Bullelin of ConcrrnedAsion Scholars. Vol. 30.No. 1
(1998):56-65
ISSN 0007-4810 0 1998 BCAS (Oakland. California)
Review Essay
Two Trends in Analyzing the Causes of Military Rule in Bangladesh
For more than fifteen of the twentj-five years since its
independence in 1971. Bangladeshhas been dominated by eilher
dlrect m l l ~ t a yrule and martial law or military rule in civilian
guise. The natlon has expmenced at least four successful and at
least seventeen abortive coups d'etat in the post-mdepcndence
pmod.
Why the mil~taryhas intervened in polit~csremalns to be
answered. Personal accounts of coups in Bangladesh abound,
especially after the downfall of the Ershad regime in 1990, but
unfortunately fcw scholarly studies have adequately examined
the causes of and condit~onsfor military intervention. Among
the book-length studies, the works of Emajuddin Ahamed, Zillw
Rahman Khan, and Hassan Uzzaman are worth mentionmg.
Rounaq Jahan, Marcus Franda, and 'lalukdar Man~nuzamankeen observers of Bangladesh politics-have also addressed the
issue of the military mtmention on different occasions. Lawrence Lifschultz and Anthony Mascaranhas dealt with the two
m i l i t q coups of 1975 in detail in their books.
In this paper some of the studies on the intenrention of the
military in Bangladesh politics will be analyzed (see titles below). I have no intention of providing a complete sunfey of
writing on the toplc m quesl~nn.Rather, I will focus on works
that go beyond a description of events and attempt to explain the
causes of and condil~onsfor the military intervention through
rigorous reseaich. The objective of thrs paper is to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of some of the existing literature. Thls
exerclse will highlight the crucial factors that deserve attention
in our analysis of military intententions in Bangladesh politics.
Scrutiny of the scholarly literature on this topic reveals two
broad, yet distinct, strands: corporatist and structuralist. In the
first are included those studies that cite military factors as the
principal reasons for military intervention; political elements are
considered secondary. The second s t r a n d - V L ~ weak to datepoints to political and social factors as the paramount reasons for
the military's rise to power. Not only is the corporatist trend the
more prominent, it has also given rise to studies that specifically
I
Books and Articles Discussed
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8
i
Emajuddin Ahamed, ,\filirary Rule and
~UythsojDemocran. (Dhaka. Universit). Press, 1988).
Peter .I Bertocc~,"Bangladesh in the
Early 1980s: Praetorian Polltics in an
Intermediate Regime: .:ision Survey
22. no. I0 (October 1982)
Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First
Decade (Ncw Delhi: South Asian
Publishers, 1982).
Ruunaq Jahan. Bangladesh Pulirics:
Prohlems and Issrres (Dhaka: Univers l y Press, 1980).
B. K Jahangir, Pmblemalics oj.Varionalism m Bangladesh (Dhaka: Centre
for Soc~alStudies, 1986).
Zillur Rahman Khan, .liarlial Law lo
~UarlralLaw: Leadership Crisis rn
Bangladesh (Dhaka. Univers~t).
Press,
I
I
1984).
"Polrt~cizationof the Bangladesh
Military A Response to the Perceived
56
Shortcomings of the Civilian Government," Asian Survey 21, no. 5 (May
1981).
Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: Unfinished Revolurio,~ (London: Zed
Books, 1979).
Alan Lindquist, "Mlitary and Development in Bangladesh. IDS Bullerin 9.
no 1 (July 19'77)
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh: An
Unfhished Revolution," Journal o f
Asian Stz~dies34,110.4 (August 1975):
891-910.
-- "Bangladesh: An Unfinished
Revolution," Journal ojAsian .Strrdirs
34.no.4 (August 1975); 891-910; and
'Anatomy of Dhaka Coup,"~n.SrmJ<?'
(Calcutta), September 7, 1975
Anthony Mascaranhas. Bangladesh: .-I
Legacy ojBlood (1,ondon: Hoddm and
S t o u g h ~ o1986).
~
"Politicization of the Bangladesh
Military: A Response to the Perceived
Shortcomings of the Civilian Government," Asian Survey 21, no. 5 (May
1981).
Badruddin Umar, Samorik Shasan O Bangladesher Rajni~i.(Military rule and
politics in Bangladesh) (Dhaka: Protik
Prokashana Sangstha, 1989. In Bengali.).
.
. General Crisis o j l h e Bourgeoisie
in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Papyrus Pro-
kashanee, 1986),
Hassan Uuaman, Bangladesh: Raslra O
Sarkorer Samarikikoran (Bangladesh:
Militarization of the state and government) (Dhaka: University Press, I991 ).
SamonkBahini abong Bangladeshor
Anha-Somajik Baslabala o Rajniri. (The
rmlitary and the socio- economic realit).
and phtics in Bangladesh) (Dhaka: Dhanshish, 1987).
Bulletin ojConcemedAsian Scholars
address the issue of military intervention, thus giving it even
more visibility and influence. Only a few authors take the structuralist approach, and even these tend to treat military intervention as a peripheral theme, mentioning it only in passing reference within their broader analysis of contemporary politieal
situations. One interesting feature of the eorporatist strand is that
despite some differences among the authors who favor this
perspective, some common elements bind them together All take
a broad approach, examining a number of issues, and all are in
agreement that no single factor explains military interventions in
politics. Moreover, they all assume apriori that military factors
take preeedence over political factors. The strueturalist interpretation, by contrast, focuses on the state-society relationship and
attempts to explain military intervention in terms of the socioeconomic structure of Bangladesh.
CORPORATIST INTERPRETATION
OF MILWARY INTERVENTION
The prominent characteristic of the studiespertaining to the
eorporatlst strand is the assumption that military intervention is
an abrupt reaction to the perceived failure of a civilian regime.
These studies emphasize the interests, oullooks, and ideologies
of particular actors in milltary coups more than the suuctural
factors that created conditions conducive to military intervention. The explanations presented in the works of the authors
belonging to the corporatist strand do not ignore the political
factors: they relegate them to secondary status. They recognize
the fact that there is a close relationship between politics and
military intervention, yet they define that relationsixp narrowly
and fail to comprehend its deep structural aspects. Emajuddin
Ahamed's Milrrary Rule and the dli/fhs of Democracy is an
excellent example of this weakness. He tacitly accepts that the
roots of the phenomenon of military intervention are entwined
in Bangladesh politics when he posits that "systemic weaknesses" of Bangladesh society played a key role in bringing the
military to power. The "systemic weaknesses," he believes, are
the absence of eonsensus among the politically relevant sections
of the population regarding the nature of political power, the
mode of its exercise, the procedure for transferring it, and the
nature of incumbents. Ahamed fails to make a direct connection
between the "systemic wea!inesses" and military intervention.
His study falls short of answering the question as to why such
weaknesses arise in the first place and, further, why this should
require the military to seize state power.
Hassan Uvaman and Peter Bertocci also call attention to
important aspects of structural problems in Bangladesh. Uzzaman asserts that the military intervened in Bangladesh polltics
to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, while Bertocci insists
that it was the lack of political institutionalization and the failure
of the "intermediate regime" that brought the miiitary to power
But these factors are cited as subsidiary to factors that are
primarily connected to the nature of the mil~tary.This is equally
true for the works of Ahamed, Khan, Uzzaman, Jahan. Franda,
M a n i m a m a n and Lifschultz.
Notwithstanding their differences, these analysts have ascribed some common factors to the rise of military-bureaucratic
oligarchies to power. These factors include the nature of the
military, perceived threats to the corporate interests of the military, the failure of civilian government, d~visionsin political
parties, and a lack of political institutionalization. Their interpre-
Corporatist interpretation
Ema~urldinAllamed
Zillur Rahman Khan
Rounaq Jahan
Marcus Franda
Talukdar Manimaman
Lau~enceLifschullz
Structuralist interpretation
Badmddin Umar
Borhanuddin Khan Jahangu
Alan Lindquist
Middle of the continuum
Hassan Uzzaman
Peter Bertocci
tation of the Bangladesh situation draws largely on the theories
of military intervention advaneed from the late 1950s through
the m~d-1970s.
