Portfolio Media. Inc. | 860 Broadway, 6th Floor | New York, NY 10003 | www.law360.com Phone: +1 646 783 7100 | Fax: +1 646 783 7161 | [email protected] 'Routine' Means 'Necessary' For Section 101 Law360, New York (June 11, 2014, 6:42 PM ET) -- Many have stated that the two predominant opinions in the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.[1] highly disagree. However, there are overlooked agreements in the two opinions. Specifically, both opinions interpret the meaning of “routine” in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Mayo v. Prometheus decision[2] to mean “necessary” when applying a preemption test for determining patentable subject matter. This agreement is striking and relevant to the PTO’s new § 101 guidelines, and is relevant to the Supreme Court’s imminent decision in CLS Bank. To understand the importance of the term “routine,” a little history is helpful. In Benson,[3] the Supreme Court held that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” But, a practical application of a scientific truth is patentable[4] (“[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”) A question was whether any practical application is patentable. Benson said, “No.” A practical application is not patentable if it preempts the natural principle, in starting: The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.[5] Besides or instead of preemption, is there any other requirement for a claim to comprise patentable subject matter? Certain language in U.S. Supreme Court decisions would suggest that there may be an additional requirement, namely that the application of the natural principle is practical and not preemptive, but also inventive. Funk Bros. held that the application of a natural phenomena must be a “product of invention.”[6] Effectively, the discovered natural phenomena was assumed to be prior art, and the packaging of noninhibiting bacteria was found to be a simple step, i.e., not inventive. This sentiment was echoed by Flook, which stated that the “[natural phenomena] is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art”[7] and “the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”[8] Flook then determined that the other limitations (i.e., besides the formula) were well known, and thus there was no invention.[9] But, Diehr arguably overruled Flook and Funk Bros., stating: The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”[10] Instead of removing the equation and analyzing the additional limitations for inventiveness, Diehr performed a preemption analysis (“Their process admittedly employs a well known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation”).[11] It is in this context that we must interpret the meaning of “routine,” as used in Mayo. Mayo determined that the additional steps were “routine, conventional activity,” and thus the claim was not patent eligible. [12] Some courts and patent examiners have viewed this decision as a requirement that the additional steps have some level of inventiveness themselves, i.e., assume the law of nature is prior art and perform at least some 102/103 analysis. However, Mayo further stated that “since they are steps that must be taken in order to apply the laws in question, the effect is simply to tell doctors to apply the law somehow when treating their patients.”[13] Thus, Mayo viewed the steps as necessary (“must be taken”); and therefore did not limit the claims to “particular applications,” seemingly using the preemption test (and not any requirement that the additional steps be inventive).[14] Consistent with this preemption view, the Federal Circuit in Alice Corp.[15] held that “routine” means “necessary,” and that only if all of the additional steps are necessary then the claim is barred by preemption. This holding was consistent across both Judge Alan Lourie’s and Judge Randall Rader’s opinions, even though much consternation has been felt over the lack of agreement in these opinions. Judge Lourie held: Yet the Court held that those steps failed to render the claims patent eligible because, as a practical matter, they were necessary to every practical use of what it found to be a natural law and therefore were not truly limiting.[16] Accordingly, Lourie interpreted Mayo as applying the preemption test, and not requiring that the additional steps be inventive. Similarly, Judge Rader held: The Supreme Court’s reference to “inventiveness” in Prometheus must be read as shorthand for its inquiry into whether implementing the abstract idea in the context of the claimed invention inherently requires the recited steps. Thus, in Prometheus, the Supreme Court recognized that the additional steps were those that anyone wanting to use the natural law would necessarily use.[17] The opinions differ based on what is considered necessary. Both Judge Rader and Judge Lourie agreed that “shadow records” were necessary for performing an escrow function, and thus the method claims did not further limit the abstract idea and were preempted. But, there was disagreement about whether a computer system is necessary to perform the escrow function, with Lourie holding it was necessary,[18] and Rader holding it was not.