Cover Page
The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/46112 holds various files of this Leiden University
dissertation
Author: Mickler, T.A.
Title: Parliamentary committees in a party-centred context : structure, composition,
functioning
Issue Date: 2017-02-22
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Legislative
Organisation, Parliamentary Party
Groups and Committees
Relying on committees “reflects the very essence of democratic decision-making”
(Damgaard & Mattson, 2004, p. 113).
The Significance of Committees in Parliaments
are present throughout the world and play a central
role in almost all political systems. They engage in a wide variety of tasks.
Traditionally, four core tasks and functions are distinguished: oversight,
policy-making, linkage, and representation (Loewenberg, 2011; Kreppel, 2014).
Most legislatures1 fulfil these to some degree. The oversight function of
legislatures follows from one of the “foundational tenets of representative
democracy” (Kreppel, 2014, p. 84), i.e. the ability of the governed to control the
government. Parliaments accomplish this by monitoring the actions of
executive agencies and ministers and by authorizing the budget. A number of
institutional prerequisites need to be present for a parliament to be able to
dutifully assess the budget: Among others, parliaments need to have
amendment and information gathering powers. Across countries, a
considerable amount of variation is present (Wehner, 2006). Legislatures also
participate in the policy-making process of a country (policy-making, or
legislative function). The lawmaking power of parliaments is seen by many as a
P
ARLIAMENTS
1
For this dissertation, I use the terms legislatures and parliaments, as well as legislators and
members of parliament interchangeably.
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primary function, even though the scope of the involvement varies
considerably across parliaments from “providing consultative opinions to
making significant amendments, and from initiating independent proposals to
vetoing those of the executive branch” (Kreppel, 2014, p. 87).
Parliaments are also venues for the expression of different perspectives.
Legislators are expected to represent the beliefs and ideas of their constituents
and have debates on matters of the moment (representative function). They
represent the public interest in decision-making and allow for the transfer of
local demands to the central government. Parliaments are therefore the prime
means of linking citizens to the government and function as a ‘bridge’ between
governed and government (linkage function). This function is “perhaps the
most critical task of legislatures in terms of democratic theory” (Kreppel, 2014,
p. 85). In representative democracies, this linkage is achieved by means of
regular elections through which parliaments derive their legitimacy. Citizens
elect their representatives using a wide variety of possible electoral systems.2
Granted with the mandate to represent their voters, these elected
representatives then take decisions on behalf of the citizens but are accountable
for their actions at the next election (see Figure 1.1). As the ultimate principal of
the representatives, voters can evaluate the representatives’ job performance
and either renew their mandate or discontinue it. Elections are the crucial
mechanisms to enforce the responsibility of elected representatives.
Parliaments can therefore be understood in terms of a chain of delegation
(Bergman et al., 2000) from the electorate (principal) to legislators (agents). The
chain of delegation from voters to elected representatives is a core feature of
representative democracies (Strøm, 2000).3
Figure 1.1: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives
Source: Own depiction.
The functions described above assign important tasks to the elected
representatives. As they are involved in making (or breaking) the government,
giving assent to policies of the state, and representing the demands of the
2
3
Some electoral systems are based on geographic (single-member or multi-member), ethnic,
religious or other sectoral constituencies, others make use of elections through party lists. The
relationship between individual members and their citizens is to a large extent dependent on
this electoral connection.
Next to this link, pure representative democracies are characterised by at least three other
steps: The chain of delegation a) from legislators to the executive branch, b) from the prime
minister to the heads of different executive departments, c) from the heads of different executive
departments to civil servants (Strøm, 2000, p. 267).
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population, much is at stake and their decisions can have wide-ranging
consequences for a state and its citizens. Ideally, these tasks should be executed
with careful thought and decisions should be taken after extensive deliberation.
Yet, visitors of parliaments are at times baffled when watching parliamentary
business in plenary sessions, the public display of the decision-making process
of their elected representatives. These plenary sessions, which bring together all
the members of parliament (MPs) to collectively take decisions in the plenary
hall of the parliament, often portray a half-empty room, and (seemingly)
disinterested legislators who only listen to the debates with one ear. The
conclusion that is sometimes drawn is that legislators do not represent the
demands of the citizens and, generally speaking, fail to fulfil the functions
expected from them. However, this is a reductionist view and does not account
for the internal working procedures of parliaments. Beyond the immediately
visible plenary session, parliaments are highly complex institutions. They work
through various other venues in which decisions are prepared or even taken.