The literature onmilitary intervention, whieh grew together
with the proliferation of military governments in developing
countries during that 20-year period, primarily emphasized the
unique eharacteristics of the military establishment as the prime
eause of military intervention. Although authors l i e Salnuel
Huntington contend that military explanations are not sufficient
to explain the propensity of military coups,' neverthless there is
a strong tendency in the literature to overemphasize the organizational aspect of the military.
Three sub-factors related to military establishment-the
nature of the military, the corporate interests of the military, and
the personal motives of coup-makers-are heavily emphasized
by Ahamed, Khan, Franda, and Manimvaman.
Nature of Military
Regarding the nature of the Bangladesh military, Ahamed
and Khan operate with the assumption that the eolonial legacy
of the British and Indian armies-both in their institutiona1
framework and their ethos-impmed the idea that the military
is an apoIitical institution that functions as the guardian of
society. The Bangladesh military was quite content with that
understanding. (Ahamed claims that the Bangladesh military
inh&ted the anti-political orientation of its predecessor and
maintained it.) However, the gradual politicization proeess (the
army 's participation in the liberation struggle in 197 I, its assistance to the civilian administration during the Mujib regime, and
the deteriorating economic conditions of the country) made them
aware of their power. Eventually, the military exerted that power
and took control.
The most serious flaw in this kind of interpretation is the
basie assumption that the m~litaryis an apolitical organization,
operating beyond the purview of politics. Furthermore, this line
of argument ignores the fact that the military is an arm of the
state. Ahamed and Khan Inherited these weaknesses from the
general line of arguments put forth in the works of Pauker? b e , '
Janowitz,'andFeitJ They all advanced the idea thnt the military
organization can he treated as an independent variable.
Corporate Interests of Military
The corporate interests of the military have been identified
by Ahamed and Khan as another factor in military coups. These
interests involve the military's desire for greater budgetary support, for autonomy in managing their internal affairs, and for the
power to safeguard its interests in the face of encroachment from
rival institutions. A h m e d writes, "the corporate interests of the
military have always been rhe chie/moriva~ing/actorfor intervention" [emphasis added).6 According to him, the deliberate
neglect of themil~taryby the Mujib-regime (reflected through a
decline m military spending and the nse of aparallel para-military organization)' "made the military conscious of thelr corporate interests."' This consciousness was further increased in
subsequent years and, whenever themilitary perceived that theu
interesrs were at slake, they intervened in politics. Khan, refer~g to thecoup d'etat of I5 August 1975, remarks that "the most
imporfanl/acror that led to the coup was the distrust and unhappiness among young officers of the Bangladesh Army" (emphasis added).'
In positing corporate interests as a promi~lentfactor in
military coups, Khan and Ahamed follow the arguments of
~ i n e r , "Nordlinger," Dowse," and Gutteridge.') It should be
noted here, however, that coups cannot be attributed to corporate
interests alone. Guttaidge acknowledges this. Accord~ngto him,
civil discontent is a precondition for a m~litarycoup. In his view,
a coup is most likely to take place when military gnevances and
serious civil discontent converge or coincide." Nonetheless,
these analysts cite a number of cases in which the military
intervened in politics when they perceived that their corporate
interests were at stake. The series of mllitary interventions that
took place between 19 12 and 1964 in Peru, the overthrow of the
Egyptian monarchy in 1952, the overthrow of Brazil's President
Goulart in 1964, and the overthrow of President Nkrumah of
Ghana have been cited as examples.
Although the findings of cross-national studies in recent
years have clearly called into question the validily of any claim
to a correlation between defense expenditures and military intervention," Ahamed claims that a gadual reduction of defense
expenditures by the Mujib-regme was amajorcause of the coup
d'etat in Bangladesh in 1975. Had that been a determining cause,
however, subsequent regmes, especially the Zia regme, should
not have faced any opposition from the military, because they
increased the budgetary allocation for the defense forces. Instead, the Zia regime was the one most prone to coups, experiencing at least fifteen abortive coups in only five years.
Ahamed mentions two other faetors perceived by the military to be threats to their corporate interest p i o r to the August
1975 coup. These are the establishment of the Jatiyo Rakhh~
Bahini (National Security Force) and the regime's favoritism
towards the members of the m~litarywho took an active part in
the liberation war Khan holds the same opinion. Not only did
both these causes disappear after August 1975, but the situation
was almost rcversed. Yet the intervention~sttrend of the military
continued. This raises doubts as to whether these factors were
genuine causes or simply a pretext to legitimize the actions of
the military.
Personal Motives of C o u p M a k e r s
Both Franda and Manlruzzaman rely heavily on the hypothesis that the personal motives of coup-makers are important
factors. Referring to the 1975 coup, Franda writes: "The Bangladesh coup provldes a class~cexample of the way in which the
most significant changes in governmrnt can be brought about by
a very small group of people."'6 According to Franda, it was
disgruntled young majors in the military who conspued to crcate
58
the 1975 coup. Mannuzzaman concurs with this interpretation.
According to both writers, one of the key figures in the August
1975 coup, Major Sharful Islam Dalim, plotted the coup for
persona: vengeance.
The theoretical ground for theu general conclusion that the
personal motives of coup-makers can he the prec~pitatingfactor
in coups is essentially denved from Lieuwen," Finer,'' and
Decalo,lYwho feel that personal motives are important factors
~
for example, asserts
and need to be taken into a c c o ~ n t . :Finer,
that in addition to the orga~zatlonalcapacity and corporate
interests of the military, the most common motives for military
interventlons were those of individual self-interest. Decalo comments that in Afncan countries, the motlves of " m b ~ t i o u sor
discontented officers, who have a great deal of freedom and
scope for actlon in a fragmented, unstructured and unstable
political system," constitute a more important variable than any
other." Decalo also insists that personal interests of the military-such as the desire for promollon, political ambition and
fear of dismissal-werc also important motivating factors in a
sigmficant number of the coups in Africa that he analyzed. The
theory of personal motlves may have some relevance, especially
in those countries that have had only a single coup attempt, but
the theory is not adequate to explain the case of Bangladesh,
which experieneed a number of coups withn a short period of
time. Personal vengeance on the part of a few militay officers
may have been the cause of the coup d'etat of 15 August 1975;
but that reason does not explain the coups in the years that
followed becausc Ziaur Rahman had already carned out a massive restructuring of the military (mcreasing budget allocations
for the defense forces, promoting a number of military officers,
appointing "loyal" officers to hgher posts, and setting up new
cantonments). Furthermore. it is noteworthy that the instigators
of one coup (or theufollowers) made several other attempts after
failing in their initial bid. For example, the engineers of the
August I5 coup, who were dnven out on 3 November 1975,
staged an abortive coup on 30 April 1976. The followers of the
original planners of the 7 November 1975 coup made several
other attempts to regain power, the most important of which took
place in fall 1977 (September 30 and OctoberZ). These examples
clearly indwdte that the personal motives theory is inadequate to
reveal the hdden cause of mihtary interventionism in Bangladesh.
Conspiracy against the Regime
Lifschultz, in his detailed description of two of the coups
of 1975-the August 15 coup and the November 7 coup-refers
to anumberof issues that have not been discussed or emphaslzrd
by other analysts. Aceording to him, the August coup was the
outcome of a year-long conspuacy hatched by a number of
right-wing Awami League leaders and some military officers,
with the knowledge of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency."
Lifschultz insists that the primary beneficiaries of the two coups
were those within the bureaucracy and the army who had been
repatriated from Pakistan after the liberation war. He also argues
that a group of political leaders, who had prior connections with the
United States, came tothr fore following the August coup. Th~s,he
argues, proves that they conspued and engmesred the wup.
Some background will put Lifschultz's arguments in context. During the war of independence a large number of Bengali
bureaucrats in the central government beeame stranded in Pakistan, along with a good number of m y officers who were
Bulletin ofconcerned Asian Scholars
stat~onedm Pakistan. Although some of the army officers faced
persecution when they were repatr~atedto Bangladesh in 1973,
thc government burcaucrats, in general, did not face any major
problems. In the meantme, junior army officers, who had participated actively in the war, received escalated promoti<ms.
Before the 1973 repatriations, the newly promotedjunior officers
had been assured by the go\.ernment that nothing would he done
to prcjudicc their seniority. But this placed the returning senior
officers in an awkward position-onemade worse due to the fact
that a large numher of the officers were either retired, on temporary assignment in departments outslde the army, or had been
superseded. The repatriated officers felt that the new govemment
was either being vindir~iveur that it had become hostage to the
young officers who had been militant pro-freedom fighters.
