Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight
Author(s): Roberta Wohlstetter
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1965), pp. 691-707
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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CUBA AND PEARL HARBOR:
HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT
By Roberta Wohlstetter
and October
of September
recall the atmosphere
1962 now seems
than two decades
almost as difficult as to recreate the weeks, more
TO
the
earlier, before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But if we are to understand
onset of the Cuban missile
crisis, it is worth the effort. Indeed we may learn
about the problems of foreseeing and forestalling
or, at any rate,
something
side
side
of
such
the preludes
crises
the
by
by examining
diminishing
severity
to both these major turning points in American
these
history. In juxtaposing
rather than in
separate events, our interest is in understanding
temporally
like to know not only how we felt, but what we did and
drama. We would
what we might have done, and in particular what we knew or what we could
have known before each crisis.
come naturally
following the first wave of relief and jubila
Afterthoughts
of the
tion at having weathered
crisis and forced the withdrawal
the missile
contrast with Pearl
the obvious
But it is good to keep in mind
missiles.
a great failure of
Harbor. At the least, Pearl Harbor was a catastrophe,
was a narrow
and
missile
crisis
decision.
At
the
the
very worst,
warning
its outcome must be counted as a success
escape. Taken as a whole, however,
both for the intelligence
and the decision-makers.
But a com
community
success
a good
at
of
failure
Harbor
and
Cuban
reveals
the
Pearl
the
parison
success
deal about the basic uncertainties
the
and
failure
of
intelli
affecting
gence.
It is true for both Pearl Harbor and Cuba that we had lots of information
crisis. In discussing
this information
it will perhaps
about the approaching
be useful to distinguish
again between signals and noise. By the "signal" of an
a
a clue, a piece of evidence
that points to the action
action is meant
sign,
or to an adversary's
to undertake
the
intention
it, and by "noise" is meant
in the wrong
of irrelevant or inconsistent
signals, signs pointing
background
the signs pointing
that tend always to obscure
the right way.
directions,
shows how hard it is to hear
Pearl Harbor,
looked at closely and objectively,
a signal against the prevailing
noise, in particular when you are listening
of information.
for the wrong signal, and even when you have a wealth
(Or
are clearly cases when
riches can be em
then. There
perhaps especially
barrassing.)
After the event, of course, we know:
like the detective-story
reader who
turns to the last page first, we find it easy to pick out the clues. And a close
of Pearl Harbor
look at the historiography
accounts,
suggests that in most
memories
of the noise and background
confusion have faded quickly,
leaving
the actual signals of the crisis standing out in bold relief, stark and preter
naturally
clear.
take their place. For a
After the crisis, memories
fade and recriminations
time the Cuban missile crisis figured as an outstanding
triumph for the United
in the retention of Ameri
States?in
the swift discovery of "hard evidence,"
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FOREIGNAFFAIRS
692
can initiative,
in the strict security maintained
and in the taut control of
some of these aspects of the
Committee.
power by the Executive
Today,
critics talk of a
Cuban crisis have been thrown into doubt, and in particular,
failure
crisis.
In
Pearl Harbor
in
the
both
significant
intelligence
anticipating
of silence has been raised, the sugges
and Cuba the notion of a conspiracy
tion that we knew all along and failed to act, that Kennedy,
like Roosevelt,
or that information was so
had some special information which he withheld,
obvious that even a layman could have interpreted
it correctly.
New York's
for example, was explicit and articulate
in
Senator Keating,
or
missiles
Soviet
and
insisting that he believed
long-range
medium-range
combat troops were in Cuba as early as August. On August
31 he said in the
on landings between August
Senate that he had reliable information
3 and
1200
at
of
of
the
Cuban
Mariel
Soviet
15
troops wearing
port
August
fatigue
uniforms. He also reported that "other observers" had noted "Soviet motor
on Cuban
the presence
roads in military
of
convoys moving
formation,"
landing craft, and of suspicious cylindrical objects that had to be transported
on two flatcars, and so on. He claimed that his statements
had been verified
Between August
31 and Octo
by official sources within the U.S. Government.
ber 12 he made ten Senate speeches warning
of the Soviet military
build-up.
After the crisis, Congressmen
naturally wondered why we had not listened
to have had these warnings
to Senator Keating,
and
it was possible
why
15. But failures to foresee and
many others and still be surprised on October
are by no means abnormal. Military
men and states
to forestall catastrophes
on being taken by surprise. The example of the Dallas
men have no monopoly
police department
springs to mind, and the murder of Oswald which gave rise,
to rumors of conspiracy
in high places and in local govern
like Pearl Harbor,
ments. Nor are American
and financiers
immune. Witness
businessmen
the
cautious bank
$150 million De Angelis vegetable-oil
scandal, where normally
ers suddenly found they were holding empty storage tanks as security for their
loans.
Conspiracy
tion,
as
with
is suggested
the culprit,
by
a recent
however,
natural
is hardly
a universal
catastrophe?the
line of explana
earthquake
in
and
near Alaska that sent a tidal wave to shatter the northern shore of California
and caught some towns unprepared
in spite of timely warnings.
For the
in the past that had not been
sounded
others
warnings
just like many
are all American
followed by tidal waves. These
but Singapore,
examples,
on
"Barbarossa"
attack
German
others
and
many
(the
suggest that
Russia)
we are not dealing with a purely national
to
susceptibility
surprise.
II
and intelligence
Defense
of course,
departments
agencies,
continually
can do, may do, intends to do. They try to gauge
estimate what an opponent
to determine his usual ways
the technical limits within which he is operating,
of behavior, under what
conditions
he will probe, push or withdraw.
They
estimate
the risks
try to measure what risks he will take, and how he might
to us of countering
him. Much
of this work by American
is sound,
analysts
not
brilliant?but
thorough,
intelligent,
frequently
ingenious and sometimes
infallible. Unhappily,
of
these
estimates
but
be
any
may
partly,
critically,
is never enough.
wrong. A wealth of information
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CUBA AND PEARL HARBOR
693
To get a rapid idea of the mass of data available for predicting
the Cuban
crisis and the Pearl Harbor
attack, let us run through the main
intelligence
sources. In the case of Cuba, there was first of all magnificent
photographic
coverage
as well
as visual
reconnaissance.
The
Navy
ran
air
reconnaissance
of all ships going in and out of Cuba, especially
in Soviet
ships originating
or satellite ports during the summer of 1962, and intensified
this sort of
reconnaissance
coverage during September. High-level
by U-2s
photographic
over the island of Cuba was taking place at the rate of one flight every two
weeks until the month
of September,
when
it increased to once a week.1
Low-level
reconnaissance
photographic
began
only after the President's
first being on October
23. In addition to photog
speech of October 22?the
accounts
from Cuban refugees who were leaving
raphy, we had voluminous
the island in a steady stream. We had agents stationed on the island who
were reporting, and we were
from Cuba. The
listening to radio broadcasts
some announcements
Cuban press, while
carefully
controlled, was making
are interesting
which
in retrospect. A number of European
correspondents
stationed on the island were reporting to their newspapers,
though the Ameri
can
press
was
not
welcome.
