Federalism, the geographic location of groups,
and conflict
February 27, 2011
10534 words, including notes, tables, and references
1
1
Introduction
Federalism and regional autonomy frequently appear among the proposed remedies for societal conflict (e.g., Nordlinger, 1972; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Cohen, 1997; Congleton, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Bermeo, 2002; McGarry and O’Leary,
2005). Such arrangements would grant disgruntled minorities at the national
level autonomy to run their affairs at the regional level. As scholars of federalism have noted for some time, however, such arrangements are quite delicate (e.g., Riker, 1964; Lemco, 1991; Watts, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and
Shvetsova, 2004; Bednar, 2008), and many federal systems have collapsed (see,
e.g., Watts, 1998; Stepan, 1999). Hence, recent research has focused more heavily on the question what types of federal arrangements are more conflict prone
and what characteristics may make them more stable (e.g. Bunce, 2003a; Hale,
2004; Bunce and Watts, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Brancati, 2006; Brancati, 2009). At the center of this debate is the question whether ethnofederalism,
i.e., a federal system where regional borders follow as closely as possible settlement patterns of minorities, is advisable or not.
Assessing whether particular makeups of federal units lead to more or less
conflict is, however, a difficult endeavor. First of all, detailed information on
the composition of federal units and the geographic location of ethnic groups is,
especially in conflict-prone regions, difficult to come by.1 Second, the general
makeup of the country is likely to influence the presence or absence of federalism
and the type of federalism chosen.2 This aspect has been largely ignored in
the literature so far. Hence, we propose to assess in this paper whether federal
arrangements in which subunits are designed so that nation-wide minorities may
be in a majority in lower level units, are more conflict prone. More specficially,
we argue that conflict-proness increases with larger shares of minority controlled
subunits, but decreases when this share approximates 1. To demonstrate this
we rely on detailed information on the ethnic make-up of subnational units in
all federal states and control for possible endogeneity biases in our empirical
analyses.
In the next section we briefly review the literature on federalism, especially as
it pertains to this institution’s potential to mitigate societal conflicts. In section
three we discuss and present data on the ethnic makeup of federal countries.
Preliminary analyses presented in this section suggest that the ethnic makeup of
2
countries affects the presence and type of federal arrangements. In section four
we assess whether particular types of ethnic makeups make conflict onset more
likely in federal countries than in others. Section five concludes and charts future
research.
2
The debate on federalism
Whether federalist arrangements or regional autonomy might prove an appropriate institutional means to mitigate societal conflicts is an increasingly hotly
debated question (see the excellent reviews in Sambanis and Milanovic, 2004; Lake
and Rothchild, 2005; Sambanis, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). Gladly, this
literature relies more and more often on the general literature on federal arrangements that highlights the latter’s inherent instability (e.g., Riker, 1964; Lemco,
1991; Watts, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004; Bednar, 2008).
When seeing the potential benefits of federal arrangements in this larger context,
very quickly the question arises under what conditions federal arrangements are
adopted. This problem of endogeneity of federal arrangements, which is already
well problematized in Riker’s (1964) incisive work (but since then often forgotten), makes the results discussed in the literature on the effects of federalism (e.g.,
Cohen, 1997; Saideman, Lanoue, Michael and Stanton, 2002) rather questionable.
Rodden (2006) also highlights this problem in his survey chapter on federalism
(see also Rodden, 2004, 493f).
While there exist many case-based descriptive studies, systematic evidence, especially evidence obtained from theoretically guided research, is rare. Commonly
it is assumed (e.g., Panizza, 1999) that large territories and/or populations or
diverse populations make the adoption of a federal system more likely (see also
Diaz-Cayeros, 2004; Elkins and Sides, 2007).
The idea that federalism is used to “hold together” diverse populations, or
letting them “come together” (Stepan, 1999), is closely related to the notion of
ethnofederalism. The debate over whether such federal systems, where federal
borders follow closely settlement patterns of minorities, increase societal conflict
or help mitigate it, is a longstanding one in political science. Lipset (1963, 81)
argues against federal units corresponding to the settlement of ethnic groups
and is supported in this by, among others, Nordlinger (1972) (see also Ghai,
2002; McGarry and O’Leary, 2005). More recently Snyder (2000, 199ff) very
3
forcefully argued against ethnofederalism, especially in the light of the experiences
after the fall of the iron curtain.3 His argument relies on the conception that
ethnofederal arrangements were not forced on the communist regimes, but were
used for strategic reasons by the communist leadership, and where they were
adopted, a breakup was programmed.4
More recently scholars have attempted to figure out under what conditions
ethnofederal arrangements are more conflict prone. Hale (2004), for instance,
suggests that the existence of a core ethnic region may lead to the collapse of
states and/or civil war.5 Brancati (2006), on the other hand, argues that regional
parties are detrimental to the stability of federal systems. Obviously, ethnofederal systems are likely to create structures fostering the development of regional
parties. Bakke and Wibbels (2006) look in their study of federal arrangements at
fiscal decentralization, inequality, and the ethnic makeup of federal units and find
interesting interaction effects when trying to explain conflicts. According to their
study ethnic heterogeneity, when combined with high income inequality, leads to
more conflict, and the effect of fiscal decentralization depends on the economic
development of the ethnic regions.
While not directly addressing the question of types of federal arrangements,
Sambanis and Milanovic’s (2004) theory on the demand for sovereignty, and their
proposed empirical investigation also suggests a close relationship between the
makeup of subnational units and demands for secession (see also Saideman, 1998;
Saideman and Ayres, 2000). Closely related is Roeder’s (2007) argument that
segmental states lead to nationalism and secession. Even though Roeder (2007)
distinguishes segmental states from federal units, the logic, namely that giving
institutional means to minority groups may foster and harden identities appears
also, for instance, in the work by Horowitz (1985).
Bunce (2003b), based on her work on the breakup of ethnofederal states in
Central and Eastern Europe, suggests that nationalist mobilization failed to lead
to conflict in all cases (see also Bunce and Watts, 2005). Subsequently Bunce
(2003a) proposes as explanation, derived from a comparison of a small number
of cases, the bargaining style in ethnofederal states.
