Problems of Majority Voting
Author(s): Gordon Tullock
Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 67, No. 6 (Dec., 1959), pp. 571-579
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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PROBLEMS OF MAJORITY VOTING
E
GORDON TULLOCK
Universityof South Carolina
CONOMISTS
have devoteda great factthatvotersare frequentlyverypoor-
deal of thought to problems of
governmentalpolicy and, in particular,to the question of properallocation of resourcesbetweenthe public and
privatesectors.'On the otherhand, little
attention has been given to the actual
or to the type
processofdecision-making
of policy likely to come out of the
2
process. It is the purpose of this article
to discuss one particularmethodofmaking governmental decisions-majority
voting-and to attempt to derive conclusions about its implications for resourceallocationand governmentpolicy.
It is hoped that the conclusionswill be
more realistic than current doctrine,
whichis based on an essentiallyeconomic
view of what "ought" to happen.
Since it is impossible to talk about
everythingat once, the demonstration
will be confinedto certainfeaturesof the
majority process. A number of other
serious problems raised by the voting
system will be disregarded. The most
importantof these concernsa series of
difficulties
and paradoxes in the voting
process itself.3I will also disregardthe
I See Julius Margolis, "The Economic Evaluation of Federal Water Resource Development,"
AmericanEconomicReview,XLIX (March, 1959),
69-111, fora reviewof some of the recentliterature
on the subject.
2
Pioneers have begun to appear. See Anthony
Downs, An Economic Theoryof Democracy(New
York: Harper & Bros., 1957), and Duncan Black,
and Elections(Cambridge:
The TheoryofCommittees
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1958).
view of
3See Black (op. cit.) fora comprehensive
discoveredto date.
the difficulties
ly informedor even deceived in voting,
the great oversimplificationof issues
necessaryin order to reduce them to a
formsuch that they can be determined
by vote, and innumerableotherpossible
limitationson the functionalefficiency
of the democraticprocess.
I shall consider the operation of
restricmajorityrule undertwo different
tions: logrolling(i.e., vote-trading)permittedand logrollingnotpermitted,startingwith the latter.Since logrollingis the
norm, discussion of the non-logrolling
case must startwithconsiderationof the
institutionalstructurewhich eliminates
logrolling.The standard referendumon
a simple issue is the best example. The
voter cannot trade his vote on one issue
for votes on others because he and his
acquaintances representtoo small a part
ofthe total electorateforthisto be worth
the effortinvolved. Further,the use of
the secret ballot makes it impossibleto
tell whethervotingpromisesare carried
out. In these circumstancesthe voter
will simply vote in accord with his
preferenceson each individualissue.
The contrary case, logrolling permitted,occurs under two circumstances.
First,it occurswherea rathersmall body
of voters vote openly on each measure;
this is normallyto be foundin representative assemblies, but it may also be
found in very small "direct democracy"
units. Under these circumstancestrades
of votes are easy to arrangeand observe
and significantlyaffectthe outcome. It
571
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572
GORDON TULLOCK
it is conis probablethat thisfact is one of the equally.By wayofillustration
send all
to
proposal
a
that
of
use
ceivable
widespread
majorreasonsforthe
Israel)
to
all
Jews
second
(or
The
to
Africa
democracy.
representative
Negroes
It
referendum.
by
whichmay be called would be passed
typeof logrolling,
of
chance
implicitlogrolling,occurs when large would have not the slightest
supporters
the
because
Congress
bodiesof votersare called on to decide passing
wouldbe willing
complexissues,suchas whichpartyshall of thesetwominorities
any other
almost
support
presented
to
to promise
rule,or a complexsetofissues
such
against
votes
for
Here
return
vote.
in
measure
as a unit fora referendum
the
of
vote-trading,
absence
the
In
bill.
