IDENTITY POLITICS AND COMPLEXITIES
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR
Lupa Ramadhani
IBIS Discussion Paper
No. 2
IDENTITY POLITICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR
Lupa Ramadhani
No. 2 in the Discussion Series: Patterns of Conflict Resolution
Institute for British-Irish Studies
University College Dublin
IBIS Discussion Paper
No. 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author acknowledges funding from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and
Social Sciences and from the Conflict Resolution Unit of the Irish Department of Foreign
Affairs.
ABSTRACT
IDENTITY POLITICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
ZANZIBAR
This paper analyses the pattern of conflict resolution in Zanzibar. Since the
introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 this semi-autonomous territory within the
State of Tanzaniahas remained on the brink of conflict. The paper argues that the
conflict in Zanzibar should not be seen as merely a political stand-off with postelection rioting. In fact it has most of the characteristics of a deep-seated and
protracted conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic
divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities. These in turn
have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history (particularly
the slave trade).The paper examines strategies employed in resolution of the
conflict to find explanations for the failure of the first and second Muafaka
(Agreement). The paper presupposes that the 2010 Reconciliation (Maridhiano)
offers actorsbetter chances for the claim to identity than the previous attempts.
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Lupa Ramadhani is an assistant lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
He obtained a Master of Arts (2002) in International Relations and is currently a PhD
candidate in the UCD Global Human Development ―Sandwich‖ PhD programme.
Publications include ―Peace and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region Since 2004‖, Conflict
Trends (ACCORD), Vol. 2, 2005, co-authored with Prof. Mwesiga Baregu.
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PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IDENTITY POLITICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
ZANZIBAR
INTRODUCTION
Zanzibar is an autonomous region within the state of Tanzania with its own
executive, legislature and judiciary. Since 1992, immediately after multi-party
politics was introduced in Tanzania, the same party system that prevented conflict
on the Tanzanian mainland led in Zanzibar to deep political division on a territorial
basis and a cycle of recurrent violence following elections. On deeper analysis,
what appears as merely a political conflict with post-election rioting has in fact most
of the characteristics of a deep-seated and protracted conflict. The political
divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic divisions embedded in
territorially-defined horizontal inequalities (political and economic). These in turn
have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history (particularly
the slave trade).
The conflict in Zanzibar is of general interest because it exhibits many of the
features that make up protractedviolent ethnic conflict: a brutal past history; ethnoracial divisions aligned with a strong territorial basis exacerbated by extreme
economic and political inequalities and a politicization of these divisions. However,
in contrast to similar conflicts elsewhere in Africa, this conflict appears now to have
been settled after only relatively minor violence. It thus poses several puzzles: Was
this ever a serious conflict? If so, how was further development of conflict
prevented? What role did the Union state play in both conflict and settlement? Did
belonging to a stable federal state—Tanzania—crucially help in the settlement
process or, conversely, did federalization serve to prolong conflict?
This paper proceeds by sketching the different levels of conflict and settlement
processes. It begins by outlining the geo-historical roots of the conflict and the ways
in which these developed in the immediate post-colonial period, and subsequently
after the revolution and Union. It demonstrates the way in which older tensions and
antagonisms were remoulded in the new situation, with a changing politicoeconomy and new horizontal inequalities which disadvantaged the previously
advantaged groups. With multi-party democracy this became politicized not on an
explicitly ethnic or racial basis but on a territorial basis. However, within Zanzibar it
is clear to all that this territorial basis carried with it strong ethnic and racial
resonances and this isshown , for example, in the interrelationships between
adherents of the different parties in everyday life (not going to each other‘s
weddings and funerals, boycotting businesses run by others and expressing a
desire to secede). Of course, this cultural-historical basis is hidden by the
Tanzanian party system which is specifically designed to preclude ethno-territorial
divisions. However, these divisions are evident in everyday as well as political
interactions in Zanzibar. Of course this is not ―ethnic‖ division in any simple sense:
several different self-identified groups (Arabs, Shirazi, and Africans) co-exist in
complex alliances, now predominantly defined in territorial terms, all speak the
same language and almost all follow the same religion. But it is in this manner that
―ethnic division‖ tends to be defined politically in other parts of Africa (see for
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example Langer‘s paper in this volume).This paper will trace how pre-Revolution
identities were given a renewed salience and formed into novel alliances during the
post-Revolution and post-Union period through a very modern politics of distribution
and within what appears on the surface as a non-ethnic party system. This is not a
repetition of the previous system; rather the old distinctions give added resonance
to the new political arrangement.
GEO-HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT
The conflict in Zanzibar has its origin in the long and troubled history of the Isles.
Made up of Unguja and Pemba lying 40 kilometers off the coast of Tanzania with a
population of a million people (of which 60% reside in Unguja: URT, 2003),
Zanzibar has passed through at least three significant phases that together define,
and had profound impact on, current socio-political relations and conflict. The first
phase starting roughly in the 12th Century coincided with early immigration to
Zanzibar by the peoples of the Persian Gulf—mainly Arabs—who established trade
links with east African coastal towns, erected garrisons to defend themselves and
introduced Islam to the natives (Newbury, 1983). Early immigrants freely
intermarried the indigenouspopulation, thus giving rise to a distinct coastal
community.
The second phase coincided with the arrival of Portuguese in the 16th Century. The
Portuguese established friendly relations with local rulers, set up trading stations
and established the Christian mission, secured by Fort Jesus in Mombasa. Portugal
became the first European power to gain political control of Zanzibar and
subsequently retained control for almost 200 years (Newbury, 1983). Despite this
lengthy period of colonization Christianity did not gain firm roots in Zanzibar or other
coastal towns.
The third phase may be said to have coincided with Arab control of Zanzibar.
Beginning in 1698 after they overran Fort Jesus, Arab forces ejected the
Portuguese from Zanzibar and from all other coastal regions North of Mozambique
(Romero, 1986). The first and second phases were politically less consequential
although highly socially significant as they gave rise to a distinct identity. The
second two phases were characterized by immigration of peoples from across the
continent. By and large socio-political relations were to radically change in the third
phase of Zanzibar history. The Arab connection with Zanzibar grew to such an
extent that by 1840 Seyyid Said bin Sultan al-Busaid moved his capital from Muscat
to Stone Town in Unguja (Groot, 1953). Zanzibar Sultans controlled a substantial
portion of the East African coast known as Zanj, and trading routes extending much
further across the continent, as far as the present day Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The Arabs also opened huge plantations that depended largely on slave
labour and later on squatters. To pave the way for plantation most of fertile and
arable land was taken from Africans; thus sowing the seeds of future socioeconomic tensions. Unlike the first and second phases, the phase of Arab rule led
to massive immigration of Africans from the Mainland especially along the slave
routes. Africans therefore would immigrate to Zanzibar to take up the low social
status positions—mainly as slaves—to work in Zanzibar plantations.
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Arab rule established extensive links with European powers—many of them already
colonial powers on the Mainland—and this was reflected by the number of
consulates established. In the 1890s Anglo-German rivalries already were too high
to threaten the survival of the Arab rulers in Zanzibar. Indeed ―all sultan successors
owed their control over the throne to implicit or overt European intervention‖
(Newbury, 1983: 256).