These repatriated officers, it 1s argued, engineered the coup,
together w ~ t hrepatriated bureaucrats who faced an almost identical situation within the civil administration,.
Although il 1s brut h a t thcse segments of thc army and the
bureaucracy achieved prominence in the post-coup government,
there is Insufficient evidence to establish that they conspired to
bring the former govemment down. It is also a fact, for instance.
that a number of leaders within the ruling party didn't like the
way the country was hclng run. Because of their irlvolvcmcnt
with a U S . initiative in Bangladesh in 1971, these leaders werc
commonly rcfmed to as being pro-American The 197 1 incident
involved an anempt by the U S . govemment to eontact the
Bangladesh govement-in-cxilethroughIiarold Saunders ofthe
U.S. National Security Couneil and Gcorgc Griffith of the U.S.
Consulate in Caicutta in order to bring an end to the conflict and
maintain the geographical integrity of Pahstan. Some Awami
League leaders-led by Mushtaq Ahmcd, then-foreign min~ster
of the govemment-in-exilc-favored establishing contaets and
negotiating nlong thesc lincs with thc U.S. govenunnlt. Pro-liberation leaders, however, foiled these efforts. (It is worth noting
that Mushtaq later became president of the post-coup regime.)
Lifschultz insists that the United States was aware of the
planning that was going on prior to the coup and that the U.S.
govemment was "behind the coup." Obviously, this is a possiblc
interpretation. It is significant, moreover, that the August coup
did mark a rurnmg point in the development of warm Bangladesh-1J.S. relations. But again it must be said that no hard and
conclusive evidence exists to support this consplrac! theon..
Lifschultz uses the word "revolution" to dcscnbc thc November 7 coup, whlch was masterminded by a left-wingpolitieal
party, because this effort was designed to change the social
structure of the soclety. Ahamed agrees. Aceording to Ahamed,
[I]t was a evolution though pre-mature and shortiived,with all the
charsctmist~csof a revolution: 'entirely new story, a story never
known ortold before" about the proposed organizational framework
of the armed forces in Bangladesh, an ideologically oriented leaderstup and the cadre backing lhis proposal, revolutionary slogans, a
program ofactian intended to bnng about revolutionaq changesnot
onlv in the armed forces hut d w in nolity."
~~~
U%dtevn h u Intcllli.r, the iu~lurr..>I' th- l~lsnnersof the
Nover~her .~pn.;~np
turncj I I IIIIU am,lhcr or.l o n n .:.*updclot,
a seizurc of power by the armed forces.
Although factors relating to the military establishment fail
to mcasure up as thc underlying causes of military intervention
in Bangladesh, they do remind us that the organizational aspect
of thc military cannot he ignored. Thcre is no qucstion that the
-
Vol.30, No. I (1998)
militap as an organization has a monopoly over the means of
cocrcion.
Political Issues in the Corporatist Interpretation
Beyond the orgmzalional aspects of t h e m l l i t q , the available literature also addresses some pertinent political issues.
These are the failure of civihm govemment, divisions in political
parties, and a lack of political institutionalization. The failure of
the civilian govemment, reflected in eeunomic performance as
well as in an inability to maintain law and order, has been
identified by Ahamed, Jahan, and Bertocci as a precipitating
facror in coups such as the one on 15 August 1975. According
to Ahamed, the poor performance of the ruling clites prior to the
w u p in 1975 isolated them from the masses and thus made them
vulnerable to acoup. lahan feels that this failure was a s e c o n d q
factor in the eoup, hut he acknowledges that it hclped the coupmakers legitimize their actions. Bertocci argues thnt both thc
coups of 15 August 1975 and 24 March 1982 were consequences
of the failure of the civilian regime to ensure a steady economic
pc~fonnance.Whether these claims are true or not is yet to be
determined;'%ut, even if we accept that the) are true, a few
questions remain unanswered. For example, what caused the
failure of the civilian government? Or, more fundamentally,
should economic performance be the sole criterion forjudging a
guvernment?
It is true that after every coup d'etat in Bangladesh, the
coup-makers alleged that the preceding govemment was "eorrupt" and incompetent. There are obviously some elements of
truth in those allegations, but the claim that those were the causes
for intenention is questionable."
The plausibility of these factors bemg among the causes of
intenention cannot be ruled out, hut what needs to be emphas u e d here is that these studies do not point to the source of the
failure of the "civilian" govemment. Neither do they attempt to
establish the relationship between the failure of a particular
reglme and other social forces. One musl not forget the basic
questions implicit in such a claim. Is it the failure of a class or
that of elites? What factors lead to that failure? Those who call
the faiiure of a civilian regme a "crisis" either deliberately or
inadvcrtcntiy fail to point tu the source(s) of the crisis: class
compositionof the mlingelites,natureofthe state,ortheposition
of the state in the global economic system.
Those who seek to explain the demise of theMujib regime,
as well as of the Sattar regime,'' in terms of a failure of civilian
govemment fail to rccognke thc weaknesses of the general
theory. Among the prominent reasons cited by Ahamed, Jahan,
and Khan for the failure of the Mujib regime, factionalism and
divisions within the ruling parly are the prime ones. Bertocci
goes further and asserts that it is not only the ruling p a y that
was factionaliaed, but that almost all part~cswcre continually
beset by factionalism. Bertocci writes,
..
Dne is lemuted to envislon the uartv
. orocess as a nlethora of e.r o u. ~ s
,pan~xxli o r q pn1ro.1-.lrenI lm?s, ,r uh3t on; rntght c3.l IT, rhe
3mglelesh io~~tcxtdodoJol
:rlauo~~;h~ps.
In wll~chulmdcr dodo.
3 tun1 lor i i l l ' i m l i ,
$.
p e i o i .isn~ormale Lnslllp
.. and h ~ . ;I < Ilouc~i
(his do/, "'puty" in the s a w or "faction") compete for power in a
constam shin of alliances. splitting off from one formalized part)
groupk to seek alliance with another, he it one actually m power
or another in opposition. The rcsult is persistent p a Q and subgroup
realignmait so saliart a feature in Bangladesh politics, the perennial
59
Turmoil and Uprisings-Bangladesh,
n ~ land
e no\v h o a r t as Bangladesh was part o l
India and under British rule from 1 7 7 to 1947:
from I947 to 1971, it exisled as the eastern
province 01' P'akistan. AAer a nine-month guerrilla war lor independence Bangladesh became
il sovereign state m Decetnber 1971. Tlus chronology listsmajor ev2nlsinBangladesh, including reported coups, s ~ n c ethe nation's
independence.
10 January 1972 Independmce leader
Shetkh Mutjihur Rahmm returns home after
nmc months' imprisonment in what wa5 then
Wen P&istan and becomes the first president
of Balgladesh.
17 March 1972 Indian troops, which had
helped Bangladesh win its independence from
Pakistan, begin rehuning home.
31 October 1972 Young militant freedom
tiehters
break away from the Awami Leaeue
~~c~
,m~
ionn c ~ J i . ~xxi~l..<t
l
pill\ 1 1 ~ i n' ~a -d
ina S m a ~ ~ . ~ iI uh A
I J\I)I
16 Drtemher 1972 :\ .onrulullim J~aitcJ
by the legislative assembly comes into elrect.
7 March 1973 Baneladesh holds its fust
.I
.
.
-
.
prime mmista
Mid-1974 Bangladesh hit by B Cauune that
causes a crisis tbr Muijbs government. Unoflicial estmates put the death ligure as high as
100.0l10: gavernmenl stahstlcs show casualties numberine 27.000.
fan rule to a presidnthal system of gavemment. One-party rule is introduced.
16 June 1975 Newspaper Declaration Annuirnent O r d a is promulgated. All but four
daily newspapers are ordered to cease publication. Govemmenl Lakes ownership of the Sour
newspapers.
1 5 A u p s t 1975 Mujib is killed, along with
mast members of his familv, in a coup led by
a p o u p of young m y officers. Martial law is
promulgated, in the name ofthe officers, by
Khandakei Mushtaq Ahmed, a cabinet mmis
ter of Mujib's government.
