The Establishment of Soviet Power in Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia
1921-1928
Stephen Jones
Soviet Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4. (Oct., 1988), pp. 616-639.
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SOVIET STL'DIES, k o l . XL. no 4. October 1988. 616-639
THE ESTABLISHMENT O F SOVIET POWER I N TRANSCAUCASIA: T H E CASE O F GEORGIA 1921-1 928 T ~ ~ 1 9 2 represent
0s
one of the brightest periods in the social and political development of the Soviet national groups despite the growing strength of centripetal
forces in Moscow. The policy of 'indigenisation' (korenizatsija) officially launched
at the XI1 congress of the RKP(b) in April 1923 was an attempt to integrate the
nationalities into a new mult,i-national state by accommodating national cultural
aspirations. The recruitinent of native cadres to run the local administrative
apparatus solved a practical problem of a chronic personnel shortage as well as
giving some legitimacy to party rule in non-Russian areas. However, the Marxist
dialectic of assimilation through national cultural growth. embodied in the policy
of korenizatsiya, encouraged the process of modern nation building that had
begun under the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The deliberate
acceleration of modernising forces (mass education, urbanisation, improved
communications and economic development) in the 1920s, combined with policies
of 'affirmative action' and wide opportunities for national self-expression, resulted
in a new confidence among the native elites, including those in the party, who
raised searching questions about the proper relationship between the centre and
the national republics.
The few Western studies that cover this period in the Soviet nationalities'
development tend to concentrate on the political struggle between native elites
and Moscow.' Social histories of the nationalities during this crucially formative
stage are rare.' The group of Soviet nationalities most seriously neglected is that of
T r a n s c a ~ ~ c a s i This
a . ~ is surprising in the Georgian case given the high profile
Georgia received as a result of its leaders' vociferous defence of national interests
against the centralising press~~re
from Moscow during the 'autonomisation' debate
of 1922-23.4 This paper will look at the Georgian example in the 1920s 'from
below', and particular attention will be paid to the results of korenizatsija. The
first part will deal with social and economic change in the Georgian population
under the impact of Soviet policies, and its consequences for national development. The second section will deal with the major political problems faced by
Soviet power in the region (opposition, peasant unrest, relations with Moscow)
and how native leaders dealt with them.
In February 1921, when the 1 1 th Army ended three years of independent Menshevik government in Georgia, the multi-national population stood at TABLE 1
1917
1922-3
1926
Geoi.ginr~.v Ainrri~icins Ru.s.\iai?.s
Lrk~crininnt
67.7
11.5
4.9
71.5
10.8
3.4
1 1.6
4.2
67.6
'in "/u )
71ir.k.s
0s.sc~ticiiit Ahkilciziiin.~ Ot11crs
P~~i..sinrl
t
5.3
4.0
1.7
4.9
1.5
5.6
3.2
4.0
5.4
4.3
2.2
4.7
2.453,670, a growth of 27% since 1897.911is was despite a 7.3% decline in
population during the war and civil war years of 1914-21 ."n 1926, after five years
of relative stability, the population had grown almost 9% to 2.666.494, which was
a little above the pre-war figure of 2.600,000.7 Between 1917 and 1926 the national
composition of the Georgian republican population varied as shown in Table 1 .
The increase in the proportion of Georgians between 19 17 and 1922 reflected
the pro-Georgian policies of the Menshevik government, the loss of Georgian
territory containing a large proportion of non-Georgians and the out-migration
of Azerbaidjanis (classified above as Turks/'Persians),Armenians and Russians to
their respective republics in a time when ethnicity represented an 'implied claim to
p r i ~ i l e g e ' This
. ~ tendency was reversed after the Soviet victory in Georgia, when
refugees, including Russians searching for work and fleeing the famine in thc
North Caucausus and Kuban, returned home; but the reversal was s~nallas most
skilled jobs were already occupied by Georgians and unernploynient was very
high. The 'Georgianisation' of the cities continued in the 1920s. albeit at a slower
rate than in 1918 2 1 . a pattern established since the end of the nineteenth century,
when rapid industrialisation drew in Georgian peasants from the countryside.
Between 1922 and 1930 the Georgian share of the Tbilisi\opuIation increased
from 34.6% to 42.9%. During the same period the Ar~nenianshare declined from
36.5% to 33.0°h and the Russian from 16.5% to 14.0%.10Hut in 1929 Georgians
were still over-represented in the countryside. where they made up 72%. compared
with 67'36 in the whole republic.
Korenizafsiya was applied to the sizeable native minorities in the republic as well
as to the Georgians. The Abkhazians were initially granted their own independent
republic in May 1921, the Adzharians received autonomous status (an ASSR) in
July 1921, and the South Ossetians were awarded an Autonomous Region (oblast)
in April 1922." In 1926 the Abkhazians numbered 56,847. or 27.8% of their own
republic. This was an increase of 8% since 1922 and may have been due to
resettlement fro111'Turkey, where many had sought refuge with their co-religionists
during the Georgian independence period (although not all Abkhazians were
Muslim), and to re-identification as Abkhaz rather than as Georgian or Mingrelian (a neighbouring Georgian group which had a dominant cultural influence in
the region) under the impact of korenizatsiyu. Abkhazians also received schooling
in their own native tongue and an official literary language was established, based
on a latin script. in 1928. Between 1923 and 1926 the proportion of Abkhazians in
the Abkhaz communist party increased from 10% to 25.4%. In the same years the
Georgian proportion in Abkhazia (this includes the Mingrelians who were
classified separately from the Georgians in 1926) decreased from 42% to 36% and
their proportion of the local party fell from 40.40h (1923) to 33.3% (1926).
The Ossetians were in a stronger demographic position than the Abkhazians
and made up 69% of their South Ossetian Autonomous Region in 1926. They also
benefited from korenizatsiju policies in terms of schooling and native language
newspapers and books. although betmeen 1923 and 1926 their weight in the
Georgian communist party decreased from 9.00% to 6.2% (but net numbers
increased). The Georgian proportion of the population registered an insignificant
decrease from 28.3% to 26.9% in 1922--26. The Adzharians ('Muslimised'
Georgians). made up 70% of their republic in 1926, an increase of Soh over 1922.
This was perhaps due to the departure of many of the local Greek community.
Their emigration seriously damaged the local tobacco industry, which had been
mainly under Greek contr01.'~
The slight overall decrease in the demographic weight of Georgians in their
republic in the 1920s compared to 19 18-2 1 was counterbalanced by a continuing
'Georgianisation' process in republican life, as will be shown below. Although
Georgians' political and economic power in the republic was diminished compared
to the independence period. they continued to improve their position in education.
administration and government. As a result of three years of nationai government,
when the 'nationalisation' of education and administration proceeded apace and
public opinion was frequently mobilised around wars of national defence,
Georgian national consciousness, despite the lo~iglevel of literacy (32% in 192223), could be assumed to be quite high. Over 96OA of ethnic Georgians claimed
Georgian as their first language in 1926.
The peasantry
Although 7OoA of Georgia's national income came from agriculture, Georgia was
not self-sufficient in food production and the cities remained ill-supplied. This,
combined with the particularly acute land hunger in Georgia and the continuing
unrest in the countryside focused local Bolshevik attention on the peasantry. The
problems the new rulers faced in the countryside were colossal. Georgian
agriculture was extremely backward. In 1926 37% of households were without a
working animal, 46% had no plough and 57% 110 means of transport (crucial for
getting goods to the market).13 Due to the division of land among the peasants by
the Menshevik government and the continuing growth of the rural population. the
number of separate households increased. and by 1926 84.2% of households
worked up to two desjutinjs of sown land 011ly.l' A tiny 2.8% of households
owned over four de.~j'atinjof sown land (the so-called kulaks). Land shortage was
an intractable problem in Georgia. To satisfy all Georgian households with
minimum land norms (set by the Georgian Bolsheviks at between 2.5 and 10
desyatinj according to the quality of land) required one and a quarter million
desyatinj when only three quarters of a million were available." Since the late
nineteenth century, when peasants began to switch to more profitable crops
(tobacco, tea, wine). Georgia had been unable to feed itself with grain and four
POWER IlY GEORGIA
619
million tons were imported annually. In the 1920s, with priority given to famine
areas in Russia, supplies were sporadic. Economic dissatisfaction was endemic in
this situation and Georgian peasants, after the experiences of independence in
1917-21 when many had served in the Georgian army and fought foreign
intruders. or received education for the first time and been organised into
Menshevik cooperatives. had obtained a high degree of organisational ability and
self-confidence. There was always a danger that the economic grievances of the
peasantry might coalesce around ethnic issues. Georgian leaders were aware of
this and Cornuni.~ti,the Georgian communist party organ, declared in March 1921
that 'not one of our steps must be taken without a national basis'.16
How did the Georgian Bolsheviks tackle the peasant problen~and with what
success? Immediately after the invasion emergency requisition measures were
implemented to feed the cities and the death penalty was introduced for
hoarding.17 (Bread almost disappeared from Tbilisi in June 1921.) A tax in kind
(prodncilog) was introduced in July. which led to considerable peasant resistance; it
was reduced and modified in July 1922 to allow monetary payment. A land decree
was published in April which contained all the features of the Russian model;
nationalisation, confiscation above a certain norm without coinpensation and no
buying or selling. The decree emphasised that poor and middle peasants would be
untouched and that money spent on buying their land under the conditions of the
Menshevik reform would be returned." A system of ternehi (local communes) and
peasant land conlnlittees was set up to administer the reform. Although Georgian
peasants were saved from the rigours of war comn~unism, the conciliatory
measures of NEP (New Economlc Policy) which included the provision of credit
and limited hiring and renting rights did not inspire any particular enthusiasm for
the new regime. Despite the econoinic difficulties of the independence period.
Georgian peasants had during this time already experienced economic freedoms
similar to those granted by NEP.