Clearly there are many arguments appearing in the literature whether and
under what circumstances ethnofederal arrangements might work. In the present
paper our focus will be on the following two main arguments. First, as for in-
4
stance Bunce (2007) argues, ethnofederal arrangements strenghten ethnic identities, since at the subnational level ethnic collaboration is not required (see also
Breton, 1964; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Second, as most prominently put
forward by Horowitz (1985), federal arrangements which follow ethnic lines, may
allow for easier mobilization and thus foster violent conflict (see also Cornell,
2002; Roeder, 2007). Against these two arguments other authors oppose the
claim that ethnofederal arrangements allow to appease ethnic groups that are
nationally a minority (e.g. Stepan, 1999; Bermeo, 2002). These arguments do,
however, not distinguish between different types of ethnofederal arrangements.
We propose to assess this by looking closely at the territorial arrangements. More
precisely, we agree with the critics of ethnofederal arrangements that they may
harden ethnic divisions, but argue that this depends on the share of federal units
controlled by national-minorities. If this share is small, ethnic divisions are likely
harden, but violent conflict less likely due to the lacking ressources. On the other
hand if this share is very high, ethnic groups are dispersed across several federal
units, making institutional mobilization efforts more difficult (see for instance
Kymlicka, 1998). Consequently, between these two extremes, i.e. when the share
of minority controlled federal units is about half, conflicts are most likely. This is
due to the fact that this may be the result of two ethnic groups being separated in
two federal units (e.g., Soudan or Czechoslowakia) or the national majority faces
a series of minorities with their own federal units, multiplying as a consequence
the likelihood of violent conflict.
To assess whether our claim is correct we propose to consider the federal design
in terms of subunits as an endogenous policy choice and assess the effect of this
design while taking into account its endogenous character. Before attempting to
address these problems, we need to know, however, what we consider as federal
arrangements.
3
Federalism and the makeup of subunits
When defining countries as federal scholars often refer to Riker’s (1964, 11) rightly
famous definition suggesting that ”[a] constitution is federal if (1) two levels of
government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of
action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though
merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government
5
in its own sphere.” It is clear, however, that this definition is difficult to operationalize, and thus it can hardly surprise that scholars often differ in their
lists of federal countries. Bednar (2008, 21) convincingly argues that definitions
relying both on structural features and “federal practices” are not very useful
when attempting to assess the effect of federal arrangements. She pleads for a
strictly structural definition with three necessary components, namely geopolitical division, independence, and direct governance. With the element geopolitical
divisions she requires that territorial units are “constitutionally recognized and
may not unilaterally be abolished” (Bednar, 2008, 21) and thus rules out nonterritorial arrangements as those advocated, for instance, by Bauer (1907). With
independence it is assured that different levels of governments have “independent
bases of authority,” while direct governance assures that “each citizen is [directly]
governed by at least two authorities” (Bednar, 2008, 21). This clearcut and crisp
definition, which, despite its similarity with Riker’s (1964) one, strengthens the
importance of constitutional recognition of federal units, allows to cut through
the maze of different types of federal arrangements and competing lists of federal
countries.
Based on these criteria, Bednar (2008) identifies 26 entities having fulfilled
all three of them at least for some time between 1990 and 2000 and thus can be
classified as federal. The list of countries Bednar (2008) proposes comes very close
to the list appearing in McGarry (2002). What McGarry (2002, 2005) provides
in addition is a classification of the federal countries as national or multinational
federations,6 as well as start and end dates of the federal arrangements. Similarly,
Roeder (2009) provides a distinction between federations and ethnofederations
that we also include. We provide in table 1 the list of countries we consider
federal.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 lists these countries and adds two pieces of information. First, we
provide information on the time period for which Bednar (2008, 26) and McGarry
(2002) consider these countries as federal. Second, from McGarry (2002) we also
employ as a first indication for the ethnic make-up of federal units the distinction
between national and multinational federations.7
As table 1 illustrates, there are very few contradictions between the two sets
of authors. Omitting small differences in timing (e.g., Belgium becoming federal
6
in 1993 or 19948 ) the only contradictions concern Burma, St. Kitts-Nevis, and
Micronesia. The first two countries are coded by McGarry (2002) as federal but
are considered as quasi-federal, respectively unitary by Bednar (2008, 26), while
for Micronesia the exact opposite is the case.9
Having at hand a list of federal countries a first question to address is what
distinguishes these countries in terms of the overall ethnic makeup from other
countries. First, if we just consider the ethnic composition of federal and unitary
states we find on the basis of Fearon’s (2002) dataset that the ethnic fractionalization is practically identical in federal and unitary states, namely on average
0.485 compared to 0.476 (F-statistic 0.017, statistically not significant). When
we distinguish between the two types of federations proposed by McGarry (2002)
we find average ethnic fractionalization indices of 0.381 and 0.601 for the national and multinational federations. Despite the marked difference, and even
when compared to the averages for unitary states, we fail to find a statistically
significant relationship.
Figure 1 about here
Slightly different is the result if we look at the overall number of groups per
country as reported in Fearon’s (2002) dataset. We find on average 5.144 groups
in the 160 countries for which he provides this information. When distinguishing between federal and non-federal countries we find hardly any differences. In
federal states there are on average 5.412 groups present, while this number is
only slightly lower in unitary states, namely 5.112 (F-statistic 0.111, statistically
not significant). When we distinguish, however, between the two types of federal
systems, namely national and multinational, differences become more marked. In
national federations we find 3.556 groups on average, while this number increases
to 7.500 in multinational federations (F-statistic 2.811 (p=0.063)). These differences mask to some degree the distribution of the number of groups depicted in
figure 1. This figure suggests that unitary states have a very wide spectrum of
numbers of groups, while national federations are very much concentrated on the
left side of the graph, and, not surprisingly, multinational federations more on
the right side of the graph. Interesting to note is, however, the pattern that the
highest number of groups appears in unitary countries.
Table 2 about here
As noted above, some authors claim that the concentration of groups in par-
7
ticular areas lead to higher probabilities of conflict outbreak in general (e.g.,
Toft, 2003) and more particularly in ethnofederal countries (Saideman, Lanoue,
Michael and Stanton, 2002; Hale, 2004). For this reason we depict in table 2 for
each federal country the information on group concentration as collected in the
“minorities at risk” project (Gurr, 1993), as well as the number of groups according to Fearon (2002).10 In the country tables we provide in the web-appendix we
also indicate for all minorities at risk in the federal countries considered here their
group concentration, as well as information on their relative group size stemming
from Fearon (2002) and Elkins and Sides (2007).