thereis no formaltradingof votes,but a
cent,
51
reach
per
it
might
an analogousprocessgoes on. The "en- supportfor
who offercandidatesor but it wouldnot be intense,at least in
trepreneurs"
programsto the votermakeup a com- themarginal
cases,andhencethetrading
plex mixof policiesto attractsupport.4 processwouldinsureits defeat.
in mindthe
Even voterswho are moreor less inIn doingso,theykeepfirmly
to a givenissuemayfindtheir
factthatthevotermaybe so interested different
as muchas thoseof
in theoutcomeofsomeissuethathe will voteson it counting
voteforthe partywhichsupportsit, al- the most highlyconcernedindividuals.
thoughthe partyopposeshimon other The fact that a voter votes normally
indifissues.This implicitlogrollingwill not provesthat he is not completely
ferent,but manyvotersare motivated
be discussedfurther.
issuesmoreby a
In the systemin whichlogrollingis to vote on referendum
not permittedeveryvotersimplyindi- senseof dutyto vote than by any real
and the preferenceconcernwiththematterat hand.Under
cates his preference,
of the majorityof the votersis carried these circumstanceseven the tiniest
forone sideor theothermay
out. The defect,and it is a seriousone, preference
the cititheissue.Permitting
of thisprocedureis that it ignoresthe determine
of the desiresof the zens who feel very stronglyabout an
variousintensities
thosewhoseopinion
voters.A man who is passionatelyop- issueto compensate
posedto a givenmeasureand a manwho is onlyfeeblyheldcan resultin a great
ofbothgroups,
does not much care but is slightlyin increaseofthewell-being
is to
such transactions
favorof it are weightedequally.Obvi- and prohibiting
ously,both could veryeasilybe made prohibita movementtowardthe optibetteroffif the man who feltstrongly mumsurface.
Note that the resultunderlogrolling
to givea presentto the
werepermitted
onlyif
differs
in return and undernon-logrolling
man who had littlepreference
about
feelsmoreintensely
fora reversalof his decision.The satis- the minority
and theissuethanthemajority;ifthefeeling
factionofbothwouldbe improved,
situationwould,on strictly of the majorityis equal to or moreintheresulting
thenthemajorto theout- tensethantheminority,
be superior
Paretiangrounds,
comeofvotingthatweighedtheirvotes itywouldprevailbothwithand without
It is onlywhenthe intensity
logrolling.
4This problemis discussedin a paper presented
by JuliusMargolis beforethe Conferenceon Public of feelingof the minorityis enough
Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization,of the greater
thanthatofthemajorityso that
Universities-National Bureau of Economic Reare
willingto make sacrificesin
they
search Committee,held April 10 and 11, 1959, at
to detach the
areas
sufficient
other
Charlottesville,Virginia.
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PROBLEMS OF MAJORITY VOTING
573
marginalvotersfromthe majority(in- ownroadat variouslevelsofrepairwith
tense membersof the majoritymight the benefitsto be receivedfromit and
if theywished)that reacha decisionas to the pointwhere
makecounteroffers
thelogrolling
processwillchangetheout- the marginswereequal. He could then
thisdecision:he couldvoteon
generalize
come.
to repaira givenroad in
proposal
each
to
logrolling,
let
us
As an introduction
as he wouldvote forreway
same
the
model.
A
township
considera simple
road.If everyvoterfolown
his
on
pairs
who
inhabitedby one hundredfarmers
havemoreorless similarfarmsis cutby lowedthisrule,we wouldfinda schedule
a numberof mainroadsmaintainedby of votingbehaviorsuch as that illusthe state. However, these roads are tratedin Figure 1. Each markon the
the standard
roads,and thefarmers
are horizontalline represents
limited-access
ofall roads.
permitted
to entertheprimarynetwork ofonevoterformaintenance
a givenroad
onlyat pointswherelocalroadsintersect If a proposalforrepairing
it. The local roads are builtand main- fallsto theleftofhisposition,he would
tainedby the township.Maintenanceis voteforit; ifit fallsto hisright,against.
who wishesto have If each road has at least one farmer
simple.Anyfarmer
forroad repairsfalls
a specific
roadrepairedputstheissueup whosepreference
to vote.If therepairing
is approved,the to the rightofthe median(A in Fig. 1)
as partof
costis assessedto thefarmers
B'
A
B
the realproperty
tax. The principaluse
of the local roads by the farmersis to
MUCHREPAIRING
REPAIRING
LITTLE
get to and fromthe majorstate roads.
