THE THEORY OF CORRUPTION İlhan TEKELİ
- Gencay ŞAYLAN
A. Introduction
The phenomenon of corruption has preoccupied society for
a very long time. This phenomenon can be defined as occurring
whenever a public official because of his position is consciously
willing to procure for a person or a group of persons a certain
number of advantages and receiye advantages in return. This dual
(taker-giver) rdationship which takes place outside the system of
socially accepted norms has always been considered as a question
of morality; historical studies have shown this dearly. In other
words, because the phenomenon of corruption takes place outside
the field of legality recognised by the social system, the problem
has also been considered as a corruption of morality and ways
and means of estabJishing control mechanisms which would pre­
vent this have been sought. In fact, complex control mechanisms
and inspection services have been formulated and developed in
order to give priority to the prevention of bribery or when found,
to punish the perpetrators, it is now felt that apart from the tra­
ditional approach of looking at corruption from the moral point of
view and trying to avoid its recurrenee İn the administration with
a number of regulations, a funetional approaeh is required. This is
especially so when the problem is studied in an environn1ent where
publie officials receiye insufficient economic rewards in terms of
income. Today the subject is taken up from that angle in institu­
tions where public adminİstration İs taught. 1 By doing, so, it İs
(ı) Of recent years, English and American Universities have taught the
subject of corruption within the relevant curriculum and some insti·
tutions have even given the subject a place of i'ts own, as a sub·
group of administrative studies.
a'ssumed that corruption is bad, that it has to be abolished, and
thus the approach is tending to provide a normative framework;
in general the problem of corruption and that of the decay and
collapse of theadministration are equated.
The tradİtional, normative approach to the question of corrup­
tion means essentially that this phenomenon is made to pivot around
the good-bad dichotomy. it assumes that, and establishes a system
where, at a given period of time certain things are good, certain
others are bad in the value system of society. As we know norms
assume different forms, from moral rules to written legal injuncti­
ons, and become instİtutionalised at various levels. There is no
doubt that the strife and tensions inherent in the social structure
and the resulting changes in social equilibrium affect the process
of norm-forming; the process of social change brings about new
norm-forming arrangements. However, as we said above, no matter
what the content of such a norm- forming process is, the phenome­
non of corruption is always considered «bad» by the on-going sys­
tem and all relevant evaluations have been based upon this fact.
Hence the question asked is not «why is there corruption» or «what
is the s.ocial function of corruption» or some such, but «how can
this bad thing be prevented» or «how can corruption be minimised».
These discussions are all based on the fact that corruption is con­
sidered by the normative social system as a phenomenon which is
definitely bad.
Corruption must be thought of as an operational necessity emer­
ging out of a certain structural system; it occurs during the exer­
cise of power by goverment officials. The state is an institution
which has appeared as a product of the unequal sharing of and
controlover, social resources. This in turn, becomes the normative
system of the society, the norms being called, variously, customs,
morality, culture, lawand suchlike and come into being at various
levels and in various forms. In short, it can be said that the whole
normative system is there in order to determine who can have or
control how much of what; the mechanism which operates this
distribuEon or the process which ensures that the system operates
according to these norms may be termed the state. The organisa­
tion of the state and the system of norms within it determine the
sharingout process and the controls but the resources at the state's
disposal are continuously changing, and show the characteristic of
24
increasing or diminishing. In other words, a part of the resources
which are to be controııed, whether qualitatively or quantitavely,
overflow the limits of the normative system. The question is then
reduced to this: where does the overflow go? it is at this point that
bribery appears as a phenomenon, the growing surplus mechan.ism
begins to work and the question of control· by whom emerges. To
summarise, corruption is one of the mechanisms which organise a
form of controlout the on-going system of control and distribution.
This apptoach requires an examination of the concetps of social po­
wer and equilibrium and the connecting of corruption to these. Lo­
oked at in this way, corruption plays a definite operational role in
the effeotive functioning of society. We may define this operational
attribute as the opportunity to control and use potential resourees.
In other words, the marginal control of the social resources which
remain outside the limits of the normative system is made possible
by the phenomenon of corruption; and potential resources become
usable by society. Hence, corruption plays an important role in
the efficient operation of the social system.
it was pointed out above that the normative system of a socie­
ty expresses the consensus regarding the use and control of
resources, such as the understanding of the equality principle. In
different societies, the inequalities found in the use and control of
resources are observed to be related to each other; but in all socie­
ties the normative system ensures a compromise at a certain level
of ineqality. Whereas, it was pointed out before, a potential surp­
lus resource appears outside the system's norms; and this surplus
has the effect of further inereasing the :inequalities agreed upon
generally by the sodal system. Just as it is impossible to determine
how and where the surplus will appear, it is obvious that its inclu­
sion within the system will create an imbalance in the basic assump­
tions held by the social compromise. In more concrete terms, while
the social comuromise is based on the assumption of relative equa­
Hty, the use of the potential increase will jeopardise this assump­
tion. We can go one step further and say that, social change and
the normative system will tend to become increasingly equalitarian
and that because of this, there is a proportional relation between
social change and duration for which corruption wiıı remain out­
side the normative system. As a matter of fact in agricultural or in
other terms feudal sodeties corruption has become a recognised
part of the system. On the other hand as an agricultural society
25
becomes a capitalist society, corruption gets definitely pushed out·
side the normative syste:n; in socialist societies corruption is
negative even in value judgments. A discussion of the way İn whieh
the phenomenon of corruption is dealt in different types of society
will take place later on in this paper.
From the point of view of the social system, the evaluat,ion of
corruption whether in an agrieultural or a modern or a capitalist
society, taking as abasis the good-bad diehotomy, e.g., a normative
evaIuation, is in itself a recognition of the operat1ional role of the
phenomenon. This operationaHty, can be defined as the tool whieh
ensures the control of a potential surplus and the preservation of
the social compromise. While groups which feel the necessity to
resort to the phenomenon of corruption attaIİn their aim and make
use of it, corruption is still considered as a phenomenon which
should not occur and is left outside the normative system. Other­
wise corruption \vould become a factor whieh would upset the
compromise and become inoperative. This is why in almost every
society corruption has been considered a negative and bad thing,
that has to be abolished and discussions have centered around
moral principles, social values or legal rules.
Whereas in this paper, corruption will be considered as a mec­
hanism performing a definite function within the social system.