Once a parliament is constituted, the members of a parliament differentiate
themselves in their daily operation to be able to fully exert the powers that are
formally granted to them and to dutifully fulfil their functions. The plenary
session is mostly simply the public display of the decisions taken in these other
venues.
Conceptually, this process of differentiation into different positions and
venues can be thought of as legislative organisation. The process of
differentiation occurs in parliaments around the world after they are
constituted. Within this process “resources and parliamentary rights [are
assigned] to individual legislators or groups of legislators” (Krehbiel, 1992, p. 2).
Mattson and Strøm (1995, p.62) distinguish differentiation in terms of
“hierarchy (functional differentiation) and specialisation (horizontal
differentiation)”. The process of differentiation is remarkable. Ultimately,
legislators are elected with the same rights and privileges. Legislatures are
characterised as “collegial, rather than hierarchical, organisations” (Mattson &
Strøm, 1995, p. 62). Nevertheless, this process is a universal phenomenon and
vital for ensuring the efficiency of the parliament. Numerous parliamentary
resources and positions are distributed in this process. Specialisation is a
crucial and necessary element within parliaments. Although legislators should,
ideally, be able to make informed decisions on a wide range of issues using a
wide array of useful knowledge, in reality, it might be difficult to be able to grasp
the details of all issues they face. Given these limitations in terms of time and
resources many legislators rather focus on a subset of issues or even single
issues. There is a large variation in how parliaments organise themselves. The
outcome is a complex system of venues and rights which structure the
decision-making process.
This differentiation manifests itself within several groups. One of the main
outcomes of this process are partisan groups within the legislature. Parties play
an important role in the chain of delegation in modern democracies. As
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Schattschneider famously asserted, “political parties created democracy and
modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties”
(Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1). Parties structure elections by offering choices over
policies and personnel through elections. In doing so, they allow voters to hold
representatives accountable and make “responsible party government”
(Aldrich, 1995) possible. Parties are not only of major importance at election
times, but they are also of importance after the constitution of a new legislature.
As one outcome of the above-mentioned process of legislative organisation,
elected representatives usually cluster into parliamentary party groups.4 These
groups comprise all members of the representative body who are “elected either
under the same party label or under the label of different parties that do not
compete against each other in elections, and who do not explicitly create a
group for technical reasons only” (Heidar & Koole, 2000, p. 249). These groups
are heavily involved in the organisation of a legislature and fulfil important
functions with regard to the preference aggregation among legislators.
Figure 1.2: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives,
including parliamentary party groups
Source: Own depiction.
The strength and unity of these groups vary across legislatures. Strong
parliamentary party groups can especially be found in parliamentary systems of
government. They are considered strong because these groups are “powerful
floor coalitions, capable of disciplining their members and passing their
programs, [...] effectively dominating the legislative agenda and taking
responsibility for the final legislative product” (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, p. 5).
The reason for their strong organisation lies in the relationship that the
legislature has with the executive branch. The institutional structure of
parliamentary systems of government involves an additional step in the chain
of delegation from the legislatures to the executive. The executive flows from
the legislature (usually from within its own ranks) and relies on the absence of a
parliamentary majority against it in order to stay in power. In such ‘fused power’
4
These groups are referred to differently in different countries, e.g. Fraktion (Germany), fractie
(Netherlands), Club (Austria), or simply party group. In the U.S. Congress, these are referred to
as party conferences (Republicans) or party caucuses (Democrats). Following Heidar and Koole
(2000) the term parliamentary party groups (PPG) is used as a generic term to describe these
partisan groups in this book.
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systems, the removal from office can occur at any time when the majority of
legislators does not support the executive any more. Both branches of
government are highly dependent on each other. A resignation of the
government usually means a fall of the legislature as well. Due to this chain, and
the subsequent possibility for “mutually assured destruction” (Kreppel, 2014, p.