FIG. 1
Sincethesemajorroadscut through
the
district,
generallythereare onlyfouror then a proposalfor repairswould be
fivefarmers
on anyparticular madeas soonas a givenroad fellbelow
dependent
bit of local road to reach the major his preferred
degreeof repairand sucroads.
suchproposalsas theroad
cessivefurther
Underthesecircumstances
thereferen-graduallydeteriorated.
Whenit reached
dum systemwould resultin no local the median level, a repair proposal
roads being repaired,since an over- wouldpass; henceall roadswouldbe rewhelming
majoritywould vote against pairedat themedianpreference.
repairing
any givenroad.The logrolling Althoughthisresultwould not be a
theroadsto be Paretianoptimum,
system,
however,
permits
it wouldbe possible
kept in repairthroughbargainsamong to argueforit in ethicalterms.In fact,
voters.The bargainingmighttake a I believethatthisis theresultthatmost
numberof forms,but most of these proponents
in such situaof democracy
andthe"equilibrium" tionshave in the back of theirminds.
wouldbe unstable,
ofresources. In any event,I intendto use thisresult,
involvesoverinvestment
One formthat the implicitbargain whichI shallcall "Kantian"as the"coramongthe farmersmighttake is this: rect"resultwithwhichI shall contrast
each individualmightdecide,in his own whatactuallyhappens.Sincemy Kantmind,the generalstandardthat should ian resultdiffers
fromthe "equal marbe maintained.That is, he would bal- ginalcost and marginalbenefit"system
ance, accordingto his own scheduleof used by most economistsin this field,
on me to explainwhyI
his it is incumbent
thecostsofmaintaining
preferences,
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574
CORDON TULLOCK
useit.The reasonis simple-itis thebest however,in order to obtain support for
I can do. I have beenunableto findany some repairproject on his own road, he
systemof votingwhichwouldlead to a must also vote for the repairof another
social matchingof costsand benefitsat road, then he must also count the cost
themargin.
to him of this other repair project as
If the farmers
generallyfollowedthis part of the cost of his own road. In
policy in voting,then any individual weighingthe costs and benefits,he must
farmercould benefithimselfsimplyby considernot only the tax cost to himself
votingagainst all proposalsto repair of the repairof his own road but the tax
roadsotherthanhis ownand votingfor cost of the other repair job which he
proposalsto repairhisroadat everyop- must vote for in order to get his road
portunity.
This wouldshiftthe median done. In the particularcase we are now
oftheschedulesslightly
so thathis taxes discussing,when the farmerson all the
would be reducedor his road kept in roads except two are still Kantian, this
better-than-average
repair.If the other would put few restraints on feasible
farmers
on hisroadfollowed
hisexample projects, but it would still have to be
(we shall call farmerswho followthis considered.However, as more and more
rule "maximizers"),
theywouldbe able Kantians become tiredofbeingexploited
to shiftthe standardsof repairso that by the maximizers and switch to a
theroadson whichtheylivedwouldbe maximizing pattern of behavior, this
repairedat level B' whilereducingthe considerationwould become more and
standardof repairon otherroadsto B. more important.
Since the largestshare of the cost of
Let us now examinea ratherunlikely,
keepingtheirroadup fallson othertax- but theoreticallyimportant,special case.
payers,whilethe largestshareof their Suppose that exactly51 of our 100 farmtaxesgoesfortherepairof otherroads, ers were maximizers, while 49 were
thischangewouldbe greatlyto thead- Kantians. Further suppose that all the
vantageofthemaximizers
andgreatlyto maximizerslived on some roads while
all the Kantians lived on others.Under
thedisadvantageoftheKantians.