The main purpose is to explain the mechanisnı, not to consider
corruption from a partieular, good-bad moral angle; by evaluating
the truth or untruth of explanatory propositions. In other words, a
scientific study of corruption will emerge if this phenomenon's
role as a mechanism working \vithin the social system can be pro­
ved with valid propositions. This is the guide-line of the paper and
corruption will not be taken at any point during the exposition as
a bad thing and how to abolish it.
B. Definition of the Concept of
Cornıption
This concept can be defined in different manners according to
the point of view taken.2 Here we shall try to define corruption
(2) Prof. Bulutoğlu has also eonsidered the ınatter and defincd corrup­
don as a double-faeed phenoınenon. These are: to exeeute legal pub­
lk funedons in return of payınent and to do the same, but for ac­
'tivides which are illega!. See Kenan Bulutoğlu, Introduction to Pub·
Uc Economy, İstanbul 1970, p. 410.
26
from three different aspects and then proceed to find the relation­
ship between them. The first definition which shall be examined
is the normative definition, the second the operational one, that is
the operation of the phenomenon in question within the social sys­
tem and the third definition will dwell on the economic content of
corruption and an attempt be made to give an economic definiton.
ı.
Normative Definition:
As was mentioned before, the examination of the phenomenon
of corruption from a normative point of view and the resulting
approach have almost become traditional. We have aıready seen
that corruption appeared at the same time as the state and has
become a subject for legislation in the course of historicaldevelop­
ment. To-day the situation is substantially the same and corruption
is amatter for legislation in many societies. To cİte an example,
cıaissical Roman Law has a definition for corruption, and the «Lex
Julia», promulgated at the time of Caesar fixes the amount of fi­
nes that shall be inflicted upon the taker as well as the giyer of
brıibes: Later on, the J ustinian Code defines corruption as one of
the «crimen repertundarum» and defines the punishment for each
type of bribe.3
The situation is the same in almost every country to-day; the
definitions given can be divided roughly into two categories: the
laws divide corruption into two; the case where a government oHi­
cial takes some action he should not take in return for bribe and
the case where he refrains from taking an action which he should
take in return for a bribe. Here the oHicial is guilty of «heavy cor­
ruption», As against this,when the official receives a bribe for
doing what he should or not doing what he should not, this is con­
sidered by the law as «mild corruption». Different countries have
put different penalties for these two types of corruption. One dif­
ferent example is that of the centrally planned socialist countries
where generally speaking the gıİver of bribes is punished as heavily
and even more heavily than the receiver.
(3)
Ahmet Mumcu, Corruption in the Ottoman Empire, Ankara, 1969,
p. 34. Dr. Mumcu gives a historical deseription ot corruption in the
first two chapters (PP. 22-82) and then continues with the subject in
the Onoman Empire.
27
In Turkey, Artide 211 of the Penal Code ,defines
thus:
corruptıon'
«Corruption is said' to oeeur when: a person who is
in reeeipt of a salary or who does not reeeive a salary
and who is permanent or temporary, or appointed or
eleeted, or under oath or not, while personally charged
with a duty or diseharging a duty under power of attor­
ney for the Government, district, village or municipa­
lity or eharged with the duties given to him by the Go­
vernment or distriet offiees and institutions; or a per­
son who is a member of the pubHe but acts as arbiter
expert, eontroller, translator, bankruptey derk, estima·
tes derk, and dosure derk and thus performs a pubHe
office; or notaries publie, lawyers, or attorneys; when
the above mentioned persons reeeive material goods or
other advantages in return for doing or not doing what
theyare obliged by law or other regulation to do, this
is eorruption and; eorruption is also taking plaee when
these persons in the process of buying and selling mer­
ehandise or real estate, or engaging in pubHe auetion, re­
eeive an outrageous differenee between the eost and the
final price».
This definition shows that the first eondHton in the phenome­
nen of eorruption is the faet that the reeeiver has to be a publie
official or a person eharged with duties towards the pubHe; the de­
seniption of what takes plaee follows. Artide 212 devines as «mild
eorruption» what happens when the said person reeeives a bribe
either to «do what is legally eharged with doing» or «not doing
what he is legally forbidden to do;}) Artide 213 further states that
the erime of «heavy eorruption»oeeurs when the said person «does
what is legally forbidden to do» and «does not do what he is legally
eharged with doing». In short, eorruption has been defined by the
normative system as one of the erimes which are eommitted by
pubHe officials.4 The law reeognises ;İWD sides to the transaction,
the faet that there is a giver and that the taker of bribes is a pub­
(4) The situation İs a little different in socialist ountries. Corruption is
a erime from both points of view, the giver and the taker.
28
Hc official. In Turkeyand other countdes with a similar system the
normative system punishes the taker, Le., the pubHc offioial, when
corruption occurs.
Within the framework of the normative definition touched
upon in the above paragraph, corruption ,is considered only when
it occurs in a pubHc context even if the Turkish legal system,
through the definition in the Penal 'Code, has given the definition of
a public person a much wider scope than other legal rules-, corrup­
tion is only considered as a phenomenon which takes place within
the field of authority wielded by the state. In addition, corruption
has been classified according to the acts performed, as Artides
212 and 213 show. The question here İs if corruption is defined as
an abuse of power in return for an advantage ıin the pubHc sector,
why then does not the definition cover asimilar situtation in the
private sector? There is no doubt that in the private sector also
bureaucratic rigidities create similar situations and relations; how­
ever these do not influence the normative system but are conside­
red as mildly shocking moral lapses.
The term bribery may be used by people \vhen describing an
abuse of power in return for gain by someone ,vorking in the private
sector; but in this case type of action is not evaluated by the nor­
mative system as a definite case of the good-bad dichotomy, e.g.,
it has been left outside the sanctions of the law. it is worthwile
dwelling on th~~ fact that the systen1 does not sanction severely cor­
ruptive practices in the p:dvate sector, while it does so for the pub­
lic sectoro
'
First of all, the taking of bribes by private persons is an act
consistent with the system of private property and this is the reason
why the normative system regards this type of corruption as posi­
tive. All the societies which are run by the pI'ivate property system
accept the fact that a companyowner will want to acquire for
himself his surplus or a potential rent; as we know, the normative
system itself is a product of the variable of private property. As
amatter of fact, whether in our country, or in other countries
similarly run by the private property principle, corrupt1ion in the
private sector is definitely not a subject for consideration either
by moral or legal norms. There are some exceptions as in the Bri­
tish systen1, where İn some definite circumstances corruption in
the private sector is punishable by law.