[19] Not to diminish the importance of the disagreement about whether a computer was necessary for all applications of the “abstract idea,” the agreement about the fundamental rule is critical. Proper guidance can be provided once it is firmly established that the additional limitations do not have to be inventive, but just be optional choices so that the claim is not co-extensive with every application of the judicial exception. There are real-world examples where the proper application of “routine” is critical. In Ariosa vs. Sequenom,[20] the additional steps were required to be inventive (i.e., use new detection methods), and not simply necessary of all applications. Accordingly, in so far as the holding relied on the requirement that additional steps be inventive (and not just necessary), the Ariosa decision is directly at odds with the Federal Circuit’s opinion in CLS Bank. Further, the new PTO guidelines for 35 U.S.C. § 101 lack a proper understanding of the term “routine” and a proper implementation of preemption. At times, the guidelines have some similarity with the preemption rule. Factors (b) and (h) refer to “others are not substantially foreclosed from using the judicial exception(s)” and “substantially all practical applications” used. But, the use of the term “substantially” is not consistent with Benson, which instead refers to “no substantial practical application except.” Accordingly, the test should not be a certain percentage of applications (as implied by substantially), but a question of whether at least one other application is substantial. Other factors can be viewed as being consistent with the preemption test, but it will be seen how the PTO applies them. Similarly, with the examples, there are times that the discussion focuses on preemption, but at other times stray. In example C, it is suggested that gunpowder would not be eligible since it is a mixture of naturally occurring saltpeter, sulfur, and charcoal. However, gunpowder does not preempt all uses of any one of these naturally occurring substances, as they can be used in other practical applications; and gunpowder itself is not naturally occurring. Further, it is not addressed whether the elements in example C are necessary in the firework art, and the same for heating and cooling in the nucleic acid amplification art in example E, where heating and cooling are not required for all amplifications. Thus, the guidelines appear to be inconsistent with the preemption test. It is noted that the PTO guidelines state that the abstract idea is to be assessed in a different manner than a natural principle, although the Federal Circuit used the same guideline for abstract idea as was used for a natural principle in Mayo. Regardless, MPEP § 2106(II) has similar factors as the recent guidelines, and thus CLS Bank is informative in general. As to the Supreme Court’s impending decision in CLS Bank, it would ideally clarify the preemption test, e.g., that the question is whether the additional limitations are necessary, and not that they are inventive with the judicial exception being assumed to be prior art. This clarification can affirm the interpretation of “routine” as being “necessary” for determining that a claim is co-extensive with the judicial exception. Additionally, it is hoped that the Supreme Court could provide some guidelines as to determining when a computer system is necessary to an abstract idea, and thus not enough to overcome preemption. More importantly may be how one is to identify and define an abstract idea, although such an attempt may be futile, and better left to indefiniteness, enablement, and written description, which can more efficiently act as a filter. As a footnote on “routine” being “necessary,” Mayo did refer to an English case, Neilson,[21] but the analysis is short and unclear. As claims did not exist in 1841, an invention was determined by comparing the prior art to the description. But the principle did not exist in the prior art; so to avoid the invention being the principle, the court analyzed the description to look for additional steps that applied the principle. Mayo acknowledged that Neilson found the patent to include an application of the principle, but Mayo characterized the principle as being implemented in an inventive way. However, the Neilson court found the application enabled (sufficient) because the steps in isolation were known (i.e., techniques for heating air),[22] but the steps were not conventional in combination with a furnace. Perhaps Mayo simply found that heating air before blowing into a furnace was not necessary to the operation of a furnace (as one can use cold air), or the heating of the air blown into a furnace is not necessary for all applications of the principle that hot air is more efficient than cold air. Regardless, because the techniques for heating air were well known, Mayo could not possibly have held that the heating of air between the blower and the furnace was inventive over existing technology when one assumed the principle of hot air being more efficient than cold air was part of the prior art. —By David Raczkowski, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP David Raczkowski, Ph.D., is a partner in Kilpatrick Townsend's San Francisco office. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice. [1] CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2013) [2] Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) [3] Gotthschalk v. Benson, 175 USPQ 673, 675 (1972) [4] Id., citing to MacKay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94, 40 USPQ 199, 202 [5] Id., at 676. [6] Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 76 USPQ 280, 282 (U.S. 1948) [7] Parker, v. Flook 198 USPQ 193, 198 (U.S. 1978) [8] Id., at 199. [9] Id. [10] Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1, 9 (U.S. 1981) [11] Id., at 8. [12] Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) [13] Id., at 1299 [14] Id., at 1302 (“the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of those laws.”) [15] CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2013) [16] Id., at 1705 (emphasis added) [17] Id., at 1719 [18] Id., at 1710 [19] Id., at 1724. [20] Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXUS 156554, page 16. (“The Court similarly concludes that paternally inherited cffDNA is not patentable simply because the claims contain steps indicating that it may be detected using existing DNA detection methods.”) [21] Neilson v. Harford, i Webs. 295 (1841) [22] Jeffrey A. Lefstin, “INVENTIVE APPLICATION: A HISTORY” http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398696 All Content © 2003-2014, Portfolio Media, Inc.
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