If thefarmers
alonganotherroadalso these circumstancesthe Kantians clearly
switchedto a maximizing
pattern,this would neverget theirroads repaired,but
wouldbringthe level of road-repairingthe level of repair on the maximizers'
on the two maximizingroads down roads presentsa more difficultproblem.
towardabout that whichwouldprevail In order to simplifyit, let us assume
under the Kantian system,while still (plausibly) that they are maintainedon
furtherloweringthe standardson the a high enough level so that all the
Kantianroads.However,it is likelythat Kantians vote against any project for
couldbene- further repair. Under these circumthetwogroupsofmaximizers
a coalitionin orderto raise stances it would be necessaryto obtain
fitbyforming
the standardsof road maintenanceon the votes of all the maximizersforeach
theirownroads.Let us considerthesitu- repair project. A farmer considering
debat- whetherhe wants to have his road reationof an individualmaximizer
or notto entersucha coali- paired must considerthe whole cost, iningwhether
tion.Sincehewillpayonlyabout1/100th cluding the taxes he must pay in order
of the cost,practicallyany proposalto to repairthe roads ofthe otherpartiesto
repairhis ownroad is to his benefit.If, the bargain. He can, however, simply
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PROBLEMS OF MAJORITY VOTING
compare his own marginalbenefitsand
costs, and this requiresno knowledgeof
anyone else's utility.He need only decide whetherthe total bargain is to his
advantage or not.5
Note, however, that, while no roads
leading to the Kantian farmers'houses
will be repaired, they are required to
contributeto therepairoftheroads leadingto thehousesofthemaximizers.Thus
part of the cost of the road-repair
projects will be paid by persons not
party to the bargain, and, since the
maximizersonlycountthe coststo themselves of theirvotes, the general standard of road maintenanceon the roads on
which theylive should be higherthan if
they had to count also the cost of maintainingthe roads on whichthe Kantians
lived. Under such conditions, where
virtueso conspicuouslyis not paying,it
seems likely that at least some of the
Kantian farmerswould decide to switch
to a minimizingpolicy. For simplicity,
let us assume that all of them do this at
once. Since they would still be in a
minority,their change of policy would
not immediatelybenefitthem,but surely they could find two of the original
maximizerswho would,in returnforvery
good maintenance, desert their former
colleagues. It is again obvious that the
new majority would be susceptible to
similardesertions;a permanentcoalition
of 51 farmersforthe purpose of exploiting the remaining49 could thus not be
maintained. In terms of game theory
any combinationof 51 voters dominates
any other size of combination,but no
combinationof 51 dominates all other
575
combinationsof 51.6
The outcome is clear. Each farmer
would enter into bilateral agreements
with enough farmerson other roads to
insure that his own was repaired. He
would then be forced to count as part
of the cost of gettinghis road repaired
the cost (to him) of repairingthe roads
of the other 50 farmers.These bilateral
agreements, however, would overlap.
FarmerA (morepreciselythe farmerson
road A) would bargainwith Farmers B,
... , M. Farmer M, on the otherhand,
might make up his majority from
Farmer A and FarmersN, . .. , Z.
Counting the cost to himselfof the
maintenanceof his road in termsof support forotherroad-repairprojects,each
farmerwouldconsideronlythoseprojects
forwhichhe voted. Thus his expenditure
patternwould countthe tax paymentsof
49 votersas a freegift.The naturalresult
would be that each road would be maintained at a level considerablyhigherand
at greaterexpense than is rational from
the standpoint of the farmers living
along it. Each individual behaves rationally,but the outcome is irrational.
