UNHCR. Of
necessity, it must reformulate its mandate from primary assistance to the long-term implementation of
“naturalization” policies, capacity building, awareness campaigns, etc. One may note that there are many other
countries in need of immediate refugee settlement support, requesting essential human and material resources,
humanitarian assistance, and UN missions for protecting the rights of forced migrants.
In promoting public awareness to increase the awareness of refugee interest in acquiring citizenship,
UNHCR representatives advise refugees to naturalize by promising all the advantages they currently enjoy, including
covering the expenses of acquiring passports. In reality, however, the number of individuals who acquire Armenian
citizenship remains unchanged. Instead of resolving such primary problems as shelter, unemployment or the
privatization of communal centers, which would provide a more enduring solution, this agency probably enjoys the
slow and prolonged process of naturalization, hardly ensuring integration.20
Thus, it is possible that the UNHCR benefits by postponing the naturalization of ethnic Armenian refugees.
This agency will not be placed in a favorable situation by refugees either acquiring citizenship en masse or the same
17
It is interesting to note that UNHCR has promised to give priority to shelter projects for those refugees who acquire
citizenship, and thus help motivate them to undertake this step. Refugees, however, have no faith in these claims after tenyears of similar promises and the absence of solutions.
18
This statement is justified by the example of one of the respondents who acquired citizenship in 1995 and regretted it as
he has not received any aid from that time.
19
An NGO fund is envisioned by the UNHCR for enabling NGOs involved in refugee or migration affairs to act on behalf
of refugees. Through this fund, the UNHCR also supports the participation of NGO representatives in workshops, seminars
and conferences aimed at promoting awareness of refugee issues and to increase the effectiveness of these organizations.
20
As published in a newspaper on August 9, 1999, a huge wave of refugees lodged a complaint with the UNHCR on the
deliberate postponement of providing travel documents. The UNHCR representative reportedly recommended that they
acquire citizenship to solve the problem (Poghosian, 1999a).
11
individuals receiving travel documents and emigrating to other countries. One might ask who still seeks refuge in
Armenia? As the former head of the Refugee and Migration Department noted in an interview, only several Africans
have asked for refugee status in Armenia. Moreover, only one was approved, since most of them are not forced or
political but economic migrants, which contradicts to the Geneva Convention and Article 1 of the Refugee Law of
RA (Poghosyan, 1999a).21
Like the DMR, the UNHCR is probably also in need of refugees to continue its involvement in the country.
Currently, it seems that UNHCR pursues its own interests. In other words, if there is a need to ensure an
organization’s further operation, it is not difficult to generate and sustain enough reasons to enhance and continue its
campaign. In Armenian, a project of this nature is executed under the umbrella of “citizenship acquisition to ensure
durable solution for refugees.” More than ten years have passed. The policy pursed seems to prolong a problem rather
than to provide a long-term solution. After all, citizenship does not change anything in refugees’ lives. Nonetheless,
for how long will they be considered refugees only to justify the continuing activities of the institutions named
above?
In concluding the analysis of policy from the institutional perspective, it must be noted that the acquiring of
citizenship by refugees jeopardizes the future functioning of the DMR and the UNHCR. Moreover, there is a lack of
coordination between the agencies involved, buttressed by the fact that “they speak in different languages” with
regard to the target group, which confuses refugees. Overall, despite the apathetic or passive behavior of some
refugees, there is a lack of valid information about the rights of refugees and citizens. As a result, the current
ambiguity enables these institutions to continue their mission through engaging in national assistance programs,
refugee advocacy activities, the dissemination of information, etc.
2. The Rational Model
A survey of the refugees, conducted among a population that was living in a dormitory, revealed an interesting
trend regarding the citizenship issue. The overall attitude of the group with regard to their living conditions,
government policy assessment and its relevance and the need for aid was quite consistent. 22 The policy analysis
conducted from the rational perspective indicated that the refusal of ethnic Armenian refugees to become naturalised
seems to be based on pure self-interest. The conducted survey revealed two interesting trend regarding refugee
behavior (See Table 2).23
Table 2
Division of the Ethnic Armenian Refugee Community24
Indicators
Refugees
Type A
General Background
Participation in elections
First generation refugees (age 41-58)
Second generation refugees (age 1833)
Never voted
(does not affect)
Type B
Second generation refugees (age
20-29)
Never voted
(affects)
21
During his interview, he also promised that cottages constructed due to in-kind UNHCR donations in Ashtarak will not be
granted to other refugees. This hardly makes any difference for Armenian refugees given the conditions of these cottages
and their remote location. Actually these cottages were constructed to tie refugees, who are mostly from urban areas, to the
land, but increasing numbers are refusing to from the capital’s dormitories. This is explained by the fact that they have
already seen the advantages of living in the city.
22
A general portrait of the target group is presented in Annex 1.
One of the respondents, an 85-year old male, is a unique case in this group of respondents, as he has both refugee
status and Armenian citizenship. He was granted a “blue” passport by the first president of the newly independent
republic during the fiftieth celebration of WWII Victory Day. He was also promised an apartment and compensation
but never received either. Presently, he regrets acquiring citizenship as he lost his aid privileges. Nevertheless, he has
recently been permitted to live in the refugee dormitory by the Head of the Department of Refugees and Migration.
This participant is the only one who voted during elections. As this individual so distinct from the remainder of the
interviewees, his responses are an anomaly for the purposes of this study, and, hence, were excluded.
24
This data is based on interviews with refugees conducted in August-September, 1999 in the dormitory.
23
12
Interest/
Awareness
in Politics
Aware, but not
interested in politics
Aware, more or less
interested in politics
No Right to Vote
Does not affect
(politically apathetic, disappointed)
Affects
(more or less optimistic,
concerned with this right)
RA Citizenship
Refuse
Willing, but bargain
Refugee Status Value
Valuable
(gives protection for shelter and
entitlements)
Has no value
(but is still something)
Reason
Emigration from Armenia/other country
citizenship possibilities
Right for Privatization
(in this case dormitory)
1) Refugees who do not care about citizenship (hereafter considered as Type A)—these are people who are
politically apathetic and disappointed. They do not see any benefit to themselves in acquiring Armenian
citizenship and intend to leave the country as soon as they obtain their travel documents. The failure of the
government to meet their expectations in the early 1990s and their current disappointment explain their behavior.