British rule was established in Zanzibar in the late 1890s mainly to oversee the
abolition of the slave trade and to check the spread of German influence over the
East African coast. Indeed in the 1890s to counter the increasing encroachment of
German power, the sultan requested the establishment of a British protectorate
over Zanzibar (Newbury, 1983). With the advent of British rule a system of dual
colonialism emerged in Zanzibar since the British established ―indirect rule‖ which
assured the Sultan and Arab aristocracies a big share in the running of the new
British bureaucracy.
DEMO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN ZANZIBAR
The presence of diverse groups superimposed on exploitative economic relations
coupled with an exclusive colonial political system became a source of political
turmoil. The much cited population census of 1948 was the last official and
systematic enumeration to carry a complete study of group identities. It indicated
four principal groups including Arabs, Asians, Africans (from the mainland and
indigenous) and others (including Comorians, Goans, and Europeans) (Newbury,
1983; Lofchie, 1963). The significance of the figures in Table 1 relates to the
proportion of the Arab population—standing at 17%—which has remained a
significant factor in socio-political relations to date. Apart from South Africa—
comprising 20% of non-African population—Zanzibar had the second largest nonAfrican majority in Sub Saharan Africa (Lofchie, 1963).
Table 1: Ethnic/Racial composition of Zanzibar population, 1948 Census
UNGUJA
PEMBA
RACE
NUMBER
%
NUMBER
%
African
118,652
79.3 81,208
70.9
Arab
13,977
9.3
30,583
26.7
Indian
13,107
8.8
2,104
1.8
Comorian
2,764
1.8
503
0.4
Goan
598
0.4
83
0
European
256
0.2
40
0
Other
221
0.2
66
0
Total
149,575
100
114,587
100
Source: Lofchie (1963)
TOTAL
NUMBER
199,860
44,560
15,211
3,267
681
296
287
264,162
%
75.7
16.9
5.8
1.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
100
The 1948 census is a reflection of centuries of migration to Zanzibar of different
ethnic groupings, which in turn were placed into a hierarchical socio-political
system. Africans from the mainland arrived mainly as slaves or porters; Arabs were
slave traders and aristocrats; Europeans mainly as expatriates and later on
colonialists; and Indians as traders concentrated in the urban centres in Unguja
(Sheriff, 2001). As will be highlighted later in this paper, geographical factors
contributed to shape identity and politics in Zanzibar. It is demonstrated, for
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example, in Table 1 that there were twice as many Arabs in Pemba as in Unguja
and the number of Africans in Unguja was one and a half times the number of
Africans in Pemba.
The figures and categorization in Table 1 have not remained constant, as identity
was instrumentalized relative to benefits of belonging to certain categories. These
categorieswere neither rigid nor impervious. Sheriff (2001: 308), for instance, has
shown that between 1924 and 1948 Swahili who had numbered 34,000 had
virtually disappeared by 1931 ―as the label came to be seen as a pejorative term
referring to people of slave origin…On the other hand, the Shirazi, as the
indigenous people of Zanzibar preferred to call themselves, grew from 26,000 in
1924 to 41,000 in 1934‖. The Shirazi, claiming a mixed blood from the early 12th
century Shirazi from the Far East, is largely an identity invention arising out of
desperation for the original inhabitants of Unguja and Pemba to differentiate
themselves from recent African groups of mainland origin brought in mainly as
slave labourers (Newbury, 1983). Clearly, as studies have confirmed, the slave
trade and slavery left indelible marks in Zanzibar and are repugnant legacies. In a
mid-1980s study of the legacy of slavery, it was found that today very few people
associate themselves with slavery despite the fact that at the height of the ―trade‖
the slave population outnumbered all free people combined (Romero, 1986; Killian,
2008). As was evident in Zanzibar, the slave trade disintegrated the core African
group. Africans—the largest group in the isles—invented other identities such as
―Shirazi‖ in order to distance themselves from the disgraces of slavery. As Tambila
has observed, slavery formed part of the relations of production and resulting class
conflict and class relations, though changing over time,italso informed ideological
positions deriving from one‘s social class (Tambila, 2001). In the ―sons of soil‖
understanding the Shirazi gave rise to three distinct groups in Zanzibar:
waTumbatu, waHadimu, and Pemba Shirazi. It is the way each of these groups
allied with the minority but dominant Arab power holders and/or the African majority
powerless in the struggle to alter power relations that determined political outcomes
in the run up to independence in 1963. The ZNP/ZPPP coalition government came
about after a political alliance of the Arabs and Shirazi, thus elevating the
discrimination of Africans.
The post-1964 Revolution period, however, ensured a changing political landscape
commensurate with noticeable identity shifts deriving from the Africans acquisition
of power. Killian (2008) has shown that in the early 1970s the Revolutionary
Government of Zanzibar issued a circular and mechanisms to enable people to
change their identity. Many who had previously identified themselves as Shirazi
now identified themselves as Africans. ―While in 1948 about 56% of Zanzibaris
identified themselves as Shirazi, only 42% said so in early 1960s and this number
had declined to 20% by the early 1980s‖ (Killian, 2008:106). Clearly in the post
Revolution period African identity became safe and advantageous for one to
identify with. But interestingly, as freedom of expression increased with the advent
of liberal democracy, expression of Arab and Shirazi identity started to re-emerge.
For example in a 1999 survey, Killian found out that 51.3% of respondents
identified themselves as ―Africans‖, 27.5 as ―Shirazi‖ and 12.7% as ―Arabs‖.
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It is important to point out that the Zanzibar-Pemba regional divide coincided with
colonial penetration and the class relations that arose from it. By the 1830s the
economy of Zanzibar was firmly in the hands of Arabs who had established large
coconut and clove plantations, especially in Unguja (Sheriff, 2001; Killian, 2008).
Pemba started to attract investments only when world market prices plummeted in
the 1870s and extreme weather wiped out many clove plantations in Unguja
(Sheriff, 2001). These events are significant in a number of ways. Firstly, the
number of African immigrants from the mainland was much larger inUngujain
comparison to Pemba. Secondly, the scale of land alienation was noticeably higher
in Unguja as a result of increased immigration.Thirdly, following this, the level of
Arab-African antagonism was of a more intense nature in Unguja compared with
Pemba. According to Sheriff (2001) Pemba attracted relatively fewmainland
immigrants and Arab-African/Shirazi socio-economic relations were in turn more
harmonious. Since the shifting economic attention to Pemba coincided with (i) the
abolition of slave trade and (ii) a global decline in price of cloves, by the time Arabs
started clove farming in Pemba in the 1870s they had to rely mainly on free labour.
Moreover, since they were relatively impoverished they could not establish large
plantations, relying therefore on small plots maintained on a feudal basis. According
to Sheriff (2001) Arabs were forced to enter into agreement with Africans whereby
Africans would help in the clearing of the fields in the understanding that they would
gain half the land after a predetermined period. Politically, therefore, Africans in
Unguja
were struggling against Arab hegemony and wanted to restore their expropriated
land and local autonomy while in Pemba the Shirazi regarded the mainlanders as
enemies and foreigners accusing them of taking their jobs and promoting Christianity
in a predominantly Muslim state (Killian, 2008: 105).
