Research Monograph
Siting and Community Response to Locally Unwanted
Land Uses: A Literature Review
Pong-Wai Lai, Lai-Yan Woo,
Kin-Che Lam, Wai-Ying Lee, Tung Fung
April 2007
ISBN 978-988-97957-3-3
Centre for Environmental Policy and Resource Management
Department of Geography and Resource Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Research Monograph
Siting and Community Response to Locally Unwanted
Land Uses: A Literature Review
Pong-Wai Lai, Lai-Yan Woo,
Kin-Che Lam, Wai-Ying Lee, Tung Fung
April 2007
ISBN 978-988-97957-3-3
Centre for Environmental Policy and Resource Management
Department of Geography and Resource Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Executive Summary
1
Introduction
In the course of urban and economic development, modern societies require a full array of
public facilities and land uses to provide the various services and benefits needed to support
their development. These facilities and land uses have to be planned and sited, and
unavoidably will have certain impacts on some sectors of the communities. Throughout
recent decades, with the growing public awareness of environmental and health issues, sitings
of so-called “Locally Unwanted Land Uses” (LULUs), such as landfills, incinerators,
chemical waste disposal and treatment facilities and nuclear power plants, have become
increasingly difficult and have emerged as major public issues in many nations. In Hong
Kong, with limited space, rapid urbanization and a population approaching 7 million, siting
of LULUs also poses serious problems. These siting cases have provoked considerable public
debate, concern and even opposition and protest, resulting in conflicts, project delay,
cancellation or increase of project costs.
In Hong Kong, there has not been any systematic attempt to analyze the siting problems of
LULUs or to develop a conceptual framework for the resolution of such conflicts. A
Research Grant Council (RGC) funded policy research, “Siting Locally Unwanted Land Uses:
In Your Backyard or in Mine?” (Project No. 4008-PPR20051), is being undertaken by the
Centre for Environmental Policy and Resource Management of The Chinese University of
Hong Kong to develop a conceptual framework as an aid to resolve or least minimize the
conflicts and public concerns arising from the siting of LULUs.
As the first phase of this research, a comprehensive literature review on the siting of LULUs
has been conducted, the results of which are presented in this monograph. The monograph
examines the fundamental concepts of LULUs and the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”)
phenomenon, explores the reasons underlying public responses through overseas cases and
briefly reviews the siting problem in Hong Kong. It is believed that both successful and notso-successful experiences overseas will provide useful insights for siting LULUs in dense and
compact cities such as Hong Kong. It is hoped that these findings will provide a road map,
preliminary and rough though it may be, for developing policy and strategies which can
enhance social cohesion, reduce environmental risks and minimize social conflicts.
2
Understanding LULUs
LULUs serve to fulfill certain functions for society as a whole, providing benefits for local,
regional or national communities. LULUs may be needed regionally or nationally, but are
objectionable to people nearby.
LULUs generally impose (or are perceived to impose) negative externalities on the local
neighbourhood and pose (or are perceived to pose) threats to their surroundings in the form of
negative environmental, health and safety, social and economic impacts.
Appreciation and understanding of these impacts is pre-requisite to a successful strategy for
siting of LULUs. Detailed analysis of impacts of individual LULUs may require further
elaboration on the criteria to be considered, assessment and the associated risks.
iii
On one hand, impact assessments should be carried objectively based on sound scientific and
technical data and methods. On the other hand, stakeholders’ perceptions of such impacts and
risks are more subjective and are influenced by a variety of social, political and economic
factors. Both the objective data and the subjective perceptions should be carefully studied in
the siting of LULUs.
Often, LULUs satisfy strong non-local public need or private demand, and offer (or appear to
offer) large regional or national benefits, but their environmental, health and safety, social and
economic costs fall mainly on their immediate locality or neighbourhood. In other words, the
benefits of such facilities are usually broadly distributed, but most of the costs tend to be
localized. The spatial asymmetry of costs and benefits is often inequitable. This is often the
key public problem posed by LULUs. The apparent inequity therefore must be addressed in
all successful siting strategies for LULUs.
Faced with the daunting task of providing the land uses or facilities needed by society,
planners or proponents such as government administrations or agents and private sector
entities typically take the approach of reducing negative impacts in the hope of enhancing the
chance of acceptance by the community concerned. They seek to distribute and reduce the
harm of LULUs through various technical and planning strategies.
An emerging approach to resolving conflicts in the siting of LULUs focuses on understanding
the perceptions of the objectors and the proponents, and attempting to create a common
understanding by merging the two separate horizons.
A multi-stakeholder process based on trust, genuine public participation and equity facilitates
the understanding of others’ perspectives, the merging of horizons and the search for common
ground towards an acceptable solution.
3
A Conceptual Framework for Conflict Resolution of LULUs Siting
A conceptual framework for LULU planning, siting and conflict resolution has been proposed
(see Figure 1), comprising the key components of:
z
z
z
z
z
Needs and benefits, scale and distribution
Impact types, scale and distribution
Risk perception, assessment, management and communication
Multi-stakeholder process based on trust, participation and equity for conflict
resolution
Acceptable solutions based on merging of the separate perspectives and horizons
Proper understanding of the nature of a LULU, in terms of its needs, benefits, impacts and
risks, is essential. The interactions among actors are embedded in a multi-stakeholder process
that is multi-dimensional and multi-directional. The dynamics of this process is influenced
and affected by the understanding of the nature of the LULU on one hand, and the
community response on the other hand. Community response may be opposing or welcoming.
The multi-stakeholder process helps to merge the two horizons and extremes, towards finding
a solution acceptable to all parties concerned for the good of society as a whole.
Sitting external to the inner core of the framework are the political, socio-economic,
iv
geographical and environmental settings which impose constraints on the whole conflict
resolution process. On the other hand, opportunities can be explored within these settings to
help shape the process and find acceptable solutions.
Review of extensive overseas literature and case studies shows that the process depicted in
the conceptual framework is characterized by the political, institutional, social, economic,
geographical and environmental setting of the localities. Some recent LULU siting cases in
Hong Kong have also been briefly reviewed. While each of these cases warrants more
detailed study, it is evident that better understanding and communication of the needs,
benefits, impacts and risks, as well as the social, economic and political profiles of the
communities concerned, is necessary to address the conflicts arising from siting of LULUs.
Only by truly understanding the public concerns and objections will we be able to solve the
siting problem satisfactorily and in the public interest.
Hong Kong is and has always been a dynamic city. It faces changes in its economic, social
and political arenas. The environmental challenges that Hong Kong faces are significant,
although not insurmountable. “Work together harmoniously for another new miracle” is both
a political slogan and a dream, whether illusive or realistic. This dream is challenged every
time a LULU is proposed, and the risk of a shattered dream is real. It is hoped that this
monograph may provide all interested parties with a better understanding of LULUs, and that
the conceptual framework proposed may serve as a diagnostic tool and guiding framework
towards the fulfillment of this dream and a sustainable future for Hong Kong.
v
Figure 1: Siting and Community Responses to Locally Unwanted Land Uses: The Conceptual Framework
LULUs
Political/Institutional Setting
Stakeholders
Nature of LULU
Needs and
Benefits
Territorial
Public &
Interest
Groups
Government
Community
Response
Risks
Oppose
Local
Regional
Perception
Communication
Planning, Siting,
Conflict Resolution
Assessment
Management
Acceptable
Solution
Impacts
Trust
Environmental
Health and Safety
Economic
Public
Participation
Equity
Social
Multi-Stakeholder Process
Geographic Setting
vi
Welcome
Environmental Setting
Socio-Economic Setting
Facility
provider
Preface
This monograph is one of the deliverables of the policy research project “Siting Locally
Unwanted Land Uses: In Your Backyard or in Mine?” (Project No. 4008-PPR20051),
supported by the Research Grant Council (RGC) of Hong Kong.
The monograph examines the complexities of siting locally unwanted land uses (LULUs),
starting with an elucidation of the fundamental concepts of LULU and the NIMBY
phenomenon, explores the reasons underlying public objections to LULUs, and briefly
reviews the siting problem in Hong Kong. It is believed that overseas experience, good or bad,
will provide useful insights in siting problems in dense and compact cities such as Hong
Kong.
By analyzing the complexities arising from the siting of LULUs, it is hoped that the findings
will point to strategies which can enhance social cohesion, reduce environmental risks and
minimize social conflicts.
The research team wishes to thank Ms. Mary Felley for her invaluable assistance and
proofreading our monograph. The technical support rendered by Mr. Gary Lui and Ms.
Teresa Chung in the preparation of this monograph is also grateful acknowledged.
vii
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. iii
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... iii
2 Understanding LULUs..................................................................................................... iii
3 A Conceptual Framework for Conflict Resolution of LULUs Siting ...............................iv
Preface......................................................................................................................................vii
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................ix
List of Tables.............................................................................................................................xi
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................................xii
List of Appendix .................................................................................................................... xiii
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................1
2 Understanding LULU ........................................................................................................2
2.1
What is LULU?..........................................................................................................2
2.2
Needs and Benefits ....................................................................................................2
2.3
Impacts (Externalities) ...............................................................................................4
2.3.1
Introduction........................................................................................................4
2.3.2
Environmental Impacts ......................................................................................4
2.3.3
Health and Safety Impacts .................................................................................4
2.3.4
Social Impacts....................................................................................................5
2.3.5
Economic Impacts..............................................................................................5
2.3.6
Impact Assessment.............................................................................................5
2.4
Inequity between Benefits and Costs (Impacts)....................................................... 11
2.5
LULU Siting Strategies............................................................................................ 11
2.5.1
Land Use Strategies ......................................................................................... 11
2.6
A New Perspective: Merging of the Horizons .........................................................12
2.7
Summary ..................................................................................................................14
3 Conflict Resolution ..........................................................................................................17
3.1
Public Opposition ....................................................................................................17
3.2
Core Factors Affecting Community Concern and Attitudes Towards LULUs ........17
3.2.1
Justification of Need in Community Perspective.............................................17
3.2.2
Impact Management.........................................................................................18
3.2.3
Risk Perception and Communication...............................................................19
3.2.4
Trust .................................................................................................................25
3.2.5
Equity...............................................................................................................26
3.2.6
Public Participation..........................................................................................27
4 Experiences of Siting of LULUs in Overseas Countries .................................................31
4.1
Trends of Facility Siting ..........................................................................................31
4.2
Siting Approaches and Processes.............................................................................32
4.2.1
A Brief Review of Siting Approaches/ Strategies............................................32
4.2.2
A Typology of Siting Processes .......................................................................38
4.3
Policy Instruments ...................................................................................................39
4.3.1
Mitigation Policies ...........................................................................................39
4.3.2
Compensation Policies.....................................................................................40
4.4
LULU cases in Singapore, Canada, Japan and Taiwan............................................41
5 Siting Problems in Hong Kong ........................................................................................50
5.1
Introduction..............................................................................................................50
5.1.1
Hong Kong SAR: A Growing City Within a Confined Space .........................50
5.1.2
LULUs: Increasing Needs and Higher Impacts (Actual or Perceived)............50
5.1.3
Responding to Changing Social and Political Profiles ....................................51
Page ix
5.2
Cases of Siting of LULUs in Hong Kong................................................................51
6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................55
References................................................................................................................................57
x
List of Tables
Table 1: Impacts of LULUs and their Inherent Characteristics .................................................6
Table 2: Examples of Intensively Studied LULUs in the Literature........................................10
Table 3: Advantages of Citizen Participation in Government Decision Making.....................28
Table 4: Disadvantages of Citizen Participation in Government Decision Making ................30
Table 5: The Facility Siting Credo...........................................................................................32
Table 6: Major Siting Approaches and Subsets .......................................................................35
Table 7: Proponents’ and opponents’ arguments for and against three siting approaches .......37
Table 8: Examples of LULUs Siting in Other Countries .........................................................42
Table 9: Recent Examples of LULUs Siting in Hong Kong....................................................53
xi
List of Figures
Figure 1: Siting and Community Responses to Locally Unwanted Land Uses: The Conceptual
Framework ...............................................................................................................................16
Figure 2: Dread Risk (Factor 1) and Unknown Risk (Factor 2) ..............................................20
Figure 3: Simplified Representation of the Social Amplification of Risks .............................22
Figure 4: Risk Communication Model ....................................................................................24
Figure 5: Site Selection Approaches ........................................................................................34
Figure 6: The Siting Policy Triangle........................................................................................38
Figure 7: A Typology of Siting Processes................................................................................39
xii
List of Appendix
Appendix 1: Review of Siting Experiences in Singapore, Canada, Japan and Taiwan .......A1-1
Appendix 2: Summary of Recent LULU Cases in Hong Kong...........................................A2-1
xiii
1
Introduction
In the course of urban and economic development, modern societies require a full array of
public facilities and land uses to provide the various services and benefits needed to support
their development. These facilities and land uses have to be planned and sited, and
unavoidably will have certain impacts on some sectors of the community. Throughout recent
decades, with the growing public awareness of environmental and health issues, sitings of socalled “Locally Unwanted Land Uses” (LULUs), such as landfills, incinerators, chemical
waste disposal and treatment facilities and nuclear power plants, have become increasingly
difficult and have emerged as major public issues in many nations. In Hong Kong, with
limited space, rapid urbanization and a population approaching 7 million, siting of LULUs
also poses serious problems. Examples of some recent controversial sitings include proposals
for :
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Upgrading of the chemical waste treatment centre in Tsing Yi,
Columbarium and waste incinerator in Tuen Mun,
Landfill extension,
Slaughterhouse in Sheung Shui,
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Soko Islands,
Super prison plan in Hei Ling Chau,
AIDS treatment facilities in Kowloon Bay.
These siting cases have provoked considerable public debate, concern and even opposition
and protest, resulting in conflicts, project delay, cancellation or increase of project costs.
In Hong Kong, there has not been any systematic attempt to analyze the siting problems of
LULUs or to develop a conceptual framework for the resolution of such conflicts. A
Research Grant Council (RGC) funded policy research, “Siting Locally Unwanted Land Uses:
In Your Backyard or in Mine?” (Project No. 4008-PPR20051), is being undertaken by the
Centre for Environmental Policy and Resource Management of The Chinese University of
Hong Kong to develop a conceptual framework as an aid to resolve, or least minimize the
conflicts and public concerns arising from the siting of LULUs.
As the first phase of this research, a comprehensive literature review on the siting of LULUs
has been conducted, the results of which are presented in this monograph. The monograph
examines the fundamental concepts of LULUs and the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”)
phenomenon, explores the reasons underlying public responses through overseas cases, and
briefly reviews the siting problem in Hong Kong. It is believed that both successful and notso-successful experience overseas will provide useful insights for siting LULUs in dense and
compact cities such as Hong Kong. It is hoped that these findings will provide a road map,
preliminary and rough though it may be, for developing policy and strategies which can
enhance social cohesion, reduce environmental risks and minimize social conflicts.
Page 1
2
Understanding LULU
2.1 What is LULU?
2.1.1
With growing public concern about environmental and health protection, the siting of
an increasing range of controversial facilities has become a major policy problem in
North America, Europe, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and other
nations (Shaw, 1996; Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005). Such controversial facilities include
power plants, airports, prisons, highways, sewage treatment plants, landfills, waste
treatment facilities, oil refineries, rail lines, cemeteries, amusement parks, hospitals,
etc. These are collectively described as Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULUs) by
Popper (1981).
2.1.2
The term NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) is generally used to describe the attitude of
the opponents of LULUs, who may recognize that a facility is needed but are opposed
to its siting in their locality. Dear (1992) describes the NIMBY phenomenon as
follows:
“In plain language … the motivation of residents who want to protect their
turf. More formally, NIMBY refers to the protectionist attitudes of and
oppositional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome
development in their neighbourhood … residents usually concede that these
“noxious” facilities are necessary, but not near their homes, hence the term
“not in my backyard”.
2.1.3
The NIMBY phenomenon is so pervasive that a series of acronyms has arisen
including: NOOS (not on our street); NIABY (not in anybody's backyard); NOPE (not
on Planet Earth); BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone) and
CAVE (citizens against virtually everything) (Dear, 1992).
2.1.4
Problems of siting LULUs are worldwide and common to the post-modern world. For
example, the strong objection in Nevada to the United States Government’s decision
to site the nation’s first high-level waste repository site in Yucca Mountain within the
state of Nevada caused the project to be delayed for 19 years (Erica, 2006). Similar
examples can be found among different countries across the political, social and
economic spectrum.
2.1.5
Freudenburg & Pastor (1992) pointed out that people who see public reactions as the
heart of the problem refer to the "NIMBY phenomenon", and those who take this
perspective generally tend to see only the location as problematic. On the other hand,
people who see the facilities themselves as problematic often refer to them as LULUs.
For simplicity, the term LULU will be adopted throughout this monograph to cover
both perspectives collectively where appropriate.
2.2 Needs and Benefits
2.2.1. LULUs serve to fulfill certain functions for society as a whole, providing benefits for
the local, regional or national community. Further to Zeng (1995a, 1995b, 1995c,
1995d), LULUs can be classified into five types according to their functions and the
Page 2
benefits they provide:
• Energy facilities: These facilities are related to the generation of energy, the
production of energy-related products or the storage of fuels. They include, for
example, nuclear power plants, coal-fired power plants, refineries, petrochemical
plants and oil depots. They may be risky to health and human life (nuclear power
plant), cause pollution (coal-fired power plants and petrochemical plants), or pose
the risk of explosion (oil depots).
• Waste facilities: These facilities are related to the treatment and disposal of
hazardous or non-hazardous wastes. They include, for example, nuclear waste
dump sites, chemical waste treatment facilities, landfills, refuse stations, recycling
centres and incinerators. They may be hazardous (nuclear waste dump sites and
chemical waste treatment facilities) or cause nuisance (landfills and refuse stations)
and pollution (incinerators).
• Transport facilities: These facilities are related to road or rail, air and water
transport. They include, for example, airports, railways, highways and transport
interchanges. They are usually noisy (airports, railways, highways and transport
interchange) and may be dangerous to nearby residents (airports).
• Industry facilities: These facilities are related to manufacturing or production.
They include, for example, chemical plants and industrial parks. They are usually
polluting (chemical plants and industrial parks) and may have adverse visual and
landscape impacts.
• Human service facilities: These facilities are related to the provision of human
services, including, for example, psychiatric hospitals, HIV centres, homeless
centres, prisons, cemeteries and sex businesses. They are usually unwelcome to
residents because of the possible impacts on the community such as stigmatization
and depopulation effect.
2.2.2
LULUs can also be classified by the community level at which the benefits are aimed
(Li & Chen, 1995):
• Neighbourhood facilities: These facilities are usually of a smaller scale that suits
the needs of a local community. They include, for example, refuse storage
facilities, small sewage treatment plants, transformer houses, bus terminals and
car parks.
• City facilities: These facilities are usually of city scale to serve the needs of the
whole city. They include, for example, large sewage treatment plants, water
treatment works and hospitals.
• Inter-City facilities – These facilities are usually of larger scale than city facilities,
and serve the needs of more than one city. They include, for example, railway
transport networks and strategic waste treatment facilities.
• Regional facilities: These facilities are needed by the whole region. They include,
for example, waste incinerators, industrial parks, highways and railways.
• National facilities: These facilities are needed by the entire nation. They include,
for example, international airports, strategic power generation facilities and
nuclear dump sites.
2.2.3
LULUs may be needed regionally or nationally but are objectionable to the people
nearby (Popper, 1981, 1987a, 1987b). Portney (1984) found that, although over 50%
Page 3
of respondents supported the construction of a hazardous waste management facility
somewhere in their state, over 60% would oppose its construction in their community.
2.3 Impacts (Externalities)
2.3.1
Introduction
LULUs generally impose (or are perceived to impose) negative externalities to the
local neighbourhood (Quah & Tan, 2002) and pose (or are perceived to pose) threats
to their surroundings in the form of negative impacts (Popper, 1981). Such
externalities include:
•
•
•
•
2.3.2
Environmental impacts
Health and safety impacts
Social impacts
Economic impacts.
Environmental Impacts
Environmental impacts may include air, water and noise pollution, disturbance or
damage to ecosystems, visual and landscape impairment, and nuisances from odours,
light, vector insects and pests, etc. (Al-Yaqout et al., 2002; Rahardyan et al., 2004;
Tuan & Maclaren, 2005).