84) for both branches, parliamentary party groups within the legislature have an
incentive to be strongly organised. A strong internal organisation and
cohesiveness allow them to collectively support the government or bring it
down. Examples of these strong parliamentary party groups can be found in the
legislatures of most European countries.
The role and strength of parliamentary party groups in such ‘fused’ power
systems is different than in what is commonly referred to as
‘separation-of-power’5 , or presidential, systems. In these systems, the executive
is elected by the people and does not rely on the support of the legislature to
stay in office. The survival of the government is not dependent on the majority
situation in parliament, and the executive branch has no provision for the
dissolution of the legislature. Such a system is practised, among others, in the
United States of America which comprises a legislature and an executive
roughly coequal in power. As the survival of the government is not dependent
on the majority situation in the legislature, the existence of strong
parliamentary party groups within the legislature is not necessarily expected in
presidential systems of government. Parliamentary party groups in the U.S.
Congress have traditionally been characterised as weak in terms of their
influence on the individual legislator, at least when comparing them to their
counterparts in many European democracies. The United States Congress is
characterised as the “terrain par excellence for the individual legislator” (Owens
& Loomis, 2006, p. 263, italics in original).
Depending on their level of unity, “[parliamentary party groups] promote
decisional efficiency in the chamber and allow legislators to influence policy”
(Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372). Strong parliamentary party groups, like the
ones found in most European legislatures, are heavily involved in agenda
setting, building majority coalitions, examining and processing legislation.
Parliamentary party groups are important mechanisms to solve internal
collective action problems, allow government effectiveness and legislative
accountability. Their contribution to running the legislature is undisputed.
Yet in most legislatures, parliamentary party groups are only one part of a
more complex internal organization. There is another institution within
parliaments which is central for the working procedures: parliamentary
committees. Together with parliamentary party groups, committees are “the
most important component of legislative organization and preference
aggregation” (Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372) within legislatures. Parliamentary
committees are vital to the functioning of parliaments. Laundy (1989, p. 96)
5
It is common to use this term for presidential systems of government, but see Möllers (2013) for
an application in the context of international organizations like the EU and WTO.
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notes that “all parliaments work to a greater extent or lesser extent through
committees” (see also National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
1996). Generally speaking, parliamentary committees are deliberative
assemblies established by, embedded within, and linked to the larger
deliberative body. Each committee consists of a sub-group of legislators across
parliamentary party groups who are formally appointed to consider and satisfy
a defined organisational need. Probably the most striking definition of what
constitutes a committee and how committees decide was given by Sartori (1987)
who discusses committees in his proposed decision-making theory of
democracy: a committee is a small, interacting, face-to-face group whose
existence is recognised - i.e. institutionalised - and durable6 which is engaged in
a continuous flow of decisions (Sartori, 1987, p. 228). Although he refers to
committees in a broad sense, therefore also covering a government under this
definition, his description includes parliamentary committees.
Committees are creatures of parliaments. They are established purposefully
and are mandated and restricted by the power assigned to them by the plenum.
Within legislatures, they are the prime organisational structures for the
preparation of plenary sessions and documents and provide a focal point for
parliament’s activity. Committee seats are resources which are distributed in the
process of legislative organisation. These lead to the above mentioned
specialisation in terms of “hierarchy (functional differentiation) and
specialisation (horizontal differentiation)” (Mattson & Strøm, 1995, p. 62).
Committees are privileged institutions which subdivide policy areas and, at
least in principle, offer “property rights”: Once assigned, committee members
have the right and duty to work on issues within their jurisdiction. As an
example, legislators on the committee dealing with agricultural policy have the
right to work on issues relating to this policy area before the other members of
the parliamentary party groups and before the plenum eventually decides on
the issues. By doing so, committee negotiations among this sub-group of
legislators constrain the space of possible outcomes. Figure 1.3 depicts the
relationship between the plenum and committees schematically.
Committees are the ‘work horses’ of legislatures, which sub-divide the
plenum and allow for an efficient policy-making process. Why do legislatures
around the world rely on committees? Legislatures work under relatively tight
time constraints and time is especially restricted during plenary sessions.
