2014
The Olympic Truce
AN ANCIENT CONCEPT IN A MODERN WORLD
MARTIN GUDERT
Danke Stefan
1
Table of contents
1.
Introduction ............................................................................................. 4
2.
Overview ................................................................................................. 5
2.1.
Aim and Research Question............................................................. 5
2.2.
Delimitations ..................................................................................... 6
3.
Methodology ........................................................................................... 8
3.1.
What can be known? ........................................................................ 8
3.2.
How can it be known? ...................................................................... 9
3.3.
Methods used ................................................................................... 9
4.
The two spheres ................................................................................... 11
4.1.
Sports and politics .......................................................................... 11
4.1.1. Sport as “war without weapons” ................................................. 14
4.2.
Sport and Civil Society ................................................................... 15
4.2.1. Case studies ............................................................................... 16
4.3.
Why sport is important for politics ................................................... 20
4.4.
Why politics are important for sport ................................................ 21
5.
The Olympic Truce ................................................................................ 24
5.1.
The Concept of the Olympic Truce ................................................. 24
5.1.1. The Historic origin....................................................................... 24
5.1.2. Modern Revival........................................................................... 26
5.2.
Modern Games ............................................................................... 29
5.2.1. The Olympic Truce Foundation .................................................. 32
5.2.2. Modern view on Truce ................................................................ 33
6.
What kind of concept is the Olympic Truce? ......................................... 35
6.1.
The Olympics and politics............................................................... 35
6.1.1. The IOC and sport politics .......................................................... 36
6.1.2. The Olympics as political arena .................................................. 37
6.2.
The IOC and the UN ....................................................................... 40
7.
How does the Olympic Truce fit into theory? ......................................... 42
7.1.
Realism .......................................................................................... 44
7.2.
Constructivism ................................................................................ 46
8.
How does the concept work? ................................................................ 49
8.1.
The Olympic Truce as a myth ......................................................... 49
8.2.
The Truce as a regime ................................................................... 51
8.3.
Summary ........................................................................................ 56
9.
Is the Truce a relevant concept? ........................................................... 57
9.1.
Defining a relevant concept ............................................................ 57
9.2.
How to measure relevance ............................................................. 57
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10. The concept in practise ......................................................................... 59
10.1. Nagano 1998 .................................................................................. 59
10.2. Salt Lake City 2002 ........................................................................ 60
10.3. Beijing 2008 .................................................................................... 62
10.4. Small-scale conflicts ....................................................................... 63
11. The Olympic Truce and Sochi 2014 ...................................................... 65
11.1. Russia and the Games ................................................................... 65
11.2. References to the Truce ................................................................. 66
11.3. Events in the Ukraine ..................................................................... 67
11.4. The Olympic Truce during the crisis ............................................... 69
11.4.1. The relevance of the Truce during the events ............................ 71
11.5. So is it?........................................................................................... 72
12. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 74
12.1. Reviving the Truce ......................................................................... 76
12.2. A step back..................................................................................... 77
12.3. Another view on the Truce.............................................................. 80
13.
Reference ............................................................................................. 82
3
1. Introduction
Sports and politics are often considered as two separate entities which should
not be mixed. This perception goes back to a classification of both areas, in which
sports represent something noble, where fair play and honest competition are of the
essence, whereas politics or anything “political” is seen as something very different
and maybe even contradictory to these qualities. This perception of course is not true
at all and both topics are more interwoven than separate. However, especially from the
institutions of global sports it is often claimed that they themselves are unpolitical. From
the other side, political leaders often seek the company of sport idols, mostly in the
hope to profit from their popularity. In this somewhat conflicted environment between
two spheres, some recent developments further trouble the claimed separation.
However, the concept of the Olympic Truce, promoted by the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), seemingly proves that such a separation is not possible.
However, the IOC still claims to be not involved in international politics at all. Another
example, although not as striking as the Olympic Truce, is FIFAs campaign against
racism and for Fair Play, addressing societal issues, reaching over the boundaries of
the sport.
So why is there the claim to be unpolitical, while on the other hand global sports
organizations clearly leave their obvious domain and reach into society? And further,
what might be the reason for this outreach into other domains, and are there any
chances of success? The Olympic Truce is an excellent object to study in this regard,
since it has roots in both spheres, sports and politics. These come from the historic
origin of the concept, based in the ancient Greek Games, and its aim at the relations
between states and other conflict parties.