The implementation of reforms was hampered by the chronic weakness of party
adininistration in rural areas. In the whole of the countryside in 1924 there were no
inore than 6,000 party members and 47% of these had joined since 1921, which
indicated a lack of experience. The number of village soviets and tenzehi in Georgia
in 1926 was far lower than anywhere else in T r a n s ~ a u c a s i a . 'Sergo
~
Ordzhonikidze, close ally of Stalin and chairman of the Caucasian Regional Bureau
(Kuvhj~uro),complained in 1925 that peasant cotntnittees 'take away land and
commit every excess'.20 Materials prepared for the fourth congress of the
Communist Party of Georgia (CPG) in 1925 complained of forced taxation. of
crude party interference in village soviets and insensitive closure of churches, of
party members lacking elementary knowledge, and of a complete lack of authority
or trust for any state institutions in the c o u n t r y ~ i d e . ~Additional
'
causes for
dissatisfaction atnong the peasantry included the continuing high rate of inflation.
the prices of manufactured goods (part of the 'scissors crisis'),22 the tardiness of
the land reform, which did not effectively commence until 1923, party purges
(which affected peasant members in particular), and the institution of state
monopolies in crops such as silk and tobacco. which forced down prices. An
indication of peasant indifference to the Soviet government was reflected in village
620
ESTABLISHMENT O F S O VIET
elections. In the 1923 village soviet elections, only 28% voted for the CPG while
60.3% voted for non-party representatives. In similar elections in 1927 only 47%
of those entitled to do so voted, and in 1929 the figure was
The policy of collectivisation proved a failure in the 1920s with only 3.649
inembers organised in cooperative farms in 1928. NEP also failed to stimulate a
rapid recovery in Georgian agriculture. In 1926 the sown area of grain was 88% of
the pre-war figure and productivity per desyatina 53.7% of the pre-war
The government, operating on a deficit budget throughout the 1920s. failed to
establish an adequate local governinent infrastructure in the countryside. Ordzhonikidze reported in 1924 that in the western regions of Georgia only 52.6% of
village taxes (the government's main source of revenue) was c~llected.~%fterthe
Menshevik-led rising that same year (discussed below), the tax burden on peasants
\\.as decreased by 2Soh although such a reduction was a heavy blow to government
revenues. Tf in 1915 1 7 annual agricultural aid to peasants in Georgia worked out
at 17.8 kopeks per head, it was 3.3 kopeks in 1923-24.26 There were numerous
reports at party congresses throughout the 1920s that regional administration was
corrupt or in a complete shambles, and at the fifth Georgian party congress (1927).
it was alleged that village soviets were sitnply not in control of the p e a ~ a n t s . ' ~
The lack of Bolshevik influence among the peasantry during the 1920s was
accompanied by continuing politicisation of the village as a result of the growth in
schools. literacy. and campaigns for the creation of cooperatives. women's groups
or village soviets.28 The rural intelligentsia, large numbers of whom remained in
the Menshevik party and dominated the leading village institutions (schools,
soviets. reading rooms). probably welcolned the official policy of national cultural
development as an opportunity to promote national consciousness among the
villagers. The Georgian party central committee noted in 1923 that there were
strong 'national-bourgeois tendencies' among rural (and urban) teachers.29 and
during the 'face to the village' campaign after 1924 great emphasis was placed on
winning them over by improving their material conditions. The rural intelligentsia
played a prominent part in the Menshevik revolt of 1924.30
However, the slow economic improvements in the village compared to 1921 and
the greater political stability, although offset by the insensitive activities of the
party's more zealous followers, and by the inadequate rural administration and
unpopular pvol/nulog, probably encouraged the peasantry, except in a few western
and mountainous regions. to avoid open conflict with the Bolsheviks. Peasants'
natural inclination is to get on with their daily tasks and any appeals for revolt
would have to be founded on more than a sense of grievance against, or
indifference to, government. The Georgian peasantry, though relatively homogeneous, was also divided amongst itself regionally, economically and culturally,
which hindered united action.
The li.or/iing class
In 1921 the Bolsheviks faced a chaotic industrial situation in Georgia and a highly
politicised, largely Georgian working class. hostile to the new regime. Georgian
worlters had formed the backbone of the Georgian Menshevik party (which was
POWER IN GEORGIA
TABLE 2
Number of industrial concerns
Percentage of total
Number of workers
Percentage of total
Average number of workers per concern
250
3.304
11.148
43.20/0
44
40
0.5'/0
326
1.3%
8.2
7.666
96.2'/0
14.325
55.5%
1.9
7.956
100%
25.799
100%
3,2
Source: S L I I C L I I ~ ~ ISZSIR~ ~rukh~ilkho
IO.~
i~?eurizeobir1921-67. General ed. P. Gugushvili (Tbilisi. 1977).
p. 140. 'Workers' were defined in Soviet censuses of the 1920s as those 'employed directlq in the
production and transfer of material value or 111 the maintenance of produc~ionrnecl~anisms'"~.
75.000 strong at its height) and of its elite military defence force, the National
Guard. They were almost all unionised and had been frequently mobilised for the
defence of the Menshevik government against foreign i n t e r ~ e n t i o n . ~Georgian
'
Menshevism had evolved in the independence period (if not before) into a broad
based national movement which had the support of the vast majority of the
Georgian population, including the working class.
In 1923 a survey of 'industrial' concerns in Georgian towns revealed the
situation as shown in Table 2. Only 451 of these concerns had any machinery
(12%). adding up to a total of 25,068 horsepower. In addition there were
approximately 11.000 workers in mining and transport and 10,000 in concerns in1
rural areas (89.7% of the latter in private hands).33The above data suggest that a
large number of workers were involved in handicraft (Iczrsturnj~i)rather than
'factory' production. Small scale economic units were the norm and the line
between townsmen (meshchune) such as tradesmen, shopkeepers and craftsmen,
on the one hand, and 'workers', on the other, was probably rather blurred.
In 1926 Georgians made up 90% of the miners. 68% of the rail and transport
workers and 44% of those in 'industrial concerns' (i.e. the smaller ktrsturnj.~
units).34 The total number of trade unionists in 1923 was 87,000 (this included
office personnel and those in 'free professions'), with Georgians comprising 53%:
by 1928 this figure had increased to 61 %. mainly at the expense of Russians and
Armenians. This implies that korwzizutsij~cror 'Georgianisation' was progressing,
but whether it was the result of Bolshevik policies rather than just a 'natural
process accompanying urbanisation. and which social groups were benefiting the
most, are unclear.
'Georgianisation' would have been more rapid in the towns had industrial
growth been quicker and led to recruitment from the surrounding pool of
Georgian peasant labour, but industrial recovery was slow and inany Georgian
crops, such as viticulture. tea. tobacco and sericulture were labour intensive and
could absorb a large rural labour force. In 1921 industrial production in Georgia
was 13.8% of the 1913 level and in the first two years of Soviet power many
industries continued to decline (although the depopulation of towns was not as
dramatic as in European R ~ s s i a ) . ~ " n 1921-22, 27OA of factories surveyed by the
newly installed Bolsheviks were not working. unemployment stood at 28%
(among 'industrial' workers) and the average worker's wage was 68% of the 1913
622
E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF SOVIET
In 1927 registered unemployment stood at 13% (the real figure was
probably higher) and was climbing." In 1925. after four years of Soviet power,
productivity in industry was still only 66% of the pre-war level despite large
numbers of layoffs (part of a rationalisation campaign), and exports remained at
65.3% of 1913 levels. Between 1922 and 1926 the cost of housing, food and clothes
combined increased almost twice as much as wages and workers, due to a shortage
of state goods, were forced to spend an average of 66% of their budget in the
private market where prices were not under government control.38
Given such conditions and the long tradition of Menshevik support among the
Georgian working class, it is hardly surprising that the new government faced
considerable difficulty in securing a firm base among the workers. Menshevism,
which in the Georgian context had become synonymous with national independence, remained a major force among Georgian workers until the mid-1920s.
Georgian communist leaders recognised the strength of nationalism anlong
workers. Stalin in his address to the Tbilisi party organisation in July 1921
declared:
. . . the former solidarity [between Caucasian peoples] is no longer evident. Nationalism has awoken among peasants and a.orl<ersgreater distrust for other peoples. This nationalism remains a strong obstacle to the united work of the Caucasian republics. . . . 3 9 Besides open ar,ti-Bolshevik expression by workers a t meetings or on demons t r a t i o n ~ , ~lack
'
of cooperation with the new regime in the early years was
reflected in their low party membership. In January 1922 those of worker origin in
the Georgian party stood at 13%. By 1923 it had crept up to 17% and only in
1925, after the 'Lenin enrolment', was it a respectable 39%. However, the 'Lenin
enrolment' resulted in a reduction of 6% in the Georgian proportion of the party.
which suggests that non--Georgian workers may have been the primary beneficiaries."' By 1930 worker representation was down to 30%.
The party attempted to secure worker support through its kor-er~iacrt.sijwpolicy.
which was littlp more than an early form of national communism. The K L / ~ ~ ~ ~ , z I I . o
declared in September 192 1 :
To 01-ercome the remnants of nationalism. the communist party is forced quite consciously to give way temporarily to the masses' national aspirations with the aim of remol-ing that chauvinist poison which has been left by the Mensheviks. Musavat and Da~hnaks.'~ Thus Georgian workers, especially newcomers to the city. were provided with the
cultural and technical means for strengthening their national identity. A literacy
campaign by trade unions and soviets led to an increase from 32% literacy in
Georgia in 1922 to 43% by 1926, although this may have been due partly to earlier
Menshevik education policies which were coming to fruition by the mid-1 9 2 0 ~ . " ~
Over the same period (1922--26) literacy anlong urban Georgians increased from
72.8% to 77%.
