Fulfilling disarmament obligations under the Non

NPT Briefing Note |
MAY 2017
Fulfilling disarmament obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate
weapons ever created. Both in the scale of the devastation they cause, and in
their uniquely persistent, spreading, genetically damaging radioactive fallout,
they are unlike any other weapons. A single nuclear bomb detonated over a
large city could kill hundreds of thousands of people. Almost half a century
after the NPT opened for signature, there are still close to 15,000 nuclear
weapons in the world, many ready to be used within minutes.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 requires all 190 of its states
parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for
nuclear disarmament.
As a new review cycle of the NPT starts in Vienna, the world is seeing two
parallel trends regarding nuclear weapons.
A majority of states parties are working determinedly to implement the
treaty by participating in historic UN negotiations on “a legally binding
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination”. This much-needed instrument will complement and reinforce
the NPT, placing nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as other
weapons of mass destruction – which have long been outlawed.
Regrettably at the same time, nuclear-armed states and many of their allies
are contributing to global tensions and insecurity by engaging in, or assisting
with, the build-up and modernization of nuclear forces, increased threats of
using nuclear weapons and a lack of implementation of past agreements and
steps as outlined in the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Their actions have
placed enormous strain on the NPT.
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A major development for the NPT:
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The UN negotiations in 2017 on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons are the
most significant initiative in decades aimed at implementing article VI of the
NPT. All states parties should participate constructively in this process.
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The negotiations are the logical and necessary response to the deep concern
expressed by all NPT states parties in 2010 at the “catastrophic humanitarian
consequences” of any use of nuclear weapons.
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Moreover, they reflect the affirmation by NPT states parties in 2010 of the need
for all states “to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to
achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons”.
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After decades of paralysis in multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, the UN
negotiations now under way are a major opportunity for states parties to
contribute positively towards the full implementation of article VI.
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The failure of certain NPT states parties to participate in these negotiations and
their efforts to prevent other governments from engaging in negotiations casts
doubt on their commitment to the NPT, as well as their commitment to the
United Nations and to multilateralism more broadly.
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All states parties that are committed to preserving the NPT should join the June–
July negotiating session, and loudly protest the continued upgrades to nuclear
forces and the alarming threats of a new arms race.
Worrying developments:
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Despite the positive development of negotiations of a treaty prohibiting nuclear
weapons, there are many worrying developments and threats to the NPT and the
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
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Nuclear-armed states continue to test nuclear weapons and missiles designed to
deliver nuclear bombs. Nuclear-armed states and some of their allies also
continue to conduct military preparations to use nuclear weapons.
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All nuclear-armed states are engaged in extensive modernisation programmes,
aimed at upgrading and improving their nuclear arsenals and their means of
delivery, for example increasing explosive yields, improving targeting systems,
developing short-range cruise missiles and smaller, “more usable” warheads. By
envisaging and creating new possibilities and military options for nuclear
weapons, these practices could lower the threshold for their use.
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While some nuclear-armed countries are reducing the numbers of nuclear
weapon delivery vehicles (particularly inter-continental ballistic missiles), more
states are now developing their capacity to carry multiple warheads on the same
missile. Combined with changes to targeting capabilities, these efforts are
increasing the kill capacity of nuclear weapons.
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According to a new report from UNIDIR, the substantial levels of investment in
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems and their modernization have
enhanced rather than decreased the likelihood of an intentional or accidental
detonation.
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In addition, leaders of nuclear-armed states have engaged in nuclear sabre-rattling,
boasted about engaging in a new nuclear arms race and are sending clear signals
that the value ascribed to nuclear weapons is growing. This posturing by leaders
of nuclear-armed states could erode the already-shaken confidence that progress
is possible on the NPT’s disarmament pillar.
Failure to take agreed actions:
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The most significant challenge for the NPT is the continued lack of
implementation of agreed steps and actions on nuclear disarmament by some
states. In order to rebuild trust and confidence in the NPT, the 22 disarmamentrelated steps agreed in the 64-point action plan adopted by consensus at the 2010
NPT review conference needs to be implemented.
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In particular it is disappointing to see the nuclear weapon states fail to implement
specific actions from the 2010 NPT Action Plan, such as ratification of the
CTBT, negotiations of an FMCT, negotiations of further bilateral reductions
between United States and Russia, lowering of the operational status of warheads,
reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, and
increasing transparency and risk reduction measures.
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Recent statements from the G7 and some nuclear-armed states call into question
their commitment to the fundamental goals of the NPT and the steps to achieve
them as agreed by consensus in 2000 and 2010.
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These statements reveal that even previously widely supported initiatives, relating
to CTBT ratification, the negotiation of an FMCT and even the goal of a nuclear
weapon free world, are under review by certain nuclear-armed states.
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Implementing previously agreed steps and actions must be a key priority for this
review cycle in order to restore trust in the treaty’s ability to make progress
towards nuclear disarmament.
Implementing and strengthening the NPT:
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The UN treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons will greatly strengthen the NPT,
which specifically envisages the creation of additional legal instruments to help
achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world.
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The NPT, while requiring disarmament and barring new states from acquiring
nuclear weapons, does not prohibit nuclear weapons categorically. The UN treaty,
by contrast, will firmly establish the illegality of nuclear weapons.
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The NPT has established a strong taboo against the spread of nuclear weapons
globally. But it has not established an effective taboo against nuclear weapons as
such. The prohibition treaty will strengthen the NPT by doing precisely that.
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The UN treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons will in no way affect the status of the
NPT, which will remain in force after the UN treaty has been concluded. All
NPT states parties will still be legally bound to fulfil their NPT obligations.
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The prohibition treaty will not be in competition with the NPT – just as, for
example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 is not in competition with
the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. One builds upon the other.
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