What is immediately transparent from this table is that in all multinational
federations with “minorities at risk,” some of the latter are concentrated in a
region or form a majority in the region (codes 3 respectively 2 in table 2). In
national federations, however, having regionally concentrated “minorities at risk”
is rare, with Venezuela and Brazil being the exceptions to the rule. Hence,
following Toft’s (2003) argument we would expect multinational federations and
federations with federal units populated mostly by a national minority to be much
more conflict-prone.
Taking this cursory evidence as indication that multinational federations (or
ethnofederalism) is something to avoid, is, however, a step too far. What many
defenders of federal arrangements in general and multinational federations in
particular argue is that even though multinational federations may lead to conflict
or state collapse, the necessary counterfactual would be to look at what would
have happened if the country had not been federal (e.g., McGarry and O’Leary,
2005). This obviously suggests (again) that federal arrangements are chosen in
particular situations to address a set of problems. Hence, empirical analyses
trying to assess the effect of federalism and its specific form need to take into
account the endogenous nature of these institutional choices. Given the important
role the number of ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” appear to play when
comparing federal and non-federal systems, we will employ these variables in our
strategy to address the endogenous nature of federalism. In addition we also
include the colonial-tradition, and more precisely the British, Dutch, French and
US-tradition as instrumental variable.11 The data for this variable stems from
the “Quality of Government” data (Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein, 2008) and
are based on Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) work.
8
4
The geographic location of groups and its effect on conflict
To assess the effect of the ethnic makeup of federal countries we employ as starting point Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) analysis of the conditions leading to civil
war, but focus only on the onset of ethnic civil wars as coded by these authors.
We first analyze the effect of federal arrangements.12 In table 3 we report first
report a simple analysis which replicates Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) analysis but
estimate it as a probit model and add a federalism indicator.13 The coefficient
for federalism suggests that such arrangements marginally decrease the probability of ethnic conflict onset. To assess whether this indicator suffers from endogeneity bias different strategies are possible (e.g., Wilde, 2000; Monfardini and
Radice, 2008; Freedman and Sekhon, 2010). For simplicity’s sake we estimate a
bivariate probit in which the federalism indicator appears in one equation as dependent and in anoter as independent variable. A test of the hypotheses that the
correlation between the two error terms of the bivariate probit model is different
from zero is equivalent to a test of endogeneity (see Wilde, 2000). To predict the
presence of federalism we as instruments the number of ethnic groups, “minorities at risk” and the colonial tradition. In this approach it is assumed that these
instrumental variables are exogenous and can be used to predict the presence of
federal arrangements. Our analyses presented in the previous section seem to
suggest that the ethnic makeup of a society is clearly linked to these presumably
exogenous variables. Following Acemoglu (2005) we include all other exogenous
variables also in this auxiliary regression. As a consequence, also other variables
associated with the presence of federalism are used in this auxiliary regression,
as for instance those employed by Panizza (1999), Elkins and Sides (2007) and
Diaz-Cayeros (2004).14
Table 3 about here
The results of the bivariate probit model suggest a rather reduced effect for
the presence of federalism on the onset of ethnic civil wars. The estimated coefficient remains statistically insignificant. At the same time the correlation between
the two error terms (ρ) is small and cannot be distinguished from zero on statistical grounds, suggesting that with the instrumental variables employed we find
no evidence for endogeneity. After having assessed the effect of federalism we
9
now turn to our main independent variable. We measure the degree to which a
federal arrangement follows the ideas of ethnofederalism by using the proportion
of federal units in which a national minority forms the majority group in the
population.15 We enter this variable also squared to allow for the hypothesized
curvilinear effect. The estimated coefficients reported for model 3 suggest contrary to our hypothesized effect that federal states with either a small or a large
share of minority controlled units are most conflict prone. The two estimated
coefficients are, however, far from reaching statistical significance. Suspecting
again possible endogeneity bias we instrument this variable with the number of
ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” as well as the number of federal units.
Clearly as the number of federal units increases, the likelihood that one is dominated by a national minority increases, hence this variable is a useful instrument.
Adding in model 4 the residual of this auxiliary regression suggests a moderate
problem of endogeneity (a likelihood ratio test generates a p-value close to 0.1).
Given this we replace in model 5 the proportion of federal units dominated by a
national minority (as well as its square) by its predicted values from the auxiliary
regression.16 The results suggest that increasing this proportion has a positive
(though statistically not significant) effect on the onset of civil wars civil wars,
but decreases when this share exceeds approximately three quarters.
While this first analysis already suggests that if ethnofederal arrangements
have an effect it is more likely to increase the likelihood of conflict onset, the
analysis also has an important shortcoming. More precisely, since in considering
the effect of the proportion of minority controlled federal units we also include
all unitary states, for which this main independent variable is 0. Hence, even
when controlling for the presence of a federal arrangement, the coefficient for
our main independent variable conflates both the effect of federal arrangements
per se and the effect of the ethnic makeup of the federal units. A quick way to
resolve this problem is presented in Alemán and Treisman (2005) and Bakke and
Wibbels (2006), which basically consists of only considering federal states. The
problem with this solution is obviously that federal institutions are often chosen
with particular goals in mind. Hence, instead of having an endogeneity problem,
focusing only on federal states creates a potential selection bias problem.
To address these two problems, we use in what follows a Heckman (1976) selection model in a probit model (see Dubin and Rivers, 1990), where the selection
10
corresponds to the choice (and maintenance) of a federal system. The results for
this second approach to assess the effect of ethnofederal arrangements appear in
table 4.
Table 4 about here
In the first column of table 4 we report the results of the first Heckman model
that estimates simultaneously a selection equation, namely whether a country is
federal, and an outcome equation assessing whether these federal countries experience in particular years the onset of an ethnic civil war. In terms of explanatory
variables we proceed as above and use the number of ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” as well as the colonial tradition as main variables explaining the
presence of a federal arrangement, but also including the remaining explanatory
variables of Fearon and Laitin (2003). For the outcome equation we use again
this latter set of independent variables but add our main explanatory variable,
namely the proportion of federal units controlled by a national minority and its
square. Not surprisingly the estimation results suggest that an increasing number
of ethnic groups increases the probability that a country has a federal arrangement. Similarly, federalism is more prevalent in former Dutch, French and British
colonies. Controlling for this selection mechanisms, the estimation results for the
outcome equation suggest that increasing the proportion of minority controlled
federal units increases again in a curvilinear fashion the probability of an ethnic
conflict onset. This effect fails to reach statistical significance, however.