3 November 1975 Brigadier Khaled
Mosharraf a senior carmnander during the
1971 war for independence. stages a coup
d'elat, ousting the junior m y offices who
led the August coup. Chief-of-Amy m i o r
General Ziaur Rshman is pnt under house arrest. Svnl N a ~ m Islam,
l
pres~dcntof the preindependence government-in-exile (MarchDecember 1971). h s prme mlnmer. Tajuddin
Ahmed, and hvo key ministers, Mohammed
Kamrurzaman and Mansur Ali, are assmsin a t ~ dinside the Dhaka central jail by a group
of am" oflicers (allegedly w ~ t hthe consent of
the then-president Mushtnq and llle young
m y officers who eng~nceredthe August
coup). The junior offtcers successfully negotiate a deal u"th Brigadier Kl~aledthat allows
t h m to flee the collntp.
19:
7 November 1975 Rad~callorces willtin the
Army, 1 4 by Lt. Co1 Abu Takr, a retired senior commander during the likration struggle,
staee a "rzvolution."Non-cobssioned olfi-
and, in a bizarre twist, merges once again as
a strongman
March 1976 An m y unit in the port clv of
Chinaeone mutinies: b e e =%or r a h e officers are khcd.
30 ~ p r f l 9 7 6:\ ahon-hvcd nghuumg .>up~numpLIc.1 h\ c\llc.J Ann) \ h l o n a . J s u p
P(IIW-~h\ fi*. ,\u l.orlc .hlel in hoprrl. lltc
h o n ~ - t & oIZiaur Rahman.
17 July 1976 A day-long rebellion in Bogra.
21 April 1977 Ziaur Rahmau becomes president of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
30 May 1977 Referendum is held to confirm the legitimacy oiZiaur Rahlan's presidencv Official results show about 98 orrcent
ofthi vot&fivorulg Ziaur ahm man. '
29-30 September 1997 Soldiers' uprising in
Bogra.
2 October 1977 An uprismg by a large seetion ol.Armv and Air Force ~ersonnelin
dent.
1 September 1978 Ziaur Rahman launches
the Bangladesh Nationalist P@ (BNP)
18 February 1979 BNP wins207 of 300
sat:. Awami Lwgue wins 39 seals.
30 May 1981 Liaur Rahman is assassinated
in an abomve army coup in Chthgoug. He is
succeeded by his vice-prmident, Justice Abdus Satfar.
15 November 1981 Sattar codmed as
resident in national election.
Sattar Militq takes o v a
14 February 1983 Ershad crushes lust challenge to his power by Dhaka University dudents; a numkr of students are Wed.
1January 1984 Ershad establ~shesthe Jatiya Party (IF').
21 March 1985 Ershad wins 94 percent
vote in referendum to rearum his rule.
7 May 1986 Ershad's JatiyaParty wins 153
of 300 seats in parliamentaq elections.
Awami League, led by Shelkh Mujib's daughter Sheikh Hasina, wins 76 seats, and the funriamentalist Jamat-e-lslami ( n ) uvls 10 seats.
15 October 1986 Ershad reelected President
in a poll boycotted bv all major political parties including BNF and AL.
6 December 1987 Ershad dissolves Parliament, in reaction to intense agitation by the
opposition.
3 March 1988 Parliamentay elections are
6 Drremhrr 1990 1:r.shd.i tdpplcJ In a11ttrh y pop~lluuprlzln: :~d
b! Sheddl I l a ~ t r l ~
an I Hesuun Khalcu~/13. ulJnn 21'~ L J U I nrcsl.
dent ~ i a l t~r a h m m~. r s h a hd d s over oowsr
..
to Chiel Justice ha ha bud din Ahmed, Gho
kkcs over as actinp. president. Ershad is tal;m
into custodv w i t h ~ & v and
s a caretaka eovemment is'fomed. '
27 Fehruan. 1991 Parli.dmentary elections,
billed as fust free elections in Bangladesh, are
held. The BNP. under Khaleda Z b . wins I46
seats, Awami ~ e a g u e86,
, Jatiya PA", 35, and
Jamaat-r-lslarm, 18. BNP forms g o v ~ n m e n t
with n support.
6 August 1991 Constitution amended to allowrehlm to parliamentilry system of government Gom presidential y s t r m .
1 March 1994 Alleged insulting remarks
by I n f m a t i o n Minister Nazmul Huda leads
to mass walkout by opposition MPs, who
never corne back.
13 May 1994 Opposition parties demand
new parliamentary elections under a neutal
caraaker administration, following a by-election for a parliamentary seat which the opposition claim was rigged by the ruling BNP
28 December 1994 Opposition MPs resjgn
en masse fiom parliament.
30 July 1995 Speaka Sheikh Razzak M i ford y vacates opposition seats in parliament.
24 November 1995 Resident Abdur
Rahman Biswas dissolves parliament.
15 February 1996 Parliamentary elections
boycotted by major political parties except the
BNP Opposition steps up long-running campaign of stnkes.
26 March 1996 Parliament p s s e s bill proposing that non-p@ caretaker govmments
oversee all future elections.
30 March 1996 Resident dissolves parliament and Khaleda resigns. Caretaker govemment appointed, headed by former Chief
Justice Habiburhhman.
20 May 1996 President Abdur Rahman
Biswas furs Army chiefdf-statTLt. Gen. Abu
Saleh Mohammed N a ~ i maccus~ng
,
b m of attempting la rebel against the president. Tm
other high-ranking army officers are fmd.
12 June I996 Parliamentam elections held
under caretaker government. i n fiee and rela.
tively peaceful election Awami Leaglu:
emerges as the largest political p&.
23 June 1996 Awami League returns to
power after twenty-one years. Shetkh Harina,
daughter of slain president Shelkh Mujibur
Rahman, becomes the Prine Minister
14 August 1996 A nunberof p a p l e involved -4th the 15 Aueust 1975 coup are urested for their alleged involvement in the
killine of Shetkh Muiib and his farmlv.
5
held for 14
.sentember 1996 d~v-election
plr;lmo:uq s a t $ Pan\ sw.dmgs out o i
33~sc.%1~0
IT<;tAl.,, :131I35?,,33(JP,, 3
(Jaamat) and one sent each for JSD and 01J
30 November 1996 Parlinment repeals llle
~'lndemnityOrdinance," which prohibited the
h a l of the killers
of founder-oresident S h e k t
~~Mujibur Rahman.
~
.
~~~~
~
~
~~
Bullenn aJConcemed.4sian Scholarr
emergence of innumaable splinte groups and their eventual withering away inmost cases.2'
This proposition is somewhat similar to that advanced by
Germani and ~ilvert,"who suggest that there is a direct relationship between d~visionswithin thc govenrmcnt and military inlervenf on. They asscrt that the greater the divisions and the less
the consensus in a society, the greater the likel~hoodof military
intervention. As mentioned before, those who seek to explain the
Bangladesh situation by this means fail to identify the underlying
social forces that cause these divisions.
Lack of Political Institutionalization
Lack of political institutionalization has been emphasized
as a precipitating factor inmilitary coups by a number of scholars
including Ahamed, Khan. Jahan, and Bertocci. Ahamed refers to
thc question of institutionalization as a systemic weakness. To
him, systemic weaknesses are the absenee of consensus among
the polltically relevant sections of the population regarding the
nature of political power the mode of its exercise, procedures
for transferfing power, and the naturr of incumbents. He feels
that thescfactors along with other thlngs led to military intervention. He wntes that
[I]n all fairness it is not nght to put the blame either on the militan
or civilian politicians for a prolonged military rulr in the country.
On one count, however, both the mili!ary elite and political leaders
are to be blamed in that preaching and activities of both these gmups
have miserably failed to generate or help generate a broad-based
consmsus and strengthen organizational b a s s in the saclety?'
According to Khan, the rise of the m i l i q to power was
due to the vacuum created by the absence of institutionalized
politieal leadership in Bangladesh. To him, it was tbe cl~nrisma
of Sheikh Mujihur Rahman that inittally "provided badly needed
u ~ t and
y direction for the country," but which also eventually
weakened the party because the "unity and direction" was not
routinized. Thus factionalism within the party surfaced and
paved the way for thc bureaucracy and military to take over.