Under no circumstances (including the privatization of a dormitory room, privileges, entitlements, humanitarian
aid and compensation) do they agree to obtain citizenship.
2) The optimistic category (hereafter considered as Type B)—consists of people who are more or less optimistic
and still hope that citizenship is something valuable. This is seemingly based on psychological reasons, and the
desire to lose the refugee label. However, these individuals are only willing to give up their refugee status and
acquire citizenship if they are permitted to privatize their dormitory room.
A) First Refuge Category
1.
Type A
Category: Refugees who see no gain in acquiring Armenian citizenship and intend to leave the country
upon receiving travel documents;
The Type A category of refugees is subdivided into three sub-groups:
(a) Apathetic: people who are aware of the politics of their host country but have never voted as
refugees and feel unaffected by developments in the political realm.
(b) Careless: people who are not interested in politics, have never voted and have no desire to take
part in political life of Armenia. The fact that their voice is not heard does not have any effect on
them.
(c) Disappointed: people who are more or less interested in politics but have never voted and have
no desire to participate in the political life of Armenia. Nevertheless, they feel affected by the lack
of a right to vote as they are Armenians who have lived in the country for eleven years and must
have equal rights with full citizens. At the same time, they are unwilling to vote in the upcoming
elections as they have lost their faith in government and are quite persistent in their opinion that
their voice would not change the results.
The most common shared characteristic in these three sub-categories is the intention of these
individuals to leave the country; i.e., nothing holds them in Armenia. The specific characteristics
of these individuals are as follows:
13
1. General background 0 (specific differences from the optimistic Type B category)
The apathetic/disappointed group can be distinguished by age criterion:
a) Second generation (18-33) refugees who are either students or failed when applying to
university, and those who were recently married or are unemployed and depend on the support
of the older generation. This category has overcome language barriers to a large extent as they
were educated in Armenia.
b) First generation refugees (41-58) who are heads of households and have to support family(ies)
of their children and who still have language difficulties.
Both these age sub-groups consider their rights as refugees have been violated since they are
compelled to serve in the army although they are not citizens of Armenia.25
2. Citizenship acquisition
This group has no desire to acquire Armenian citizenship. This justified by the fact that
they have “other plans,” implying that they would leave the country regardless of any other
benefits, whether compensation paid by Azerbaijan for lost property or a privatized space in a
dormitory. They see no future either for themselves or their children in Armenia. After having
been trapped in Armenia for eleven years, they will leave upon receiving their travel document,
mainly for economic reasons.
3. The Value of Refugee Status
Although refugees often feel humiliated or offended, they still accept the value of their refugee status. The “blue”
passport, the passport of Armenian citizens is, on the other hand, nothing but the right to vote—a privilege about
which they do not care. The reason why these people still see their refugee status as invaluable is the hope for the
receipt of aid, the protection of their interests and a certain confidence that they will not be thrown out from the
dormitory. In other words, this piece of paper provides them with substantial benefits.
Nevertheless, the most crucial factor reinforcing the value of this status is its power to be used for acquiring
travel documents, for which they wait for impatiently. Among these people, some (primarily young males) do not
even care for travel documents, and, given a chance, will leave the country anyway. For them, refugee status is
nothing as they make no use of it. The piece of paper is perceived simply as a business card. It is interesting to note
that if these individuals were allowed to privatize dormitories, they would either sell their apartments in order to leave
the country with the income or retain the property, expecting to eventually return. This last comment implies that the
refugees still fear being persecuted and thrown out of other countries. It is conceivable to them, therefore, that they
might have no other choice but to return to Armenia.
Overall, the implication of this perspective is clear: these refugees are so desperate to leave the country that
are ready to do so regardless of any benefits offered for staying. The only reason why they do not leave is because
they can neither afford to do so nor have the right to move freely, based on their former Soviet passports.
4. Identity
The motherland of the refugees is any country (Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, etc…) other than Armenia. Some
even confess that they do not have a home country at the moment. They explain this by stating that, after being forced
from their previous residence, they did not care about their lost property, fostered by the hope that they were
returning to their home country at last and that Armenia would welcome them “with open arms.” However, after
eleven years living as something between refugees and citizens, they regretted for their initial “patriotic” feelings and
“high” expectations. They are deeply offended, especially considering that the locals, “with [their] nationalistic
ideology” treated them as “Turkified” Armenians.
When asked about their identity, the refugees do not primarily see themselves as Armenians disappointed
with the current situation and the government’s attitude towards them, they see themselves as immigrants who are
only temporarily in Armenia. Their “Armenian-ness” is somewhere far in their sub-consciousness and appears to be
one of the last factors with which they would identify. It is possible, perhaps, that they might think otherwise under
different circumstances, but at present they do not mention that they are Armenian by origin as this seems to be a
minimal factor in their identities.
25
The case of these refugees is complex in terms of de jure recognition and de facto treatment. They are treated as de
facto citizens in terms of military conscription, despite the state law on citizenship, which states that only citizens and
volunteers can be drafted. At the same time, the Refugee Law states that refugees should not be drafted. In terms of
elections, refugees are not considered de facto citizens and are deprived of their political and civil rights based on
Convention and the Refugee Law. These contradictions between international instruments signed and domestic
legislation clearly violate refugee rights.
14
These refugees also think that they are different from local Armenians. As one interviewee tried to explain,
she saw herself as living in a heterogeneous society (in an international community), enjoying equal rights and
privileges with Russians, Azeris, etc. For them, their ethnicity did not matter. In Armenia, however, society was and
is currently too homogeneous. People first looked at the nationality of others and only then at the qualitative features
of the individual. From this woman’s perspective, this was the main reason why local Armenians put barriers on the
way of their successful integration. They do not see refugees as indigenous Armenians. Thus, it may be concluded
that the negative attitude these people experience is so persistent that they are unable to bear the conditions, are fed up
with their social and economic hardships and have absolutely nothing (even a sense of patriotism) that could hold
them in Armenia.