Groups were thusstrongly heterogeneous and belonging to one group did not stop
one from re-categorizing depending on economic circumstances. Of course there
were poor Arabs much the same as there were rich Africans although this rarely
affected the political alliances that were formed.
It seems reasonable to suggest that associational life is very important in holding
society together. In a study of ethnic conflict and civil society in India, Varshney
(2001) divided community life into associational forms and everyday engagement
and observed that associational forms of engagement have a stronger impact on
political relations than everyday engagement and are more prone to political
manipulation than the latter. Political parties in Zanzibar, as in many parts of Africa,
seem to follow this pattern. In the 1920s, largely as a response to the impact of the
Great Depression on local populations, four prominent associations emerged: the
Arab Association, the African Association, the Shirazi Association and Indian
National Association (Sheriff, 2001). The British colonial policy encouraged
intragroup solidarity and mobilization. Arabs were favored as a ruling group and
have since been the main driving force in the colonial bureaucracy and policy
organs. As far back as 1914 only the British, Arabs, and Indians had representation
in the Protectorate Council. Even after the establishment of the Legislative Council
in 1926 representation remained organized in this way (Killian, 2008). Africans of
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Shirazi identity were appointed for the first time into the LEGCO in 1946 signaling
that the British defined the Shirazi as the indigenous Zanzibaris rather than African
of Mainland origin. This led to further polarization of the African group as the Shirazi
argued that generational longevity in the Islands had to be used as the primary
criterion for representation (Killian, 2008).
THE CONJUNCTURE: THE ETHNO-NATIONALIST CLEAVAGES IN THE
INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE
As in many other parts of Africa, anti-colonial struggle in Zanzibar gained
momentum after the Second World War and especially in the 1950s. As Mukangara
(2000) observes, by the mid-twentieth century Zanzibari communities were already
racially and ethnically divided. Racial relations characterized political affiliation and
became the driving force for formation of political parties. In a climate of increasing
tensions the African majority were bitter about sociopolitical and economic
deprivation at the hands of an alien minority (Campbell, 1962; Mukangara, 2000).
Political parties appearing in the 1950s became polarized along racial lines,
reinforcing ethnic and regional divisions. All political parties could be traced back to
previous racially based groups formed mainly in the 1920s to cater for specific
interests of the groups. Africans and Shirazi (of Unguja) formed the Afro Shirazi
Party (ASP) in 1957; Arabs formed the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1955
and the Shirazi of Pemba splintered from the ASP to form Zanzibar and Pemba
People‘s Party (ZPPP) in 1959; henceforth voting in coalition with the ZNP
(Mukangara, 2000). It is interesting that even the Shirazi and Africans of Unguja
only came together to form the ASP after a visit by Nyerere, then leader of TANU in
Tanganyika, to Zanzibar in 1957 to encourage them to unite (Campbell, 1962). The
pattern of support of these parties clearly followed the racial and ethnic location of
the various groups. Africans of mainland origin, for instance, were mainly found in
Unguja where the ASP had a stronghold. The ZNP drew its support from the areas
where the Arab elite lived in Ungujaand the heavily Pemba based ZPPP drew
support from Pemba. Although the Indian National Association was not transformed
into a political party, it is clear that Indians were more likely to vote in alliance with
Arabs than Africans since they exhibited a closer relation to power elites than to
Africans. This combination of factors led to a party system that was almost
balanced down the middle.
Issues of ethnicity and racial division dominated political campaigns with parties
desperately struggling to win popular support. While ASP clearly stated that it stood
for an African majority commensurate with an African government for Zanzibar,
ZNP on the other hand advocated mechanisms to safeguard the monarchy and
build an Islamic multiracial state. They accused ASP to be ―alien‖, a thinly veiled
referral to the party‘s supportfrom recent immigrants from the Mainland. A religious
chord was struck in the claim that if it was to be elected ASP would Christianize
Zanzibar (Killian, 2008).
Four elections were organized by the British government from 1957 to 1963 and a
clear pattern may be deduced. Firstly, it was evident that none of the political
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parties could command an absolute majority to enable them to formulate a
government. Therefore it was important for parties to work together in coalition
government. Secondly, election results were highly contested mainly due to
questions of legitimacy over the electoral management body. This is seen in
several instances of shifts of constituency boundaries with a covert gerrymandering
motive. The number of seats was increased from a mere 6 in 1957 to 31 in the July
1963 election. Thirdly, and unfortunately, Africans and Arabs failed to surmount
their differences and work together in a coalition government, the only alternative
that could logically ease the tensions. The 1957 election—the first to be held in
Zanzibar—was the only one to be clearly won by the ASP who gained 5 of the 6
seats in the Legislative Assembly, enabling Karume to form an internal selfgovernment (Rwambali, 2001). Even with this clear victory political discontent was
high as many eligibility conditions were stringent; hence only 40% of the expected
100,000 people were eligible to vote. Following accusations of double voting riots
broke out in the Darajani area, the heart of Unguja town and strong ZNP base.
Voters who were suspected of twice casting a ballot or of voting from other districts
were attacked with stones and knives leaving 62 people dead and scores more
injured. A state of emergency was declared with British troops from Kenya and the
Middle East called in to restore order (Campbell, 1962).
Table 2: January 1961 Legislative Council Election
PARTY
UNGUJA
PEMBA
VOTES %
SEATS VOTES
ASP
27,495 61.11 8
9,203
ZNP
15,555 34.57 5
17,169
ZPPP
1,946
4.32
13,595
TOTAL VALID
SOURCE: AFRICAN ELECTION DATABASE
NATIONAL TOTAL
%
SEATS VOTES %
SEATS
23.03 2
36,698 43.19 10
42.96 4
32,724 38.52 9
34.02 3
15,541 18.29 3
84,963
22
The next elections in January 1961 were inconclusive, as Table 2 indicates, since
neither ASP nor ZNP were initially able to form government. Only later was a
compromise reached to form a coalition government. Of interest to the January
1961 elections is the relative regional and racial division between ASP on the one
hand and ZNP and ZPPP on the other. While ASP enjoyed 61% of the popular vote
in Unguja, it managed only 23% and 2 seats in Pemba. Conversely, ZNP emerged
with 43% of the Pemba vote and only 35% of Unguja vote.
Rivalries, disagreements and violence followed the June 1961 Legislative Council
Elections. At the root of the contestations was a constitutional crisis accompanied
by an emergent nationalism that demanded for radical changes to incorporate
Africans in government. The depth of the crisis was evident following six days of
―bloody rioting‖ (Lofchie, 1963: 186). Indeed as Lofchie correctly argues, all political
parties in Zanzibar professed a common ideology of nationalism, but had
irreconcilable differences between them that led to a legacy of bitterness and
intransigence that in turn acted as a centrifugal force within Zanzibar society
(Lofchie, 1963). However, at the centre of Zanzibari nationalism lay a deep
contestation as to the identity of the Zanzibar state itself as witnessed by the
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campaign platforms of political parties: Would it be an Arab state? Would it be a
Shirazi or African State? Political parties saw different routes to a Zanzibar state
thereby exacerbating the threat of conflict.