Khan's interpretation is much like Samuel Huntington's
insistence that military explanations are insufficient to account
for interventions. He attempts to explain the propensity of military intmentiomsm in terms of the socio-political structure of a
given country. in support of this approack Huntington writes,
"the most important causes of military intervcntion in politics
arc not military but political and institutional structure of the
societv." In his view the reason for intervention "lies in the
absence or weakncss of effective political instit~tions."'~(It
should be noted, however, that Huntington's hypothesis is not
u ~ q u eHis
. proposition can be traced hack to the modernization
theory that holds that "the various dictatorships of the Third
World are products of the lack of capitalist development and the
social and political modernization that are presumed to be associated with dcvclopment.""
Jahan agrees with some of the points raised hy Khan. After
Bangladesh became independent, Jshan points out, the Awami
League successfully completed the task of constihition-making,
hut they failed to institutionalize the charismatic leadership of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and thus "the emerging politieal system . . . depend[ed] more on an individual than institutions."" In
the long run, the concentration of power in the hands of one
individual limited the possibilities of institution-huildinp and
'701. 30,No. 1 (1 9 9 8 )
started an authoritarian trend. Ahamed a g e e s that the Mujib
rceime's authoritarian trend was a factor. but he disaerees with~Jahan that the regime lacked political institut~onal~zation.
Instead, Ahamed asserts, "animportanttrend of the Awami League
regime was the gradual strcngthcning of the political infrastructure [after 19721 at the administrative level."" Jahan also contends that the Bangladesh polity lacked a dominant power group,
and that the party, the civil bureaucracy, and the w e d forces
were all weak and factionaiized. Yet, more and more powerwas
being vested in the party, and this antagonized the bureaucracy
and the military. Taken together with the dismal economic performance of the regime, these factors created condtions forthe
military take-over After the intervention in 1975, Jahan mainrains, the civil and military bureaucratic elite consolidated their
position and pcrpetuated thrir rulr. She writes,
-
~
Ihc ardl rn!llLlr\ hwwwrau. uliv. wh,) nrled HmglaJr..;h J ~ m g
thc I'ak~runperlud. ;mJ uho wrrc rckeuid h, a %:onJan po<lr~on
d u i 1 1 ~tile like "cars of Sheikh ~ u l i b ' smle. again gained a5cendance.. . p ~ d ]...continued to consolidate its ioszian &d decisionmaking.
It is difficult to dispute Jahan's claim that the civil-militq
bureaucratic elite strengthened their position and perpetuated
their rule in Bangladesh in the post-1975 period, but what
processes led to their unity prior to 1975 and why other classes
(e.g., the bourgeoisie) failed to consolidate power are questions
yet to be answered.
The emerging trend in interpreting &ary
rule. ..ir to
identifvfictors such as the nexus of state and clms as
critical deferminants at given pointr in hirtnry. Thir a p
proach gives us apoint of departure for a study that
probes into the causes ofand conditionsfor the intervention of the military in Bangladesh politics.
Syed~eraju11slam3'attemptstoanswerthe question ofhow
the civil-military bureaucrats resurfaced in the state apparatus in
1975. Islam refutes Hamza Alavi's argument tbat the militarybureaucratic oligarchy usurps power in post-colonial societies,
as it becomes overdeveloped in comparison to other social
c l a ~ s e s .The
' ~ rise of a military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Bangladesh, Islam argues, was due to the "socio-political dynamies"
in post-indepcndencc Bangladesh. He asserts,
The political and economic crises of the Mujib regime, the Islamic
haitage of Bangladesh society, and lhe grievances of [the) militari--aU of which reflected the praetonanism of the Bangladesh
polit-wae the factors responsible for the fall of a regime of
politicians and [the] rise ofthe civil-mili!ary bureeucracv3'
Bertocci also insists that therecument return of military rule
in Bangladesh is primarily due to the praetorian nature of its
polity. Fallowing Ihu~tingtun'sassertion that politieal systems
with low levels of institutionalization and a high level of particlpation confront situations in whieh "social forces using their own
methods act directly in the political sphere,"" Beriocci contends
that in Bangladesh, the institulionaluation nf the (political) party
process is remarkably weak. Like Huntington, Bertocci defines
political institutionslzation as "the process hy which organize-
61
tlons and procedures acquire value a i d stability " And using that
cntenon he conc!udes t!1at.
[Tlhe counby's civil w.d militq bureaucratic estabLshments do
reflect a ixgh degree of autonomy and cornp1exi~-two of Wuntington's criteria of institl~lionalization.
They might, however, score
less well in measures of adaptabi!ity and coherent-Huntington's
othrr two cribria-since both mighl he seen to have feahres of
rigidity and to have displayed disunity at critical polnts during
Bangladesh's fist
Bertocci cites two other characteristics ~1iBangladeshpolity as evidence of a lack of political institutiona!ization. First, the
political partics are not uwil-developed elcctioneering organizations with well-articdatcd ar.d lone-standine erassroots su~oort.
second, all partics in Bangladesh are continually beset by fact~onalism.Nevertheless, as Bertocci observes, Bangladesh "has
a long tradition of high political participation." The lack of
institutionalization and the high political participation counterweigh each other and pave the way for social forces to act directly
in the pollt~calsphere.
Bertocci's most important contributions are the idcntificationofthe ruling class and his characterization of the regime. He
contends that the "intermediate classes" inBangladesh seized the
state in 1972 and began to exercise state power for their own
advantage. This situation is ca!led the rise of an "intermediate
regime," whlch Batocci explains by usiug the framework of
Kalecki and Raj." Refemng to the first decade of Bangladesh's
nationhood, Bertocci writes,
-
--
..
[Tlhe results of t u s proetorim political dynamics openling in the
smctural context of an intermediate regime have been a decade of
fluidity, a fluctuation between civilian and milibry rule, and a
mixture ol' relative democracv and relative dictatorship."
(,
!I
i
What Bertocci fails to recognize is that the lack of what he
calls "political institutionalization" has originated from the lack
of a dominant class.42Yet, it should be recognized that Bertocci
quite appropriately distances hmself from mainstream explanations of military uvntervention 111 Bangladesh politics.
Hassan Urraman's proposition adds different elements to
s
the milithe Factors underscored by other analysts. In h ~ view,
tary intervened in politics in Pakistan (in 1958 and 1969) and
Bangladesh (from 1975 to 1982).
I ) to preserve the interests of the hourgeoisie, the bourgeois
production relations and property >?stem, and theirhegemony in
the albeit shaken state structure;
2) to preserve all interests of impenalism as a coercive
apparatus of the state, while depending on the neo-colonial
structure of international capital;
3) to preserve the group and corporate interests of the
military and to safeguard their institutional structure; base, material interests, large share of the budget, their access to money,
prnperty, licenses, contracts, opportunities, and so forth; and
4) to establish, preseme, and expand the narrow personal
interest of a cuterie within the military4'
He also ossefis that wenknesses in the political system,
divisions within political parties, the disintegration of pol~tical
p d e s , a lack of wnrmsus regarding the basic principles of the state,
and the absence of civic cultwe pave the way for praetonanism.
Urraman's interpretation, though it offers a broader socioeconomic perspective, fails to show how the "bourgeois" state
structure evolvedinBangladesh and whether or not the weakness
of the slate lies in the formation processes. Furthermore, his
analysis does not answer the question as to why the bourgeoisie,
as a polilical force, is unable to subordinate other classes through
moral leadership, and must resort to coercion.
In sum, these analyses largely share the limitations of the
mainstream literatun. The most serious limitation of this line of
analysis is its failure to see that the military organization is not
Independent of social relations, it is an integal pan of the state
structure. The historical context of the m i l i t q as a component
of the total history of the society and the state in w h c h it
functions is ignored. The iniluence of class upon the militav as
a social force also receives scant attention. These shortcomings
make the available interpretations somewhat incomplete. The
inadequacy of these frameworks is further accentuated by thc
fact that the authors do not give adequate attention to the histoncal context of how the ~ L g l a d e s h - s t a t ecame into being. The
Drocess of state formation has had enormous influence on the
subsequent course of politics in Banela'desh. The ~ o u u l a struer
gle for-independence ;f ~ a n ~ l a d eahaped
sh
the dLstinctive fo&
of state-participation in the eeonomy. Since the available litera-,
lure on militaw intervention ignores these crucial relationshius
between the state, class, and economy, they end up examining
superficial factors such as the lackof political institutionalization
or the economic failures of a civilian regime.