His cas
Finally, but by no means
least, we had Castro's pronouncements.
ual interviews with reporters, debates with
of pris
students,
interrogations
television
oners, and nearly interminable
speeches offer a rich fount of infor
mation.
If you wait
long enough, it seems, Castro will tell you everything.
The only problem in a crisis is that you may not be able to wait that long.
Castro
is noted for his slyness, and he is perhaps better able than most
to keep a secret. But sometimes
Cubans
he cannot resist hints that may
reveal a trap before his victim
falls into it. And often in real rather than
calculated
anger he will show his hand.
For predicting
the Pearl Harbor
States Government
attack, the United
sources.
had an equally
of
aerial sur
array
impressive
intelligence
Though
a system
veillance of the Japanese fleet was limited, the Navy
had developed
of pinpointing
the location of ships and deducing
their types by radio-traffic
the call signs of various ships,
analysis. This was accomplished
by analyzing
even though we could not read the content of the messages.
Any change in
call signs was in itself a cause for alarm, and it took usually several weeks of
close listening to an enormous amount of traffic to re-identify
the call signs.
Call signs were changed on November
1.We
1, 1941, and again on December
had not identified the new ones by December
7.
While we had not broken any military
codes, we did have one superlative
source that is perhaps comparable
to the evidence provided by U-2 photog
raphy. That was the breaking of the top-priority
Japanese
diplomatic
code,
as well as some less complicated
known as MAGIC,
codes used by Japanese
consular observers. We were listening in on diplomatic messages
on all the
circuits?to
so on.
and
major Tokyo
Rome,
Berlin, London, Washington
an Army cryptographer,
Colonel Friedman,
had devised a machine
for rapidly
so that, in general, we knew what a message
said
decoding these messages,
before its intended Japanese
in
stationed
recipients. Our ground observers,
1
Flights
irregularity
over
the
took place on
to bad weather.
island
is attributed
September
5,
17, 26,
29, October
5, 7 and
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14. The
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
694
key ports
along
the coast of China
and Southeast
Asia, were
reporting
in by
radio.
Ambassador
staff in Tokyo were experienced
Grew and his Embassy
ob
servers of local economic
and political
activities. Grew himself had a very
sound estimate of Japanese character and diplomacy,
censor
but as Japanese
warn
in
closed
the
last
few
the
to
Grew
had
weeks
before
ship
during
attack,
was
on
to
he
that
unable
any
report
prepara
Washington
accurately
military
tions then under way. American
in Japan were also
newspaper
correspondents
to our own
In addition
quite well informed and shrewd in their reporting.
we
with
British
information
At
that
sources,
exchanged
date, our
intelligence.
own intelligence
ex
officers did not trust British
fully. They
intelligence
a
over
unease
certain
amount
of
methods
of
British
in
up
pressed
picking
as
which
but
underhanded.
As
General
they
regarded
sophisticated
formation,
Sherman Miles put it, U. S. intelligence preferred to be "above board." How
ever, the British provided us with some good leads and lots of corroborative
information. And there was, of course, the Japanese press, which proclaimed
to the American
in Asia, and announced
presence
Japan's undying hostility
with increasing violence
the Japanese
intention to expand to the south.
In sum, for each of the two crises there was plenty of information
suggest
is a closed society,
and even though
ing its advent. Even
though Cuba
and tight security, the
Japan, in the last weeks, was under heavy censorship
data provided by U. S. intelligence
were
excellent.
Once more, then,
agencies
we come to the question, what went wrong? With
all these data, why didn't
we know that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor on December
7? Why, when
it seems so clear in retrospect,
didn't we anticipate
that Khrushchev
might
into Cuba? Why
missiles
didn't we seize the first indica
put medium-range
tions that such installations were on the way? Weren't
these early signs clear
enough?
they were not, and almost never are. Even with hindsight,
Unfortunately,
we are not able to reconstruct
the exact sequence of events that led to the
of our sources are alive, and some of them are
crisis. Most
Cuban missile
talking. But what can we say with certainty about Cuban and Soviet motives?
for example, has spoken on many occasions
about why missiles were
Castro,
the view that he requested
them and
into
Cuba. But he swings between
put
the
idea
and
that
the view that Khrushchev
felt so
suggested
he, Castro,
two motives?one,
indebted economically
he had to accept. He has mentioned
invasion that he believed was imminent, and the
defense against an American
cause of socialism, which
implied
other, the need to advance the international
that the missiles were for offense as well as defense. Khrushchev's
story is
more consistent,
but also more "official": he cites only the need to help Cuba
an
de
invasion. But of course for active Cuban
American
prepare against
on
are
not
and
Soviet
missiles
Cuban
necessary.
fense, long-range
Speculation
motives
still continues.
With hindsight, we can look back now and see that during the crisis there
were naturally many confusions embedded
in the mass of intelligence
reports.
refer to a surface-to-air missile which is approxi
A report of a "missile" might
is
missile which
30 feet long, to the nose cone of a surface-to-surface
mately
is almost 60 feet long, or to a fuel
about 14 feet long, to its body which
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CUBA AND PEARLHARBOR
695
storage tank. Or perhaps it might
just represent the imagination of an excited
seen at night through closed
of these objects were
Cuban
refugee. Most
shutters and in motion.
Visual observation,
except by a highly trained ob
to
even
as
was
to
not
accurate
the length of the object. And
be
server,
likely
this con
in perpetuating
did not act altogether
Senator Keating
responsibly
fusion centering around the word "missile." He was right when he described
as alarming, but he was proceeding
the evidence
the total build-up
beyond
in suggesting, as he did, that he had positive proof of the presence of medium
of surface-to-air
range missiles,2 and of the capability for rapid transformation
into medium-range
missiles.
missiles
surface-to-surface
critics
Or take the presence of Soviet combat troops. President Kennedy's
22 speech he made no mention
of
noted after the crisis that in his October
was
the American
later
informed
combat troops in Cuba, although
public
of their presence. Actually,
Soviet
into four regimental
troops, organized
men.
were
at four different
located
totaled
5,000
They
approximately
units,
one in Central Cuba and one in Eastern Cuba. They
spots, two near Havana,
were equipped with modern Soviet ground-force
including
fighting equipment,
rocket launchers
similar to the American
battlefield
"Honest
John." This
and tent installations,
barracks
the accompanying
along with
equipment,
was not identifiable,
or at least was not identified, until we started photo
graphing at low level. For this reason, President Kennedy made no demand
about removal of troops on October 22, but kept to the colorless term, "Soviet
as the MAGIC
is almost as magical
technicians." While U-2 photography
code at the time of Pearl Harbor,
like the code, it is limited; it cannot reveal
all.