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By looking closer at the most recent events during the Sochi 2014 Winter
Olympics, I will evaluate whether the concept is still valid or not. To this case study, I
will take the constructivist approach as explained by Bachtler and Wren, which accepts
that it is impossible to separate facts and values (Bachtler & Wren, 2006, p. 146). Since
the overall aim of this work is to determine whether the Olympic Truce is a valid concept
or not, future assumptions on the Truce might change these findings (Hoerner &
Stephenson, 2012, p. 704).
2. Overview
The Olympic Truce is a concept long known to mankind, with its roots dating
back to ancient Greece. In our modern days, it is promoted by the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) and aims at a temporary hold of all conflicts globally during the time
of Olympic and Paralympic Games.
2.1.
Aim and Research Question
The research question this thesis seeks to answer is a straight-forward one. Is
the Olympic Truce currently a valid concept in International Relations? To answer this
question, several topics have to be covered. Has it ever been one? And what are the
differences in the modern concept compared to the ancient origins? Further, this thesis
shall examine possible explanations of why the Olympic Truce is constantly being
promoted by the IOC.
The issue is focussed on the connection between sports and politics in general
and the Olympic Truce in particular. The question of the role of the concept of the
Olympic Truce in this regard is in my opinion a vital one. With the concept sometimes
being considered as the “longest-lived institution of international law in the history of
the ancient and modern world” (Georgiadis & Syrigos, 2009, p. 17) and the
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development of sport mega events from true festivals of sports and health to economic
assets, the question of the purpose of the Olympic Truce arises. Although there are
constantly Resolutions passed, demanding the observance of the Olympic Truce
(United Nations General Assembly, 2011), there is legitimate doubt about the concept.
Recent conflicts, as well as the developments within the International Olympic
Committee pose a serious threat to the Olympic Truce. An updated analysis of the role
and contributions of the Truce is necessary. However, the most pressing issue in
regards to the Olympic Truce and its’ promotion is the question of relevance.
As a starting point of this work I will examine the overlapping spheres of sports
and politics, which create the fundament for the concept of the Olympic Truce. After
exploring this fundament, I will give an overview over the concept itself and its historic
origins as well as its modern interpretations. The next step will then be an exploration
of how the Olympic Games and politics are intertwined, followed by a presentation of
how the concept of the Olympic Truce correlates with the dominating theories of
International Relations of the recent history. From this, a closer look at how the concept
is brought to life will follow. Based on this groundwork, I will then explain what defines
a relevant concept as such, followed by an analysis of different situations to which the
concept applied in the recent history. From these case studies, I will derive at my
conclusion.
2.2.
Delimitations
This work will always be the result of subjective findings. My results depend to
a large extent on the sources I can gather and the way I interpret them. Nevertheless,
this thesis aims at a general understanding of the concept and its relevance in our
present world. The legitimacy of the concept will thereby only be considered in minor
aspects. Other difficulties arise from the fact that the Olympic Truce as a perceived
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noble concept (Hoberman, 2011, p. 17) might serve as a scapegoat for any party in a
conflict which otherwise would have to acknowledge any kind of weakness when
demanding a ceasefire. Keeping this in mind, one could argue that the Truce is relevant
regardless of the real motives behind its application, since it has to be considered as
a working concept through its sheer existence either way. However, I will try to
differentiate between these cases.
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3. Methodology
Under the term methodology all steps towards the answer of a research problem
or question are summarized. Starting from the epistemological and ontological outset,
the methods to get to the core of the problem are to be determined to fit the purpose
and the intended path to examine the problem at hand. The chosen methods depend
to a great extent on the problem which is to be examined and the available data or
sources.
3.1.
What can be known?
This question lies at the heart of all epistemological and ontological
considerations. While ontology is concerned with what we study, that is the nature of
the world we live in, epistemology is concerned with how we could know this world
(Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 21ff). On both issues, I see myself in an Interpretivist
approach as classified by Della Porta and Keating. The reality, in which I try to examine
the validity of the Olympic Truce in, is obviously not as objective as positivists would
argue. It is rather a mixture of objective and subjective perceptions, something
intrinsically inherent in all situations of crisis, since all sides claim their truth is the only
honest description of events. Following from this, the “truth” of reality, or even reality
itself, will always be influenced by subjectivity. The outcome of this work will be the
specific explanation of cases, which can provide concepts for the analysis of future
cases (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 27). In other words, I will strive for a
generalizable analysis of the cases at hand.