~~
-
STRUCTURALIST INTERPRETATION
OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
The structuralist analyses presented by Badruddin Umar,
B. K. Jahangu, and Alan Lindquist are panially free from the
limitations discussed above. Umar's central proposition is that
without a proper understanding of the state and society of developing countries it is impossible to delineate the causes of militaq
rule. The nature of the state needs to be determined both from
the countq's mode of production and from its location within
the global context.
Umar asserts that both pre-capitalist and capitalist economic systems uredom~natein develo~inasocieties and that it 1s
through.the
of finance capital that the developing
countries are exploited by imperialism Furthermore, he argues,
the imperialist powers export arms in order to capitalize the
surplus concentrated in the hands of the state. In neo-colonial
states, surplus value appropriated by the state (through an indirect tax) is usually spent to buy arms in order to qual~fyfor
militan. and economic aid from the imperialist countries. The
aid, grants, and loans from imperialist powers are necessary for
neo-colonial states because the mixture of pre-capitalist and
underdeveloped capitalist production systems-inhibss the accul
for ca~italistdevelo~ment.Thus.
mulation of c a ~ i t a necessan
neo-colonial states arein an inescapable dependency relationship
with imperialism, wherein the imperialist countries establish
firm control over the neocolonies' economies and force them to
pursue policies geared towards imperial interests.
The primary objective of the state then becomes maintaining a system that favors capital, even though this results in the
export of internal surplus value to the imperialist countries. This
situation creates a perpetual crisis within the neo-colonial country and fosters perpetual dependence on imperialism. The crisis
eventually reaches a level in which the indigenous comprador
bourgeoisie fail to provide any solutions to the economic problems ( e g , declining productivity, mflation, etc.) that the country
Bullerin of Concerned Asian Scholars
faces at a given point in time. Hence they resort to coercion to
preserve the relations of production (ie., econonicounership of
productive forces, m general, and ownership of the means of
production, in particular). The bourgeoisie try to preserve the
socially and historically constituted forces and relations of production, for these constitute the basis upon whichothcreconomic
nnd social
relations rest. Thus. accordine., to Umar. the seizure of
power by the military in any "neo-colonial state"means that the
continuatiunofhourgeoisrulebecomes unpossible4'and thus the
bourgeoisie fail to fulfil the primary objective of the capitalist
state, namely, maintaining a system that favors capita14'~eferm g to the Bangladesh situation, lJmar writes,
Thc Army in Bangladesh. as m any other countn, seized power
because ofa certain crisis within theruling classes,particularly [the]
bourgeoisie. 'Ihe Amly continues to remain in power because in
Bangladesk as many other coune, 11is the last stlbiking factor
in a situation in wiuch the political parties of the ruline classes have
disintegrated and hecome urzableto form a stable Bovemmmt for
one reamn or anothm"
In his understanding, insofar as the class character of the
ruling classes is concerned, there is no dfierence between the
M q i b regime and the scbsequent regimes of Zia and Ershad, in
spitc of thc fact that the latter two were military regimes w h ~ l e
the first one was a civillan one. Instead, it was to preserve and
strengthen the interests of the v e q classes that Mujib's civilian
reglme represented that the Mujih regime was ousted and military rule was introduced 47
It is difficult indeedto disagree with Umar's contention thst
without a proper appreciation of the nature of the state and the
class character of the ruling classes onecannot analyze the causes
uf militaq rule in Bangladesh, or in a w given country. But what
is problematic is Umar's uncritical acceptance of the idea that
external dynamies (i.e., dependency on imperialism) play a
pivotal role in shaping whatever the ruling class does in a
peripheral state. In addition, it is evident that Umar's anelvsu is
based upon the classical Marxist position that in a capitalist
soeiew there are two fundamental classes, the bourgeoisie and
the working class. The problem with Umar's analysis lies in his
point of departure, not in his method.
Lindquist and lahangu both assert that through the liberation struggle it is the petit-bourgeois class that emcrged as the
d i n g class of Bangladesh. Lindquist writes,
proceed to the identification of two different sets of factors
concerning military rule in Bangladesh.
According to Lindquist, though therullngclass\vas primarily petit-bourgeoisie, "there was also a small productive bourgeoisie that Ayub Khan had begun to foster as part of state policy
in the 1960s" (emphas~sadded). Lindquist argues that the military takeover of 1975 resultedfrom a confrontationbetween "the
petit-bourgeois and the nascent bourgeois elements with roots 111
production rzther than trade orthe plunder of state resources. The
m y , bureaucracy and international capital seem to have swung
behind tt.e latter." The fundamental problem with Lindquist's
essay is that it describes rather than explains thc situation. As a
result, his readers are left questioning why the m y , bureaucracy,
and international capital all swung behind the nascent bourgeoisie.
Jahangir, in contrast to Lindquist, attempts to explain the
situation. Bringing in the question of lhe state, Jahnrlgir.contends
that the non-capitalist path of development pursued by the ruling
petty-bourgeoisie-taken together with the nature of petty-bourgeois politics its& (including its weak economic base)-made
the state eentral and strong. These factors, in turn, strengthened
the bureaucratic processes in Bangladesh According to Jahangir,
In the mst-liberation priod the anerzence of the bmucracv is the
ne5s due to the armed hbaation stmeale.
.. erouth of labour oraarulanol:.; nnd ihcmtrr.cres:np rnhlLn:\ and ~oi~fr'rauon
of po !llral
p;t?\cs ,he mr n Imponin1 c\t~mnll x m r 1s g1vr.n hr' c-ororna
dqefidence of the counky, the bureaucracy itself is a dependent
group, and its orisin as an instnvnent of global capitalia inlaest
continues to influenceits development In this coniuncture the only
pmplcablc Io !Ac rcpomih~l:ti~and:ommandpou.r.rwe how a hb
are I l t c r ~UI*.
~ . admm:.;mrtvcamI ~wa!~ugrnal
C ~ ? ~ C ~ L I C IS~ C I art
necszaq to handleapolitical pa@ or togovemas~teortoorganise
a military."
&
Insofar as theentry ofthemilitary into politics isconcemed,
Jahangir states unequivocally that there is a "close and eomplex
eonneetion between authoritarianism and the petty-bourgeo~sie"
and that it is the political aspect that determines the role of
military." There is hardly any point in challenging this interpretntiun, though it seems that Jahanglr contradicts himself, somewhat. when he falls back on the "corporate interest theory" in his
analysis of the August 15 coup. He notes,
Bangladesh is perhaps uruque for having in effect deported its
"feudal"1anded c l s s s w h c h was mostly HmduAo India in 1947,
and then for having deportcd its bourgeoisiemostly from West
Pakistan--to Pakistan at independence in 1971. The "'leading" (but
not actually "dominant') classes that remained can be roughly
termed petit-bourgeois,and nearly all of them was represented in the
Awamj League. These included iradcrs and merchants of all sues,
contractorsand rich
the bureaucracy, military off~cers,professionals,
peasants.48
The entry of the military represents a crisis of petty-bourgeois
politics. In a situation of scarcity, civihan and mihtar, grievances
tend to coincide, and in reality this has sparked the coup of 15th
Aueust 1975. Too militow oficers were on'marilv concerned with
g&
andpen&al inte&s~rYotha. elitm<oliti~ians, mde unionists, student leaders-were also concerned for the same reuwds and
moils. The nre-Aueust 1975 situation was riddled with intra- civil^
&tm-mili&, and-civil-militmy ca-&ctr- Thse cantlicts w c
enough to sharpen corporate andfor pasonal ambitions of military
oficers to sparkoff a coup. In this way the army as an institutionally
based faction has entered into the cornpeiitire tmOm of petty-hourgeois politics (emphasis added)''
In Jahangr'sview, "mthe formative years, in the post-liheration period the state [was] dominated by petty-bourgeois
elernent~."'~
And "the peny-bourgeoisie [were] eomposedof two
elements: (1) the small-scale producers and small traders [small
p r o p e q ] , and (2) the non-productive salaried employees: civil
servants employed by the state and its various
From this common point of departure, i.indqt1ist and Sahangu
It is encouraging to note, howeyer. that Jahangir does not
rely completely on this eorporate interest issue. Instead, he
maintains thst "the staging of the [ I 5 August 19751 coup was an
indication of the army's desire to dismantle the c o o l i h , n which
comprised the Awami League and paved the way for army
officers to enter into the public and private sectors" (emphasis
added). Evidently it is what Sahangu called the army 's "desire"
I
I
that brought the civil bureaucracy and the military closer together It is, therefore, qulte correct to deduce from Jahangir in
particular and from the structuralist interpretation in general that
the emergence ofmilitaq-bureaucratic ruie should he viewed as
one process. made up of two intertwined elements.