This apparentparadox may be explained
as follows: each voter pays enough in
support for repair of other roads to
equalize the benefithe receivesfromthe
repairofhis own road. But his payments
counted under this systeminclude only
part of the road repairjobs undertaken.]
6 In the "Theory of the Reluctant Duelist"
(American Economic Review, XLVI [December,
1956],909-23) Daniel Ellsberg contendsthat game
theoryreally only applies to "reluctant" players.
Our case is a particularlypure example. The voter
must"play thegame" by enteringintobargainswith
50 of his fellows,even though this leads to rather
5In practice the problemof getting the unaniunsatisfactoryresults, simply because any other
mous agreementof 51 persons mightbe insoluble. courseof action is even worse.
Since we are now only discussinga ratherunlikely
7The fact that he is taxed for other roads not
special case, we can ignorethe point. Alternatively,
the reader can assume that there are 53 or 54 part ofhisbargainreduceshisreal incomeand hence,
maximizers,and those who set theirtermstoo high to some extent,reducesthe amountofroad repairing
can simplybe leftouit.
he would wishto corlsumr.
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576
GORDON TULLOCK
There are otherswhich are the result of
bargains to which he is not a party.
Taken as a group, the road-repair
projects for which he votes representa
good bargain for him, but other ad hoc
bargains to repair other roads will also
take place. He will vote against these,
but, as he will be in the minority,he will
have to pay for them. The result is a
sizable loss to him.
Anyfarmerfollowingany othercourse
of action will be even worse off. A
Kantian farmer, for example, would
never have his own road repaired but
would pay heavy taxes for the support
of repairjobs on otherroads. The whole
process will proceed through elaborate
negotiations;the man who is the most
effectivebargainerwill have a considerable advantage, but the general pattern
will be less than optimal for all parties.
This seems a ratherunsatisfactoryresult, and we should consider whether
thereare not ways ofimprovingit. First,
however,I should like to discuss certain
possible objections to my reasoning.8It
may be said that the maximizersare behaving wickedly and that ethical considerationswill prevent the majority of
the population from followingsuch a
course. Ethical systems vary greatly
from culture to culture, and I do not
wish to rule out the possible existence
somewhereof an ethical system which
could bar logrolling, but surely the
American system does not. Under our
system logrolling is normally publicly
characterized as "bad," but no real
stigmaattaches to thosewho practiceit.
The press describes such deals without
any apparent disapproval, and, in fact,
8 James Buchanan kindly permitted me to
present this paper before his graduate seminarin
public finance,and the objectionsmade by some of
the studentstendedto followthese lines.
all our political organizationsbargain in
this fashion.
A second argumentasserts that each
farmerin our communitywould realize
that, if he adopted a maximizingpolicy,
this would lead all other farmersto do
the same. Since the "maximizingequilibrium"is worseforall9thefarmersthan
the "Kantian median," each farmer
would, on the basis of cold selfishcalculation, followthe Kantian system.This
argumentis similarto the view that no
union will forceits wage rate up because
each union realizes that such action will
lead other unions to do the same, the
eventualoutcomebeinghigherpricesand
wage rates but no increase in real income. There seems to be overwhelming
empiricalevidence that men do not act
thisway; in addition,the argumentcontains a logical flaw.This is the observation that, in any series of actions by a
number of men, there must be a first
one. If this can be prevented,then the
whole series can be prevented. This is
true,of course,but therealso must be a
second, a third,etc. If any one of these
is prevented,then the whole series cannot be carriedout. If all our 100 farmers
would refrainfroma maximizingcourse
of action because each one felt that his
personaladoptionof such a coursewould
lead to a switchto the "maximizingequilibrium,"then,if one of them had done
so, we could constructan exactly similar
argument"proving" that no 1 of the 99
remainingfarmerswould follow his example. But if this second argumentis
true,thenthe firstis false; and hence the
chain of reasoning contains an inconsistency.