Given that with the more simpler approach presented above we also found
initially such a statistically non-significant effect among all country-years used
by Fearon and Laitin (2003), we need again to worry about possible endogeneity
bias. For this reason we estimate again an auxiliary regression model to predict
the proportion of minority controlled federal units. Given that this regression
might again be subject to selection bias if we focus only on federal countries,
we estimate this auxiliary regression with a classic Heckman (1976) model (see
table 5 in appendix). The residuals from the outcome equation and their square
appear as additional explantory variables in the second Heckman probit model
in table 4. While most of the estimated coefficients remain stable compared to
the previous model, the effect of the proportion of minority controlled federal
units decreases dramatically and the coefficient for the variables related to the
residuals are large and statistically significant. Hence, with our instruments we
11
can be sure that there is a problem of endogeneity. Consequently, we provide in
the last two columns of table 4 the results of a model where we use the predicted
values of the auxiliary regression to replace the proportion of minority controlled
federal units and its square. Doing so results in coefficients which again support a
curvilinear effect of the share of minority controlled federal units.17 The strongest
effect can be found for federal states with approximately 60 percent of the federal
units being controlled by minorities. States with larger or smaller shares are less
conflict-prine. Hence, we can conclude from this analysis that if there is an effect
among federal states of the proportion of minority controlled federal units, then it
is much more likely to be a positive one, since only few states have a larger share
of minority controlled units than 60 percent. Consequently, scholars like Horowitz
(1985) seem closer to the mark in their assessment of the effect of ethnofederal
arrangements.
5
Conclusion
If federal arrangements are chosen to allow diverse populations to “come together”
or to be “held together,” (Stepan, 1999) two things follow quite directly. First,
the stability of federal arrangements and the latter’s conflit-proness are likely to
be related to the “ethnic map” of the country. Second, if trying to assess the
effect of different federal arrangements like ethnofederalism and the like, we also
need to consider what brought about these particular arrangements.
In trying to offer elements pertaining to the first point, we have also offered
ways in which to address the second point. Using very detailed information
on the ethnic makeup of federal countries we assessed through a rather crude
indicator the effect of different types of ethnic makeups of federal units on civil
war onset. Once we control for the endogenous nature of federal arrangements we
find that larger shares of federal units dominated by a national minority increase
considerably the likelihood of ethnic civil war onset in federal countries.
This result has to be interpreted with some caution, and future research has
to demonstrate its robustness. First of all, it would be useful to build into our
empirical model more detailed information on the geographic location of groups.
Group concentration, ethnic core regions etc. might be measured more precisely
groups by using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data gleaned from the
Atlas of Soviet geographers (Bruk, 1964) (see Weidmann, Rd and Cederman, 2010
12
Forthcoming). Even with more and better data, however, the most daunting
endeavor still seems to get a theoretical handle on the question why and possibly
how and what type of federal arrangements might mitigate societal conflicts.
13
Appendix
Below we report first in table 5 the results of the auxiliary regressions and then
in detail for each country the type of data we collected to determine the makeup
of federal units according to groups. The federal units were determined on the
basis of information from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ (accessed July 21, 2006)) and the Administrative Divisions of Countries (“Statoids”) (http://www.statoids.com/ accessed
July 21, 2006)). To identify groups we relied on Fearon (2002) and the “minorities at risk” data (Gurr, 1993) as reported in Elkins and Sides (2007). For the
group sizes we relied on data from European Values Study Group and Association
(2006) as well as other surveys (as noted in the tables), which we also used to
complement the list of groups if appropriate. When possible we use Census data
at the level of the federal units. We first present in table 6, however, a summary
of the information provided in the tables per country.
Below we summarize the information on the group composition of each federal country studied in this paper (Table 6). In a web-appendix we report in
detail for each country the type of data we collected to determine the makeup
of federal units according to groups. The federal units were determined on the
basis of information from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ (accessed July 21, 2006)) and the Administrative Divisions of Countries (“Statoids”) (http://www.statoids.com/ accessed
July 21, 2006)). To identify groups we relied on Fearon (2002) and the “minorities at risk” data (Gurr, 1993) as reported in Elkins and Sides (2007). For the
group sizes we relied on data from European Values Study Group and Association
(2006) as well as other surveys (as noted in the tables), which we also used to
complement the list of groups if appropriate. When possible we use Census data
at the level of the federal units.
Table 5 about here
Table 6 about here
14
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Federal countries
Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Brazil
Germany
Mexico
Venezuela
United Arab Emirates
USA
Belgium
Bosnia
Burma
Cameroon
Canada
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
India
Malaya
Malaysia
Mali
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
St. Kitts-Nevis
South Africa
Soviet Union
Switzerland
West Indies Federation
Yugoslavia (former)
Yugoslavia
Bednar (2008, 26)18
McGarry (2002)
national federations
185319011920189119491917196019711789multinational federations
199419931995199519481961-1972
18671990-1992
1968-1992
1995-2000
199219501957-1963
19631960
1998-2000
19601990-1999
1947-1971
1992-2000
199319831993-2000
19961990-1991
1918-1991
18481958-1962
1990-1991
1953-1992
1992-2000
1992-
15
Roeder (2009, 205)19
federations
185319011918-1938, 19451891-1934, 19461867-1938, 19491917186419711789
ethnofederations
198019951948-1962
1961-1972
18671969-1992
1952-1962
1953?
1963-1965
F: 1960
196019471991F 1983A: 1972-1994
1922-1991
F: 1848?