1963 saw the last pre-independence elections. The universal electoral suffrage
almost doubled and the electorate and the number of seats was raised to 31
(Sheriff, 2001). The ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition and with 18 seats in the
National Assembly, assembled the first post-independence government on 10
December 1963. Interestingly, the Sultan assumed the role as head of state. ASP
immediately cried foul. It had garnered 1,092 more popular votes that the ZNP and
the ZPPP combined and 54% of popular vote. ASP complained that this was a plot
by the colonial government through the gerrymandering of electoral districts to stop
it from translating its majority into seats (Mukangara, 2000).
Table 3: July 1963 National Assembly Election
PARTY/COALITION UNGUJA
VOTES %
SEATS
ASP
53,232 63.09 11
ZNP/ ZPPP
31,144 36.91 6
ZNP
26,572 31.49 6
ZPPP
4,572
5.42
TOTAL VALID
SOURCE: AFRICAN ELECTION DATABASE
PEMBA
VOTES
33,853
42,415
21,378
21,037
NATIONAL TOTAL
%
SEATS VOTES %
SEATS
49.39 2
87,085
54.21 13
55.61 12
73,559
45.79 18
28.03 6
47,950
29.85 12
27.58 6
25,609
15.94 6
160,644
As Table 3 indicates, the election of 1963 was yet another indication of the
polarization of votes among political parties and their bases of power. It reconfirmed
the ASP‘s strength in Unguja (63%) relative to Pemba (44%). It was an
improvement in that ASP was able to close the gap in Pemba compared to previous
elections although like 1961 it ended with only two seats in Pemba. ZNP appeared
to have an even distribution of votes in Pemba and Unguja with 31% and 30%
respectively. The distortion only comes when ZNP and ZNPP votes are collapsed in
Pemba. ASP was two times more influential in Unguja than the ZNP. But again
ASP had a respectable lead even in the ZNP‘s stronghold.According to ASP the
procurement of independence in 1963 therefore was translated as Arab
Independence (Killian, 2008).
THE 1964 REVOLUTION AND THE UNION: TURNING BACK THE CLOCKS
With the numbers on their side and the feeling that the 10 December independence
was ―Arab Independence‖, ASP was left with no alternative except to wage a
revolution. The Revolution, said to have been carried by not more than 600
insurgents, targeted the ruling aristocracy including Arabs and Indians (Daly, 2009).
Barely four weeks from assuming power, on 12 January 1964, the Sultan had been
overthrown by the African forces. There was little resistance as the revolutionaries‘
overpowered the police with traditional weapons, capturing arms and reinforcing
their ranks. The sultan and members of his government fled the country.
SheikhAbeidAmani Karume was named President of the newly created People‘s
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Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba. Several thousand Arabs (5,000-12,000) and
Indians were killed, thousands more detained or expelled, their property either
confiscated or destroyed. Large landholdings were nationalized and distributed to
the landless squatters in three-acre plots. Trade was made a state monopoly
(Sheriff, 2001). In addition 611 homeswere confiscated, many in Stone Town which
was a residential area for Arabs and Indians (Killian, 2008).
After the Revolution the ASP government immediately nullified the constitution and
banned all political parties except the ASP. Civil society activities were banned as
well. The 10 December is never celebrated as Independence Day; rather it is 12
January, the Revolution Day that is celebrated in colorful annual ceremonies. By
any means, as already explained, the 10 December remains independence day for
Arabs. The Revolution effectively marked the end of liberal democracy and paved
the way for rule by decrees of the Revolutionary council.
The Union with Tanganyika barely three months after the revolution on 26 April
1964 has remained a subject of much speculation. It is believed that Karume never
felt secure and feared retaliation from the overthrown forces that could easily
regroup. Pemba for instance remained lukewarm to the Revolution. Being
geographically isolated from Unguja with the largest Arab population in the Islands,
it posed a genuine political threat. There were also within the ASP intragroup
squabbles and radical elements that Karume needed to neutralize. This could
plausibly explain the mysterious disappearance of John Okello and other left wing
elements. The Union with the Mainland, which had strong historical and blood links
with the Africans in Unguja, would provide much needed political relief. Many of the
radical elements within the ASP were therefore either transferred to Tanganyika
where they served in the Union government or were suppressed. It is also
speculated that the Western bloc led by the US was worried about the connection
between some elements within the new regime in Zanzibar and the Communist
bloc; rumours of militant factions having received training in China, USSR and
Cuba. The earliest countries to recognize Zanzibar were Communist governments;
Zanzibar simultaneously offering recognition of East Germany then not recognized
by countries of the Western Bloc.
The Union complicated the Unguja-Pemba relations in several ways. First it
affirmed the long held hypothesis that ASP was formed by ―aliens‖ and this made
Pemba even more sceptical. The question of the legitimacy of the Union has been
a recurrent theme ever since and has remained a delicate subject. Some of the
contentions surrounding the Union include inadequate consultation prior to the
Union, structural defects, difficulties of sharing costs and benefits and an increased
demand for autonomy (Killian, 2008). If the Union was entered into without
sufficient knowledge of the ruling elites in both sides, it has been perpetuated
through even more repressions. Public debates over the form or legality of the
Union were regarded as treasonous and some politicians got victimized for
questioning the Union. Aboud Jumbe, assuming the presidency in the aftermath
ofKarume‘s death in 1972, was forced to resign in 1984 ―because of his intention to
call for a Special Constitutional Court to determine the fate of Zanzibar‖ (Killian,
2008:112). Four years later SeifShariffHamad, then Chief Minister, was also
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expelled from the party and forced to resign partly because of his pursuit of
autonomy of Zanzibar. Killian (2008) sees this as complicating the ethno-political
relations in Zanzibar. Since the establishment of the Union, another struggle has
emerged; that of restoring the identity of the Zanzibar state. Very interestingly,
demands for Zanzibar autonomy bring together Zanzibaris regardless of regional or
ideological affiliation.1 More curiously, however, some people see the move to
create more autonomy for Zanzibar as paving the way for Pemba to declare its
independence. In fact while CCM position is a two government structure, CUF
advocates for a three tier loose federal structure which makes it easy for
constituencies to break away.
THE POST UNION PARTY SYSTEM
The Union as elaborated above brought together two sovereign states—
Tanganyika and Zanzibar. At the time of unification Tanganyika was already a de
facto one party state. In 1961 the British handed over power to the Tanganyika
African National Union (TANU) having won all the seats in the Legislative Council.
From 1964 until 1977 when the two parties merged, TANU remained the sole
political party in the Tanzanian Mainland as it came to be known while ASP
remained the party for Zanzibar. In February 1977 TANU and ASP merged to form
Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) unofficially translated as the Revolutionary Party. For
all practical purposes, and in relation to the critical aspect of identity, CCM claim to
be the heir to ASP and custodian of the Revolution and the Union. In terms of
current labeling CCM is still dubbed ―a party of Mainlanders‖ by their main
opponent, the Civic United Front (Mbunda, 2009). CUF alongside several other
political parties, on the other hand, was formed in 1992 after the re-introduction of
multi-party politics in Tanzania. Currently (November 2010) there are 18 fully
registered political parties in Tanzania.