One of the first acts of the Georgian Revkom (the Revolutionary Committee,
the first provisional Bolshevik government in Georgia) was to declare that all
POWER IN GEORGIA
623
government and other business in towns must be conducted in G e ~ r g i a nThis
.~~
applied to trade unions and other worker organs such as arbitratioll committees
and soviets. A trade union publishing house (Shroma) was set up and in 1927 it
published a total of 158,000 editions of various works, the vast majority of them in
Georgian. compared with 6,000 in 1921. At the same time 'The Society for the
Spreading of Literacy among Georgians', set up in 1879, continued its work, and
in 1924 produced 75.000 copies of Light. a book of the Georgian a l p l ~ a b e t . ~ ~
There was also continued emphasis on the press and by 1925 the Georgian
government was producing 48 newspapers and journals, the majority in
clubs, libraries and discussioll groups were promoted among
G e ~ r g i a nReading
.~~
the \vorkforce and although a censorship organisation was established in 1923 (the
Main Administration of Literary and Publishing Affairs). it did not prevent
llatiollalist writers, illegal pamphleteers and private publishing houses reaching an
illcreasillgly literate audience.
The party press highlighted llational concerns as well, particularly during the
campaign against the 'national deviationists' (discussed below), and during the
acrimonious debates concerning the loss of Georgian sovereigllty to the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (the ZSFSR fhrmed in 1922).47 The
Georgian Red Army was also a nationalising illstrument (the first Georgian
division was created in August 1922 and there were 40,000 soldiers in Georgian
units by 1925). Young soldiers, in living conditions described as 'very severe' by
the CPG second congress, were conlinanded by an officer corps 97% of whom (in
1922) were former Menshevik offi~ers.'~This was a dangerous situation for the
Bolsheviks and could not have helped in their campaign against Georgian
nationalism.
Although there is no effective means for measuring national consciousness
among Georgian workers and soldiers in the 1920s, one suspects that Soviet
policies, combined with the lack of experienced native cadres and
ltoi~et~izut.r&a
high unen~ploynlent(and conlpetition for jobs with other ethnic groups), encouraged its growth. This is not to say that such 'national consciousness' predisposed
workers to revolt, but it was a hindrance to integration into the Soviet multinational state.
Tlze meshchane
This is a highly heterogeneous category including tradesmen, traders, shopkeepers
and the self-employed, what the Bolsheviks called. along with the richer peasants,
the 'petty bourgeoisie'. There are very few data on this group and one suspects
they had little sense of corporate identity; there is no documented organised
resistance to the increasing restrictions placed on their activities by the Georgian
government. Nevertheless, they continued to play a major role in Georgian (and
Russian) economic life throughout the 1920s. In 1926, at the very minimum, 18%
of the urban working population in Georgia could be described as belonging to the
Traditionally, the majority in this group were Armeniall (in 1926
n~esl7chut1e."~
there were 115,000 Armenians living in Georgian towns) although there are no
figures on national breakdou.11. Lenin, who saw Georgia as an economic 'window
624
ESTA BLPSHlbfEIVT O F SO VIET
on the West', urged Georgian Bolsheviks to compromise with the local petty
bourgeoisie, partly to avoid alienating Western capital interested in economic
concessions in the region and partly to prevent the disruption of the Georgian
econoiny in a time of local Bolshevik weakness.jOIf the majority of this group was
still Armenian in the 1920s, repression may also have taker1 on a dangerous ethnic
colouring (like the repression of the Chinese trading class in socialist Vietnam). In
fact, the Georgian government was financially destitute and was unable to take
control of small businesses even had it wished. The hope was that these petty
industrialists and tradesmen would gradually be drawn into the socialist sector
and converted to more progressive methods. Consumer and producer cooperatives
were promoted by the party to counter private trade, \?.it11 some success. In 192930 cooperatives had 52O/0 of all trade turnover (wholesale and retail) in Georgia.
Under NEP the private econonly in Georgia continued to prosper. A large
section of the urban population remained outside the socialist sector and thus less
accessible to Bolshevik propaganda (many in the private sector were not
unionised). In 1924-25 there were 11,000 private trade units in Georgia (including
rural areas), controlling 77% of all retail trade. In contrast, there were only 29 1 state
trade units. In 1926-27 private units numbered 11,700 (state--645) and in 1930
47.3% of all trade units were still in private hands. However, their share of total
trade turnover (retail and wholesale) went into steady decline after 1926-27, falling
from 32.6% then to 7.3% in 1929-30, as a result of increasing competition from the
state sector. as well as discrimiilatory tax and legal restrictions." During the first
five-year plan most of the nzeshchal?e were forced to join cooperative unions or had
their property nationalised.
The rve.shchut~efor obvious reasons were not attracted to the Bolshevik policy of
trade monopolies and government econon~icdirection, and despite NEP were
subject to increasing restrictions on their economic activity. Private traders were
also oficially disenfranchised, although how far this went in practice is unclear."
in addition, the large Armenian contingent may have been antagonised by the
official policy of korenizufsiya which favoured the Georgians. Although direct
evidence is lacking, one can reasonably assume that despite the limited prosperity
enjoyed by this group under NEP, support anlong them for the Bolsheviks would
be quite weak.
In the nineteenth century the Georgian 'intelligentsia', like its Russian counterpart, was not a social group but a stratum united by radical ideas and opposition
to tsarism. Every modernising step by the tsasist state (the Emancipation reforms,
expansion of education, forrilation of local government) broadened its ranks and
increased its political consciousness. Fuelled by European radicalism and Russian
populism, the Georgian intelligentsia assumed the role of national cultural
leadership of the 'people'. By 1905 the vast majority of 'intelligenty' supported
Georgian Menshevism, which already had the overwhelming support of other
C~eorgian strata (peasantry and working class), and during the independence
period they saw an unprecedented increase in their power as a result of the
POWER IIV GEORGIA
625
nationalisation of administration and government. This articulate and educated
group greeted the Russian-backed Georgian Bolsheviks with hostility, sufTered
serious levels of unemployment throughout the 1920s and bore the brunt of initial
Bolshevik suppression. Combined with the much broader category of 'white
collar' workers such as clerks, civil servants, engineers and teachers, they made up
6.6Oh of the working population in 1926 (this is including non-Georgians); 0.8%
more than the manual worker c a t e g 0 1 - y .There
~~
is no national breakdown of this
white collar group but a report on government institutions in Tbilisi in 1924
(where the non-Russian representation was likely to be high) showed that
Georgians in this group were overrepresented relative to their proportion of the
city's population: Georgians made up approxinlately 36O/0 of the Tbilisi population but occupied 54% of all posts in government institutions of all-Georgian
competence (the figure was 61% for non-economic institution^).^^ However, as
Georgians made up 67% of the total republican population, these figures were
condemned as too low by the 1924 report. which urged increased Georgian
recruitment and insisted that only those who knew Georgian should be employed
by government bodies. By 1927, as a result of the continuing indigenisation
programme. Georgians made up 74% of all those working for republican and
government i n ~ t i t u t i o n s . ~ ~
White collar workers were heavily represented in party and soviet organs. In
January 1922 they made up 29% of the CPG and in 1929, despite worker
recruitment drives and numerous purges (c.hi.rtki): they still comprised almost one
quarter. Their representation was greater in the higher levels of party and
government. At the third, fourth and fifth Georgian party congresses (1925, 1927 .
1929) they made u p 48%, 42% and 46% of the delegates respectively. In 1925-29
they made up, on average, 71% of soviet presidiums and 57% of regional (ztezcl)
However, it was not Georgians who necessarexecutive committees (i.spolliom~~).~"
ily benefited from this high white collar contingent in the party. Although
Georgians did better in the upper levels of party and government (nationally, they
conlprised 82% of all soviet presidium members in 1926-27 and overwhelmingly
dominated the party central committee and its Presidium), in 1927 they still only
made up 55% of the GCP. Thus the koret~izutsijuprogramme put Georgians in
leading positions, but it was not completely satisfactory in drawing them into
party life, although this may be due as much to the Georgians' predominance in
rural areas as to resistance to the Bolshevik regime.