II!
1
I
1,
i
4
I
!
Conclusion
The m y ' s close relationship with the bureaucracy, their
search for a populist ideology, and the massive militarization of
administmiion and society in post-1975 Banplndcsh cannot be
understood solely by emphasizing military factors ( e g , the
nature of the military, corporate grievances, or personal vsngeance on the part of the coup-makers) or supc~ficialpolitical
reasons ( e g , divisions in political parties, lack of political
institutionalization. or the "failure of civilian regimes") The
corporate interests of the military can aud do precipitate coups,
but the recurrence of coups in Bangladesh-especially given the
fact that one mil~taryregime was replaced by another and that
the regime that allocalcd enorn~ousamounts of resources to the
defense sector was the most coup-prone of all administrations in
Bangladesh-does not allow us to conclude that corporate interests arc ihz detcrmining factor.
CCAS Statement of Purpose
The Bulletin oiConcemed Asian Scholars (BCAS) conlinues lo
be inspirod by lheorigiml1969 sroremenrofpvrposeofitspamnt
organization, the Comminee of Concerned Asian Scho1ar.r
(CCS). The BCAS boardhu~decrdedinMarch 1993 that even
though CCAS hos not em.fred since 1979, h e Bulletin should
publish rhe CCWl staremenr of purpose or least once a y e o r .
We f i t came together in oppasition to the brutal aggression
d
in V i w and to the complicity or silence
of the U ~ i States
of our profession with regard to tlmt policy. Those in h e field of
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of theu
research and the political posture of their profession. We are
concerned about the present unwihgness of specialisls to spenk
out a g m t the implications of an Asian policy committed to
ens!xing American domination of much of Asia. We reject the
legitimacy of tlus aim, and attempt to change this policy We
recognize that the present structure of the profession has often
paverred scholarstup and alienated many people in the field.
The Committee of Cancemed Asian S c h o h sceh to develop a humane and knowledgeable understnndq of Asian
societies and theu effolis to maintain cultml integrity and to
confront such problems a poverty, oppressio~and impenatism.
We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must f i t
understand our relations to hem.
CCAS wishes to creak alknlatives to the prevaihg Wends
in scholmiup on Asia, which too often SQM~ from a parochial
cultural perspective and serve selfishinterests and expansionism.
Our organization is designed to fimction as a catalyst n cammunlcatlons network for both Asian and Western scholars, a
provider ofcRltml resources for localchapten. and a community
for the development of anti-imperialistresearch.
Passed 28-30 March 1969,
Boston, Massachuxtb
64
The argument in favor of the nature of militaq as a predicating factor is weak on two counts First, it is a ~ o s mistake
s
to say that the pre-1975 Bangladeshmilitaq inherited the ethos
of the Pakistani mllitary and hmoc I'ullowed in their footsteps in
usurping power The post-independence Bangladesh Army was
entirely different from the Pakistan A m y ouring to its participaI
tion in tile war oT liberation and its consequent pol~t~cuation.
recognize, however, that after 1975+specially after a massive
r e s t r u c t u ~ gin 1978-the Bangladesh Army did return to the
i~~stitulional
ethos of the Pak~stanArmy. Second, in Bangladesh,
as elsewhere in the Thud World, the military does not act on its
own. Instead it represents a social force and the interests of h e
state. The superficiality of political factors as the causes of and
conditions for military intervention becomes evident as one
looks closely at the causes per se. The failure of civilian govemment (1972-l975), for example, has been cited as an important
reason. But, as mentioned prrviousl~,the most eoup-prone regime was a military government. Furthermore, what contributed
to the failureofthe first civilian regime has not received adequate
attention in the literature, especially those factors that fall into
what I have described as the "corporatist trend.'' I have no
~ntentionof denying that military and political factors, have had
a role in the events in Bangladesh, but I insist that theu role was
guided, if not entirely dictated, by deeper socio-economic dynamics in Bangladesh. These dynamics are an integral part of the
underlying social structure; conjunctural events cause them to
erupt at a given moment.
Fomnately, the emerging trend in interpreting military
rule-identified as the "structuralist interpretation" above-is to
identifl factors such a s the nexus of state and class as critical
determinants at given points in hlstory. Zhis approach gives us a
point of departure for a study that probes into the causes of and
condttions for the inrervwtion of the military in Bangladesh
politics.
Notes
1. Samuel Huntington. Polih'cal Onier in Chonging Societies (New
Haven: Yale U~versitvPress. 1968).
2. Guy Pauker, . ' ~ o u & ~ a s t ~asproblem
ia
Area in theNext Decade,'.
WorldPolitics 11, no. 3 (1959): 32545.
3. Luclan Pve. "Armies in the Pmcess of Political Modernization." in
The Role ojbhrtary in ljndedeveloped coun$esj ed. lohn 1oh;ls;n
(Princeton: Princeton U~versityPress, 1962).
4. Moms Janowitr, The .Wilirary in h e Political Development of N m
Natims (Chicago: Chicago Univasity Press, 1964).
5 Ed&
Feil, ''Military Coup and Political Development" World
Politics 20, no 2 (1968).
6. EmajudbAhame4hfilitoryRvlemdMyfhrofDemocmq (Dhhka:
Tlniversitv Press, 1988). P.49.
pnrmulmr) Come
7 In 1973 thu Auaml l:&w rcgxmc u;iltlbl~shed~
named J s u ~ oKakhhi Uhuu Waoonal S a u n t ~Forre that uw composed p&mimtly of freedam fightas 1a~al.10the ~ e a ~ u e .
8. Ahamed,MiliroryRule, p. 141.
A
9.ZillurRahmanKhan.MamblLmvroMamb1Lmv:Leadership
in Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 1984). p. 133.
Cnnsi3
10. S. E, k'ina,The &fan on Hrrrseback: Ihe Role ofMrlrtary in Politics
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).
11. Eric Nor-er,
O n rhe Auronomy of the Democrntic Sfore (Cambridge: IIarvard University Press, 1981); and Soldiers in Politics, M i l i rary Coups andGovemmenls (Saddle Ridge,N. I.: Prentice Hall.1977).
12. Robert E Dowse, "The Military in Political Development," in
Polin'cr and Chrmge in Developing Counhies. cd. Colin L q s (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Pres, 1969).
Bulletin ofConcernedAsian Scholars
13. Wdliam Gultaidge, A m e d Forces in New Slates (London: Oxford
rr~versih.Press. 19621.
lbid.,bp. 2-3'
I 5 For example, in a study of stx counhes (India, Bangladesh Palartan, Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal), Tutu Vanhanen concluded that "a
high level of military expenditure is neither suficient nor a necessary
condition of military coups." See Tutu Vanhanen, The Rmtr o/Democmcy: India Cornpored with Irs Neighbours (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1982). p. 100. This f m h g runs counter to the
.)arti
conclusion of Robert D. Putnam m 'Towards Explaining M
Intervention in Latin America," World Politics 20, no. 1 (1976) Accordmg to Putnam, m i h m expenditure (as a percentage of GNP) has
a strong correlation with dim intervention.
16. Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi South
Asian Publi&ers, 1982), p. 50.
17. Eduin Lieuu% Am.r ond Politics in Lotin America (New York:
Praeger, 1960).
I 8 Finer, TheMan on Horsebock.
19. S. Decalo, Coups ond A m y Rule in Afn'ca (Saddle h d g e , N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1976).
