Pakistan National
Assembly
1
Contents
Letter from the Secretary General ................................................................................................................ 3
Letter from the Under Secretary General: .................................................................................................... 3
Letter from the Committee Directors ........................................................................................................... 4
Introduction to the committee ..................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction to the topic............................................................................................................................... 9
Previous Strategies........................................................................................................................................ 9
Financing ................................................................................................................................................... 9
Military Operations ................................................................................................................................. 10
Negotiations ............................................................................................................................................ 10
Current Strategies ................................................................................................................................... 11
National Action Plan ................................................................................................................................... 11
History and Formation ............................................................................................................................ 11
Implementation Mechanism................................................................................................................... 13
The Military ................................................................................................................................................. 14
History of Political Intervention .............................................................................................................. 14
Powers and Responsibilities of the Military ........................................................................................... 15
Building Police Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 18
Reducing the Burden on Infrastructure .................................................................................................. 19
Helpful Links ................................................................................................................................................ 20
Questions a Bill Must Answer: .................................................................................................................... 21
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Letter from the Secretary General
My name is Daniyal Taufeeq Jangda and it gives me immense pleasure to welcome you to the 12th
iteration of LUMS Model United Nations.
At each LUMUN we begin with the ambition to inculcate intellectual responsibility and equip
students with the skills to initiate endeavors that go on to change the world. This year, however,
our theme is ‘Presenting Perspectives, Preparing Pakistan’ – to remind the delegates that their
journey starts at home.
A clear example of this shift in perspective is reflected in our committees, where we look at both
the tumultuous events in our country’s past as well as around the world to solve age-old problems,
while also simulating a rendition of our National Assembly. In any case, no matter how this theme
resonates with you, we ask that you allow LUMUN to become more than a Model UN conference,
and instead let it invoke a convergence of ideas, hopes and aspirations that transcend local, cultural,
economic and political boundaries.
Eventually, our ambition with LUMUN is not limited to instilling in each of you a wish to
transform the world: fix poverty, end the scourge of war, or erase tyranny. But instead, we wrap
up the conference contentedly if we have helped you see our own, local issues in a new light:
helping the poor in our neighborhood, ending gang wars in our slums, and erasing tyranny in our
feudal system alone.
As long as our work impacts you, the leaders of tomorrow, in this small way, it is worthwhile to
continue. Closing on this note, let me restate the value of listening to those who do not see the
world the way we do. Know that your perspective is bettered each time it meets and survives
disagreement, and only an empathetic outlook will help us prepare Pakistan for prosperity. Please
feel free to contact the Under-Secretary Generals or the Committee Directors should you need any
help along the way. On behalf of the entire Executive Council, Secretariat and Directorate, I look
forward to making your time at LUMUN a memory to keep.
See you all soon.
Regards,
Daniyal Jangda
Secretary-General
LUMUN 12
Letter from the Under Secretary General:
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Delegates,
It is with immense pleasure that I welcome you all to the 12th annual LUMUN Conference in my
capacity as Under Secretary General. Having previously served as an Assistant Committee
Director for this very MUN last year, I expect nothing but an uphill curve in the quality and style
of debate that awaits us.
My name is Hiba Fatima, and I am currently pursuing a degree in Law from LUMS. As Under
Secretary General, I shall facilitate constructive debate in LUMUN's simulations of the Pakistan
National Assembly, Social Cultural and Humanitarian Affairs Committee (SOCHUM), Arab
League, and World Bank. Each committee tackles pertinent issues that continue to plague the
world today, and introduces unique perspectives on contemporary problems.
The Committee Directors have laid the foundation for a productive, intellectually stimulating
discussion in each of their committees, and it is now up to the delegates to delve into the depth of
each argument to the best of their abilities and dissect the roots of each problem presented to them.
I look forward to seeing you all this winter at LUMUN XII, ready to engage, debate, and most
importantly, learn.
Happy researching!
Letter from the Committee Directors
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Hello.
My name is Aadil Azad Lalani and fortunately you will not hear me tell you about my Model
UN career and how it changed my life and made me an angelic human being because I know that
you won't be interested.
Instead let us talk about you, the delegates.
In recent years it has been disappointing to see how for many delegates the idea of participating
in a conference begins and ends with achieving an award. This has often led to plagiarized
resolutions, non-practical and unviable solutions, and an unrealistic representation of countries
and organizations. While strategizing and making tactical decisions is expected of delegates it
should not come at the expense of solving the issue at hand.