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3.2.
How can it be known?
The motives behind the actions taken in reference to the Truce, which shall be
examined in this work, are very important to understand the mechanisms of the Truce
and its historic origin. Therefore, I argue that knowledge, or what we think to know, has
always to be seen in the context in which it was produced. The perceptions of the
actors of the outside world at the time of their decision-making has to be considered in
depth. Why this is important becomes obvious in chapter 7 of this work, which is
concerned with theories of International Relations. Since underlying theories do shape
our actions, the theories that were dominating at the time of certain decisions have to
be taken into account to fully understand those decisions. The Truce offers a great
example to observe this, since decisions made in this context seem irrational only ten
years and a change in dominating theories later.
3.3.
Methods used
The question of the validity or value of a concept can not only be measured by
analysing the frequency and number of usages and referrals to this concept. Keeping
this in mind, it is obvious that an analysis first has to describe the concept in full to
emphasise its relevance to the situation at hand. Further, it has to be established
whether this concept was seen as being valid in the past or not. Giving the recent
nature of events, an extensive analysis of scientific literature is not really possible,
simply due to a lack of publications. However, extensive writing exists on the part of
the concept itself and applications in the past. By analysing the standards these
publications use to make references to the concept and by applying them to the
accessible publications on the recent events, I hope to be able to draw my own
conclusions.
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On the recent events, I will have to rely mostly on officially released documents,
press announcements and other documents which might be flawed in a distinct manor
to give the subject a spin or framing in the desired direction, dependent on the
background of the publisher. I am aware that the highly emotional situation in the
Ukraine increases the risk of flawed sources. On other cases, more distant accounts
are available. However, this thesis does not aim at taking sides but rather focusses on
the concept of the Olympic Truce and its validity, therefore referrals to the concept will
be my main focus. Judging the respective actions of all involved actors and their
accordance to the concept cannot and will not be the focus of this work.
When examining past referrals to the concept, I can rely on personal accounts
by involved actors as well, which is not possible when it comes to the more recent
events.
Given the special role of the Olympic Truce as a somewhat noble concept and
the possibility of it being used as an “excuse” for an otherwise inevitable truce, I will
have to test the reasons given for the respective truce, framing it in reference to the
Olympic Truce. This is best done by crosschecking this explanation with other possible
explanations, ruling out unlikely references to the concept of the Olympic Truce. If other
explanations fit better, they are more likely to be the real reason behind a truce
agreement (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 540).
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4. The two spheres
To be capable to analyse the concept of the Truce, we first have to examine the
two spheres it is rooted in. The Olympic Truce is a concept closely linked to two
spheres, sports and politics, in this case represented by the subfield of international
relations. These two spheres both have distinctive actors, professionally conducting
their tasks in the respective fields. However, both fields lie close together and the Truce
as a concept challenges both fields to a common game, the rules of which are not clear
to begin with. The International Olympic Committee itself has to be seen as a major
contributor to this game, being one of the first actors in the sphere of sports acting on
a truly global level. It has to be noted that the IOC itself is not involved in the rulemaking
of any sport, thereby lacking one aspect of the close ties between the two spheres of
sports and politics which discipline-specific entities such as the FIFA or FIBA possess.
4.1.
Sports and politics
Both these fields have traditionally been seen as separate. This view however
was never unchallenged and has come under further pressure lately. To start out with,
a definition of both sports and politics is needed. In this regard, I will fall back to the
definitions used by Kissoudi (2008, p. 1689): Sport is an ‘institutionalised competitive
activity that involves vigorous physical exertion or the use of relatively complex physical
skills by individuals whose participation is motivated by a combination of intrinsic and
extrinsic factors’ (Coakley, 2009, p. 17). The key word in this definition for my purposes
is with no doubt “institutionalised”. Although individual efforts surely do deserve to be
called “sport” from a physical point of view, those efforts are, as said, individual, and
have thereby no greater influence on society as such. Nevertheless, it is notable that
this view on individual sport efforts was certainly different in history. Especially in
Victorian Great Britain, men were supposed to keep themselves in shape. This duty
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was closely connected to the militarisation of society, seeing every man as a possible
soldier to defend the motherland. Strong and healthy citizens in this view meant a
strong country.