Therefore, it may be concluded that this group has no desire for Armenian citizenship. For
the, an Armenian passport has no value—they have “other plans,” implying that they would leave
the country and acquire citizenship in another country, regardless of any benefits offered by
Armenia. Nothing will hold them in Armenia, and they see no future in that country either for
them or their children.
While receiving aid these individuals still accept refugee status, whereas an Armenian passport is nothing
but the right to vote—something about which they do not care. The reason these people maintain their refugee status
is because of the aid, the protection of their interests and housing. In other words, a refugee document allows them to
reside in a dormitory and enjoy the rights and privileges of refugees. Nevertheless, the most crucial factor reinforcing
the value of refugee status is its power to be used for acquiring travel documents. In sum, the implication is clear:
these refugees are so desperate to leave the country that they are ready to do so regardless of any benefits to staying.
The only reason why they do not leave is that they cannot afford to do so and have no right to move freely based on
their holding Soviet passports.
B) Second Refuge Status
The second group of refugees is comprised of those who are more or less optimistic and still see citizenship as
something valuable for them. This appears to be based purely on psychological reasons and a desire to lose the
“refugee” label. However, these individuals are willing to shed their refugee status and acquire Armenian citizenship
only if they are allowed to privatize their rooms in the dormitory.
Type B
2. Category: People who are more or less optimistic, and still have hope that Armenian citizenship has value based
just on purely psychological reasons.
The second category has different characteristics than the first group. Namely, individuals
in this category are interested in the politics of the country, but have never been given a chance to
vote while living in Armenia.26 Not having the right to vote affects them as they feel like nonhuman beings or children rather than adults capable of judging whom and what to vote for.
Individuals in the type B category seek to acquire RA citizenship. However, these people
will give up their refugee status and acquire citizenship only if allowed to privatize dormitory
rooms. In addition, these people belong to a particular age category, and their desire to apply for
citizenship can also be explained by their realizing the significant reduction of the privileges they
enjoyed as refugees. At present, they see almost no difference between being a refugee and a
citizen of Armenia. At first glance those in this category seem proud of becoming citizens, but
their patriotic feelings are impulsive. Eventually, they set preconditions while being asked to
apply for Armenian citizenship.
1. General background (with emphasis on specific differences from Type A)
Members of the Type B category are predominantly second generation (20-29 years of age), unemployed,
not married and are supported by their parents. A sub-group of this generation has overcome the language barrier and
(surprisingly) is proud of being drafted into the Armenian army. For them this indicates that they are really
recognized citizens of the Armenian, despite the fact that they hold refugee status.
26
Despite the fact that these refugees did not seek to participate in the most recent elections, they were quick to point out
that they had no right to vote. In reality, however, refugees have been permitted to vote several times (e.g., during the
presidential elections). Newly arrived residents of this dormitory confirmed this. Those who were displaced from hotels or
married and returned to the dormitory, confessed that they were urged to vote but had no opinion as to who to vote for.
Despite this, none of them were allowed to vote in the last elections (for the president and the National Assembly).
15
2. Acquisition of Citizenship
Individuals in this category are willing to acquire Armenian citizenship on the condition that their dormitory
rooms are privatized. Hence, the issue of shelter is quite acute for them. It is interesting to note that they would leave
the country if they received travel documents. However, if they could privatize their dormitory rooms, they would
stay in Armenia. Their willingness to stay is, however, conditional and hinges on their socio-economic conditions.
The reasons behind this bargaining behavior are as follows.
On the one hand they would stay in Armenia:
first, because of their apartments;
second, since they love the country and do not want to seek refuge again or experience the language difficulties
and other hardships connected with migration.
On the other hand, however, without benefiting from obtaining citizenship, they will not be naturalized. Since they
bargain against acquiring citizenship, this may imply two things, namely that:
their behavior is conditioned by perception of the circumstances and factors affecting them;
second, that they have something to bargain for.
Consequently, once offered the right to the privatization of their dormitory space, they apply for citizenship.
3. The Value of the Status of Refugee
For this type, refugee status has no value and is considered a non-authentic status.27 The fear of losing their
dormitory space is quite natural, considering they have no other alternative. Furthermore, if they were allowed to
privatize their dormitory apartment, they would sell it to buy a new, more comfortable one rather than use the income
to leave the country. All this speaks towards their being more or less integrated into Armenian society, which is
partially explained by their age (a young generation that has been educated in Armenia), the lack of a language barrier
and not having a negative attitude toward Armenian society.
4. Identity
The optimistic group considers Armenia as their motherland. These people, as opposed to the previous group,
identify themselves as (de facto) citizens of Armenia or as Armenians, but as their feelings go beyond their
patriotism, it may be concluded that even the patriotism of these people is conditioned. This implies that the Type B
group is patriotic to an extent that does not infringe upon the benefits of refugee status.
Thus, these people are willing to acquire Armenian citizenship, which is conditional on the right to privatize
their apartments. It is interesting to note that they would leave the country if they received a travel document.
However, if they were allowed to privatize their dormitory space (or receive compensation), they would stay in the
country. Their staying in Armenia is, however, conditional on their socio-economic well being and privatization
(respectively): first, because A privatized apartment holds them, and second—since they love Armenia—they do not
want to seek refuge or experience language difficulties again. On the other hand, without concrete benefits for
acquiring citizenship, they will not be naturalized.
For this category, refugee status is practically nothing, and it has no value since they consider it as a nonauthentic status.28 In other words, to them, it is a piece of paper without value and only protects against displacement
or removal from their current residence. The fear of losing their dormitory space is quite natural since they have no
other alternative. Interestingly this refugee sub-group is the second generation of refugees who had more of an
opportunity to interact directly with the indigenous population, as they graduated from Armenian educational
institutions and seem to be more or less integrated.
Trade Off: Refugee Status versus Citizenship
It can be inferred that, for refugees, taking Armenian citizenship comes with the threat of losing the advantages
and legal protection they enjoy by having refugee status. Citizenship offers refugees the following rights, which are
actually not as valuable as those they have by virtue of holding refugee:
(1) the right to participate in the political processes of the country and to be elected (but even if refugees were
given this right, it would hardly make a difference—a part of the refugee group is politically apathetic and
intends to emigrate, and the second half, although interested in politics, cannot sacrifice their refugee status
for the right to participate in political life as it would entail the loss of temporary shelter);
27
This perception was usually based on comparison with refugee conditions in other countries, based on discussions
with relatives living abroad and having (as they call it) a “better life.”