Committees often act as preparatory bodies for the plenum to secure an
efficient policy making process. Delegating issues to committees can relieve a
legislature to better cope with its workload by examining and processing
legislation on behalf of the larger floor. This prevents that an overflow of
legislation grinds parliamentary business to a halt. Ceteris paribus, more
matters can be handled when more committees are established. The division of
labour and delegation to smaller sub-groups also allows for proper consultation
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Regardless of its actual rate of turnover.
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of witnesses and examination of documents.7
Figure 1.3: Schematic depiction of plenum and committees in a legislature with
three parliamentary party groups
Source: Own depiction.
Committees are highly adaptable institutions and parliaments rely on them
for a wide variety of tasks. The list of tasks can be adapted to the need of the
parliament. The frame of reference and room for manoeuvre varies
considerably and is guided by formal and informal rules. Next to work of
committees which is imposed on them by the chamber (non-discretionary
work), committees can have extensive rights to take up issues independently
and put them on their own agenda (discretionary work). If not constitutionally
restricted, in principle all tasks can be delegated to a committee. What to do in
committee or what to do in a plenary session remains a normative (what should
be done by all MPs) and a practical issue (what can be done by all MPs). There is
great variation in the type and tenure of committees. Committees can be
permanent, i.e. established for the duration of a whole legislative period, or
temporary (ad hoc), and thus be dissolved once their task is complete. They can
be legislative by function (entitled to scrutinise or even pass bills), work on
‘housekeeping’ matters, pursue investigations into issues of current importance,
prepare a concern of prospected future importance or review matters that were
parliamentary business in the past. They can also have a control function and
scrutinise external groups or be charged with the election of certain actors. Of
special importance to a legislature are specialised committees.8 These
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Always assuming that the right to hear witnesses and send for documents is granted.
Not all specialised committees have a legislative function. Referring to these simply as ‘legislative’
committees may, therefore, be misleading.
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jurisdiction-specific committees are responsible for matters on a particular
substantial policy area (agriculture, finance, etc.) and prepare it for plenary
treatment. These committees form the backbone of a legislature and are the
‘work horses’ for its content-related work. They are heavily used for the
fulfilment of parliaments’ functions (policy-making, control, representation,
linkage).
The Puzzle: Committees and the Chain of Delegation
The establishment of committees and the reliance on them is a universal
phenomenon in parliaments across the world (see Laundy, 1989; National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996). Arguably the strongest
committee system is established in the United States Congress. The exceptional
standing has been pointed out by Lees and Shaw who argued that “it should be
emphasized [..] that the committee system in the American Congress is not only
the strongest system in the present study; it is by far the strongest. It might, in
fact, be argued that the American committee system is in some ways a deviant
case” (Lees & Shaw, 1979, p. 387). The US Congress is unique in its reliance on
and the substantial resources accorded to its committees (Owens & Loomis,
2006, p. 269). Committees have been central to the legislative process in this
legislature for over 200 years.9 However, also small legislatures such as the
Consiglio Grande e Generale of San Marino (60 members) or the States of
Guernsey (47 members), the parliament of the British Crown dependency of
Guernsey, establish parliamentary committees and effectively delegate tasks to
them.
This heavy reliance of parliaments on committees presents an interesting
puzzle which serves as the starting point of this dissertation: After each election,
through the process of legislative organisation, parliaments around the world
differentiate themselves into smaller subgroups and effectively work through
different venues. Parliamentary party groups are important institutions in this
regard. Despite the fact that the involvement of parliamentary party groups is
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The U.S. Congress‘ committee system is exceptionally strong. It is characterised by an intricate
system of committees and subcommittees. Committees in the House of Representatives go back
until the time of its inauguration (1789) when three committees were established, increasing to
seven committees in 1804. In the U.S. Senate it was not until 1816 that standing committees were
established (Avery, 1901, p. 245). Welsh (2008) notes that around 1914 the number of committees
was in danger of surpassing the number of senators (74 committees and 96 senators). and a high
number of congressional staff working for committees. An overview provided by Ornstein et
al. (2013, p. 104) lists 1300 in the House and over 900 in the Senate in 2009. Research on the
U.S. Congress has highlighted the distinctive life of its own that each committee has developed,
the substantial degree of freedom that committees possess and the large portion of time spent
in committee by each MP. There is wide acceptance that committees are at the heart of the
legislative process, “the consideration of matters not previously studied by a committee (’writing
legislation on the floor’) is frowned upon” (Matthews, 1960, p. 148). During the after-committee
stage on the floor, recommendations of committee members are highly influential on the curse
of the debate. Committees play a part in the establishment of norms and the allocation of roles
to legislators (Jewell & Patterson, 1966, p. 203).
