Gender inequalities in
labour markets in
Central Asia
Tamar Khitarishvili
ThecollapseoftheSovietUnionhasinitiatedanunprecedentedsocialandeconomictransformationofthe
Central Asian economies. Their experience has demonstrated that the changes in the gender balance
triggeredbyeconomicshiftsarefarfromobvious.WhereasduringtheSovietyears,womeninCentralAsia
experiencedconsiderableadvancesineconomicandsocialwell-being,duringthepost-Sovietperiodthese
advanceswereinmanycasesreversed,inpartduetotheeconomicshiftsexperiencedbycountriesinthe
region, including private sector growth and significant migration flows, and to some degree due to the
strengthening of patriarchal traditions. This paper establishes the current state of various dimensions of
gender inequalities and their recent dynamics in the five countries of Central Asia and proposes steps
aimedatreducingthemtoadvanceinclusivegrowth,decentjobcreationandeconomicempowerment.
TamarKhitarishvili1
1
ResearchScholar,LevyEconomicsInstituteofBardCollege,[email protected],18457587714;paperpreparedforthejoint
UNDP/ILOconferenceonEmployment,TradeandHumanDevelopmentinCentralAsia(Almaty,Kazakhstan,June23-24,2016).
2
Table of Contents
Background......................................................................................................................... 4
Labour markets .................................................................................................................. 5
Rural development and agriculture ................................................................................ 11
Entrepreneurship and private sector development ...................................................... 13
Industrial and occupational segregation ....................................................................... 19
Education .......................................................................................................................... 21
Pay gaps ............................................................................................................................ 24
Unpaid work and care ...................................................................................................... 26
Migration ........................................................................................................................... 32
Social Institutions, Legislative Framework and Policy-Making ................................... 35
Social protection systems ............................................................................................... 39
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 40
References ........................................................................................................................ 43
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 49
Background
The Central Asian countries2represent a heterogeneous group that includes energy-exporting countries
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan); agriculture-dependent small economies (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); and
themoreindustrializedeconomyofUzbekistan.UzbekistanandKazakhstanhavethelargestpopulations,
atover30and17million,followedbyTajikistanwithovereightmillion,andTurkmenistanandKyrgyzstan
withalmostsixmillioneach.KazakhstanisthemostaffluentCentralAsiancountrywithaGrossNational
Income(GNI)percapitaof$20,867,andTajikistanthepoorestwithGNIpercapitaof$2,517(UNDP2015).
BasedontheGenderInequalityIndex(GII)andtheGenderDevelopmentIndex(GDI),theCentral
Asianregionischaracterizedbymoderatelevelsofgenderinequality(Figure1).AccordingtotheGII,which
gaugesreproductivehealthandgendergapsinempowermentandeconomicstatus,theregionperforms
betterthantheworldaverageonmeasuresofgenderequality(TableA1).Thisislargelydrivenbyrelatively
strong gender indicators in education and below average maternal mortality rates (even though they
remainconsiderable).
AsimilarconclusionemergesusingtheGDI,whichmeasuresgendergapsinhumandevelopment
achievements focusing on health, education and living standards and places the Central Asia countries
abovetheworldaverage(TableA2).However,inthecaseoftheGDI,thisoutcomecanbeexplainedinpart
by poor health outcomes of men, in particular, and the relatively low levels of gender-disaggregated
estimated gross national income per capita (with the exception of natural-resource-rich Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan). Turkmenistan stands out as a Central Asian country with the lowest life expectancy for
womenandmenandthelowestexpectedyearsofschooling.Ontheotherhand,Kazakhstanperformsthe
bestoutofitsfellowCentralAsiancountriesandistheonlyCentralAsiancountryclassifiedbytheUNDPas
a country with high level of human development. The other four countries of the region fall into the
mediumhumandevelopmentcategory(UNDP2015).
Kazakhstan also performs better than its regional neighbors based on the Social Institutions and
Gender Index (SIGI), an OECD-produced measure of discriminatory social institutions, which assesses
formal and informal laws, attitudes and practices that restrict women’s and girls’ access to rights, justice
and empowerment opportunities. In fact, it is the only Central Asian countries categorized as having low
degreeofdiscriminatorypractices,withtheSIGIvalueof0.1196.Tajikistan,UzbekistanandKyrgyzstanare
partofthemediumdegreegroupwiththeSIGIvaluesof0.1393,0.1475,and0.1598,respectively(OECD
SIGIdatabase).
2
TheCentralAsianregionincludesKazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan.
4
Labourmarkets
Despite the region’s positive performance relative to the rest of the world, gender inequalities in
labormarketsarepervasiveintheCentralAsianregion.Theyemergealreadyattheleveloflabourforce
participation(Figure2).ItisnotablethatmaleparticipationratesacrossCentralAsiancountriesaresimilar.
The gaps are present due to the considerable variation in female labour force participation rates, which
rangefrom46.9percentinTurkmenistanto67.7percentinKazakhstanin2013.Asaresult,thegendergap
in labour force participation in the Central Asian region varies from about 10.2 percentage points in
Kazakhstanto30percentagepointsinTurkmenistan
Overthelast20years,theoveralllabourforceparticipationratesinCentralAsiahavenotchanged
considerablyhowevertheirgenderdynamicshavevaried.InKazakhstan,thegendergapcontracted,asthe
female labour force participation rate increased considerably from 70.1 in 1991 to 75.1 percent in 2013
5
whereasmaleratewentuponlyslightlyfrom81.9in1991to82.4in2013.3Theincreaseinthefemalerate
isparticularlynoteworthybecauseitwasthehighestintheregiontobeginwithandhasrisenevenmore.
On the other hand, the gap appears to have widened in other countries of the region. In Tajikistan,
TurkmenistanandUzbekistan,thishappened(albeitonlymarginally)duetotheslightincreaseinthemale
participation rate without the accompanying increase in the female rate. The widening of the gap was
muchmorepronouncedinKyrgyzstanbecausewomen’sratefellfrom64.5percentin1991to59.6percent
in2013whilemen’sparticipationrateincreasedfrom78.1percentto82.5percentduringthesameperiod
(theWorldBankGenderStatisticsDatabase).
Thegenderwagegapwidensaswomenenterprimechild-bearingyears.Thisistoalargedegree
duetotheirdomesticandcareburdens(Maltseva2007).Infact,asmanyas61percentofTajikwomennot
inthelabourforcecitedomesticresponsibilitiesasthereasonfortheirinactivity(Figure13).At11percent,
thisshareismuchlowerinKazakhstan,possiblyduetothebetterstateofsocialinfrastructureprovisioning.
Notably,theyouthfemalelabourforceparticipationratedeclinedinKazakhstanfrom48.9percentin1991
to 44.4 percent in 2013 even as it increased among working-age females. However, this could be partly
attributedtomorewomengoingforhighereducation:thedecreasewasaccompaniedbyariseintheratio
offemaletomaletertiaryenrollmentfrom114.1in1999to129.5in2013.OntheotherhandinUzbekistan
theratiooffemaletomaletertiaryenrollmentfellfrom82.4in1999to64.7in2011.
3
Source:WBGenderStatistics,seriesSL_TLF_ACTI_MA_ZS
6
In the environment with low labor force participation rates, low unemployment rates are
commonlyinterpretedwithcautionbecausethelowratesmaysimplybeareflectionofalargeportionof
inactivepopulation.However,intheCentralAsianregion,thisisnotthecase:countrieswithhigherlabor
force participation rates tend to have lower unemployment rates. Moreover, in these countries,
considerablegendergapsintheunemploymentratesbenefittingmenarepresent,unlikethegapsinlabor
forceparticipationrates,whicharesmallinthesecountries.ThisisthecaseinKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan
(Figure 4). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where female labour force participation
ratesareverylow,thegendergapintheunemploymentrateislessthanonepercentagepoint.Hence,in
strongerlabormarketsproportionatelyfewermenthanwomenareunemployedwhereasinweakerlabor
markets,thesharesofmenandwomenseekingjobsaresimilar.
Gender gaps in employment largely mirror the gaps inlabour force participation rates (Figure 5).
They are the lowest in Kazakhstan at 11.2 percentage points and the highest in Turkmenistan at 26.9
percentagepoints.Next,weshedmorelightonthefactorsthatlikelyexplainthispicturebyanalyzingthe
employmentcompositionbytypeandsectoroftheeconomy.
In particular, smaller gender gaps in the employment rate are observed in the countries with a
higher share of wage employment, which also tend to have higher female employment rates. This
potentially suggests that wage employment contributes to higher female employment rates, generating
7
moregender-equaloutcomes.Henceunderstandingthefactorsthatcontributetotheexpansionofwage
employmentintheCentralAsianregionmayyieldinsightsintocontractinggendergapsintheemployment
rate.
Indeed, wage employment is a considerably more dominant form of employment in Kazakhstan,
which has better overall gender indicators compared to other Central Asian countries, with a wage
employmentshareofover60percentamongbothmenandwomen,followedbyTajikistanwithabout53
percentandKyrgyzstanwiththesharethatvariesbetween47and48percent(Figure6).
Countrieswithhighersharesofwageemploymentalsodemonstratesmallergenderdifferencesin
thecompositionoftheirself-employment.Ontheotherhand,inTajikistanandKyrgyzstan,forexample,in
which wage employment shares are about 50 percent or lower, proportionately more women are
contributingfamilyworkersthanmen,reflectingapatterninwhichwomenaremorelikelytobeinvolved
inunpaidactivities.
8
Thesecountry-andgender-baseddifferencescanbelinkedtothesectoralstructureoftheCentral
Asianeconomies(Figure7).Morethanaquarteroftheemployedpopulationinthisregionisemployedin
agricultureand,withtheexceptionofKazakhstan,theshareofagriculturalemploymentamongwomenis
veryclosetoorhigherthanthisshareamongmen.ThegendergapisparticularlystrikinginTajikistan,in
which75.1percentofwomenworkintheagriculturalsectorcomparedto41.8percentofmen.