Ill
For the layman, the feeling persists that there must be some marvelous
source that will provide
a single signal, a clear tip-off that will alert the
American
there is no
forces and tell them exactly what to do. Unfortunately,
instance where such a tip-off arrived in time, except perhaps in the Philippines
of nine hours' warning
had a minimum
in 1941, when General MacArthur
attack and the initial Japanese
of the Pearl Harbor
between his knowledge
assault on his own forces. The news of the attack on Pearl Harbor clearly did
not tell him what alert posture to take, since his planes were found by the
to wing-tip
on their bases.
in formation, wing-tip
Japanese attackers
in the formation
Instead we must wait for a number of signals to converge
about the intentions and actions of an opponent. This
of a single hypothesis
is a necessary but slow process. In 1962, for example, General Carroll, head
of the Defense
became suspicious of Soviet activities on
Intelligence Agency,
to Secre
the basis of several pieces of data from different sources. According
tary McNamara's
testimony,
. . . [Carroll] had had thousands of reports like this. What gradually formed in
his mind was a hypothesis based on the integration of three or four pieces of
2 See
testimony,
and Committee
tions
12; U. S. News
and speech
87;
on Foreign
States
Rela
Committee
17, 1962: United
Senate,
September
on Armed
in Cuba,
Situation
2d Sess.,
87th Cong.,
Services,
1962, p. 7,
and World Report, November
week of November
19, 1962 (distributed
12), p.
to the Senate, October
12, 1962.
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FOREIGNAFFAIRS
696
one
evidence,
to
be
know
in a
over
was
of which
through photographic
rather
what
unusual
period
of
a
not
analysis
report
at
that a SAM
place.
time?but
all,
. . .
Gradually
sometime
one
of which
(surface-to-air
over
a
between
was
missile)
a
recognition
site appeared
do
of time?I
period
18th of September
the
not
and
the 14th of October, there was formulated in his mind a hypothesis
specifically
that there was the possibility of a Soviet ballistic missile installation in a particular
area, a hypothesis that had been formulated previously and had been tested pre
viously
and
found
to be
in error
with
respect
to other
locations.
His only action here?I
to test
think quite properly his only action here?was
that hypothesis, to submit it to the targeting group that targets the reconnaissance
missions,
was
which
on
that
target
place
the October
14 mission.3
and
the
track
for
the
next
reconnaissance
mission,
18 to October
This period of time from September
14 is not long for the
of a hypothesis.4
It is long only in relation to the speed of
crystallization
the missile
is a perpetually
installation. This sort of time difference
agonizing
of
of sources and
aspect
intelligence
Collection,
interpretation.
checking
all take time. There
is always delay between
the intelligence
interpreting
source and the evaluation
the center and the final report
center, and between
to the decision-maker.
Even then, the decision-maker
may merely
request
more information before taking action. In the meantime,
the opponent moves
forward.
In the Cuban missile
crisis, for example, there were delays in the identifi
cation of surface-to-air missiles.
From July 29 to August
5, Cuban
refugees
cargo and passengers
reported that "an unusual number of ships" unloaded
at the ports of Havana
and Mariel. All Cubans were excluded from the dock.
these
the
14
reports reached U. S. intelligence
By August
agencies, which
next day requested U-2 photo coverage of the suspect areas. On August
29
on July 29 to the over
the flight was made. From the first visual observation
29 a full month
flight on August
passed.
This August
29 flight turned up the first hard evidence of surface-to-air
in Cuba. During
missiles
surveillance
September,
flights seem to have been
5, 17, 26, 29, and on October
5, 7 and
stepped up: the U-2 flew on September
area a hundred
5 flight, which took in the San Cristobal
14. On the September
the photographs
miles east of Havana,
showed no evidence of medium-range
10 was canceled, perhaps because
for September
missiles. A flight scheduled
a U-2 had been shot down over Red China the previous day. According
to
the American
States waited
press, all U-2 flights stopped while the United
for the world reaction.
testified that available
evidence
indicated
the first
Secretary McNamara
on
of
mobile
M.R.B.M.s
occurred
landing
September
8, and that construction
of the sites did not begin before September
that
15 to 20. It is possible
10 photography
at the San
have shown some activity
September
might
Cristobal
site. The September
17 flight was of little use because cloud cover
on Department
3U. S., Congress,
House
of Representatives,
Subcommittee
of Defense
Ap
ist Sess.,
of Defense
for IQ64, 88th Cong.,
Department
propriations,
Appropriations
1963,
most
contain
of the intelligence
data cited
in this article.
p. 45-46. These
hearings
4
to Roger Hilsman,
the request
for a U-2
the western
end of the
According
flight covering
on October
island was made
the flight was
made.
"The Cuban
4?ten
days before
actually
to War,"
Crisis: How Close We Were
Look, August
25, 1964, p. 18.
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CUBA AND PEARLHARBOR
697
18 and 21
obscured the areas photographed.
between
However,
September
and these were evaluated on
further Cuban reports came to U. S. intelligence,
led to the flight on October
14, again over San
September 27. They eventually
Cristobal. This flight produced
of medium-range
the first reliable evidence
missiles on the island.
In spite of the frequency of the U-2 flights, there is a lag of 33 days from
the first visual observation made by a Cuban exile on September
8, and re
ported on September 9, to October
14, the day that hard evidence was ob
tained. There is a lag of 39 days between September
5 and October
14, during
area. This gap in coverage was
which no flights covered the San Cristobal
some inquiring Congressmen
not apparent
until
their cross-ex
pressed
Minshall
of Ohio asserted
that the U-2 flights
amination. When William
had been covering the wrong end of the island, General Carroll pointed out
that
it was
necessary
to
cover
the
eastern
and
central
portions
also.
Secretary
McNamara
5 flight over
supported him by pointing out that the September
no activity whatsoever."