29
it is necessary to elaborate a little at this point. As a result of
bureaucratic development in the private sector, it is not the owner
of the firm, but the executiye in charge of decision-making who is
in a position to receive personal gain; this creates a different
situation. In other words, what is the position for the executives
who operate in large organisations? This problem has not yet been
regulated by the normative system on the legal plane. It can be
seen here that the phenomenon of corruption which appears in the
private sector bureaucracy is not taken too seriously and the accept­
ed view is that the social normative system wiII not influence its
course in any powerfulmanner. Another factor which is respon­
sible for the above attitude is the fact that property owners ex­
ercise effective control upon the bureaucracies of private enterp­
rises. ActuaIIy, seeing that in private institutions, the property
owners are qualitatively different from the bureaucratic-executive
group, if the former group's control is effective, the control and
earnings \-vhich will come about outside the normative system will
become easily identified with the basic value of private property.
In that case the phenomenon of corruption which wiII occur in
large scale organisational bureaucracies will not influence effect­
ively the legal normative system.
The second point is as foIIows: the normative treatment of
corruption in the pubHc sector is gaining inereasing importance
in the historical development of private property. In agricultural
or in other \vords feudal societies the way in \vhich property laws
are differently structured, property resources are used through a
developing hierarchy of rights. At the top of this hierarchy we find
a privileged aristocracy which administers the society directly. In
other words, in feudal societies property owners and administrators
are one and the same the economically independent aristocracy is
responsible only to itself while engaging in the administering of
society. Hence the ease with which the phenomenon of corruption
becomes institutiona1ised in a feodal society where o\vnership and
control are gathered in the same hands. Also, the fact that in a
feuda! society the relationships are face-to-face makes the
process of giying and taking bribes easier and helps the process
of institutionalisation. Even though there have been since the
times of the Roman Empire and down to the Ottoman Empire in
an agricultural societies attempts to deal with corruption, these
30
attempts remained ineffeetive both in theory and İn pr,aetice.
There are many examples in history showing how institutionalised
eorruption had beeome in those societies, and attempts at abolish­
ing eorruption have taken plaee whenever there was an imbalanee
in the hierarehy which manipulated the resourees. In those
societies it was eonsidered very normal to give a present or a tip
to a public servant when certain decisions were taken. In the
Ottoman Empire there is an especiaIly good example of this in
the institution of the religious judge, the Kadı. The Kadı was
charged with channeIling to the central government a definte şum
of money and also he was the representative of a local power and
in charge of a definİ te set of fun tions; the kadı' s controlover
society had thus a double aspect: part of the available resources
were sent by him to the central government and part were app­
ropriated by him personnaly. Corruption plays an important part
in the Maximisatİon of the resources under the control of the
kadı. At the same time, when the kadı starts to take for himself
the surplus which he should have transferred to the centre, he
meets with a reaction from the centre. What he does then is to
refrain from touching the part which is due to the centre while
attempting to İncrease the source of. personal revenue. Even to­
day we can see the same effect taking place in societ.ies which
have strong feudal features. As an example, Myrdal shows that
the taking of bribes is widely accepted in the countries of South­
East Asia 5 and that neither periodic anti-corruption compaigns,
special police organisations or new legal measures seem able to
change the situation. it appears that in these countrİes the measures
reflect not so much the wish to abolish corruption asa reaction
against corruption as a means of distributing surpluses.
When a feudal system disintigrates and g.ives place to capitalism,
property and control become separated or in other words, the mode
of social control changes; the special aspect of capitalism which is
fictitious equality has conquered the normative system. As a
result, there is a corresponding attitude toward corruption in each
sector of the system; thus, together with the development of
capitalism corruption has emerged as the mechanisın which dist­
ributes and controls potential surpluses in public institutions. At
(5)
Gunnar Myrdal, Asi:.m Drama, London 1968, vol. II, p. 940.
31
the same time the normative system disowns corruption. As against
this, when corruption takes place in the context of private property
or the private sector, and since the principle of fictitious equality
is not at odds with the system, the phenomenon of corruption is
not disowned; at least it can be sa.id that corruption is not
considered as a negatiye phenomenon by all sectors of the normative
system.
2. The operadonal definition of corruption: Corruption is
one of the decision in puts at the disposal of a person who has the
authority to take decisions in any number of institutionalised
decision-making fields. When in a society the decision-making
power gets ,institutionalised then a status position occurs. A person
attains this by go ing through institutionalised channels. On the
other hand, no decision-making power within the social system is
or can become entirely programmed. Added to this the person
with the power of decision-mak,ing has at his disposal a number of
alternatives; various inputs affect the way in whieh the decision­
maker makes his choiee, within a relative freedom. The pressure of
various interest groups, the partieulars of a definite status, the
type of role-playing ete., are decision inputs to which bribery can
be added as another input. Taken like this, we must not think that
this input will only influence the choiee at the disposal of the
decision-maker, it will also make him step out of the limits
formally set for him by the system.
Thus, corruption brings about two different stages when the
decision-maker deviates from his decision, first when there is a
question of abusing power, second, when there is talk of «abuse».
This matter of degrees has been also defined by the nornıatiye
system and has been treated differently in legal rules.
We can look at corruption as a decision-making input from
two points of view: a) that of the decision-maker and b) that of
the person who makes him take a particular decision. In the first
case, corruption affects the ranking of assumptions when the
decision-maker evaIuates his choiee or corruption itself becomes
one of the assumptions. As we shall show later, çorruption beeomes
institutionalised in many ways in society. Related to this, eorrup­
tion can beeome the main assumption where there is atendeney
towards institutionalisation in gaining rights or distributing
32
resourees by a decision-maıker who is not affeeted by other deci­
sion-makers İn that instanee. As against this,. the decision-making
power in a sodety, whieh has b~eome institutionalised and
thus has made the oceurenee of eorruption possible, this power
has als o given the decision - maker an important field for the
exercise of his judgment since all the decisions of a society can
not be programmed. This possiblity of exercising judgernent bears
a marginal characteristic which has to be recognised: if, within
the social system, the number of decisions which are left to the
diseretion of the decision-maker exceed a eertain amount, and the
repetition of similar decisions increases, then institutionalisatİon,
identifieation or programming tendencies will appear, and the
power of diseretion or judgement deerease. In this way, the form
of effeetiveness of corruption will change and the ıform of «misuse
power» will turn into the form of «malpractice».
One important function of the corruptİon phenomenon from
the point of view of decision-making İs the faet that it İs effective
in bringing about the execution of a deHnite admİnİstrative task.