Although according to the 1992 Political Parties Act in Tanzania, political parties are
supposed to espouse national unity and refrain from sectarian politics in order to
qualify for registration; that does not stop constituencies from supporting one
political party over another depending on several factors. But as we shall see later
in this paper, what is striking in the Zanzibar political party system is the resurgence
of the pre Revolution patterns of political support. For instance, CUF performs well
in Pemba and generally in areas where ZNP and ZPPP were successful while CCM
strongholdscoincide with ASP‘s.
Furthermore, CCM and CUF in turn use the past to boost popularity and dent the
rival parties. CUF has at least three identities and all of them problematic. Firstly, it
is associated with all those who were either oppressed or dissatisfied with the way
the Revolutionary Regime worked and wanted radical reforms. Secondly, it is
1
The debate on the statehood of Zanzibar recently resurfaced when the Prime Minister of Tanzania in a
question and answer session in parliament responded that Zanzibar was not a state. This statement was
angrily received in Zanzibar where the HoR took considerable time to discuss it. The Union president
eventually cooled off the matter by stating that Zanzibar was a ―state‖ in so far as all non-Union issues were
concerned, and not a state in all other Union affairs including currency and Citizenship. In 1992 for example,
Zanzibar unilaterally joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) but was forced to withdraw in 1993
since it was argued that Zanzibar government did not have mandate to join international organizations.
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labeled, especially by CCM, as representing ZPP and ZNPP; the parties that were
overthrown by the current regime. Thirdly, and related to this, CUF is seen to be the
champion of ―Pemba nationalism‖ (Mbunda, 2009), an identity which they carefully
try to avoid. Pemba nationalism has ebbed and flowed but was strongly expressed
in April 2008 when Pemba elders and CUF leaders met with the Ambassador of
United States of America to Tanzania, Mark Green, and requested the USA to help
Zanzibar gain independence from the United Republic of Tanzania ―as the USA did
for citizens of Kosovo, who successfully seceded from Serbia‖ (Mbunda, 2009: 5).
Although Police arrested and kept in custody 12 elders for possible charges of
―treason‖, no charges were formerly registered and the elders were subsequently
released. The significance of these pronouncements lay not in the legal weight they
carried but in conveying the message of an area that felt neglected by the regime.
THE SKETCH OF THE CONFLICT
The Zanzibar conflict reflects what Todd (2005: 93) describes as an ―extreme case
where the state is simply the instrument of the dominant community, its interests
constituted by community interests—an ‗ethnic state‘‖. Indeed in Zanzibar the
dominant group has been using state resources to secure and reproduce its own
dominance and to exclude the dominated group. The Revolution was poised to
affect Pemba negatively given the kinds of political and economic policies that the
government adopted. As Sheriff argued ―by declaring Zanzibar a one-party state
and banning the overthrown political parties, the revolution essentially
disenfranchised nearly half the population‖ (Sheriff, 2001: 315). Some examples
follow to help explain why Pemba started to feel a sense of alienation which slowly
pushed it to seek a separate collective identity. An opportunity to wage a struggle
for its reclamation emerged following the re-introduction of multi-party politics.
Primarily in Pemba, political and economic inequalities go together and actually
reinforce each other. People of Pemba enjoy fewer benefits from the state than
fellow Ungujans. All of the six presidents and many of the chief ministers in
Zanzibar for over four decades came from Unguja. In a country that is regionally
divided this created a powerful sense of alienation. The fact is that that only after
the Reconciliationof 2010 (Maridhiano)—to be detailed later—did the first president
from Pemba come to be elected following the 31 October 2010 election in Zanzibar.
Seif Sharif Hamad, the only Chief Minister from Pemba, who was ascending the
ladder into the presidency, was suddenly dropped from the cabinet in 1988,
expelled from CCM and detained for 30 months based upon accusations of
tampering with the Union (Killian, 2008). Incidentally, Hamad is now first vice
president in the Government of National Unity that was formed after Maridhiano.
Since the cabinet is drawn from the winning party, Pemba ended up with very few
cabinet posts. The following extract from an interview with Nassor, a resident in
Pemba, captures the feeling of the common people in Pemba….―the infrastructure
here is so poor, unemployment rate is higher than in Unguja…and despite its size
and population, the entire island has only two ministers in the government..this is
unfair‖ (Daily News, 26th May 2010). Similarly, the feeling is that Pembans are
excluded in other government posts down the bureaucracy. CUF maintains that in
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the previous government (in power from 2000 to 2010) Pemba had less than 20
percent of the bureaucratic posts in the government (Mbunda, 2009).
Pemba is also visibly marginalized economically. The general state of infrastructure
(roads, electricity supply, tourist hotels, fast ferries, number of air flights) is poorly
developed in Pemba compared to Unguja.Tourists fly directly via Zanzibar
international airport to Unguja and stay in numerous luxurious beach hotels.
Tourists rarely visit Pemba because there is no physical infrastructure, and many
who visit ―have been shocked by obvious signs of malnutrition among children‖
(Sheriff, 2001: 315).
Relatedly, the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of 2004 revealed that of the 94
industrial establishments in Zanzibar, only 15 were located in Pemba. Many of them
had less impact economically as they were small scale with 9 employing less than
10 people and only 3 employed between 50-99 people. The rest of the industrial
establishments were located in Unguja with 3 alone employing up to 500 people.
The HBS established consumption per member of household to find out poverty
levels in Zanzibar. The results indicated that 13% of people in Zanzibar lived below
the poverty line, with a further 49% unable to meet their basic needs. The survey
also uncovered the rural/urban dichotomy in the incidence of poverty with rural
areas having a much higherrate than urban areas. Since Pemba is still heavily rural
in comparison to Unguja, this implies that Pemba is more affected by poverty than
Unguja. The HBS found that while the total percentage of the population
ofUngujaconsidered poor amounted to 10%, in Pemba the figure approached to
upwards of 20%.
As a major world producer of cloves (70% of global output), Pemba has been less
satisfied with the way the Zanzibar government handles the economy and
complained about the government‘s exploitative monopoly over the clove market, at
times offering 50% less than world market prices (Pottie, 2002), or in the worst
cases as in 1978 only 7% (Sheriff, 2001). The Zanzibar government‘s Special
Forces KMKM (coastguards) ensure that clovesare not smuggled to nearby Kenya
where prices are far better (Sheriff, 2001). Moreover, smugglers are treated witha
heavy hand. While Pemba claims to be generating a large share of the national
income, the income seems to be benefiting Unguja.
THE RISE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRISALS
When in 1995 violence erupted in Zanzibar following disputed election results,
people outside Tanzania had little notion of what was going on. Africa was grieving
from an unprecedented stream of violent conflicts. Genocide in Rwanda in 1994
had left a million people dead and thousands of refugees. Its effects spread
violence throughout the Great Lakes region mainly in Burundi and Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). If weighed against the damage and destruction of the
Great Lakes conflicts, Zanzibar seemed insignificant in scale. This explains its
obscurity and the general indifference of the international community to address it.