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sometimes viewed suspiciously, as critical decisions are often unobservable, or
even deliberately concealed, we usually accept political parties as a normal
component of modern representative democracy. As has been argued above,
the chain of delegation from voters to representatives in modern democracies is
largely structured by relying on parties and holding legislators accountable who
are elected under a party label. The subdivision into parliamentary party groups
occurs at the beginning of the legislative period and, more importantly, is
parallel to the choice of the voters. The actions of the parliamentary party
groups, therefore, have a democratic mandate. The partisan groups, depending
on their level of unity, allow for clear policy choices by setting the agenda,
building majority coalitions, and processing legislation and are, therefore,
important to allow voters to hold their representatives accountable. But how
should committees be assessed, given that they are also central institutions
which change legislative outcomes? Together with parliamentary party groups,
committees are heavily involved in shaping collective outcomes. Committees
subdivide the plenum and prepare documents or even take decisions on behalf
of the floor. While parliamentary party groups usually fulfil tasks such as agenda
setting and processing legislation for all MPs of the same parliamentary party
group, committees consist of sub-groups of legislators across all parliamentary
party groups. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4. At least in principle, legislators in
committees have an opportunity to work on an issue before the other legislators
can.
Figure 1.4: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives,
including parliamentary committees
Source: Own depiction.
Within the democratic chain of delegation, committees are not clearly
placed. Voters do not elect committee members. This begs the question of the
implications of the reliance of committees for the working procedures of
parliaments and the execution of the functions ascribed to parliaments. Does it
hinder or even distort the democratic chain of delegation if small numbers of
legislators have the right to work on an issue before other legislators? How do
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these privileged groups derive their power? Whose views are represented and
how are decisions taken within these sub-groups of legislators? These questions
are at the core of parliamentary decision-making processes. In order to make an
assessment of the role of committees in the chain of delegation we need to
reach a deeper understanding of the structure of committees, the composition,
and the working procedures and how this relates to parliamentary party groups.
This dissertation aims to tackle these issues.
Strong Parliamentary Party Groups and Strong Committees: No Longer
Mutually Exclusive
Within legislatures, strong parliamentary party groups and strong committees
were traditionally seen as mutually exclusive.10 In the presence of strong
parliamentary party groups, so it was argued, only weak committees are
established and vice versa (see Shaw, 1979). The assumption of the absence of
strong parliamentary party groups was, traditionally, one of the main keys to
understanding the exceptional committee system of the U.S. Congress (Shaw,
1979). In such a ‘separation-of-power’ system practised in the United States,
without strong parliamentary party groups to set the agenda, build majority
coalitions, and process legislation, the emergence of strong committees was
seen as a ‘natural’ step to provide the legislature with the necessary equipment
to be a credible counterpart to the executive. Within parliamentary systems of
government, the establishment of strong committees is not straightforward
(Longley & Davidson, 1998, p. 2). In these systems, the presence of strongly
organised parliamentary party groups makes strong committees unnecessary,
as the latter would only be a disturbing factor. Following this reasoning, the
discussion of the internal organisation of legislatures in parliamentary systems
of government usually minimised the importance of legislative committees
(Mezey, 1994, p. 433). This conclusion misses, however, the more nuanced
picture.