The person who takes a bribe is made to promise to act in a
determined fashion or, in other words, İs foreed to take a certain
action. it can be said that from a technical point of view the meeha­
nism of eorruption increases the efficaey of the bureaueraey. As a
matter of faet ,it is known that one result of institutionalised bribes
especially is to move the irrational and non-economic bureaueracy
into aetion that is quick, and economic. Simple daily observation is
enough to show that the public considers it normal to paya certain
surplus in order to have some public services performed with speed
and efficieney. In short, corruption is a relation which increases
the efficiency of the bureaucracy and insures the performance of
his duties by a decision-maker.
From the point of view of the person who makes the administ­
rator take a certain decision, corruption is evaluated as a tool for
maximisation. Such a person finds a way out of the rigid and formal
laws of the society. This situation occurs especially ip. cases where
there is «malpractice». In such cases as a rule, the decision does
not have a cost for the corrupted; for him, the proportion between
gain and eost can be said to be inf,inite, but this is not true. The
person in receipt of a bribe is if! danger of losing the use of his
position as a source of advantage, sinee he takes his decision by
33
remaining within, or going outside the limits of discretion given to
him by the system. The size of this risk determines the size of the
bribe received.
There is asimilar question of marginality where the corrupter
is concerned. He can obtain what he wants by making the decision­
maker overstep the limits of his discretion, which he could not dcı
under normal conditions. In this case, the advantage obtained is
much larger than the bribe paid, or in other words, the relative
proportion advantage/cost is high. Actually this may be misleading
also; since in practice in society there İs the possibility of applying
all kinds of decision through different channels and with the
acceptance of corruption there is no decision which remains
unimplemented. This being so, we cannot speak of the infinity of
advantage or of the very high advantage/cost proportion.
Within the ter,ms of what precedes it can be generally advanced
that İn cases where the mechanism of bribe-giving and taking has
been established, the bribe-giver can obtain more advantages.
it can be said that corruption has a further role İn
society:
that of diminishing frictions and facilitate change. Within a deter­
mined developing process in a society which has rigid prescriptions
a group which is in a position of making decisions may find that
it is forbidden from taking advantage of some opportunities or
even recognising them as such, then groups which will want to
use these opportunities to their advantage will emerge. Again in
order to do so, they will have to go through pre-determined
channels of decision-making; contradictions will occur between
the former and latter groups and corruption will then come İn
to play the role of diminishing these contradictions, and be used
as a tool to persuade the decision-makers to take decisions in
favour of the group which values the new opportunities. This
stepping over the limits recognised by the social system makes the
evaIuation of new opportunities possible. The incidence of such
occurrences through this and other ways and the increasing
strengthening of the groups to which advantages accrue will lead
to new institutionalisations. Thus corruption will play the role of
a preparatory, facilitating auxiliary tool in the change over from
one pattern of institutionalisation to another.
3. Economic definition of corruption: Corruption is a rent
arising out of the position occupied by a person in the decision­
34
making process. In is a rent which does not create a value bu t
operates as a tool in the transfer of income.
Ô
it is possible to define the source of this rent by the position
withıin the bureaucracy, which means that the said position is a
source of income. This fact must be studied in detaiL. First, for a
resource to create arent, it is necessary that the resource should be
more scarce than the demand. In that case the marginal demand
for the resource will determine the level of the rent. It is not the
bureaucratic position in itself which creates corruption, hut the
decision-ma1king power contained within it. It could be argued that
in this case it could be possible to decrease corruption by inereasing
the resource, i.e., enabling a bureaucrat to make a very great number
of decisions or inereasing the nurrıber of decision-making bureau­
crats; but this is not so. No matter what arrangements are made
the decisions that a bureaucrat can make are limited. For example:
a decision to put a patient into hospHal, or to allocate travel cards
or some such, is not related to the number of decisions that a
bureaucrat can make or his powers of decision, but is a function
of the way in which society has organised İts resources. In other
words the decision will be given by considering the number of
beds in a hospital or the number of carriages ,in the train. Here,
scarcity is linked to social resources not to the number of decisions.
This 'means that there are two ways in which corruption
comes about. if demand is greater than supply, rent will ensue and
increase İn the proportion to which supply is smaller than demand.
Part of this rent wiıı be taken by the bureaucrat who takes the
decision as to how the opportunities will be distributed; here the
rent, or bribe, will also be determined by the amount of money
which the marginal user is w.illing to give. This amount is a func­
tion of the income group or wealth of the marginal user and of his
effectiveness in using the opportunity. This means that the presence
of corruption in a social system is a channel through which
powerful groups are able to by-pass social norms.
The other way in which corruption occurs is when although
demand is not greater than supply, the decision-maker does not
make available the whole of the supply and thus ensures that he
(6) In connectİon with the economic definition see Kenan
op, cit., p. 8.
Bulutoğlu,
35
gets a bribe. 'In this cases the taking of bribes has become the
first principle of the decision-maker, and the phenomenon of
corruption has begun to obstruct social performance. It can also
be said that if we accept the fact that bureaucratic positions are a
potential source of corruption, then the higher levels of the bure­
aucracy where decisions are given more rarely are the source of
higher rents.
C.
Institutionalisation Patterns of
Cornıption:
In a society where activities such as the giving and taking of
bribes are illegal, and where social norms, and of these the most
effective one being the legal system punishes such activities, it must
be expected that channels and organistaions will develop which
will ensure ,the connection between the two sides and see that
the risks taken by both are minimised. For one, there will
be alternative ways in which the taker and the giver can get in
touch with each other; the first way to be thought of is the direct
approach; in this case there should be a way of communication
whereby both parties are able to make their wishes and the
amountknown." This communication, outside ordinary language,
generally assumes the form of special signs and symbols. Another
form which is known is to use everyday language in such a manner
that two interpretations are possible. This second way could be
considered as a means to decrease the danger inherent in a bribing
connection.
The second way is when experts in the making of bribery
connections appear. In practice these are men employed in office s ,
hommes a tout faire who ,know how to «get things done», and in
the upper levels, politicians who have become specialised in the
matter. The type of decision, its degree of importance and secrecy
will info rm the choice of an intermediary. No matter the level at
which this takes place, intermediaries decrease the risks involved
for the giver and taker of bribes. As a return the intermediary
gets part of the rent, or bribe. The political power of the person or
group engaged in these go-between relations can become an im­
portant factor in the division of the rent and it can be said that
in some cases they have control upon the whole of the reni.