28
This perception was usually based on a comparison with refugee conditions in other countries as reported by their
relatives living abroad.
16
(2) the right to privatise property (although in reality they have nothing to privatise since the privatisation of
dormitories, illegally occupied basements, apartments and other dwellings is still under consideration by
the government);
(3) the right to travel (although refugees currently are hoping to receive travel documents under the newly
adopted Refugee Law of 1999).
Thus, the acquisition of citizenship cannot be seen as favourable since it does not compensate for the
disadvantages of giving up refugee status. In becoming citizens, for example, refugees lose the protection of living in
temporary dwellings and can be evicted at anytime (the protection of temporary shelters is based on an Armenian
governmental decree). In addition, refugee status offers them entitlements, hopes of emigrating and travel documents.
It must be noted that, among the reasons refugee behaviour, fear of the loss of entitlement for humanitarian aid and of
being drafted into the army (according to the Armenian Constitution), as well as hope for the possibility of being
compensated for lost property were major factors. These reasons, however, play an insignificant role in their refusal
to acquire Armenian citizenship.
For refugees the issue of shelter has become an immediate priority. For one part of the target group, the fear of
losing their temporary accommodation impedes their desire to gain Armenian citizenship. Another group of this
population is completely apathetic about obtaining Armenian citizenship. For them, even privatizing dormitories will
not keep them in the country, as they intend to leave the country to seek a better life abroad for economic reasons. As
a result, they deliberately oppose acquiring citizenship. This indicates that this group has unfounded “dreams” of
leaving that block the feasibility of the mass acquisition of citizenship. They consider that leaving the country as
refugees could solve all of their problems and assist obtaining refugee status in other country, which is perceived as
more “advantageous,” but these are only dreams. A refugee cannot stay as such forever; the label is temporary by
nature and not a permanent means to protection, aid, support, entitlements, etc. Eventually, a refugee is either
returned to his/her home country (after the conflict/war is over), resettled in a third country or integrated and
naturalized.
At present, ethnic Armenia refugees, despite some restrictions on their political and civil rights, are de facto
recognized as citizens of Armenia. Especially in relation to issues important to the state such as conscription, refugees
are considered to be de facto citizens. At the same time, de facto citizens do not have equal rights. In relation to issues
having a direct effect on their lives, refugees are not considered citizens—they do not have an Armenian passport, the
right to move, the right to own privatize property or the right to participate in the political life of the country.
To summarize, let us note that the rational model considers policy analysis from the rationale of “maximizing
social gains,” mainly revealing whether “the values this particular policy strives overweigh values it sacrifices” (Dye,
1995:27). The examination of the refugee policy from this model has discovered that the policy of integration pursued
by the government of Armenia, with particular reference to the naturalisation stage, does not outweigh the values it
sacrifices. In fact, it hardly makes a difference in the life of these refugees.
The naturalization campaign is being implemented unsuccessfully for a number of reasons,
among which is the refugees’ expectation of refugees of receiving the refugee status prescribed by
the 1999 legislation and travel documents enabling them to move. This has become even more
evident after waves of refugees demanded the publication of the newly adopted law and crowds
occupied the DMR and UNHCR, ostensibly to protest the obstacles postponing the consideration
of the travel document issue by the National Assembly. As reported by one newspaper, this
rushing of the process was preceded by the US President stating that the US government would
accept 20,000 refugees in the last year of the millenium (Poghosyan, 1999:a, 1999:b).
It may seem natural for the provision of travel documents to lead to a huge wave of
refugee emigration. After all, these people have lost their faith in the future—an outlook that is
largely supported by the inaction of the Armenian government over the last ten years. At the same
time, refugees are afraid of being late in reaching their final (perhaps) “destination”—a country of
their dreams, because of the difficulty in acquiring travel documents (Poghosyan, 1999:a, 1999:b).
However, the dreams of these refugees hardly ever come true as there are “man-made” obstacles
to acquiring and using travel documents.
It is clear that, at present, no one is rushing to acquire Armenian citizenship, despite the
fact that a new (September, 1999) amendment to the “Law on Citizenship (1995)” extends the
deadline for refugees to apply for citizenship to December 31, 2001 instead of the original
December 31, 1998 (Novoe Vremya, 1999). The final steps towards integration, naturalization,
17
appears irrelevant for these refugees. An Armenian passport offers no additional benefits to them.
It is either laden with the fear of losing the protection of the right to shelter they enjoy as refugees
or with an obstacle to their future plans (or both). As a result, the final stage of the naturalisation
policy has not been successful.
Part V
Conclusion
In Perico Rodriguez’s view, “a refugee is a person who does not want to be a refugee”
(Lindberg & Miseries, 1991:87). Ethnic Armenian refugees probably have enough grounds to
argue this statement. This study has revealed real obstacles contributing to the delay in
naturalising displaced persons. It has become evident that neither for refugees nor for the
institutions involved is the acquisition of citizenship advantageous. Refugee resistance to
naturalisation is explained by rational self-interest and is reinforced by the institutional settings.
Thus, overall, the government’s goal of finishing the integration process through naturalizing
refugees rather than by addressing existing problems contributes to their reluctance to obtain
citizenship.
The “refugee” category was expected to disappear after these individuals were
successfully naturalized, but this has not been the case. The Armenian government has not
attempted so much to reduce but rather to eliminate the refugee group for ten years. Supposedly,
this would enable the government to lose their responsibility for addressing the problems of this
group and equalize them with the plights of ordinary citizens. Once there is no well-specified
target group in need of assistance, it is "presumed" that there is no "problem of refugees" at all.