9
ThehighproportionsofcontributingfamilyworkersinTajikistanandKyrgyzstanappeartobetied
to the predominance of relatively small-plot based agriculture, in which women tend to participate. In
particular,16.9percentand19.1percentoffemaleworkersbutonly8.9percentand12.5percentofmale
workersinTajikistanandKyrgyzstan,respectively,arecontributingfamilyworkers.Ontheotherhand,in
Kazakhstan,despitemorethanathirdofworkersemployedinagriculture,lessthantwopercentofboth
male and female workers are contributing family workers. This is likely due to the larger-scale nature of
agriculture,especiallyinthenorthernpartofKazakhstan.Indeed,Petricketal.(2013)arguethatlarge-scale
farming based on hired labour will continue to be the main mode of land cultivation for the foreseeable
futureintheKazakhgrainregion.
Highsharesofown-accountworkersintheoverallemploymentarealsolinkedtonon-agricultural
private sector development although gender patterns vary by country. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
proportionately more men are own-account workers. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, 34.7 percent of female
workers as opposed to 30.5 percent of male workers are own-account workers. Although data from
Turkmenistanislimited,ILO(2010b)indicatesthatself-employmentinTurkmenistanisfemale-dominated
with 62 percent of self-employed individuals being women. Further linked to gender gaps in the private
sector development and entrepreneurship is the higher share of employers among men compared to
women (Figure 6). For example, in Kazakhstan, proportionately twice as many men as women were
employersin2013(1.1percentofemployedwomenand2.5percentofemployedmen).Expressedinother
terms,only15percentofemployersinTajikistanand30percentofemployersinTurkmenistanarefemale
(ILO2010b;WorldBank2013).
10
Asusefulastheselabourforceclassificationsare,theymaynotaccuratelyrepresentlabourforce
participation. For example, the boundary between inactivity and unemployment reported in household
budget and in labour force surveys can be very blurry, especially for rural women. Moreover, these
classifications do not necessarily reflect the quality of the engagement in labour force. For example,
agricultural employment tends to be concentrated in low-productivity subsistence activities and, among
females in particular, is dominated by contributing family workers who are unpaid. Furthermore, a large
shareofagriculturalproductiontakesplaceinformally,withoutanysocialprotection,andthesameapplies
to the non-agricultural private sector. On the other hand, informal activities may provide better
remuneration and higher standards of living than employment in the formal sector. Indeed, despite its
relative stability and social benefits, public sector employment is typically poorly remunerated. These
distinctionsareimportantandweaddresssomeoftheirgenderdimensionsinCentralAsiainthecontextof
ruraldevelopment,agricultureandprivatesectordevelopment.
Ruraldevelopmentandagriculture
ClosetohalfofthepopulationinCentralAsialivesinruralareas,asmuchas66percentofthepopulation
inKyrgyzstanand55percentofthepopulationinTurkmenistan.Thisisthecaseeventhoughoverthelast
two decades, the rural share in population has been consistently declining. For example,in Uzbekistan it
dropped from 64.2 percent in 2007 to 48.8 percent in 2011 (Stulina 2004; ILOa 2010), with internal and
external migration contributing to the decline. Indeed, migration from and within Central Asia has
transformed the labour market landscape of rural areas in particular, with complex consequences for
familiesandcommunitiesleftbehind,anissuewediscussinthemigrationsectionofthepaper.
Agriculturalsectoristhemainemployerinruralareas.Femaleshareofagriculturalemploymentis
more than half and stands at 54 percent and 53 percent, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively (FAO
GenderandLandRightsDatabase4)andat53percentinUzbekistan(Alimdjanova2009).However,women
are underrepresented among workers responsible for decision-making, such as specialists and managers,
andtendtobeconcentratedinseasonalandunskilledjobs. Forexample,amongunskilledwageworkers
thissharevariesbetween36.7percentinKyrgyzstanand59.3percentinTajikistan(TCICWC2006).WECF
(2014b)givesanevenhigherestimateof80percentinTajikistan.Ontheotherhand,amongspecialists,the
femaleshareinTajikistanisbelow16percent(itiszeroinTurkmenistan)andamongfarmmanagersitis
only12percent.InUzbekistan,only4.2percentofmanagerialpositionsinagricultureareheldbywomen
(ADB2014).
4
ThisdatabasedoesnotincludedataonKazakhstan.
11
Evidence from Tajikistan also suggests that fewer women participate in decision-making in
individualorfamilydehkanfarmsthaninlargecollectivefarms.Forexample,inKhatlonandSughdregions
ofTajikistan,TJICCAdataindicatethatwomenparticipateindecision-makingforfarmingdecisions,suchas
thechoiceofacroporthesaleofagriculturalproduce,inlessthan25percentofthehouseholdsandthisis
especially the case among small farms. Even in large farms, women have little bargaining power and are
trapped in low-wage, low-productivity work. It is remarkable that this picture is prevalent even among
female-headedhouseholds,indicatingthatmaleextendedfamilymemberscontinuemakingdecisionswith
respect to farming (WB 2014a). Hence, despite their considerable presence in agriculture, women in
CentralAsiaareconcentratedinlow-skilledjobswithlittledecision-makingpower.
Genderasymmetriesinagriculturalemploymentarealsolinkedtogendergapsinlandownership
and lease holdings. Although laws generally do not discriminate against women, in reality, women rarely
hold land titles, reflecting strong patriarchal customs and attitudes. Only 17.1 percent of farm owners in
Tajikistan in 2007 and 12.4 percent of land holders in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 were women (FAO 2011). In
Uzbekistan,only7.2percentofleaseholdfarmswereledbywomen5(Alimdjanova2009).Infact,duringthe
implementation of the land reform and the distribution of land use rights, families with only daughters
receivedlesslandinUzbekistan(FAOGenderandLandDatabase).Difficultiesoftransferringownershipto
womenpresentparticularproblemsinfemale-headedhouseholdswithmigrantmalemembers,rendering
women unable to participate in critical land transactions required for sustaining the livelihood of their
households,suchasrentingormortgagingland.Moregenerally,thissituationconstrainsthedevelopment
of female-owned micro and small businesses in agriculture due to women’s inability to obtain credit
withoutcollateral.
The restrictions on land access are also translated into water access challenges because
membership in water users’ associations is commonly linked to land ownership (WB 2014a). Water
irrigation issues are particularly challenging for individual and family dehkan farms, which employ
proportionatelymorewomen(Alimdjanova2009).Thissituationcontributestotheuseoflow-productivity
agricultural practices among female-headed farms, affecting their living standards. Women-headed
householdsarealsolesslikelytoadoptsustainablelandmanagementpractices,especiallyinsmallfarms
because women tend to have relatively weak knowledge-sharing networks. Conditional on having this
knowledge, however, they are as likely to adopt sustainable land management practices as male-headed
farmhouseholds(WorldBank2014a).
5
Landownershiplawsvarybycountry.InTajikistanandtheKyrgyzRepublic,landcanbeprivatelyownedandistransferable.In
Turkmenistan,privatefarmersgetlanduserights,butlandownershipisnottransferable.InUzbekistan,thereisnoprivateland
ownership(FAOGenderandLandDatabase).
12
Anotherfactorcontributingtoloweragriculturalproductivityoffemale-headedhouseholdsisthe
plotsize.Similartononagriculturalenterprises,intheagriculturalsector,womentendtoownandmanage
smallerlandplotsthanmen.InTajikistan,in2007theaverageplotsizewas0.22acresinfemale-headed
(not necessarily female owned) farms/households and 0.37 acres in male-headed households (State
CommitteeoftheRepublicofTajikistanonStatistics2010,p.18).Thesenumbersareconsistentwithdata
based on land ownership. In Tajikistan, in 2007 the average size of female-owned land plots (based on
officialownershipdocuments)was0.27acres,asopposedto0.31acresformale-ownedplots(Kieranetal.
2015).InKyrgyzstan,theoverallfemaleshareinlandholdingsis12.4percent,butonly5.5percentoffarms
with100-1000hectaresofarablelandwerefemaleheldandwomenheldonly5.4percentofthetotalland
area (FAO Gender and Land Rights Database). These findings emphasize the importance of disentangling
thecomplexfactorsthatunderliegendergapsinagriculturalproductivity.
This picture of gender disparities in rural areas and in agriculture reveals that women are more
likelytoengageinlow-value-addedagriculturalproductioncomparedtomen.Asinnon-agriculturalsectors,
womenoperateonasmallerscalecomparedtomen.Moreover,incountrieswith asmallshareofwage
employment in agriculture, women are more likely to work as contributing family workers. For these
countries, in particular, the challenge lies in improving income-earning opportunities of women. Impact
evaluation studies indicate that female farmers in countries with small-scale agriculture benefit from an
integratedsuiteofservicesthattargetsproduction,marketing,andsocialconstraintsandfromthecreation
of farmer groups and collectives to establish and strengthen networks (Buvinić et al. 2013). Providing
women with agricultural education services and training in the use of seeds, fertilizers and livestock has
also been effective in raising the productivity of female farming (Manfre et al. 2013). Finally, improving
women’saccesstocreditthroughalternativefinancingmechanismandtolandtenurethroughlegaladvice
andinformationonlandtenurearrangementscanhelpinalleviatingthebarriersencounteredbywomenin
ruralareasandinagriculture.
Entrepreneurshipandprivatesectordevelopment
ForalastingimpactongenderinequalitiesinthelabourmarketsofCentralAsianeconomies,agricultural
sector reforms have to take place in conjunction with shifts in the structure of non-agricultural private
sector employment. Private sector expansion has been viewed as key to generating robust employment
growth in the region (World Bank 2012) and its current GDP share ranges from only 25 percent in
Turkmenistanto75percentintheKyrgyzRepublic.