Four different forms of insitutionalisation of corruption may
36
be mentioned. In the first type, the amount of the bribe or the
«price» has been established. In order for such a market price to
develop the first condition is that many people ımust be involved
in order to obtain the decision needed, als o the privileges to be
distributed must be limited, not large. As a result, there will be
no competition among the people who want this privilege. In such
a case, the symbolism involved in the giving and taking of bribes
is wide-spread and there are many go-betweens at a low leveL.
Besides the widely-spead and accepted legal value judgements
there are contrary value judgements which receive a wide
consensus. In such cases the formal control channels of the society
are not very effective. In this category can be shown customs
controls, driving licences and various other decisions regarding
other licences.
The second form of institutionalisation is depersonalisation.
In such cases the bribe is not received by a person, but by the
group to which the person, or decision-maker belongs. This type
of corruption is usually directed at a large group. I ts most widely­
seen effect is the giving of a grant in return for a definite decision.
The receiver of the grant may be a foundation, an assistance fund,
a party or asimilar institution. This type of grants receive a wide­
spread approval from society and ensures to the grant-giver or the
person who has imposed the grant prestige value. AIso, the control
of such institutionalised bribes is generally in the hands of the
decision-maker who has imposed the grant and to whom the
ensuing prestige will accrue.
The third form is giving the decision-maker a bribe but after
having previously determined its use which takes the form of
legally accepted advantages; this may be qualified as a type of
reward granted by the bribe-giver: among these are inviting the
decision-maker on a fact-finding tour, granting him an official
residence, the use of acar, publishing his book, asking him to give' a
lecture and so on. Another form which strikes the eye on this context
is to make the bureaucrat a partner in some venture and thus
ensure that he will later give the «right» decisions or make sure
that the «right» decisions will be taken. Some bureaucrats are
made partners in an enterprise before any kind of demand is for­
mulated and this ensures the «right» decisions of the future. As an
example, there are bureaucrats to whom real estate, shares, bonds
37
and such like advantages are given making them partners in coopera­
tives or companies; this is a phenomenon often observed when
influence over the administration is sought. What should be noted
here is the effort to legalise corruption and the corresponding
decrease in risk-taking.
The fourth form of institutionalisation of corruption concerns
relations at high levels of the society; here mutual advantages and
compromises are subject to secrecy and some form of protocole. The
protocole and price obey the traditions and customs of the internati­
onal market. In this category are included the use, distribution and
obtention of very valuable resources and rights. The size of the
resources and the keenness in competition, while preventing instituti­
onalisation, are responsible for making the rent of corruption
reach very high levels.
D. A Working Model of Corruption
So far the defini.tion of corruption from various points of view,
and the process of its institutionalisation have been reviewed and
thus abasic franıework has been established in order to assist
later discussion. Here the operation of the mechanism of corrup­
tion will be shown as a general modeL. The proposed model is
not a subjective one, and only bears general characteristics, thus
it will not show a special form of corruption or the way it operates
İn a special social system, but the general qualitative aspects of
the phenomenon of corruption will have priority. In this general
model the variables which bring about the mechanism of corrup­
tion are grouped under three headings. The first heading covers
the characteristics of the socİo-economic structure, the variables
involved in the bureaucracy are covered by the second heading and
the variables concerned with the characteristics of administrative
decisions will come under the third heading.
ı. Variables in the socio-economic structure: The first of
these is the level of development or to put it differently, the size
of the potential resource and the' form of 'distribution. Opportuni­
ties for use of the economic resources are scarce and ,it is this
scarcity which encourages corruption. While this scarcity and the
insufficiency of economic development encourage the giving of
bribes, the opportunity to ensure a better standard of living for
38
himself and his family lead the public offioial to take bribes. When
the social system is ,in the process of rapid change potentia1
resources and opportunities
increase and the need to control
these creates corruption as a useful mechanism. For example, if
there is rapid urbanisation in the social system, some persons or
groups wlll be able to obtain substantial gains through the decisi­
ons of the planning authorities. A process popularly known as real
estate speculation will thus emerge as a result of some regulations
and afford opportunities for considerable gains to these persons
or groups.
While one of the variables is the size of the resource, the
second is whether or not there is competition for its control and
the power wielded by the competing groups. Here two points must
be made: one is the strength of the groups or in other words the
relative position of the private and the public sectors in the social
system, the second, the presence of ınany groups in the private
sector and the competition among them. No doubt competition
may take place between the private and the public sector. The type
of power and the violence of the competition will determine in
large measure the subject and scope of the bribe. For example in
centrally planned systems where there are no powerful interest
groups corruption will take place when decisions are taken upon
the demand of large-scale groups and when very large advantages
are not involved. As against this, in any society where two firms
compete for the privilege of being each th'e onlyone to make a
certain İnvestment or become the sole importer of a certaİn
merchandise, then corruption will ensue as a result of this compe­
tition.
A third point that may be mentioned here concerns the formal
control mechanisms developed by the social system to deai with
corruption. The press, public opinion, pressure-groups, parliamen­
tary control and such like may be shown as examples of this. Their
effkicacity is linked very largely to the characteristics of the com­
petition mentioned above. if there is a hard competition between
different groups, then these controls may be expected to operate.
Also the strength of the values system of the society help the
operation of formal controls. Social value s which operate against
corrup tion or in other terms the strength of ideology not only
increases the efficiency of wide controls but have a special effect­
39
iveness where the attitudes and behaviour of the bureaucracy
concerned.
İs
Finally, it ,is of some use to touch upon the rate of change
experienced by the social system; rather than being a factor 'which
influences corruption on lts own, the form and speed of social
change influences the variables shown above and the appearance
of corruption. The size of the potential resource, the strength of
the groups, the competition between these and the content of
formal control mechanisms change at the same time as the social
system does.
2.
The structure of ,the bureaucracy:
As we mentioned before interest in the phenomenon of corrup­
tion has centered essentially within the framework of the pubHc
sector. This being so the bureaucracy can be taken as the system
in which corruption takes place, and the obvious characteristics
or some particularities of the structure of the bureaucracy will
play an important role in the emergence of corruption. Four impor­
tant characteristics may be distinguished in this connection.
First, we must consider the relative importance of the bureau­
cracy as a distributor of social resources, or ,in other words the
scope of the state's functions. Whether in developed or less­
developed countries, almost all the countries in the modern world
are witnessing the state's changing role; the supremacy of the
welfare state asserts itself over the liberal state which did not
interfere in the socio-economic life of the country. Actually, to-day's
typical public bureaucracy conducts operations designed to create
resources and opportunities, and to control their use and distribu­
tion. As a result, there is a close connection, on the one hand bet­
ween the increase of the relative importance of the state in creating
and controlling economic resources and on the other hand, the
increase of the potential resources which wiıı become the subject
of corruption. This situation is gaining importance especially in
less-developed countries where the intervention of the state is
increasing fairly rapidly in the field of economic opportunities
and resources.