The country itself is experiencing an economic crisis, high unemployment, and extreme housing
problems (e.g., as a result of the 1988 devastating earthquake, which left thousands of people
without shelter and who, for twelve years, have lived in wooden/iron makeshift shacks). By
avoiding its responsibility, the government will let refugees survive as ordinary citizens free to
make any necessary effort to survive in the current environment. In the meantime, as far as the de
juro refugee group exists, one should address their problems and listen to the demands they
present during demonstrations. On the other hand, there is a need for refugees in the country for
the same government and institutions to ensure their missions and to justify their budget
requests—in other words, to keep attracting international aid.
Eventually, both the rational and institutional approaches reveal obstacles, the clarification and removal of
which would facilitate the successful integration of these refugees. For the agencies involved, delaying citizenship
acquisition enables them to continue their mission through engagement in countrywide assistance programs, refugee
advocacy activities, the dissemination of information, etc. In addition, despite the apathy and passive behavior of
some refugees, in reality there is a lack of information for both refugees and citizens. In reality, the UNHCR and the
DMR speak different languages. As a result, refugees have only a vague understanding of the issues affecting them,
and the information they have is based mostly on hearsay. The simple provision of information to refugees could be a
powerful tool that would enable them to fight for that which is prescribed for them by law. The absence of such a
frank exchange on the positive and negative sides of citizenship fosters distrust and results in unfounded dreams with
regard to emigration from the country as refugees. They live with uncertainty and presumably this has been the main
source of their carelessness, apathy and distrust. As a result, refugees live on hopes that are unlikely to be realized.
For refugees, naturalization makes no difference. From the rational model perspective, it
should be noted that the survey revealed that the last stage of integration does not overweigh
values it sacrifices. The benefits of refugee status are not perceived as aid or compensation, but
mostly hinge on: the protection of their current place of residence and a chance to emigrate,
mostly for economic reasons.
Thus, this study indicates that naturalization is senseless as it does not make any positive
changes. This implies that the statement “what is sacrificed for what, and whether it is worthwhile
to be sacrificed” has and will have a negative response, unless more reasonable incentives are put
in force.
Overall, the study has led to three conclusions:
18
(1) the social and economic integration of the target group has been accomplished to some
extent, but numerous problems still persist. Moreover, there is no need to “deepen”
integration through naturalization;
(2) refugees are waiting impatiently for travel documents to leave the country, or are
bargaining for additional benefits in order to compromise and acquire citizenship;
(3) refugees are still dependent on aid and feel entitled to privileges (although in insignificant
numbers, this does exist).
From the rational policy model perspective, which strives to obtain maximum social gains, the
“government should choose policies resulting in gains to society that exceed costs by the greatest
amount,” and, similarly, “government should refrain from policies if costs are not exceeded by
gains” (Dye, 1995:29). In addition, one of the important requirements of this model is that
policymakers should be aware of society’s value preferences and their relative weights (Dye,
1995).
The Armenian government presumably is aware of the preferences of refugees, which are
identical with the expectations of ordinary citizens of Armenia. The country is still experiencing
the hardships of a difficult transition period coupled with harsh socio-economic conditions,
unemployment, the mass outflow of educated individuals, etc. However, must the government
choose an alternative that would maximally address refugee preferences, while having the
remaining population in such dire circumstances? In light of the present circumstances and after
ten years, one must ask for how long can Armenian-born refugees in Armenia be considered de
jure refugees.
Experience has shown that in a developed country, refugees matching the definition of the
term “refugee,” as defined in Geneva Convention (1951, Article 1), are supported for two to three
years through basic material support and the provision of shelter, health care, etc. Moreover,
refugees are granted the opportunity to work. After this initial period, refugees gradually have
their privileges reduced as they are considered to be capable of sustaining themselves. In
accordance, when refugees see no benefit in holding their status, they, rationally make a choice
after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining their status. Interestingly, in most
cases—regardless of whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with their economic
circumstances—people appear driven to acquire citizenship.
One issue should be highlighted in the Armenian case: the perceived value of citizenship in a
country of refuge plays a decisive role while making a choice to refuse refugee status. This issue
is crucial and deeply rooted in the reality of the Armenian case study. Armenian citizenship
neither offers employment opportunities (they have right to work in Armenia without citizenship,
although whether they can find a job or are able to work due to language difficulties is another
matter) nor addresses their socio-economic needs. For ethnic Armenian refugees living in
Armenia, Armenian citizenship has practically no value: (1) either because of the reasons
presented above, or (2) even if citizenship is seen as desirable, these individuals have begun
bargaining before giving up their refugee status. This last statement implies that they still have
something to bargain for, which, once removed, can lead to tangible results.
Part VI
Recommendations
The goal of naturalization is to provide refugees with a legal status in the country, since
they are considered stateless at present. They have neither certificates stating that they are
recognized as refugees based on the 1999 legislation nor valid passports, but hold Soviet
passports stating that they are citizens of the Soviet Azerbaijani Republic, a state that no longer
exists. Furthermore, there is a perception that the naturalization law is not for ethnic Armenian
refugees, but for others who might seek asylum in Armenia.
19
Although these displaced persons are considered de jure refugees, they are recognized as
de facto citizens in some important areas. They are, for example, drafted into the army, a practice
that contradicts the 1999 Law on Refugees (which states that refugees can be drafted only if they
are willing to serve in the army) and the 1995 Law of Citizenship (which states that only citizens
can be drafted). As de facto citizens, refugees are deprived of their political and civil rights, e.g.,
they do not have the right to participate in elections. Moreover, naturalization may solve another
problem. At present, there is an intense wave of emigration from Armenia and approximately one
third of the population has left the country in the last seven years.29 Considering that the refugees
number nearly 300,000, a large percent of the countries residents are not heard. In addition, the
refugee category may be considered to be like a minority group with no representation in
parliament or local self-government. Thus, the agenda must be to integrate refugees by whatever
means and to finalize naturalization to give them legal status and right to participate in political
life.
To some extent, integration has taken place.30 As noted already, refugees enjoy similar rights
to citizens, are drafted for military service and have the right to employment. In other words, these
people are de facto citizens of Armenia, with the important exceptions of the right to vote, to run
for office and to hold privatized property. To finalize the process of integration and naturalization,
however, the government has to undertake more effective measures. First, the problem can be
addressed to a certain extent through an information campaign comprised of clear messages on
refugee issues. Priority should be given to the provision of information on all options backed by
facts, laws, government resolutions, etc, rather than promises removed from reality. Moreover,
promises need to be kept. Presumably, this would renew the trust and faith refugees lost during
the last ten years.