At this year's simulation of the Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN, we shall be discussing
two topics that are currently greatly hindering the progress of the country: education and the
energy crisis. While various governments of the country have been attempting to resolve these
issues for years and decades, they still remain prevalent and relevant. And that is where you
come in.
Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN has historically attracted some of the brightest young
minds in the country, and this year we hope to push your minds to the limit to come with an
extensively detailed and practical plan to deal with these issues in the short term as well as the
long term. I will expect delegates to be fully knowledgeable about the topic area and to research
extensively as to why despite the efforts of the government these issues still exist.
I will be on the lookout for participants who possess and display considerable knowledge of the
topic area, speak eloquently and conduct themselves with the general grace that is expected of an
international diplomat. That means no more wild fish-market-like unmoderated caucuses that
seem to have become a staple of every Pakistani Model UN conference.
Come to PNA to make a difference.
Cheers,
Aadil Lalani.
Assalam-o-Alaikum Everyone!
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I'm Rida Ahmed and it is an honor to welcome all of you on behalf of the LUMUN society. I am
a Junior at LUMS and have been a part of LUMUN since 2010; only then I was a delegate like
yourself.
I, myself have been in the debtaing circuit since 2008, establishing myself as a parliamentary
debator as well as a delegate in various Model UNs. After having been the ACD for UNSC in
LUMUN X, an Under Secreatry General for LUMUN XI, this year, I am ever more privelaged to
be serving as a committee director for Pakistan National Assembly along with my co-chair
Aadil.
Pakistan National assembly is especially close to my heart, not only because i happened to chair
the committee on Health and education in The first Youth Leadership parliament and the khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Crises cell at LGSMUN'14, but because more than anything I can relate to it. It
pertains to all the relevant issues that Pakistan faces and gives us the oppurtunity to act as
Parlimentarians and look for feasible solutions that can become a part of a formal bill. Pakistan
National Assembly has the power to unleash reality, to speak to our moral-selves and shake from
slumber the Patriot within us.
It is empowering to know about our country and even more so, to know we can make a change.
I hope to see this spirit in each and every one of you when I see you in the fall and I hope that
you will table a debate that rings so loud and so true that it becomes a force to be reckoned with.
Best,
Committee Director PNA,
Rida Ahmed.
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Introduction to the committee
Welcome delegates, to the Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN 12.
The second simulation of PNA in LUMUN’s history, the inclusion of the committee this year
reflects the focus of the conference on furthering debate and learning that will positively affect
our country. Indeed, this is also the reason that the conference theme of ‘Presenting
Perspectives, Preparing Pakistan’ is being stressed on so much in the LUMUN society’s
promotional material (it also makes for some nice alliteration).
The focus of PNA this year will primarily be to promote an understanding of the way the
National Assembly functions, its powers and responsibilities, and its related entities; along with a
deep understanding of some of the most prominent issues affecting our country right now. This is
why, along with attaching a set of Special Rules of Procedure with this document, we have also
decided to explain a bit about the committee and how it will function here, while we still have
your limited attention.
Since PNA at LUMUN 12 is still a simulation being held at a Model UN conference, it will more
or less function under the usual rules that govern a Model UN, with a few changes.

There will be moderated and unmoderated caucuses as happens in any Model UN, and
the usual diplomacy and articulate speeches that are a staple characteristic of delegates at
LUMUN will also be expected.

One major change is that the committee will be bilingual. Hence delegates can choose to
address the committee in either English or Urdu, or a mixture of both. Provincial and
cultural languages, while certainly beautiful in their own regard, will unfortunately not be
allowed.

The Committee Directors will be referred to as Speakers and the Assistant Committee
Directors will be referred to as Deputy Speakers.
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
Delegates will be expected to thoroughly read and understand the Special Rules of
Procedure, which include information relating to:
o Special Motions
o Secret Sittings
o Standing Committees
o Bills

The final documentation will be in the form of Bills.
We encourage you to read the Study Guide and Special Rules of Procedure carefully, and come
well prepared to the committee so that you may be able to give your best performance and
hopefully learn something new.
You are most welcome to email us at any time with any queries that you may have.
Happy researching!
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Topic Area A: Strategies and
the Role of the Military in the
Fight against Terrorism
Introduction to the topic
Terrorism is not something new.