Contrary to this traditional view, there is agreement among scholars that
strong committees and strong parliamentary party groups are no longer
mutually exclusive: There is evidence for a strengthening of parliamentary party
groups in legislatures with strong committees (such as the U.S. Congress), and
strong committees can be found in legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups. The strengthening of committee systems within legislatures with strong
parliamentary party groups is mostly the result of a reform wave of the
committee rules which started several decades ago.11 One of the most striking
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11
An exception to this rule are the committees established by the legislature of the French 4th
Republic (see Wright, 1989, p.137-138)
It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the exact moment of change as committee systems may
evolve gradually. According to Hazan (2001, p. 77) “the main stimulus for parliamentary
committee reform is a change in the balance of power between the executive and the legislative
branches” meaning that when parliaments are relatively deprived vis á vis the government, they
adapt. Executives have more ways to broaden their room for manoeuvre to cope with the task of
governing by expanding (i.e. the establishment of new departments and the hiring of new staff).
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features of this reform wave was a “trend away from ad hoc arrangements and
towards parliamentary committee systems that are specialised and permanent
and replicate executive departments” (Shaw, 1998, p. 230, italics in original).
Some legislatures reformed their committee system as early as the 1970s and
1980s (Britain, Denmark, Portugal and Spain). Latecomers like Switzerland and
Ireland had introduced changes in the 1990s (see e.g. Shaw, 1998; Hazan, 2001).
Among legislatures of the Westminster tradition, the Australian House of
Commons established a comprehensive committee system in 1987 by setting
up eight general purpose standing committees and reformed thus a little later
than the Canadian House of Commons which reformed in 1968 (Hockin, 1970).
An overview of 18 legislatures provided by Mattson and Strøm (1995) indicates
that almost all have established a system of specialised committees which
mirror governmental departments. The trend towards specialised systems is still
ongoing. By the time of the study of Mattson and Strøm (1995), the Irish Dáil
Éireann12 relied on permanent committees merely for government oversight
and not for legislative scrutiny. Due to reforms in 1997 each committee now
“monitors the activities of its department, discusses its estimates, and deals with
the third stage of legislation within the area of the department” (Gallagher, 2005,
p. 231). The British House of Commons is the exception to this process, as it still
relies on temporary committees for legislative scrutiny. This particular
committee system is characterised to serve “the purposes of the government wary of informed scrutiny by specialist committees” (Norton, 1998, p. 144) and
is still limited in terms of the possibilities of specialisation for MPs. Nevertheless,
even in this instance reforms starting in 1979 led to the establishment of
fourteen permanent select department committees with government oversight
function left the House “more specialised and institutionalised than ever before
in its seven-century existence” (Norton, 1998, p. 151).
Similarly, several scholars acknowledge a strengthening of parliamentary
party groups in the U.S. Congress. A turning point was a growing influence of
the leadership of the House Democratic Caucus since the 1970s which engaged
in various activities such as “scheduling committee legislation, structuring floor
choices, mobilizing floor votes, and concocting other aspects of legislative
strategy” (Owens, 1997, p. 259). By the 1980s, considerable procedural powers
were exercised by Democratic Speakers. This development was continued when
Republicans won the majority in the mid-term elections of 1994. Under the
leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich, even more drastic changes were induced
to enact the ‘Contract With America’. The Republicans continued to disregard
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Parliaments, however, remained in a contradictory situation, leaving the executive to become
the dominant player in the political arena. Copeland and Patterson (1994, p. 160) argue that
“when an institutionalised parliament finds its ability to fulfil its functions slipping, it must adapt
to recover those lost roles or lose its right to be considered a parliament”. Here, not even the
immediate threat of losing its existence but rather “the recognition of the weakening of those key
functional responsibilities will lead to calls for ’reform‘ or ’adaptation‘” (Copeland & Patterson,
1994, p. 160).
In common parlance, the Irish parliament is referred to as the Dáil but without article when
using the full name Dáil Éireann
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the seniority principle for committee assignments, imposed strict deadlines on
committees, and sanctioned committee members in the event that committees
failed to deliver legislation which complied with the party programme (see
Owens, 1997, p.259). These measures indicate the implementation of a
distinctive form of party government.
These developments contradict the old formula of “the existence of strong
parliamentary party groups is mutually exclusive to the existence of strong
committees”. The question arises how strong parliamentary party groups and
committees relate to each other. Both are central institutions and pivotal
elements in the internal organisation and preference aggregation of legislatures.