The Georgian Bolsheviks were extremely suspicious of the native intelligentsia
which during the Menshevik period had come to accept the legitimacy of Georgian
independence. Ordzhonikidze declared a month after the Bolshevik invasion:
I want to u-arn our intelligcntsia not to makc thc salnc mistake as the Russian
intelligcntsia. . . . The Georgian intelligentsia must accept that the old Menshevik
government is dead. For those itzrelligc,tzry who accept this. every door is open. But if the
intelligentsia begins sabotage, secret conspiracies and risings. u-c have only bullet talk for
them. . . . j 7
This crudely stated policy-compromise
with fellow travellers combined with
suppression of 'nationalist recidivists'--produced a workable t~zo~lu,s
vivet~diwith
626
ESTABLISHMENT O F SO VIET
the majority of the Georgian intelligentsia, but if the Bolshevik authorities are to
be believed, failed to curb its nationalism. A Georgian central committee plenum
in 1927, for instance, noted the 'ideological antagonism' of students and teachers
to Bolshe~ism.~"oth these groups resisted party influence. At the first congress
of the Teachers' Union in November 1924, party efforts 'to crudely control
cultural forces' were fiercely condemned and as late as 1929, at the party's fifth
congress, it was admitted that the 'seeds of opposition are most deep in the
students'." The university of Tbilisi was seen as a hotbed of nationalism. The
student body was almost entirely Georgian (96.50h in 1925) and the largest
number were of white collar origin (the Russians and Armenians congregated in
the Polytechnic where the Georgians made up only 16.5% of the students in 1925,
an indication of ethnic divisions in e d ~ c a t i o n ) . 'Of
~ the 4,685 university students
in 1928 only 65 were party members. One Soviet historian claims that in the first
years of Soviet power the overwhelming majority of 'bourgeois students' took an
'active anti-Soviet position'.61 They led demonstrations in May 1922 to cornrnemorate Georgian independence and many were active in the Menshevik youth
organisation. the Young Marxists. The Georgian party paper Comunisti noted
that most of those captured after the abortive 1924 uprising were between 15 and
25, although presumably not all were students." The university staff also resisted
party influence; of the 103 faculty in 1924425 none were communist party
n ~ e m b e r sWhite
. ~ ~ collar disaffection with the government was possibly indicated
by a 12% decline in their trade union membership between 1921 and 1925,
although this may have been equally due to layoffs.64
Georgian nationalism was openly articulated by writers and journalists before
the imposition of Stalinist literary uniformity in the early 1930s. A myriad of
literary movements, from symbolists and futurists to formalists and 'proletarian
associations', were active throughout the 1920s. Most writers belonged to the
'fellow traveller' category (exemplified by the 'Academic Association of Writers')
who cooperated with the regime but rejected all ideological programmes. Although the party officially adopted a policy of non-interference in literature, it
constantly condemned Georgian writers for nationalism and other ideological
deviations. A report to a Georgian central committee plenum in June 1928 was
typical:
'There has been a growth of chauvinis~namong the urban intelligentsia . . . which is
rcflectcd in artistic. . . literature. Recently. nationalist tendencies have characterised the
statements of different literary groups.65
Such assertions were not unjustified. Many books and journals, encouraged by
the policy of national cultural development, expressed nationalist ideas. Constantine Gamsakhurdia, a leading member of the Academic Association group, wrote
in 1923 that 'when a people is defeated on the political front, it puts all its strength
onto the cultural front' and called for a Georgian 'cultural dictatorship'. Another
influential writer, Leo Kiacheli, put it more poetically and announced that 'the
Georgian soul should rule in Georgia'." One Soviet historian admitted that in the
first years of Soviet power Georgian nationalism 'was deeply infused in literature,
art and culture in every sphere'.67
POWER I N GEORGIA
627
The ideological conflicts between party and intelligentsia in Georgia were
exacerbated by a number of factors. First mong them was unemployment. In 1923
it stood at 63.3% among white collar groups, four times the rate among
'industrial' workers and double the figure in the RSFSR." In these conditions
students had a particularly hard time finding work and the situation barely
improved before 1929. According to Ordzhonikidze, the Georgian intelligentsia
blamed this position on Soviet nationality policy, which in their view gave too
many jobs to non-natives.69 The economic difficulties of the intelligentsia were
exacerbated by the preferential rations given to the workers. A second irritating
factor for an intelligentsia accustomed to defending Georgian sovereign rights in
1918-21 was the loss of Georgian territory to Turkey (Artvin, Ardahan and part of
the Batumi district, ceded in March 1921 by the Soviet government) and the
abandonment of claims to Armenian and Azerbaidjani territory, over which
Georgian blood had been spilt during the Menshevik period. Third was the
decision to incorporate Georgia into the USSR as part of a larger Transcaucasian
federation. This reduced Georgia's status and power within the Union and
led to the resignation of the Georgian central committee in protest. This was the
dominant political issue in Georgia in 1921-23 and its resolultion in favour of
the centralisers in Moscow was a blow to Georgian national pride. Fourth was
the continuing influence and strength of a political alternative represented by the
Georgian Menshevik party, which advocated a policy of national independence.
Many of the intelligentsia remained loyal to the Georgian Menshevik party, which
led a semi-legal existence until its 'voluntary' self-liquidation in August 1923.
However, the failure of the 1924 revolt led to considerable repression and a
significant decrease in active Menshevik support. Fifth was the activity of the
Georgian Cheka (or secret police) and the revolutionary tribunals. Armed with wide
powers of arrest,70the Cheka and other organs of justice directed much of their
early activity against the native intelligentsia and were often reprimanded for
excesses. Repression intensified in 1923 after the defeat of the more liberally minded
'national-deviationists' in the Georgian party, and reached a climax after the 1924
revolt when, depending on one's source, 300 to 3,000 insurgents were shot." Many
of the former Georgian national leaders who took no part in the revolt but were
accused of conspiracy were e x e c ~ t e d . ~Finally,
'
there was fear of creeping
Russification and increasing centralisation of power in Moscow, despite the
indigenisation programme. This requires a separate section.
Socio-economic forces outside government control such as urbanisation and
increased mobility and communications continued to promote a process of
'Georgianisation' in the 1920s. Bolshevik policies of mass education and social
mobilisation encouraged this process. In 1923 48% of Georgia's budget was being
spent by the Commissariat of Enlightenment (prosl~eshchenie)and the total
number of pupils increased from 157,000 in 1914 -1 5 to 282,000 in 1925-26.73
Between 1920 and 1924 the number of schools increased by 62%. The national
minorities in Georgia also benefited from this expansion, but in 1927 980A of
628
ESTABLISHMENT O F SOVIET
Georgians at primary level were being taught in their own l a n g ~ a g e . 'Georgians
~
were by far the best educated natives in Transcaucasia in the 1920s and were
overrepresented in their own republican higher education institutions (Vzrzj.) at
74% in 1930. That same year Georgians comprised 77% of pupils in all other
republican educational institutions. ''
The number of books published in Georgian also rapidly increased from 122
titles in 1921 to 846 in 1927. By 1929, 71 % of all books published in the republic
were in Georgian (in 1913 the figure was 33'/0).'~ The total number of papers
decreased between 1921 and 1929 (from 44 to 34), due no doubt to increasing
censorship, econon~icdifficulties and a shift of priorities to key government organs
in a time of variable paper production. The Georgian language proportion of
newspaper titles, after an increase from 52% in 1922 to 91% in 1924, decreased to
68% in 1925 as other minority language papers were introduced." However, in
absolute terms, the number of Georgian papers still rose after 1924. As noted
above, Georgians were also well represented in senior government and party posts,
and Georgian was officially recognised as the language of government and
commerce.
Despite such favourable signs for the Georgians, there was some dissatisfaction
among the local intelligentsia with the slow pace of the indigenisation programme
and the increasing centralisation and interference from Moscow. In 1924 a survey
of administrative institutions in Tbilisi revealed that of the approximately 40%
non-Georgians working in them, 67% did not know Georgian at all, even though
it was a condition of employment.78This was due in part to an influx of Russian
officials from the centre, about which Philip Makharadze, chairman of the
Georgian Revkom, complained bitterly to L e r ~ i n . ' At
~ the XI1 congress of the
RKP(b) in 1923 Cote Tsintsadze, one of the leading Georgian 'national-deviationists', deplored the fact that up to 15,000 non-Georgians were signed on
(vjy~i.sj.l~uli)
to 'completely replace local elements' on the recently united Transcaucasian railways, and called it 'hidden c o l ~ n i a l i s m ' .In
~ ~June 1923 a Georgian
central committee plenum had to re-emphasise to the people's commissariats that
their business should be carried out 'strictly' in Georgian. S. Kavtaradze, another
leading Georgian 'oppositionist', went so far as to declare at the second Georgian
party congress:
Our party [the RKP(b)] is pursuing a colonial policy in Georgia. . . The metropolitan
centre hinders the economic development of the colonies with the aim of exploiting them,
of extracting raw materials and transforming them into manufactures. That is the nature
of colonial policy. . . The use of this term in our polemic may seem bizarre. But this term
must be applied in exactly the same sense to both the imperialist state and to the group
(in Moscow) that pursues a colonial policy. . .
This concern with 'Russian in~perialisn~'became a major issue within the
Georgian party and the ratification of the ZSFSR treaty in December 1922, which
deprived Georgia of a number of vital sovereign rights (notably the Leninist right
to secede), signalled a victory for the centralisers. Other 'Russification' measures
which caused bitter disputes inside and outside the party included the loss of a
separate Georgian Red Army and currency in 1922, and the constitutional and
P O W E R IN GEORGIA
629
legislative models laid down by the RSFSR. Despite Lenin's constant warnings
against shuhlon or 'thoughtless imitation' of the Russian experience, the Georgian
government created identical institutions and adopted civil and criminal codes and
a constitution closely modelled on the RSFSR. However, it would be inaccurate to
talk of 'Russification' in the 1920s. Centralisation of power in Moscow, although
it meant increasing conformity with the laws and institutions of the RSFSR, was
not accompanied by the imposition of Russian cultural values or by the adoption
of Russian customs and language by Georgians. Tbilisi university did not start
teaching Russian language until 1923---24,or start training Russian language
teachers until 1933 (followed by other higher education institutions in Georgia's
major cities).82 In fact Russians, who remained an insignificant minority of the
republican population until the 1930s, were under considerable pressure to adapt
to Georgian customs in the 1920s, and although Georgia lost its quasi-autonomy
during this period and was increasingly subject to central directives, 'affirmative
action' ensured that Georgians dominated the local political, educational, cultural
and administrative apparatus. As in Russia, the 1920s witnessed a blossoming of
native culture.