The international media, known at times for picking only trouble spots in Africa, was
simply busy elsewhere. But the conflict in Zanzibar was real and has tended to
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grow and become more complex and hence more difficult to resolve. What might
differentiate Zanzibar from other countries that entered into large scale conflicts is
the tactics utilized. Escalation did not reach the level where military struggle
became an option. Moreover, the Union government acted as a stabilizing force
much the same as the United Kingdom would provide stability in the Northern
Ireland conflict.
Violence in Zanzibar has tended to erupt during election time. Four general
elections have been conducted in Tanzania since independence and the trend is
surprisingly similar to that of the 1957-1963 elections in Zanzibar, only that the
power balance has shifted. The bottom line has been the apparent fear of the
Revolutionary government to lose power as ―this government came about through
struggle and blood and will not be let away through a piece of paper‖. 2 CUF on the
other hand is aware of such sentiments and feels that its rightful democratic victory
was deliberately denied. Indeed elections have tended to act as sparks of violence
in Zanzibar. As correctly argued by Cameron, CCM leaders and many people in
Unguja think that CUF will return the Omani Sultanate, associating CUF with the
pre-Revolutionary ZNP which was overthrown by ASP. A speech by the first lady at
the meeting in Pemba epitomized the CCM‘s campaign:
opposition leaders dreaming of a return the pre-Revolutionary regime ... before the
1964 Revolution the people of the Isles were slaves in their own country... I call upon
you to be more analytical before you support parties with hidden agendas aiming at
humiliating your dignity as independent people (Cameron, 2002: 316).
As a result, CCM employed similar oppressive strategies to that of its
predecessor—the pre-Revolution government—to stop CUF gaining access to
power. Table 4 and 5 below indicate the closeness of political competition in
Zanzibar and reveal a yawning gap in the current winner-take-all electoral system.
In the presidential elections, for instance, the difference between the winner and
loser is just a fraction of a percentage.3 The 1995 elections were held amidst claims
for more meaningful reforms including a new constitution and reformulation of the
electoral commission. It is argued that CCM played a precautionary game allowing
only symbolic reforms while the previous superstructure and machinery of a one
party state remained intact. In such an environment CCM won narrowly the
presidential seat in an election that was full of fraudulent practices. CCM won
50.2% of popular votes against CUF 49.7% and gained 26 of the 50 seats in the
House of Representatives. CUF refused to recognize the government and
boycotted all sessions of the House of Representatives. They maintained that the
elections were rigged to rob them of victory. Hamad declared himself the rightful
elected president of Zanzibar. The CCM government responded by arresting 18
CUF followers keeping them in custody without in what was coined ―treason trial‖.
Table 4: Elections for Zanzibar House of Representatives (1995-2010)
2
This was a message that was circulated during the 1995 election by anonymous people.
Elections on the Tanzanian Mainland and Zanzibar are usually held on the same day. In Zanzibar, however,
in addition to the Union President and Members of the Union Parliament, voters elect the Zanzibar president,
members of House of Representatives and local councillors. The HoR has 50 elected members.
3
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UNGUJA
PARTY
Votes
% of votes
Seats
CCM
134,399
86.1
26
1995
CUF
40,212
25.5
3
CCM
2000
CUF
CCM
203,713
89.7
31
2005
CUF
82,117
41.5
1
CCM
22
2010
CUF
4
SOURCE: KILLIAN, 2008; ZEC ELECTION REPORT 2010
YEAR
PEMBA
Votes
21,632
118,716
% of votes
13.9
74.7
Seats
21
23,346
115,693
10.3
58.5
18
18
In the 2000 elections CCM had a new presidential candidate, Amani Karume, who
had to contest with Seif Sharif Hamad who was running for the second time having
been contentiously defeated in 1995. Karume gained more popular votes than his
predecessor (67% of the popular vote cast) in an election that was again full of
controversy and recriminations.
Table 5: Zanzibar Presidential Election Results (1995-2010)
ELECTION
PARTY
TOTAL
%
YEAR
VOTES
1995
CCM
165,271
50.2
CUF
163,706
49.8
2000
CCM
248,095
67.0
CUF
122,000
33.0
2005
CCM
239,832
53.2
CUF
207,773
46.1
2010
CCM
179,809
50.1
CUF
176,338
49.1
SOURCE: KILLIAN, 2008; ZEC ELECTION REPORT 2010
%UNGUJA
%PEMBA
87.4
39.0
90.6
42.0
63.9
33.4
12.6
61.0
9.4
58.0
18.2
80.1
The 2000 elections were described as being more corrupt and more rigged than
those in 1995. Local and international election observers reached similar
conclusions that elections were neither free nor fair and could not represent the
wishes of the Zanzibar people. A Local observer group, TEMCO, simply stated that
elections were ―aborted‖. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) grossly
mismanaged the vote counting process as vote counting was halted in over 40% of
the polling centres; ballot boxes sent to District Commissioners‘ offices without the
presence of party agents. This gave CUF more impetus to claim for a re-election
and grounds to boycott the new regime. CUF refused to recognize Karume as
president of Zanzibar, organized countrywide boycotts and in one incidence ―police
and protestors clashed in Stone Town. Police fired shots at protestors and 16 CUF
supporters were arrested. The nearby market and some streets were closed‖
(Pottie, 2002: 347).
The general situation remained explosive and delicate. ZEC offices, churches and
pubs were targeted for attack normally by home-made bombs. CUF and CCM
traded accusations with each side placing blame on f the other for the explosions.
While CUF maintained that explosions were a typical CCM ploy in order to gain an
excuse to crack downon CUF members, CCM accused CUF of using ―guerrilla‖
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tactics to render the country ungovernable. CUF boycotted all sessions of the
House of Representatives and the National Assembly. Nationwide demonstrations
were organized; albeit most of them banned by the Police. Following police claims
of illegal demonstrations in Dar es Salaam CUF Chairman Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba
together with several other CUF followers were arrested, roughed up and tortured
when in custody. Tensions came to a head on 27 January 2001 when the police
crashed with angry demonstrators in Pemba, shot live ammunition randomly at the
crowd and in the fracas killed over 27 demonstrators.4 Despite Amnesty
International‘s strong communiqué requiring the Tanzanian government to establish
and explain what happened, as well as bring to justice any public official
responsible for human rights abuses and unlawful action, no visible action was
taken (AI, 2001).
Similar eruptions of violence emerged during the 2005 election. At the height of
tensions a leader ofthe Valantia5 militia in Pemba was stabbed to death by people
who were suspected to have been disgruntled with the role of the armed forces in
preventing CUF followers from registering. However, the killers have not been
arrested. In April 2005 four people were killed by the police following violence after
CUF supporters protested against the refusal to be registered (FEWER, 2005).
Violence and hostilities spread to affect other forms of everyday interaction
between Zanzibaris. Followers of political parties stopped buying goods from shops
of those belonging to rival political parties and refused to attend funerals or other
social functions of opposing followers. Furthermore, in Unguja some people of
Pemba origin received written threats urging them to leave immediately.