Second, the government and agencies involved in refugee affairs should follow-up to see
whether the information is adequate and has reached the target population. For example, in a 1999
UNHCR leaflet, it is clearly stated that the “DMR will give a document certifying that you were
previously registered as a refugee, and also will keep a record of people who were formally
registered as refugees.” However, during site visits to both DMR and UNHCR office, it was
discovered that the staff had no idea what this document looked like, and there was no record of
refugees who have already acquired citizenship. Consequently, the target population has little
faith in this mechanism.
Other recommendations for the government directly related to facilitating the completion of
the naturalization policy are rather scarce. Generally the solution seems to hinge on the bargaining
points of refugees, indicating that they still have something with which to bargain. The removal of
these items perhaps could help encourage naturalisation. In addition, the following propositions
should be analyzed and discussed to support the implementation of the refugee policy.
First, the government could consider providing refugees with a certificate of their status,
which would provide refugees with a sense of security. This is, however, incompatible with both
international provisions and state legislation as it contradicts the Geneva Convention (1951) and
Article 1 of the “Law on Refugees of the Republic of Armenia” (1999). Both documents imply
that refugees should give up their refugee status while applying for citizenship. Thus, while
acceptable to refugees, this option is not justified by normative acts.31
29
Technical Cooperation in Transition countries: “A Strategy of Technical Cooperation and Migration for Countries
in Transition.
30
Integration only took place to some extent as these people still perceive a negative attitude from the larger society, face
economic hardships and are largely unemployed.
31
Some changes have been reported with regard to the implementation process of the naturalization policy, although the
reasons for these drastic changes have not been articulated. The latest initiatives were initiated at the higher levels of
government as a result of changes in the leadership of the DMR. From the institutional process perspective, it is too early to
say whether these changes will succeed in the future.
Interestingly, this option corresponds to some extent with the current practice of the authorities actively naturalizing
refugees in the regions of Armenia, while the urban refugee population is largely not approached. During a recent seminar
at the DMR, it was noted that the actual moment these refugees give up their refugee documents is extremely painful to
20
Second, since refugees are concerned with shelter and bargain for it in order to acquire
citizenship, the government can successfully integrate the group by addressing this issue. The
government should simply provide the target group with permanent places of residence through
an enormous construction program or allow refugees living in communal centers to privatize their
rooms in the dormitories and, thus, to become citizens. Neither alternative is as simple in reality.
The first is not feasible given the present economic situation and in consideration of the need of
Armenian citizens (especially the 1988 earthquake victims) for new apartments. While the second
option does not seem beneficial to the state agencies that own these dormitories (e.g., the Ministry
of Health, the Ministry of Social Security, etc.).
Third, an amendment in the refugee law or statutes can be made to establish a ceiling on the
number of years refugees may retain their status. After six or seven years, for example, refugees
would automatically become citizens of Armenia. Such a solution may seem appropriate for the
Armenian case, but this is considered inhumane from the perspective of international law. If, for
example, refugees resisted the loss of their status, the government would be forcing these people
into a “no man’s land” where they would be neither citizens nor refugees. International law, on
the other hand, clearly indicates that the integration and naturalization of refugees should be
sought rather than imposed.
Fourth, a more promising possibility to naturalize refugees is to put a ceiling on their right to
reside in dormitories or other state-owned facilities. This is to say that after a certain period of
time, refugees would automatically lose their temporary place of residence. This may seem
inhumane, but the government could also provide long-term loans for the procurement of new
apartments to facilitate the transition.
All of these proposals seem to impose the acquisition of citizenship. The point is that naturalization does not
guarantee the integration of refugees. Regardless of any recommendations proposed in this study, the issue will not be
addressed completely if the core concerns of this population are not addressed. The government may remove the
tangible benefits currently provided to refugees, but this may not motivate them to obtain citizenship. Refugees need
to be assisted from their arrival. The solution, however, must focus on addressing social and economic problems by
providing long-term solutions rather than food parcels, which lead to the emergence of aid dependency syndrome.
There is a proverb stating that “instead of giving a fish, it would be better to teach one to catch it.” Therefore, by
providing refugees the opportunity to stand on their own feet by providing job opportunities and permanent shelter,
refugees would be discouraged from living on dreams of emigrating from the country and there would be no reason to
refuse citizenship. Subsequently, the following recommendations are proposed for facilitating the process of
integrating the refugees:
(1) the enhancement of the social security system to address the social and economic problems of the refugees;
(2) the resolution of the issue of shelter, partly by providing refugees the right to privatize their dormitory rooms or
with credits to buy/construct shelter on their own,
(3) the introduction of mechanisms to create jobs and to provide training and support in overcoming the language
barrier.
Eventually, a lasting solution to the refugee problem is only possible if the group’s social and economic needs are
addressed rather than merely naturalizing them. Presumably, once housing, employment and other socio-economic
factors are improved, naturalization would follow automatically.
Part VII
Recommendations for Future Research
As the sample group for in depth studies is typically small, this research cannot be generalized to a larger
refugee population. Nevertheless, this type of qualitative field study points out the need for a more thorough
exploration of the problem utilizing quantitative research methods. Additional further research in this field should
consider (1) the socio-economic consequences of the naturalisation policy, (2) the political and economic feasibility
them. Hence, the Head of the DMR head decided to provide a document, as if notifying that they were refugees for ten
years, and thus naturalize them. This indicates the urgency of attaining certain number of refugees acquiring RA citizenship,
set by the end of this year. It seems that the time has gradually come to show some results but it is not clear who is
interested in such a rapid change in the attitudes towards refugees.
21
of the naturalization process, and (3) the resources available for the government to meet the demands of the refugees.
Furthermore, follow-up studies should focus on investigating the socio-economic consequences of the naturalization
process, including:
the effect of terminating aid programs for the target group and the gradual decrease of international resources for
refugees ;
the feasibility of integrating refugees into the labor-market integration of refugees, especially
in consideration of the fact that many of them are over-qualified;
housing problems.