2.3.3
Health and Safety Impacts
Based on the degree of risk to health and human life, LULUs can be either hazardous
or non-hazardous (Quah & Tan, 2002). Hazardous facilities are those that may pose
risks to human health and safety. They include, for example, nuclear power plants
(energy facility), hazardous waste treatment plants or disposal sites (waste facility)
and chemical manufacturing plants (industry facility). They are potentially more
polluting than other facilities and their environmental impacts may in turn cause
considerable health and safety concerns to the local community.
Hazardous facilities are considered very difficult for local residents to accept because
of the considerably larger externalities they impose on their surroundings. In
particular, the siting problems of hazardous facilities become more complex when
there is long-term uncertainty or risk about the environmental impacts (e.g., air
pollution, radiation) and health and safety impacts (e.g., cancer, respiratory diseases
and damage to DNA structure) (Quah & Tan, 2002).
Whereas non-hazardous facilities, for example, hospitals, cemeteries, psychiatric
hospitals and homeless centres (human service facilities), generally have no
significant environmental or health and impacts on their neighbourhoods, they do
generate negative externalities such as loss in aesthetic values and decline in
community attractiveness. These facilities are usually cited as nuisance facilities.
They can be made more acceptable with appropriate mitigation and economic
incentives, including in-kind or monetary compensation (Dear, 1992; Quah & Tan,
2002).
Page 4
2.3.4
Social Impacts
LULUs such as incinerators, landfills, power plants, mortuaries and crematoriums, halfway
houses and prisons, and drug addiction treatment centres may also cause social impacts to the
local community, resulting in loss in aesthetic values and decline in attractiveness of the
community (Zeiss & Atwater, 1987). For example, facilities labeled as “hazardous” will lead
to stigmatization because of the negative images that the term conjures up (Edelstein 2004).
The facility is perceived to threaten the community directly in terms of physical impacts and
indirectly by the stigma associated with it (Zeiss, 1996, 1999).
2.3.5
Economic Impacts
Environmental, health and safety and social impacts may in turn be translated into economic
impacts in terms of declining property prices, depressed land values, slow development, and
finally a decline of the community’s economic and social profiles, due to original residents
and businesses moving away.
2.3.6
Impact Assessment
Overall, the actual and perceived magnitude or “footprint” of a LULU's impacts will vary
according to the nature of externalities from the facility (the frequency and consequence of
the impact events), local site characteristics (nearby sensitive areas, social, political and
economic profiles) and the feasibility and reliability of mitigation measures implemented at
the facility (Zeiss & Atwater, 1991).
Table 1 summarizes the impacts related to siting of LULUs and their inherent characteristics.
Appreciation and understanding of the impacts is pre-requisite to a successful strategy for
siting of LULUs. Table 1 is not meant to be exhaustive in listing all LULUs and their impacts,
but to provide a framework in examining these impacts. Detailed analysis of impacts of
individual LULUs would require further elaboration on the criteria to be considered,
assessment and the associated risks.
The externalities of a LULU may vary depending on its location, type, number, scale,
technology, operation procedures, appearance and so on (Dear, 1992). In most cases, the
intensity of opposition will very much depend on the perceived externalities (Armour, 1991;
Popper, 1981, 1987a; Quah & Tan, 2002). Therefore, the larger the perceived externalities by
the public, the higher the public opposition, especially to hazardous facilities such as
hazardous waste treatment facilities and nuclear power plants.
Popper (1981) notes that the most prominent LULUs are typically large, based on medium to
high technology (e.g., nuclear power), built by the public sector, and sited primarily by local
governments. Many such LULUs have a technology, scale, or other features (e.g.,
transportation requirements for hazardous wastes) that require detailed risk assessment
(Popper, 1987b). How to assess, manage and communicate the risks associated among the
stakeholders is crucial.
Page 5
Table 1: Impacts of LULUs and their Inherent Characteristics
Characteristics of Impact
Type of
Impact
Example of
Impact
Environmental
Impacts
Example of LULU
Hazardous/
chemical waste
incinerator
Air pollution
Water pollution
(if used for
drinking,
irrigation,
contact
recreation)
Coal-fired power
plant
Factory/
industrial park
Dying factory
Food processing
factory
Chemical plant
Wastewater
treatment facility
Noise
Transport Facility
(airport, road,
Normal
operation
Accident or
plant failure
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
Accident or
plant failure
Normal
operation
Accident or
plant failure
Normal
operation
Spatial Scale of
Impact
(Neighbourhood
/Local/Regional)
Life &
Health
Threatening
(Yes/No)
Frequency of
Impact
Events
(High/Low)
Consequence
of Impact
Event (High
/Medium/Low)
Feasibility
and
Reliability of
Mitigation
Measures
Yes, but
costly
Difficult
N, L, R
Yes
High
Medium/ High
N, L, R
Yes
Low
High
N, L, R
Yes
High
Medium
N, L
Yes
High
Medium/ Low
Yes, but
costly
Yes
N, L
Yes
High
Medium/Low
Yes
N, L
Yes
High
Medium/Low
Yes
N,L
Yes
High
Medium
Yes
N, L, R
Yes
Low
High
Difficult
N, L
Yes
High
Medium/Low
Yes
N, L
Yes
Low
Medium
Yes
N, L
Yes
High
Medium/Low
Yes
Page 6
railway)
Factory
Landfill
Soil & ground
contamination
Refinery
Hazardous waste
disposal
Open mine
Golf course
Ecological
impacts
Visual and
landscape
impacts
Odours
Light
Highway
Industrial park,
incinerator,
landfill
Refuse transfer
station,
wastewater
treatment plant,
landfill
Golf course,
playground
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
N
No
High
Medium/Low
Yes
N, L
High
Medium/Low
Yes
Accident or
plant failure
Accident or
plant
N, L
Low
Medium
Low
High
Yes, but
costly
Difficult
Normal
operation
Normal
Operation
Normal
operation
N, L
Yes (through
groundwater
contaminatio
n)
Yes (through
after-use)
Yes (through
after-use and
migratory
pathways)
No
High
High
No
N,L
No
Low
Medium/Low
Yes
N,L
No
High
No
Normal
operation
N, L
No
High
Depending on
the sensitivity
of the habitats
and wildlife
therein
Medium/low
Normal
operation
N, L
No
High
Low
Yes
Normal
operation
N, L
No
High
Low
Yes
N, L
Page 7
Yes
Vector insect/
pest
Long term
health effects
(chronic
exposure)
Health and
Safety
Impacts
Short-term
health effects
(acute
exposure)
Explosion and
fires
Infectious
disease
parks, airports
Refuse transfer
station, landfill,
incinerator
Hazardous/
chemical waste
facility
Incinerator
Electromagnetic
installation
Radioactive
facility
Hazardous/
chemical waste
facility
Incinerator
Electromagnetic
installation
Radioactive
Oil depots and
refinery
Infectious disease
medical centre
Normal
operation
N, L
Yes
High
Medium, low
Yes
Normal
operation
N,L
Yes
High
High/Medium
Yes
Normal
operation
Normal
operation
N,L
Yes
High
High/Medium
Yes
N,L
Yes
High
Medium/Low
Yes
Normal
operation
Accident or
plant failure
N,L
Yes
High
High/Medium
Yes
N,L,R
Yes
Low
High
Difficult
Accident or
plant failure
Accident or
plant failure
N, L, R
Yes
Low
High
Yes
N, L
Yes
Low
High
Yes
Accident or
plant failure
Accident or
plant failures
N, L ,R
Yes
Low
High
Yes
N, L
Yes
Low
High
Yes
Normal
operations
Accident or
security
failures
N, L
Yes
Low
High
Yes
N, L, R
Yes
Low
High
Yes
Page 8
Social Impacts
Economic
Impacts
Stigma
associated with
undesirable
facility
Aesthetic
impacts on
local
environment
Depressed land
and property
values, stagnant
development,
decline in
business and
economic
investment
Normal
operation
N, L
No
High
Medium/Low
Yes
Normal
operation
N, L
No
High
Medium/Low
Yes
Normal
LULU causing
operation
detrimental
impacts upon the
social and
economic profiles
of the community
N, L
No
High
High/ Medium
Yes
Facility labelled
as “hazardous” or
perceived as
environmentally
or socially
undesirable
Industrial park,
incinerator,
landfill, cemetery
Page 9
On one hand, impact assessments should be carried out objectively, based on sound scientific
and technical data and methods. On the other hand, stakeholders’ perceptions of such impacts
and risks are subjective and influenced by a variety of social, political and economic factors.
Both the objective data and the subjective perceptions should be carefully studied in the siting
of LULUs.
Most literature reviewed focuses on LULUs such as hazardous waste treatment facilities,
nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal sites, and waste treatment and disposal facilities
like incinerators, landfills and waste recycling centres (Table 2).
Table 2: Examples of Intensively Studied LULUs in the Literature
LULUs
Hazardous waste
treatment facilities
Nuclear power plants
Nuclear waste disposal
sites
Waste incinerators
Landfills
References
Andrews & Pierson 1984; Castle, 1993; Elliott 1984;
Fareri & Ligteringen, 1998; Gerrard, 1994; Gregory &
Kunreuther 1990; Gregory, Kunreuther & Easterling
1990; Groothuis & Miller, 1994; Huitema, 2002; Hunter
& Leyden, 1995; Kellow, 1996; Kuhn & Ballard, 1998;
Kunreuther, Easterling & Richards, 1991; Kunreuther &
Easterling, 1996; Lidskog, 1997; Lindell & Earle 1983;
McQuaid-Cook, 1992; Portney 1984, 1985, 1991; Rabe,
1991, 1992, 1994; Rogers, 1998; Sien, 1996; Spies et al.
1998
Aldrich, 2005; Lesbirel, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000;
Ohkawara, 1996, 1999; Yoo, 1996
Benford, Moore & Williams, 1993; Johnson, 1987; Kraft
& Clary, 1991; Kunreuther, Easterling, Desvousges &
Slovic, 1990; Sjöberg 2003; Slovic, 1991
Hsu, 2006; Lober & Green, 1994; Löfstedt, 1997; Petts,
1992, 1994, 1995; Rahardyan, Matsuto, Kakuta &
Tanaka, 2004; Reams & Templet, 1996; Zeiss & Atwater,
1987, 1990
Al-Yaqout, Koushki & Hamoda, 2002; Bacot, Bowen &
Fitzgerald, 1994; Elliott et al., 1993; Elliott et al,. 1997;
Furuseth, 1989; Himmelberger, Ratick & White, 1991;
Okeke & Armour, 2000; Rahardyan et al., 2004; Shen &
Yu, 1997; Snary, 2002; Tuan & Maclaren, 2005;
Wakefield & Elliott, 2000
Popper (1981, 1987a) quotes a U.S. national poll on environmental issues conducted by
Resources for the Future in 1980, which suggests there may be a general consensus on which
LULUs are most unwanted by the public. Assurances were given in the poll that each of the
five facilities (a 10-storey office building, a large factory, a coal-fired power plant, a nuclear
power plant, and a hazardous waste disposal site) “would be built and operated according to
governmental and safety regulations” and, in particular, that the disposal site would be
“regularly inspected for possible problems”. The poll revealed that people objected least to
the 10-storey office building and most to the nuclear power plant or a hazardous waste
disposal facility. Only 10 to 12 percent of the population would voluntarily live a mile or less
Page 10
from a nuclear power plant or hazardous waste facility, compared to about 25 percent willing
to live the same distance from a coal-fired power plant or large factory, and nearly 60 percent
willing to live that close to a ten-story office building. Majority acceptance of the factory and
coal-fired plant was reached before the distance exceeded 10 miles, whereas neither the
nuclear power plant nor the hazardous waste disposal facility reached majority acceptance
until the distance reached 50-100 miles.
Based on the poll results, Popper (1987b)
concluded that LULUs which most seem to threaten low-probability/ high consequence
events (e.g., nuclear power plant and hazardous waste sites) are the most objectionable to the
public.
Armour (1991) echoes the findings of the above poll and similar public opinion surveys in
Canada which confirm that proximity of a LULU, the type of facility and its perceived
externalities are the key factors influencing people’s responses. In short, the most unwanted
LULUs are the ones which threaten the largest negative externalities as perceived by the
public.
2.4 Inequity between Benefits and Costs (Impacts)
A LULU often satisfies strong non-local public need or private demand and offers (or appears
to offer) large regional or national benefits, but its environmental, health and safety, social
and economic costs fall mainly on the immediate locality or neighbourhood (Popper, 1981,
1987a). In other words, the benefits of such facilities are usually broadly distributed but most
of the costs tend to be localized. The spatial asymmetry of costs (i.e., externalities on the
surrounding areas) and benefits (i.e., functions or services provided by the LULU to the
region or nation) is often inequitable (Popper, 1981, 1987b). This is often the key public
problem posed by LULUs as described by Wolsink (1994):
“The NIMBY phenomenon arises when, in order to provide a public good, a local
facility must be constructed. The disadvantages are all at the local level, and the
local residents feel that they are being saddled with the consequences of something
that is of benefit to society as a whole. They enjoy few of the benefits, while the
costs are concentrated in their own area. NIMBY is the result of a social dilemma
characterized by a spatial separation of advantages and disadvantages.”
This apparent inequity therefore must be addressed in all successful siting strategies for
LULUs.
2.5 LULU Siting Strategies
2.5.1
Land Use Strategies
Faced with the daunting task of providing the land uses or facilities needed by society,
planners or proponents such as government administrations or agents and private sector
entities typically take the approach of reducing negative impacts in the hope of enhancing the
chance of acceptance by the community concerned. They seek to distribute and reduce the
harm of LULUs through four land-use strategies (Popper, 1981):
• Concentration: A new LULU may be concentrated into a few areas, for
example, an undeveloped or industrial area, so as to reduce public resistance.
Page 11
The concentration strategy works best when the areas of concentration have
natural (e.g., environmental resiliency, green buffering) or manmade (e.g., preexisting factories or strip development) features that make them especially
suitable for LULUs. However, the strategy may unfairly force LULUs into
those sectors that are least able to resist them, such as poor, minority or underrepresented communities as has been documented in the U. S. (Popper, 1981).
• Dispersal: Dispersal is the strategy of spreading out LULUs within a city or
region. This strategy works best when the LULUs are small and can be
widely separated from each other (e.g., low-income housing projects, lightly
traveled rural and suburban highways). However, the strategy may fail to
guarantee that the disadvantaged communities will not be affected due to an
unfair spatial distribution of LULUs. It may create sprawl of LULUs (e.g., the
spread of lightly traveled highways in rural and suburban areas) which may
ignore environmental, economic, and social constraints in in certain areas
(Popper, 1981).
• Randomization: Randomization is the strategy of deliberately siting LULUs
in a seemingly haphazard way. It frequently amounts to allowing the private
market to make the siting decision. The strategy seems to work best when
LULUs are divided into small pieces and scattered in different areas
depending on their local economic and political situations. Examples are
industrial parks, factories, components of strip development, halfway houses
and residential development, which can be scattered to fit with local social,
economic and political situations. The strategy may eliminate the costs of
siting by government and may respond to local needs and desires. Yet the
strategy may equally produce a problematic siting process with unpredictable
environmental or social consequences and may also ignore the overall
requirements and needs or benefits of the larger area (Popper, 1981).
• On-site Mitigation: This strategy aims to minimize the adverse effects that a
LULU imposes on its immediate vicinity while accepting its siting location.
On-site mitigations such as stringent environmental regulation, zoning
ordinances, public health or building regulations may reduce the
environmental impacts of a LULU. Concessions or improvement of public
services may mitigate the economic impacts associated with a LULU. On-site
mitigation may lower a LULU’s environmental, economic and social costs.
Yet the mitigation measures may not be as effective as expected or are not
delivered as promised (Popper, 1981).
2.6 A New Perspective: Merging of the Horizons
An emerging approach to resolving the conflicts in the siting of LULUs focuses on
understanding the perceptions of the objectors and the proponents, and attempting to create a
common understanding by merging the two separate horizons.
Since the late 1980s, many researchers have focused on public reactions to LULUs
(Burningham, 2000; Freudenburg & Pastor, 1992; Hunter & Leyden, 1995; Kraft & Clary,
1991; Kuhn & Ballard, 1998; Pushchak & Rocha, 1998; Wolsink, 1994). Freudenburg and
Pastor (1994) suggest that the NIMBY response is often seen as:
• Ignorant/irrational: the public are considered to be “wrong” and thus the
Page 12
response of planning authority is either to educate them or simply to overrule
them;
• Selfish: Such protest is considered less important than that based on wider
social and environmental concerns; or
• Prudent: The public act reasonably based on good grouns, distrust scientists,
see the siting problem in wider terms than the planning experts.
The first and second perspectives are the most predominant views historically (Kraft & Clary,
1991; Hunter & Leyden, 1995). Freudenburg and Pastor (1994) conclude that all three
perspectives try to explain what lies behind local protest and attempt to uncover the basis for
their protest. However, rather than limiting discussion to any of the three perspectives, it is
more fruitful to focus on understanding the broader system that creates such conflicts in the
first place.
From the 1990s till now, more researchers on NIMBY issues appear to be suggesting that the
public may be rational and politically legitimate, and that local protest may serve a broader
public interest. The following lists out some findings of NIMBY studies in the 1990s
supporting this new, positive view of the NIMBY phenomenon:
• The local community is reacting against a transfer of disadvantages in their
own direction, rather than trying to pass it on to another community. They
demand attention for the cause of the problem – e.g., the application of a
particular technology or policy with severe environmental impact (Wolsink,
1994). As Gore (1992) recognizes, environmental awareness, including
awareness of global environmental problems, begins with concerns about local
environmental impacts. He even calls NIMBY effects “a healthy trend” for
this reason.
• Siting failure for hazardous waste facilities may be one of the critical turning
points on the road to sustainable production, that is, a shift in focus from
where to site a facility to whether a good is worth producing at all if its wastes
are not suitable (Pushchak and Rocha, 1998).
• The NIMBY phenomenon is a “checking factor” against ineffective decisionmaking. Community opposition develops from well-grounded concerns about
the impacts of LULU siting and the fairness or equity of the siting process
(Kuhn and Ballard , 1998).
• In contrast with the negative depiction of “NIMBYism” in the literature, local
protest against LULUs can be viewed as an essential starting point and an
ongoing component of dynamic environmental movements addressing issues
of government spending, sustainability, community and democracy
(Burningham, 2000).
• The use of the blunt NIMBY argument is a sign of frustration, and this
approach is no longer appropriate to study facility siting issues which are
complicated and multidimensional in nature (Wolsink, 2006).
In short, it is evident that there is a new trend of positive assessments of the NIMBY
phenomenon, which suggests that the public’s position on siting issues may be rational and
politically legitimate. In other words, citizens may have a fairly good grasp of the issues and
a reasonable concern for genuine risks to community health and welfare that may be ignored
by technical and administrative authorities. From this perspective, local opposition may
serve a broader public interest, for example, in identifying important weaknesses in expert
Page 13
analyses underlying siting proposals and forcing consideration of a broader range of options,
some of which may be more technically suitable or socially acceptable. (Fiorino, 1989a,
1989b). Only by understanding the true nature of public opposition can the siting problem be
resolved satisfactorily and in the interest of the public.
Open and sincere consultations and communications among stakeholders at the
national/regional and local levels are of paramount importance for understanding multiple
stakeholders’ perceptions and agenda, for working towards merging their respective horizons,
and for finding a solution which is seen to be equitable and sustainable.
2.7 Summary
LULUs serve to fulfill certain functions for society as a whole, providing benefits for local,
regional or national communities. LULUs may be needed regionally or nationally, but are
objectionable to the nearby people.
LULUs generally impose (or are perceived to impose) negative externalities on the local
neighbourhood and pose (or are perceived to pose) threats to their surroundings in the form of
negative environmental, health and safety, social and economic impacts.
Appreciation and understanding of these impacts is pre-requisite to a successful strategy for
siting of LULUs. Detailed analysis of impacts of individual LULUs will require further
elaboration on the criteria to be considered, assessment and the associated risks.
On the one hand, impact assessments should be carried objectively based on sound scientific
and technical data and methods. On the other hand, stakeholders’ perceptions of such impacts
and risks are subjective and influenced by a variety of social, political and economic factors.
Both the objective data and the subjective perceptions should be carefully studied in the siting
of LULUs.