20. E x p h i n g the causes of military inmention in Latin American
counties. Eduvl Lieuwin touched umn other factors such as the
d r r t c n c u of the oLgacl~!, the polluci llmnatUntv of groupc a\pmn(!
to pour7 and the 1&1, of other cohecive comptlng iorcuc
?I Dlralo. ( b u m a , ~ d : l n nRul.9
~ on 233-230
52. iifschklz's'assalion &at thediA was involved m thrs coup has
been rejected as "farfetched by Khan (Mam'alLow, p. 147, in. 12);
Ahamed, on Ole other hand, feels that it is "credible." In IVho filled
.&ib,A. L. Khatib suggests thatthe August coupwas alnrgaconspiracy in which Bhutto, the CIA, and British lntclligence all had a hand.
(New D e k : Vikas Pubhshmg, 1981).
23. Ahamed MilitorvRule. D. 80.
23 lhc most g l m g proof oithe Mi~jlhrcgunc's imlwc , a < c o r h ~ gto
d ~ owho
. ~ cun\l&r 11a iailuru) IS Ols i m i c of 1 '174 that look thc Lvei
ofan esf~mated27,jCr) pwple rxcordmg tu the guvernrnent's esrunalu
glvm in ..Stal~mrntof MmLita of kood and Hchsf in the I'ilrLun~mt,"
Ba>,~lodrsh
Ohserver. 23 Nnvmher I373 l.'noflic~dusurnah- out thu
figure ashigh as 100,000.)In the lab1970s it became clear thatthere
were a number of factor-some of human o r i ~ i and
n others beyond the
contributed to the severe-famine.
control of the Mujib regim-that
Tbese included inflation that resulted b m the sudden price luke of oil
in 1973. devaluation of the Baneladesh currency (because of severe
fromthe World B& a i d the I n t e n ~ ~ tMonetary
i o ~ ~ Fund),
and a deliberale delay in the shpment of PL480-supported food grains
from the United States bemuse of the U.S. government's displeasure
over Bangladesh's decisionto exportjute to Cuba. See BenCrow. "US.
Policies in Bangladesh: The Making andBreaking of Famine?" J m m l
o/SocialShrdies (Center for Social Studies, Dhaka University), no. 35.
14.
-
I
I
I
!
~
29. Ahamed, MilitaryRule, p. 140.
30. Huntington,Political O d e ? p, 194,
31. Dale L. Johnson, '<?he State as an Expression of Class Relations,"
in Aiddle Classes ;n Dependent Counm'es, ed. Dale L. Johnson (London: Sage, 1985), p. 167.
32. Rounaq Jahan. Bangladesh Politics: Pmblems ond Issues (Dhaka:
University Press, 1980), p. 115.
33. Ahamed, MilifaryRule, p. 51
34. Jahan. Bmeladesh Polincs. o. 201
35 Syed ~eraj; Islam, "?he R& of the Cinl-Mditary Bureaucracy m
the State A p w a t u s of Baneladesh."
Asion Thou~hiondSociem
, I I.. no.
31 (Mar~h~l986).
36. Hamza Alsvi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and
Bangladesyin Imperialism ondRevolution in SouthAsia, ed. Kathleen
Gough and Hmi P Sharrna (London and New York: Molttidy Review
Press, 1973).
37. Islam, "The Rise of the Civil-Military Bureaucracy," p. 35.
38. Huntington, Polirical Order, p. 80.
39. Bertocci. "Baneladesh in the Earlv 1980s." D. 992.
40. ~ c c o r d & to kichal Kalecki,
in&ediate regime is chmaclerized by the domination of the pohty by an alliance of the lower-middle class or p e w bourgeoisie and the rich peasants. He states that m the
absence of a welldeveloped industial capitalist establishment allied
with a big landlord class, what he calls the "intermediate classes" tend
to exercise state power fortheir ownadvantage. By intamediate classes
he means the middle clars and educated groups associated with the
professions or wiOl small-scale enhmrenemial businesses, i.e.. o e w
b u ~ l i ~ s o iKallxh
~ ~ e suggesa thut thi i u n h . e n n conuadlcu&c i
~ n t c r m d ~ uregmles
te
IIC, oli the onc M.hetumn intermalekclasuand a mall "bie business" or k v m r middle c1ass"fallied incmsinelv
with foreign capital), and, on th; bther hand, betwe& the intermedze
classes with their "rich ~easant"allies and the small land holders and
landless peasants. To shire themselves up against both, the i n t e r m h t e
class relies on some form of "state cmilalism." i.e.. public sector
cnbpr1ze. supported I~herali! u ~ l hforelin m d ~ a ~8:hal
.
Kalecltl,
"Soslal and t con om^ A s ~ e c t os f ' l n v r m c ~ d aKugulaer'." mSelecred
-
L s q s on IhdLconom~c(7nmrh o/rhrSocial~.~rat~dd~e
i!xedL;ronom~
~~
25 'Ihough 00s Ira v q iommoi~cxplanaUon inHm@liL1~ili
foralmnct
all 1nllitan xum.11 is tntureslUlle m notc that S I U ~ I ~>how
S
that v e n
few mili& regunes stage coup;in order to change the course of the
government. For example, a cross-national study by William Thompson
revealed that onlv 8 &cent of 229 c o u ~ or
s COUD-attemphbetween
153(, Jnd I 370 ;ire i ; n d m ~ mto ;orre:t the msiecds uitheclvi~lan
govcnunmt thm m powsr See W I I L K~ l h o m p s o ~(;nwonczs u/
I41lrfar).Coup.\4okrs (I3cvrsl) I-hlls,Calif Sage. 1973)
26 Ju<tl;eAtdu~Samu~aselec(edpmsl&ntufHanglndah =Novanhcr 1081,fullju?np ihensvls~1wuonof7~aurKRhmanon
3C MA) 1.181
S a m , who uus vice-prrs~d~~lt
in the 71a go\r.mmmt, wac rrmoval
l'rom purer m the rnll~lancoup led h Gennal Frshnd on 24 March
I982
27 P ~ L TJ HLT&CCI,
.Hangla&h mthetml\ 1'18lJs I'rarinnar~I'uliUcs m
an 111tLTmdavRcglme.".4run S u m 22, no IlJ (0.7oka I9821 '1'13
28 (itno l i ~ and
m Kalman S l l v ~ n'Fol~u;s. So.~al Structve and
(CamhnJgc Cambr~dgcllmverc~nRcss, 1.172) for Kq's dnal\sts we
K N K ~ I.'The
.
I'oh~csm d t ~ o n o m i c so i 'lntermdluv Rcrlmss
~ c r n o m i ~ m t d ~ o l i t iWeekb
n r l 8, no. 27 (1973).
41. Bertocci "Bangladesh in the Early 1980s,"p. 993.
42. For futha explanation see Aii %a,
Sfate. Chss and Mi1;ililoryRule:
Politico1 Economy ofbfomiol Lrm.in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Nadi New
Press, 1994).
43. Hassan U z z a m q Samorik Bahini obong Banglodeshor drfhSomojik Boshzbofa o Rnjniti (Tbe military and the socio-zconomic
reality and politics in Bangladesh) (Dhaka: Dhsnshish, 1987. In Bengali.), p. 20.
44. Badruddm U r n , Somonk Sharan 0 Bmgladesher Rnjniti. (Military rule and politics in Bangladesh) (Dhaka: Pro& Pmkashana
Sangstb, 1989. In Bengali.), p. 15.
45. {bid., p. 17.
46. Badnnidin Umnr, Geneml Crisis o/rheBmrgeoisie in Bmgladesh
(Dhaka: Papyrus Proksshanee, 1986), p. 4 1.
47. Umar, SamorikShasm, pp. 24-25.
48. AIan L i n d w 'Mlitar). and Development in Bangladesh I D S
Bulletin 9, no. 1 (July 1977): 14.
49.9. K. Jahang~,Pmblrmaticso/Natio~lism
inBangladesh (DhakaCentre far Social S h d i ~19B6).
,
D. 20.
5C1 l b ~ d, p 24 ~ h h w ~ i r ' s d e f i n ; t l b n o f-hmrgmns!e
~m
i s h u m from
Nlcos I'ouhiQar. C ' l o r r In C'mtzmpomry Cop,hbrm, ~ a n sDav~d
remhach llondon Ncw l.efi Hunks. 1975)
5 1. lahaniir, Pmblematics of Nationalism. p. 29
52.Ibid., p. 51.
53. Ibid.,p. 53.
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