Due to a stronger representation of women in the public sector of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
femalesharesinprivateemploymentinthesecountriesarelowerthanmaleshares.InTajikistan,onthe
13
other hand, the female share in the private sector is higher than male share, reflecting a very high
proportionofwomenemployedinagriculture(Figure8).
A large proportion of private sector activities, especially small and medium enterprise and ownaccount business activity, in Central Asian countries takes place in the informal sector, especially in
agriculture. In 2006, the size of the informal economy in Central Asian countries was around 40 percent
(Schneideretal.2010).In2007,36percentofwageworkersand47percentofallemployedindividualsin
Tajikistanworkedintheinformalsector,withthemajoritybeingwomen(WorldBank2013).Thisindicates
theconsiderablemagnitudeofinformalactivitiesamongtheself-employedinTajikistan.InTurkmenistan,
informalsectoremploysabout14percentofworkforce,amongwhom57percentarefemale(ILO2010b).
In Kyrgyzstan the female share in informal employment in 2009 was 36.2 percent, whereas it was 41.7
percent of total employment, likely reflecting the stronger position of women in formal public-sector
employment(Laboursta).
Womenemployedinformallyinagricultureareprimarilyengagedinthesaleofagriculturalproduce
grownonowngardenplots.Womenininformalnonagriculturalactivities,inturn,areengagedingarment
production,shuttletradeandlocalmarkettrade(Ishkanian2003;ADB2014;ADB2006).Forexample,ADB
(2014)reportsthatbetween70and80percentofbazaarvendorsand50percentofbazaar-basedshuttle
tradersinUzbekistanarefemale.Therealsoappearstobeagenderpatternwithrespecttothedirectionof
tradeasfemaleshuttletradersaremuchmorelikelytoshuttletoandfromKyrgyzstanandTajikistanthan
toKazakhstan(ADB2014).Thesepatternsreflecttheoftenprecariousnatureofprivatesectoremployment
intheregion.
Indeed, informal activities often represent a coping strategy to address the lack of employment
opportunities in the formal sector and its high costs due to regulations and corruption. Nevertheless,
evidence suggests that informal activities are a preferred option to migration. Indeed, migration is often
thelast-resortcopingstrategy–forexample,unlikeprofessionalworkers,low-skilledworkersinTajikistan
aremorelikelytomigratethantobeinformallyemployed(Abdulloevetal.2012).
Thepresenceofalargeinformaleconomyalsodoesnotnecessarilyruleoutthepresenceofstrong
entrepreneurial elements in the formal private sector. In Kazakhstan, the established formal business
ownership rate 6 is 7.4 percent and the entrepreneurial intention rate 7 is 3.9 percent (Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor survey). The corresponding rates were 7.3 and 8.1 percent and 16 and 2.4 for
6
Businessownershiprateisthepercentageofthepopulationaged18–64whoarecurrentlyanowner-managerofanestablished
business,i.e.,owningandmanagingarunningbusinessthathaspaidsalaries,wages,oranyotherpaymentstotheownersfor
morethan42months.
7
Entrepreneurialintentionrateispercentageofthepopulationaged18–64—individualsinvolvedinanystageofentrepreneurial
activityexcluded—whoarelatententrepreneursandwhointendtostartabusinesswithinthreeyears.
14
GeorgiaandRussia,respectively,theonlyotherformerSovietcountriesinwhichthesurveywasconducted.
Bycomparison,intheUnitedKingdom,theserateswere6.5and6.3percent.Hence,theestablishedformal
businessownershiprate,inparticular,suggestscomparablelevelsofentrepreneurialactivity.Nevertheless,
during the last decade, about 28 percent of formal entrepreneurial activity in Kazakhstan was necessitydriven,comparedtoonly16percentintheUnitedKingdom.Thiscomparestothe2006-2014averageof30
percent in Russia and the 2014 value of 49 percent in Georgia. The key question remains whether the
entrepreneurialintentionandactivity,evenwhennecessity-driven,canbecomeaseedbedforinnovation
andjobgrowthandwhetherwomencanplayaprominentroleinthisprocess.
Indeed,womencanplaydifferentfunctionsinentrepreneurship.Asfirmowners,theirownership
participation rates in the Central Asian countries currently stand at about one-third or higher (Figure 9).
They have increased over the last decade. For example, in 2005, the female share varied from only 14.4
percentinTajikistanto29.4inKazakhstan.Inthesameyear,thefemaleshareinenterpriseownershipwas
11.2percentinTurkmenistan(UNDP2008).However,by2013,theratesrangedfrom28.3inKazakhstanto
ashighas49.4percentinKyrgyzstan,inlineorabovetheOECDaverageofabout30percent(WorldBank
EnterpriseSurvey).
Therewasapronouncedincreaseinthefemaleownershiprateduring2008and2009,perhapsdue
tothehighturnoveroffirmsinthesecountries.However,thesharpincreasein2008and2009acrossthe
15
board may also be due to the disproportionately strong impact of the recession on male-dominated
industries,suchasconstructionandtransport,whichreducedthenumberofmale-ownedbusinesses.
Whereas female ownership rates are relatively high, the proportions of being a top manager are
muchlower(Figure9),especiallyinTajikistanandUzbekistan.Topmanagersexertstronginfluenceonthe
daily operations of firms as well their long-term development. In some cases, the female share in top
managementmaybeabetterindicatoroffemaleparticipationindecision-makingthanthefemalesharein
ownership.InTajikistanin2013,32.7percentoffirmshadfemaleparticipationinownershipbutonly9.6
percenthadafemaletopmanager.Similarly,inUzbekistan,29.2percentoffirmshadfemaleparticipation
inownershipbutonly13.4percenthadafemaletopmanager.Itisnoteworthythatdespitethedecreasein
the proportion of firms with female ownership after the recession, in Kyrgyzstan and, to some extent, in
Uzbekistan, the percentage of firms with female top managers increased and in the Kyrgyz case reached
one-thirdofmanagersofformalSMEsin2013.Thisindicatestheincreasedinvolvementofwomeninthe
formalprivatesectorinKyrgyzstan.8
8
Othersourcesconfirmtheseestimatesoffemalemanagerialengagementintheprivatesector,butalsoindicatethattheytendto
bebelowthefemalesharesinthemanagementofstateandmunicipal(self-government)entities,highlightingamoreactive
femaleengagementinthepublicsector.Forexample,whereasin201123.7percentofenterprisesintheKyrgyzRepublichad
femalemanagers,thefemalesharewas23.6percentforprivateenterprises(inlinewiththeevidencefromtheWorldBank
EnterpriseSurveys),21.1percentinstateentitiesandreached34.1percentinmunicipal(self-government)entities((National
StatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012),p.97).InKazakhstanin2010,25.6percentofenterpriseshadfemale
managers,andthisproportionwas24.6percentinprivateenterprises,18.8percentinforeignenterprises,andashighas38.2
percentinstateenterprises(WomenandmeninKazakhstan,2011,p.98).
16
Reflectingtypicalindustrialsegregationpatterns,thereareconsiderabledifferencesinthefemale
ownership share by industry. For example, in 2005, whereas the overall female share of managers in
Uzbekistan was 27.3 percent, in the healthcare, education and culture sectors it stood at 36.1, 45.7, and
44.6percent,respectively(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics2007).Womenare
alsomorethanproportionatelyrepresentedinretailtrade,foodandgarmentsproductioninKazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan(WBEnterpriseSurveys).Thisisalsoconfirmedbythefindingsofthe
femaleentrepreneurshipsurveyinUzbekistan(UNECE2009)andinTurkmenistan(UNDP2008).
Thereissubstantialregionalvariationinthefemaleownershipshare.InKyrgyzstan,theproportion
of female managers varied from 24.5 percent in Batken region to 55 percent in Bishkek region (which
incidentally also has a lower gender wage gap than the average for Kyrgyzstan) (National Statistical
CommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).InUzbekistan,itvariedfromonly9.7percentinAndijanregionto
37.9percentinNamanganregion(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics2007).
Female-managedfirmsdifferfrommale-managedfirmsinanumberofways.Female-ownedfirms
tend to be smaller than male-owned firms, typical of the gender differences in firm size across the
transition region. For example, in Kazakhstan the average firm size of male-owned firms is 50 workers,
compared to 30 workers in female-owned firms. This is the case even though female-owned businesses
tendtohavegreaterscaleeconomiesduetotheindustriesinwhichtheypredominate,whichimpliesthat
they would benefit from expansion more than male-managed firms. The smaller size of female-managed
firms has been found to be largely responsible for their weaker financial performance (Sattar 2012). It is
notable that female-managed firms tend to hire proportionately more full-time female workers. For
example,in2013inUzbekistan,59.9percentpercentoffull-timeworkersinfirmswithfemaleparticipation
17
in ownership were female compared to 23.9 percent in firms without female participation in ownership.
Findingsofthefemaleentrepreneurshipsurveyindicatethatfemaleemploymentsharein female-owned
firmsis68percentinUzbekistan(UNECE2009).SimilarrelationshipsholdinotherCentralAsiancountries.
Thesefindingsimplythatalleviatingobstaclestotheestablishmentandexpansionoffemale-ownedfirms
cancontributetotheshrinkingofgendergapintheemploymentrates.
Someofsuchobstacleshavetodowithwomen’slackofnetworksandexpertiseinnavigatingthe
“racketeerandcorruptpublicofficials”(Ishkanian2003),whichexplainswomen’sengagementininformal
andsmall-scaleactivitiesthatrequirelowinitialcapital.Femalenetworksalsotendtobelessusefulthan
malenetworksforbusinessdevelopment(Welteretal.2006).Inaddition,womenfacegreaterregulatory
barriersandlackbusinessknowledgerelativetomen(Sattar2012).
Accesstocreditisanotherfactorthatpotentiallyhinderstheestablishmentandgrowthoffemaleowned businesses. It is in general relatively rare in Central Asian countries to borrow money to start,
operateorexpandafarmorabusiness,withfewerthan8percentofindividualsreportinghavingdoneso.