The elections in October 2005 saw CCM emerging victorious against its arch rival
CUF amidst the usual cries of foul. As Table 5 above indicates, Karume‘s votes
slightly declined from 67% in 2000 to 53% while Hamad managed to increase his
votes from 33% to 46%. CCM scored 31 seats while CUF finished with the
remaining 19 seats. But what is remarkable is that CUF won all the 18 seats in
Pemba and managed one seat in Unguja, while CCM pooled all its seats from
Unguja. The historical divide seems to be entrenched. CUF immediately disowned
the election results and refused to recognize Karume citing a gross breach of
electoral laws, this time pointing to the massive registration of armed forces, double
voting and deliberate disenfranchisement of CUF followers. Much like a sadistic
movie, the situation in Pemba once again descended into the doldrums.
Having traced the complex development of political party system aligned with
ethno-territorial resonances and the violence involved, the paper goes on to explore
how conflict in Zanzibar was resolved.
THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 1995-2010: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
DRAWBACKS
4
Accurate figures have not been established as the government never established an independent
commission to enquiry into the killing. A joint fact finding report by the International Federation for Human
Rights and the Legal and Human Rights Centre found out that altogether 65 people were killed in the whole
th
th
of Zanzibar on 26 and 27 January 2001.
5
Valantia is one of the special paramilitary forces of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
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The likelihood for resolving any conflict depends on the extent to which underlying
issues are identified and addressed before reaching agreement. In certain cases
simple issues are neglected or partially addressed, leaving them to grow into
grievances that over time trigger violence. Conflict becomes very difficult to resolve
after violence has erupted, as violence takes on a logic of its own. Zanzibar‘s peace
process has been a protracted affair; first attempts at settlement were initiated in
1995 before agreement was finally reached in 2010. Several strategies of conflict
resolution have been attempted in order to accommodate ethno-political rivalries in
Zanzibar. The Commonwealth mediation after the 1995 election is the only direct
international involvement and third party participation in the conflict. Apart from the
Commonwealth mediation, contending parties have also attempted negotiations.
These attempts at forging settlement are usually referred to as ―inter party‖
negotiations and occurred immediately after the elections of 2000 and 2005. The
Commonwealth mediation led to the first Agreement (first Muafaka, 1999); the
interparty negotiations came with the Second Muafaka in 2001. However, although
the two agreements eased the tensions to some extent, they were not able to
resolve the conflict.
Settlement, therefore, has to be viewed as a typically cumulative effect of several
layers of personality shifts, agreements, and structural transformations. None of
these processes could be said to have led to the present outcome alone. This is in
marked contrast from cases where electoral violence erupted on a massive scale,
prompting international reaction and intervention, andas in the case of Kenya,
leading to a quick resolution of the conflict. Zanzibar has remained low key because
violence was seen to be less intense and therefore more manageable.
At the individual level it is possible to talk of the executive-level personality shift
which, coupled with changing circumstances, seems to have contributed
significantly to the attainment of peace. Since 1995 Zanzibar has passed through
two different personalities as heads of the Revolutionary Government. Obviously
both have faced different sets of circumstances that in turn have led them to view
challenges and opportunities posed by the conflict in a contrasting fashion.
According to the Zanzibar and Tanzania constitution, the president can only serve
for two terms of five years each.
Salmin Amour, coming to power as president first during the single party system,
steered the country into plural politics and had to face the first multiparty election in
1995. He is known to have been a hardliner, a man who stood for
―MapinduziDaima‖ (Revolution Forever)—CCM‘s motto in Zanzibar—and as a
personality resolute in his refusal to cede too much to the CUF demands. He
indeed earned the name of ―Commando‖ not only by the way he dealt with CUF
with a heavy hand, but also how he stood firm against the Union government‘s
undue interference in Zanzibar affairs. He engineered the attempt of Zanzibar to
join the OIC in 1992 as a way of expressing Zanzibar‘s autonomy. Incredibly, the
Commonwealth-brokered first Muafaka in June 1999 came about during his term
and promised major structural and policy reforms including commitment by both
parties to
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work together in the spirit of national reconciliation to consolidate democracy in
Zanzibar, promote human rights and good governance and ensure that the elections
scheduled for the year 2000 and all other subsequent elections were free of
controversy and in which the will of the electorate will be respected (Amnesty
International, 2000).
In short the first Muafaka was wide ranging, containing 15 items that included
aspects of the ZEC, the constitution, the judiciary, the electoral laws, the state
media organs, a permanent voters‘ register, the freedom of political parties, civic
education, attendance in the House of Representatives, promotion of good
governance and democratization (the East African, in Mpangala, 2006). Issues of
domination by the ruling party and exclusion of the dominated party cropped up and
the agreement contained provisions for finding an independent assessor to
examine claims of destruction of property, unfair dismissals from government
employment, the withdrawals of student scholarships andprovisions to allow
allegations of human rights abuses to be taken to the courts. Those who claimed to
be dismissed from government employment were people of Pemba origin thought
to be followers of CUF. By the October 2000 election—which was supposed to be
the benchmark for implementation of this agreement—not only had the agreement
not been implemented, but the human rights situation was deteriorating. The 18
―prisoners of conscience‖, as the Amnesty International came to refer to the CUF
leaders who were arrested on Amour‘s order for alleged ―treason‖ trial, were still
languishing in jail. Clearly Amour wanted to divert the little international attention
that Zanzibar attracted to allow him a free hand in quashing the opposition.
Karume,6 on the other hand, came to power after the October 2000 election with
the strong backing of CCM Mainland and was not as popular as his close intraparty competitor Dr Gharib Bilal in Zanzibar. Ostensibly Bilal came first in the CCM
Zanzibar caucus voting only to be overturned at the CCM Central Committee on the
Mainland. His election to the presidency revealed the tension between the Union
and Zanzibar government and the level of resentment over ―undue interference of
the Mainland in Zanzibar affairs‖ grew. The violence on January 26/27—the largest
ever after the 1964 Revolution—did more harm than good in boosting his popularity
in Zanzibar. By allowing the reform of ZEC to include Commissioners from both
CCM and CUF after the second Muafaka in 2001, Karume was seen among CCM
hardliners as being too liberal and giving too much to the CUF. So although the
2005 election was still contentious, the level of contestation from CUF declined. For
instance, although CUF refused to recognize Karume as Zanzibar president, they
still attended sessions of the House of Representatives. What was evident however
was the fact that the Pemba-Unguja divide was crying out for more attention.
Unless Karume strove for a sustained attempt at reconciliation the only legacy he
6
Amani Karume is son of Abeid Karume the leader of the 1964 Revolution and First President of Zanzibar.
Karume was assassinated in 1972 in what is believed to be revenge related to the Revolution. His major
legacy is to have enabled majority Africans to gain power in Zanzibar. It is also generally agreed that
Zanzibar made greater stride in development during his term in office including the modernizing of housing
that are still in use presently.