The second variable is the distribution pattern of bureaucratic
authority. This aspect must be investigated within the framework
40
/
of the central-Iocal dichotomy. What type of decisions are given at
what level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, and the distribution of
powers within the 'hierarchy are matters which have an important
effect in the development of corruption relations. If the system ,is
strongIy centraHsed, meaning that control wiıı he concentrated at
the upper levels then corruption wiıı occur at those levels,' and the
tendeney will be to push the occurrence of the phenomenon of
corruption towards the upper levels. As against this, in systems
where authority is distrıibuted locally then corruption will emerge
at the middle levels of the ibureaucracy concerned.
The third variable is made up of the cultural norms of the
established bureaucracy and their effect upon the pubHc officials.
The internalisation of such socio-economic nornıs as ideologyand
other social values by the bureaucratic culture will also affect the
evaIuation of attitude 10wards, and controlof, the phenomenon of
corruption. Essentially, given the fact that these norms are inheri­
ted from a previous period it is the attitude of bureaucrats towards
the bureaucratic cultural norms that will determine the content
of the process of social change. The fourth variable is the degree
of specialisation within the bureaucracy. In bureaucracies where
specialisation is advanced, the powers of initiative of the decision­
maker increases and bureaucratic controlover decisions generally
decreases. This question looks as if it were closely connected to
the variable of authority. The authority of a decision-maker who
occupies a position where decisions are quite specialised increases
at no matter what level; eve n ıif the structure is strongly centralised,
the. power which derives from the fact that a public official is
an expert tends to İncrease. In such a situation the corruption
relations are not pushed upwards, as in centralised structures, but
concentrate at the point where the expert public official is situated.
3. Variables connected with the type of decision. it is neces­
sary now to look at the set of variables İn the working model of
corruption. it can be said that apart from the structural factors
which make of a decision an opportunity for corruption there are
also certain characteristics involved İn the decision which influence
the emergence of the phenomenon. These can be grouped under
three headings. These are the degree of programmİng, the timing
of the decision and the information related to the decision-making
event.
41
Authori ty and discretion in gıvıng a decision increase İn an
inverse proportion to the degree of programming ,involved; in this
way the maker of the decision gains a deHnite positional advantage.
From this point of view, unprogrammed decisions generally contain
a large potential of resources and opportunities ~nd can easily be­
come the subject of corruption relations. AIso the fact that the
decision has not been programmed decreases the control which the
upper level of the bureaucracy may have had.
The timing of the decision is especially connected to the time
at which the advantage İs expected and is correspondingly impor­
tant. The fear of missing opportunities lead prospective bribers
to act quickly and by so doing, the fear of losing an opportunity
decreases their powers of bargaining in the matter of the bribe.
The question of information ,is closely related to both the
programming and timing aspects. if there is an insufficient flow
of information between the decision-maker and the prospective
bribe-giver, then the corruption relationship will not develop
easily. For this to happen, that is for the relation to be established,
both sides must develop an effective form of information and know
everything there is to know about the matter concerned.
The \vorking of the model of corruption may be shown as
below: Within the framework of the working model defined above,
various propositions may be advanced. These propositions will
clarify the problem of corruption taken in a wide context.
E. Propositions
1. When resources and opportunities which can potentially
create corruption increase and if the groups competing for these
are of an equal strength then the amount of the bribe will tend to
increase and new forms of corruption will develop.
2. if competition for a resourıce is weak, and the competitors
are many and known in advance, if the resource is not too large
then corruption will spread out and a recognisable institutionalisa­
tion will take place,
3. if the rate of social change is rapid, demand for corruption
will increase and institutiona1isation decrease.
42
J-IO
en
o
D. «
ı.
Size of resource
("i)
n
O
~
2. Competition
O
3
ı-ı.
n
3. Formal control mechanism
-<
$:ı.>
"'i ı-ı.
$:ı.>
4.
Social change rate
O­
....... nı
r;,ı
~
~
0-<
s:: $:ı.>
"'i
("i)
ı. "'i
ı-ı.
Scope of bureaucratic
function
CORRUPTION
$:ı.> ~
s::n ("i)
....... t3
c.
n
r;,ı
O
2.
ı-ı-ı
Pattern of authority
distribution
3. Bureaucratic culture
s::
s::
"'i
n
.-to
4.
Degree of specilisation
$:ı.>
ı. Degree of programming
of the decision
r;,ı
2.
Timing
3.
Information system
nı
Size of bribe
~
2. Degree of
r;,ı
.-to
"'i
ı.
institutionalisation
of corruption
w
Q...<
("i)
D. :::1.
~. $:ı.>
o::ı o­....... ("i)
i
3
$:ı.>
o
~ı-ı-ı ,.... ::ı
rrcı
4. if competition is keen and there is a balance of strength
between the competitors then formal control mechanisms İn the
social system will get stronger.
5. Where a society is in a state of transition, some operations
will not have yet become institutionalised in the new form of so­
ciety, then the second type discussed above, the impersonal type
of corruption may be expected to become institutionalised.
43
6.
The increase of control by the bureaucracy which results
social change and the attendant changing of functions will
increase corruption.
froın
7. Centralisation and uniform control facilitate the instıtu­
tionalisation of corruption and İts or.ganisation. The degree of bu­
reaucratic centralisation will affect the amount of bribes received
at each level and push corruption upwards. On the contr.ary, when
Iocalisation is the rule then corruption remains at the lower hierar­
chical levels. The sensitivity of the bureaucracy towards the pheno­
menon of corruption in centralised systems tends to become iden­
tified with the sensitivity of the upper-Ievel bureaucrat. In such a
situation, strongly established corruption relations may isoIate the
bureaucrat who is unwilling to comply.
8. The degree of specialisation within the bureaucracy tends to
decrease the effectiveness of the mechanisms controlling corruption
and increase the amount of the bribe. In such a situation it may be
expected that institutionalisation will also decrease.
9. The low incidence of some decisions or the fact that these
are not programmed will increase the initiative of the bureaucrat
and negatively influence the institutionalisation of corruption. Es­
pecially in cases where large opportunities are present, then the in­
novative type of corruption will appear.