It is a phenomenon that Pakistan has been
dealing with for the past couple of decades.
Reports of mass shootings, suicide bombers,
arson and general violence caused by
individuals belonging to certain extremist
groups have come to be regarded as part of
regular life in the country. According to the
Global Terrorism Index (which ranked
Pakistan as the 3rd most affected country by
Terrorism in its 2014 report), between 2000
and 2013 the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) carried out 778 attacks, out of which
‘12% were carried out by suicide bombers’.
It is worth noting that the Global Terrorism
Index report for 2015 also stated that
Pakistan has been on the Index’s ‘Ten
Countries Most Affected by Terrorism’ list
for the past 13 years. These few statistics are
more than enough to emphasize how much
terrorism is a part of the everyday reality for
the citizens of Pakistan. The government of
the country has taken several different
approaches to combating this problem, the
most recent of which has been an aggressive
military campaign initiated after the
emotionally scarring school shooting in
Peshawar last year that claimed the lives of
144 innocent children.
Keeping the reality of this threat and the
long-term economic, social and political
damages that it has wrought in mind, the
Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN 12
has been tasked with discussing current
strategies in place in the fight against
terrorism, as well as the roles,
responsibilities and powers of the military in
this regard. Members of this committee must
keep in mind that sufficient knowledge of
the current status-quo between the
government and the military, as well as a
general understanding of the different
stances that political parties have on this
matter, is critical. This Study Guide is only a
guiding document, meant to outline the
major factors and events. It is by no means
an exhaustive store of information on the
topic, and members are encouraged to carry
out extra research accordingly.
Previous Strategies
The government and military of Pakistan
have taken various steps and strategies to
deal with terrorism in the past. These have
ranged from extensive military operations to
attempts at peace talks to curbing the
influence of terrorist groups through various
means.
Financing
Pakistan’s response to terrorism financing
has focused mainly on low-level
inconspicuous activity, such as some
informal hawala (Informal money transfer)
money transfer services, mainly used by
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migrant workers, importers and traders. The
government has so far been able to freeze
certain accounts that have been used to
launder terrorism financing from abroad, the
total value of which is approximately $100
million. They also claim to have recovered
over $1 million from individuals belonging
to banned extremist outfits, that were
allegedly supposed to be used for terrorist
acts.
the Malakand region as the provincial
government had agreed to the terrorists’
demand for implementation of Sharia law in
the region. However, due to delays in the
signing of the bill, the terrorist groups
continued to expand their territory until they
had reached within 97 km of the capital city,
Islamabad. Operation Black Thunderstorm
was initiated in April 2009 in order to
reclaim all the lost territory.
Terrorist groups also resort to crime in order
to raise funds for their operations. This has
included bank robberies, kidnappings, petty
theft and other such crimes. The government
has attempted to block off this source of
funding by enacting laws pertaining to the
biometric registration of all mobile SIM
cards in the country, and blocking off all
unregistered SIM cards. Since terrorist
groups have been known to make regular
use of untraceable or unregistered SIM
cards, this has been a step forward.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb: This is the current,
ongoing operation being conducted by the
Pakistan Army against various militant
groups in the country. Launched in June
2014 in the wake of the attack on Jinnah
International Airport in Karachi, it is
described as a ‘comprehensive operation’ to
flush out all terrorists in the North-West
Pakistan region.
Military Operations
Operation Rah-e-Nijat: Operation Rah-eNijat happened in the latter half of 2009. It
was a concentrated attack by the Pakistan
Armed Forces against Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). Involving the Army, Navy and the
Air Force, the operation continued for six
months and was deemed a success.
Operation Black Thunderstorm: In early
2009, a temporary ceasefire was in place in
Negotiations
There have several instances of negotiations
taking place between the Pakistan
government and the militants.
2004: In 2004 the government of Pakistan
signed the first of three peace treaties with
militant groups operating in South
Waziristan. However, the treaty was
nullified when the militant leader who
signed the treaty was killed by an American
missile.
2006: In September 2006, the Waziristan
Accord was signed between the government
of Pakistan, tribal leaders, and militants in
North Waziristan. The agreement included
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clauses that called for the government to
reconstruct infrastructure and compensate
families for material and other losses, while
implementing a no-tolerance policy in the
region for any kind of terrorist activity.