Often, LULUs satisfy strong non-local public need or private demand and offer (or appears to
offer) large regional or national benefits, but their environmental, health and safety, social and
economic costs fall mainly on their locality or neighbourhood. In other words, the benefits of
such facilities are usually broadly distributed but most of the costs tend to be localized. The
spatial asymmetry of costs and benefits is often inequitable. This is often the key public
problem posed by LULUs. This apparent inequity therefore must be addressed in all
successful siting strategies for LULUs.
Faced with the daunting task of providing the land uses or facilities needed by society,
planners or proponents such as government administrations or agents and private sector
entities typically take the approach of reducing negative impacts in the hope of enhancing the
chance of acceptance by the community concerned. They seek to distribute and reduce the
harm of LULUs through four land-use strategies (concentration, dispersal, randomization and
on-site mitigation).
An emerging approach to resolving conflicts in the siting of LULUs focuses on understanding
the perceptions of the objectors and the proponents, and attempting to create a common
understanding by merging the two separate horizons.
A multi-stakeholder process based on trust, dialog, public participation and equity facilitates
Page 14
the understanding of others’ perspectives, the merging of horizons and the search for common
ground towards an acceptable solution.
Figure 1 depicts a conceptual framework for LULU planning, siting and conflict resolution,
which consist of the key components of :
•
•
•
•
Needs and benefits, scale and distribution
Impact types, scale and distribution
Risk perception, assessment, management and communication
Multi-stakeholder process based on trust, participation and equity for conflict
resolution
• Acceptable solutions based on merging of separate perspectives and horizons
Page 15
Figure 1: Siting and Community Responses to Locally Unwanted Land Uses: The Conceptual Framework
Political/Institutional Setting
LULUs
Stakeholders
Nature of LULU
Needs and
Benefits
Territorial
Public &
Interest
Groups
Government
Community
Response
Risks
Oppose
Local
Regional
Perception
Communication
Assessment
Management
Planning, Siting,
Conflict Resolution
Acceptable
Solution
Impacts
Trust
Environmental
Health and Safety
Economic
Public
Participation
Equity
Social
Multi-Stakeholder Process
Geographic Setting
Page 16
Welcome
Environmental Setting
Socio-Economic Setting
Facility
provider
3
Conflict Resolution
3.1 Public Opposition
Review of literature on the subject shows a variety of concerns and views that fuel public
opposition:
• Public concerns about property values, aesthetics, or health and safety risks (Dear,
1992; Johnson, 1987; O’Hare, Bacow & Sanderson, 1983; Rahardyan et al., 2004)
• Distrust of science and technology, a lack of confidence or trust in project
managers or government regulators, and/or public misinformation (Kunreuther,
Fitzgerald & Aarts 1993; Mazmanian & Morell 1990; Pijawka & Mushkatel
1991/1992)
• Community concerns that are not adequately addressed through open meetings
(Armour, 1991; Baxter, Eyles & Elliott, 1999; Petts, 1994, 1995).
Community concerns about the physical, economic, social and political impacts of facility
siting and these impacts are correlated with one another. Zeiss (1991) proposes a consecutive
linkage running from physical impacts to beliefs and finally to attitudes. Physical impacts
include health risks, nuisances, and environmental change, and these in turn generate nonphysical impacts, which are categorized into economic (e.g., property value decrease), social
(e.g., stigmatization or loss of community image) and political (e.g., lack of fairness, lack of
trust) impacts. He comments that fears about physical impacts affect attitudes as strongly as
physical impacts themselves do. Therefore, a minor physical impact may trigger a very
strong negative attitude toward a LULU such as a solid waste management facility.
3.2 Core Factors Affecting Community Concern and Attitudes Towards
LULUs
3.2.1
Justification of Need in Community Perspective
The notion of need for a facility has been characterized as “the fulcrum upon which all siting
process rests”; this “need” refers to both rational determination and public recognition of the
need for a facility (Laws & Susskind, 1991). Portney (1991) suggests that increased
awareness of the need for facilities leads to a sense of shared interest in the facility's
operation. In other words, if people accept the argument that there is a need for a facility,
they may also accept some of the responsibility for responding to that need and then the siting
process may have a chance of succeeding. Similarly, the Siting Credo (Kunreuther, Susskind
& Aarts, 1993) stresses that when planning and building LULUs, every effort should be made
to achieve agreement that the status quo is unacceptable. In particular, the stakeholders need
to understand the trade-offs of different options and the consequences of doing nothing – not
just now, but in the future as well. Another study by Kunreuther, Fitzgerald & Aarts (1993)
shows that host community recognition of need is significantly correlated with facility
acceptance by the public.
The Alberta case studies (Kuhn and Ballard, 1998; McQuaid-Cook, 1992) underscores the
importance of identifying the need from the host community perspective. A hazardous waste
facility was seen to address the threat of economic loss and even community extinction in
Page 17
Swan Hills after the oil field recession in 1982, and it was accepted by the public with 79% of
voters in support. Therefore, if the facility can be framed so that it addresses existing
discrepancies in the community, then the value of the facility to the community is likely to be
much improved even before other incentives are added (Zeiss & Lefsrud, 1995).
In short, new facilities must respond to real social needs and the needs should be defined and
justified in the community perspective.
3.2.2
Impact Management
The prevention and reduction of impacts and risks to the environment and to health are found
to be effective in allaying community concerns in several studies (Zeiss, 1991; Zeiss &
Lefsrud, 1995; Zeiss & Lefsrud, 1996). Among the siting objectives in the “siting credo”
postulated by Kunreuther, Susskind & Aarts (1993), the following guidelines are related to
impact prevention, reduction and management:
• Choose the facility design that provides the best solution to the problem.
• Fully address all negative aspects of the facility.
• Guarantee that stringent safety standards will be met.
Moreover, Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) advise that project proponents should focus on
mitigating the negative impacts of a facility before introducing compensation packages to the
community. Therefore, it is clear that impact prevention, reduction and management are very
important in successful facility siting.
3.2.2.1 Impact Avoidance/ Prevention
Zeiss and Lefsrud (1996) suggest that a detailed comparison of technical options, site
characteristics, and environmental impacts for several sites should be used to evaluate the
proposed site selection. Other researchers (Easterling, 1992; Kunreuther & Easterling, 1996)
also support the conclusion that the chance of accepting a LULU is improved if it can be
demonstrated through a comparison of alternatives that the proposed site and technology are
the best.
3.2.2.2 Impact Reduction
Engineering measures that control impacts are strongly preferred over remediation and
compensation (Portney, 1985, 1991; Zeiss, 1991; Zeiss & Lefsrud, 1995, 1996). Aesthetic or
nuisance effects can trigger more serious concerns about community image, health risk, etc. It
is more effective to emphasize measures that will prevent them.
3.2.2.3 Impact Mitigation
Zeiss and Lefsrud (1996) suggest that when impacts cannot be eliminated through prevention
or control, the mitigation of effects through monitoring, remediation, cleanup, etc., is
preferred.
In summary, impact management through community choice of prevention, reduction and
mitigation is an essential component of a siting proposal that must come before compensation
Page 18
can be effectively negotiated.
3.2.3
Risk Perception and Communication
3.2.3.1 Risk Perceptions of Lay and Expert
Risk in a broader sense can be defined as the possibility of an adverse outcome; it is inherent
in any action, even in inaction (Lundgren & McMakin, 1998). Risk assessment is designed to
aid in identifying, characterizing and quantifying risks (Slovic, 1987). Technical experts
employ risk assessment to evaluate hazards, whereas the majority of public rely on intuitive
perceptions and judgments of risks (Slovic, 1987).
For technical risk assessors, there is only one true risk for any given hazard, usually based on
the probability and the magnitude of negative outcomes, and it can often be reliably assessed
(Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992). Hazard management is basically a matter of systematically
applying the results of analytic risk assessments to identify areas of concern. For social
scientists, environmental hazards are social issues and represent the interaction between
physical and psychosocial characteristics which involves culture and value judgments.
(Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992; Kates & Kasperson, 1983).
Slovic (1987) finds that risk perception can be reduced to two main factors, “dread risk” and
“unknown risk” (Figure 2). The “dread risk” factor includes risks that are considered
uncontrollable, dreaded, globally catastrophic, having fatal consequences, not equitable,
posing high risks to future generations, not easily reduced, increasing, and involuntary.
Examples include nuclear weapons and nuclear power. The “unknown risk” includes risks
which are indeterminate, unknown to those exposed, have a delayed harmful effect, or even
unknown to science. Examples include chemical technology and electromagnetic field effect.
DNA technology scores high on both the “dread risk” and “unknown risk” factors. An
individual’s perceptions of the risk of any activity can be plotted against these two factors to
show where the risks are acceptable. The “dread factor” is often considered more important,
and the higher a hazard’s score on this factor, the higher the perceived risk and the more
people want to see its current risks reduced.
Page 19
Figure 2: Dread Risk (Factor 1) and Unknown Risk (Factor 2) [Source: Slovic (1987)]
Factor 2
Unknown Risk
Controllable
Not dreaded
Not globally catastrophic
Consequences not fatal
Equitable
Individual
Low risk to future
generations
Easily reduced
Risk decreasing
Voluntary
Not observable
Unknown to those exposed
Effect delayed
New risk
Risks unknown to science
Observable
Factor 1
Dread Risk
Uncontrollable
Dreaded
Globally catastrophic
Consequences fatal
Not equitable
Catastrophic
High risk to future
generations
Not easily reduced
Risk increasing
Involuntary
Known to those exposed
Effect immediate
Old risk
Risks known to science
Public and technical views frequently differ on risks, as the experts see risks as synonymous
with probability and expected annual mortality, whereas how the lay public assessment of
risks is dependent on their experience and reports of the news media (Slovic, 1987). In other
words, the lay-expert confrontation on the risk perception is due to the fact that they have
different definitions of the risk concept (Petts, 1997). Indeed, such differences in risk
perceptions have been noted for different sectors of society, such as the media, scientists,
political leaders and environmental groups (Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992).
3.2.3.2 Social Amplification of Risks
Furthermore, some researchers (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992) study the social
experience of risk and the dynamic processing of risks by the various participants in a
pluralistic society. Kasperson et al. (1988) propose a new approach to study the social
experience of risk, which integrates the technical assessment and the social experience of risk.
The concept of social amplification of risk is based on the thesis that events relating to
hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that
can heighten or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and thus shape risk
behaviour. Behavioral patterns, in turn, generate secondary social or economic consequences
(“rippling”) that extend far beyond harm to humans or the environment (Figure 3). In the
case of facility siting, the secondary impacts of the risk or the “risk ripples” include conflicts
within the community, the stigmatization of the facility and the community, the possible outmigration of residents, and a loss in property values (Kasperson, 2005).
Renn et al. (1992) carry out an empirical study to investigate the functional relationships
among five sets of variables that enter into the amplification process: physical consequences,
amount of press coverage, individual layperson perceptions, public responses, and the
Page 20
socioeconomic and political impacts. They find that:
• Individual and social risk experience appears to be more strongly related to
exposure than to actual casualties. Thus, an exposure of a few people resulting
in several casualties is likely to be less influential for risk perception and
public response than an exposure of many people that results in minor injuries
or only a few casualties;
• The processing of risk by the media, social groups, institutions, and
individuals shapes the societal experience with risk, and plays a crucial role in
determining the overall intensity and scope of societal impacts;
• Events with widespread human exposure to risk received significantly more
media coverage than events with low exposure;
• The societal impacts of risk experience seem to be related to the shaping and
modifying risk judgments through a variety of factors through the social
processing of risks.
3.2.3.3 Risk Communication and Management
Effective risk management is a process of reducing risks to a level deemed tolerable by
society and assuring control, monitoring and public communication (Renn et al., 1991). In
this definition, risk communication is an essential part of management.
In recent years, it seems that more and more emphasis has been put on risk communication to
resolve siting conflicts in the literature (Bier, 2001; Elliott, 1984; Fiorino, 1990; Halfacre,
Matheny & Rosenbaum, 2000; Ishizaka & Tanaka, 2003; Kasperson, 1986; Lindell & Earle,
1983; Petts, 1992; Rogers, 1998; Sjöberg, 2003; Slovic et al., 1991; Snary, 2002; Wakefield
& Elliott, 2000). According to the US National Research Council (1989) definition, risk
communication is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among
individuals, groups, and institutions, and this process is defined by levels of improvement in
decisions, actions or policies aimed at managing or controlling health and/or environmental
risks. Ishizaka and Tanaka (2003) depict in more detail what risk communication is about.
They suggest it is a process in which each party (citizens, groups, governmental officials and
public/private limited companies) repeatedly exchange information and opinions concerning
“the risk estimated based on the scientific method”, “risk perception”, “countermeasures”,
“risk assessment” and “the extent of acceptable risks”, basically to enhance the level of
mutual understanding and trust. Additional information such as “cost effectiveness”,
“benefits”, “environmental load”, etc. is exchanged to understand the trade-offs on
environment, economy, and society. Ideally, this process leads to effective solutions to the
problem and wide support from society (Figure 4).
Page 21
Culture
New Risk Area
Industry
Risk Related
Behaviour
Event
Event
Characteristics
Portrayal of
Event
Company
Societal Impacts
Litigation
Indirect Costs
Directly
Affected
Groups
Political Changes
Protests
Individuals
Town
Region
Country
Hazard
Event
Selection of
Event
Characteristics
Information
Flow
Interpretation
and Behavioral
Response
Spread of
Impacts
(Rippling)
Type of Societal
Impacts
Figure 3: Simplified Representation of the Social Amplification of Risks [Source: Kasperson et al. (1988) and Renn et al. (1992)]
Page 22
Some researchers have proposed ways to improve the risk communication process. Keeney
and von Winterfeldt (1986) propose six major objectives of successful risk communication,
including:
• To better educate the public about risks, risk analysis, and risk management;
• To better inform the public about specific risks and actions taken to alleviate
them;
• To encourage personal risk reduction measures;
• To improve the understanding of public values and concerns;
• To increase mutual trust and credibility; and
• To resolve conflicts and controversy.
Bier (2001) suggests that strategies of risk communication should include:
•
•
•
•
Simple, vivid messages to raise awareness of a hazard;
Explanatory tools such as diagrams, outlines, and analogies to educate people;
Techniques of persuasion to motivate people to take action;
Stakeholder participation processes to reach agreement on a controversial
issue; and
• Mechanisms by which people can monitor potentially hazardous situations in
order to build trust.
Apart from considering the objectives and strategies stated above, in 1988, the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided seven cardinal rules which are very
practical and helpful in conducting a good risk communication process. They include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner;
Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts;
Listen to the public’s specific concerns;
Be honest, frank and open;
Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources;
Meet the needs of the media ; and
Speak clearly and with compassion.
Moreover, mass media may play an important role in the risk communication process. When
the local media amplify environmental and social risks, mistrust can grow stronger (Upreti &
Horst, 2004). Johnson-Cartee, Graham & Foster (1992/1993) analyze the content of
newspaper coverage regarding the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator in Tuscaloosa
County, USA, and find that:
• Newspapers provided little background information about hazardous waste,
hazardous waste disposal, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis;
• The coverage consisted primarily of hard news stories without seeking out
additional sources of hazardous waste information that might have served as a
check on both the proposals and the opposition’s objections;
• The news pieces revolved around a theme of controversy and readers were
provided with a snapshot of the politics of siting.
They argue that it is critical for the public to receive informed and balanced coverage of the
Page 23
policy issues, and they suggest that analysis is needed in the news coverage. News stories
should detail the range of both costs and benefits associated with various policy proposals. It
is also important to enlighten and educate the public rather then heighten the controversial
nature of the occasion so that the public have the proper perspective to get involved in the
siting process.
Exchange of Information and Opinions
Estimated Risk,
Risk perception,
Government
officials
Public/ Private
Limited
Companies,
etc.
Countermeasures,
Cost effectiveness of
countermeasures,
Citizens,
Civic Groups,
etc.
Acceptable risk, and
Additional information
Improvement of Mutual Understanding and Trust
Effective Solution to Problems
Figure 4: Risk Communication Model [Source: Ishizaka and Tanaka (2003)]
Page 24
As noted by Slovic (1997), risk is socially constructed, and risk assessment is inherently
subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological,
social, cultural and political factors. An effective risk communication process can introduce
more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision-making in order to make
the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis,
and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
3.2.4
Trust
3.2.4.1 Trust Concept and Dimensions
Trust is a concept widely identified as important to social interactions in disciplines as
diverse as psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and mass communication in
the past two decades (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). It can be generally defined as “a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon the behavior
of positive expectations of the intentions of or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Fort & Budd,
1998).
Some researchers have tried to identify the core elements of trust, i.e., what kind of
evaluative judgments contribute to the creation or destruction of trust in the society. Renn
and Levine (1991) identify five core components or attributes, namely: perceived competence
(which represents the degree of technical expertise of the source); objectivity (reflecting the
absence of bias in information); fairness (the degree to which the source takes into account all
relevant points of view); consistency (the predictability of arguments and behavior based on
past experience and previous communication efforts), and faith (which reflects the perception
of the source's “good will”).
Similarly, Kasperson, Golding & Tuler (1992) define social trust as “a person’s expectation
that other persons and institutions in a social relationship can be relied upon to act in ways
that are competent, predictable, and caring”. Kasperson et al. (1992) further propose four key
dimensions that are important in the development and maintenance of trust including:
commitment (as social trust involves some degree of vulnerability, one wants to make sure
that the trustee is fully committed to the mission, goal or obligation); competence (since trust
can only exist when a person or institution is competent in the thing it is obliged to do,
someone should not only be committed to his or her responsibilities but should also fulfil
them competently); caring (the perception that an institution acts in a way that shows concern
for the people who put their trust in it); and finally predictability, in that people tend to trust
people or organizations that are consistent.
3.2.4.2 Trust and Facility Siting
In fact, trust is seen as one prerequisite for effective risk communication, and a lack of trust
may exacerbate the community’s concerns about the risks of facility siting. In the US,
research (e.g. Kasperson et al., 1992) has shown that there has been a broad loss of trust in
leaders and in major social institutions since the 1960s. Together with growing public
concern over health, safety, and environmental protection, these trends combine to make
hazardous facility siting highly controversial. Pijawka and Mushkatel (1991/1992) show that
the lack of trust in the Department of Energy is the key factor in the public’s opposition to the
siting of the high-level nuclear waste repository, along with public perceptions of risks
associated with the facility. Groothuis and Miller (1997) present a similar finding that social
Page 25
distrust increases the perceived risk of a facility and influences the likelihood of accepting a
referendum to site a hazardous waste disposal facility. In Asia, for example, the Republic of
Korea, it has also been reported (Yoo, 1996) that new issues about value systems emerged on
the nuclear arena after the nation’s democratization in late 1980s. The general public seemed
to distrust the Korean government administration, although nuclear power was economically
justified and technically feasible. People no longer assumed that public institutions always
care about their best interests. Lack of confidence in the government conduced to subsequent
rejection of the proposed siting of nuclear power plants.
3.2.4.3 Trust Building
Trust is a primary property of the social capital that exists in society. Putnam (1993) has
argued that it is built over time in the socialization of individuals into the political culture and
in their encounters with others and the political system. Thus, it seems that trust is easier to
destroy than to create (Slovic, 1997), and once distrust develops, it is very difficult to regain
trust without wholesale changes to the siting process and/or the stakeholders involved
(Covello, 1996). Thus, it is important to nurture trust within the process despite its fragility.
Kunreuther, Fitzgerald & Aarts (1993) assert that practices like public participation, admitting
past mistakes, avoiding exaggerated claims/promises and highlighting past successes can help
establish or re-establish trust between siting agents/government and the public. Perhaps the
ultimate solution to situations of distrust is “sharing of power… the empowerment of risk
bearers, in the management of the risk or the facility” (Kasperson et al. 1992).
3.2.5
Equity
One important aspect of community opposition is concern about fairness or equity of the
siting process. The cause of the NIMBY phenomenon is actually a response to an inherent
imbalance in the distribution of a facility’s benefits and costs. Costs in terms of human health
and environmental and aesthetic impacts are concentrated in the hosting community, while
benefits accrue to the whole community (Mazmanian & Morell, 1990). The hosting
community may question why a facility should be located in their backyard and why they
should bear its cost but not others. For example, McAvoy (1998) finds that the rural citizens
in Minnesota who were opposed to the hazardous waste facility appealed to decision makers’
sense of fairness and argued that the metro area residents should assume the risk since most
of the waste was produced in the urban area. The citizens’ opposition finally led to failure of
the siting attempt.