9 Not necessarilyforall. There mightwellbe one
or morefarmerswhosepersonalpreferenceschedules
called fora large enoughinvestmentin roads so that
the "maximizingequilibrium"was preferableto the
"Kantian median."
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PROBLEMS OF MAJORITYVOTING
577
I turnnow to possiblemethodsof im- more resources spent on road-repairing
provingthe results. Could the members felt more intensely about it than the
of a communitysomehow enterinto an voters who wanted less, then the Kantenforceablebargain under which they ian system would not result in an
act accordingto the Kantian model? In optimumdistributionof resources.Perthe very narrow special case of our mitting logrollingwould take care of
model, it is at least conceivable that this problem.
Requiringmore than a simple majortheycould. It is possiblethat a clear,unambiguous formulafor telling when a ity would reduce the resourcesspent on
road neededrepairmightbe agreedupon, roads, since more people would have to
and then the exact figuresto be inserted be includedin each bargain,and the cost
in the formula determinedby general to each voterof repairto thisroad would
voting. Probably even in our case this consequently be increased. The larger
would not be practical, but the theo- the majorityrequired,the more closely
would the result approach a Pareto
reticalpossibilitymust be admitted.
In the more general and realisticcase optimum.Practically,however,the difwhere governmentalunits deal with a ficultyof negotiatinga bargain would
continuingstream of radically different increase exponentiallyas the numberof
projects, no such agreed formulawould required parties increased, and this
be possible. A formulawhichwould per- mightmake such a solutionimpossible.
mit weighingsuch diverse programsas The provisionin so many constitutions
buildinggiant irrigationprojects in the for a two-houselegislature,each house
West to increase farmproduction,pay- elected accordingto a differentsystem,
ing large sums of money to farmersin raises much the same issues.
Our next problem is to inquire to
the Midwest to reduce farmproduction,
givingincreasedaid to Israel, and dredg- what extent the results obtained in our
ing Baltimore's harbor is inconceivable. simple model can be generalized. It
be any agree- would appear that any governmental
There could not,therefore,
ment on an automatic system of al- activitywhichbenefitsa givenindividual
locating resources, and this throws us or group of voters and which is paid for
back to makingindividualdecisionswith from general taxation could be fitted
into our model. It is not necessarythat
the use of logrolling.
This is by no means a tragedy. If it the revenuesused to pay forthe projects
were possible to set up some systemby be collectedequally fromall voters. All
present voting to determinefuture re- that is necessaryis that the benefitsbe
more concentratedthan the
source allocation, it is more likely that significantly
this determinationwould take a form costs. This is a very weak restraint,and
favoredby a simplemajorityof the vot- a very large number of budgetarypaters than a formfavored by the whole ternswould fitit. If the taxes were colgroup unanimously. This is likely to lected by some indirectmethod so that
result in a worse decision than that re- individualscould not tell just how much
suitingfromlogrolling.The problem of they were paying for any given project,
intensitymust also be considered. The then this fact would accentuate the
Kantian systemmakes no allowance for process. In the marginal case the indiabout projintensitiesof the voters' vidual might be indifferent
the differential
preferences.If the voters who wanted ects benefitingother people whose cost
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578
GORDON TULLOCK
to himwas slightand difficult
to calcu- exemptionsfor all sorts of groups. This
late.
would greatly reduce the effectof any
One requirement
of the processhas general tax policy, such as progression,
notyetbeenemphasized.