The party
The Georgian Bolshevik party had been decimated during the period of Menshevik rule. Makharadze reported to the Russian party's central committee at the end
of 1921 that the position of the local Bolshevik organisation at the time of the
invasion was 'inconsolable' and that 'not one party cell' or party member at the
time was capable of organising local power. After the establishment of Soviet
power, he went on, the Georgian central committee and Revkom were only
'nominally considered supreme organs', the real power lay with the 1lth Army
Military Soviet and the Kuvhyu~o,which made major political decisions without
consulting Georgian party organs.83This was partly due to the Georgian party's
own powerlessness in the early years, racked by internal conflict and incapable of
establishing an effective party network in the regions or combatting the strength of
the Menshevik opposition. A party conference in June 1921 declared the party
'split and out of touch with the masses'.84 The cadres situation was particularly
bad. According to official statistics, the GCP remained an essentially peasant party
until 1928, when for the first time the 'worker' contingent became the largest (at
42.9%). Until then the peasant proportion had ranged from 60% (June 1922) to
42% (January 1927) but was probably greater than either of these figures
indicates. In addition, the overwhelming majority of members had joined since
1921 (73% in 1926), were in the younger age groups (67% were under 35 in 1926),
and were poorly educated. In 1925 77% of party members had elementary
education only and 14% were still illiterate (this figure was 25% in 1922). All these
factors indicate an inexperienced party membership, possibly prone to excesses or
misinterpretation of the party line. A party plenum complained in 1923 that the
'general and political development of the mass of former Mensheviks is not only
not inferior to our party masses, but higher', and it was admitted that in one area
of western Georgia (the rural region of Guria) there were 8,00010,000 Menshevik
630
ESTABLISHMENT O F SOVIET
members compared to the 6,000 Bolsheviks in the ~vhole of the Georgian
co~ntryside.~'
The Georgian Bolsheviks' remedy was to set up a system of party schools and,
rather than expanding party numbers, they operated a strict system of selection
and purge. Thus in 1921-22 a purge reduced the party by 21%; a second purge in
1922-23 reduced it a further 36%,s6most of which affected the peasantry. The size
of the party did not reach much above 12,000 before the 'Lenin enrolment' in
1924, which led to the recruitment of 4,000 'workers'. This recruitment policy led
to a serious shortage of experienced party personnel, particularly in rural areas. A
commission investigating a rural party organisation in west Georgia in 1924, for
example, declared 'party members have not elementary knowledge' and noted that
party and soviet organs were 'cut off from the m a ~ s e s ' . ~With
"
the lack of
experienced party personnel there was a need to recruit from the former
Menshevik pool of 'experts' (spetsy). Strict rules were laid down about their
recruitment but a party plenum in September 1923 noted that Menshevik influence
inside the party was considerable and warned that 'our victory over the Mensheviks could easily be transformed into our heavy defeat'.88 Officially, of the 8% in
the party from non-Bolshevik organisations in the mid-1920s, 74% were former
M e n s l ~ e v i k sThere
. ~ ~ were many more in soviet and other administrative bodies
but whether they had any impact on the process of government or the white collar
workforce is doubtful. The Mensheviks' illegal work was more significant, if
unsuccessful, as we shall see below.
The question of the Georgian party's attitude toward the Mensheviks (repression versus limited toleration) was one of several that bitterly divided the Georgian
Bolsheviks. A group of what were pejoratively termed 'national deviationists'
emerged in the Georgian party (as in other republican sections, most notably in
the Ukraine), which was concerned with the defence of national autonomy and
was united in its opposition to the growing centralisation and 'bureaucratisation'
of power.90 In Georgia, apart from urging the retention of the Georgian Red
Army and the Georgian ruble and pushing for separate Georgian representation in
international bodies such as the Profintern (the Red Trade Union International)
and the Comintern (the Communist International), the Georgian national deviationists, led by Makharadze and Budu Mdivani, a secretary of the Georgian
central committee presidium, advocated greater democracy (and dissent) in the
party, more leeway for private trade and foreign concessions (thus encouraging
independent links with the West), gruduul land reform and toleration for a semilegal opposition. The crucial issue. however, was opposition to the centre's
insistence, pushed most emphatically by Stalin, that Georgia enter the new Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics indirectly through a Transcaucasian federation.
From the first months of Soviet power in Georgia there was a drive by
Ordzhonikidze and the Kulsbj.uro, initially with Lenin's backing, to unite the
Transcaucasian republics econon~icallythrough such organs as the Transcaucasian
Economic Bureau and the United Foreign Trade Commissariat (Ohlsneshtorg).
Despite fierce resistance within the Georgian party at the highest levels, including
the refusal to hand over foreign currency reserves to Obvneslztorg and delaying the
dismantlement of Georgia's customs and tariff barriers, the Kuvbj.zrr.o (which
PO W E R IN GEORGIA
became the Transcaucasian Regional Committee or Zukrnikorn in February 1922),
went ahead in March 1922 with the creation of a Federation of Socialist Soviet
Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSRZ) which had a 'plenipotentiary conference' of
Transcauasian representatives as its supreme organ. This loose federation of
republics was tightened up into a single federated republic (the ZSFSR or
Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic) in December 1922. The new
federation was highly centralised. The republics were left with only six commissariats of their o ~ v n ,~vhich
~'
put them in a weaker position vis-u-vis the centre than any
other Union republic. The Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee (ZTsIK),
which became the supreme executive organ of the Federation, was given the power
'to establish the bases and general plans in all economic spheres' and, along with the
Transcaucasian Sovr?rrrliom,could overule any of the republics' decisions. Until an
amendment to the ZSFSR constitution \vas introduced in 1925, the various
republican supreme organs had no constitutional right of appeal against Transcaucasian government rulings. Most sigificant of all, the republics' right to secede was
made the competence of the ZSFSR." Even Stalin, who was not known for his
defence of republican rights, wrote to Ordzhonikidze in March 1923 that the
ZSFSR constitution was too centralised, '\vrong' and even 'illegal'." D d u c f o , the
republican organs were deprived of operational functions and all work was
concentrated in the united Transcaucasian organs.94
The struggle in the Georgian party over republican rights became a bitter feud
between the non-Georgian dominated Zukruikom and the Georgian central
committee. There was little support for the latter from other Transcaucasian
leaders and in October 1922, feeling itself isolated on the issue, the committee
resigned er? bloc. A new and more compliant committee was quickly formed by
Ordzhonikidze, whose dictatorial behaviour during the whole 'Georgian affair', as
the dispute became known in Moscow, gave the polemic a bitter personal
character. The Georgian opposition pleaded its case by letter and orally to Lenin,
Bukharin, Kamenev and other Soviet leaders; petitions were gathered and a
campaign for an extraordinary congress of the Georgian party was launched.
However, the opposition was firmly crushed by the Zukruikonz at home, using a
combination of bullying and manipulation of party cadres, and by Stalin in
Moscow at the XI1 RKP(b) congress in 1923, where he had the support of the
majority of Russian delegates. Despite a change of heart by Lenin, who in the last
months of his working life supported the Georgian opposition against the 'Great
Power Chauvinism' of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, the Georgian 'national deviationists', along with other non-Russian representatives who sought to combat the
'deep centralising inertia' in the party, Ivere decisively defeated at the c o n g r e ~ s . ~ "
Of the nine Georgian voting delegates to the XI1 congress. only Makharadze could
be described as a 'national deviationist', although Budu Mdivani and Cote
Tsintsadze (the first commissar of the Georgian Cheka) both attended the
congress with an advisory voice and supported him. Together they painted a bleak
picture of the Georgian party organisation. Makharadze declared it 'sick' and in a
'nightmarish position', with senior members subject to 'slander'. The 'one-man
management' of Ordzhonikidze and excessive interference by the Zukruikom made
him wonder whether the Georgian central committee was necessary at
632
ESTA BLISHMENT OF SO VIET
Such protests, and similar ones from the Ukrainian party delegates, N . A.
Skrypnik and Christian Rakovsky, made little impression. Stalin, with the backing
of most Soviet leaders at the congress (although reservations were expressed by
Bukharin, Zinoviev and Karl Radek) declared that the right to national 'selfdetermination' was subordinate to the right of the 'working class to strengthen its
power'.97 Given that the overwhelming majority of the working class was Russian,
the implicatiori that Russians wo~lldbe prirnus infer pares within the Union was
obvious. Stalin confirmed this at the congress, and declared that to put the
Russian proletariat in a position of inequality was 'absurd'. Although the battle
for greater national autonoiny went on within the All-Union TsIK which had the
task of drawing up concrete regulations on centre-republican relations, the
'national-deviationists' had lost, Trotsky later wrote that Stalin's success against
the Georgian opposition was 'the first victory of the reactionaries in the party' and
signalled the beginning of the Stalinist counter-rev~lution."~Certainly, the
congress was one of the first demonstrations of Stalin's ability to swing a congress
behind a 'n~oderate'course by exploiting the conservatism and caution of the
delegates. In this case, Stalin sided with the Great Russian sense of superiority visu-alis the more backward and less powerful nationalities within the Russian orbit.
Skrypnik declared at the congress that such Great Russian prejudice was 'sucked
in with their [i.e. Russians'] mother's milk' and had become 'instinctual in many,
many comrades'.99 The problem of Great Russian chauvinism had long been
recognised by the party."O After the XI1 congress, opposition within the
Georgian party continued until 1929, linked with the Left and United Opposition,
but it was insignificant, gathering little more than 1-2% of the vote at party
conferences and congresses."'
Along with dissent in the party, Georgian Bolsheviks faced a well organised
Menshevik opposition which hindered party influence among the population.
Until 1923 the Mensheviks, along with other opposition parties such as the
Social-Federalists and National Democrats, led a semi-legal existence, publishing
newspapers, taking part in certain eiectioil campaigns and organising cooperatives.lo2 After the defeat of the 'national deviatioriists', who in many cases had
maintained personal friendships with prominent Mensheviks and raised the
possibility of a 'loyal opposition', repression intensified and mass arrests occurred
throughout 1923. The Georgian Bolshevik party, slowly growing in confidence,
could not tolerate for long a Menshevik organisation which, according to Soviet
leaders, was larger and stronger than the Georgian Bolsheviks' own.lo3In August
i923 the Menshevik organisation, shortly followed by the other Georgian
opposition parties, liquidated itself at a Bolshevik controlled conference.lo4It was
addressed by the former Russian Menshevik. A. Martynov, as well as by Georgian
Bolshevik leaders. The conference was followed by a party plenum on the
liquidation of Menshevism where 'imposing (vnuslzitei'nye) measures' were called
for to deal with the 'relatively powerful and broad mass [Menshevik] party'.105
The banning of legal Menshevik activity reinforced underground activity, which,
POWER IN GEORGIA
though weakened by defections and Cheka repression, maintained its own illegal
press and central committee. Instructions were received from a Menshevik
'Foreign Bureau' in Paris, and from October 1923 steps were taken to organise an
uprising. An 'Independence Committee'. 'Military Commission' and a host of
regional organisations were formed to unite all opposition parties under the
guidance of the Mensheviks. Former Menshevik leaders returned from abroad to
lead the uprising set for August 1924.'06
The rising was not a success. The underground organisation had been penetrated by the Cheka (in which the ycung Beria played a leading role)lo7 and there
were massive arrests on the eve of the rising: there were also serious disagreements
on tactics. Attempts to involve other Transcaucasians and foreign powers, such as
the British and French, were unsuccessful.108 The Chairman of the Independence
Committee, Cote Andronikashvili, wrote sometime before the revolt that the
Georgian population 'had neither the desire nor the capacity to carry it
through'.lo9 However, the insurgents did seize large areas of west Georgia for
between two and four days; this was the area where the Mensheviks were strongest
and had widespread peasant support. Ordzhonikidze later admitted that in Guria
there was 'a general peasant uprising'.'l0 Tbilisi, however, was unaffected by the
revolt and Georgian workers took no part. Estimates of the numbers of deaths of
both rebels and their opponents (including executions) range from 630 to 4,000.'11
The party post-mortem put forward a number of reasons for the revolt, ranging
from the 'hyper-centralism' of the Transcaucasian unio~lto the economic problems brought about by the 'scissors crisis'. Zinoviev described it as 'a blend of
Menshevism and nationalism' and co~nparedits significance to the revolts in
Kronstadt and Tambov.'12 It was probably a combination of all these factors.