In the meantime, recommendations based on current evidence can be made. First, the
socio-economic consequences of the naturalization process have not been analyzed because
interviews with naturalized refugees were not conducted. At the time of this project, the number
of naturalized refugees was too small (2%). Future research should investigate the situation and
seek to measure the attitudes of naturalized refugees, to reveal (1) the psychological effects of
acquiring citizenship and the subsequent deprivation of refugee entitlements, future hopes, etc. (2)
whether citizenship is imposed or desired,32 and (3) what changes did acquiring citizenship make
to their socio-economic status.
Currently, the UNHCR and the DMR claim that—regardless of whether refugees acquire
citizenship—aid and services will continue to be provided. By the end of 1999, this was not the
case. Judging from refugee demonstrations and interviews, refugees claim that those who were
naturalized regretted the decision. This means that the termination of aid and entitlements may
leave refugees (especially elderly generation) without any chance for survival.33
2. The integration of naturalized refugees into the labor market is not realistic, not only because
they are overqualified but because of the scarcity of jobs. Refugees are not discriminated
against and have equal rights to be employed in the country, but the issue is whether they seek
to overcome the language barrier34 and are capable of finding appropriate positions. The
acquisition of citizenship will have absolutely no effect on their chances to be hired. Clearly,
integrating refuges into the labor market must be accompanied by the creation of jobs.
3. Housing problems are acute in the country. There is no question of that equitable opportunities
exist as the prices of real estate are very low, but neither refugees nor citizens can afford to
purchase accommodation. The only opportunity for refugees is to let them privatize dormitories.
Secondly, it is obvious that the political and economic feasibility of naturalizing refugees
is attainable. Amendments were passed to the Citizenship Law to simplify the naturalization
procedure for refugees, prolong the deadline for their applications and to nearly completely cover
acquiring passports. Moreover, refugee officers throughout all country have been assigned to
persuade refugees to naturalize. Currently, as the talks on the travel documents have intensified
amidst claims that refugees cannot move easily with their current documents, the naturalization
campaign has stopped.
As to the economic feasibility of naturalization, regardless of citizenship, the joblessness
of refugees will not be eliminated. First, unemployment in general is high. While financially,
32
If imposed, this might be considered the second human rights violation with regards to the naturalization process
according to the regulations of the Geneva Convention. While based on the Armenian Constitution, international
documents ratified by Armenia should prevail in the event of any conflict with national legislation.
33
The situation for older refugees is threatening during the winter time these people make fires in the dormitory to
save money on electricity as they allowances are hardly sufficient to buy bread. This is a response to the
government’s inaction as it is "playing deaf."
34
The Armenian Red Cross Society recently organized free computer and language courses for refugees to assist
them in entering the job market. An overwhelming majority refused to take Armenian language courses, instead
favoring instruction in English. Mostly Russian-speaking, these people are evidently not eager to learn their mother
tongue. This also may imply that they will not stay in the country for long and hope to leave.
22
refugees have no need to spend money on acquiring citizenship, naturalization is economically
feasible. Thirdly, the government lacks adequate resources (permanent housing35, long-term
loans, administration, documentation, etc.) to provide assistance programs to naturalized refugees.
The refugee support is provided primarily by the American Department of State through UNHCR.
It has become obvious, however, that the UNHCR budget is decreasing, and the time has come for
the government to take over the responsibility for the refugees. Furthermore, there are other
countries (Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.) where refugees need of urgent and more direct assistance. The
mission of this body is coming to its end slowly, but they have initiated income-generating miniprojects for refugees to be run by NGOs and shifted assistance for construction programs to repair
existing dorms rather than produce entirely new structures.
Nevertheless, these individuals are not provided assistance based on their refugee status,
but rather as determined by a PAROS system of needs assessment. Likewise, citizens receive
benefits after the same process. This is a deliberate attempt to equalize the entitlements of
refugees and locals. Based on this system, fewer refugees receive social welfare payments. The
consequences of this policy will have to be analyzed in the future.
Annex 1: Notes on the Survey
General conditions and background
The surveyed population ranged from 18 to 58 years old (with a proportionate distribution of females and
males in each age category) and had a higher or community college-level education. These people arrived under
difficult circumstances either before or after the pogroms. Some were warned by their Azeri neighbors to leave or be
forced to do so, some were assisted in leaving the country by the same Azeris or were thrown out by those Azeris
who fled from Armenia (mostly from rural areas). Thus, these people, who fled from urban areas are citizens of the
“post-Soviet Union.” In other words, all of them, including those who reached the age of 16 in Armenia,36 have the
old “red” passports of the Soviet Union and the legal status (blue document) of refugees. This target group is mostly
unemployed and has few possessions. They are generally satisfied with the dormitory conditions, mostly because they
have no other alternative. Practically all of them have experienced some discrimination or isolation perceived in their
own words as a negative or differentiating attitude from “some strata” (i.e., non-intelligentsia).37
Violation of Refugee Rights
Generally, all the respondents believed that their rights had been violated in Armenia on a number of issues.38
Overall, this perception was connected mainly with drafting refugees for military service. However, while the older
generation complaining about military conscription, some representatives of the younger generation expressed a
desire to serve in the army. This was explained by the feeling that the government had accepted them as equal,
potential citizens without differentiation. In their words, it would be strange if they were not drafted for military
service.
Language Barrier
Another thing that differed by age group was language. The younger generation, mostly those who studied in
Armenian educational institutions, consider Armenian to be their native language. The elderly, on the other hand, still
considers Russian as their native language and has some difficulties with Armenian. This is understandable as young
Initiating construction programs for refugees is less realistic considering that this may rouse strong
opposition from the 1988 earthquake victims who have lived in metal/wooden makeshift shelters (domiks) for 12
years.
35
36
Younger people (up to the age of 16) were still receiving the “red” passport of the Soviet Union as a travel
document as late as 1999.
37
This attitude was dominant in schools during the period immediately after the refugees arrived in Armenia. Later,
due to the language barrier, most classes were divided. The classes for refugee children allowed them to feel as a
majority and allowed them to study and protect one another. This gave time for both locals and refugees to adopt to
and each other.