(Figure10;GlobalFindexsurvey,2014).Thisisespeciallythecaseamongwomen.Femaleentrepreneursin
Uzbekistan specifically cite access to credit as a key barrier to expansion, instead depending on limited
savings or the network of family and friends. Only 40 percent of the surveyed female entrepreneurs in
Samarkand and 54 percent in Tashkent sought credit from commercial banks. Out of the women who
sought credit, only 38.2 percent in Samarkand and 78 percent in Tashkent received it (UNECE 2009).
Womenalsotendtobemoreriskaversethanmen,potentiallycontributingtothegendergapinbusinessrelatedborrowing,althoughtheevidencelinkingwomen’sriskaversiontothesmallersizeofoperationsis
inconclusive(Sattar2012).
18
Moreworkisneededtounderstandwhywomenarelesslikelytoestablishfirmswithemployees,belarger
in size, and function in the formal sector compared to men and, more generally, how to turn necessity
entrepreneurship into opportunity entrepreneurship. Access to credit, weaker networks, and the lack of
business knowledge are some of the constraints that female-headed businesses face. Alleviating these
constraintscanincreasethepotentialforemploymentgrowthandforcontractingthegendergapsinlabor
marketsviatheexpansionoffemale-ownedbusinesses.Indeed,impactevaluationstudiessuggestastrong
positiveeffectofbusinessandfinancialliteracyprogramsontheperformanceoffemale-ownedbusinesses.
These studies also suggest the importance of utilizing multi-pronged methods. For example, providing
financial capital alone has impact on the performance of female-owned businesses when combined with
income-generation training and follow-up activities (Buvinić et al. 2013). Moreover, larger sized femaleownedbusinessesbenefitfromin-kindcapitalinjectionsbecausetheyaremorelikelytobeinvestedinthe
business (Buvinić et al. 2013). The expansion of female-owned businesses may have a particularly strong
impact on female employment because the female employment rates are higher in the firms owned by
women,asthefindingsoftheWorldBankEnterpriseSurveysdemonstrate(Sattar2012).
Industrialandoccupationalsegregation
IndustrialandoccupationalsegregationbygenderisatypicalfeatureoflabourmarketsandCentralAsian
countries are no exception. Women’s employment tends to concentrate in health, education and social
services, a pattern established in Central Asia during the Soviet times. For example, the proportion of
women working in education and healthcare in total female employment varies from 27 percent in
Tajikistan to 58 percent in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, despite the lower female employment rates, women’s
presenceinthesesectorsisconsiderable.Forexample,inTajikistanwomenconstitute45percentoftotal
employment in education and 57 percent of total employment in healthcare. In Kyrgyzstan, these
proportions are even higher at 72 percent and 78 percent. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistanthefemalesharesineducationare69,74,and64percentandinhealthcare78,77,and70
percentofwageworkers,respectively.
Thesesectorsarepredominantlystate-financedandwomen’spresenceinthemisoftenconnected
totheprevalenceofwomeninthepublicsector.Indeed,whereastheshareofwomenintheprivatesector
employment stands at about 45 percent in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, their share in public
sector employment varies from 39 percent in Tajikistan, to 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 59 percent in
Kazakhstan (UNECE database). However, even withinthe public sector there is variation. For example, in
19
stateorganizationsinTajikistanthefemaleshareis55.4percentinsocialassistanceprovisioning,butonly
19.8inthecustomsdepartment(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofTajikistanonStatistics2010).
Despiteitsconsiderablesize,thefemaleshareinstatesectoremploymenthasdecreasedsincethe
collapse of the Soviet Union. This development has been accompanied by the increase in the female
presence among NGOs (Ishkanian, 2003), reflecting a duality in the nature of female involvement in the
public sector in the Central Asian countries. On the one hand, women are actively involved in the civil
society,but,ontheotherhand,thereseemstobeverylowawarenessoftheimportanceofparticipatingin
civil society, in particular in local budget processes, among women that are not in the labour force
(EsenalievandKisunko2015).
Conversely,women’spresenceintheprivatesectorhasincreasedoverthelasttwodecades.This
increasewasinpartdrivenbytheexpansionofthetradesectorandthepredominanceofwomenincertain
subcomponentsofit,suchasshuttletrading(USAID2010).Women’srolealsoincreasedinthehoteland
cateringsectors.Forexample,womenconstitute61and55percentofworkersintrade,hotelsandcatering
inKazakhstanandUzbekistan.ThecorrespondingfemalesharesinKyrgyzstanandTajikistanare45and34
percent(WomenandMenpublications).
Inadditiontoindustrialsegregationpatterns,verticalsegregationpatternstendtobeprevalentas
women are underrepresented in decision-making positions such as legislators, senior officials and
managers(Table3).Wehavediscussedthepresenceofverticalsegregationinagriculture.Itisalsoevident
in other sectors with considerable female presence, such as education and healthcare, and in the public
sector.Forexample,whereas48percentofdeputydirectorsofsecondaryschoolsarewomen,thefemale
shareisonly31percentatthedirectorlevel(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics
2007). In Kyrgyzstan, in 2011, despite having higher skill level, only 29.1 percent of managers at state
institutions, organizations and enterprises were females (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz
Republic2012,p.88).Theyarealsounderrepresentedamongplantandmachineoperatorsandassemblers
(Table1).Tosomedegree,thelatterfindingmaybeduetothelegislativeconstraintsontheengagement
ofwomenincertainoccupationsandindustriesinCentralAsiancountries.Forexample,innoneofthese
countries are women allowed to work in construction, factories and mining the same way as men do
(WorldBank2015).
On the other hand, women are overrepresented among professionals and technicians in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Table 1). Reflecting their growing role in services and trade, they are also
overrepresentedamongclerksandserviceworkersandshopandmarketsalesworkers.
20
Education
These patterns of industrial segregation are closely linked to the gender specialization of women at the
tertiaryeducationlevel,itselfavestigeoftheSovietlegacy.Attheprimarylevel,schoolenrollmentrates
have been generally high among boys and girls, according to the World Bank data (Figure 11). However,
other sources reveal the emergence of worrisome gaps favoring boys already at the primary level. For
example, in 2006, the gross enrollment rate was 95.1 percent for boys but only 88.5 percent for girls in
Kazakhstan(vanKlaverenetal.2010).Theenrollmentratesdropwithage,andmoresoamonggirlsthan
boys.InTajikistan,theboytogirlratioincreasesfrom99for10yearoldto120for16yearolds.By21years
of age, the enrollment rate of boys is 17 percent and for girls it is only 5.2 percent. The gender gap is
especiallywideinruralareas.Itisalsowideramongchildrenfromaffluentfamiliesbecauseboysfromwelloffhouseholdsaremorelikelytostayinschoolcomparedtogirlswhereasinpoorhouseholdsenrollment
ratesdropwithageforbothboysandgirls.Evidenceindicatesthatmilitaryconflictsmayhavealsoplayeda
rolecontributingtothewideningofthegendergapinenrollmentrates.Forexample,Shemyakina(2011)
findsthattheCivilWarinTajikistanledtoadeclineintheeducationalattainmentofgirls.Re-emergenceof
traditionalnormsmaytoohavebeenafactor.Despitethesedifferencesintheeducationalattainmentand
the worsening sex ratio, however, there is no evidence that girls are discriminated against boys in
consumptionexpenditures(Pena2012).
Notably,testresultsoftheProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessment(PISA)showthatgirls
tend to outperform boys in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with the gap being smaller in mathematics and
21
larger in reading and science. However, the gap varies across the performance distribution: it is large
favouringgirlsatthelowerendandeitherdisappearsorfavoursboysamongthetop-performingchildren,
especiallyinmathematics.Ifitisthecasethattop-performingchildrenaremorelikelytoachievepositions
of power, the relatively stronger performance of boys at the top of the distribution can play a role in
perpetuatingmaledominanceinthepublicandprivatespheres(StoetandGeary2015).
At the tertiary level, women currently represent the majority of students in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan,similartoothercountriesoftheformerSovietUnionandthefemaletomaleenrollmentratio
has increased in recent years. This increase has been been particularly sharp in Kyrgyzstan, as the ratio
increasedfromparityat101.4percentto161.3between2000and2013.Complementingthisobservation,
Brϋck and Esenaliev (2013) find that, compared to older cohorts, young women in Kyrgyzstan are more
likelytoobtainhigherlevelsofeducationthantheirparents.
UnliketherestoftheformerSovietUnion,inTajikistan,Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan,itisyoung
menwhorepresentthemajorityofstudentsatthetertiarylevelalthoughinTajikistanandTurkmenistan
theratiooffemaletomaleenrollmenthasmovedclosertoparityinrecentyears.InTajikistan,itincreased
from44.8to61percentbetween2000and2014(WorldBank2013).InTurkmenistanitwentupfrom47
percent during 2000-2009 to 64 percent in 2014 (ILO 2010b). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan, it fell
sharply from 83.9 to 64.7 percent between 2000 and 2011, a worrisome development. Hence, there is
22
considerablevariationinthechangesinthefemaletomaleenrollmentratio,highlightingtheimportanceof
understandingcountry-specificcontext.
InallcountriesoftheCentralAsianregion,womenareconcentratedineducationandhealthcare
subjects, and somewhat less so in economics and social sciences. For example, in Kazakhstan, about 80
percentofgraduatesineducationandhealthcarearefemale(WomenandMenpublications).InKyrgyzstan,
these percentages are 80 and 66 (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012). In
Uzbekistan, the female share of graduates in education is about 60 percent, in healthcare it is about 50
percent,andineconomicsandsocialsciencesitisonly24percent(theseshareshavebeendecreasingin
Uzbekistan).Reflectingtheoveralllowfemalesshareintertiaryeducation,inTajikistan,womenconstitute
only 39 percent of graduates in education, about 30 percent of graduates in healthcare, and only 24
percent of graduates in economics and social sciences9(State Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan on
Statistics2010).Thesegenderpatternslargelymirrorindustrialandoccupationalsegregationpatterns.The
importanceofthisfactisunderscoredbythewell-establishedfindingthatgenderdifferencesinthefields
ofstudytranslateintogenderdifferencesinlabourmarketoutcomesintheformofindustrialsegregation
andgenderwagegaps(Flabbi2011).