The peasants in Guria, who made up the largest contingent of insurgents. were
probably aggravated by the continuing economic crisis, by the unpopular
government monopolies in wool and silk (which were removed after the revolt), by
the narrow recruitment policies of the Bolsheviks, and by the repression of 'their'
party, the Mensheviks, who had enjoyed massive support in Guria for over twenty
years. Gurians had dominated the Menshevik leadership and made up the largest
~ne~nbership
of any Georgian region. Family and kinship ties with the Menshevik
organisation were strong. The rural intelligentsia and former Menshevik officers,
who by and large led the revolt. were also undergoing a serious economic crisis.
After the revolt. village teachers were i~n~nediately
given long overdue back pay
and their wages increased. 'Foreign' occupation after three years' independence
must also have antagonised a class traditionally at the forefront of national
movements in peasant societies.
The party response to the revolt indicated that its leaders saw it as a primarily
rural phenomenon. Adopting the slogan of 'face to the countryside' recently put
forward by Zinoviev, the Georgian party directed all its energies to the villages,
attempting to break down what C017zu11isticalled the 'deaf barrier' that had risen
between 'the party organs and the m a s s e s ' . ' l ~ e a s a n t swere recruited inco the
party in large numbers and the rural party network was co~npletelyoverhauled.
After the failure of the rising and the fierce repression of Menshevik activists,
Menshevism went into serious decline with mass defections and public recanta-
634
ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET
tions. The Menshevik organisation could no longer be seen as a viable alternative
to Bolshevik rule in Georgia.
Bolshevik policy in the 1920s encouraged national consciousness among the
nationalities, and in some cases, most notably in Central Asia, created nations.
The policy of korenizatsiya, combined with continuing social and economic
changes such as increased urbanisation and education, which had been set in
motion by the tsarist state in the nineteenth century, produced nationally
conscious native Elites prepared to assert what were recognised in the 1920s as
legitimate national rights. However. although Bolshevik policy led to major
political and social advances for the 'less developed nations' such as the Central
Asians and Belorussians, for the more nationally conscious Georgians (and
Armenians), who had deeply rooted national traditions and had experienced a
recent period of embattled independence, the advantages were less clear.
'Georgianisation' of the republic continued throughout the 1920s, but because of
the already well-developed national, cultural and linguistic bases among
Georgians, it took place at a much less dramatic pace than comparable processes
in Central Asia. Slow 'Georgianisation' of the cities had been evident for some
time before 1917, and Georgian political control, though maintained at republican
level in the 1920s. had been more extensive in the 1918-21 period. Moreover. the
1920s witnessed 'national losses' for the Georgians such as forfeiture of their
political and economic autonomy to a Transcaucasian federation. repression of
their national church, increased competition with other minorities in Georgia
(Abkhazians, Ossetians) who also benefited from the korenizat.siya programme.
the loss of distinctive civil and political institutions, the replacement of national
symbols (the flag and constitution) with Soviet versions, growing administrative
centralisation in Moscow. and territorial losses. The repression of the Menshevik
party. which was so closely associated with Georgia's national independence, was
probably also seen by many Georgians as a form of national oppression.
It was the recent existence of the nationalist oriented Menshevik government
which probably put the Bolsheviks at their most serious disadvantage. The
Menshevik interlude had given Georgians a real taste of independence and
control. This was in contrast to the Russian flavour and formal character of Soviet
Georgian independence. In addition, the continuing social mobilisation in the
1920s brought more and more Georgians into contact with alien ethnic groups,
which in a time of intense job competition could only enhance ethnic rivalry and
consciousness.
Having said that. the Bolshevik policies of lcore~~izatsiya
and NEP proved a
reasonably effective means of political control in the borderlands, although the
Bolsheviks had little choice given the lack of qualified personnel and the failure of
war communism. In Georgia this gradualistic approach to integration had by the
mid-1920s neutralised much of the initial hostility among Georgian social groups,
although active opposition continued among sections of the intelligentsia until the
early 1930s, when all defiance, ethnic or otherwise, was terrorised into submission.
POWER IN GEORGIA
Large sections of the population no doubt welcomed the civil and economic order
eventually established by the Bolsheviks in Georgia after the chaos and strife of
revolution and civil war between 1917 and 1921. The failure of the 1924 revolt was
probably a turning point for many Georgians hostile to Bolshevism. This event
emphasised the permanence of the Bolsheviks and the absence of a serious
alternative.
Bolshevik nationality policies in the 1920s, summed up by the slogan 'national
in form. socialist in content', contained an essential contradiction, although it was
not perceived at the time, between proletarian solidarity and ethnic diversity. The
promotion of national cultural development and the training of native cadres laid
a firm basis for re-nationalisation of the Soviet nationalities. Ironically, socialist
policies of national equality and cultural development strengthened ethnic attachments which in turn hindered integration in the new proletarian state. Georgia in
the 1920s is a clear example of the contradictions in Soviet policy. Although there
was accommodation with the new regime, the power of ethnicity was not
diminished. Ethnic politics were effectively submerged during the Stalinist period
but not extinguished, and contemporary Georgia continues to demonstrate the
enduring strength of ethnicity in Soviet life.
SSEES, London University
* The author would like to thank the ESRC for funding and Geoffrey Hosking for comments on a
previous draft of this paper.
See, for example, James E. Mace, Conz~nunisnzand the dilemma.^ oJ Nntional Liberation: National
Conz~nurzisnzin the Soviet C%rairze 1918-933, (Cambridge, Mass., 1983); J. Borys, The Sovietization of'
C'ltrairze 1917-23: The Conzmunl~tDoctrine and Practice qf National Self' Deternzinntion, revised ed.
(Edmonton, 1980). A. A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush in Mu.~limNational Cornnzunisrn in the
Soviet Union. A Revo~utionnrj,Strategj,for rlze Colorzinl World, (Chicago and London, 1979) deal with
the conflict between Moscow and Muslin1 national communism in the early 1920s. For more general
assessments of this period see R. Schlesinger ed. Clzmzging Attitudes in Soviet Russia: The Nationalities
Prohbm and Soviet Adnzinistratiorz. Selected Readings on the Developnzent oJ Soviet Natiorzalitie.~
(London, 1926); E. H. Carr, The
Policies, (London, 1956); W. R. Batsell, Soviet Rule in Ru.~.~ia,
Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23, (Pelican Books, 1971), Vol. I, Part 111; and R. Conquest, Soviet
Narionnlities Policy in Practice, (London, 1967), Ch. 3.
A major exception to this is Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change arzd National Consciou.~ne.~.~
in
Tu,entietlz-Centuv Ukraine, (Oxford and London, 1985). For a similar approach see S. L. Guthier,
'The Belorussians: National Identity and Assinlilation. 1897-1970'; Soviet Studie.~XXIX no. I
(January 1977), pp. 37-1, and Ingeborg Fleischhauer and Benjamin Pinkus, The Soviet Germans Past:
and Present, (London, 1986), pp. 31-65.
There is very little in Western historiography on Transcaucasia of this period. A few exceptions
include M.Matossian, The Impact qf Soviet Policie.~in Armenia, (Leiden, 1962); D. Ogden, National
Cornnzurzisnz in Georgia 1921-23, unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1977); and S. Blank.
'Bolshevik Organizational Development in Early Soviet Transcaucasia: Autononly vs. Centralization,
1918-24', in R. G. Suny ed. Tmnscauca,~ia:Nationnlisnz arzd Social Change. Essays in the Hi.~torjof
Arnzenia. Azerbnijnn and Georgia, (Michigan, 1983), pp. 305-38.
'Autonomisation' was a plan introduced by Stalin to incorporate the Soviet nationalities into the
RSFSR. The resistance to this plan, particularly by Georgian Bolshevik leaders, led to Lenin's
condemnation of the 'social nationalism' and the 'Great Russian nationalistic campaign' of his
deputies, Ordzhonikidze and Stalin, and contributed to his break with Stalin before his final
incapacitating stroke in March 1923. On Lenin's last thoughts on the nationalities see M . Lewin,
Lerzin's Last Struggle. (Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith, London, 1968), Chapters 4-7 and
appendices; and R. Pipes The Fornzation oJ the Soviet Union. Cornrnunisnz and Nationali.~m1917-1923.
(Cambridge. Mass.. 1964). See also V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sohrariie sochinenii (Henceforth PSS). 5th ed..
(Moscow, 1964), Vol. 45, pp. 356-62.
"
ESTABLIS.YY;MENT OF SO YIET
636
'
Sahdchotlla Sakarth~,elustziphreb.r.lli (Henceforth tziphrehshi) (Tphilisi(.~ic),1929), p. 31. This
274%increase is despite the loss of Georgian territories in the south-west ceded to Turkey in 1921. (The
transliteration system used here is the one adopted by the library catalogue of the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London University). Although I refer to the 'Menshevik' government of Georgia.
oficially it was formed by the Georgian Social Democratic Labour Party. I also continue to refer to
'Mensheviks' in the 1920s for the sake of convenience and so as not to confuse the reader. although
strictly speaking. the Georgian 'Mensheviks' ceased to exist when they separated from the RSDLP in
December 1918 and became a separate Georgian socialist party.