1945-1992
1992-
Figure 1: Number of groups in different types of federations
50
unitary
multinational federalsm
0
10
20
%
30
40
national federalism
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
number of ethnic groups
16
Table 2: Group concentration and number of groups in federal countries20
Country
Austria
Australia
Mexico
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Germany
USA
Belgium
Bosnia
Canada
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
India
Malaysia
Mali
Nigeria
Russia
South Africa
Switzerland
Yugoslavia
Groupcon groups spatial distribution21
0
1
2
3
N
national fedederations
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
0
3
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
1
4
multinational federations
0
0
1
1
1
3
2
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
5
7
1
1
3
5
10
0
1
1
5
7
1
1
0
2
4
0
0
1
4
5
2
2
6
17
27
2
1
2
3
8
1
0
0
1
2
1
0
4
3
8
17
Fearon (2002)
N
4
3
4
4
3
3
3
4
4
3
6
4
11
12
9
5
7
5
13
9
7
Table 3: The effect of federalism and its form on ethnic civil war onset (with
robust standard errors)
Federalism
Proportion of minority
federal units / (pred.)
Proportion of minority
federal units2 / (pred.)2
Proportion of minority
federal units (res.)
Proportion of minority
federal units (res.)2
Prior war
Per capita incomet−1
log(population)t−1
log(mountainous terrain)
Noncontiguous state
Oil exporter
New state
Instability
Democracy (Polity)t−1
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
1
probit
onset
b
(r.s.e.)
-0.299
(0.165)
2
bivariate probit
onset
federalism
b
b
(r.s.e.)
(r.s.e.)
-0.133
(0.258)
3
probit
onset
b
(r.s.e.)
-0.236
(0.288)
-0.361
(1.078)
0.340
(0.995)
-0.389
(0.149)
-0.123
(0.030)
0.177
(0.035)
0.064
(0.044)
0.179
(0.115)
0.420
(0.125)
0.779
(0.180)
0.167
(0.106)
0.011
(0.008)
0.358
(0.220)
0.653
(0.300)
-0.382
(0.151)
-0.130
(0.032)
0.159
(0.040)
0.059
(0.044)
0.207
(0.120)
0.423
(0.128)
0.781
(0.181)
0.183
(0.107)
0.010
(0.025)
0.322
(0.230)
0.599
(0.309)
-4.304
(0.399)
-4.106
(0.476)
Number of ethnic groups
Number of “minorities at risk”
Dutch colony
US colony
British colony
French colony
constant
ρ
log-likelihood
N
6327
-0.988
(0.467)
0.107
(0.034)
0.394
(0.123)
0.156
(0.132)
0.044
(0.417)
0.098
(0.409)
0.521
(0.202)
0.218
(0.167)
0.011
(0.005)
-0.656
(0.589)
2.025
(0.830)
0.242
(0.109)
0.088
(0.057)
0.673
(0.244)
0.062
(0.117)
0.075
(0.101)
0.267
(0.080)
-7.223
(1.374)
-0.177
(0.154)
6327
18
5
probit
onset
b
(r.s.e.)
-1.051
(0.452)
3.312
(2.367)
-2.154
(2.076)
-0.389
(0.151)
-0.126
(0.032)
0.178
(0.037)
0.063
(0.045)
0.180
(0.116)
0.421
(0.125)
0.777
(0.178)
0.168
(0.106)
0.011
(0.008)
0.361
(0.222)
0.654
(0.300)
4
probit
onset
b
(r.s.e.)
-1.140
(0.445)
4.538
(2.329)
-3.378
(2.049)
-2.820
(2.473)
0.873
(2.781)
-0.310
(0.155)
-0.113
(0.039)
0.148
(0.044)
0.078
(0.047)
0.108
(0.127)
0.392
(0.123)
0.793
(0.180)
0.153
(0.106)
0.013
(0.008)
0.264
(0.247)
0.554
(0.316)
-4.309
(0.426)
-4.033
(0.476)
-4.014
(0.465)
-337.890
6327
-335.754
6327
-336.429
6327
-0.309
(0.154)
-0.114
(0.034)
0.146
(0.041)
0.082
(0.045)
0.140
(0.118)
0.400
(0.119)
0.791
(0.181)
0.165
(0.106)
0.014
(0.008)
0.241
(0.245)
0.546
(0.316)
Table 4: Explaining ethnic civil war onset in federal countries: Heckman probit
selection model (with robust standard errors)
Proportion of minority
federal units
Proportion of minority
federal units2
Proportion of minority
federal units (res.)
Proportion of minority
federal units (res.)2
Prior war
Per capita incomet−1
log(population)t−1
log(mountainous terrain)
Noncontiguous state
Oil exporter
New state
Instability
Democracy (Polity)t−1
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
outcome
b
(r.s.e.)
-0.259
(4.223)
-0.108
(3.858)
selection
b
(r.s.e.)
-1.010
(0.417)
-0.297
(0.189)
0.405
(0.413)
0.414
(0.179)
0.274
(0.403)
0.590
(0.315)
0.858
(0.403)
0.309
(0.276)
0.010
(0.023)
-0.911
(0.952)
1.724
(1.602)
-0.987
(0.468)
0.107
(0.034)
0.393
(0.123)
0.155
(0.132)
0.042
(0.416)
0.099
(0.410)
0.509
(0.202)
0.221
(0.167)
0.010
(0.025)
-0.657
(0.588)
2.023
(0.828)
0.243
(0.109)
0.088
(0.059)
0.669
(0.245)
0.060
(0.117)
0.074
(0.101)
0.263
(0.083)
-7.203
(1.371)
-0.611
(0.231)
-1112.010
Number of ethnic groups
Number of “minorities at risk”
Dutch colony
US colony
British colony
French colony
constant
-6.845
(4.203)
ρ
log-likelihood
LR-test χ2 , 2df
n
959
19
6327
outcome
b
(r.s.e.)
13.143
(4.034)
-11.218
(2.661)
-19.978
(4.553)
-17.989
(3.597)
-1.927
(0.831)
-0.416
(0.177)
0.862
(0.377)
0.292
(0.175)
0.417
(0.508)
0.347
(0.208)
0.682
(0.499)
0.416
(0.393)
0.001
(0.045)
-1.285
(1.137)
1.824
(2.333)
-15.231
(5.111)
959
selection
b
(r.s.e.)