Unfortunately, we know very little about how parliamentary party groups and
committees interact and how specialised committees work in parliaments with
strong parliamentary party groups.
The assumption about the
contradictoriness of strong parliamentary party groups and strong committees
within a legislature had important ramifications for the study of committees in
legislatures. The traditional view of committees being less relevant in
parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups meant that the study of
committees was largely confined to the U.S. Congress. Much scholarly attention
has been devoted to this legislature, comparatively little to other legislatures.
Due to this “Washington bias - which deems Congress, and Congress alone, as
the only legislature worthy of study” (Nelson, 1974, p. 120) our knowledge of
committees in other legislatures lags behind. We are left with an incomplete
picture of how committees work in legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups. By studying this issue we can reach a deeper understanding of the
policy-making process in parliaments. Of special importance to study are the
above mentioned specialised, jurisdiction-specific committees due to their
importance for the legislature. This leads to the formulation of the main
research question which guides this dissertation:
Main research question: ‘How do specialised committees work in parliaments
with strong parliamentary party groups?’
Within this broader question, three sub-questions are pursued. The first
part of this book consists of an analysis of the variation of institutional features
of committee systems across legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups and the rules which specify them. A wide variety of formal committee
structures (e.g. size, jurisdiction, and tenure) exists across legislatures. Why do
some legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups establish committee
systems with extensive powers while others do not grant many rights to their
committees? Only a few researchers have turned their attention to analyse the
factors which determine this variation across legislatures. The formal structure
of the committee system needs to be taken into account when giving a
complete picture of how parliamentary party groups organise their work in
committees. The characteristic features of a committee system determine the
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‘playing field’ and are not randomly chosen, but purposefully designed.
First sub-question: What factors account for the variation in formal
committee structures across legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups?
Apart from this macro-oriented approach, the analysis focuses more closely
on the purpose of committees and the question ‘who they serve?’ by analysing
the mode(s) of operation of committees. An important process to study in this
regard is the assignment process of legislators to committees. The aim of this
part of the dissertation is to give more insight into the question ‘who gets what
and why’? Committee assignments are the structural manifestation of
legislative organisation. When committees are influential or even decisive
institutions in the policy-making process, we need to know who controls their
power. As Rohde and Shepsle note, understanding the “process by which
members are assigned to committees is of the greatest importance” (Rohde &
Shepsle, 1973, p. 889). It is expected that strong parliamentary party groups
have a major stake in the assignment process and committee proceedings but
we do not fully understand based on which fundamental reasons and principles
(rationale) committee seats are assigned. Some scholarly literature is available
which has focused on the allocation of committee seats, but the underlying
rationale of committee assignments in other legislatures is hitherto still unclear.
By analysing legislators’ goals, motivations and preferences the analysis
contributes to the ongoing discussion on what explains why certain legislators
serve on particular committees.
Second sub-question: How are members assigned to legislative committees
and what criteria play a role in the assignment process?
The third question focuses on the actual working procedures of committees.
The main issue is on the level of independence of committee members vis á vis
their parliamentary party groups and other actors once they are assigned. It is
important to understand how strict the distinction between committee
members and non-committee members is upheld. This is of central relevance
with regard to the chain of delegation of voters to legislators. As has been
argued, committees subdivide policy areas and, at least in principle, offer
“property rights”: Committee members have the right and duty to work on
issues within their jurisdiction. By doing so committee negotiations among this
sub-group of legislators constrain the space of possible outcomes. Thus, they
“modify the decision-making principle of one person, one vote” (Mattson &
Strøm, 2004, p. 92) and shape the behaviour of legislators. In how far committee
members are autonomous or are tightly monitored and have to report back to
their parliamentary party group is hitherto not widely studied. A related issue is
the interactions between members on a committee and legislators from other
parliamentary party groups (opposition or government) on the same
committee. We do not yet understand how exactly committee work is
coordinated between committee members and these groups in the legislature.
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The third part of this study aims to give more insight into these relationships
and the links between individual committee members and other groups outside
of the committee by analysing formal and informal rules which can restrain the
behaviour of MPs in committees.