2008: A ceasefire was implemented in North
Waziristan in 2008 by negotiating peace
deals with the TTP. The provincial
government was able to make a 15-point
peace deal with the Taliban that included
points ensuring the free movement of
workers, the expulsion of ‘foreign’ militants
by the Taliban, the immediate halt of any
anti-state, anti-government, or anti-military
activities, and the removal of the Pakistan
Army troops from the region.
2014: In January 2014, negotiations between
representatives of the Pakistan Taliban and
the government of Pakistan began in
Islamabad. The talks were aimed at
resolving the ongoing insurgency in the
country by the TTP. However these talks fell
apart a few days later when a U.S. drone
killed the TTP chief, Hakeemullah Mehsud.
Current Strategies
Currently, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism
strategy has not yet been able to eradicate
terrorism in all its forms. Terrorism is still
very much rampant across the country, from
the tribal areas of Western Pakistan to the
major port city of Karachi. Reports of
military or police personnel being injured or
killed in events related to terrorism or
terrorist outfits have become increasingly
common over the years, prompting action
from the authorities. The most recent of
these is the implementation of the National
Action Plan (NAP). Considered and drafted
in the aftermath of the school shooting
incident in Peshawar, the National Action
Plan reflects the new found aggressiveness
that the government and military have been
displaying since then. Containing clauses
pertaining to the regulation and registration
of madrassas, execution of terrorists,
establishment of special courts for speedy
trials of terrorists, enforcing a ban on armed
militant groups in the country and several
other points, the NAP has become a sort of
license for the military to engage in war-like
campaigns against targeted terrorist groups
that are currently carrying out attacks
against the state and its people.
There are many critics of the National
Action Plan that state that the huge amount
of power and autonomy bestowed upon the
military by the implementation of the plan
can only lead to trouble. Given the history of
the military inferring in politics and
overthrowing the government on more than
a couple of occasions, this is a valid
concern.
National Action Plan
History and Formation
The National Action plan is the most recent
strategy of the government of Pakistan. It
builds upon the points in the policies
previously signed into law by the PML-N
led government. These include the 64-point
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National Internal Security Policy (NISP) and
the Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA). These
two policies, both signed into law in 2014,
provided for steps and actions aimed at
increasing the short and long term ability of
dealing with extremism in all its forms, as
well as modernizing aspects of the criminal
justice system. While the NISP had points
pertaining to better regulation and oversight
of madrassas, building institutional capacity
and other ‘soft’ forms of intervention and
policy prescriptions, the PPA allowed for
short-term solutions such as increasing the
power and authority of certain security
agencies, detaining suspects without
revealing their locations, hiding reasons for
detention and other harsh and controversial
actions. Military and police personnel (grade
BPS-15 and above) were given the authority
to exercise shoot-to-kill actions. The
creation of special courts for trials was also
one of the points in the PPA.
closed meeting between bureaucrats,
military personnel, lawyers, civil society
representatives and political party
representatives, the framework for the NAP
was drafted. After presiding over an allparties conference, the Prime Minister,
Nawaz Sharif, announced the 20 point
National Action Plan in a televised address.
Following the 16th December 2014
Peshawar incident, the government was
pressurized by the military to continue and
expand upon policies that gave military
forces greater autonomy in the choice of
strategies employed against extremists.
Yielding the increasing pressure from the
military, the government developed the PPA
further and drafted a new policy that would
build upon previous policies that allowed the
use of coercive and aggressive actions to
combat terrorism. Following the Peshawar
attack, the government lifted the moratorium
on death penalties for cases of terrorism on
17th December. On 19th December, in a
5.
Countering hate speech and
extremist material
The 20 points of the National Action Plan
are as follows, according to the website of
the National Counter Terrorism Authority
(NACTA):
1.
Execution of convicted terrorists
2.
Establishment of special trial courts
3.
Ensuring no armed militias are
allowed to function in the country
4.
Strengthening and activation of
National Counter Terrorism Authority
(NACTA)
6.
Choking financing for terrorists and
terrorist organizations
7.
Ensuring against the reemergence of
proscribed organizations
8.
Establishing and deploying a
dedicated counter-terrorism force
9.
Taking effective steps against
religious persecution
10.
Registration and regulation of
madrassas
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11.
Ban on glorification of terrorism and
terrorist organizations through print and
electronic media
12.
FATA reforms
13.
Dismantling communication
networks of terrorist organizations
14.