In regards to politics, Kissoudi gives two definitions, one by Millar and one by
Leftwich (2008, p. 1689). The definition used by Millar, which says that ‘politics is
concerned with the use of government to resolve conflict in the direction of change or
in the prevention of change’ seems to be either too state-centric or, if one would like to
see it more broadly, suffers from the confusion of the terms government and
governance. Leftwichs definition in turn is broader, saying that ‘politics is at the heart
of all collective social activity, formal and informal, public and private, in all human
groups, institutions and societies, not just some of them’. Employing this definition, it
becomes clear that there is at least something which could be called an “internal”
political dimension of sports. The governing bodies of most sports are concerned with
rulemaking, doing so in many cases via voting procedures amongst members and/or
their representatives. Questions of staffing and organisation of events is also a deeply
politicised process. To name only a few examples, the election campaigns for positions
in FIFA and IOC have become very important, with clear signs of different alliances
sticking together. In the “external” political dimension of sport, the one which is often
said not to exist, is a bit harder to proof using these definitions. Nevertheless, what is
always there is at least a slight feeling that both areas are interrelated to say the least.
However hard this connection is to grasp, it becomes easier if we don’t stick solely to
definitions, but look at what constitutes something as being political in general.
Kissoudi follows the same steps in his text (Kissoudi, 2008).
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The first and most spread concept is that something is political as soon as
governments are involved. This is obviously true for sports on many levels, since sport
for example is always conducted under the jurisdiction of the state it is played in.
The second concept is that politics always deal with issues of power, control
and influence over people’s behaviour. Again, the internal organisation of international
sport organisation deals with exactly these issues. Further, as the IOC for example
only accepts one National Olympic Committee per state, a recognition of the IOC of a
NOC is also practically a recognition of the regime ruling in the state of the NOC.
The third and most obvious concept is that anything that is capable of bringing
together large numbers of people can be seen as political, something which is
absolutely true for sports. Even more so for the Olympic Movement, undoubtable the
by far largest universal sport movement on the planet.
Beacom sees sport as a generally accepted contributor to the dynamics of
International Relations (2000, p. 1) and goes on to assume that the changes in
International Relations will be reflected in International Sports. Espy sees sport even
as a tool of diplomacy, with delegations of athletes fulfilling the roles of ambassadors
and the cancelation of organised tours as a serious tool of diplomatic pressure (Espy,
1979, p. 3). Houlihan predicts that the long-term involvement of global companies and
businesses ‘will weaken the ability of governments to manipulate and exploit sport for
diplomatic purposes (1994, p. 24). This 20 year old view has already been proven to
some extent, given the major role companies possess as financial contributors to sport
events and organizations, influencing decision making and rules of conduct.
Over the years, sport has served as a tool for politics in many different shapes:
through boycotts, recognition of states or their isolation, as incentive for unification or
simply as a mean to gain prestige.
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4.1.1. Sport as “war without weapons”
The view on sports and politics has changed over centuries. The most recent
changes involve the view on sports as a war without weapons (Strenk, 1979, p. 128).
Although this concept existed nearly since the beginning of sports, some authors see
the simulation of war even as the birthplace of sporting competitions, starting as early
as Plato and Aristotle, I will focus on the more recent developments in this regard,
namely since the 19th century.
With the formation of the larger nation states came the urge to unify those states
and to show superiority over neighbours and competitors. Sport competitions soon
proved to be the perfect arena for this, since athletes representing their respective
states were competing against each other, employing strength and tactics to gain the
edge over their opponents, two key features of any militaristic equation. Lord
Wellingtons’ famous quote “the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of
Eton” illustrates this connection rather drastically (Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2011, p.
382).
Without risking the loss of military power, comparisons and competitions
between different states were moved to the sports fields. The dominance of the British
Empire was mirrored in the sports played in the world, predominantly those which
originated in England like Cricket, Football and Rugby. Later on, these factors also
contributed to this view on sports being the dominant one during the cold war. With
both blocs seeing sports as an excellent opportunity to prove their superiority,
significant resources were channelled into elite sports to “produce” medals and
trophies (Wagg & Andrews, 2006, p. 153). These resources in the case of the German
Democratic Republic for example reached as much as 2% of the Gross National
Product in 1970 (Strenk, 1979, p. 129).The main arena for these battles were the
14
Olympic Games, since the whole world was or is watching these competitions. But not
only in the context of the Cold War was sport seen as a tool, but also in colonialism as
mentioned above (Mangan & Baker, 1987).