V. Jaoshvili, Sakaithi~elosrnosalchleoha XVIII-XX Saucuneebslzi. (Tbilisi, 1984). p. 102.
By 1929 the figure was 2,773,900, an overall increase since 1921 of almost 13%. Natsionnlizn~,n
politilta VfCPl'hl 1, ts$nkh, (Moscow. 1930). p. 42.. and Jaoshvili, p. 103.
The citation is from K. Deutsch, Nntionniism ant1 Social Conzrirunication. Air Inquirj into the
1~'uundntion.soJ Nationalit),, Second ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 102.
Tbilisi is the current name of the Georgian capital: until 1936 in official publications, it was often
referred to as 'Tphilisi' or 'Tinis' (the old Russian form).
I n Sczbdchothn Saliurtlzvelos I 0 tseli, (TiRis 1931). p. 24.
The Abkhazians are a non--Georgian people who inhabit the north-western regions of Georgia.
The Adzharians are 'Muslimized' Georgians living mainly in the Batumi area. The Ossetians are of
Iranian origin and inhabit the northern areas of the republic.
" Sabu'chothn. . . pp. 20-21. and Jaoshvili, p. 139. For details of the formation of these national
v Gruzii 1921-36, (Tbilisi,
units see V. I. Merkviladze, Sortlanie i ukreplenir sovetskoi gos~idnrst~'eirrzosti
1969). The Abkhazian SSR became an ASSR in 1931, recognising its real judicial position. For the
figures cited here see Vsesojurnaja pere11i.c' rzaseleniyn 1926 godo, Vol. 14: Zrrkn~,knzsknjln.sotsialistic/~eskaynJet/eratii>~zaj,a
sovetsk<ijla i.esp~iblika,(Moscow, 1929), pp. 3-35: Konzmunistichesknj.apnrti~.a
Gruzii v t.~ifiukll:IY2I-1970, (Tbilisi. 1971), pp. 11, 31 (henceforth KPG v tsifi.alihl: R. Wixman.
Lnrzguage Aspects of Ethnic Pattein.~and Piocesses in tile North Caucnsu.~,(Chicago. 1980), pp. 129,
178: B. G. Hewitt. 'Aspects of Language Planning in Georgia (Georgian and Abkhaz)', unpublished
paper delivered at SSEES seminar series. 1 February 1988. prissim; Darrell Slider, 'Crisis and Response
in Soviet Nationality Policy: the Case of Abkliazia'. Cenirirl Asian Survej.. 4, no. 4, pp. 52-53:
Jaoshvili. pp. 120-145.
l 3 Tz$~hrebshi,p. 120.
l 4 One desyatina is 1.09 hectares.
" I. M. Cadcharava, Snhdchotha Snkurthvelo sakl~uikllonzeurneohis aghzrdgenispeiiod.Fl~i1921-25),
(Tbilisi, 1958). Georgia had one of the highest population densities in the USSR in the 1920s at 40.1
people per sq. km. The USSR average in 1926 was 7.3, and in neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaidjan
it was 32.1 and 28.1 respectively. Natsiorzai'rzc~yyapolitiltuV K P f b ) ,p. 42. Henri Barbusse, Voici ce qu'on
a j c ~ i tde la Georgie, (Paris. 1929) gives slightly different figures, p. 182.
l h Cornunisti, 18 March 1921, (No. 12).
" Cornunisti, 26 March 1921, (No. 19).
l 8 Decree No. 17. published in Conzzmisti, 9 April 1921, (No. 31).
l 9 Despite hahing the largest rural population in Transcaucasia in 1926, Georgia had only 525 to
pere11is' nuseienij'a 1926 goda. Vol. 14, Part 2.
Armenia's 822 and Azerbaidjan's 1105. Cr.~eeoyuzrznj~a
Sotsiaii,rticl~e.~kn~u
sovetsltaya respuhlika Gruzii, p. 3.
20 G . K. Ordzhonikidze. Stnt'i i rechi, (Moscow, 1956), Vol. 1, p. 407. Another party report in 1924
declared that 'the [peasant] committees and presidiums do not meet properly. . . . [and they] have very
poor links with the masses and rarely take them into account'. Su1tarthvelo.r cor7zpartiis r7ze IV-e
qrilobisutl~vis: 1924 islis ivrzisi-1925 tsli:, sektembeii. (Henceforth IV-e qiiiohisatvis), (Tphilisi, I (sic,)
1925). p. 122.
21 Il~iu'.pp. 173. 206. 241. and pcrssinz.
2'
The 'scissors crisis' was a term given to the imbalance between rural and city prices in 1923-24.
Initially, this imbalance favoured the peasants (high prices for agricultural goods) but then swung in
favour of the city. See A. Nove. An Econonzic, Historj of the L;SSR. (Penguin Books, 1969). pp. 93-96.
2 3 Cadcharava. pp. 381-2. and Merkviladze, p. 430.
2 4 Cadcharava, p. 183.
2Wrdzhonikidze, pp. 336-7.
2 6 Cadcharava, p. 177.
2 q Strkaithveloa conzuni\~uripnrtiisib) V qrilobu, (Tphilisi. 1927), Section 11, pp. 2-3.
2 8 Literacy in the Georgian countryside increased from 25.5% in 1922-23 to 39.5% in 1926.
rziplriebslzi. p. 35.
2 y Cited in Cadcharava. pp. 415-16.
3 0 The 1924 revolt was largely confined to [he western regions of Georgia. There were minor peabant
"
A
A
P O W E R IN GEORGIA 637
revolts in Svaneti and Khevsureti (isolated mountain areas in north Georgia) in 1922. D . Charachidze,
H . Baibcrsse, les Soviets et la Georgie, (Paris, 1930), pp. 134-5.
3 1 Between 1918 and 1921 the iildepeildent Georgian state fought wars with Armenia, the Russian
Voluilteer Army, Turkey. a i d Soviet Russia.
3 2 R . S. Clem, Reseuich Guide lo the Rzcaaiun and Sovief Censuses, (Ithaca and London, 1986),
p. 105.
3 3 These numbers were arrived at by adding up selected figures provided in M . V. Natmeladze,
Ittoiijcr iuboclzego kluasa Gruzii, (Tbilisi. 1980), Vol. 2, pp. 25-6. There is considerable confusion
among Soviet authors as to who was a worker and therefore how many there were. See IbirZ. pp. 49-51:
P. Gugushvili ed. Sukaithvelos aakhalkho r7lezcineoba 1921-67. (Tbilisi, 1967). pp. 141-50: Cadcharava,
pp. 203-9.
3 4 Natmeladze, p. 44.
3 j Ibid. pp. 22, 51. For discussion of the depopulatioil of cities in Russia see R. Pethybridge. The
Social P~.elucieto Stalinisln. (London, 1974). pp. 218-19.
3 W a d c h a r a v a , pp. 198-200 and 203-4. and Natmeladze, pp. 40-42.
37
fziphrebshi, p. 227.
3 8 tziphrebshi, p. 24, and Cadcharava, p. 332. Attempts were made to help workers by paying them
in kind; state workers had their wages index-linked with prices. IbirZ. p. 208.
3"ddress
by Stalin to the Tbilisi party organisation. Cor7lunisti. 12 July 1921, (No. 106).
40 Accordiilg to E. Dumbadze. (il'a sluzhbe cheka i kolninternu, Paris, 1930). there was a
demoilstration of workers in Poti in May 1922. (pp. 101-2). Trotsky also recounted a famous iilcideilt
in his biography of Staliil when the latter was given a hostile reception by Tbilisi workers at a meeting
in July 1921. L. Trotsky, Stalin. An Apprultcrl of the M(m and His Inflzcence, (Ed. and translated by
C. Malamuth, London. 1947), pp. 359-60.
KPG v taificrklz, pp. 9, 15. 22, 25-26.
4 2 C~l)iunitti,
1 September 1921, (No. 149).
were
The Musavat and Dashnaks (Dashnakts~~tiun)
former anti-Bolshevik Trailscaucasian parties.
Both were governing parties, respectively, of iildepeildeilt Azerbaidjail a i d Armenia.
tziphiebshi. p. 35.
44 C~l)izeni,tti,
3 and 6 March 1921, (Nos. 2 and 5).
4".
Gugushvili. Sakaithcelos da amiercavcasii,t economiuii guncitlzareba XIX-XX sa. (Tbilisi,
1984). Vol. 7, pp. 643, 655.
4 6 Cadcharava. p. 439.
Georgia entered the USSR as part of the ZSFSR and was thus subject to two tiers of higher
authority.
YLI.Cadcharava. M. E. Melikadze et al., Bor'ba za zcpiochenie aocetakoi vlasti v Gruzii. Sbornik
rZokur71entov i r7lufericrloc (1921-25gg). (Tbilisi. 1959), p. 51, and V. Suladze, Sotazialisturi inteligentziis
sheknlna Sakaithceloslzi. (Tbilisi, 1972), p. 93.
4 y 111 1926 1% of the employed urban population had hired workers, 2.3% employed family
members and 14.5% were self-employed. Of the 19.6% 'workers' category. some were probably
partners or craftsmen in small business. One suspects that many of the 11.2% who refused to give their
occupation did so for tax or other reasons and belonged to the meshchme category. For these figures
see tziphrebalzi, pp. 14-15.
Ogden, pp. 11 1, 129, and Lenin, PSS, Vol. 43. pp. 98-100.
For these figures see fziphiebalzi. pp. 262-3,266. Sabdchota. . . pp. 471,477,484. and Cadcharava,
p. 257.
5 2 G . Eremovi ed. Sakarfhvelos S S R constitufsziuii ukfebis krebuli 1921-78. (Tbilisi, 1983), p. 62.
Sabdehofa. . . . pp. 36-7.