Measures against abuse of internet
and social media for terrorism
15.
Zero tolerance for militancy in
Punjab
16.
Taking the ongoing operation in
Karachi to its logical conclusion
17.
Balochistan reconciliation
18.
Dealing firmly with sectarian
terrorists
19.
Policy to deal with the issue of
Afghan refugees
20.
Revamping and reforming the
criminal justice system
Implementation Mechanism
In order the implement the diverse points of
the National Action Plan, numerous bodies
have been formed. The policy guidelines for
these bodies are provided by a central
committee that is presided over by the Prime
Minister. This central committee includes
nine Cabinet members. There are also 15
sub-committees designed to oversee
particular NAP constituents. Eleven of these
sub-committees are chaired by the Federal
Minister for the Interior. The
implementation of the NAP is supervised on
the provincial level by an ‘apex’ committee
that is led by the Chief Minister among other
bureaucrats, military officials and
representatives from civilian and military
intelligence agencies.
However, it is worth noting that while this
framework seems well placed to work on
implementing the National Action Plan,
there was no mention of the formation of
these bodies or their powers and limits in the
NAP or in the policies guiding NACTA. As
a result, fears of authorities abusing their
powers have grown over the past few
months. There have been allegations that the
implementation of the NAP only furthers the
interests of the military officials by granting
them more power with low accountability
mechanisms in place. Responding to a
question after holding a press conference on
3rd January 2015, the Director General of
the Inter Services Press Relations (ISPR)
wing of the military stated that the existence
of the military courts and the ongoing
Operation Zarb-e-Azb would continue until
all of the extremism in the country has been
eliminated. This reflects the determination
of the military to continue their aggressive
tactics in the foreseeable future. Critics of
the NAP’s implementation mechanism point
out such examples to warn against the
growing influence and ultimate takeover of
the government by the military.
The main arguments presented revolve
around the opportunity that the
implementation mechanism of the NAP has
provided military officials with to ‘get
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involved in police administrative issues’.
The Leader of the Opposition in the
National Assembly has also issued warnings
that these provincial apex committees were
fast becoming an equivalent government.
The Military
History of Political Intervention
The Pakistan Armed Forces is the seventh
largest military force in the world in terms
of number of active personnel. It is divided
into three different inter-services branches:
the Army, the Airforce, and the Navy. The
different branches are led by their own
Chiefs who have full operational command
of the troops under their division. The three
Chiefs are also part of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee, which is headed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee (CJCSC). While the CJCSC is
the highest-ranking military official in the
country, he is only responsible for
supervising and coordinating the Chiefs of
staff, and does not wield any operational
command over them or any of the troops.
Historically, the Pakistan Army has played a
very active role in the politics of the
country. Exerting political clout has become
an almost expected characteristic of any
general who is appointed as the Chief of
Army Staff. This immense influence in
political matters stems from the several
times that the Pakistan Army has
overthrown the government and assumed
control of the country.
The very first instance of this toppling of the
government was in 1958 when President
Major General Iskandar Mirza dismissed the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the
government of Prime Minister, appointing
army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Ayub Khan
as the Chief Martial Law administrator.
Ayub Khan then proceeded to carry out his
own plan against Mirza, forcing him to
resign from his post as President and
transfer it to Khan.
In 1969, General Yahya Khan succeeded
Ayub Khan when the latter fell ill and was
unable to deal with the increasing pressures
from political parties. Yahya Khan appeared
in a televised address and imposed Martial
Law across the country. In true military
fashion, Yahya stated, ‘I will not tolerate
disorder. Let everyone remain at his post.’
The third, and perhaps most infamous,
instance of Martial Law was enforced when
Operation Fair Play took place on 4th July
1977. Then Chief of Army Staff General
Zia-ul-Haq devised a coup against the
government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq also dissolved the
Parliament and all provincial assemblies and
suspended the Constitution. He retained his
power for a period of 10 years, despite
constant assurances of having elections in
the next 90 days. He remains Pakistan’s
longest serving head of state.
The most recent instance was when General
Pervez Musharraf assumed control of the
country by suspending the Constitution and
declaring Martial Law on 15th October
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1999. He did so after successfully staging a
coup against then Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif who had attempted to keep
Musharraf’s plane from landing at Karachi
airport. Musharraf proceeded to appoint
himself President of the country and held
elections according to the Supreme Court
ruling, which resulted in him retaining the
post until 2008.