San Cristobal
"showed absolutely
He also recalled
that this was the hurricane
in that part of the
season, "and the weather
is very bad. We had a number of flights canceled
Caribbean
during that
then produced the official weather
report showing clear
period." Mr. Minshall
from September
of Havana,
and said that "the weather
days in the vicinity
was
at
at
to
October
least
in
the
25
2,
7:00
morning,
generally clear." No one
out
at
not
that
time
that
weather
actual weather,
de
pointed
forecasts,
termined the schedule of U-2 flights.
on the
scheduled
coverage,
then, was
being
apparently
Photographic
that any Soviet construction would proceed at a pace which might
assumption
to our own experience
in installing
similar
be considered
rapid according
was
no
McNamara
several
times
that
there
repeated
Secretary
equipment.
area
on
as
in
the
Havana
missile
construction
if
5,
activity
this,
September
coupled with the pressing need to get clear pictures of other parts of the
14.
island, were sufficient reason for not covering the area again until October
This judgment, with hindsight, may have been correct, but in the absence of
the layman can only wonder why
the full intelligence
it was not
picture
possible to cover more than one section of the island on a single U-2 sortie,
or why it was not possible
to make
several simultaneous
sorties when good
weather
prevailed.
Perhaps
Secretary
McNamara's
statement,
made
under
pressure of Mr. Minshall's
criticism, to the effect that "we were facing surface
to-air missile
be coming into operation,"
indicates that
systems that might
the flight schedule was sensitive to the political atmosphere. The fact is that
there were increasing dangers to our pilots as the SAM sites became opera
now in opposition,
tional. With
the Republicans
it was easy for some of them
to forget the extreme embarrassment
of the Eisenhower
r?gime at the shooting
down of the U-2 over the Soviet Union
in i960 and the collapse of the Paris
summit that followed. Certainly
after the publicity
shot
given to the U-2
down over Red China on September 9, the United
States would not want to
lose such a plane over Cuba. U-2 planes are never armed; and the August
installations
in western Cuba.
29 flight had showed surface-to-air missile
a
Naval
shows
somewhat
similar
of the
gap.
photography
Photographs
crates containing
IL-28 bombers were
taken on September
28 but not
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698
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
10. This identi
until October
evaluated until October 9, and not disseminated
fication of bombers capable of carrying a nuclear or non-nuclear
payload of
6,000 pounds and with a combat radius of about 700 nautical miles5 came
a report of October
of
the U-2 photographs
15 evaluating
together with
M.R.B.M.S.
sort of delay can easily be paralleled
in the Pearl Harbor
intelligence
a delay
there was inevitably
In the handling of the coded messages,
at the intercept
of the message
station through trans
interception
center inWashington,
to the decoding
in
determination
of priority
for
full
and
for
translation
the
decoding,
handling,
assignment
assignment
to final delivery
to the approved
list of recipients. The
actual translation,
the
in
recorded
in
is
54 days between
delay
Congressional
hearings
longest
and translation.
Part of the delay is a function of the time neces
terception
the accuracy
Part of the delay comes from checking
sary for transmission.
for responsible
of the reports, which
is necessary
decision. But these delays
in response must all be seen against the forward march of events.
In Cuba, the rapidity of the Russians'
installation was in effect a logistical
to the technological
surprise comparable
surprise at the time of Pearl Harbor.
two
Before September
1962 we were scheduling U-2
flights approximately
we
could
weeks
because
couldn't
believe
that
apart,
change
capabilities
a shorter period. But Secretary McNamara
in
testified
within
significantly
that
the
his first background
mobile
(October
briefing
22)
medium-range
re
to be de-activated,
to have a capability
missiles were planned
moved,
on a new site and ready for operation within
a period of about
activated
the entire intelligence
six days. The Stennis Report, which
reviewed
opera
one
to
matter
two sets of
"a
In
refers
of
hours."6
instance, between
tion,
photographs
separated by less than 24 hours, there was an increase of 50
in the amount of equipment
visible. On the date of withdrawal,
percent
were fully operational.
missiles
October
28, the medium-range
Intelligence
as
set December
estimates
date for the non-mobile
I.R.B.M.s
the
outside
15
to be operational.
or logistical surprise may be either a secret so
This kind of technological
agencies until after
carefully guarded that it doesn't reach our intelligence
the event; or it may happen too swiftly, too near the outbreak of the crisis,
in time. In the case of Pearl Harbor,
there
to be transmitted
and evaluated
to
failed
reach
were two technological
either
the
that
changes
intelligence
officers who needed the information:
( 1 ) that the
agencies or the commanding
in the
Japanese had fitted fins to their torpedoes which would permit bombing
and (2) that the combat
radius of the
of Pearl Harbor;
shallow waters
to 500 statute miles, making
Zero fighter plane had been stretched
possible
from Formosa.
Both of these developments
aerial attack on the Philippines
came to fruition only a few weeks before Pearl Harbor.
This
picture.
?from
mission
5
& Row,
to W. W. Kaufmann,
The McNamara
Strategy,
1964, p. 270.
Harper
According
to General
to John Hughes,
"about
600 nautical
miles/'
Special Assistant
Carroll,
According
p. 15.
Hearings,
6U.
on Armed
Committee
Preparedness
Investigating
Services,
Subcommittee,
S., Congress,
on Cuban Military
Interim
of the Preparedness
Program,
Report
Investigations
Build-Up,
ist Sess., 1963, p. 3.
88th Cong.,
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CUBA AND PEARLHARBOR
699
IV
Besides
in transmission
technological
and
surprise
checking,
and the inevitable
there
are more
subtle
physical
obstacles
delays
to
involved
accurate
per
Stark
Admiral
ception of signals. First, there is the "cry-wolf" phenomenon.
any further
actually used this phrase in deciding not to send Admiral Kimmel
about the Japanese. An excess of warnings which
turn out to be
warnings
false alarms always
induces a kind of fatigue, a lessening of sensitivity.
and his staff were tired of checking out Japanese
Admiral Kimmel
submarine
In the week preceding the attack they
reports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.
had checked out seven, all of which were false.
General Carroll had the same problem with missiles
re
in Cuba. Refugee
ports of missiles had been coming in for a year and a half and the first San
Cristobal
that suspect area, later confirmed
report of September 9 describing
as harboring medium-range
was "comparable
to many
other re
missiles,
ports . . . similarly received and checked out," and found to reveal not sur
or nothing
face-to-surface
but surface-to-air
at all. This history of
missiles,
mistaken
observations
tended to reinforce
the feelings of
by the refugees
to the fact that
fatigue and disbelief. There was also a justifiable reaction
of anti-Castro
ferment in Cuba had not been properly
refugee exaggerations
at the time of the Bay of Pigs, and that their self-interest
discounted
in
to return to Cuba had not been
This
wanting
properly weighed.
background
increased the reluctance
of the intelligence
to credit their reports
agencies
without
careful verification.