The equity problem is of increasing interest in the siting literature (Armour, 1992; Baxter,
1999; Greenberg, 1993; Lawrence, 1996; Lober, 1995; Rabe, 1992; Reams & Templet, 1996).
Different forms of equity are discussed in the literature. For example, environmental equity
and environmental justice are more general and broader principles, while social, spatial,
procedural, intergenerational and cumulative equity are more specific principles (Lawrence,
1996; Baxter, 1999; Kasperson, 2005). Environmental equity and environmental justice are
closely linked. Environmental equity concerns fairness in the distribution, both socially and
spatially, of environmental risk based on certain criteria (e.g., in relation to generators of risks)
(Baxter, 1999). It is considered to be one of the tractable principles for achieving
environmental justice.
Environmental justice embraces the broad principle that all people and communities are
entitled to equal protection of environmental, health, employment, housing, transportation,
Page 26
and civil right laws (Bullard, 2004). The environmental justice movement in the US started
out as a series of local and often isolated community-based struggles against toxics and
facility siting and gradually blossomed into a multi-issue, multi-ethnic, and multi-regional
movement (Bullard, 2004). It is the convergence of two social movements – the social
justice movement and the environmental movement. However, the term is more politically
charged since it involves remedial action to affect the distribution of existing risks in addition
to equitable distributions of new risks (Baxter, 1996). The US EPA defines environmental
justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (US Environmental Protection
Agency [US EPA], 2006). Fair treatment means that “no group of people, including racial,
ethnic, or socioeconomic groups should bear disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects resulting from Federal agency programs, policies, and
activities”.
Within the broad framework of environmental equity and environmental justice, social equity,
spatial equity and procedural equity provide more specific and practical principles for guiding
the siting process (Lawrence, 1996; Baxter, 1996). Social equity addresses the issue of
fairness in the distribution of facilities, benefits and costs among stakeholders in the society.
Spatial equity considers the fairness of locations and the allocation over space of facilities at
the selected sites. Procedural equity is concerned with fairness in the planning process,
especially for groups and interests traditionally under-represented in planning and decisionmaking.
Kasperson (2005) also discusses the problems relating to intergenerational equity and
cumulative inequity. The former is about fairness of distribution of costs and benefits among
different generations, for example, between present and future generations. Kunreuther et al.
(1990) finds that the perceived risk to future generations was an important determinant of
willingness to accept high level waste disposal facilities, a finding supported by Kunreuther
and Easterling (1990) and Easterling (1992). Cumulative inequity refers to problems arising
from past siting and other actions that have created a legacy of risk-bearing in the community
and region.
In reality, different forms of equity issues may come to play in the siting process, and some
may seem more effective in addressing the public concerns than the others. For example,
Zeiss (1991) finds that procedural equity issues of prevention, control and mitigation
overshadowed compensation (which is traditionally considered as a means to attain social
equity) as effective and fair waste management practices. Similarly, Kunreuther and
Easterling (1996) recommend that only after the community is convinced that adequate
prevention and mitigation measures are in place should issues of compensation be raised.
Thus, it is advisable that the facility proponent considers different forms of equity issues and
understands the one(s) which is/are the most controversial in the siting process so as to
properly address the public concerns.
3.2.6
Public Participation
Public participation can generally be defined as “a process by which public concerns, needs,
and values are incorporated into governmental and corporate decision making” (Creighton,
2005). “It is two-way communication and interaction, with the overall goal of better
decisions that are supported by the public” (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).
Page 27
In the siting literature, much has been written on the benefits of public participation for
increasing public acceptance of facilities and thus the probability of facility siting success
(Armour, 1992; Kunreuther, Fitzgerald and Aarts 1993; Petts, 1995; Lidskog, 1997; Rabe,
1992). Further, public participation is also believed to foster trust, which in turn gives the
community more procedural equity as they are involved in how siting decisions are made
(Baxter et al., 1999). In short, it is regarded as a guiding principle for facility siting (Tuan &
Maclaren, 2005; Beierle & Cayford, 2002).
Table 3 shows the advantages of public participation in government decision making. It
shows that both citizens and government benefit from the public participation process in
terms of education, trust building and the capacity building of both parties. Moreover, public
participation can also break policy gridlock, creating better policy and implementation
decisions as outcomes.
Similarly, Creighton (2005) summarizes the benefits of public participation as: improved
quality of decisions with public input and considerations of new alternatives, minimizing cost
and delay in the long run; consensus building among stakeholders; increased ease of
implementation; avoiding worst-case confrontations especially if the public participation
takes place early; maintaining credibility and legitimacy if the process is visible and credible;
anticipating public concerns and attitudes; and developing civil society.
Empirical research on the benefits of public participation has been limited until recently,
when studies have begun to build a firm empirical base for these claimed benefits (Creighton,
2005). One recent example is the study by Beierle and Cayford (2002), who conduct an
analysis of 239 public participation cases over the past thirty years in the United States. They
evaluate public participation based on five social goals: (1) incorporating public values into
decisions; (2) improving the substantive quality of decisions; (3) resolving the substantive
quality of decisions; (4) building trust in institutions; and (5) educating and informing the
public. They concluded that “The case study record of the past 30 years paints an
encouraging picture of public participation. Involving the public not only frequently
produces decisions that are responsive to public values and substantively robust, but it also
helps to resolve conflict, build trust, and educate and inform the public about the
environment”.
Table 3: Advantages of Citizen Participation in Government Decision Making [Source:
Irvin and Stansbury (2004)]
Decision Process
Advantages to Citizen
Participation
Education (learn from and
inform governmental
representations)
Persuade and enlighten
government
Gain skills for activist
citizenship
Advantages to
Government
Education (learn from and
inform citizens)
Persuade citizens; build
trust and allay anxiety or
hostility
Build strategic alliances
Gain legitimacy of
Page 28
Outcomes
Break gridlock; achieve
outcomes
Gain some control over
policy process
Better policy and
implementation decisions
decisions
Break gridlock; achieve
outcomes
Avoid litigation costs
Better policy and
implementation decisions
However, Irvin and Stansbury (2004) also highlight how certain disadvantages of public
participation processes may emerge and how they may be overcome by effective structuring
of the processes if resources permit. As shown in Table 4, the disadvantages of public
participation include: time consuming, costly, public opinion being ignored, the process
backfiring and creating more hostility toward government. The outcomes include, for
example, a worse policy decision if heavily influenced by opposing interest groups, and loss
of decision-making control. Moreover, ineffective public participation can frustrate the
development of trust, the satisfaction of equity and siting efforts if stakeholders and the
authorities do not respect each other's values and do not agree on the principles and goals in
the process (Baxter et al. 1999).
Creighton (2005) commented that effective public participation should have the following
characteristics:
• Public participation is viewed as the way decision makers get the mandate they
need to act;
• The public participation process is well integrated into the decision-making
process;
• The interested public is involved in every step of decision making;
• Programs are targeted to ensure the involvement of all stakeholders who perceive
themselves to be affected;
• Multiple techniques are used, aimed at different audiences.
Commonly cited principles or strategies for constructing effective participatory practices in
facility siting or environmental management issues (e.g., Armour, 1992; Beierle, 1999;
Beierle & Cayford 2002; Creighton, 2005; Petts, 1995; Rabe, 1992) include early public
involvement; continuous public involvement; provision of resources for capacity building; a
collaborative environment; careful selection of a representative group of stakeholders; a
transparent decision-making process to build trust; clear authority in decision making;
competent and unbiased group facilitators; regular meetings; and adequate financial resources
to support the potentially long learning and decision-making process. If the above principles
are followed, there is a higher chance of achieving significant outcomes - more effective
community decision making and a public that accepts the new policy as the most effective
choice.
Page 29
Table 4: Disadvantages of Citizen Participation in Government Decision Making
[Source: Irvin and Stansbury (2004)]
Decision Process
Disadvantages of Citizen
Participants
Time consuming (even
dull)
Disadvantages to
Government
Time consuming
Costly
Pointless if decision is
ignored
Outcomes
Worse policy decision is
heavily influenced by
opposing interest groups
May backfire, creating
more hostility toward
government
Loss of decision-making
control
Possibility of bad decision
that is politically
impossible to ignore
Less budget for
implementation of actual
projects
Page 30
4
Experiences of Siting of LULUs in Overseas Countries
4.1 Trends of Facility Siting
Developments and trends in the siting literature show that there are increasing difficulties
involved in facility siting and in managing siting disputes (Lesbirel, 2005). During the 1970s,
early siting studies (Hamilton, 1979; Keeney, 1980) tended to focus on least-cost approaches
to site selection. Such early attempts feature the DAD (decide-announce-defend) and
technical screening techniques, with an emphasis on choosing minimum-cost sites and
ranking those sites based on technical and economic efficiency criteria (Lesbirel & Shaw,
2000).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the literature focused more on social and political aspects of
siting, predominantly based on US siting cases (Lesbirel & Shaw, 2000). O’Hare et al. (1983)
explain the reasons why communities oppose the DAD approach:
“In the first stage, the developer makes a series of technical choices with his
engineer, market analysts, and lawyers. He typically has no interaction with local
government nor those who would be affected by his decisions. Because most
developers lack eminent domain power, they often keep these decisions secret until
the appropriate land has been optioned, initial environmental reports made, and
one particular site chosen as the best. The developer then announces his
technology and site package to the public. If he mentions alternatives, they often
seem factitious. He appears to approach the public with a single firm decision
camouflaged behind impossible alternatives. His strong position sets the stage for
conflict.”
Opposition emerged towards the DAD approach, which often involves no consultation with
communities on site selection and thus breeds conflict and mistrust.
Two trends emerged in the siting literature during the 1980s and 1990s (Lesbirel & Shaw,
2000). The first one is related to attempts to devise guiding principles for managing siting
conflicts. The best example is the Facility Siting Credo (Kunreuther, Susskind & Aarts,
1993). It was developed by a group of practitioners and researchers at a national workshop
on facility siting in the US in 1990. They formulated a set of guidelines for siting noxious
and/or hazardous facilities. These guidelines were formalized in a Facility Siting Credo
which focused on developing a workable and fair procedure for locating a facility (e.g., seek
consensus through a broad-based participatory process, work to develop trust, etc.) as well as
an outcome which satisfied distributional (equity) considerations (e.g., work for geographic
fairness) as well as benefit-cost (efficiency) considerations (e.g., consider a competitive siting
process, keep multiple options open at all times, etc.) (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald & Aarts, 1993;
Kunreuther, Slovic & MacGregor, 1994). The Credo makes a distinction between a set of
procedural steps that help create a participatory environment conducive to the development of
trust and consensus building, and a set of desired outcomes that identify the goals that the
procedures should be directed toward (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald & Aarts, 1993). Table 5
summarizes the principal elements of the Credo.
Page 31
Table 5: The Facility Siting Credo [Source: Kunreuther, Susskind and Aarts (1993)]
When planning and building Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULUs), every effort
ought to be made to meet the following objectives:
1. Seek consensus through a broad-based participatory process
2. Work to develop trust
3. Achieve agreement that the status quo is unacceptable
4. Choose the facility design that best addresses a solution to the problem
5. Fully address all negative aspects of the facility
6. Seek acceptable sites through a volunteer process
7. Consider a competitive siting process
8. Work for geographic fairness
9. Keep multiple options on the table at all times
10. Guarantee that stringent safety standards will be met
11. Fully compensate all negative impacts of a facility
12. Make the host community better off
13. Use contingent agreements
14. Set realistic timetables
The second trend, developed in the 1980s and 1990s, emerged from siting experiences in
countries other than the US (Lesbirel & Shaw, 2000; Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005; Shaw, 1996).
For example, some studies (Rabe 1992 & 1994; Munton 1996) focused on siting experience
in Canada, and explored whether the Canadian experience (particularly the hallmark case of
Swan Hills, Alberta discussed in more detail in Appendix 1) has any implications for siting
policies in the US. Other studies focused on analyzing the success factors leading to
successful siting experiences (e.g., Dente, Fareri & Ligteringen, 1998), while some focused
on public participation, risk perception, trust and fairness in facility siting (Barthe & Mays,
2005; Davy, 1996; Kunreuther, Slovic and MacGregor, 1996; Linnerooth-Bayer & Fitzgerald,
1996; Renn et al., 1996; Schneider et al., 2005; Vari, 1996) in several European countries.
More recently, more (though still limited) studies have focused on siting experiences in Asian
countries including Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand (Aldrich, 2005; Chiou,
2005; Lesbirel, 1996, 1998; Li, 1998; Ohkawara, 1996; Shen & Yu, 1996; Tuan & Maclaren,
2005; Yoo, 1996). However, as noted by Lesbirel and Shaw (2000), most of the siting
literature is still heavily non-comparative in nature, particularly with respect to cross-national
comparisons, and the comparative literature is still in its infancy (Huitema, 2002).
4.2 Siting Approaches and Processes
4.2.1
A Brief Review of Siting Approaches/ Strategies
A siting approach is a broad strategy for designing and conducting a siting process (Lawrence,
1996). Different forms of siting approaches are described in the literature, and a brief review
is provided in the following paragraphs.
Page 32
Lawrence (1996) characterizes three major siting approaches as follows:
• Environmental Suitability Approach (ESA) – an ESA seeks to minimize
adverse and to maximize positive consequences. It represents a combination
of rational planning, land suitability mapping and various qualitative and
quantitative evaluation methods;
• Social Equity Approach (SEA) – a SEA focuses on procedural and substantive
fairness. Procedural equity pertains to fairness in the planning process,
especially for traditionally under-represented groups in planning and decision
making whereas substantive equity is concerned with the fair distribution of
facilities and of benefits and costs among stakeholders and over space
• Community Control Approach (CCA) – a CCA is premised upon a high
degree of process and outcome control by interested and potentially affected
individuals, groups and communities. Under the CCA, the community largely
decides its own fate
The above three approaches and their variations can be combined in a variety of ways, as
illustrated conceptually in Figure 5.
Table 6 highlights the subsets within these approaches. Besides these approaches, Lawrence
(1996) also lists a range of site selection methods which can strongly influence both the site
selection process and its outcomes. They include the groundwork that precedes the siting
process; the siting process steps; the interactions between process and project characteristics;
public, political and agency organizational and involvement procedures; and implementation.
He also lists various conflict resolution instruments that can be used to resolve disputes that
arise in the process of facility siting negotiations. These instruments include zoning,
mitigation, compensation, licensing permits and court-based strategies.
Kuhn and Ballard (1998) evaluated four Canadian siting processes from the perspective of
public participation and access to decision-making authority. They identified two basic
approaches to facility siting:
• Closed Siting Approach – Adopting predominantly a technical perspective;
this is the siting approach used by most proponents (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald
and Aarts 1993). Its major characteristic is that the balance of decision–
making power lies with the proponent. The closed approach uses a top-down
process wherein environmental data are used to reduce a generalized study
area down to a specific site. There are seven sequential stages under this
approach: (1) goal identification; (2) project characterization; (3) selection of
site specific evaluation criteria; (4) area and site screening; (5) site assessment
and selection; (6) final detailed design; and (7) site decision. However, facility
siting with a top-down orientation leads to only one outcome – an imposed
decision (Armour 1991). Closed siting approaches often fail because social
and political considerations are not given adequate consideration, not because
of environmental or technical mistakes. As such, an alternative open siting
approach has emerged that addresses public distrust, supports more effective
public involvement, and shares decision-making power.
• Open Siting Approach – This approach attempts to overcome the social and
political constraints that lead to conflicting siting problems. One basic
principle of this approach is that only communities or volunteers that would
Page 33
accommodate to host a facility are considered as potential hosts. Seven
sequential stages are identified under this approach: (1) establishment of
general environmental criteria; (2) broad public consultation with interested
communities; (3) invitation to participate; (4) consultation with interested
communities; (5) site investigation; (6) community referendum; and (7) site
decision. Communities are able to withdraw from the siting process at any
time and for any reason, and this protects them from imposed decisions and
reinforces the voluntary and cooperative nature of the approach.
Figure 5: Site Selection Approaches [Source: Lawrence (1996)]
Page 34
Table 6: Major Siting Approaches and Subsets [Source: Lawrence (1996)]
Environmental
Suitability
Constraint minimization
• Area screening/
identification
• Site screening/
identification
• Site comparison
Social Equity
Community Control
Fairness: distribution of
facilities
• Unfair locations
• Fair locations
Location control
• Voluntary
communities/local veto
• Voluntary site vicinity
• Voluntary sites
• Voluntary access routes
• Combinations of above
Opportunity maximization
• Physical suitability
• Existing facilities
• Site rehabilitation
• Compatible land uses
• Available lands
• Performance
standards – private
bids
Fairness: distribution of
costs and benefits
• Avoid imbalances
• Redress imbalances
• Redistribute to more
than redress
imbalances
Procedural control
• Citizen siting authority
• Siting partnerships
• Citizen advisors
• Use of third parties
Service maximization
• Service to facility
• Service from facility
Procedural fairness
• Participant/intervenor
funding assistance
• Conflict
resolution/consensus
building
• Community
involvement
Facility control
• Needs analysis
• Policy/programme
options
• Alternative
technologies
• Systems characteristics
• Facility characteristics
• Facility management
Variations and
combinations
• Evaluation methods
• Project type
• Proponent type
• Impact management
methods
• Environmental context
• Siting requirements
• Combinations
Variations and
combinations
• Procedural fairness
and location
distribution fairness
• Location distribution
fairness and fairness in
distribution of benefits
and costs
• Procedural fairness
and fairness in
distribution of benefits
and costs
Variations and
combinations
• Locational/procedural
control
• Procedural/facility
control
• Locational/facility
control
• Locational/procedural
and facility control
Kasperson (2005) notes that democratic countries have adopted different ways to deal with
Page 35
siting problems. He generalizes that siting approaches seem to evolve from more
technocratic ones toward more recent voluntary siting models, as follows:
• DAD (decide-announce-defend) approach which usually refers to early
attempts to site a project based on technical screening techniques. Rabe (1994)
demonstrates that this approach has not worked for some time in North
America due to strong public opposition to the siting process and outcome.
• Participatory and voluntary approach which is developed in response to
increased demands for more democratic processes, power sharing and
transparency in siting.
• Bartered consent approach which involves bargaining and compensation for
negative spillover effects. This, however, is often seen as immoral in
resolving siting conflicts because of increasing opposition to the use of
compensation.
• Voluntary/partnership siting approach which involves seeking to obtain
greater voluntary acceptance of a project given expectations for greater public
information, consultation and participation, and to engage community interests
in partnership with developers in siting the project.
However, Lesbirel (2005) comments that even though highly participatory and voluntary
approaches seem to have worked marginally better than more traditional ones, they still have
not reduced the transaction costs of siting in any meaningful way because forging social
agreements on projects will continue to be problematic where such contested values polarize
the positions of key stakeholders.
Linnerooth-Bayer (2005) argues that siting failures arise from failure to take into account
competing views of fairness in the context of major forms of social organization - hierarchy,
market and egalitarian (Table 7).
• Hierarchical approaches stress authority and procedural rationality. Fairness
is settled by administrative determination.
• Market approaches are distinguished by an emphasis on personal rights,
freedoms and economic rationality. Distributive issues are settled by market
interactions.
• Egalitarian approaches reject the unequal social relations contained in both
hierarchical and market views of farness. They morally abhor any procedures
that perpetuate social inequalities. This is reflected in demands that unwanted
projects should be sited in wealthy communities on environmental justice
grounds.
Page 36
Table 7: Proponents’ and opponents’ arguments for and against three siting approaches
[Source: Linnerooth-Bayer (2005)]
Proponents’ view
Opponents argue
that this approach:
Hierarchical
Approach
Market Approach
Egalitarian
Approach
Offers expert
assurances that the
most efficient or
least risky site is
selected
Appeals to the
notion of equal
treatment of all
citizens and
increasing human
welfare
Enables the
government to
balance the burdens
against other
benefits and burdens
in society
Imposed burdens
may be preferred to
accepting burdens
for monetary or
other compensation
Guarantees a Pareto
superior outcome
Leads to more social
and economic
equality
Resolves the siting
problem without
force
Discourages the
activity generating
the need for an
unwanted facility
Places responsibility
on the developer to
propose an
acceptable
technology and
benefit package
Places responsibility
on the citizens to
assess and approve
the technology and
monitor its
performance
Will lead to siting
facilities in poor
communities
Involves the citizens
in the process from
the beginning
Is too authoritarian
and paternalistic
Excludes viewpoints
of citizens
Will force citizens to
trade off health and
other burdens for
monetary reward
Gives too little
credence to expert
judgment
Page 37
Will paralyze
industrial economies
with too many
demands for changes
in the system
Hierarchical Siting Processes
Robust
Policy
Space
Market Siting Processes
Egalitarian Siting Processes
Figure 6: The Siting Policy Triangle [Source: Linnerooth-Bayer (2005)]
Linnerooth-Bayer (2005) suggests that the key strategy in designing an effective deliberative
approach to siting is to consider the moral boundaries of each of these cultural solidarities
and to compromise based on appeals to cultural pluralities in a deliberative process (see
Figure 6).