Powers and Responsibilities of the
Military
Given the previous coups at the hands of the
military, it is only natural that there is
general mistrust and confusion about the
actual powers and responsibilities of the
military. While a segment of the country’s
citizens view it as the last bastion of honest
and uncorrupted patriotism, there are also
many who believe that the military has its
own agenda that it is constantly looking to
advance. In the past, military leaders such as
Zia-ul-Haq have taken and kept power by
wielding their power as Chief of the Army
Staff for many years. This has led to the
general perception that there is a seemingly
constant struggle between the government
and the military for control of the country.
As far as the powers of the military goes,
one must keep in mind the guiding
principles observed by Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father. The
Quaid, on the occasion of the country’s
independence, said,
‘Do not forget that the armed forces are the
servants of the people. You do not make
national policy; it is we, the civilians, who
decide these issues and it is your duty to
carry out these tasks with which you are
entrusted.’
These words clearly reflected the
unambiguous views that Jinnah held
regarding civil-military relations. However,
over time it has been proven that the military
has repeatedly ignored these words and done
as they have please to ‘make national
policy’. It has also been argued that these
historic interventions in the country’s
politics have left remnants of a strong sense
of protectionism amongst the soldiers of the
army – so much so that a large number of
them believe that it is only the military that
consistently stood between Pakistan and its
destruction whenever it assumed control of
the country. This view, articulated in several
articles and books, shows that there is
clearly a sort of doctrinal belief system that
is impressed upon individuals when it comes
to the military, and specifically the army.
This belief system usually either condemns
the extrajudicial actions of the army, or
celebrates them as a mark of true patriotism
and love for the country.
Part XII, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of
Pakistan is dedicated to the Armed Forces,
and lays out the command and functions of
the military. A few important clauses of the
Constitution are mentioned below:
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1.
Clause 243 (1): ‘The Federal
Government shall have control and
command of the Armed Forces’
seem that the oath is not taken too seriously,
at least by the upper echelons of the
hierarchy.
2.
Clause 245 (1): ‘The Armed Forces
shall, under the directions of the Federal
Government, defend Pakistan against
external aggression or threat of war, and,
subject to law, act in aid of civil power when
called upon to do so’
The question here is whether or not there is
a need to enact laws further safeguarding the
continued existence of a democratic
government by limiting the powers of the
chiefs of the military.
These two clauses of the Constitution
emphasize how the Federal Government has
the power to control and command the
Armed Forces. It is these clauses that are
often overlooked, ignored, or not taken into
full consideration when undue pressure is
applied by the military to get their way. A
prime example is the undue pressure that
was applied by the Pakistan Army to
implement the National Action Plan in the
aftermath of the attack on the Army Public
School in Peshawar (an institution owned
and managed by the army).
Another interesting official document is the
oath taken by Members of the Armed
Forces, as per the Third Schedule. This oath,
taken by all troops that enlist in the military,
clearly states that they
‘… will not engage (themselves) in any
political activity whatsoever …’
And will
‘… Serve Pakistan … as required by and
under the law…’
Since the military is known for its sense of
discipline and adherence to rules, it would
Relations between Political Parties and the
Military
Over the years, different political parties
have developed different core agendas, on
the basis of which they contest elections.
These different core agendas also have led
to alliances between specific parties, and
enmity between others. This disparity has
meant that while a few political parties view
the military in a favourable light, others
outright condemn many of its actions and do
not enjoy particularly good relations with
them.
The Pakistan army also appears to have
chosen a few parties that it believes it could
work well with, and allegedly lends
unofficial support to those parties. While
this may seem to be a logical outcome in the
scenario of the military supporting a party
that vocally champions it, it must be
remembered that the military is not
supposed to play favourites. It is supposed to
keep any favourable or unfavourable
relations aside and only follow the
instructions and guidelines provided by the
Federal Government.
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Anti-Terrorism Bills Passed by the National
Assembly
commit such act that constitutes scheduled
offence under this act”.
Given below are a few of the bills relating to
terrorism and counter terrorism efforts that
the National Assembly has passed over the
years.
3.
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014:
Inroduced to amend the Anti-terrorism Act
1997.The Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill
2014, moved by Minister for Kashmir
Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, Chaudhry Birjis
Tahir, would oblige security forces to seek
permission from a Grade-17 officer or a
magistrate before opening fire on suspects.