Since the end of the Cold War, this view on sports is on the decline. Contributing
to this might be the continued professionalization of club sports, resulting in teams
consisting of athletes from many countries. This multi-nationalism might have
contributed more to the development of a more peaceful view on sports than known
yet. Teammates from the same club are less likely to turn on each other when
representing their respective home countries.
The internationalism and peacebuilding capacities of sport have moved into the
spotlight (Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2011, p. 384). This move is closely linked to the
developments in the field of International Relations theory which will be examined in
chapter 7 of this work. Thereby sport itself has moved from a government-dominated
domain into the sphere of civil society.
4.2.
Sport and Civil Society
Civil Society is a revived concept in political science. It was seldom used until
the 1990s, a point in time which not coincidentally matches the diminishing of realism
as the dominating theory in International Relations. Gellner defines civil society as:
‘That set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to
counterbalance the state, and whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of
keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent
the state from dominating and atomising the rest of society’ (1995, p. 32). In the
practise of political science, there is a tendency to accept only those institutions as part
of civil society who support norms which are generally accepted (Allison, 1998, p. 713),
thereby limiting civil society to somewhat positive actors and coining the term as
15
something positive. So how do sports and its governing bodies fit into the concept of
civil society? Diamond lists five functions of civil society (1994):

Checking government power

Developing participatory skills and practises, as well as democratic
values

Recruiting and training leaders

Disseminating information

Providing channels for the expression of interests.
Sports organizations can perform most of these tasks, as Allison points out
(1998, p. 714). Especially when it comes to the developing of participatory skills and
practises, the recruitment and training of leaders and disseminating information, sports
organisations show their strength. Although Allison limits his findings somehow by
pointing out that most of this happens in a context of sports only, I would suggest, since
people do employ skills they acquired in one field also in other fields, that this makes
sports organisations a very important actor in the formation of a civil society. Further,
sports, regardless of the organizational aspects, teaches values which are also
important in the context of a working civil society, for example competing while
retaining respect for opponents, teamwork and an ultimate willingness to accept
authority (Ibid.).
4.2.1. Case studies
To prove the connection between sports and civil society, Allison conducted
three case studies of nation states and their sports “systems” or the level of
organization of sports, and the level of development of the civil society in these states
(1998, p. 716ff.). Thereby, a close interconnection between the two spheres of sports
and politics becomes obvious.
16
The states were chosen for their different level of civil society involvement, with
South Africa representing a state with a strong civil society, Thailand with a small and
weak civil society and Georgia with a basically non-existent civil society. All three states
however shared the faith of the recent development of democratic structures, though
from different backgrounds.
For Georgia, Allison assessed a lack of nearly any organizations, including
local, religious or charitable ones. Even trade unions or other workers-related
organizations were practically non-existent. To some extent, this can be traced back
to strong ties within extended families, resulting sometimes in mafia-like structures.
Although Allison saw these structures as helpful during times of distress, he also
argued that they hinder government and the development of a ‘mature party system’.
The sport-system of Georgia in his view was a typical soviet one in his view, with the
state being the central authority and organising authority. With the decline of soviet
influence there was also a diminishing of sports, accelerated by the lack of independent
sports organisations. With the retreat of governmental structures, no actor was in sight
to take over. This decline can be seen in all parts of sport, measurable for example in
the number of spectators during high-league football matches as well as the interest in
grassroots sports or recreational activities.
Thailand is described by Allison as a centralized state, “dominated in every way
by Bangkok” (1998, p. 719). Struggles in society in general are seen as a power
struggle amongst different members of the city-elites, only focussing on individual
advantages and gains, thereby playing out different groups of society against each
other. However, with a rise of economic power and a growing middle class, the author
also saw a strengthening of civil society during the mid-1990s. When it comes to sport,
only a few clubs with professional structures exist, all tied to members of the ruling
17
elite. Clubs at a grass-root level practically did not exist. Economic considerations were
in the focus of those involved in the clubs. A similarity is seen in the sports systems of
Georgia and Thailand, as they both originally imposed by outside powers. One by the
Soviets and in the Thailand case by British occupants.