5 4 Ibid. p. 24. and IV-e qrilobisathvis, p. 176.
~Natsionul'nayapolifika. . . , p. 240.
5 6 Merkviladze, Sozdunie. . . , pp. 428. 431. and KPG v tsifiukh, pp. 9, 49.
j'
Comunisti. 19 March 1921, (No. 13).
5 8 K~i?~i?~~ni,tfiehe,tlcaju
parfiya Gruzii c rezo!,.ut.ti,.uklz i reaheniyukh ssoqezdov, konferenfsii i
plenzemoc T t K , (Henceforth KPG v rczol~utsiycrkh),(Tbilisi, 1976), Vol. 1, p. 243.
j 9 Sukuifhveloa comuisturi V i b ) qiiloba, p. 23.
6 0 Klara Tsetkin, Kcrvkaz v ugne, (Translated by S. Shevedrin), (Moscow/Leningrad. 1926), p. 261.
Cadcharava, p. 425.
Cwolnunicti, 10 September 1924. (No. 206).
6 3 Cadcharava, p. 426.
6 4 Ibid. p. 378.
Beilito Buachidze, Tunalnediove lcarthuli ~nfser.lobisgzebi, (Tbilisi, 1934), p. 91.
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
ESTABLISHMENT OF SO VZET
" Ibici. p. 22, and Cadcharava, p. 452.
Cadcharava, p. 415.
" Natmeladze. p. 41.
" Ordzhonikidze. p. 401.
'6
' O Sakuitlzvelos sotzialisturi scrbdchotha iespzcblicis ~nzcshatlzcrrZcr glekhtha lritlzuvrobis ccmontlzu rZcr
gankargulebatha kiebuli. (Tiflis), 1924 No. 1. pp. 100-03. and 1926 No. 1, pp. 5-7.
' I Tsetkin, p. 49, informed by Georgian Bolsheviks eager to play down the revolt, claimed 320;
Charachidze, pp. 142-3, a Georgian emigre, claims over 3,000.
" Corvunicti, 31 August 1924, (No. 198), provides a list of 24 organisers of the revolt who were to be
executed. Many were prominent leaders of the Menshevik period.
'3 V. N. Khudadov, Zakavkaz'e lisfoiiko-ekonolnic1zsIcii ocherk) (Mosco\v,Leningrad, 1926), p.
189; Gugushvili ed. Sakarthvelos auklzcrlklzo nzeuineoba p. 163. The Menshevik government must have
some credit for this massive expansion in education.
'4 ~\~crtaionul'nuju
p olifika. . . , p. 278.
' j Ibid. p. 295.
'"ugushvili,
Sukuitlzvelosa da crr7lierccrvcasiis. . . . Vol. 7. pp. 650, 690-691.
Peclzat' S S S R . K XIV sezrhc R K P l b ) . (MoscowiLeningrad, 1926), p. 134; Pechut ' S S S R za sorok
let 1917-57, (Moscow, 1957), pp. 44-45.
' " IV-e qiilobiscrtlzvic. pp. 176-7.
" ogden. p. 87.
Dcenudtaufyi s"ezci R K P i b ) 17-25 crpieljcr 1923 gociu. Sfenogiafrclzeskii otchet. (Moscow, 1968).
pp.
- 582-4.
' I Charachidze, pp. 206-7. This is the view, rvutcrtis nzutanrl'is, put forward by the Ukrainian
econon~istM ykhailo Volubiev pis-d-vis the RSFSR's relations with the Ukraine in the 1920s. See Mace,
pp. 161-2 and Krawchenko, pp. 83-6.
V. V. Ivanov et al, Russkii ycrzyk v nufsioncrl'nykh re,cl~ublilcukhSovetakogo Sojuza. (Moscow,
1980), pp. 190.
8 3 A photocopy of this report (made on 6 March 1921) is in the author's possession. It is a reprint
from the Georgian emigrt- journal Tavi,cuplznlo Sakaithcelo, pp. 26-32. There is no date on the copy
but it was published in Paris in the 1920s. Henceforth Tuvisuplzalo Sakaitlzcelo.
CComunisti, 7 June 1921, (No. 78).
'j
KPG v rezo(vutsi~.crkh.. . , p. 71, and Cadcharava. pp. 307-8. '"PG
v fsifrukh. . . , pp. 9, 15. " IV-e qiilobiscrthvis, pp. 241. 244. KPG c i e z o l ~ ~ u t ~ i ~.~. a.kp.h .72.
'"PG
c tsifrcrklz. . . , p. 28. Trotsky commented in his autobiography. %1 Life:
q q
A
A
A
''
"
''
"
That the Great Russian Lenin accused the Georgian Djugashvili and the Pole Dzerzhinsky [Head of
the Cheka] of Great Russian nationalism may seen1 paradoxical, but the question here is not one o f
national feeling oipuiticrlifies but of two systems of politics whose differences reveal themselves in all
spheres. the national question among them.
Cited in C'lziisficm Rukovsk~.:Selected Cpifings on Ol~positionin the C'SSR 1923-30 ed. G . Fagan,
(London. 1980), p. 32. The italics are Trotsky's own.
" These were the Commissariats of the Interior, Justice. Education. Land, Health and Social
Security. Cadcharava, p. 69. Merkviladze, pp. 327-8, claims the Commissariat of Supply was also
exclusively Georgian. The more important con~n~issariats-Military, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade,
Finance, Cheka-were left with the ZSFSR.
For discussion of the formation and powers of the ZSFSR, see Merkviladze, pp. 322-43;
Cadcharava, pp. 67-140; and A. Menabde, Nekotoq,.e vopioaj rcrzvitiyu giuzinskoi nufsional'noi
goszcrZarstvennoati. (Tbilisi, 1970), pp. 93-103. The right of secession was restored to the Azerbaidjanian
and Armenian constitutions in 1927. but not to the Georgian until 1936. (Was this some sort of
punishment?). However, given that the republics' rights to secession contradicted the ZSFSR
constitution, they had no judicial standing.
Cadcharava, p. 69.
'"enabde,
p. 114.
Lenin's change of heart is reflected in his 'journal', as he called the collection of notes he dictated
before he was incapacitated. See particularly his notes 'Concerning the Question of Nationalities or
about Autonomisation'. PSS. Vol. 45. pp. 356-62.
" Dvencrdtscrt,vi ar'ezci,pp. 17 1--2.
Ibici. pp. 650-2.
''
"
"
"
POWER IN GEORGIA
" L. Trotsky, Sfnlin, p. 361
9vencrdtscrq.i a"ezci. p. 571.
The RKP(b) congress resolution in 1921, for example, declared that 'the liquidation of
nationalist. and ill the first place coloilisiilg waverings in comn~uilismconstitutes one of the most
important tasks of the party in the borderlands'. Cited in Conquest. p. 53.
l o ' On the Georgian 'Opposition' after 1924. see Sh. Thethvadze. 'Trotzcistuli opozitziis gamoszla
partiis leninuri organizatziuli printzipebis tsinaaghmdeg Sakarthveloshi (1923-25)', in Snkarfhvelos
cor7lzlnisturipcrrtiis istoi.ii,t sukitklzebi, (Tbilisi, 1973). Vol 2, pp. 86-103, and D . Dzhibladze, Bol'sheviki
Kuvkuzcr v bor'be s Trotakittsko-Zinovievskin~blokom. (Tbilisi, 1973).
' 0 2 The Left Social-Federalists initially joined the Bolshevik government and occupied 3 out of [he
36 seats on the Georgian Central Executive Committee in 1922. Before they were absorbed into the
Bolshevik party in November 1923, they had their own newspaper (Tribunu) which was subsidised by
the Bolsheviks. The Menshevik oppositioil produced two legal papers i.bfour7lbe and Silnurfhlit khlnn)
until the party's liquidatioil in 1923. The Georgian Bolsheviks permitted this because it was 'an
opportunity to familiarise ourselves with the intentions of the Mensheviks in the future' iKPG 1.
iezoljufsijnkh. . . , p. 15.
I o 3 At the final legal Menshevik coilfereilce in August 1923, 11,235 members were represented.
Klara Tsetkin, p. 194, claims the Meilsheviks still had 28,000 members in the summer of 1923. Soviet
v taifknlch. . . , p. 22.
oficial figures at this time give the Georgian Bolsheviks 10,942 n ~ e n ~ b e rKPG
s.
l o " The Natioilal Democrats and Young Marxist group declared their own liquidatioil at separate
conferences in October 1923. The Left Social-Federalists followed in November. Youth orgallisations
of the National Democrats and Social- Federalists (even a Jewish Youth Organisation) coiltiilued to
operate but had disintegrated by 1924. Cadcharava. pp. 295- 9.
""PG
v iezoljztfs~jnkh.. . p. 68.
l o 6 Noe Khomerici and Valico Jugeli (respectively former Minister of Land a i d Comnlailder of the
National Guard in the Menshevik government) returned to Georgia in 1922-23 to lead the revolt. Both
were arrested before the rebellion took place and were subsequeiltly shot.
l o ' See Colnztnisti, 30 and 31 August 1924.
l o g Barbusse, pp. 133-4, 137-8.
'OY IIid. p. 136.
' l o Cadcharava. pp. 306-7.
"' See Tsetkin p. 69: H. Buxton. Trans-Caztcasin, (London. 1926), pp. 48-49: a i d Charachidze.
pp. 142-3.
Cited in E. H. Carr, Sociulism in One Coztnfrj)1924 26, (Pelican Books, London), Vol. 1. pp. 199
200. Kronstadt (February March 1921) a i d Tambov (August 1920 July 1921) were the scenes of
serious popular revolts against Bolshevik rule. See 0. H. Radkey, The L;nkno\rn Civil War in Rztssin: A
Study o f f h e Gwen Mocemenf in the Tamhol. Region. (Stanford 1976) and P. Avrich, Kronstacit 1921.
(New Jersey, 1970).
"3
Cadcharava. pp. 310-1 1.
"
loo