Besides
the refugees, members
of the Congres
sional opposition were also using exaggeration
and pressure, because they had
an interest in overstating
in order to indicate laxness on the Ad
provocation
ministration's
claimed to have hard evidence at a time
part. Senator Keating
it seems, such evidence did not exist. Opposition
when,
pressure tended to
evoke a natural counter-pressure
from the Administration,
which responded by
in its critics, and which
insisted on caution and the
charging irresponsibility
for special evidence before entering on such serious action. In this
necessity
served in some respects as rein rather than simply as spur.
way the opposition
to objective
Another
obstacle
evaluation
is the human
to see
tendency
what we want to see or expect to see. The Administration
did not want open
conflict with the Soviet Union.
on a program of trying to
It was working
relax tensions, of which
a test-ban
agreement was one important
though
distant goal. It most definitely did not want an offensive Soviet base in
Cuba,
in the same way that Zermatt,
the famous Swiss ski resort, did not want
its existence until epidemic pro
typhoid fever and refused to acknowledge
wanted no war in the
portions had been reached. Just as President Roosevelt
Far East?no
war on two fronts?and
didn't want to believe that it could
happen, so we didn't want to believe that the Soviets were doing what they
were doing.
When
this is the background
of expectation,
it is only natural to ignore
small clues that might,
in a review of the whole or on a
simple count, add up
to something
For example,
the large ships that turned out to
significant.
be the villains in the Cuban case had
especially
large covered hatches. They
were unloaded at
and all Cubans were excluded
night by Soviet personnel,
from the docks. The contents, whatever
at night. The
they were, were moved
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7oo
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
decks were loaded with 2?- and 5-ton trucks and cars. But these ships, in
transit, had been noted to be riding high in the water. If intelligence
analysts
in the American
had been more ready to suspect the introduction
community
of strategic missiles, would this information have led them to surmise, before
as well as after October
14, that these ships carried "space-consuming
[i.e.
low density]
rather than a bulk
cargo such as an M.R.B.M."7
large volume,
cargo? Roger Hilsman
points out that these vessels had been specially de
for
signed
carrying lumber, and "our shipping intelligence experts presumably
deduced that lumbering ships could be more easily spared than others." "We
"that the Soviets had had some trouble finding the
knew," Hilsman writes,
of
ships they needed to send their aid to Cuba."8 This is a good illustration
to the facts) a disturbing
or
the way we can adjust (without
doing violence
to "save" a theory?in
unusual observation
this case that the Soviets would
not send strategic missiles
to Cuba.
Our estimate of Soviet behavior
of
included, of course, some expectation
how the Russians would react to what we were telling them, to our warnings
we overestimated
in words
and acts. However,
the clarity of our signals.
on August
General Maxwell
had
visited
Florida
bases
25 with a great
Taylor
deal of publicity. Naval
reconnaissance
of ships approaching Cuba had been
stepped up to the point where U. S. planes were shot at by nervous Cubans
on September
2. Castro reacted with great restraint
on this
in commenting
incident?a
fact which might
in itself have been thought
But
suspicious.
above all, on September 4, President Kennedy
the installation
announced
of
surface-to-air missiles
in Cuba which had been confirmed by the photographs
care that we would not tolerate an
of August
29. He said with the greatest
offensive base or the installation of missiles
capable of reaching U. S. territory.
He made the distinction
between offensive and defensive weapons,
and he did
this publicly
in a way that put him on the spot. To anyone familiar with the
of the American
that
system, this should have indicated
workings
political
we were "contracting-in."
The President was deliberately
engaging his own
as
to the Republicans
and that of the country. He was reacting
prestige
well as to Castro. He was justifying
not acting up to a certain point, but
it more likely that he would act beyond that point. In other words,
making
he was drawing a line, and he was making
it extremely unlikely that we would
back down if that line were crossed. Again on September
13, the President
to the firmness of his commitment.
called attention
we must
To the official Administration
add the formal an
statements,
nouncements
the
Senator
Everett
Dirksen
of Illinois
party.
by
opposition
and Charles Halleck
of Indiana, the Republican
Congressional
leaders, both
on Cuba on September 7. Halleck warned that the increases
issued statements
in armaments
technicians
and numbers of military
supplied by the Soviet
to Cuba made
the situation
there "worse from the point of view of
Union
our own vital interests and the security of this country."
Senator Dirksen
and defined current Soviet military
invoked the Monroe Doctrine
aid to Cuba
as a violation
of that doctrine. He pointed out that, in view of our treaty
7
of Defense,
Robert
S. McNamara,
by the Honorable
Briefing
"Department
Special Cuba
of Defense,
State Department
5:00 p.m., February
Secretary
Auditorium,
6, 1963." A verbatim
of a presentation
made
Carroll's
actually
by General
transcript
John Hughes.
assistant,
8
Op. cit., p. 18
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CUBA AND PEARL HARBOR
701
of American
States should immediately
either the Organization
commitments,
agree on a course of action or, quoting President Kennedy's
speech of April
States should act on its own, "if the nations of this
20, 1961, the United
should fail to meet their commitments
against outside Communist
hemisphere
penetration."
elections
distractions
have been the
American
and their accompanying
and concern. Yet they are not always easy
subject of world-wide
speculation
for an outsider to understand. These protests from the opposition were taking
may have hoped to
place in a setting of pre-election
debate, and Khrushchev
aware
not
that
alarm expressed by
He
have
been
that
the
fact.
may
exploit
was something
not ignore. In
the Republicans
could
President
Kennedy
to explicit proposals
addition
and resolutions
about the Monroe
Doctrine,
to call up
authorization
there was the President's
request for Congressional
150,000 reserves. This action too should have been a warning
signal; it did
had no need for an offensive base in
that Moscow
trigger a Soviet reassurance
Cuba. However,
the Soviets did not find these warnings weighty
enough to re
verse their plans for installation.
V
Another major barrier to an objective U. S. evaluation
of the data was our
own estimate of Soviet behavior. The Stennis Report
isolated as one "sub
stantial" error in evaluation
of the intelligence community
"the predisposition
to the philosophical
conviction
be incompatible
that it would
Soviet
with
to
never
introduce
missiles
into
Cuba."9
Khrushchev
had
policy
put
strategic
or long-range missiles
mediumin any satellite country and therefore, it was
on an island 9,000 miles away from
reasoned, he certainly would not put them
the Soviet Union, and only 90 miles away from the United
States, when this
was bound to provoke a sharp American
reaction.
let us remember that the
In considering
this estimate of Soviet behavior,
was
not
had
alone.
It
community
intelligence
plenty of support from Soviet
At any rate, no articulate expert
experts, inside and outside the Government.
now
claims
the
role
of Cassandra.