4.2.2
A Typology of Siting Processes
Kunreuther, Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald (1996) propose one way to categorize
differences in siting processes: by looking at decision authority and the openness of the
process.
• Decision Authority: This specifies which organization or group has the right to
make the final selection of the site(s). For example, at one extreme is the case
where the government has the authority to make a final decision independent
of whether the community residents or the general public agree with it. At the
other extreme is the ability of residents of the proposed host community to
determine whether or not to accept a facility through some type of social
consensus process such as a referendum.
• Openness of the Process: An open process is one where there is active public
participation, and the different interested parties have standing in the siting
debate and access to relevant information about the site. In a closed process,
decisions are made with little public involvement and cannot usually be
challenged by the affected citizens.
Figure 7 depicts a typology for characterizing siting processes by crossing Decision Authority
on the X-axis with Openness of the Process on the Y-axis. Four quadrants are formed by the
cross-over of the X- and Y-axis, including: (1) Open Process with Local Rights; (2) Closed
Process with Local Rights; (3) Open Process with Developer Rights; and (4) Closed Process
with Developer Rights. Examples of siting cases from Europe and North America are placed
in these quadrants. Note that the controversy over siting a high-level nuclear waste
repository in the US has moved from an open process with some local control to a closed
Page 38
process with government authority. This shows that some cases may move from one
quadrant to another over time. Such a typology provides a perspective on the advantages and
challenges of using different siting strategies for attempting to site new facilities. Kunreuther,
Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald (1996) conclude that a good siting process and a fair
outcome will vary across individuals, interested parties and regions, and it is important to
create mutual respect among those holding different concepts of fair procedures and outcome
by building the required institutions.
OPENNESS OF PROCESS
Sweden (High
Level Nuclear
Waste)
Open
Alberta (Swan Hills)
U.S. (1982)
High Level
Nuclear Waste
DECISION AUTHORITY (Community)
Developer
Rights
(National/
State/
County/
developer)
Local
(Community)
U.S. (1994)
High Level
Nuclear Waste
(Community)
Switzerland
(Wolfenschiessen)
Closed
Figure 7: A Typology of Siting Processes [Simplified from Kunretuther, LinneroothBayer and Fitzgerald (1996)]
4.3
Policy Instruments
Beyond siting approaches, the nature and effectiveness of policy instruments are also
important factors influencing the transaction costs of resolving siting conflicts (Lesbirel,
2005).
The literature identifies two broad classes of siting instruments or tools for resolving siting
conflicts: mitigation and compensation (Gregory & Kunreuther, 1990; Gregory et al., 1991;
Jenkins-Smith & Kunreuther, 2005; Zeiss & Lefsrud, 1995, 1996). Mitigation and
compensation policies are described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
4.3.1
Mitigation Policies
Two basic types of mitigation measures are used in facility siting – engineering and
institutional (Gregory & Kunreuther, 1990; Gregory et al., 1991).
• Engineering mitigation is designed to reduce the physical and perceived risks
of a proposed facility. It typically reflects well-defined probabilities based on
Page 39
the past performance of related systems. It involves activities such as placing
materials in secured underground storage tanks, designing long-term electronic
site monitoring, or installing double liners and clay membranes around waste
pools.
• Institutional mitigation seeks to regulate the operation of a facility or to
directly empower the local citizenry in the facility siting decision. It may
involve imposing fines for accidental releases, establishing local
representation on a facility’s governing board, providing additional
information about facility impacts, or developing training programs for local
health officials. It is particularly useful for overcoming mistrust in the siting
process.
4.3.2
Compensation Policies
Compensation measures emphasize cost-sharing and the redistribution of gains, utilizing
payments of money or goods to address concerns of equity and fairness. Six general types of
compensation are widely used in facility siting (Gregory & Kunreuther, 1990; Gregory et al.,
1991).
• Direct monetary payment: this approach is widely used in many nations
including the US, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam
(Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005; Munton, 1996; Shaw, 1996; Tuan & Maclaren, 2005).
• In-kind awards: these approaches include replacing impacted resources, for
example, building fish hatcheries to replace lost stock.
• Contingency funds: these set aside funds to assure that a facility will meet its
future financial obligations if an accident occurs.
• Property value guarantees: this form of compensation protects homeowners
and landowners by tying future price changes in the vicinity of a facility to
those of a larger region.
• Benefit assurances: these typically guarantee employment opportunities for
community members or tie contracts for services and materials to local
suppliers.
• Economic goodwill incentives: this form of compensation includes general
non-project expenditures, such as contributions to charities.
Gregory et al. (1991) comment that compensation has a temporal dimension. It can be
provided at the time a facility is sited (ex ante), while the facility is operating smoothly
(interim) and/or after some negative event occurs (ex post). The timing of incentives can be
critical and each option (i.e., ex ante, interim and ex post compensation) signals a different
intent on the proponent’s part and satisfies a different need of the host community.
There is growing evidence that compensation may not be as effective as a policy tool for
resolving siting disputes (Kunreuther & Easterling, 1990, 1996; Portney, 1984, 1985; Smith
& Kunreuther, 2005). Both Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) and Smith and Kunreuther
(2005) have similar findings: they conclude that compensation is a promising strategy for
gaining public acceptance for facilities on the low risk or benign end of the spectrum (e.g.,
landfills, prisons). However, it is subject to serious limitations when it comes to facilities that
the public regards as particularly risky or of questionable legitimacy (e.g., radioactive waste
repositories). The residents may view the offer as a bribe or “blood money” rather than as a
form of benefit-sharing, and this may even intensify local opposition. They recommend that
the proponent focus on mitigating the facility's impacts before introducing compensation.
Page 40
Smith and Kunreuther (2005) further suggest that levels of support are likely to be higher
where non-monetary compensation is offered first, as the communities may not view it so
strongly as a bribe or “blood money”.
Lesbirel (2005) argues that the political acceptability of benefits packages is likely to be
dependent on the risks associated with projects. Smith and Kunreuther (2005) note that the
commensurability of benefits to the risks may be more important than their absolute level in
determining the effectiveness of compensation. For example, compensation is likely to be
more successful if it satisfies residents’ concerns about economic equity (e.g., property value
guarantees), health (e.g., medical costs), if it provides other risk-reduction measures (e.g.,
hospitals near an incinerator) or if it provides for the needs of the community (e.g., free
garbage services in exchange for landfills). Therefore, the challenge for proponents in
facility siting is how to design such a compensation package to persuade the hosting
community to support the proposed facility.
4.4
LULU cases in Singapore, Canada, Japan and Taiwan
Appendix 1 provides a synopsis of LULU planning and siting cases in Singapore, Canada,
Japan and Taiwan. The key features of these overseas cases are summarized in Table 8.
Page 41
Table 8: Examples of LULUs Siting in Other Countries
Project
Singapore
Incineration
plants
Landfill
LULU
Type
Scale of
Needs
/benefits
Scale of
Impacts
Impact Type
Life &
Health
Threatening?
Main
objector/
supporter
Key concerns/
problems
Waste
facility
Regional/ Local
Environmental
Territorial (Ulu
(Air)
Pandan,
Tuas,
Senoko and
Tuas
South)
Yes
No
objection
from nearby
residents.
Safety
operation and
environmental
monitoring
Waste
facility
Territorial Local
(Offshore
Semakau)
No
No
objection
from the
public.
Environmental
protection and
monitoring
Environmental
(Ecological)
Page 42
Outcome/solution
Facility sited.
The public
trusted the
government's
competence in
siting and
operation of the
facility.
All facilities were
sited without
public
opposition.
Facility sited.
The offshore
Semakau Landfill
is the only
landfill in
Singapore in
operation since
April 1999, and
the Singapore
Government
plans to open the
western part of
the landfill for
recreational use.
Canada
Hazardous
Waste
Treatment
Facility
Waste
facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (Swan
Hills,
Alberta)
Environmental
(Air, chemical
contamination)
Yes
79% of
Swan Hills
voters
supported
the siting of
the facility
Safety
operation and
environmental
monitoring
Hazardous
Waste
Treatment
Facility
Waste
Facility
Regional/ Local
Environmental
Territorial (Montcalm, (Air and
Manitoba) chemical
contamination)
Yes
Residents
expressed
their
support for
the facility
in a
referendum.
Safety
operation and
environmental
monitoring
Special Waste
Management
Facility
Waste
Facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (Cache
Creek and
Ashcroft,
British
Columbia)
Yes
60% of
local
residents
originally
supported
the plan, but
Mistrust of the
facility's
proponent in
the siting
process
Environmental
(Air and
chemical
contamination)
Page 43
Facility sited.
With an open and
participatory
siting process and
the provision of a
full package of
compensation
measures, the
facility, which
was viewed as
addressing a local
economic
downturn, was
sited
successfully.
Facility sited.
A voluntary and
open siting
approach was
adopted,
incorporating the
principle of comanagement
between the
proponent and
community.
Facility not sited.
Integrated
Hazardous
Waste
Management
Facility
Waste
Facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (West
Lincoln,
Southern
Ontario)
Environmental
(Air and
chemical
contamination)
Landfill
Waste
Facility
Regional
Environmental No
(chemical
contamination),
nuisances and
health impacts
Energy
Facility
Territorial Local
(Hamaoka)
Japan
Nuclear
Power Plant
Local
(Aurum,
Edmonton)
Environmental
and Health
Impacts
Yes
Yes
Page 44
support then
evaporated
Local
Although
Facility not sited.
residents
extensively
involved in
decisionmaking,
citizens felt that
they had no real
ability to
influence
decisions, and
considered
themselves
“losers” in the
siting process
Local
Lack of
Facility not sited
community definition of
facility need
and community
need, as well as
the absence of
effective impact
reduction
Local
political
leaders and
local
residents
supported
the project
Concerns about
safety issues
Facility sited.
The leadership
took an approach
which addressed
local concerns in
a legitimate way,
ensuring that
large, observable
Nuclear
Power Plant
Energy
Facility
Territorial Local
Environmental
(Hohoku,
and Health
Yamaguchi Impacts
Prefecture)
Yes
Nuclear
Power Plant
Energy
Facility
Territorial Local
Environmental
(Ashihama, and Health
Mie
Impacts
Prefecture)
Yes
Nuclear
Power Plant
Energy
Facility
Territorial Local
(Suzu)
Yes
Environmental
and Health
Impacts
Page 45
Local
residents
and the
local fishing
cooperatives
strongly
objected to
the project.
They
formed an
alliance and
protested to
the local
government.
Local
residents
Local
residents
Strong
opposition to
the project
because of
public concerns
about safety
issues
Strong
opposition on
the project
because of
public concerns
about safety
issues
Strong
opposition to
the project
because of
public concerns
about safety
issues.
Facility
benefits could be
obtained from
accepting a
nuclear plant.
Facility not sited
Facility not sited
Facility not sited
Waste
Treatment
and Disposal
Facilities
Waste
Facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (T City,
Okayama
Prefecture)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Local
residents
Taiwan
Solid Waste
Incinerator
Waste
Facility
Regional
Local
(South
Taoyuan
Hsien)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Solid Waste
Incinerator
Waste
Facility
Regional
Local
(Changhua
Hsien)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Local
residents
and antiincinerator
self-help
group
Local
residents
Page 46
proponents had
economic
concerns due to
the costly and
timeconsuming
process of
building a
nuclear power
plant.
Concerns about
environmental
risks,
incomplete
disclosure of
information,
incomplete
public
participation
and inadequate
communication
procedures.
Facility not sited.
Residents’
distrust of
municipal
officers is the
chief cause of the
siting failure .
Concerns about
dioxin
emissions and
treatment of
toxic fly ash
Facility sited.
Compensation
and local political
support.
Concerns about
compensation
arrangements
Facility sited.
Compensation
and local political
support.
Solid Waste
Incinerator
Waste
Facility
Regional
Local
(Chang
Bei)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Local
residents
and antiincinerator
self-help
group
Concerns about
dioxin
emissions and
treatment of
toxic fly ash
Facility not sited.
Local
government did
not support the
project due to
strong local
objection.
Petrochemical Energy
Plant
Facility
Regional
Local
(Yulin
Hsien)
Environmental
(Air and
chemical
contamination)
Yes
Local
fishermen
and local
self-help
group
Concerns about
environmental
pollution
Local
(Taichung)
Environmental
(Air and
chemical
contamination)
Yes
Local
Concerns about
political and environmental
community pollution.
leaders.
The local
government
decided to
hold a
public
Facility sited.
The facility was
supported by
local political
leaders. The
facility provider
was committed to
providing
compensation
and employment
to local people,
who viewed the
project as helping
to improve the
local economy.
Facility not sited.
The facility
provider
withdrew the
project because
of local
objections and
the unfavourable
conditions, such
Chemical
Plant
Industrial Regional
Facility
Page 47
referendum
to determine
whether or
not to site
the facility.
Other countries (e.g., United States, Spain and United Kingdom)
High-level
Energy
Territorial Local
Environmental
Nuclear
Facility
(Yucca
and health
Waste
Mountain, impacts
Disposal
Nevada,
Facility
US)
as the fact that
the siting
decision would
be made by
referendum.
Yes
Local
residents
and local
government
Concerns about
environmental
and health risks
and
stigmatization
effects
Concerns about
environmental
risks, health
impacts, lack of
proper
information and
communication.
Concerns about
environmental
risks, health
impacts, lack of
proper
information and
communication.
Biomass
Electricity
Plant
Energy
Facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (Cricklade,
UK)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Local
residents
Waste
Facilities
Energy
Facility
Regional/ Local
Territorial (Central
Catalonia,
Spain)
Environmental
and health
impacts
Yes
Local
residents
Page 48
Facility not yet
sited, though it
has been
approved by the
Department of
Energy. The
project’s
scheduled
opening has been
delayed for 19
years.
Facility not sited.
The failure was
mainly due to the
“there-is-noalternative”
attitude of the
developers.
Facility not sited.
The failure was
mainly due to
biased
communication
strategies (largely
inspired by the
DecideAnnounce-
Defend
principle), the
underestimation
of health and
environmental
risks, the little
attention paid to
possible
stigmatizing
effects, and
ignorance about
issues of
geographical
inequity.
Page 49
5
Siting Problems in Hong Kong
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1
Hong Kong SAR: A Growing City Within a Confined Space
The siting problem is intense in Hong Kong because of its large and growing population, rapid
urbanization and development pace, and limited space available. Coupled with increasing public
awareness of environmental and health issues and the demand for more public participation in
the public policy making process, the siting problems in Hong Kong will become even more
accentuated in the future.
Hong Kong, situated at the south-eastern tip of China, is recognized as a world-class financial,
trading and business centre and a world city. It has a total area of 1,104 square kilometers and a
population of about 6.88 million (Hong Kong SAR Government [HK SAR Government], 2006).
Hong Kong is also one of the world's most densely populated areas, with a population density of
about 6,380 people per square kilometer (HK SAR Government, 2006).
In the past two decades or so, Hong Kong has undergone rapid urbanization with many new
development projects at the strategic or regional level. The following are examples of strategic
environmental impact assessment studies undertaken for various land uses, transport planning
and territorial developments (Environmental Protection Department [EPD], 2006) during the past
two decades:
• Port and Airport Development Strategy 1989
• Tseung Kwan O New Town Feasibility Study of Opportunities for Further
Development 1989
• North Lantau Development Plan 1992
• Railway Development Study 1993
• Freight Transport Study 1994
• North West New Territories (Yuen Long District) Development Statement Study
1994
• Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996
• Studies on Future Strategic Growth Areas - North Western New Territories and
North Eastern New Territories 1999
• Third Comprehensive Transport Study 1999
• Second Railway Development Strategy 2000
• Extension of Existing Landfills and Identification of Potential New Waste
Disposal Sites 2003
5.1.2
LULUs: Increasing Needs and Higher Impacts (Actual or Perceived)
Despite its small size and rapid development over the years, Hong Kong still has about 43% (or
48,200 ha) of its land area within the protected areas system, that is, designated as country parks,
special areas or put under conservation zonings and protected for nature conservation purposes
Page 50
(Environment, Transport and Works Bureau [ETWB], 2003). No development is normally
permitted in such protected areas. A study report by the government shows that there is very
little land in Hong Kong on which LULU facilities can be established without impinging on
nearby residents or areas with high conservation value (EPD, 2003).
As Hong Kong continues to develop at a rapid pace, more projects are forthcoming, with a
pressing need to find appropriate sites in which to locate them. Meanwhile, as people are better
educated and more aware of international environmental and health issues through the rapid flow
of information through the 1990s, conflicts arising from LULU sitings became more common in
different countries, especially Asian countries (Quah & Tan, 2003).
5.1.3
Responding to Changing Social and Political Profiles
Also, as Hong Kong continues to grow, we can afford neither to ignore the LULU siting problem,
nor to stick to the conventional mode of decision-making, of the decide-announce-defend (DAD)
type characterized by over-reliance on expert advice. In fact, the recent controversies over
reclamation in Victoria Harbour and the demolition of the clock tower and Queen’s Pier signify
increasing aspiration for a better quality of life and greater participation in public policy making.
Ng (2007) comments that the existing consultation process for land use in Hong Kong is
“flawed” and suggests that Hong Kong needs a participatory planning process to help decide on
land uses that will deliver quality planning outcomes. A similar comment is found in Loh (2007),
who comments that the government failed to carry out proper public consultation on the Harbour
reclamation and the public was never given a fair opportunity to raise objections to the
reclamation or to demolition of the clock tower and Queen’s Pier.
As social and political profiles evolve towards more open government and a more participatory
and transparent decision making process, the LULU siting policy will need to respond to these
changes.
5.2 Cases of Siting of LULUs in Hong Kong
Conflicts arising from the siting of LULU facilities have aroused much concern in the past and
are expected to become more aggravated in the future. In the past decade or so, a number of
LULU facility siting cases in Hong Kong have aroused public concern because of their
externalities on either ecological sensitive areas or nearby communities. Based on secondary
data analysis, including the literature, government information and newspapers, the following
siting cases are summarized in Appendix 2:
• Proposed Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Receiving Terminal and Associated Facilities
by China Light and Power Company Limited (CLP)
• Proposed Waste Incinerator by the Hong Kong SAR Government
• Upgrading of the Chemical Waste Treatment Centre by the Hong Kong SAR
Government
• Proposed Landfill Expansions by the Hong Kong SAR Government
• Proposed Central Slaughterhouse by the Hong Kong SAR Government
• Proposed Columbarium and Crematorium Facilities by the Hong Kong SAR
Page 51
Government
• Proposed Super Prison by the Hong Kong SAR Government
• Sheung Shui to Lok Ma Chau Spur Line by the Kowloon Canton Railway
Corporation (KCRC)
• AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) Treatment Facilities by the Hong
Kong SAR Government
As a synopsis of the brief analysis of LULU cases given in Appendix 2, Table 9 summarizes the
key feature of these cases. While each of these cases warrants more detailed study, it is evident
that better understanding and communication of the needs/benefits, impacts/risks, and the social,
economic and political profiles of the communities concerned are needed to address the conflicts
arising from siting of LULUs. Only by truly understanding the public concerns and objections
can we be able to solve the siting problem satisfactorily and in the public interest.
Page 52
Table 9: Recent Examples of LULUs Siting in Hong Kong
Project
LULU
Type
Scale of
Needs
/benefits
Scale of
Impacts
Impact Type
Life & Health
Threatening?