1.
The Pakistan Army (Amendment)
Act, 2015: An act to further amend The
Pakistan Army Act, 1952. President
Mamnoon Hussain approved an ordinance
which amends the Pakistan Army Act 2015
to offer security to the recently established
military courts, their presiding officers and
military prosecutors and also lawyers and
witnesses appearing before them. The
amendment visualizes in-camera trial of
terrorists and a provision for proceedings
through video link. It will be applicable to
areas where military courts have been set up
or will be set up.
2.
The Protection of Pakistan Act,
2014: The bill defines “militant” as “any
person who wages war or insurgence against
Pakistan, or raises arms against Pakistan, its
citizens, the armed forces or civil armed
forces; or takes up advocates or encourages
or supports or abets the raising of arms or
waging of war or a violent struggle against
Pakistan; or threatens or acts or attempts to
act in a manner prejudicial to the security,
integrity or defense of Pakistan; or commits
or threatens to commit any planned offence;
and includes; a person who commits any act
outside the territory of Pakistan for which he
has used the soil of Pakistan for preparing to
4.
The National Counter Terrorism
Authority Bill, 2013: The bill addresses the
need for a pivotal institution to integrate and
synergize national counter terrorism and
counter extremism struggle in view of the
nature and magnitude of terrorist threat,
present strategic policy options to the
government for
consideration/implementation by the
shareholders after scientifically studying the
phenomenon of extremism and terrorism.
The bills aims at forming the national
counter terrorism authority (NACTA) which
is also at par with best international
standards to unity and organize national
counter terrorism and counter extremism
measures and provide for their more
effective and efficient enforcement.
5.
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2005:
Further amendment of Anti- Terrorism act
of 1997. To deliver for the making of
'control orders' imposing obligations on
individuals suspected of being involved in
terrorism-related activity. These are
preemptive orders which are designed to
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restrict or prevent the further involvement
by individuals in such activity.
Mapping a New Counter-Terrorism Policy
Following the Peshawar attack, the
newfound aggression of the authorities in
the fight against terrorism has been reflected
in the resumption of the execution of
terrorists, ramping up of the ongoing Zarb-eAzb campaign, and the increase in powers
and authority given to military and police
personnel. While this may appear to be a
positive step in the way that the government,
military, and general citizens all seem to be
fully supportive of the response to extremist
groups, it may not be the most effective and
beneficial strategy in the long term.
Currently, the National Action Plan provides
for a short term response to terrorists and
terrorist groups. It does not go beyond
giving propositions for legal and
constitutional amendments to improve the
criminal justice system, deploy a dedicated
counter-terrorism force, or enact reforms in
FATA. There is a lack of details that are
necessary in order to implement these
propositions. In order to map an effective
counter-terrorism policy, the government
must look into a holistic approach that
involves capacity building for lower level
security personnel, reducing the burden on
hugely strained security facilities, and
combating corruption and politicization of
government and military forces.
Building Police Capacity
Police personnel are often ignored when
considering actions to be taken against
terrorist outfits. This appears to be a major
oversight on the part of the authorities
involved, as these police offers are
permanent residents in the areas that they
are tasked with protecting. Not only does
this have the potential to give them greater
incentive in carrying out their tasks
responsibly and professionally, this also can
prove to be a good source of intelligence and
expertise. Since police officers are more
familiar with the people and places in the
areas that they are posted in, they have the
potential to be the first and strongest
deterrent against any possible incidents of
terrorism.
However, this is sadly not the case. Instead
of investing in this highly valuable resource,
the government instead relies on the military
and rangers to protect cities and towns. If
resources are instead spent on improving the
training and intelligence of police officers, a
number of potential incidents of terrorism
could be proactively stopped. Simply
increasing the number of police officers will
not work, as this was already done on a large
scale in Sindh in the 1990s. The practice
resulted in scored of underpaid,
underperforming personnel. Since 2005, the
number of police personnel across the
country has nearly doubled from 220,000 to
430,000, yet it has not seemed to have had
any visible impact on the law and order
situation of the country, which has
progressively gotten worse.