Third sub-question: Once appointed, how is the work in legislative
committees coordinated? What is the relationship between members in the
committees and other groups in the legislature?
The Contribution of this Study
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of committees in
legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. The contribution of this
study is twofold. In the recent years, a growing interest was devoted to the
committee structure and functioning of committees in parliaments outside of
the U.S. context. The evidence for these studies has been inconclusive. Several
studies have focused on the assignment process of committee members.
Although these studies have enhanced our understanding of this issue, the
limitation to assignment criteria is not enough to fully capture the procedures
in committees. This analysis extends initial studies of committees in
parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups by including the working
procedures of committees in the policy-making process. By focusing on
different levels of analysis (structural features - macro level; modes of operation
of committees - micro level) the evidence from this dissertation allows for a
holistic view of committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups. All issues are complementary to reach a better understanding of
committees in legislatures. The actual relationship between parliamentary
party group meeting and committee delegation as well as the formal structures
are hitherto not widely analysed. By analysing the structural features,
committee assignments and modes of operation, the analysis allows for a
complete look on committees in parliamentary systems of government. The
formal powers granted to committees provide the incentive structures for
legislators. Looking at committee assignments without considering the working
procedures gives an equally incomplete description of committee work. Only
with a combination of themes the complexity of committee workings can be
sufficiently understood.
Answering this question is not merely of academic interest. Research on
committees gives important insight into decision-making processes and power
relations within modern parliaments. We do not yet fully understand how
committee work is organised in legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups and, subsequently, how this affects the democratic chain of delegation.
The chain of delegation assumes that legislators and their actions can be held
accountable by voters at the next elections. Parliamentary party groups are
important actors and have a relatively clear placement in the chain of
delegation. In legislatures with strongly organised partisan groups, these groups
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set the agenda, build majority coalitions, and process legislation. They,
therefore, allow voters to decide, whether they will provide their representatives
with a new mandate or not. Yet, committees also constitute a central venue for
political actors. Neglecting the committee stage means leaving out a
fundamental part of modern sequential decision-making processes within
parliaments. Parliamentary procedures affect political outcomes and
committees play a major role in shaping parliamentary output. We need to
better understand committee organisation and functioning. Research on
committees and subcommittees of the U.S. Congress has been vital to
understanding the work of the legislature as a whole. Similar in-depth analyses
of how committees work within legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups will be equally beneficial.
Another contribution refers to the academic debate on legislative
organisation. In the scholarly debate on how and why parliaments organise
themselves, there is an ongoing discussion about the theoretical treatment of
how to analyse this process. Research on committees has long been
characterised by the above mentioned “Washington bias” (Nelson, 1974, p. 120)
and focused heavily on the U.S. Congress. As other studies which have analysed
committee workings in parliamentary systems, this dissertation builds on the
congressional framework of distributive, informational and partisan theories
(with the addition of the ‘keeping tabs’ perspective). The debate on ‘how well do
the predictions of the congressional theories travel to legislatures outside the
United States?’ has been a central issue in the scholarly debate on
non-congressional committees (see e.g. S. Martin, 2014a). Some scholars have
started questioning the usefulness of the congressional theories and have
argued against drawing too much on the congressional theories (Hansen, 2011;
Yordanova, 2011). I contradict these views. One of the central arguments of this
study is that the congressional theories are of major help to understand
committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. How the
theories are used in this dissertation is further clarified in Chapter 3. I argue
that, when treating the theories as inter-depending models and acknowledging
the multifaceity of committees, the predictions of the congressional theories
help us to get a much more accurate and deeper understanding of how
parliamentary party groups in parliamentary systems organise their work in
committees. This will also be of importance for the discussion on the issue of
legislative organisation in the U.S. Congress. As has been argued above, the
assumption of weak partisan influences was traditionally one of the key reasons
to focus and to understanding committees in this legislature. However, recent
literature has questioned this assumption and argued that parliamentary party
groups are much stronger nowadays. By studying legislatures in which there is
no question of the level of strength of parliamentary party groups, the results of
this study may help to broaden the focus of the discussion among congressional
scholars as well.