Main
objector
Key problems
Outcome/solution
Proposed Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG)
Receiving Terminal
and Associated
Facilities
Energy
facility
Territorial
Energy
industry
Local
(Soko
Island)
Environmental
(Ecological)
No
Green
groups
Proposed Waste
Incinerator
Waste
Facility
Territorial
Territorial
Local
(Tuen
Mun)
Environmental
(Air)
Yes
Green
groups,
local
community
in Tuen
Mun
Upgrading of the
Chemical Waste
Treatment Centre
Waste
Facility
Territorial
Local
(Kwai
Tsing)
Environmental
(Air, chemical
contamination)
Yes
Local
Community
Inequity among
districts
Political and
social profiles
Proposed Landfill
Expansions
Waste
Facility
Territorial
Environmental
(Ecological)
No
Country
and Marine
Park Board
Loss of
conservation area,
impingement of
authority limits
Proposed Central
Slaughterhouse
Industrial
Facility
Territorial
Territorial
(all country
parks),
local
(Tseung
Kwan O)
Local
(North
District,
Sheung
Pledge of funding to
improve local ecology.
Remaining issue: How
much compensation is
enough, and how is it
shared and managed?
Better communication of
impact assessment and
risks
Political dealings
Consideration of
alternatives
Provision of local benefits
Better communication of
impact assessment and
risks
Political dealings
Provisions of local
benefits
Better communication of
benefits and impacts
among wider spectrum of
stakeholders
Health and
Safety
Social
Economic
Yes
Local
community
Risks of bird flu
Decline of
property value
and development
Reassurance from
Government against risks
of bird flu
Consideration of
Page 53
Insufficient
justification of
needs,
equity between
impacts and
benefits
Mistrust of
incineration
Inequity among
districts
Political and
social profiles
Proposed
Columbarium and
Crematorium
Facilities
Human
Service
Facility
Territorial
Proposed Super
Prison
Human
Service
Facility
Territorial
Sheung Shui to Lok
Ma Chau Spur Line
Transport
Facility
Territorial
AIDS (Acquired
Immunodeficiency
Syndrome)
Treatment Facilities
Human
Service
Facility
Territorial
Shui)
Local
(Tuen
Mun)
prospects
Inequity among
districts
Political and
social profile
Social
No
Local
community
Regional
(Lantau
and
outlying
islands)
Local
(Long
Valley)
Environmental
Social
No
Lack of
justification of
needs and public
consultation
Environmental
(Ecological)
No
Green
groups,
local
community,
politicians
Green
groups
Local
(Kowloon
Bay)
Health and
Safety
Social
Yes
Local
community
Misconceptions
and lack of proper
communication of
risks and
consultation
Page 54
Insufficient
consultation with
green groups,
lack of proper
considerations of
alternatives
alternative sites
Better communication of
impact assessment and
risks
Political dealings
Provisions of local
benefits
Project shelved.
Alternative schemes with
higher costs and less
environmental impacts
finally adopted after legal
appeal.
Better consultation and
cooperation with green
groups.
Provision of benefits to
improve local ecology and
eco-tourism.
Legal proceedings
Better communication on
impact assessment and
risks
Better public consultation
6
Conclusion
A new and positive perspective of the NIMBY phenomenon has emerged in this post-modern
world. Instead of being regarded as an ignorant response or irrational protest, it is increasingly
being recognized as a well considered and legitimate public response to issues which underpin
broader public interest such as public decision making, government spending, sustainability and
democracy. Public opposition to LULUs can be attributed to a host of factors, such as unclear or
unjustified need, significant impacts, risks and risks perceptions, social distrust, inequities and
poor decision making processes.
Siting approaches have evolved over time from the more technocratic or DAD (decideannounce-defend) approach to a more participatory and voluntary approaches as practiced in
some Western nations. Mitigation (engineering and institutional mitigation) and compensation
(monetary and non-monetary compensation) are the major siting instruments used by some
countries. The effectiveness of mitigation and compensation may depend on the socio-economic
and socio-political situations of the proposed site.
Indeed, the siting of LULUs facilities is a dynamic process that is shaped by local characteristics
of the site, including its environmental, geographical, social, economic and political
characteristics. As such, different approaches and instruments are called for different countries
and type of facility giving due consideration to the specific needs, concerns, values and character
of the community, and the leadership and commitment of the government/proponent. The key is
to nurture mutual respect among different stakeholders in the siting process so as to reach a
socially acceptable consensus for the good of the public.
This monograph has discussed the basic understanding of LULUs and the process of conflict
resolution in siting of LULUs. While much of the existing research has focused on individual
relevant aspects such as community characteristics (e.g., demographic characteristics), LULU
characteristics (e.g., functions and impacts), or psycho-social responses (e.g., perception of risk
and safety issues), a conceptual framework based on an extensive literature research of siting
theories and case studies would help policy makers, planners, impact assessors and the public
achieve a better understanding of the complex issues involved. This conceptual framework has
been introduced in Chapter 2 and is depicted as Figure 1. To conclude this monograph, we shall
return to this framework and trust that this will give us an overall picture and insights into the
complex issues in the siting of LULUs.
Forming the core of the framework are the three key components:
• Nature of the LULU
• Actor Interactions
• Community Response
Proper understanding of the nature of a LULU, its needs, benefits, impacts and risks, is essential.
The interactions among actors are embedded in a multi-stakeholder process, which is multidimensional and multi-directional. The dynamic of this process influences and is affected by the
understanding of the nature of the LULU on one hand, and the community response on the other
Page 55
hand. Community response may be opposing or welcoming. The multi-stakeholder process may
help merge the two horizons and extremes, towards finding a solution acceptable to all parties
concerned for the good of society as a whole.
Outside the inner core of the framework are the external political, social-economic, geographical
and environmental settings which impose constraints on the whole conflict resolution process.
However, opportunities can be explored under these settings to help shape the process and
finding acceptable solutions.
Hong Kong is, as it has always been, a dynamic and rapidly growing city. It faces changes in its
economic, social and political arenas. The environmental challenges that Hong Kong faces are
significant, although not insurmountable. “Work together harmoniously for another new miracle”
is both a political slogan and a dream, whether illusive or realistic. This dream is challenged
every time a LULU is proposed, and the risk of a shattered dream is real. It is hoped that this
monograph will provide all interested parties with a better understanding of LULUs, and the
conceptual framework proposed may serve as a diagnostic tool and guiding framework towards
the fulfillment of this dream and a sustainable future for Hong Kong.
Page 56
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Appendix 1: Review of Siting Experiences in Singapore, Canada, Japan and Taiwan
This section reviews LULU siting experiences in Singapore, Canada, Japan and Taiwan, each of
which adopts different siting approaches (i.e., DAD, participatory/voluntary and battered consent
approaches) and policy instruments in the siting process. The similarities and differences
between them are compared based on three main aspects: (1) physical, socio-political and
economic characteristics of the hosting community/region/country; (2) siting approaches and
processes; (3) siting instruments - mitigation and incentives/compensation. Special attention is
given to factors which have led to successes and/or to the lessons learned from the siting
processes for managing siting conflicts in these countries.
A1.1. Hazardous Facilities Siting in Singapore
Singapore became an independent Republic in 1965. Owing to its limited land area and lack of
resources, the government has had to fully use Singapore’s only natural resources – its people
and the island’s strategic location – to meet its economic and social needs (Tan, 1999; Dale,
1999). The following provides a summary of the relevant key issues in the siting of LULUs,
particularly hazardous facilities, in Singapore.
(1) Physical, socio-political and economic characteristics:
1A. Geographical/
Land Use
Singapore is an island of 699.4 sq km and comprises one main
island (617.1 sq km) and some 63 offshore islands (Singapore
Government, 2006). It has a hilly terrain in the central and
northern parts of the main island (Tan, 1999). It has a total
population of 4.351 million (2005 figures from Singapore
Government (2006)) and the population density is 6,222
persons per sq km.
Since 1958, Singapore has a Master Plan on clearly demarking
siting of factories, commercial and residential usage (Yuen
1998; Dale 1999). The Master Plan is the statutory land use
plan which guides Singapore's development in the medium
term, over the next 10 to 15 years. It is reviewed once every
five years, and translates the broad long-term strategies as set
out in the Concept Plan into detailed implementable plan
(Urban Renewal Authority [URA], 2006).
Since the Concept Plan is a strategic land use and
transportation plan, its broad strategies will be translated into
detailed proposals through the Development Guide Plans
(DGP) (Yuen, 1998; Tan, 1999). In total, 55 DGPs have been
prepared for the whole Singapore as 55 respective planning
areas between 1993 to 1998. The DGPs are concerned with
planning and development at the local level and will set out
land use details, development control parameters and urban
A1-1
design guidelines. The DGPs seek ways to eliminate
discordant development, including hazardous sites within an
area if it poses a danger or nuisance to the surrounding
residents (Sien, 1996). The overall aim of DGPs is to
optimize land development potential of the local area and to
guide both public and private sector development.
The DGPs are displayed for public comment and any
complaints about the use of a site for a facility that might be
considered to be obnoxious or objectionable can be raised and
dealt with at an early stage (Sien, 1996). As each DPG is
completed and gazetted, it replaces the corresponding part of
the Master Plan.
In Singapore, the heavy and polluting industries are located on
the coast and on nearby offshore islands, while medium and
light industries are furthest from residential and commercial
areas (Sien, 1996). A buffer zone of 50-500 m are provided
depending on whether they are light, general or special
industries (Yuen, 1998). The physical separation of such
industries from populated areas helps to explain the absence of
public pressure on industries arising from environmental
pollution (Sien, 1996).
1B. Socio-Political
Singapore gained the status of self rule in 1959 from the
British colonial administration and subsequently, for a brief
period (1963-1965), it became a part of the Malaysian
Federation, before becoming a sovereign state on 9 Aug 1965
(Tan, 1999).
Singapore has been widely known for its efficiency, strong
government, limited democracy and economic priorities (Bell,
1997; Hwee, Li & Lin, 2005). The governing philosophy and
ruling strategies of Singapore can be summed up as
utilitarianism (pragmatism) and elitism (Hwee et al., 2005)
and these two philosophies or ruling strategies are playing a
significant role in facility siting in Singapore as explained
below.
One of the main themes about pragmatism is to ensure
economic progress (Hwee et al., 2005). In facility siting, the
Singapore government has shielded industries from public
protests through a “forward looking land use planning” and
the benefits have been interrupted growth and prosperity
(Sien, 1996). Moreover, the Singapore government has
established powerful legislation to enable her to acquire land
A1-2
from individuals or organiszations, to enable land to be
developed in an orderly manner and to maximize the value of
the limited land (Sien, 1996). Sien (1996) states that there has
been large scale relocation or shut-down of industries
including the hazardous facilities in Singapore and such
decisions of shut down or relocation are made entirely by the
government without consultation with the people.
The other long held belief and approach of the Singapore
government is elitism (Hwee et al., 2005). It reflects the belief
that leaders are the best judges and the guiding forces of the
country’s destiny. According to Hwee et al., (2005), during
the past two decades of nation-building in the 1960s through
to early 1980s, the government did not consider it particularly
important to consult Singaporeans or promote their
participation in the political system. The relationship between
Singapore government and its people is described to be “a
long-standing one bonded by trust” and their relationship was
built on the subtle consensus of tangible material returns in
exchange for acceptance of a paternalistic regime. The ruling
party People’s Action Party (PAP) would want the
government-people relationship to be based on rationality
rather than sentiment and that people should respect and trust
the government and let the government rule the country
without much hindrance (Hwee et al., 2005).
However, as noted by Sien (1996), whether or not the public
complaints will in time grow into organized public protests
against siting of existing or intended hazardous facilities will
depend in part on the credibility of the government in working
for the good of the people in making decisions.
1C. Economic
The strategy of Singapore economic development is to create
employment and generate income through rapid
industrialization (Tan 1999). The total GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) in 2005 is S$194,359 million and the per capita GDP
is S$44,669.96 (or US$31,457.25) (Singapore Government
2006). The per capita GDP in 2005 represents about 15 folds
increase as compared to 1960 figure (S$3072.5) and 2-fold
increase to the 1990 figure (S$21245.3) (Sien, 1996).
(2) Siting Approaches and Processes:
2A. Siting Approaches
The siting approach adopted by the Singapore
Government is the typical DAD (decide-announcedefend) or top-down approach, as the decision-making
A1-3
power lies with the proponent (Sien, 1996).
The DAD or top-down approach generally exhibits seven
sequential stages: (1) goal identification; (2) project
characterization; (3) selection of site specific evaluation
criteria; (4) area and site screening; (5) site assessment
and selection; (6) final detailed design; and (7) site
decision (Kuhn & Ballard, 1998). Once the facility
design has been completed, a site is announced to the
prospective host community. A process of education and
defense of the project begins in order to “demonstrate”
the environmental and technical credibility of the
decision. Public input may be formally required in the
siting process, but often with little or no room for
negotiation, and the proponent is the decision maker
determining the final outcome.
2B. Siting Processes
The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is
Singapore's national land use planning authority. Land
use planning for housing, commercial, educational and
recreational facilities, roads and industrial estates and so
on are included in the Master Plan.
In the drawing up of the Master Plan, URA works with
other government agencies to establish requirements for
the various major land uses and facilities provision (Tay,
2006 pers. comm.). Polluting major items of
infrastructure such as incineration plants and sewage
treatment plants are usually located away from
residential areas (e.g., on outlying islands and in
industrial estate areas) (Sien, 1996; Tay, 2006 pers.
comm.). Major infrastructure installations are zoned as
"Utility" in the Master Plan.
The draft Master Plan proposals are exhibited for public
inspection for a minimum of 2 weeks. This is required
under the Planning (Master Plan) Rules 1999 so that the
public can lodge objections or make representations
before the proposals are finalized by the URA (Tan,
1999).
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(3) Policy Instruments:
Mitigation
As the planner and entrepreneur for the country, the
Singapore Government uses planning to facilitate the
optimal use of Singapore’s scare resources and to resolve
development conflicts in the overall interest of the state for
the common good (Yuen, 1998; Dale, 1999). In particular,
the physical separation of polluting industries from
residential areas has played an important role in mitigating
or avoiding the possible public sentiments on the siting of
the NIMBY facilities (Sien, 1996).
For example, the National Environment Agency (NEA)'s
solid waste disposal infrastructure comprises four
incineration plants - Ulu Pandan, Tuas, Senoko and Tuas
South, and an offshore Semakau Landfill (National
Environmental Agency [NEA], 2006). A total of 2.55
million tonnes of waste was disposed of in 2005. More than
2.28 million tonnes or 89.4% of the refuse was incinerated,
while the remaining refuse was landfilled. Three of the four
incineration plants (Ulu Pandan, Tuas, and Tuas South
Incineration Plants) are located in or near industrial estates,
and the fourth (Senoko Incineration Plant) lies at the
northern tip of the country. All are remote from residential
areas. In fact, given such a physical separation between the
incinerator plants and the residential areas, no situations
have arisen where the building of an incineration plant has
needed to be postponed or abandoned (Wong, 2006 pers.
comm.).
The Semakau Landfill (350 ha), the only landfill in
Singapore has been in operation since April 1999 and is
expected to last till 2040. The landfill was created by
constructing a 7 km perimeter rock bund that encloses the
sea between Pulau Semakau and Sakeng islands. It is lined
with an impermeable membrane; leachate is processed
properly and the environmental impacts are monitored.
Moreover, mangroves are planted outside the perimeter bund
for biodiversity conservation. The Singapore Government
planned to open the western part of the landfill for
recreational use in 2005 (NEA, 2004/2005).
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Summary – Siting NIMBY Facilities in Singapore:
In summary, two major factors contribute to the success of LULU siting in Singapore. Firstly,
unlike citizens in many western countries who do not trust their governments but rely more on
the public participation process and the private sector (Rabe, 1991), Singaporeans in general trust
the government in their siting decisions, understand the need for these facilities, and accept the
trade-offs (Quah, 2006 pers. comm.). Secondly, the Singapore government’s effectiveness in the
planning of its scarce land resources is seen as a form of mitigation to pre-empt possible public
complaints or sentiments arising from the siting of NIMBY facilities, as these polluting
industries are physically separated from the residential areas (Sien, 1996; NEA, 2006).
A1.2 Siting of Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities in Swan Hills, Alberta, Canada
The Swan Hills integrated hazardous waste facility, located in north central Alberta, stands as a
hallmark of siting success (Dean, 2005; Harris, 1993; Kuhn & Ballard, 1998; McQuaid-Cook,
1992). The process began in 1981 and concluded in 1984. The Alberta Special Waste Treatment
Centre, which includes treatment, incineration and landfilling, was officially opened in 1987 and
became the first hazardous waste facility in Canada to be sited using both environmental and
social criteria and employing the open siting approach (Rabe, 1991). The two innovative
features of the process were that only communities that satisfied technical feasibility criteria
would be eligible, and then only if they volunteered to be considered as a possible candidate
(Rabe, 1992). It was also the only hazardous waste facility to be sited in North America during
the 1980s (Tammemagi, 1999). The following provides a summary of the relevant key issues in
the siting of the Swan Hills integrated hazardous waste facility.
(1) Physical, socio-political and economic characteristics:
1A. Geographical/
Land Use
Swan Hills, Alberta, is situated about 200 km northwest of
Edmonton (Rabe, 1991; McQuaid-Cook, 1992). The site has a
good transportation link to Edmonton and has no neighbouring
land users, so that the support of nearby towns was not
required (Tammemagi, 1999). In addition, the site has no
value for agriculture or forestry, nor is it prime habitat for
wildlife or birds (McQuaid-Cook, 1992). There is no adjacent
surface water and no potential for flooding; the also site has a
dense clay layer, providing a natural containment barrier for
safety against contamination from any source (McQuaidCook, 1992).
1B. Socio-Political
Swan Hills, Alberta, a town of 2,396 people, has a high level
of trust in its elected local officials, mayor and councils (Rabe,
1991, 1992). The strong support of local political leaders was
essential in building trust and grass-roots support in the siting
process. Leaders emphasized the positive economic
development potential of the facility, the voluntary nature of
the exercise, the need for such a facility, and the concern that
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1C. Economic
wastes in the province, including their region, were currently
being managed in an unsafe manner (Tammemagi, 1999). The
mayor and council were proactive in encouraging citizens to
attend meetings about the proposed facility siting
(Tammemagi, 1999).
There was a decline in the oil and gas industry in Alberta in
the 1980s, and many areas, including Swan Hills, were
considering options to the slumping oil and gas business.
Therefore, from the community perspective, the proposed new
facility could help overcome a decline in the oil and gas
industry, provide new jobs, and also lure new industries and
tourists in the town (McQuaid-Cook, 1992; Tammemagi,
1999).
(2) Siting Approaches and Processes:
2A. Siting Approaches
The siting approach adopted in the case of Swan Hills
was the voluntary/partnership or open approach. Such
an approach attempts to overcome the social and
political constraints that lead to siting conflicts or
gridlock. It has seven sequential stages: (1)
establishment of general environmental criteria; (2)
broad public consultation; (3) invitation to participate;
(4) consultation with interested communities; (5) site
investigations; (6) community referendum; and (7) site
decision (Kuhn and Ballard 1998). A key feature is that
the communities are able to withdraw from the siting
process at any time and for any reason. This “opt-out”
principle protects communities from imposed decisions
and reinforces the voluntary and cooperative nature of
the approach (Kuhn & Ballard, 1998).
2B. Siting Processes
2B(i) Pre-siting Consultation
The government of Alberta established the Hazardous
Waste Management Committee in 1980 to investigate the
need for waste treatment, options for disposal and siting
process reforms after recognizing that the traditional
DAD approach would be unlikely to succeed (Kuhn &
Ballard, 1998).
The Committee proposed a siting process that involved
the three main parties – the community, the private sector
and the provincial government (Rabe, 1991, 1992). One
key was an emphasis on voluntarism: only communities
that offered to host the site would be considered. The
private sector’s role was to plan and operate the facility.
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The province was responsible for developing siting
criteria and a public participation program.
Siting criteria were applied through constraint mapping,
which ruled out parcels of Albertan territory that were
deemed inappropriate for various physical, biological,
economic, social, and political reasons (Rabe, 1991).
The siting constraint mapping was largely a result of
exhaustive consultation with the public, an important
part of the process that provided for extensive public
participation at each stage (Rabe, 1991). In particular, an
important policy of the public participation program was
to be open and honest with the public at all times, and
educate the public as to the nature of the hazardous waste
problem and alternative remedies (McQuaid-Cook,
1992; Rabe, 1991). Particular emphasis was placed on
communication from the very outset of the process.
With the underlying theme of safety and protection of
human health, the siting program worked to find
candidate sites that were environmentally and socially
acceptable (McQuaid-Cook, 1992).