One of the most pressing labour market challenges in the Central Asian region lies in low youth
labourforceparticipation(Figure3)andhighyouthunemploymentrates.Inthiscontext,facilitatingschool
to work transition is seen as a key step to addressing this challenge. In Kyrgyzstan, young men are more
likelytocompletetheschooltoworktransitionwhereasyoungwomenaremorelikelytowithdrawfrom
schoolandfromthelabourforcerightaftergraduatingtostartfamiliesandtakecareoftheirhouseholds
(Elder et al. 2015). Over 40 percent of employed youth works ascontributing family workers primarily in
agriculture, with higher shares among young women than young men and much higher than the 8.9
percent among working-age men and 19.1 percent among working-age women (Figure 6). In addition,
moreyoungworkersareengagedinirregularthanin“regular”work,i.e.workforpaywithacontractofat
leastoneyearinKyrgyzstanwithsharpgenderdifferences.Infact,only14.3percentofyoungwomenas
opposedto25.4percentofyoungmenareemployedinregularwork,thelargestgapamongtheformer
SovietUnioncountries(Elderetal.2015).Moreover,proportionatelymorewomenworkfewerhours:64.6
percentofmencomparedto50.6percentofwomenworkmorethan30hours.Finally,alargerproportion
ofyoungwomenthanmenareneitheremployednorineducationortraining(NEET):7.5percentofyoung
men and 22.7 percent of young women, the second largest gap after Armenia (Elder et al. 2015). These
9
Referstotheproportionofcurrentlyenrolledstudents.
23
patterns present a picture of a highly underutilized young generation, in which labour-market-related
gendergapsareperpetuated.
Paygaps
The patterns of industrial segregation by gender and gender specialization in tertiary education have
contributed to the presence of gender wage gaps10in Central Asian countries. There is considerable
variation in the estimates depending on the earnings measure and the data source. For example, in
Tajikistan,theUNECEdatabaseindicatesthegapof50.9percentin2013(Table2).However,forthesame
year,itsvalueis46percentwhenusingthegenderearnedincomegap(WEF2015).AccordingtoJohnes
(2002),thegenderwagegapcontractedfrom55percenttoabout51percentbetween1999and2003.The
UNECE database suggests that it decreased further to 38.7 percent in 2008, before increasing to 50.9
percentby2011(UNECEdata).Wenotethatthe2003valueof51percentinJohnes(2002)issubstantially
higherthanthevalueof27.2percentreportedintheUNECEdatabase(Figure12).
AccordingtotheUNECEdataset,Kazakhstanstandsoutasacountrywithaverylowanddeclining
genderwagegapthatreached6.8percentin2012(Figure12,UNECEdata).However,anumberofother
sourcesfindthegenderwagegapinmonthlywagesisabove30percentandthatitdecreasedfrom39.3to
31.4 percent between 2003 and 2008 (van Klaveren et al. 2010; Men and Women in Kazakhstan, 2011).
Using hourly wages the gap was 47.8 percent in 2003 (Staneva et al. 2010) and 19.4 percent in 2009
(Blunch2010).
10
Wedefinethegenderpaygapasthedifferencebetweenmen’sandwomen’saverageearningsfromemploymentexpressedasa
percentageofmen’saverageearnings.
24
On the other hand, the relatively stable gap observed in Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2010 is
confirmed by all available sources (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012; UNECE
database;WECF2014).Thegapincreasedfrom32.4percentin2000to36.4percentin2010,afterwhichit
sharply dropped. More recent evidence from Kyrgyzstan from 2013 points to the further lowering of the
genderearningsgap(includingself-employedworkers)toabout19percent(Andersonetal.2015).
ThereispaucityofdataonwagegapsinUzbekistanandTurkmenistan.Databasedonasurveyof
Turkmen self-employed individuals, which includes small business employers and own account workers,
indicatesthattheincomegapamongown-accountworkersisabout36percent(UNDP2008).Ontheother
hand,amongsmallbusinessowners,women’searningsare30percentmorethanmen’searnings.
Itisnotablethatthegenderwagegapappearstobesmalleramongyoungworkersintheregion.
For example, Baumann et al. (2013) find that the gap among young wage and salaried workers in
Kyrgyzstan is 23 percent and Elder et al. (2015) indicate that it is negligible. Hence, even though labourmarket-relatedgendergapsamongyoungworkersremainsubstantial,theremightbesomeindicationsof
changinggenderdynamics.
There is also variation by firm size. For example, in Kazakhstan, the gap is narrower at small
enterprisesthanatlargeenterprises,66.3percentversus89.8percent,whichismainlyexplainedbymen’s
wages in small enterprises being substantially lower than in large and medium enterprises. In addition,
therearelargeregionaldifferencesinthemagnitudeofthegapfrom15.6percentinNorthKazakhstanto
50percentinMangistauskayaregion(MenandWomeninKazakhstan,2011).Similarly,inKyrgyzstan,the
gapvariesfrom26.6percentinBishkekto47percentinJalalAbadin2010(NationalStatisticalCommittee
oftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).
25
GenderwagegapsintheCentralAsiancountriesalsovarybyindustry.Forexample,inKazakhstan
thegaprangesfrom59percentinaccommodationandfoodservicesto91percentineducation.Moreover,
industrialsegregationhasbeenshowntocontributetothepresenceofthegenderwagegapinKazakhstan
(Van Klaveren et al. 2010). Similarly, in Turkmenistan UNDP (2008) attributes the gender gap among
entrepreneurstodifferentindustriesinwhichmenandwomenoperate.Andersonetal.(2015)findthatin
Kyrgyzstan in 2013 the higher proportion of women in wage employment contributed to widening the
genderearningsgap,likelytowomen’sstrongerpresenceinthelowerremuneratedpublicsector.
In Tajikistan, not only industrial segregation but gender differences in education and occupations
alsocontributedtothegap.Ontheotherhand,inbothKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan,thegreaterproportion
of women with tertiary education has a contracting influence on the gap. In fact, in Kazakhstan, gender
differences in endowments (e.g., industry, occupation, education, and experience) jointly reduce the
genderwagegap(Blunch2010)andoccupationalsegregationdoesnotcontributetoit(VanKlaverenetal.
2010).
Beyondtheanalysisofthegapatthemeanofthedistribution,thegenderwagegapisthehighest
attherighttailofthedistribution,potentiallyindicativeoftheglassceilingeffect(Andersonetal.2015).
Despiteconsiderablevariationsinthegenderwagegaps andtheirtrends, the common finding is
thatthemajorityofthegapinCentralAsiancountriesisunexplained,arguablyduetounaccountedfactors
anddiscriminationinthelabourmarkets(Andersonetal.2015;AndersonandPomfret2003;Sattar2012).
There are several important caveats that must be taken into account when interpreting the
evidence on the gender earnings gaps. For example, gender gaps in monthly earnings are a common
measure of gender pay gap. However, this measure can overestimate the magnitude of the gap to the
extent that women work fewer hours (Brainerd 1998). Moreover, gender pay gaps are commonly
measuredusingwageincomeofemployees.Assuch,theanalysisofgenderpaygapsprovideonlyapartial
pictureofthegenderearningsgapsincountriesinwhichwageemploymentisnotthedominantformof
employment, as is the case for most Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan).
Furthermore, agriculture plays a sizable role in employment, employing more than a quarter of the
workforce, and its role is especially large in self-employment, for which the measurement of income is
particularlyproblematic.
Unpaidworkandcare
One factor that has played a role in influencing women’s ability to engage in labour markets as wage
workersandentrepreneursisunpaidworkconstraints.Similartoothercountriesintheworld,womenin
26
CentralAsiacarrymostoftheburdenofdomesticandcareresponsibilities.Thisisclearlydemonstratedby
timeusesurveys,whichshedlightonthegenderdistributionofunpaidandpaidworktime.Womenspend
between 1.5 and 4 times as much time as men on unpaid work, with the gap being the lowest in
KazakhstanandhighestinUzbekistan(Table3).Ontheotherhand,menspendmoretimethanwomenon
paidworkandthegendergapinpaidworktimeissimilaracrosstheCentralAsianregion.Intotal,women
and men in Kazakhstan spend about the same amount of time working in paid and unpaid activities,
whereas in Kyrgyzstan, women spend between 10 and 20 percent more time working than men, higher
thantheOECDaverageoffivepercent.
27
Perhaps not surprisingly, rural men and women spend more time on unpaid work activities than
theirurbancounterparts(exceptforKazakhstan)butgendergapsinruralareasarelower(Table4;Meurs
and Slavchevska 2014). This finding does not necessarily imply a more equal sharing of household
responsibilitiesinruralareasbutrathermaybeareflectionofthegreaterdegreeofgenderspecialization
inunpaidworkactivities(Walkeretal.2014)aswomentendtospendmoretimeoncooking,cleaningand
carewhereasmenengageinhouseandpropertymaintenance.
Similartorural/urbandifferencesinotherdomesticresponsibilities,ruralwomeninKyrgyzstanand,
to some extent, in Uzbekistan spend more time on childcare. However, the opposite holds in Tajikistan
(Table4).Thismaybebecausepoorinfrastructureconstrainstheirnon-carerelatedtimeuse(hencethey
spend more time on non-care activities), but, as a result, their care time suffers (Meurs and Slavchevska
2014). We note however that urban/rural comparisons in childcare have to be made with caution,
especiallywhenconsideringprimarychildcaretime.Thisisbecausetheshareofsecondarychildcare(i.e.,
childcare that takes place while parents are primarily involved in other activities) may be higher in rural
areas if mothers are engaged in activities, such as tending to a garden plot, which better allow for
supervisorychildcare(Short,etal.2002).