10. The programming of decisions increases the degr.ee of ins­
titutionalisation of corruption; while at the same time it facilitates
the working of bureaucratic controls. Programming turns the source
of corruption from amatter of judgement into one of controlover
new, information and duration.
F.
Functionality of Corruption Controls
if it is agreed that corrupti/1n performs definite functions du­
ring the process of social change and tends to become institution­
alised, as was shown above, then we must explain further why
society develops control mechanisms in order to prevent corruption.
The first point in this connection is that the tendencies to institu­
tionalise corruption are contlnually creating a margina!, illegal side
pattern to the main pattern of the social system. At the same time,
this side pattern is created in reference to the main pattern. This
44
type of institutionalisation must be thought of in terms of the
defined above.
limİts
There are two important limitations which compel corruption
institutions to remain outside the main pattern of the social system.
The first is a consequence of the definition of corruption. Corrup
tion is used to make the state grant a privilege to the bribe-giver. it
İs at this point that the culture and institutionalisation of corrup-'
tion develop. In other words, corruption ıis fated to take place out­
side the accepted legal norms. If bribes, or rights obtained through
bribes become one of the basic institutions of society than they
cease to be corruptive and the rights and opportunities will be
distributed without reference to bureaucratic decisions and thus
become a type of transaction similar to other market transactions.
In this latter case, the bribe-giver will lose his advantage and the
privileges he is seeking will become more expensive.
The second Iimitation is the fact that it is not possible to spread
to the whole of society the privileges obtained through corruption
because resources are scarce. These privileges can only become ope­
rative for a part of society especially 'when the social system is in the
process of transition. In every society the way in which resources
are used and enjoyed İs part of the process of technological develop­
ment and this in turn tends to become a norm, parallel to this, new
opportunities for use and enjoyment appear, and these in turn, tend
to become norms. Between these two processes of norm-forming,
there is a time-Iag. The opportunity to enjoy the new opportunities
through old norms are limited; in other words, there is not yet a
consensus as to how the new opportunities are to be distributed
and taken advantage of; İn this situation the mechanism of corrup·
tion intervenes and ensures the use of new opportunities until such
time as a new pattern of norms is established. In this case corrup­
tion appears as an effective mechanism İn the use of resources.
Bearing these two limitations in mind, then it can be said that
corruption remains outside the pattern which has created it. Ho­
wever the spreading out of corruption or the prevention of it makes
for the necessity of control to show itself. In other words, there must
he mechanisms which will ensure that corruption will remain onlyas
a side phenomenon; otherwise the social systemmay become static
because it will be deprived of a \vay in which to take advantage
45
of new opportunities. This type of control appears at different levels
and in different forms.
The most usual and ordinary of the upper-level controls is
achieved with the help of social values. The fact that these work
against corruption and that society as a whole is against corruption
acts as a factor which prevents corruption from spreading. if the
society is one which is going through a crises then economic condi­
tions will spread corruption and the social values above will beco·
me looser; in this case the result will be a feedback effect upon
the taking of bribes.
There are two aspects connected with the value s involved in
corruption: one, values connected with the bribe-taker and two,
those connected with the bribe-gi ver. While legal norms consider
both behaviours as illega!, in many societies the blame is put upon
the taker and not upon the giver. This is an interesting characteristic.
if various parts of the public have continuous contact with the bu­
reaucracy and become aware of corruption as a phenomenon which
makes things difficult and creates delays and if theyare under the
obligation to give bribes in order to get their most natural rights,
they will consider bribe-giving as a necessity they have to put up
with. In that case negative attitudes do not develop in popular fee­
ling, on the contrarymost of the time the bribe-giver is looked
upon with compassion and the blame is concentrated upon the
bribe-taker. Even if very large privileges accrue to the bribe-giver the
latter is not blamed but considered as a person who knows how to
get his way.
Such wide-spread social attitudes eventually become legal norms
and acquire the character of becoming a controlling factor in the
prevention of corruption through judicial 'and administrative chan­
nels. In many instances and as was seen above important differences
and vacuums occur between the legal norms and the value-judge..
ments which de'telop in society as time goes on.
The second level of control is provided by organisation. The
pattern of graduated powers and responsibilities of the organisation
ensures that a higher level can prevent the misuse of power by
levels below it. While this is an institutionalised possibHityı there
are many more side mechanisms which prevent it from operating
in an effetive way. Among these may be mentioned the following:
46
strengthening of the lower level by outside channels, the setting
up of friendaships with the bureaucrats of the upper level through
such organisations as parties or trade-unions, and the devising of
methods whereby the bribe İs shared-out. In spite of all these, bu­
reaucratic control may work, even if partly. In some cases this
control results İn a situation where the point at which bribes are
taken gets transferred to a different level; corruption gets carried
from the lower to the higher levels.
The third level of social control of corruption is brought about
by those who initiate relations with the bureaucracy, the people
who demand rights and services and who use their right of com­
plaint to administrative or judicial authorities, thereby ensuring,
a measure of control. This is not always a very efficient form of
control. If the group ,"vhich has obtained a privilege through corrup­
tion has done so to the detriment of another group fighting for
the same privilege, then the losing group will work to bring into
open the instance of corruption or misuse of power and work
actively to that end. At this level it is the degree of organisation and
therefore the strength of competing groups which will determine the
degree of efficacy of control at this leveL.
G.
Effect of Corruption on Bureaucratic Processes
if the assumption that corruption creates within society a side
pattern İs accepted, then it must also be accepted that all the mem­
bers of an organisation will not be able to take bribes. This being
so, the persons who take bribes and those who do not will be to­
gether in the same organisation. The presence of two such groups
within one organisation will creat a special dynamiİCs of its own
which will in turn, affect the success of the bureaucracy. In other
words, the relationship between the public officials who can take
bribes and those who are against corruption and the relative posi­
tion within the organisation of these groups will create a special
dynamic process.
The particularities of such dynamics will be determined by the
number of officials who can take bribes, the circumstances which
will arise for them to do so, and the size of the bribe-taking group.
In addition theway in which the bribe-taking group will organise
itself internally will also be influenced.
47
The presence of a bribe-taking group and a bribe-refusing group
within the organisation has an operational effect upon the former;
the size and influence of the latter group have the effect of increa­
sing the positional rent controlled by the bribe-taking group, since
it is clear that if everyone took bribes, then the amounts received
would decrease. At the same time the efficiency of the bribe-refusing
group will be limited. Once rumours begin to spread that there
are officials who take bdbes in a certain office, then the officials
w'ho do not take bribes will become very sensHive and take great care
that such gossip does not come out of the decisions theyare taking.