2B(ii) Siting Implementation
The Alberta Cabinet later created a Hazardous Waste
Management (HWM) Team to identify a site for a
facility under a siting policy of strict environmental and
social criteria (Kuhn & Ballard, 1998). The HWM Team
was committed to strong public involvement and public
relations throughout the process. The independence of
the HWM Team also helped to establish community trust
by diminishing the fear of imposed decisions (Kuhn &
Ballard, 1998).
The public information and participation program was
long-term and involved all stakeholders, including
opposition groups; all information was made public
(McQuaid-Cook, 1992). In particular, the information
meetings and frequent sharing of technical and related
reports with community organizations served an
educational purpose and demonstrated to the public the
need for the facility (Kuhn & Ballard, 1998).
The public involvement and public relations for facility
siting in Alberta occurred in four phases (Kuhn &
Ballard, 1998; Rabe, 1991; Tammemagi, 1999):
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(1) Phase 1 consisted of a broad public involvement
program targeted at the provincial level. A total of 120
informational meetings were held throughout the
province.
(2) Phase 2 was a focused consultation program with
communities that volunteered to consider hosting the
facility. Fifty-two jurisdictions requested these
consultation and analyses. Siting criteria were
developed with the communities and applied through
constraint mapping.
(3) Phase 3 comprised the establishment of liaison
groups in potential host communities. Altogether 14
communities expressed interest in continuing in the site
selection process. Of these, nine dropped out either
because of technical unsuitability or in response to
strong public opposition. The remaining five
communities held plebiscites in 1982, and Swan Hills,
with 79% of voters in support, was selected as the host
for the facility in 1984.
(4) Phase 4 comprised the establishment of a postsiting
liaison committee to ensure the continued support of the
community during the construction and operation stages.
2B(iii) Post-Siting Liaison
When Swan Hills was chosen by the Cabinet as the
successful candidate for Alberta’s Special Waste
Treatment Plant, a Liaison Committee was formed to
liaise with the plant operator and with the Town Council
to monitor plant construction and operations. This
volunteer committee is in addition to the official channel
of communication between the elected officials of the
Town of Swan Hills and the Swan Hills Treatment
Centre (EarthTech, 2005).
Through the Liaison Committee, local issues are
identified and addressed at regular monthly meetings
with the operator in order to broaden the understanding
of the operation of the Swan Hills Treatment Centre in
the community and surrounding region. Swan Hills and
area residents can raise issues and voice their concerns
through the Committee. The Liaison Committee also
facilitates regular tours of the facility and is involved in
the review of annual environmental monitoring results.
In short, the Liaison Committee functions to identify
community issues related to facility operation and help
communicate responses (EarthTech, 2005).
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(3) Policy Instruments:
3A. Mitigation
3B. Incentives/
Compensation
The principle used in site selection was that no site meeting
the social criteria was accepted unless it could also meet
basic environmental criteria. As such, during the site
selection process, all areas with any environmental,
biological, cultural or land use constraints were eliminated
no matter whether they were socially acceptable or not. This
constraint mapping based on the physical siting criteria helps
safeguard both the environment and public safety (Kuhn &
Ballard, 1998; Tammemagi, 1999).
There were some possible economic and social advantages
associated with the acceptance of the facility in Swan Hills.
For example, the construction of a facility with an
anticipated $45 to $50 million in capital costs and creation
of an estimated fifty-five new jobs would boost the area's
economy and its capacity to attract desired developments,
such as a new hospital (Rabe, 1991).
In addition, a comprehensive package of benefits to the
community also formed a key part of the siting negotiations.
For example, the crown corporation (a publicly held
enterprise, which is quite common in Canada) provided the
following: a grant of approximately $105,000 to cover
expenses of town meetings, consultations with experts,
travel expenses, hiring a consultant to review monitoring
data, purchasing a van to transport town people to the site,
and subsidized housing for approximately 35 family units.
The private corporation responsible for development and
operation of the facility supplemented these benefits with the
following: golf course development, other educational,
sporting and cultural activities, planting 400 trees for town
beautification, and a special surveillance program for all
facility employees (Rabe, 1991).
Summary - Siting of Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities in Swan Hills, Alberta, Canada:
The siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities in Swan Hills established a model of success
with public involvement early in the planning and design process (Dean, 2005). This effectively
turns away from the DAD (decide-announce-defend) approach which failed repeatedly in
Canada and the United States toward a more open and voluntary approach – a “consult-decideannounce-consult-improve” process (Rabe, Becker & Levine, 2000; Tammemagi, 1999).
Some specific conditions led to the success of the Swan Hills case (Kuhn & Ballard, 1998; Rabe,
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1991, 1992; Tammemagi, 1999) including: (1) allowing the public to understand and accept the
need for the proposed facility through a public education and participation program; (2)
provision of extensive opportunities for public participation early in the policy making process,
and keeping the public informed and giving them access to information about the siting process;
(3) commitment of the proponent to share decision making power with the community; (4)
development of economic and related incentive packages for the host community to compensate
for the inconvenience and potential risk they are accepting; and (5) recruitment of credible and
capable policy professionals to guide policy making on complex policy issues and build trust
during the process .
A1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan
Japan has consistently developed nuclear plants since the 1960s. According to Lesbirel (2003),
Japan had 31 nuclear power plants in 1985 and 52 plants in operation by 2001, and it is expected
that between 10 and 13 more power plants will be required by 2010. A key feature of the nuclear
power plant implementation process in Japan is the indirect role played by the central
government in creating innovative strategies (e.g., incentives and compensation tools) in an
attempt to smooth the siting process (Aldrich, 2005; Lesbirel, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000; Ohkawara,
1996, 1999). Another feature is the negotiations between private power companies and regional
interests over the allocation of costs and benefits expected from the siting of the plants (Lesbirel
1990, 1996, 1998, 2000; Shaw, 1996). Both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan have modeled
their institutions on Japanese institutions of compensation mechanisms in facility siting (Lesbirel,
2000). While the comprehensiveness of the incentive and compensation policy tools has helped
Japan manage transaction costs historically, their effectiveness seems to be declining in the light
of increased safety concerns and an increasingly active citizenry (Aldrich, 2005). The following
provides a summary of the relevant key issues in the siting of nuclear power plants in Japan.
(1) Physical, socio-political and economic characteristics:
1A. Geographical/
Land Use
Almost all Japan’s nuclear plants and fossil-fuelled plants are
found in coastal regions, due to geographical factors
(mountainous inland regions offer little flat and stable terrain,
and inland rivers cannot provide sufficient cooling waters);
technical factors (the need to unload nuclear fuel from ports)
and demographic factors (relatively sparse population density)
(Lesbirel, 1996, 2000).
A second distinctive feature is the relatively high
concentration of plants at any given site. Even though Japan
has a comparatively long coastline, site availability is limited
in coastal regions due to climatic reasons, scarce land
resources and competing claims on those resources, and the
political acceptability of certain regions (Lesbirel, 1996).
Coastal areas are the home of Japan’s domestic fishing
industry, and fishermen have historically been the most
A1-11
vociferous opponents of Japan’s nuclear program because they
are concerned about the impacts of radiation on fish and on the
fishing industry and about the discharge of wastewater into the
surrounding seas (Lesbirel, 1998).
1B. Socio-Political
After the 1973 energy crisis, the Japanese government
recognized the importance of locating new nuclear power
plants smoothly. It began taking a more active role in
promoting a comprehensive energy policy and working to
promote power plant location as a part of its energy policy
(Ohkawara, 1996).
In 1974, the government established the Dengen Sanpou
(Three Basic Laws Related to the Development of Power
Supply Regions), which aims to promote the development of
nuclear energy (Aldrich, 2005; Lesbirel, 1990, 1996, 1998,
2000; Ohkawara, 1996, 1999; Shaw, 1996). The role of the
national government is to provide some fundamental
infrastructure to the regions where power plants are proposed,
to improve the local economy and living environment
(Lesbirel, 1996, 1998).
In 1992, the Electric Utility Industry Council’s Subcommittee
on Fundamental Issues worked out a new concept for
“Regional Symbiotic Power Plants”. The philosophy is to
think and act with the community to achieve self-supported
promotion of the siting of existing or planned plants
(Ohkawara, 1999). Ohkawara (1996, 1999) further developed
the concept and proposed that power plants seeking regional
symbiosis should consider three main elements: “Participation
in the community”, “Openness to the community”, and
“Harmony with the community”. For harmonious coexistence
with the community, electric power companies must be fully
aware of the various factors of the region in which they are
located, including history, culture and social background.
Without deep understanding of the basic structure of the
region, an electric power company cannot possibly think or act
with the community (Ohkawara, 1996).
In retrospect, in the decades when the post war political order
was retained, the central government had dignity and respect,
and most local citizens accepted the decisions made by the
central government (Ohkawara, 1999). It was relatively easier
to obtain the acceptance of power plant siting by offering
various economic benefits (Aldrich, 2005; Ohkawara, 1999).
However, it became much harder to obtain public support for
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siting after the mid-1980s because of increased safety
concerns and an active citizenry (Aldrich 2005; Lesbirel
2000). For example, at least three power firms abandoned
plans for nuclear plant siting in Hohoku, Yamaguchi
Prefecture (1994), Ashihama, Mie Prefecture (2000) and Suzu,
Ishikawa Prefecture (20040; and the reason for the
abandonment of their plans was strong public opposition,
which made the negotiations more difficult, costly and timeconsuming (Japan for Sustainability, 2004).
As noted by Ohkawara (1999), money cannot buy support for
siting; monetary compensation or subsidization is necessary
but no longer sufficient. It seems that more needs to be done
to resolve the difficulties of power plant siting in Japan. For
example, addressing safety concerns through risk mitigation
and creating more legitimate decision-making processes are
important conditions for siting very risky projects (Kunreuther,
Linnerooth-Bayer & Fitzgerald, 1996).
1C. Economic
Power plants support the economy of the hosting and
neighbouring areas. For example, 4,493 people were
employed within the five power jurisdictions (Ohkawara,
1996).
Moreover, the effect of a power plant on local government
revenues is enormous. For example, power plant construction
brings increased revenues in the form of property taxes and
transfers from the central government (Ohkawara, 1996).
(2) Siting Approaches and Processes:
2A. Siting Approaches
2B. Siting Processes
Japan has adopted a battered consent or market approach
to nuclear plant siting which involves bargaining and
compensation, and places responsibility on the proponent
to propose an acceptable technology and benefit package
to the hosting community (Lesbirel, 1996).
Although the government has legal jurisdiction over the
electricity markets, private electric utilities are directly
responsible for the planning and siting of power stations
(Lesbirel, 1996).
Site selection is based on five major criteria including:
the existence of flat and stable terrain, the availability of
cooling water, a relatively low population density
(particularly for nuclear plants), accessibility to
transportation routes and proximity to major load centres
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(Lesbirel, 1996). These criteria yield two distinct
locational features: almost all Japan’s nuclear plants are
found in coastal regions, and they are highly
concentrated at any one given site (Lesbirel, 1996).
Power companies must notify a local government of
their intent to site a plant, win public acceptance, obtain
the necessary construction license, and receive an
operating permit (Lesbirel, 1998). Public acceptance
involves reaching broad social and political agreement
on the proposal. The political consensus between the
proponent and affected community interests is achieved
though negotiations about how the expected costs and
benefits of project development will be shared (Lesbirel
1996 & 1998).
Siting processes in Japan have historically been
characterized by a high degree of openness, with
decision authority being clearly vested at the local
community level. EPDCC (Electric Power Development
Coordination Council) approval is the outcome of the
negotiating process. There is considerable public
involvement by local stakeholders in negotiations, local
communities have veto power over placement decisions,
and private developers and the national government have
not been able to bypass local governments in siting
energy or other noxious facilities.
In short, open and pluralistic bargaining processes are a
feature of siting in Japan (Lesbirel, 1996).
(3) Policy Instruments:
3A. Mitigation
3B. Incentives/
Compensation
In Japan, mitigation measures to reduce the impacts of and
risks associated with power plants include, for example,
minor and major design changes, plant location changes, the
use of monitoring stations, and even delaying project
development to give local communities more time to
consider the new social and economic order that the
development would bring (Lesbirel, 2000).
Historically, Japan has used two sets of mechanisms - the
Compensation Standards and the Three Electric Power
Development Laws (Three Laws or Dengen Sanpou), to
compensate for the risks associated with nuclear plants
(Lesbirel, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000). These mechanisms are
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explained as follows:
(1) The first mechanism is the Compensation Standards
Governing Electric Power Development (Compensation
Standards), developed by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) in 1963 and later extended to cover
power plants. The Compensation Standards require private
utilities to offer direct monetary compensation to holders of
legally recognized property rights in return for the transfer of
those property rights. Recognised property right holders
include individuals and groups with fishing, land and
customary rights such as agricultural production, forest
cultivation or capitalising on it as an asset (Lesbirel, 1996,
1998, 2000).
Apart from monetary payment for property rights transfer,
the Standards also explicitly allow the provision of other
monetary and non-monetary forms of compensation to both
property right owners and other community interests. Power
companies may offer direct subsidies for community capital
such as bridges and hospitals to increase the expected
benefits of the project. They may also offer indirect
subsidies such as preferential employment, preferential local
purchases, symbolic and political compensation
(appointment to regional decision making bodies). They
may also provide contingent compensation to reduce the
costs borne by future generations (Lesbirel, 1996, 1998,
2000). However, it is possible that under-the-table deals and
bribery are also used in Japan (or other countries) in facility
siting (Lesbirel, 1996).
(2) The second mechanism is the Three Electric Power
Development Laws: the Law for Bettering the Public
Facilities of Communities Neighbouring Electricity
Facilities, the Law for the Tax of Electricity Development
and the Law for the Special Accounting System for the Tax
of Electricity Development. These "Three Laws" were
established by MITI in 1974. The aim of the Three Laws is
to redistribute some of the gains arising from power plant
development from the national community to local
governments accepting power plants and to immediately
adjacent governments in the form of social overhead capital.
There are three elements in the provision of subsidies.
Power companies are taxed on electricity sold, although the
national public ultimately pays these taxes in the form of
higher electricity prices. These taxes are then channeled into
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a special account under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry. Finally, they are redistributed to communities hosting facilities and to adjacent
communities in the form of subsidies for local development
and the provision of public infrastructure, such as roads,
parks, hospitals and schools (Lesbirel, 1996, 1998, 2000).
In short, compensation is an important component of the
bargaining process in Japan for nuclear plant siting, and the
various forms of compensation schemes are complementary
to each other (Lesbirel, 1996). For example, the
Compensation Standards essentially provide direct monetary
compensation to property right holders and to a lesser extent
to regional communities, while the Three Laws offer indirect
monetary incentives to local and neighbouring communities
to address intra- and inter-community distributional
concerns.
Summary - Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan:
A key feature of facility siting in Japan is the market or battered consent approach. It makes use
of a sophisticated set of institutionalized compensation mechanisms and arrangements to allow
the project developers with considerably flexibility in managing complex bargaining processes
involved in siting power plants (Aldrich, 2005; Lesbirel, 1996). These mechanisms were
historically successful in the management of siting conflicts in Japan.
However, with the increase of public concerns on safety and active citizenry, the siting process is
less rosy than before and it seems that more needs to be done to address the public concerns on
safety (e.g., risk communication and management) and build trust on the government institutions
(e.g., through legitimate decision processes) (Lesbirel, 1996, 2000; Ohkawara, 1999). In short,
Japanese experience suggests that formal compensation arrangements are a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for effective siting nowadays.
A1.4 Siting of Solid Waste Incinerators in Taiwan
Due to rapid economic development, Taiwan's waste generation also grew rapidly from the
1980s to the mid-1990s. To address the solid waste crisis, the government of Taiwan adopted an
incineration policy for waste disposal. The original policy involved construction of 36 municipal
solid waste incinerator projects, to handle a projected 90% of Taiwan’s waste (EPA, 1999). In
2004, by which time 19 incinerators had been completed, EPA reviewed the government's waste
management policy and decided not to build the other 17 incinerators due to strong local
interests and public opposition, as well as the reduction in residential waste generation in recent
years (EPA, 2004).
The fact is that a NIMBY protest movement has emerged with Taiwan’s transition to democracy
A1-16
since the mid-1980s, and the rise of the NIMBY movement has caused great public opposition to
the siting of incinerators (Hsu, 2006). In response, both the Kuomintang (KMT) government and
the more recent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government have used the strategies of
compensation and local political support to assuage community opposition to the siting of
incinerators. The following provides a summary of the relevant key issues in the siting of solid
waste incinerator plants in Taiwan.
(1) Physical, socio-political and economic characteristics:
1A. Geographical/
Land Use
Taiwan is an island of 36,000 km2 carrying a population up to
23 million (Tourism Bureau, 2006). About two-thirds of
Taiwan is mountainous, leaving only one-third of the island as
habitable land (Shen & Yu, 1997).
Twenty of the twenty-two completed solid waste incinerator
plants located in Taiwan are found in the western and northern
periphery of the island (EPA, 2007). This may be due to the
fact that the western and northern side of the island has a
better wind dispersion effect compared to the eastern side,
helping to substantially minimize the impact of air pollution
on local citizens.
1B. Socio-Political
In the 1960s and 1970s, both the Kuomintang (KMT)
government and the general public had a pro-development
mentality. As a result, negative effects of industrial
development were often ignored or discounted (Shen & Yu,
1997). In the 1980s, the NIMBY phenomenon gradually
became a factor in Taiwan. To date, public opposition against
existing or proposed solid waste disposal facilities is always
identified as the most difficult problem encountered in solid
waste management programmes (Hsu, 2006; Shen & Yu,
1997).
One of the major social factors that contributed to the
widespread NIMBY syndrome in Taiwan since the early 1980s
is the rapid growth of environmental awareness among the
general public (Shen & Yu, 1997). This may have arisen
because of the significant increase in reports of environmental
and health news by the mass media starting in the late 1970s.
Another factor is related to the political liberalization in the
1980s in Taiwan. Many social movements have come to
develop, and the 1980s has been described as “the age of
social force” (Hsiao, 1989). After 1980, citizens gradually
learned how to organize among themselves in order to
challenge the government’s role in handling public policy, so
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as to protect their basic rights. Such Taiwanese social
movements have created a new type of action – namely extralegal actions or, more recently, self-help actions. Shen & Yu
(1997) comment that such social actions (e.g., blocking or
encircling the entrances to factories or sites in order to stop the
normal operation or construction of the unwanted facilities)
are an effective method of opposing locally unwanted land
uses or facilities, forcing the local government to negotiate
with the citizens.
1C. Economic
The economy of Taiwan is well-known in the world, leading to
the island being included among Asia’s “four dragons”. The
affluent economy has raised the people’s living standards, but
has also exacerbated the waste problem due to the typical mass
production and consumption cycle. Waste generation in
Taiwan grew rapidly from the 1980s to the mid-1990s. Due to
the limited land available for constructing new landfills, the
government of Taiwan adopted the incineration waste policy
as a new alternative for waste management (EPA, 1999).
Rapid urbanization and industrialization in the 1960s and
1970s has led to a sharp increase in the value of urban
marginal land since the 1970s (Shen & Yu, 1997). The land
values of urban marginal lands grew rapidly in parallel with
the increasing land prices of most urban areas. Because of the
sharp increase in land prices in many urban marginal areas in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, owners of such lands were
very sensitive and watchful of any factors that might influence
the value of their lands. This was the main factor causing
citizen opposition to government decisions to site locally
unwanted land uses such as waste disposal or treatment
facilities near their lands (Shen & Yu, 1997).
(2) Siting Approaches and Processes:
2A. Siting Approaches
Taiwan has adopted a battered consent approach to siting
solid waste incinerators (Lesbirel, 2005). The
government of Taiwan used compensation to induce the
support of local communities and to reduce the intensity
of local opposition to the siting of incinerators.
However, unlike Japan, the compensation agreements
were not reached through bargaining and negotiation
among the involved stakeholders. They were generated
by the central government and applied with the same
standard to each incinerator siting case (Hsu, 2006).
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Negotiation and agreement between the local
communities and facility provider would only come after
heated environmental disputes and conflict (Shaw, 1996).
2B. Siting Processes
In Taiwan, local governments are responsible for
selecting sites and issuing licenses for the construction of
incinerators (Hsu, 2006). As Taiwan has transitioned to
democracy, the role played by elected local politicians is
becoming central to incinerator construction.
Hsu (2006) reports that in the 1990s, unlike many other
hazardous development facilities opposed by the
opposition DPP party, incinerator sites proposed by the
KMT government were supported by DPP controlled
local governments and elected DPP county magistrates.