38
Female respondents in particular noted that the language barrier, or their accent itself, is enough for people to label
them—if not specifically a refugee—bakvetsi (i.e., someone originally from Baku), which, according to them, is the
equivalent of being called a prostitute.
23
people had the opportunity for direct interactions with locals on a regular basis in their educational institutions, while
the older generation (mostly unemployed) is somewhat isolated and rarely escapes the “restricted dorm life,”
socializing mostly with other refugees.
Perceptions of Policies
The interviewees were unanimous in their negative assessment of the policy pursued by the government. These
people the government’s actions as absolutely irrelevant. That is, refugees consider the government’s responsibility to
be the provision of short-term support and do not consider longer-term possibilities that could assist them in standing
on their own feet. They believe that the government “does nothing” and that “eleven years have passed without
results.” This indicates that government activities and refugee expectations are incompatible. Refugees feel as though
no policies addressing their needs have been implemented and that they have not benefited from government
programs. As a result of current debates over a number of issues regarding this target group, the aggressiveness of the
refugee population increases from day to day.
Awareness of Refugee Issues
Interestingly, most of the surveyed refugees consider themselves as unaware of their rights and duties. However,
control questions revealed that refugees are, in fact, aware of those rights and duties in which they are interested or
which directly impact their lives. Considering that the UNHCR is working to enhance the refugees’ awareness of
their rights and duties, it is surprising that the population feels uninformed. They hear from others about issues such
as the “Law on Refugees,” that they will receive aid or travel documents, that should not be drafted into the army,
that they are protected from being evicted from illegal residences, etc.
Refugees see the lack of information on issues relevant to them as a deliberate attempt to keep them in an
uncertain situation. Perhaps there is some truth to this as some may benefit by keeping the public uninformed.
Nevertheless, there is another perspective, that which believes that one must actively seek to obtain information. One
of interviewee noted that “the reason for the lack of information and its poor dissemination by the mass media…is the
only thing that is clear in this story. If a refugee would know for sure that, for example, he is required to serve in the
military service in the host country according to the law, he would demand the enforcement of this law. Since the
refugee is placed in a state of permanent uncertainty, and encounters different responses from different agencies when
asking about his/her rights, the situation is further confused. It is naïve not to understand that this is beneficial for
those who are on top.”
However, experience gained through this study shows that it is not as difficult for refugees to acquire
information as they state. For example, refugees often complain about the unpublished “Law on Refugees of RA”
(1999). A huge wave of refugees applied to the Prime Minister of Armenia to publish the newly adopted legislation in
the official mass media. Surprisingly the law was published two weeks later (September 14, 1999) in the Russianlanguage Novoe Vremya newspaper. This indicates that there is a way to make a difference, provided one makes the
effort.
Interestingly, another group of individuals surveyed (generally young people and especially young mothers)
considered themselves to be unaware of their rights, but concluded the interview by indicating that this was due to
their own lack of initiative.
Public Opinion Records
It is worth mentioning that these refugees were quite apathetic about being interviewed, having been polled
several times in the past and not seeing any results.39 Perhaps this explains why, after the interviews for this study and
a questionnaire, most of the respondents were upset to find out that the project was for a Master’s diploma rather to
discover their real expectations. In fact, they had never been asked about many of the issues covered during the
interview—no one cared about their ideas and opinions on “dangerous” issues such as assessing government policy,
their desire to acquire citizenship, their reasons for refusing it, etc.
Aid
As refugees, the interviewees received humanitarian aid in the form of food, second-hand clothes, etc.
Before 1996, this desperately needed assistance aid was primarily provided by the Armenian Red Cross Society.40
During the harsh winters of the early 1990s, after receiving oil, they recalled how local Armenians asked them to sell
it. These refugees realized that the country itself enduring a difficult hard transition period, and that local Armenians
had urgent needs as well. Some respondents were proud of having survived through those trying years.
39
These people were asked mainly about their general living conditions, means of survival, how many times per
week they eat meat (which they found to be an offensive question) and not about their immediate needs or their
opinions on the government refugee programs. It is interesting to note that a family with a video recorder visible in
the room was not polled.
40
They received 20 kg food parcels from ARCS on a quarterly basis, and the “Red Cross” sign on these parcels
constantly reminds them of formerly-provided assistance provided. As a result, they all remembered who assisted
them during the earliest days after their flight but had difficulty remembering recent “donors.”
24
After 1996, the number of those receiving aid and the amount of assistance itself decreased. During this
period, a non-governmental organization, “Mission Armenia,” was predominantly responsible for distributing aid,
and the organization provided free medical (dental) services, drugs and medical supplies, some food (mostly oil and
flour) and second-hand clothes. In comparison with earlier assistance, however, the quality of aid has deteriorated. At
this time, these provisions hardly make a difference in their lives is not as vital for them as it was prior to 1996. This
may imply that either these people no longer need aid (regardless of its quality and quantity) or that the aid is of such
poor quality and inappropriate for their needs, that it offends their human dignity (although they accept it). Both
interpretations are relevant, but the latter is more representative of the responses of the interviewees. All of them
expressed feeling humiliated, offended or insulted while receiving this aid. Nonetheless, the general attitude appeared
to be, “I can survive without it, but if they give it, why I should not take it.” Since the aid factor seems insignificant to
this target group, it cannot be considered a major factor holding them back from acquiring citizenship.
Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful to all those who contributed to this study for their commitment and
enthusiasm. First, I would like to express my gratitude to the Faculty of Political Science and
International Affairs of the American University of Armenia for enabling me to conduct this
project in the complicated world of politics. I am particularly thankful to Dr. Lucig Danielian,
Associate Dean of the Department. A great deal of gratitude is owed to the primary contributor to
this study, my faculty advisor, Dr. Vatche Gabrielian, whose encouragement and faith eventually
resulted in the preceding pages. I would also like to thank the Research Associate of the American
University of Armenia and my Human Rights instructor, Tereza Khorosian, for her precious
advice and consultations. Lastly, I would like also to acknowledge the support of the UNHCR, the
DRM and ARCS for providing clarification on complicated issues and assistance in locating
crucial data.
25
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