Once
a
predisposition
about
the
opponent's
behavior becomes
settled, it is very hard to shake. In this case, it was rein
forced not only by expert authority but also by the knowledge
both conscious
and unconscious
that the White House had set down a policy for relaxation
of tension with the East. This policy background was much more subtle in its
or diplomatic
influence than documents
experience. For when an official policy
or hypothesis
and to
is laid down, it tends to obscure alternative
hypotheses,
of the data that support it, particularly
lead to overemphasis
in a situation of
increasing tension, when it is important not to "rock the boat."
on Atlantic
In the case of Pearl Harbor,
there was a concentration
and
a
or
to
kind
of
led
which
affairs,
neglect of,
tendency to ignore, Far
European
Eastern
signals, and to a policy of staving off the outbreak of a Pacific war
as long as possible. In the last months
this tendency was combined
especially,
with a desire to avoid incidents. The wording
of the final warning messages
to the Army and Navy
reflected this concern:
If hostilities
9
Op.
cannot repeat not be avoided
the United
States
desires
cit., p. 3.
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that Japan
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
702
the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as re
stricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to
commit
hostile
action
Japanese
as you
measures
you
deem
are
directed
but
necessary
repeat not to alarm civil population
action
until
Japan
an
committed
has
to undertake
such
measures
should
these
or disclose
overt
intent.
be
so as not
out
carried
. . .Undertake
other
and
reconnaissance
no offensive
act.10
as "do-don't."
characterized
These directives have been frequently
was
to
avoid
order of October
Another
incidents
the
17 to
attempt
Navy
the
re-route all trans-Pacific
to
Far
East
the
and
from
through
shipping
sea
the
thus
and
New
Guinea
Torres Straits
(between
Australia),
clearing
of the Hawaiian
Islands. This order followed
lanes to the north and northwest
a warning of possible hostile action by Japan against U.S. merchant
shipping.
We avoided any incidents in these sea lanes, and at the same time we cut off
task force bound for
of visual observation
of the Japanese
the possibility
Pearl Harbor.
In the autumn of 1962, pursuing a policy of reducing tension, the Kennedy
for deception
in Soviet statements,
Administration
made very little allowance
fears. On Sep
for false reassurances
that would
quiet justifiable American
on
a
aid to
Soviet
tember 2, TASS
military
joint communiqu?
published
to
to
and
Emilio
of
Che
Guevara
Moscow
visit
the
Cuba, referring
August 27
in metallurgical
assistance
announced
The Soviet Government
Aragon?s.
to Cuba. They
in
work and the sending of technical
agriculture
specialists
added that
views
were
also
in
exchanged
connection
threats
with
of
aggressive
imperialist
quarters with regard to Cuba. In view of these threats the government of the Cuban
Republic addressed the Soviet government with a request for help by delivering
armaments and sending technical specialists for training Cuban servicemen.
The
Cuba.
Soviet
An
government
was
agreement
taking
measures
independence, while
legitimate
considered
this
this
to
insure
all Cuba's
its
security
and
true friends have
of
request
As
question.
long
threatening Cuba, the Cuban Republic
quarters continue
necessary
tentatively
on
reached
as
government
above-mentioned
has every justification
safeguard
every
the
the
right
its
sovereignty
to respond
of
for
and
to this
request.11
aid
in a negative understated
it limited military
way:
reassuring
to vague
and "technical
On September
"armaments"
11, in
specialists."
if not
request to call up reserves, a higher-keyed,
response to the President's
an
was
attack
This
issued
started
with
TASS.
pronouncement
by
hysterical,
on "bellicose-minded
the United
elements" and "the provocations
reactionary
the
which might
is now staging, provocations
States Government
plunge
world into disaster of a universal world war with the use of thermonuclear
and in the American
In the U.S. Congress
press, the Soviet Gov
weapons."
for an
an unbridled
ernment
calling
claimed,
campaign was
propaganda
commodities
and
attack on Cuba and on Soviet ships "carrying the necessary
food to the Cuban people." "Little heroic Cuba" was pictured as at the mercy
of American
imperialists, who were alarmed by the failure of their economic
This was
10U.
Joint Committee
S., Congress,
2d Sess.,
Harbor
79th Cong.,
Attack,
11 The New
York Times,
September
on the Investigation
of the Pearl
14, p. 1407.
1946, Part
3, 1962.
Harbor
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Attack,
Pearl
CUBA AND PEARLHARBOR
703
to strangle her. Particularly
serious was the
blockade and calling for measures
to
call
action in asking Congress' permission
President's
up 150,000 reservists.
fears of
then embarked on a series of jeers at the ridiculous
The statement
was
Union
Soviet
The
the American
agron
sending
peace-loving
imperialists.
to
to
Cuba
livestock
and
tractor-drivers
experts
omists, machine-operators,
Soviet
and to help the Cubans master
and knowledge
share their experience
farm machinery.
is the reason for this
leaders? What
could have alarmed the American
What
Devil's Sabbath? . . . Gentlemen, you are evidently so frightened you're afraid of
own
your
...
are moving
some
to you
hordes
It seems
other
and
tractors,
combines,
harvesters,
oil,
farming
to maintain
We
to Cuba
the Cuban
carried
economy.
we
are our
in them
and
that what
these
carry
ships
or
chinery
are
that
. . .We
people
theirs.
to Cuba
shadow.
potatoes
can
say,
a popular
quoting
"Don't
saying:
butt
when
ma
industrial
can
say to these
of
is no business
noses
your
where
you oughtn't." But we do not hide from the world public that we really are supply
ing Cuba with industrial equipment and goods which are helping to strengthen her
economy.12
A bit farther on, having had its fun, TASS recalled that "a certain amount
of armaments
is also being shipped from the Soviet Union to Cuba" and that
of
had also been requested by the Government
Soviet military
specialists
sent to Cuba "can
Cuba. However,
the number of Soviet military
specialists
in no way be compared to the number of workers
and industry
in agriculture
sent to Cuba are designed
sent there. The armaments
and military
equipment
States
for defensive
of the United
and the President
purposes
exclusively
know
what
of
the
and the American military
any
[like]
country
military
just
means of defense are." The statement went on to imply that any threat to
the United
The major
States was a figment of the American
imagination.
reassurance then followed:
to state that there is
The Government of the Soviet Union also authorized TASS
no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression,
a
for
weapons
powerful
to carry
rockets
powerful
to
blow,
retaliatory
so
are
for
instance
other
any
country,
in their
and
force
the
explosive
these
nuclear
that
warheads,
repeat
that
if war
is unleashed,
if the
or another and this state asks for assistance,
from
its own
to Cuba. And
just as it was
territory
to
render
the Soviet Union
to any
assistance
an
makes
aggressor
peace-loving
to
search
have said and we
for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. We
do
need
so
has
Union
is no
there
nuclear
Our
Cuba.