-0.987
(0.394)
0.107
(0.022)
0.394
(0.088)
0.156
(0.100)
0.045
(0.358)
0.101
(0.376)
0.514
(0.178)
0.218
(0.159)
0.011
(0.017)
-0.658
(0.558)
2.027
(0.647)
0.243
(0.044)
0.087
(0.052)
0.673
(0.218)
0.062
(0.078)
0.075
(0.083)
0.266
(0.070)
-7.225
(1.096)
-0.187
(0.576)
-1107.713
8.590
(p=0.014)
6327
Table 5: A: Explaining the proportion of minority-majority federal units (auxiliary regressions)
OLS
Prior war
Per capita incomet−1
log(population)t−1
log(mountainous terrain)
Noncontiguous state
Oil exporter
New state
Instability
Democracy (Polity)t−1
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Number of ethnic groups
Number of “minorities at risk”
b
(s.e.)
-0.029
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.000)
0.009
(0.001)
-0.008
(0.001)
0.005
(0.004)
0.013
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.025
(0.005)
0.029
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.001)
0.026
(0.001)
Number of federal units
Federalism
Number of federal units
0.243
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.000)
Heckman (twostep)
outcome
selection
b
b
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
0.014
-1.091
(0.021)
(0.103)
-0.015
0.138
(0.001)
(0.008)
0.039
0.613
(0.007)
(0.034)
-0.016
-0.008
(0.005)
(0.027)
-0.170
0.366
(0.017)
(0.100)
0.044
-0.099
(0.019)
(0.106)
0.097
0.078
(0.053)
(0.214)
-0.032
0.277
(0.017)
(0.091)
-0.009
0.013
(0.001)
(0.005)
0.364
1.497
(0.028)
(0.153)
0.296
2.010
(0.038)
(0.171)
-0.017
0.483
(0.003)
(0.022)
0.019
-0.009
(0.001)
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
Dutch colony
-0.066
(0.010)
0.597
0.099
-0.227
(0.120)
0.674
(0.054)
0.062
(0.019)
0.075
(0.024)
0.266
(0.027)
-7.226
(0.329)
6327
959
0.003
6327
US colony
Britsh colony
French colony
constant
Adj R-squared
root mean squared error
ρ
n
20
Table 6: A: Federations and Dominant Majorities or Minorities
Federations
N Fed. Units
N Majo /
Nationwide Dominant
Majo. / Mino. Fed
Majo. / Mino group
Mino States
Group
unit
National
Federations
Argentina
24
0
White (85 - 97%)
Sources: http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar/ Table: 14.1 Total de hogares y hogares donde al menos una persona se
reconoci perteneciente o descendiente de un pueblo indgena. Total del pais segun provincias
Australia
8
0
Caucasian
(84%
92%)
Sources: Census 2001: http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/home/Previous%20Censuses:%20Census%20data
Austria
9
0
Austrians (90 - 93%)
Sources: Population Estimations 2006: http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/bevoelkerung_tab8.shtml
Brazil
27
17
White (54 - 55%)
Acre
Mulatto
Alagoas
Mulatto
Amap
Mulatto
Amazonas
Mulatto
Bahia
Mulatto
Cear
Mulatto
Maranho
Mulatto
Mato Grosso
Mulatto
Par
Mulatto
Paraba
Mulatto
Pernambuco
Mulatto
Piau
Mulatto
Rio Grande do Norte
Mulatto
Rondnia
Mulatto
Roraima
Mulatto
Sergipe
Mulatto
Tocantins
Mulatto
Sources: Census 2000: http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/ Table 136
Germany
16
0
Germans (91% - 95%)
Sources: Estimations 2004 http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb01_jahrtab2.asp
Mexico
32
0
Mestizo (60%)
Oaxaca, Chiapas and
Strong Indigenous MiYucatan
norities Sources: Census 2000: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e informatica; http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/
contenidos/espanol/rutinas/ept.asp?t=mlen02\&c=3327;LibraryofCongress
United Arab Emirates
7
0
Ethnic Arabs (87%)
Sources: Library of Congress: Foreign workers who represent about 70% are not included in the calculation since
they are not citizens of UAE.
United States
51
3
White (67% - 82%)
District of Columbia
Black
Hawaii
Asian
New Mexico
Hispanics
Sources: Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau: Annual Estimates of the Population by Race Alone and Hispanic
or Latino Origin for the United States and States: July 1, 2004 (SC-EST2004-04). The Census Bureau provides
statistics for non Hispanic or latino origins and Hispanic and latino origins. All ”white” hispano have been classified
as hispanics. Other groups have been classified according to their group. E.g. Hispanics Asian alone have been
classified as Asian.
Venezuela
25
2
Mestizo (59% - 68%)
Delat Amacuro
White
Monagas
White
Sources: World Value Survey 2000; http://www.ine.gov.ve/censo/fichascenso/fichacenso.asp
Multinationals Federations
Belgium
13
7
Flemming (58%)
Brabant Wallon
Wallon (French)
Brussels
Wallon (French)
Hainaut
Wallon (French)
Liege
Wallon (French)
Luxembourg
Wallon (French)
Namur
Wallon (French)
Wallonia
Wallon (French)
Sources: World Value Survey 1999 and various official internet pages
Bosnia
3
1
Bosniak
(Muslims)
Republika Srpska
Serbs
(44% - 48%)
Sources: Estimations because the last census was held in 1991. Brsko District seems to be equally populated by
Bosniaks and Serbs (about 40% for each group). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska. http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
Burma (Myanmar)
14
7
Burman (68%)
Chin State
Chin
Kachin State
Kachin
Kayah State
Kayah
Kayin State
Kayin
Mon State
Mon
Rakhine
Rakhine
Shan State
Shan
Sources: Reported results based on the last census (1983). All States are dominated by a minority group.