It is necessary that had been adopted. This patternapthat the votingon the variousprojects pears to be veryrealistic.On the basis of
be a continuing
process.A numberof our theory,we would predictgeneraland
different
projectsor groupsof projects diffusetaxes, riddledwith special excepmustbe votedonat different
times.If all tions, and governmental functions of
projectswereinsertedin a singlebill to general benefitsacrificedin favor of the
be acceptedorrejectedforall time,then interestsof particular groups. I see no
51 per cent of the voterscould fixthe greatconflictbetweenthe predictionand
bill permanently
to exploitthe remain- reality.
der.In fact,ofcourse,sincegovernment To apply our theorygenerallyto all
is a continuing
process,our condition
is typesofgovernmentalactivity,however,
fulfilled.
we must radicallygeneralizeit. For any
The processwhichwe have been dis- individualvoterall possiblemeasurescan
cussingcan be generalized
to coverother be arrangedaccordingto the intensityof
typesof government
activity.We shall his feeling.His welfarecan be improved
startby generalizing
it to coverother if he accepts a decisionagainst his desire
typesof taxation-expenditure
problems in an area where his feelingsare comand thenturnto othertypesofgovern- parativelyweak in returnfora decision
mentalproblems.First,let us suppose in his favorin an area wherehis feelings
thatwe have somegovernmental
activ- are strong. Bargains between voters,
ity of generalbenefit,police work,for therefore,can be mutually beneficial.
example,whichis paid forby somegen- Logically, the voter should enter into
eral type of taxation. By reasoning such bargains until the marginal"cost"
parallelingthatwhichwe have done so of voting for somethinghe disapproves
far,we can demonstrate
thatspecialtax of but about whichhis feelingsare weak
exemptions
to specialgroupsat the ex- exactly matches the marginalbenefitof
of the the vote on somethingelse which he repense of the generalefficiency
police forcewould be carriedon to a ceives in return. Thus he will benefit
degree which would far exceed the fromthe total complex of issues which
Kantian median. Similarly,if a given enter into the set of bargains which he
sumofmoneyis to be spenton twodif- makes with other people. In making
ferenttypes of governmental
activity, these bargains, however,he must gain
one of whichis of generalbenefitand the assent of a majority of the voters
a seriesof special only, not of all of them. On any given
one ofwhichbenefits
groups,too muchwill be spenton the issue he can safelyignorethe desires of
latter. Defense,for example,will be 49 per cent. This means that he can afslightedin favor of riverand harbor fordto "pay" more to people forvoting
forhis measures because part of the inwork.
can be appliedto convenienceimposedby the measurewill
The samereasoning
If a givenamountof fall on parties not members of the
the tax structure.
moneyhad to be raised,we wouldexpect bargains.
Unfortunately,the converse also apit to be raisedbygeneraltaxesthatwere
"too heavy" but riddled by special plies. Bargains will be entered into in
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PROBLEMS OF MAJORITY VOTING
whichour voter does not participatebut
part of the cost of which he will have to
bear. As a result,the whole effectof the
measureswhich resultfromhis bargains
and on which he votes on the winning
side will be beneficialto him. But this
will be only slightlymorethan halfof all
the "bargained" measures passed, and
the remainderwill be definitelycontrary
to his interest.The same would be true
forthe averagevoter under a pure referendum system.In fact, the whole problem discussed in this paper arises from
the system of corrpellingthe minority
to accept the will of the majority.
Althoughthispaper so farhas been an
exercisein "positivepolitics,"the analysis does raise importantpolicyproblems,
and at least some comment on them
seems desirable. It seems clear that the
579
systemofmajorityvotingis notby any
meansan optimalmethodof allocating
This factshouldbe takeninto
resources.
account in consideringwhethersome
aspect of our economywouldbe better
handled by governmentalor market
techniques.On the otherhand, these
problemsand difficulties
do not materiallyreducetheadvantagewhichvotingprocedures
have overdespotism
as a
The primary
systemofgovernment.
lesson would appear to be the need for
further
research.Majorityvotingplays
themajorrolein thegovernments
ofall
the nationsin whichthe social sciences
are comparatively
advanced. It seems
likelythatcarefulanalysisoftheprocess
wouldlead to thediscovery
ofimproved
techniquesand a possibleincreasein
governmental
efficiency.
This content downloaded from 59.65.123.77 on Mon, 28 Oct 2013 03:52:22 AM
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