Soviet
attack
on
one
state
has the possibility
state
and
not
only
let no one doubt that the Soviet Union will render such assistance
ready in 1956 to render military assistance to Egypt at the time of
the Anglo-French-Israeli
aggression
in the
Suez
Canal
region.
to the President,
delivered
This sort of reassurance had also been privately
shocked President Kennedy
and the misuse of the private channel apparently
as much as the creation of the strategic base in Cuba.
reassurances.
and his staff had believed
the Soviet
President
Kennedy
Their reaction to what they regarded as deception was one of genuine outrage,
trust
basic tenets had been that a state of mutual
for one of the President's
between the great powers was an important part of the problem of relaxing
tension. And there is a considerable
body of literature which goes farther and
12 Text
of Soviet
statement.
The New
York
Times,
September
12, 1962.
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
704
isolates the attitude of mutual
itself as the central danger today
suspicion
in international
relations.
to know where to draw the line
It is a permanent
problem of diplomacy
trust to unfriendly
states. A certain amount of healthy
in extending
suspicion
of the opponent's
is in order. The President
public statements
deliberately
to lie, after the President
of Gromyko
knew the truth,
tested the willingness
but before the Russians
knew that he knew. The trap set by the President
aroused the indignation
who urge mutual
of some of those very Americans
trust. But the President
of the United
States would be simple indeed if he
on the basis of many
did not build his trust cautiously
such probings. The
Russian
in the fall and winter of 1962 made
it perfectly
clear
performance
that
we
cannot
take
at
face
value
Russian
statements?even
those
made
only
to the top American
those constraints
that
leadership in privacy and without
or
or
be
the
Chinese
other
the
Communist
powers
might
imposed by having
or
our
own
allies
non-aligned
listening.
In periods of high tension it is commonly
that deception will be
accepted
an enemy tactic. Before
the Pearl Harbor
attack Japanese
deception was
It involved,
shore
very refined and ingenious.
among other things, giving
leave to large numbers of Japanese
sailors, reinforcing garrisons on the north
ern border of Manchuria
to give an impression of a thrust to the north, issu
war
to
true ones only
false
and substituting
commanders
plans
ing
Japanese
side continuing
the appearance
days before the attack, and on the diplomatic
of negotiation.
For deception
is not confined to statements,
but must also be
translated
into
actions.
It is important for the enemy's security that he keep his signals quiet. On
on the island of Cuba must take
that all movement
the Soviet side this meant
place at night. The Cubans were excluded from the docks and from many of
areas. Troops were kept below decks, and unloaded
the missile
construction
was
or hidden under the trees. On our own side, in
equipment
camouflaged
to preserve
the period before October
the
22, tight security was important
initiative. And this tight security was maintained
through the next few weeks.
of the group close to the President,
The members
known as the Executive
or EXCOM,
were directly supervising
Committee
decisions normally
left to
lower command
levels and were doing paper work normally handled by their
is fine for a couple of weeks, but it means
the
staffs. This sort of procedure
neglect of other areas of government
and, in particular, other areas of foreign
a keen observer, reminds us that the Sino-Indian
policy.13 Richard Neustadt,
conflict was in progress at the same time, and offers a "lay impression"
that
"at least one side effect of Cuba" was to tighten the time and narrow the
in the making?on
frame of reference of the decision?then
Skybolt.14 Under
conditions
of tight security, there is also a danger that we may keep signals
not only from the enemy but also from ourselves. There are a good many who
13
some of my
own
to Secretary
"Senior
officers
did their own typing;
According
Rusk,
own handwriting,
to limit the possibility
in my
in order
of further
done
papers were
. . ." C.B.S.
Rusk
televised
interview
of Secretary
spread.
Reports,
by David
Schoenbrun,
November
28, 1962.
14U. S.
on National
and Operations
Senate Subcommittee
of the
Staffing
Congress,
Security
on Government
Committee
Administration
88th Congress,
of National
Security,
Operations,
ist Session,
of March
25, 1963.
1963, Part I, p. 97, testimony
basic
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CUBA AND PEARL HARBOR
705
feel that careful study by a wider range of experts might have been useful at
the time and would be useful now, particularly with regard to the Kennedy
were very closely held
Khrushchev
like MAGIC,
communications.
These,
to
the
read
and
had
be
and
crisis
during
interpreted swiftly at the time.
or missed were those appearing
set of signs we may have misread
Another
statements.
in official Cuban
that
is so verbose
and temperamental
Castro
we tend not to listen carefully to his speeches. And his controlled press is so
dull that we are equally careless about that. In addition,
the policy of em
to
over
and
in a curious way
of
island
tends
isolation
the
carry
bargo
explicit
to ignoring the voice of Cuban officialdom.
It is interesting now to review the Cuban press of 1962 for clues we might
have picked up. After Raul Castro's July visit to Moscow,
the warmth of the
references to the Soviet Union
Thanks
and praise be
increased noticeably.
came the order of the day. On September
11, the day of the falsely reassuring
TASS
the threat of
underlined
the Cuban newspaper Revoluci?n
statement,
a
war invoked by TASS. The front page was printed with
thermonuclear
and it said: "Rockets Over the
single white headline on a black background,
United
States if Cuba is Invaded." Forcing
the Soviet Union's
hand in this
for our
way had been Cuban policy for some time, so that it was natural
to
as
take
this
instance
of
Cuban
another
wishful
experts
thinking.
in intelligence work the role of chance, accident and bad luck is
Finally,
is the hurricane
always with us. It was bad luck that September-October
season in the Caribbean,
so that some reconnaissance
was
photography
unclear and certain flights were canceled.
It was bad luck that the Red
Chinese
shot down a U-2 on September
9. In 1941 it was bad luck that we
to Russia,
had cut all traffic on the Northwest
and thereby made
Passage
visual observation
task force impossible. It was bad luck
of the Pearl Harbor
that there was a radio blackout
in the Hawaiian
Islands on the morning
of
December
and
that
of
the
Communications
then
Colonel
French
Room
7,
decided to use commercial wire instead of recommending
the scrambler tele
for
the
last
alert
message.
phone
VI
To sum up then, in both the Pearl Harbor and Cuban crises there was lots
of information. But in both cases, regardless of what
the Monday
morning
were
to
have
data
and
the
say,
ambiguous
incomplete. There
quarterbacks
was never a single, definitive
signal that said, "Get ready, get set, go!" but
tended to crystallize
rather a number of signals which, when put together,
true
were
The
in
embedded
noise or irrelevance
the
signals
always
suspicion.
of false ones. Some of this noise was created deliberately
by our adversaries,
some
by
chance
and
some
we
made
ourselves.