Table4.Rural/UrbanBreakdownofTimeUse,DailyHours
rural
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan(2005)GWANET
Paidwork,nostudy
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
Total
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan(2010)
Paidworkandstudy
Onlypaidwork,onlyemployed(p.85)
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
Total
Kyrgyzstan(2005)
Paidwork,nostudy
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
Total
urban
Men
Women FMratio Men
Women
4.6
1.3
0.2
5.95
4.2
4.6
3.0
0.8
7.2
3.3
2.3
0.1
5.6
3.9
2.9
0.95
6.8
2.8
4.0
5.5
1.9
8.3
1.52
4.97
.89
6.5
4.1
5.8
4.3
1.1
8.4
28
0.85
2.23
4.75
1.13
0.7
0.9
1.8
2.0
1.2
0.46
2.16
8.90
1.16
5.7
6.1
1.6
0.5
7.3
FM
ratio
0.7
0.95
2.7
2.2
1.2
Tajikistan
Tajikistan(2003)
Paid work (employment, excluding
subsistenceagriculture)
Unpaidwork(houseworkonly)
Care
Total
Tajikistan(2007)
Unpaidwork(housework,includingcare)
Care
Tajikistan(GWANET,2005)
Paidwork(nostudy)
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
Total
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan(2005)GWANET
Paidwork(includingdomesticplots)
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
Total
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan(2006)
Unpaidwork,includingcare
Care
4.8
1.6
0.01
6.4
5.7
0.8
0.1
6.5
0.95
0.37
3.5
5.5
4.0
9
4.6
0.9
1.9
5.3
2.0
7.2
3.2
4.9
1.35
8.1
4.02
1.00
0.40
3.31
200
1.1
0.56
6.15
13.1
1.3
4.2
2.7
1.8
1.1
0.37
6.5
5.8
8.3
4.6
1.6
3.93
0.93
3.6
2.5
Sources: Tajikistan: Meurs and Slavchesvka (2014) for 2003, GWANET (2005) for 2005, State Committee of the
RepublicofTajikistanonStatistics(2010)for2007;Kyrgyzstan:NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic
(2012), p.120; Kazakhstan: GWANET 2005; Kyrgyzstan: GWANET for 2005 and workshop presentation for 2010;
Turkmenistan: GWANET survey for 2005; Uzbekistan: State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics
(2007); GWANET surveys were conducted in selected rural areas and are not representative of rural populations in
thesecountries.
The extent to which care and domestic responsibilities constrain women’s engagement in
employmentandentrepreneurshipinthecountriesoftheCentralAsianregionneedscarefulassessment.
TheavailableevidencefromtheCentralAsianregionrevealsthattheshareofinactivewomenwhoreport
domesticresponsibilitiesastheprimaryreasonfortheirinactivityvariesfrom11percentinKazakhstanto
60.5percentinTajikistan(Figure13).Ontheotherhand,exceptforTajikistan,thisshareisnegligiblefor
men.Evenonceemployed,womencontinuetofacedomesticandcareresponsibilities.Thisisevidencedby
theirhighernumberoflostworkingdaysduetotemporarydisability,suchastakingcareofsickchildren
(seeMaltseva2007fortheevidenceonTajikistan).
29
Some of the country-based variation is likely due to the differences in the available social
infrastructureandtheaffordabilityofmarketsubstitutes.Forexample,OECD(2012)findsthatthe“lackof
supportformotherhoodishurtingwomen’scareerprospects,despitegainsineducationandemployment”
and “[c]ountries with the smallest gender gap in unpaid work are those which have the highest female
employment rates” (OECD 2012). One way of interpreting this finding is that by alleviating women’s
responsibilities and reducing the gap in unpaid work, social infrastructure may be contributing to raising
women’semploymentrates.Indeed,thereappearstobeapositiverelationshipbetweenthefemalelabour
forceparticipationandtheavailabilityofchildcareinCentralAsia.Forexample,asteadyincreaseinpreschoolenrollmentratesforchildrenunderthreefromthelowof4.5percentduring2001-2002schoolyear
to15percentin2012-2013inKazakhstanhasbeenassociatedwithanincreaseinthefemalelabourforce
participation rate. Nevertheless, this relationship is not clear-cut. In fact, Turkmenistan stands out as a
country with some of the lowest labour force participation rates in the region but some of the highest
enrollmentratesforpre-schoolchildren(Figure14).
30
The coverage also varies within the countries. For example, in Kazakhstan, whereas the overall
coverageratefor1-6year-oldswas26percentin2010,itwasonly7.6percentinAlmatinskayaregionand
ashighas54.4percentinPavlodarskayaregion(AgencyoftheRepublicofKazakhstanonStatistics2011,
p.64).InKyrgyzstan,thecoverageof1-6year-oldsin2010was14.5percentandwashigherinurbanareas
at29.9percentandunder8percentinruralareas(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic
2012).Thelatterfindingmayappeartocontradictthelowerfemale labourforceparticipationofwomen
observedinurbanareas.However,thelackofsocialinfrastructureinruralareasislesslikelytonegatively
influencefemaleinvolvementinthelabourmarket.Thisisbecauseagriculturalself-employment,whichisa
dominant form of employment in rural areas, may allow women to combine work with supervisory
childcare,somethingthatmaynotbepossiblewiththemoredominantwageemploymentinurbanareas
(Short et al. 2002). Nevertheless, rural women in Central Asia feel that improvements in social care
infrastructureandthe“creationofkindergartenswouldcreatemoreopportunitiesforthem”(WECF2014a).
Indeed, a comprehensive review of policies aimed at raising women’s economic empowerment
finds that programs providing access to affordable and reliable childcare, childcare subsidies, and public
childcare provisioning are an effective approach for improving women’s labour market outcomes and
earnings in developing and transition economies (Buvinić et al. 2013). Evidence is also supportive of the
employment-increasing impact of publicly provided pre-school programs (Haeck et al. 2015). Such
programmeshavetheadditionalbenefitofdirectemploymentcreationandtheaccompanyingincreasein
thedemandforsupportingjobs.İlkkaracanetal.(2015)andAntonopoulosandKim(2011)investigatethe
direct and indirect effects of social care sector expansion and find that it supports decent employment
creation,generatespro-womenjoballocation,andreducespoverty.Theeffectofchildcareprovisioningis
31
positivenotonlyonpaidfemaleemployment,butalsoonfemaleentrepreneurship,asitallowswomento
expandtheirbusinessesandhenceaddressthesmallsizeconstraint,whichisoneofthemainreasonsfor
the weaker performance of female-owned businesses (Johnson 2005, cited in Kabeer 2012). Therefore,
policies supporting the development of the childcare support network can play a considerable role in
increasingfemalewageemploymentandentrepreneurship.
Migration
A crucial coping strategy for dealing with the lack of income-earning opportunities, migration has
fundamentally shifted the labour market landscape of Central Asia countries and affected its gender
balance.Initially,thecollapseoftheSovietUnionwasassociatedwiththemovementofethnicRussians
out of Central Asia and forced migration triggered by military conflicts. But over the last two decades,
labourmigrationhasbecomeitsdominantform,withtheRussianFederationthemainrecipientcountry,
followed by Kazakhstan. These flows can be explained by growing populations combined with limited
employmentopportunitiesinKyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan,andcontractingpopulationstogether
with labour shortages in some sectors of the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. Within countries,
regionswithhigherpovertytendtohavehighermigrationrates,underscoringthepushnatureofmigration.
NetmigrationfromKazakhstanisrelativelysmallbecauseoflargemigrantin-flowsfromotherCentralAsia
countries. The net migration rate in 2009 was 3.3 per 1,000 of population (55,000 out-migrating) (van
Klaveren,etal.2010).Ontheotherhand,inUzbekistan,bysomeestimates,7-8percentofthelabourforce
are migrants working abroad. In Kyrgyzstan, 14 percent of households in 2007 had at least one migrant
householdmember,primarilyinthesouthernpartofthecountry.InTajikistan,37percentofhouseholds
hadatleastonemigrantmember,with98percentofmigrantsworkingintheRussianFederation(Golunov,
2008). As a result, remittance flows have become a lifeline sustaining domestic economies, a fact that
becamealltoovisibleduringthe2008financialcrisis,duringwhichremittanceflowsdwindled,worsening
therecessioninthesecountries.Thecurrentvolumeofremittancesremainsconsiderable,at49percentof
GDPinTajikistan,29percentinKyrgyzstan,and13percentinTajikistan(Anichkova2012).11
Until recently, labour migration from Central Asia has been primarily viewed as a male
phenomenon,duetothenatureofdemandinhostcountriesandthedominant“malebreadwinner”family
modelinCentralAsia.Forexample,about40percentofmigrantworkersinRussiawereemployedinthe
male-dominatedconstructionin2007,followedby19percentintrade,and14percentinagricultureand
foodprocessing(FederalMigrationServiceoftheRussianFederation).Asaresult,bysomeestimates,95.3
11
DataforTurkmenistanisunavailable.
32
percentofmigrantsfromTajikistantoRussiaaremale(Golunov,2008;Abdulloevetal.2014).AmongTajik
migrantstoRussiaandKazakhstan,bysomeestimates,88percentaremen,oftenseasonalworkersleaving
inthespringandreturninginthewinter,andthemajorityofKyrgyzmigrantsaremen(WECF2014).
However, official estimates for 2010 indicate that 49.6 of migrants were women (National
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012, p.56). The 2008 crisis contributed to the rise in the
proportionoffemalemigrants.Inparticular,asremittanceflowstoTajikistanfellby30percent,theshare
of women among Tajik migrants almost doubled from 6.61 percent in 2007 to 13.01 percent in 2009
(Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010). This has been in part attributed to the increased household need to
diversifyincomesources.