Cameroon
10
9
Bamilike-Central
Adamoua
Peulh and Gbaya
(21%)
Centre
Beti
East
Meka and Gbaya
Extreme North
Mboum, Mafa and
Peulh
North
Mboum, Guidar, Fali
and Mafa
North West
Ring,
Ngemba,
Wimbum-Yamba and
Momo
21
South
Boulou-Fang
South West
Ngoe-Oroko
Sources: DHS Survey 2004; http://www.unesco.org/most/dpzognong.htm and http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/camer/
genpop.htm
Canada
13
1
English speaker
Quebec
Quebecois (French)
Sources: Ottawa: Statistics Canada - Language Composition of Canada Cat. No. 97F0007XCB2001001
Czechoslovakia
2
1
Czech (63%)
Slovak Republic
Slovaks
Sources: (Alemán and Treisman, 2005)
Ethiopia
11
6
Oromo (35%)
Addis
Amharra
Amhara
Amharra
Affar
Affar
Somali
Somalie
Tigray
Tigray (Tigraway)
Southern Nations, NaGuragie, Sidama and
tionalities and Peoples
many small groups
States were Oromo is
as strong as any other
minority:
Benishangul-Gumaz
Amharra
(28%);
Oromo
(25%)
and
Beni-Snagul-Gumuz
(?%)
Gambela
Amharra
(18%),
Oromo
(10%)
and
Gambela (?%)
Dire Dawa
Oromo
(42%);
Amharra (39%)
Sources: DHS Survey 2000; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ethiopia/et02_04a.pdf; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Image:Ethiopia_regions_english.png; http://www.csa.gov.et/
India
35
21
Religion:
Hindus
Ethnic (language) and
(81%)
Religious majority:
Language:
Hindi
Jammu and Kashmir
Kashmiri and Dogri
(40%)
(in Jammu) / Muslims
Lakshadweep
Malayalam / Muslims
Punjab
Punjabi / Sikhs
Meghalaya
Khasi / Christian
Mizoram
Lushai/Mizo / Christian
Nagaland
Ao, Sema and Konyak
/ Christian
Hindi (40%)
Ethnic (language) minority:
Assam
Assamese
Dadra
and
Nagar
Bhili/Nhilodi
Haveli
Daman and Diu
Gujarati
Goa
Konkani
Gujarat
Gujarati
Karnataka
Kannada
Kerala
Malayalam
Maharashtra
Marathi
Manipur
Manipuri
Orissa
Oriya
Pondicherry
Tamil
Sikkim
Nepali
Tamil Nadu
Tamil
Tripura
Bengali
West Bengal
Bengali
Sources: Census 2001 Religious Data http://www.censusindia.net/religiondata/index.html; Census 1991 Three
Main Languages in every State 1991, Table 26 http://www.censusindia.net/cendat/datatable26.html and http://www.
kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/mapsexplan/languages.html. The Kashmir, Tamil and Sikh minorities are the most
militants, along religious cleavages (Kohli, 2004).
Malaya (57-63)
11
1
Malay
Penang (Pinang)
Chinese
Malaysia (1963-1965)
14
4
Malay
Penang
Chinese
Sabah
Kadazan-Dusun
Sarawak
Iban
Singapore
Chinese
Note: August 7, 1965: Singapore is expelled from the Malaysian Federation
Malaysia (1966-)
13
3
Malay
Penang
Chinese
Sabah
Kadazan-Dusun
Sarawak
Iban
Sources: http://www.statistics.gov.my/english/frameset_census.php?file=pressdemo ; Wikipedia (See Table for Malaysia
for more details). We do not include the 3 Federal Territories of Malaysia; Kuala Lumpur (Capital, 1972), Labuan
(Offshore territory, 1984) and Putrajaya (Administrative centre, 1995). All are dominated by Malays and are
governed by the Ministry of Federal Territory.
Mali
8
5
Bambara (34%)
Kayes
Sarakole,
Soninke,
Marka and Malinke
Mopti
Dogon and Peulh
Tombouctou
Sonrai
Gao
Sonrai
Kidal
Tamacheck
Sources: DHS Survey 1999 and http://region.segou.net/Donn%E9es%20sur%20le%20Mali.htm
Nigeria
37
24
Hausa-Fulani (23%)
Kogi
Yoruba, Igbala and
Ibira
Ekiti
Yoruba
Kwara
Yoruba
Lagos
Yoruba
22
Ogun
Ondo
Osun
Oyo
Taraba
Plateau
Niger
Adamawa
Bayelsa
Delta
Abia
Anambra
Ebonyi
Enugu
Imo
Benue
Akwa Ibom
Cross River
Edo
Borno
Sources: DHS Survey 1999
Pakistan
8
3
Punjabi (44%)
Sindh
North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP)
Baluchistan
Yoruba
Yoruba
Yoruba
Yoruba
Wurkum,
Mumuje
and
many
small
groups
Tera, Hausa, Birom
and
many
small
groups
Nupe
Many groupes (81%)
Ijaw
Igbo, Urhobo and Ijaw
Igbo
Igbo
Igbo
Igbo
Igbo
Idoma and Tiv
Ibidio
Ekoi and many small
groups
Edo
Bura,
Kanuri and
many other groups
Sindhis and Urdu
Pakhtuns (Pathan)
Brohi, Pakthuns and
Baluchi
Sources: (Alemán and Treisman, 2005), World Value Survey 1999 and DHS Survey 1990/1991
Russia
88
12
Russian (80%)
Chechen Republic
Chechens
Chuvashi Republic
Chuvash
Republic of Dagestan
Avars
Republic of Ingushetia
Ingushs
Kabardino-Balkarian
Kabardians
Republic
Republic of Kalmykia
Kalmyks
KarachaevoKarachais
Chercessian Republic
Republic of North OsOsetians
setia Alania
Republic of Sakha
Yakuty
(Yakutia)
Republic of Tatarstan
Tatars
Republic of Tuva
Tuvinians
Aginsky Buryat auBuriats
tonomous district
Sources: Census 2002; National Composition for regions of the Russian Federation: http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/
doc/English/4-2.xls
South Africa
9
2
Black African (79%)
Northern Cape
Coloured
Western Cape
Coloured
Sources: South African Census 2001 by Province and Population group: http://www.statssa.gov.za/extract.htm ; DHS
Survey 1998
Soviet Union
15
14
Russian (51%)
Armenian Republic
Armenians
Azerbaydazhan
ReAzeris
public
Belorussian Republic
Belarusans
Estonian Republic
Estonians
Georgian Republic
Georgians
Kazakh Republic
Kazakhs
Kirgiz Republic
Kyrkyz
Latvian Republic
Latvians
Lithuanian Republic
Lithuanians
Moldavian Republic
Moldavians
Tadzhik Republic
Tajiks
Turkmen Republic
Turkmen
Ukrainian Republic
Ukrainians
Uzbek Republic
Uzbeks
Sources: Library of Congress
Switzerland
26
7
German (62% - 65%)
Fribourg
Romand (French)
Geneva
Romand (French)
Jura
Romand (French)
Neuchatel
Romand (French)
Tessin
Ticinese (Italian)
Valais
Romand (French)
Vaud
Romand (French)
Sources: Census 2000; http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/bevoelkerung/sprachen__religionen/blank/
kennzahlen0/sprachen.html
Former
Yugoslavia
6
5
Serbs (36%, 1991)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Muslims (Bosniaks)
(1991)
Croatia
Croats
Macedonia
Macedonians
Montenegro
Montenegrins
Slovenia
Slovenes
23
Sources: (Woodward, 1995); Table 2: pp 32-35.