In
addition,
our
adversary
was
the signs of his intent and did what he could to
in suppressing
interested
keep his movements
quiet. In both cases the element of time also played
came
was
the time information
against us. There were delays between
in,
checked
for accuracy,
evaluated
for its meaning,
and made
the basis for
action. Many
of these delays were only prudent,
the
appropriate
given
and
of
risks
response.
ambiguities
of data depends on a lot of things, including our esti
The interpretation
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7o6
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
to take risks. To make our lives
mate of the adversary and of his willingness
in
more complicated,
this depends on what he thinks the risks are, which
us.
that
on
the
underestimated
risks
of
We
turn depends
his interpretation
was
the Japanese were willing to take in 1941, and the risks that Khrushchev
the
and
summer
Both
the
of
to
and
the
in
fall
take
1962.
Japanese
willing
to
our
ultimate
underestimated
in
turn,
willingness
respond.
Russians,
are intrinsic.
to understand
described
that the difficulties
It is important
on
and intentions, we ob
misestimated
dispositions
capabilities,
By focusing
a very large and complex body of assumptions
scure the fact that, without
the data collected would not speak to us at all. If there were
and estimates,
a large missile
no technological
for example,
constraints
whatsoever?if,
no matter
installation
could be put in place in an instant?no
reconnaissance,
we
at
not
assurance
that
would
how frequent,
could provide
any moment
in the act of
a
new
inferences
involved
The
face massive
adversary.
complex
a
are
made
large body of assump
possible only by
interpreting photographs
from
tions of varying degrees of uncertainty,
principles of optics and
ranging
and
economic
Euclidean
judgments.
political
geometry
through technological,
in turn are based on an
themselves
The inferences from the interpretations
even wider range of uncertain beliefs. But just because a very large body of
a recon
in interpreting
is involved
confirmed beliefs and guesses
partially
or the observations
of a Cuban refugee or intelligence
naissance photograph
or observations
in many
to interpret
the photograph
agent, it is possible
as Willard
Van Orman Quine has put it, are
differing ways. Our beliefs,
and they do not face experience
"underdetermined"
sepa
by our experience,
statement
but
always in mass, as a collection. We have
rately,
by statement,
to adjust in the light of any
a good deal of freedom as to what statements
new and seemingly disturbing
report.
or its report does not seize us, then, and force any specific
An observation
is
in intelligence
free situation of hypotheses
This relatively
interpretation.
in the more exact sciences such
no different in kind from that of hypotheses
once suggested
in
that statements
as physics. A more na?ve empiricism
a crucial
of
result
the
could
be
refuted
observation,
by
definitively
by
physics
and students of the logic of science,
experiment, But a great many physicists
of the
at least since Pierre Duhem,
have shown that even the interpretation
on
about
the
theories
comprehensive
depends
implicitly
simplest experiment
a
therefore
It
else.
is
and
deal
instruments
great
always
possible
measuring
to "save" a theory or hypothesis
by altering some other one of the large set
our
connects
it with any given observation.
of
beliefs that
true for the
If this is true in the more exact sciences it is most obviously
in such spheres of practical
and their interpretation
role of observations
and
as the operation
of an intelligence
agency, and the inferences
activity
are
that shape interpretation
decisions of an executive. Here the assumptions
and also less explicit and therefore often less
likely to be more multifarious
Some of the relevant assumptions
held. This puts it mildly.
may
tentatively
or self-flattering
are
be held passionately.
likely to include wishful
They
beliefs, items of national pride or claims at issue in partisan debate. In the
concerned
case of Japan, some of the critical assumptions
technology?the
of the Zero plane, the supposed inability of
range, speed and manoeuvrability
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CUBA AND PEARLHARBOR
707
to do any better than the Americans
in launching
the Japanese
torpedoes
were
in shallow water. In the case of Cuba again some critical assumptions
to
into
minimum
time
for
the
put
required
example,
place and
technological;
a
the
missile.
Others
concerned
ballistic
make
medium-range
operational
leadership and their
politics and character of the Soviet, Cuban and American
to take a chance. Our expectations
and
estimates of each other's willingness
our
It
and
affect
their
observations
interpretation.
guide
prior hypotheses
is this prior frame of mind, now changed, that we forget most easily in retro
spect. And it is this above all that makes every past surprise nearly unintel
except perhaps as criminal folly or conspiracy.
inexplicable
ligible?and
The genuine analogies between Pearl Harbor and Cuba should not obscure
clear that
the important differences. A study of the Pearl Harbor case makes
the problem of getting warning of an impending nuclear raid today is much
the Japanese attack some 20 years ago.
harder than the problem of detecting
in
It is against this increased difficulty that we must balance
improvements
crisis illustrates
But the missile
and organization.
intelligence
techniques
something else, namely that there are other acts very much short of nuclear
and
war of which we want to be apprised, and here our improved techniques
was
can
us
of
Action
the
taken
ahead
game.
put
during the
organization
missile
crisis and taken in time to forestall Soviet plans. For while we can
never ensure the complete elimination
in the signals that come
of ambiguity
our way, we can energetically
take action to reduce their ambiguity,
by
acquiring information as we did with the U-2. And we can tailor our response
to the uncertainties
and dangers that remain.
In the Cuban missile
crisis action could be taken on ambiguous warning
reduced the
the action was sliced very thin. After reconnaissance
because
the actual contact with
the response chosen kept to a minimum
ambiguity,
that
Russian
forces, but a minimum
compatible with assuring Khrushchev
we meant business:
of
threat
actual
the
the
boarding,
boarding
quarantine,
to the Soviet Union.
it was a
of one Lebanese
chartered
vessel
Further,
in great detail as the first in a sequence of graded actions
response planned
Air Forces
and Tactical
that ranged from a build-up of U.S. Army, Marine
alert of the Strategic
bases to a world-wide
in Florida and our southeastern
Air Command. We had been partially prepared for such sequences of action
short of nuclear war by the Berlin contingency
planning, and this put us in a
to use the warning we had accumulated.
If we had had to choose
position
our
more
have been
hesitation
would
much
drastic
only among
actions,
greater.
The problem of warning,
then, is inseparable from the problem of decision.
cannot guarantee
foresight. But we can improve the chance of acting on
can do this by a more
a disaster. We
signals in time to avert or moderate
observers'
and
of
reports, by making more
analysis
thorough
sophisticated
into which we must fit
and
of
the
framework
tentative
assumptions
explicit
and by refining, subdividing
and making more selective
any new observations,
the range of responses we prepare, so that our response may fit the ambigui
the risks both of error and of inaction.
ties of our information
and minimize
at surprise,
Since the future doubtless holds many more shocks and attempts
it is comforting to know that we do learn from one crisis to the next.
We
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