In addition, recent trends show the increased feminization of migrant flows due to the rising
demandforservice-sectorjobsandtherecession-induceddropinconstructionemployment.Inparticular,
thedemandfordomesticandcareworkersincreasedwithwomenbeingtheiroverwhelmingmajority–90
percent in Russia and 74 percent in Kazakhstan (Karachurina et al. 2014), including both internal and
foreign migrants. A large proportion of migrant domestic workers are undocumented. For example, the
shareofmigrantdomesticworkerswithvalidmigrationcardswas61percentinRussiaandonly42percent
inKazakhstan.
In part for this reason, female shares in total stock of migrants are believed to be substantially
underestimated.Forexample,officialestimatessuggestthatwomencomprise14percentofmigrantflows
inRussia(FederalMigrationServiceoftheRussianFederation),butothersourcesputthefigurecloserto
30 percent (Tyuryukanova 2011). Women are more likely to be employed informally without official
contractsnotonlyindomesticworkbutinalloccupations.EvidencesuggeststhatwhereasmigrantTajik
womeninRussiaaremorelikelytoregisterthanmen(83.3percentversus74.7percent),theyarelesslikely
to engage in employment with a written contract (73.3 percent of females do not have a contract,
compared to 25.6 percent of men) (ILO 2010a). Women are also more likely to be victims of human
trafficking,remaininglargelyinvisibleinofficialstatistics.Therefore,differentanalyticaltoolsareneededto
bettercapturetheirsituation(UNIFEM2009).
Migrants from Central Asia tend to be engaged in unskilled occupations. This can be in part
explainedbythenatureoflabourdemandintherecipientcountriesand,increasinglyso,bythelowerskills
compositionofmigrants.Inrecentyears,theproportionofmigrantswithtertiaryeducationdroppedfrom
21 percent in 2002 to only 12 percent in 2011 (EDB and UNDP 2015) Indeed, studies demonstrate that
migrationisthemorelikelyoutcomeforlow-skilledworkersinTajikistanwhereasprofessionalworkersare
more likely to engage in informal activities (Abdulloev et al. 2012). However, the characteristics of the
33
labourdemandinrecipientcountriesplayacrucialrole.Forexample,eventhoughmanyfemalemigrants
have higher or vocational education, they are employed in low-skilled occupations in domestic work
(UNIFEM, 2009). Indeed, domestic workers are among the most educated labour migrants in Russia and
Kyrgyzstan(Karachurinaetal.2014).Atthesametime,thereappeartobeparticularnichesinhigh-skilled
occupationsthatmigrantshavesuccessfullyentered.Forexample,labourmigrantsfromKazakhstantend
to be high-skilled workers, many of whom work in the manufacturing sector in Siberia (Golunov, 2008).
Kyrgyz doctors have increasingly migrated to Russia in search of better earnings opportunities
(Mambetalieva,2007).
Althoughmigrationhasbeenacopingresponsetopoorlabourmarketenvironment,ithasinturn
profoundly affected labour markets in Central Asian countries and their gender balance. For example,
migrantremittancesinTajikistanhavebeenshowmtoincreasetheprobabilityofmaleself-employment,
withoutanyimpactonfemaleemployment.Thispotentiallyimpliesthatmenarebetterabletocapitalize
on remittances than women (Piracha et al. 2013). At the same time, however, male labour force
participation rates and work hours in Tajikistan decrease due to migration more so than their female
counterparts(Abdulloevetal.2014;JustinoandShemyakina2012).
Migrationhasalsohadimplicationsforhouseholddynamics.Forexample,womenhavepickedupa
greater share of the household responsibilities previously carried out by the migrant household member
(asevidencefromMoldovasuggests,Görlichetal.2007).Duetomigration,womeninCentralAsiatakeon
tasks such as “fieldworks, animal care, children upbringing, and household chores” (WECF 2014a) and
women in households abandoned by migrants are more involved in unpaid work activities than other
women(OSCE2012).
The impact of migration on individual and household well-being has been multi-faceted. On the
one hand, it has played a substantial role in reducing poverty. For example, migrant remittances have
reducedpovertyratesintheKyrgyzRepublicby6-7percentagepoints(UNDP2015)andplayedapositive
roleinchildgrowthinTajikistanbyimprovingthenutritionalintakeofhouseholds(AzzariandZezza2011).
InTajikistanwomeninhouseholdswithmigrantshaveachievedhigherlevelsofeducation(Abdulloevetal.
2014).
However,migrationhasalsohaddisruptiveeffectsonfamilylife,withasymmetricgenderimpact
onmigrantsandfamilymemberswhostaybehind.Between230,000and288,000householdsinTajikistan
can be considered economically abandoned and live at or below the poverty line, and more than 70
percentofthemconsistofmarriedwomenwithchildren(OSCE2012).Upto30percentofmarriedmigrant
men from Tajikistan do not return home (IOM 2009). The majority of abandoned women report being
34
worse off as a result of their spouses’ migration and are twice as financially vulnerable as other women
(OSCE 2012). Even in households that economically benefit from migration, children’s psychological wellbeinghasbeenaffectedbytheabsenceofaparent(UNICEF2011).
This evidence highlights the complexity in the way in which migration has influenced the gender
dynamicsoflabormarketsandhouseholdwell-beinginCentralAsiancountries.
SocialInstitutions,LegislativeFrameworkandPolicy-Making
Underlyingthegenderinequalitiesinlabourmarketsaresocialnormsandcustoms.Normsonfemalerole
in the household and male role as breadwinners affect women and men’s labour market participation
choices, the types of jobs they seek, and their ability to establish and run firms. For example, more than
halfofmenandmorethanathirdofwomeninCentralAsiancountriesbelievethatwhenjobsarescarce,
menshouldhavemorerighttoajobthanwomen(Figure15).Closetoathirdormoreofmenandwomen
believethatifawomanearnsmorethanherhusbandthismaycausemaritalstrife;closetohalformoreof
men and women believe that men make better business executives. Notably, women tend to hold less
conservativeviewsthanmen.TheseproportionsaresubstantiallyhigherinUzbekistanthaninKazakhstan
andKyrgyzstan,indicativeofitsmoretraditionalnorms.Suchattitudestowardsgenderrolesinsocietyare
bound to influence men and women’s labour market choices as workers and entrepreneurs, potentially
reinforcinggenderinequalitiesdemonstratedinthisanalysis.
35
Addressing these inequalities will require strong political will and greater female involvement in
publiclife.Asalreadyindicated,womenhavebeenactiveparticipantsinthenon-governmentalsectorof
CentralAsiansocieties,takingoncausessuchasmaternalhealthcare,businesstraining,andclimatechange
(Ishkanian, 2003). But implementing these changes will necessitate greater female participation in the
political process, which women have eschewed in part due to social norms, as politics are viewed to be
“men’s work” and corrupt (Ishkanian, 2003). Most people also believe that men make better political
leadersthanwomen–forexample,about70percentofmenand58percentofwomenholdthisviewin
KazakhstanandKyrgyzstan.InUzbekistan,consistentwithotherobservedpatterns,theseproportionsare
evenhigher,82percentofmenand72percentofwomensubscribingtothisview(Figure16).
Asaresult,althoughnolegalrestrictionsexist,during2000-2014theproportionofseatsheldby
women in parliaments was below the average for the Europe and Central Asia region (Figure 17).
Nevertheless,thisfigureincreasedand,by2014itwasatorabovetheECAaverageintwooutofthefive
countries. At the ministerial level, the proportion of women is considerably below the ECA average.
However, similar to female parliamentarians, the proportion of female ministers has increased in all
countriesofCentralAsia(Figure18).Thesearepositivedevelopmentalthoughitremainstobeseenhow
sustainabletheywillbe.
36
Instatestructures,thetypesofpositionsthatmenandwomenholdvary.Forexample,in2011,in
Kyrgyzstan,thefemaleshareofcivilservantsinthestatesectorwasarespectable39.8percent.But40.6
percent of these women were in administrative positions and only 25.5 percent in political and special
positions(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).Atthemunicipallevel,thefemale
shareis33.1percent–withonly4.2percentofwomeninpoliticalmunicipalpositionsand34.8percentin
administrative municipal positions. Out of 48 ministries and agencies, 26 had no women in political and
specialpositions(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012,p.105).InTajikistan,in2008,
out of 23 ministries and agencies, the female share in supervisory/managerial positions was less than 10
percentin11ofthemandfivehadnowomenatall.
37
FurtherreinforcinggenderinequalitiesinCentralAsiaisgender-relateddiscriminatorylegislationin
the labour market, which itself can be shaped by perceptions about gender roles and in some cases is a
remnantoftheSovietpast(Tables5and6).UzbekistanistheonlyCentralAsiancountry,whichhasthelaw
that mandates equal remuneration for work of equal value and nondiscrimination based on gender in
hiring (Table 5). Furthermore, all countries of the region contain legislation that place restrictions on the
typeofjobsinwhichwomenworkinallCentralAsiancountriesaswomencannotdothesamejobsasmen
ordothesamejob-relatedtasksasmen.TheserestrictionsarelinkedtotheSoviet-eralabourregulations
preventingwomenfromengagingin“unsuitable”andhazardousoccupations.WorldBank(2016)findsthat
theyhavecontributedtoloweringwomen’searningspotentialintheregionand,asaresult,tothegender
wagegapinearnings.
Finally,incorporatingamorenuancedandevidence-basedunderstandingofgenderdynamicsinto
policy-making can be crucial in more effectively reducing gender inequalities. For example, householdbased analyses of poverty often overlook gender asymmetries in resource allocation within households.
38
UsingthecaseofTajikistan,FalkinghamandBaschieri(2009)demonstratethat,iftraditionsallowmento
retainevenaportionoftheirwageincome,gendergapsinpovertyrateswiden:a20percentretentionof
men’swageincomeresultsinwomenexperiencingapovertyrate10percentagepointshigherthanthatof
men.Hence,poverty-reductionstrategieswouldneedtobroadentheirtargetpopulationtoincreasetheir
effectiveness.Moreover,changinggenderdynamicswillrequireacomprehensiveapproachthataccounts
forhouseholddynamicsindecision-making.Forexample,MeursandGiddings(2012)highlightthatisfairly
common in Central Asia for the eldest woman in the household to be influential in choosing healthcare
servicesthatexpectantmothersreceive.Therefore,policiesaimedatimprovingmaternalhealthoutcomes
musttargetnotonlypregnantwomenbuttheirhouseholdsaswell.