Yugoslavia
(Serbia
2
1
and
Montenegro)
(1992 - 2006)
Serbs
24
Montenegro
Montenegrins
Notes
1
We completely eschew in this paper the problem that ethnic groups or any other groups
are hardly given, but their definition is often part of ongoing conflict processes (e.g., Breton,
1964; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Fearon and Laitin, 2000b).
2
A nice illustration to this effect appears in Glazer (1983), who shows that in the United
States after 1789 new states were admitted to the Union only once WASPs formed a clear
majority (see also McGarry and O’Leary, 2005).
3
The experiences of the Soviet Union and the countries in its sphere of influence are discussed
by a series of authors (e.g. Roeder, 1991; Cornell, 2002; Bunce, 2003a; Bunce, 2003b; Hale, 2006).
4
This rather pessimistic assessment by Snyder (2000) is closely related to the notion that
a peacefully functioning democracy requires an open and free “marketplace of ideas” (see also
Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). In ethnofederalist countries, the “marketplace of ideas,” however,
is very likely to be segmented along ethnic lines.
5
This point relates to Toft’s (2003) claim that a group’s geographic concentration and desire
to control territory is closely linked to the outbreak of violence. Fearon and Laitin (2002) also
find an effect for the newly constructed concentration measure for groups, argue, however, that
this has more to do with strategic issues. Interestingly, Saideman, Lanoue, Michael and Stanton
(2002) find that group concentration of “minorities at risk” affects positively both protest and
rebellion. When separating low from high concentration groups, the authors find that federalism
fails to have a statistically significant effect for low concentration groups, but that the negative
effect on rebellion is statistically significant for high concentration groups (however, this may
in part be due to the different sample sizes instead of any substantive differences). Further
down the line, Tir’s (2005) study on the effects of secession highlighting the higher likelihood
of continuing violence after secessions that were violent, is instructive (see also Chapman and
Roeder, 2007; Roeder, 2007).
6
Unfortunately, these notions are nowhere clearly defined, but they come very close to the
notion of ethnofederalism. Bunce (2003a), however, refers to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, and
Serbia-Montenegro as ethnofederalist states. Of these only the later two are considered by
McGarry (2002) as multinational federations. Similarly, the POLITY III indicator classifies
both Azerbaijan and Georgia as mixed regime (between unitary and federal), while Henisz
(2002) codes this country as not federal. For Georgia Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh
(2001) also suggests that the subnational units fail to have sufficient authority.
7
The attractiveness of McGarry’s (2002, 2005) distinction between national and multinational federations is that it is obviously closely related to the ethnic makeup of the countries
concerned. Related notions are Alemán and Treisman’s (2005) “ethnically mined” federations
in which one group is a majority within one of the constituent units and a minority within the
federation as a whole. These authors consider nine countries to fall in this category, namely Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Soviet Union, Switzerland, Yugoslavia
(former).
8
We also put in this category the rather large differences in timing when it comes to Nigeria
and Pakistan. In the later case, Bednar (2008) considers this country as federal between 1990
and 1999, while McGarry (2002) assumes that the federal experience was limited to 1947-1971.
We follow the latter coding decision, despite the fact that Alemán and Treisman’s (2005) coding
suggests that between 1971 and 1990 Pakistan was still federal.
9
Griffiths and Nerenberg (2005) consider all these cases as federal, with the exception of
Burma/Myanmar, while Watts (1996) excludes in addition Mirconesia. Given that none of our
data on ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” nor the data on conflicts we use have Micronesia,
St. Kitts-Nevis and and the West Indies Federation as observations, we will no longer consider
these cases in the remainder of the paper. For Burma, however, we follow McGarry (2002) and
consider it as a multinational federation.
25
10
Fearon and Laitin (2000a) propose an alternative measure for group concentration, which
is used, for instance by Sambanis and Milanovic (2004). Since this data covers only 101 groups
so far, we refrain from using it here.
11
We thank Warren Camber for suggesting these additional instruments.
12
We fully concur with the view articulated in Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) that this is
probably not the best strategy. The alternative, however, would be a fully specified theoretical
model on the outbreak of civil wars. Such a model is, however, quite clearly still absent in this
literature.
13
We employ the replication data made available by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and thus refrain
from a discussion of the data.
14
We also considered endogeneity test based on Hausman’s (1978) work in the context of
non-linear models (see Rivers and Vuong, 1988; Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz, 1995) employing
either a linear probability or a probit model in the first stage (see Alvarez and Glasgow, 2000).
The substantive implications of these other models are identical to the ones reported in the
main text.
15
We provide in the appendix information on the sources for this measure.
16
To correct for the biased standard errors in this model as discussed by Rivers and Vuong
(1988) we Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) and report bootstrapped standard errors (see Efron,
1981)
17
For this model we provide again bootstrapped standard errors.
18
- indicates that Bednar (2008, 26) considers the country as federal for the whole period
between 1990 and 2000. We omit from her list the European Union, which she codes as federal
for 1999-2000.
19
A indicateds that Roeder (2009, 205) consider the country as having autonomous ethnic
regions, while F indicates he considers the country as a federation. Roeder (2009, 205) lists in
addition Indonesia (1949-1950), Tanzania (1964-) and Spain (1978-) as ethnofederations, which
we omit, given that neither Bednar (2008, 26) nor McGarry (2002) list these cases.
20
Austria and Belgium have no “minorities at risk.”
21
The codes correspond to the following labels: 0 Widely dispersed; 1 Primarily urban or
minority in one region; 2 Majority in one region, others dispersed; 3 Concentrated in one region.
26
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