Moreover, the issue of waste management has never
significantly affected the outcomes of county
magistrate’s elections. Without political risks, and
coupled with the fact that the central government
provides financial subsidies and technical consultancy to
strengthen the capacity of local county governments in
siting waste incinerators, elected local politicians have
few reasons not to support the siting of waste
incinerators in their local areas. However, the KMT
government often took suppressive actions in dealing
with local protests even if it had local political support,
because the government usually treated such local
protests as illegal activities (Hsu, 2006; Lai et al, 1999).
In 2000, the DPP government took political power from
the KMT. By the end of 2001, the EPA under the DPP
government was still following the original incinerator
construction program planned by the KMT government.
However, in 2004, the EPA announced that “apart from
the 19 incinerators already completed and in operation,
the other 17 will not be built due to opposing political
parties in each region as well as strong local interests and
public opposition” (EPA, 2004). The decision to review
the existing waste incineration policy was also due to the
marked decrease in residential waste generation
throughout Taiwan.
(3) Policy Instruments:
3A. Mitigation
The Taiwan EPA has set up a strict regulation and
monitoring program for improving the safety of incineration
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technology and the quality of incinerator operation. In
particular, they report the level of dioxin, toxic fly ash and
other air pollutants on the EPA’s web for public inspection
(EPA, 2007).
3B. Incentives/
Compensation
The strategy of using compensation to win the support of
local communities and to reduce the intensity of local protest
to the siting of incinerators is very common (Chiou, 2005;
Hsu, 2006).
The most common forms of compensation for siting
incinerators include the following:
• provision of community facilities (e.g., swimming pools,
recreational sports facilities)
• exemption from garbage fees
• funds for the elderly
• scholarships for students
• subsidies for community activities
Furthermore, innovations have been made in the design and
appearance of incinerator plants to reduce public resistance.
For example, the Beitou Incinerator in Taipei, opened in
1999, has built a revolving restaurant and observatory in the
chimney tower. Such an innovative design is the first one in
the world (Beitou Incinerator Worldwide, 2005).
However, Hsu (2006) comments that without a mechanism
for bargaining and negotiation between siting communities
and incinerator developers, the use of compensation and
symbolic public relations meetings have failed to achieve
legitimate resolution and settlements.
The literature (e.g., Chiou, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Li, 1998)
stresses that technology and compensation alone are not
likely to address all public opposition to the siting of
incinerator plants in Taiwan. The expectation of public
participation in the siting process should be fully addressed
and satisfied.
Summary – Solid Waste Incinerator Siting in Taiwan:
The siting of solid waste incinerators in Taiwan has been strongly opposed, as shown by
community protests which emerged with Taiwan’s transition to democracy from the late 1980s
A1-20
onwards. The key strategies used by the Taiwan government to reduce or resolve public
opposition are compensation and support from local politicians and government for incinerator
siting. Nevertheless, without a mechanism for bargaining and negotiation between siting
communities and incinerator developers, the use of compensation and symbolic public relations
meetings have failed to achieve legitimate settlements (Hsu, 2006).
To allay public concerns with dioxin emission and the safe operation of the incinerators, neither
scientific persuasion nor compensation is likely to change the public’s attitude about incinerator
siting. It is important to address public concerns by fully incorporating citizen participation in
the whole siting process – from site selection, planning and construction through operation.
A1-21
Appendix 2: Summary of Recent LULU Cases in Hong Kong
Project
1. Proposed
Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG)
Receiving
Terminal and
Associated
Facilities
Proponent
China Light
and Power
(CLP) Hong
Kong
Limited
Type
Energy
facility
Location
Soko
Islands
Reasons of Siting Conflicts
In 2005, CLP proposed to build a Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) terminal in Hong Kong to secure a long-term supply
of natural gas and meet air emission targets. An
environmental impact assessment (EIA) study focusing on
two site options – Black Point and South Soko – was
submitted to the Environmental Protection Department in
October 2006 (China Light and Power [CLP], 2005, 2006a).
CLP stated that they engaged with stakeholders and the
community in the course of the EIA study and held more
than 350 seminars, meetings, workshops and exhibitions
(CLP, 2006a).
CLP announced that South Soko was the preferred option for
the LNG terminal in September 2006 before they formally
submitted the EIA report to the government in mid-October
(CLP, 2006b). CLP also announced that there would be an
enhancement plan associated with the LNG terminal project,
including, for example, funding the establishment of marine
parks, the deployment of artificial reefs, enhancement of
educational and recreational facilities, and so on (CLP,
2006b).
Six local green groups jointly objected to the South Soko
option in mid-October 2006, arguing that “the inevitable
impact caused by the construction and operation of the
proposed LNG terminal to the ecology at and around the
Soko Islands, including the Chinese white dolphin, is not
justified” (Cheung, 2006a, 2006b; World Wide Fund For
Nature Hong Kong [WWF HK], 2006). They called on CLP
and the Hong Kong government to find other viable
alternatives, and meanwhile urged the Government to
designate the waters around the Sokos as a marine park due
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Outcomes
In January 2007, the EIA
report was discussed by
the EIA Sub-Committee
of the Advisory Council
on the Environment
(ACE). The EIA SubCommittee referred the
decision to the full
Council pending further
clarification from the
proponent (Cheung,
2007).
The report was discussed
at an ACE meeting on 12
February 2007. It was
endorsed by ACE with
the conclusion that the
project will have
insignificant ecological
impacts on marine life
and noting that CLP has
agreed to spend HK$100
million to enhance the
marine and land
environment of South
Soko (Cheung & Wong,
2007).
to its high marine conservation value (WWF HK, 2006).
Some groups also raised the concern that the need for an
LNG terminal in Hong Kong, and the appropriateness of
having it constructed and owned by CLP, had not actually
been evaluated or proved by independent parties (Cheung,
2007a; Green Lantau Association [GLA], 2007; Living
Island Movement [LIM], 2007).
The World Wide Fund For Nature Hong Kong (WWF HK)
launched an on-line petition campaign against the proposed
LNG terminal at South Soko Island in December 2006 and
received 8,000 signatures against CLP’s LNG plan at South
Soko (Cheung, 2007b.
2. Proposed Waste
Incinerator
Hong Kong
Government
Waste
Facility
Tuen
Mun
For some time, the Hong Kong SAR Government has been
considering the development of an integrated waste
management facility with incineration as the core technology
for final waste treatment for Hong Kong (EPD, 2005). It
was reported that the proposed incinerator would burn up to
5,700 metric tons of solid waste, making it possibly the
largest scale facility in Asia (Yung, 2005).
It was recently reported that the Government had completed
a consultancy study on the site selection for such a waste
incinerator, but the report has not yet been made available to
the public (Huang, Ma & Ye, 2007). A local newspaper
quoting a reliable source (Huang et al., 2007) reported that
the consultancy report recommended Tuen Mun West as the
site for the proposed waste incinerator . It is preferred to
other site options because of its physical location, allowing
emissions to be dispersed more easily without significant
impacts on nearby residents.
However, the local green groups have repeatedly voiced
their concerns about the incineration plan and the health
impacts of dioxin emitted from incinerators (Yung, 2005).
A2-2
As the government has
not yet formally released
the site selection report,
full details of the
incineration plan and the
proposed site are not yet
available for public
review and comment.
However, based on the
experiences of many
other nations or cities, it
is foreseeable that the
siting of such a largescale incinerator will
cause much public
concern about
environmental, health
and safety impacts.
One local community group, which opposes the incinerator,
raised concerns about dioxin emissions and called upon the
government to build it on a remote island (Huang et al.,
2006). Some legislators are also concerned that the
Government is too focused on waste incineration, and may
drag its feet with regard to the recycling of waste (Yung,
2005).
3. Upgrading of
the Chemical
Waste Treatment
Centre
Hong Kong
Government
Waste
Facility
Tsing Yi
The Legislative Council passed the Waste Disposal
(Amendment) Bill, which includes the introduction of a
Clinical Waste Control Scheme, in March 2006 (EPD, 2006).
Additional facilities will be provided at the existing
Chemical Waste Treatment Centre to receive and treat
clinical waste collected in Hong Kong.
This proposed upgrading works has caused serious health
concerns and objections among nearby residents and the
Kwai Tsing District Councillors, even though the
government promised to spend HK$ 0.3 billion dollars to
mitigate the impacts by providing noise abatement and
recreational and leisure facilities in Tsing Yi (Legislative
Council [LegCo], 2006; Cai & Mo, 2006).
As the Legislative
Council passed the
Waste Disposal
(Amendment) Bill, the
Tsing Yi Chemical Waste
Treatment Centre will be
upgraded as planned, but
it remains to be seen
how the Tsing Yi
community’s concerns
about the health impacts
can be fully addressed
by the Government.
In October 2006, some Tsing Yi residents and Kwai Tsing
District Councillors demonstrated at the Tsing Yi Chemical
Waste Treatment Centre and demanded that the government
remove the treatment plant (reported by the South China
Morning Post, 2006, October 9). Residents complained that
the chemical waste treatment centre had turned their home
from a beautiful district, home to 230,000 people, into a
polluting factory. They also attacked the Government for
failing to listen to their views and for upgrading the plant
instead of moving it elsewhere.
4. Proposed
Landfill
Hong Kong
Government
Waste
Facility
Tseung
Kwan O
The three strategic landfills in Hong Kong will be full by
2015 instead of their designed capacity date of 2020 because
A2-3
As the EIA report for the
three proposed landfill
Expansions
Hong Kong’s waste arisings have exceeded the expected
amount (EPD, 2005). As the existing strategic landfills are
running out of space, the EPD has commissioned
engineering and environmental studies to look into the
feasibility of expanding the landfills.
In September 2006, EPD consulted the Country and Marine
Park Board regarding the proposed landfill expansion in
Tseung Kwan O. However, members of the Board had
reservations about the government’s plan to expand the
existing South East New Territories Landfill (Parwani,
2006). In particular, they were very concerned that the
planned expansion would encroach 5 ha into the Clear Water
Bay Country Park.
expansions is still in
progress, it too early to
judge the possible
environmental and other
impacts and how the
public may react to
them.
The members were concerned about opening the floodgates
of development into the Country Parks and causing
irreparable damage to the natural landscape. They urged
government to consider other alternatives to the plan.
5. Proposed
Central
Slaughterhouse
Hong Kong
Government
Industry
Facility
Sheung
Shui
In early 2006, the Government proposed to build a central
slaughterhouse with a capacity of 60,000 chickens a day in
Sheung Shui, so as to reduce the risk of bird flu in the urban
wet markets where poultry are currently processed (Moy &
Yu, 2006).
The proposed site lies about 200 meters from a residential
area in Sheung Shui. Villagers and the Sheung Shui District
Council strongly opposed the site because of the high bird
flu risk to the local residents (Moy & Yu, 2006).
In August 2006, after strong opposition from North District
Councillors and the Heung Yee Kuk against the previously
proposed site, the Government considered another site
further from residential areas (Asprey, 2006). The
Government warned that there is no backup plan if this
A2-4
In the face of opposition
from some North
District Councillors, the
Government decided to
site the central
slaughterhouse near Man
Kam To Road - the
second site option
reported by Ming Pao
(27 October 2006). The
Government promised to
implement strict
operating controls to
reduce the risks of bird
flu during transport and
processing. The facility
second site location is rejected, and that they will consider
importing chilled chicken from the mainland (Asprey, 2006).
is expected to open in
2009.
However, the second site also met with opposition from
North District Councillors in October 2006 (Sun, 2006).
The District Councillors are concerned that if the central
slaughterhouse is sited in the second location, near Man
Kam To Road, it may worsen the traffic situation in the
district. Some also are worried that the plant, if sited in the
North District, may affect the desires of the property
developers to build more high-rise buildings in the area
(Sun, 2006).
6. Proposed
Columbarium and
Crematorium
Facilities
Hong Kong
Government
Human
Service
Facility
Tuen
Mun
In February 2006, it was reported that the Government was
planning to build a dozen columbarium towers and
crematorium facilities on the outskirts of Tuen Mun. The
planned facilities will be able to store the remains of 300,000
people, helping to resolve the acute shortage of resting
places for the dead (Chan, 2006). The site is considered
ideal because of its size and remote location.
It was reported that the
government is assessing
the impacts of the
proposed columbarium
on Tuen Mun and will
consult the public in due
course (Chan, 2006).
However, the scheme has already drawn opposition from
residents and district councillors, who say Tuen Mun District
should not be treated as a dumping ground for unpleasant
facilities (Chan, 2006). They are outraged over the plan for
a huge columbarium near their homes because Tuen Mun
District has already been saddled with all kinds of
unpleasant developments such as a power station, landfill,
cement works, recycling park, sewage treatment plant,
aviation fuel receiving terminal and river trade terminal
(Chan & Chan, 2006; Leung, 2006).
However, it remains to
be seen how the
cumulative inequity
suffered by Tuen Mun,
home to many locally
unwanted developments,
may be satisfactorily
resolved in the future.
A legislator who is also the Tuen Mun District Councillor
has said that the New Territories West Development receives
inequitable treatment when compared with the East side.
A2-5
Tuen Mun receives fewer resources but is always the target
for unpopular infrastructure. He urged the government to
care about the development of Tuen Mun and enhance its
environment with improved facilities (Chan & Chan, 2006).
7. Proposed Super
Prison
The Hong
Kong
Government
Human
Service
Facility
Hei Ling
Chau
In May 2003, the Government sought HK$46.7 million in
funding for a detailed engineering study to build a super
prison on 114 ha of land reclaimed from the sea between the
largely pristine islands of Hei Ling Chau and Sunshine
Island, plus a massive fixed crossing to South Lantau
(Security Bureau 2003). It was said that the super prison
would solve the prison overcrowding problem in Hong Kong
(Chok, 2004).
However, green groups and other community groups such as
the Living Island Movement (LIM), formed of Lantau
residents concerned about the super prison project, raised
strong objections to the super prison plan because of the
government's failure to justify the need for the facility at this
location, the failure to consider alternative sites, the lack of
public consultation on need and site selection, and the
expected significant environmental impacts of the proposed
prison plan associated with the massive reclamation works
and the bridge to South Lantau (Chan, 2004; LIM 2006;
WWF HK, 2003).
Because of the strong public objections, the Finance
Committee of the Legislative Council split the project into
two stages (Finance Committee of the Legislative Council,
2003). The first stage (costing around $7 million) involved a
technical and sustainability assessment of different options
for land formation and infrastructure. The second stage
(costing around $40 million) is intended to cover more
detailed assessments of the preferred development option.
The Government undertook to report to the Finance
Committee the findings of Stage 1 of the feasibility study
A2-6
Because of the strong
public opposition to the
proposed super prison
project, especially
concerning justification
of the need, the choice of
siting and defects in the
public consultation
process, the Government
decided to shelve the
project and will not seek
funding for Stage 2 of
the feasibility study.
This incident shows that
justification of the need
for a project and a
proper public
participation program
are important to gain
public support for siting
LULUs/ NIMBY
facilities.
before proceeding to Stage 2.
Stage 1 of the feasibility study started in September 2003
and was completed in May 2004 (Civil Engineering
Department, 2004; Security Bureau, 2004a). The
Government said they conducted two rounds of public
consultation involving statutory/advisory bodies, a wide
range of community groups, green groups, and other
interested parties. However, the LIM said the Government
lied and misled the public about the prison plan, and denied
that there had been genuine public consultation about the
need for or siting of the facility (Gentle, 2004).
During the Stage 1 consultation, the majority of the
respondents did not support the proposed project. The
objections received by the Government fell mainly into the
following categories: questioning the need for the prison
project, demanding alternative solutions to solve the prison
overcrowding problem, criticizing the site selection process,
criticizing the failure to justify the need to co-locate penal
institutions, questioning the need for a fixed crossing to
South Lantau, questioning the cost-effectiveness of the
project, criticizing the land requirement as excessive,
pointing out potential security risks to nearby areas, and
citing potential impacts on the environment and natural
resources (Security Bureau, 2004b).
The Government finally decided to shelve the project for the
time being due to the fierce public opposition, and it will
consider other options including development of existing
penal sites to ease prison overcrowding (Cheung, 2004;
Security Bureau, 2004b).
8. Sheung Shui to
Lok Ma Chau Spur
Line
Kowloon
Canton
Railway
Transport
Facility
Long
Valley
In 1998, the KCRC proposed to build a railway connecting
Sheung Shui to Lok Ma Chau. The 7.4 km railway passing
through Long Valley was gazetted in 1999. Long Valley is
A2-7
Soon after the second
EIA report was accepted,
KCRC announced that
they would set up an
Environmental
Committee under the
chairmanship of a
member of KCRC's
senior management and
In June 2000, the EIA report submitted by KCRC for the
Spur Line Project was released for public consultation. Nine green group
representatives to
local green groups and the Hong Kong University
Department of Ecology and Biodiversity united to protest the oversee the
implementation of the
routing of the Lok Ma Chau Spur Line through Long Valley
mitigation measures
(HKBWS, 1999).
(Kowloon Canton
Railway Corporation
EPD received over 200 public objections to the EIA report.
[KCRC], 2002).
In October 2000, EPD rejected the Spur Line EIA report
based on the potential environmental and ecological impacts
The Spur Line Project
of the project and the fact that alternatives had not been
will soon be completed
thoroughly explored (EPD, 2000).
and will commence
operation in 2007
In November 2000, KCRC lodged an appeal to EPD’s
rejection of the EIA report. However, in July 2001, the EIA (KCRC, 2006).
Appeal Board adjudicated and the appeal failed (EIA Appeal
Board, 2000).
Corporation
(KCRC)
the second largest freshwater wetland in Hong Kong, with
high conservation value for bird biodiversity: about 220
species of birds have been recorded there (Hong Kong Bird
Watching Society [HKBWS], 1999).
In January 2002, KCRC submitted another EIA report
outlining a tunnel/ viaduct option for public consultation.
EPD issued the environmental permit with conditions in
March 2002 (EPD, 2002), and the Government finally
endorsed the project.
9. AIDS (Acquired
Immunodeficiency
Syndrome)
Treatment
Facilities
Hong Kong
Government
Human
Service
Facility
Kowloon
Bay
Disputes over the provision of AIDS treatment services in
the Kowloon Bay Health Centre and protests from
neighbourhood communities lasted for six years, from 1995
to 2000 (Chen, 2002).
In July 1995, the residents of Richland Gardens learnt that
the Kowloon Bay Health Centre would provide treatment
A2-8
The dispute was settled
in 2001 following an
out-of-court settlement
between three residents
and the Equal
Opportunities
Commission.
services for AIDS patients. They started to worry about the
spread of HIV, the AIDS virus, and the impact of the centre’s
development on the environment of the neighbourhood
(Chen, 2002).
In August 1995, residents of Richland Gardens signed
statements objecting to the Government’s plan to build the
Kowloon Bay Health Centre near their homes. In October
1995, the District Board also urged the Government to stop
building the health centre at the proposed site and to create a
leisure site in its place (Chen, 2002).
Due to the residents' strong objections, the Government
decided to shift the health centre 25 metres southward,
slightly away from Richland Gardens. The Richland
Gardens residents continued to oppose the plan and to
protest through different channels (Chen, 2002).
In October 1996, construction work began and residents
tried to stop the project. The Health Centre was eventually
completed in 1999. As the previous interdepartmental joint
meetings on the clinic project had failed to ease the worries
of the residents, the Government formed a Community
Liaison Group for the Health Centre, hoping that it might
lead to breakthroughs in communications with the residents
(Chen, 2002).
The staff of the Health Centre were verbally harassed by
some residents outside the Centre, and some residents
obstructed the staff from passing through Richland Gardens.
In 1999, the Equal Opportunities Commission started a case
study on the Health Centre and was prepared to consider
prosecuting residents of Richland Gardens for harassing to
the Centre's staff and clients (Chen, 2002).
In November 2001, the Equal Opportunities Commission
A2-9
Chen (2002) reviewed
the role of the
government and
different agencies in the
incident, and made some
recommendations on
facility siting and
planning,
communication and
education about AIDS
and AIDS patient
services, public
consultation, etc. in his
study report.
commenced legal proceedings against three defendants on
the grounds of discrimination. Finally, with the help of the
Community Liaison Group’s chairman and a district
councillor, they negotiated an out-of-court settlement and the
defendants wrote apologies for their acts (Chen, 2002).
A2-10