Socialprotectionsystems
Genderinequalitiesinlabourmarketsareintegrallyconnectedwithgenderdifferencesinaccesstosocial
protectionsystems.LargeinformalsharesoftheeconomiesofCentralAsiacoupledwithstrongmigration
outflowshaveputconsiderablestrainoncontributorypensionschemesandhaveledtolargepartsofthe
populationnotbeingcoveredbysocialprotectionschemes.Infact,thecoverageofsocialassistanceand
socialinsuranceprogrammesinCentralAsiahasbeenlimitedcomparedtoothercountriesoftheformer
Soviet Union. It is the highest in Kazakhstan, with 31 percent of population covered by social assistance
programmes and 28 percent covered by social insurance programmes (e.g. pensions). However, in
Kyrgyzstan,theseproportionsareonly8.5percentand30.5percent,andinTajikistan,theyare10percent
and34percent,respectively.Inadditiontothelargesizeoftheinformalsector,thelowcoverageisalso
duetoagriculturalworkersindehkansbeingoutsideofthesocialprotectionsystem(Mikkonen-Jeanneret
et al. 2016). Furthermore, the poverty and inequality-reducing impact of social assistance and social
insurance programmes in Kazakhstan and especially in Tajikistan has been small. The small impact in
Tajikistan has been attributed to both inadequate resources and poor targeting (World Bank 2014b). On
theotherhand,Kyrgyzstanachievedamodest41percentreductioninthepovertyheadcountratiofrom
socialinsuranceschemes(WorldBankAspiredatabase).
Migration remittances have buffered the poor state of social protection infrastructure, as have
traditional informal safety nets, such as mahalla. However, these arrangements must not serve as a
substitute for a formal social protection system whose mandate is to ensure effective and targeted
coverage.
WomenandmeninCentralAsiafacedifferentconstraintsinaccessingandutilizingresourcesand
in participating in labour markets. In particular, their pensions are affected by their lower labour force
39
participationrates,involvementinlow-remuneratedserviceindustries,andhighratesofself-employment
inagricultureascontributingfamilyworkers.Furthermore,limitedchildcareprovisioning inCentralAsian
countries may be another contributing factor, preventing women from participating in formal wage
employment and further limiting women’s access to social protection (FAO 2015). Therefore, the design
andimplementationofsocialprotectionprogrammesshouldacknowledgetheseconstraints.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that gender inequalities in labour markets remain pervasive and, in some
cases, have worsened in Central Asian economies. Proportionately fewer women participate in labour
marketsandtheyaremorelikelytoengageinprecariousformsofemployment.Incountrieswithahigh
share of agricultural employment, women are over-represented as contributing family workers. They are
also substantially less likely to be entrepreneurs and to hold land titles. They face greater barriers in
accessingcreditandhaveweakernetworks.MigrationinCentralAsiahasbeenamalephenomenon,but
recentevidencepointstowardsitsincreasedfeminization.
Reducingthesegenderinequalitiesmustbecomeapriorityforallcountriesintheregioniftheyare
toachieveinclusivegrowth,humandevelopmentandprogresstowardstheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.
Theachievementofthesegoalswillrequireacomprehensiveevidence-basedstrategythatexpandshuman
choicesandcapabilitiesbycomplementingsupply-sideinterventionswithdemand-sidemeasuresaimedat
creating equitable and gainful employment opportunities. Indeed, active measures to enhance women’s
economicempowermentshouldbeofcentralconcerntothepolicydialogueaimedatinclusivegrowthand
povertyandinequalityreduction(Çagatay1998).Suchastrategyshouldincludethefollowingelements:
1. Improve the productivity and working conditions of agriculture and rural economy: a large
proportion of the workforce in Central Asia is employed in agriculture and in rural areas,
working long and unpredictable hours, in unsafe conditions of typically low wages and
productivity.Womeninruralareasareproportionatelymorelikelytobe[unpaid]contributing
family workers. They are also less likely to hold land titles and have limited decision-making
power. Improving the agricultural productivity, wages and working conditions, and women’s
accesstolandwillbeakeytochangingthegendergapsinemploymentcompositioninrural
areas(SDG2).
2. Address gender gaps in education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels and high
specializationbysubjectsintertiaryeducation:Investmentsingirls’educationandnurturinga
40
gender-balancedsystemoftertiaryeducationwillbevitalforreducinggender-basedindustrial
andoccupationalsegregation(SDG4;SDG8).
3. Improve women’s access and skills for entrepreneurship: all countries of Central Asia will
benefit from efforts that promote women’s access to networking opportunities; facilitate
women’saccesstocreditthroughinnovativefinancingandtomarketinformationandtraining
innewanddigitaltechnologies;andimprovewomen’sskillsandcapacitiestostartanddevelop
theirbusinesses(SDG8).
4. Remove legal and regulatory barriers to women’s economic empowerment: although
substantialprogresshasbeenmade,pervasivegender-basedoccupationalrestrictionsremain,
preventingwomenfromengaginginemploymentandentrepreneurship(SDG10).
5. Implement policies to address women’s care and domestic responsibilities to promote
decent employment opportunities, increase productivity and earnings: reducing women’s
burden of unpaid care to promote their participation in the labour market and in
entrepreneurshiphastobeanintegralpartofastrategytoreducegenderinequality(SDGs5,
8).
6. Placelabourmigrationandremittances,andtheirgenderedimplicationsatthecenterofthe
nationalpolicymakingagenda(SDGs5,8,10,and17).
7. Rebuild social protection systems able to play a transformative role in accompanying
women’sparticipationtotheformaleconomy.
8. Support efforts to ensure that an equitable proportion of women are elected and/or
appointed to government leadership positions throughout the region.Ensuringthatwomen
participate proportionately in the political process and in leadership positions is essential to
addressing gender disparities in the region. In addition, efforts should be made to invite the
participation of women in elected and/or appointed positions who reflect the demographic
compositionoftheconstituenciestheyserve.
9. Strengthen national capacities to generate and use sex- and age-disaggregated data for
gender analysis: this is necessary to design gender-responsive macro-economic and social
policy and programmes. It is particularly important to address the gaps on data on time use.
National statistical agencies must improve data collection to allow full mainstreaming of
genderinmacroeconomicpoliciesandmakethedataaccessible(SDGs5,17).
41
10. Includeastrongimpactevaluationelementinproposedpolicies:impactevaluationelements
(environmental, social and gender) need to be incorporated into policy design. Impact
evaluationsarekeytoprovidingnewevidence-basedpolicyframeworksforgenderequality.
11. Addressandcombatgenderstereotypes:fosteringtrustinwomen’scapabilitiesandbuilding
their confidence is key to gender-transformative social change. It is important to support
culturalcampaignsagainstsexiststereotypesofwomenaswellasmentogeneratebehavioural
patternsthattranscendtraditionalgenderrolesandresultinamoreequitabledistributionof
responsibilities and leadership between the sexes in the workplace, at home and in the
community. Promoting women in visible positions of seniority and decision-making in public
andprivatespheres,aswellasencouragingmenintraditionallyfemaleprofessions,arekeyto
changingsocialnormsandeliminatinggenderbiasesinsocial,economicandpoliticalspheres.
42
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Appendix
TableA1.GenderInequalityIndexanditscomponents,2014
Gender Inequality
Index
Maternal
mortality
ratio
Adolescent
birthrate
Share
of
seats
in
parliament
Population with at
least some secondary
education
(%ages25andolder)
Labour force participation
rate
(%ages15andolder)
(births per
1,000
women ages
15–19)
(% held by
women)
Female
Male
Female
Male
Value
Rank
(deaths
per100,000
livebirths)
Country
2014
2014
2013
2010/2015
2014
2005–
2014
2005–
2014
2013
2013
Kazakhstan
0.267
52
26
29.9
20.1
95.3
98.8
67.7
77.9
Uzbekistan
..
..
36
38.8
16.4
..
..
48.1
75.6
Kyrgyzstan
0.353
67
75
29.3
23.3
94.5
96.8
56.0
79.5
Tajikistan
0.357
69
44
42.8
15.2
95.1
91.2
58.9
77.1
Turkmenistan
..
..
61
18.0
25.8
..
..
46.9
76.9
World
0.449
—
210
47.4
21.8
54.5
65.4
50.3
76.7
Source:UNDP(2015)
TableA2.GenderDevelopmentIndex(GDI)anditscomponents,2014.
Gender
Development
Index
Human
Development
Index(HDI)
Life expectancy at
birth(years)
Expected years of
schooling(years)
Mean
years
schooling(years)
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
of
Estimated
gross
national income per
capita(2011PPP$)
Kazakhstan
1.0015
0.7865
0.7853
74.1
64.6
15.4029
14.6539
11.3300
11.5400
15408.17
26746.30
Kyrgyzstan
0.9614
0.6379
0.6635
74.6
66.6
12.6894
12.3371
10.4802
10.5500
2122.02
3991.84
Uzbekistan
0.9451
0.6404
0.6777
71.8
65
11.2728
11.7433
9.5000
9.9000
3810.68
7341.85
Tajikistan
0.9260
0.6000
0.6479
73.2
66.2
10.4981
11.9683
9.5650
11.1904
2014.24
3016.66
Turkmenistan
..
..
..
69.9
61.5
10.5543
11.0472
..
..
8725.06
17551.53
World
0.9236
0.6697
0.7250
73.66637
69.45568
12.1858
12.3960
6.2084
7.8544
10296.19
18372.57
Source:UNDP(2015)
49