This attitude \viII limit their initiating powers and prevent them
from taking radical decisions \vhen those may be needed; evasion of
responsibilities ensues, and red tape increases.
Apart from these two principles, the relations between the two
groups may be studied from the point of view of the type of quali­
fications and abiHty of the persons in the groups. To do this, a simple
typology is needed. We can classify the persons in an organisation
like this: a) qualifications and ability and b) whether or not they
take bribes. In other words it is assumed that there are officials
who are qualified, officials who are not, officals who take bribes,
and officials who do not.
Qualified persons
Bribe-refusing persons
Bribe-taking persons
UnqualiHed persons
i
II
III
IV
From an institutional point of view the above shows that a given
organisation wiII contain four different groups of people. In the
ideal situation there will only be persons of the first group. But
this is a normative wish and the chances of it being realised are
slim. Hence, the question \vhich interests us here is: what is the
incidence of situatİons which affects organisational behaviour and
what are the problems arising there from. Organisations which start
by containing all four groups change with time and their structure
eventually will reflect a process the result of which is that there
wıill be competition between administrative position holders. In
other words we are investi'gating a type of ergodic sİtuation.
48
The . bribe-taking group will gather in the positional rents
Among these, those who are qualified and abI e wi11 not only reach
. hi·gher positions hut will also receive positional rents proportional
to their abilities. As the amount of bribes increase two mechanisms
will come into play which-will push the qua1ified group outside the
bureaucracy and generally. transfer them to the private sectoro The
first mechanism is the following: the bribe-taking group may invest
their assets in a business, or use their qua1ifications to the advan­
tage of a business İn which they will eventually, share; in other
words this group wl11 use corruption as an entry into a private bu
siness venture. The second mechanism operates thus: it creates a
keen competition when the publıc official, in return for a large bribe
allocates a large resource - this being logical In this instance, most
probably, the public official concerned will be denounced by cam­
peting groups. This will create a pressure upon the public official
who will lead him to transfer to the private sector either when
he is denounced or before. it can now be said that generally speak­
ing, those who stay in the public sector are the less qualified group
of bribe-takers.
As for the qualified persons among the bribe-refusing group,
they face the possihility of transferring or being pushed outside
the public organisation through another process. The persons con­
cerned here have qualifications which enable them to find work
casily either in the private sector or in other branches of the public
sector; hence they will be in a position, within the organisation to
question and discuss cases where decisions have been taken \vithout
reference to programmed norms. This situation will lead the bribe­
taking group, if it is strong enough and correspondingly well-orga­
nised to create pressure to push the group under reviewoutside
the organisation and this pressure will result in the fact that the
bribe-refusing group, being able to find work easily will leave the
organisation.
As a result those who will remain a long time in the organisa­
tion will eventual1y be officials who are not well qualified, whether
they belong to the bribe-taking group or not. This will ensure that
in the long run, the higher levels of the organisation will be occu­
pied by the group formed by these less-qualified people. As a result,
there \vill be a tendeney for the organisation to be staffed with less,
rather than more, qualified persons.
49
This will mean that in the end the organisational balance will
tip towards a situation where the majority of public officials are
unqualified. In this situation the bribe-takers will become an orga­
nised group, while the bribe-refusers will not and they will play,
as we said, before, an operational role in the increase of the posi­
tional rents received by the bribe-taking group. it is to be expected
that with time, there will be persons from the bribe-refusing group
who will join the bribe-taking group. Howewer, the question as to
which type of administrators will reach decision-making positions
in the presence of the phenomenon of corruption has to be answe·
red by looking at the operational conditions shown in a definite
structure by the corruption modeL.
H.
Conclusion
A general evaIuation of discussions reIating to the problem of
corruption in the public bureaucracy must take place; in other
words, it is necessary to consider to what extent these discussions
heIp to understand a phenomenon which is taking place in social
life. The important thing is to understand whether or not the pro­
positions put forward in the preceding pages explain or not each
aspect of the phenomenon taken as a whole. These propositions we­
re put forward with that purpose in ınind an dactual1y form a
series of hypotheses. In other words the theory of corruption ad­
vanced here is made up of a series of hypotheses. Up to this point
there is no no question of any ıkind of problem. As we know in all
the sciences theories are formed by a series of hypotheses. However
in this instanee there are two important probIems connected with
the hypotheses of the theory of corruption which has been consi­
dered here.
First, it ınay be said that the hypotheses advanced above have
not been sufficientIy ıtested, second, that the method applied here
is not one of the standardised techniques of sociıaI science research.
Generally speaking, social scientists go through these steps before
providing an explanatory theory: they begİn by researching the
chosen field in a systematic way, then put forward their hypothe­
tical propositions in the framework provided by the information
gathered and finally test their hypotheses by usingdifferent ınet­
hods of control. In this way they measure the degree of truth
between the assumptions and the realities of the case.
50
The faet that we have not used in this paper standardised
methods of social researeh does not mean that our hypotheses eon­
eerning the tıheory of corruption have [[10 empirioal ibasis. On the
eontrary theyare entirely empirical and the observations put for­
ward arise essentially from everyday life, experienees gone through
by people, events which have been publicized in the newspapers,
various eourt decisions, eonversations and rumours. In other words
all the hypotheses can be applied to events and relations which
take plaee in real life. In this case we can say that the theory of
eorruption, taken as a system of explanatory information is based
on the method of induetion. However, the opportunHies for testing
the theory are relatively limited. First, bribe-giving and taking does
not bring about a eonerete relation type which can be easily in­
vestigated, sinee the presenee of eorruption indicates the presenee
of a penal offenee. Beeause of this it is not possible to test the
theory in all i ts aspeets by inves1Jİga ting eonerete eases of eorruption
ın real life.
Our daily observations and experiences gives us a very dear
picture about the existence and extent of eorruption; this can be
stated dear1y, while the eontrary proposition cannot. Sinee this
phenomenon can not be eonsidered as non-eX'istent then it would
not be eonsistent to leave it outside the field of researeh. Not only
there must be an effort to bring the subject up to a meaningful level
of generalisation but this is beeoming an obligation for those who
work upon social problems. The explanatory systematisation upon
the phenomenon of eorruption offered above, will help to struetu­
ra1ise daily observations and in all probability lead to the proposal
of alternative hypotheses. The main purpose of the diseussion and
systematisation entered upon here İs just that.
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