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Along with this, the general perception that
the citizens have of the police is not at all
flattering. The police force as a whole is
seen as corrupt, inefficient, politicized and
always out to do more harm than good at the
expense of the citizens. While it is true that
the issues of corruption, politicization, and
inefficiency are prevalent within the police
force, the lack of a concentrated effort to
project a more positive image of the police
force makes things worse. If the government
and other civil society institutions take the
lead in organizing outreach programs,
training workshops, motivational activities
and other such actions, then the resultant
improvement in relations between the police
and the general population will definitely be
a positive factor in the fight against
terrorism.
Improving training regimes, raising
standards for police recruitment and police
work, and working towards improving the
popular perception of the police are a few
steps that the government can take to ensure
that police personnel find that they have the
motivation and ability to actively seek out
and eliminate elements of terrorism on a
grass roots level in cities and towns that the
military is not active in.
Reducing the Burden on Infrastructure
The country’s courts and prisons are
overburdened, understaffed, and not
managed properly. This leads to a number of
problems, not the least of which is the
economic cost of maintaining such an
inefficient system. Currently about 80% of
the prison population is on trial, with the
courts having more cases than they can
handle. In this scenario, obtaining speedy
and fair justice is a near impossible task for
the common man. Not only are the police
and courts unable to meet deadlines for
delivering judgements, they are also not
very motivated to be alert and aware of the
fairness of their judgements and actions.
Lawyers and judges argue that the number
of courts needs to be doubled at the very
least. While this may seem irrelevant to the
war on terror, it must be understood that
overburdened prisons are often recruiting
grounds for terrorist and extremist groups.
Since the facilities are very over populated,
these prisons are also seen as ‘think tanks’
of militant groups, where networks are
established and operations are planned. Add
to this the lack of sufficient staff to
supervise inmates and it leads to a quite
permissive environment in which these
prisoners are able to continue planning and
executing terrorist actions.
Apart from courts and prisons, police
stations are also overburdened and
inadequately equipped. There are reports of
police officers building makeshift police
stations under bridges and on public land
due to lack of funding and facilities. Since
the process of allocating police budgets is
also flawed, many police stations do not get
the necessary funds to be able to function
19
properly. Police officers often pay from their
own salaries to buy stationery, petrol and
other such items necessary for operating.
This lack of funding for police stations is
also because of a long and inefficient chain
of police officials in a very inefficiently
formulated hierarchy. This seeming lack of
support from the government is bound to
demotivate the police officers who do
initially have a strong sense of duty and
patriotism.
All of these issues only further worsen the
problem of dealing with terrorists. While the
police does not have the ability of funding to
be able to actively ward off against terrorist
attacks, the courts and prisons are also too
overcrowded to effectively and correctly
root out terrorists and be able to hold fair,
transparent, and free from controversy trials.
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1
333523681_951.pdf
2.
Constitution of Pakistan (Searchable
website version)
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constituti
on/
3.
Global Terrorism Index report
(2014)
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/defau
lt/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20R
eport%202014_0.pdf
4.
Global Terrorism Index report
(2015)
http://economicsandpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Global-TerrorismIndex-2015.pdf
Helpful Links
5.
Revisiting Counter-Terrorism
Strategies in Pakistan – Crisis Group
While this study guide covers only a few
areas of special interest in the topic area, it is
highly recommended that delegates engage
themselves fully with all of the ideas,
propositions, bodies and policies mentioned
here. To this end, you must extensively
research on how the information given here
can apply to the Questions a Bill Must
Answer. Given below are a few links that
will serve to improve your understanding of
the topic.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asi
a/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counterterrorism-strategies-in-pakistanopportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf
1.
Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan (official pdf National Assembly
version)
7.
Pakistan’s Fight Against Terrorism –
Centre of Excellence-Defence Against
Terrorism
6.
National Counter Terrorism and
Extremism Strategy – Institute for Policy
Reforms
http://ipr.org.pk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/National-CounterTerrorism-and-Extremism-Strategy.pdf
20
http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/vol
ume7/02Pakistans_Fight_Against_Terrorism.pdf
4.
How can the National Action Plan be
expanded and made more detailed?
Questions a Bill Must Answer:
5.
How can a new, more
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy be
implemented?
1.
To what extent are the current
strategies in the fight against terrorism
effective?
6.
How can the government ensure the
survival of democracy in the current
scenario?
2.
How likely is it that the military will
once again strive to impose Martial Law?
7.
To what extent and how must the
government strive to limit the powers of the
army?
3.
To what extent is the current political
influence of the military justifiable?
8.
How can the justice system and
police be facilitated to implement the NAP?
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