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would leave behind would be the January Killing. For him negotiating a workable
peace deal became an opportunity to leave behind a favourable legacy. 7
It is not surprising then that when inter party negotiations had apparently stalled
and were likely to follow in the previous pattern of failure, Karume made a surprise
move to invite Hamad to the state house on 5 November 2009 to discuss the fate of
peace in Zanzibar. This completely bypassed CCM formal organs. This move
earned Karume two crucial credits.First he was seen as a new beacon of hope in
Zanzibar. Secondly, and most importantly, he was asserting Zanzibar‘s autonomy
to deal with its own affairs. It should be recalled that the inter party negotiations
were seen to be driven by the Mainland and people in Zanzibar were not entirely
happy about such a development. The fact that final decisions had to be endorsed
by CCM Mainland irritated a considerable constituency in Zanzibar. CCM Mainland
had interests that did not necessarily coincide with the general interest in Zanzibar
although they might have misread the intention of Karume.That the Union
government decided to keep a brave face was in no doubt due to its surprise in the
manner in which Zanzibar took up the matter in its own hands.The matter has since
remained within the domain of Zanzibar and is no longer decided by any Union
organ either of the party or the government. Immediately after the talks the leader
of the opposition camp in the House of Representatives AbubakarKhamis
Bakaritabled a private motion to ―support‖ the talks in February 2010 and called for
formulation of Government of National Unity (GNU). The House passed the motion.
Two weeks later the Attorney General drafted a bill to allow for a referendum on
power sharing be ready for tabling in the next session of the House of
Representatives in March 2010.The bill was passed by majority vote.
The critical question at this pointrelates to why power sharing was accepted in 2010
while it has been floated since 1995 and sternly refused by the dominant CCM.
Power sharing is no longer a novel strategy to resolve conflicts in deeply divided
society but it is tricky since it places a lot of demands on the current regime to
compromise. In many cases old guards in dominant parties would not allow power
sharing simply because their own positions become jeopardized. Political
development within the region must also have had an impact on the Zanzibar
conflict. The recent cases in the last three years include Zimbabwe and Kenya.
Both countries face similar problems to Zanzibar and both have adopted power
sharing structures. In Kenya power sharing preceded constitutional reform while in
Zanzibar constitutional reforms preceded the new government structure.
THE REFERENDUM AND THE ROAD TO THE GNU
In July 2010 a majority (67%) voted in favour of the GNU in a referendum. 8 The
results could be interpreted as a reverse order of thegovernment‘s usual approval
7
Although there have been six presidents in Zanzibar, there is a feeling that very few left behind strong
legacies to be remembered with and this is a strong motivation for presidential actions in Zanzibar.
8
The referendum question asked roughly translated was: ―Do you agree that a new form of government will
be formulated after the general election of 2010?‖
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in Zanzibar.9 If referendum results are read side by side with the general election
results and taken as a level of approval of the government in Zanzibar, the first
impression is that while Pemba generally would disapprove of the government
during the election, it highly approved government‘s decision to formulate the GNU,
while Unguja disapproved of the government. The ―Yes‖ vote in Pemba was in the
region of over 80% while in Unguja it was in the region of 50-55%.
The agreement leading into the GNU is simply premised upon a notion that the
government formed after the 2010 election in October would include CUF and CCM
in a power-sharing arrangement. The power-sharing formula agreed is
straightforward. A winning party produces the president while the runner up
produces first vice president. The second vice president comes from the president‘s
party and becomes the leader of government business in the HoR. In addition
Cabinet posts are distributed in proportion to the number of elected seats each
party obtained from the election. In the 2010 election held on the 31st October 2010
CCM‘s presidential candidate came first winning 51.1% of popular votes while
CUF‘s presidential candidate came second with 49.1% of popular vote (See Table
5 above). Accordingly, the CCM‘s candidate is now the president; CUF‘s becoming
first vice president. With 22 of the 50 seats in the HoR CUF got 10 cabinet posts
while CCM got 15. This makes a cabinet of 25, considerably inflated for a
population of 1 million compared to the preceding cabinet which had 16 ministers
and deputy ministers. But this is a cost of a power-sharing government built on
consociational principles. Similar arrangements have been implemented in Kenya
and Zimbabwe.
The referendum was very interesting in the way it was crafted. It was clear that
CCM and CUF had taken positions and were simply trying to get popular support.
Unlike Kenya, which had held a more similar referendum just a few days after the
Zanzibar one, there were no open campaigns in the run up to the referendum. The
government explained that allowing for open campaigns would politicize the
process and dent people‘s choice. They maintained that people had to decide
without any undue interference from the political parties. Some CSOs‘ got funding
from UNDP to conduct voter education for duration of barely four weeks.
Interestingly, much of the content provided by the voter education simply
encouraged people to go out to vote ―Yes‖. Again, the president used various
occasions to talk about the GNU. Through these rallies Karume‘s message was
clear; there was a need to break new grounds for peace in Zanzibar and therefore
people should vote ―Yes‖. CSOs carried a similar message in order to deter giving
people an opportunity to sift through positive and negative elements of the GNU. It
was portrayed as if the GNU was the only way forward for Zanzibar. To show his
seriousness, Karume fired one of the Regional Commissioners in Unguja, who was
thought to have been conducting a clandestine campaign against the government
of National Unity. This drove further underground any ―No‖ voter crusaders while
leaving the pro-Yes camp both in CCM and CUF a free ground to campaign.
9
The author of this paper spent four weeks in Pemba as part of a local observer team, Tanzania Election
Monitoring Committee (TEMCO). Much of the information in this section comes from direct observation of the
process leading to the referendum.
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IBIS DISCUSSION PAPERS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to contextualize the politics of identities and how they
impinge on the current effort in conflict resolution in Zanzibar. It has argued that
while violence in Zanzibar is not comparable to other conflicts across the continent
and beyond, it has most of the characteristics of a protracted and deep-seated
ethnic conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ ethnic
divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities. The 1964
Revolution simply shifted power balances in racial relations but left the racial
boundaries intact. It is hardly surprising therefore that when in 1992 after four
decades of policies that purported to erase ethnic and racial politics, old boundaries
resurfaced even more pronounced.While logically power mighthave been the most
appropriate form of government, strong historical memories have kept ―African‖
majority and ―Arab‖ minority apart. The identity question is complicated since in
Zanzibar it is not simply the identity of individuals that is at stake and prone to self
re-categorization and labelling but also the identity of the state. The short-lived preRevolution government identified itself as an ―Arab‖ state and the quick bid to
―Arabize‖ the bureaucracy and the security forces considerably undermined
defence and paved the way for the easy capture of government by
―African‖revolutionaries. The question after the 1964 Union has been ―Is Zanzibar a
state?‖ The answer to that question has been subject to many debates and has
cost some individuals political fortunes. Herein lies a puzzle—on the one hand the
question of identity acts as a strong divisive force in Zanzibar while on the other it
acts as force of unity. The current peace settlement therefore symbolizes the
struggle both for individuals in Zanzibar to reclaim their identity and with it a fair
share of power while at the same time searching for the lost glory of the state of
Zanzibar.
This hypothesis explains why Maridhiano worked in 2010 whereas the first and
second Muafaka failed. While the first and second Muafaka had a strong Mainland
hand, Maridhiano, more than any other previous peace processes, offered an
opportunity for Zanzibar to reassert its autonomy, however symbolic and nominal
this might seem.It is definitely clear that the agreement was skilfully crafted such
that CCM does not lose much in terms of its identity. Despite CUF‘s repudiation of
the Revolution, the Revolutionary Government and the Revolutionary Council—
powerful identity symbols in Zanzibar—these remain intact. In short CUF has been
simply invited to serve in the Revolutionary Government. CUF on its part has
reached what has been a very difficult achievement to make; it has taken
Pembaback in the political map of Zanzibar.
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