The civil society of South Africa in turn is seen as strong and influential. Allison
gives the example of the Dutch Reformed Church, which in 1986 removed the
“theological underpinnings of apartheid” (1998, p. 721). Further, there are many
organisations, covering nearly all aspects of society. However, Allison sees a conflict
in with this high level of organisation on one side and the high crime rates on the other
side. To him, these could be seen as a hint towards some basic misconstructions within
society. Further, he sees a problem in the involvement of the African National Congress
in the government. With its roots as an organisation of the civil society, there might be
a clash of interest coming from this participation in the ruling structures. In the
organization of sports, the author assesses that South African sports organizations had
managed to influence governmental decisions on apartheid (1998, p. 722). This
conclusion is reached through the analysis of different sport organizations founded
during the era of apartheid and the Governments reaction to it. Further, many
organisations were founded during that era by private actors to counterbalance the
negative effects of sanctions imposed against the country in the sports sector, including
the national sports of Cricket and Rugby. The 1995 Rugby World Cup was a milestone
in the nation-building of the new country after apartheid, thanks to the careful framing
of the event as a chance to portrait the new rainbow-nation to the world by the
Mandela-led ANC-Government.
As a conclusion of this study, Allison point out that there is at least a correlation
between the level of development of civil society in a country and its sports
18
organisations. However, the direction of influence needs to be further investigated. Or,
as Allison puts it “sport tends to reflect the rest of civil society” (1998, p. 725).
Following from Allisons’ findings on the case of South Africa, there are other
examples of this connection. Sports organisations have, as INGOs, in some cases
demonstrated the capability do influence governmental decision-making (Beacom,
2000, p. 6). However, this requires substantial resources, which are not available to all
international sports organisations. Murray for example only considers the IOC and
FIFA as capable of influence on such a scale (Murray, 1999, p. 29), while Beacom
sees a chance for other organisations to reach these capabilities and resources by
banding together in collectives, such as the General Association of International Sports
Federations (GAISF) and the Association of Summer Olympic International
Federations (ASOIF) (2000, p. 7).
It is important in this respect to remember the outstanding role of the IOC in this
regard, as only the International Olympic Committee decides on the program of
Olympic Games and therefore has the significance and even future of some minor
sports at their disposal. This impact shows for example in the recent rule changes in
the modern pentathlon and the constant rule changes in field hockey, both aimed at
remaining a part of the Olympic program and thereby securing vital financial
contributions. The prospect of a cut of wrestling from the Olympic Games sparked an
outrage amongst the fans of this traditional Olympic sport and led to alliances across
borders to work together and keep the sport in the program. As we will notice further
on in this work, this magnitude of influence on the governing bodies of single sport
disciplines is only matched by governmental restrictions.
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A very important aspect in the analysis of the effects sports have on societies is
the personal level of interaction. Sport events bring together people with the same
interests, often resulting in friendships beyond the sport.
4.3.
Why sport is important for politics
Nye points out in his concept of soft power that it is important to be feared and
loved at the same time (Nye, 2009, p. 1). While the part of fear is predominately played
by the tools of hard power, that is military might, the sources of soft power are more
diverse. Nye defines power as the ability to change the behaviour of states (Nye, 1990,
p. 155), an asset certainly present in international sports organizations, illustrated for
example by FIFAs pressure to allow beer in the stadiums of the 2014 World Cup.
However, the influence of sport as a source of soft power is far more diverse than this
example. Nye points out that the significance of other power resources only increased
when the tensions of the cold war were on the decline, and other actors were seen as
legitimate. The end of the Cold War will be mentioned in this work on several
occasions, as it changed the arenas and actors of international politics and made a
rise of non-state actors possible.
A good example of the use of sport as a source of soft power is given by Huish,
Carter and Darnell in their analysis of Cuba’s policies of internationalism (Huish, et al.,
2013). The authors here take the standpoint that sport, as well as issues of more
prominent Cuban domains such as health care, is used to promote Cuban
internationalism.
To a great extent, political leaders know and use the benefits of being
associated with winners of sporting competitions. But not only athletes and teams cast
a possible chance to shine, but also global sporting events. Using events for political
goals certainly is not a recent development. One of the oldest examples are the games
20
in ancient Rome, paid for by the emperors, to entertain the masses and prove the
power of the empire. In modern times, the Olympic Games of 1936 are a prime
example of how sport events are used to promote nationalistic policies. The Hitlerregime used the Games to portray the Third Reich as an open, peace-loving country,
which at the same time was capable of organizing such a huge event, proving the
superiority of its own people. A much more positive example of this use of events is
the Rugby World Cup 1995 in South Africa, coined as the first global event in the
country after the end of Apartheid, unifying all ethnic groups of the country in their
support for the (still predominantly) white team.
Another aspect of this is the perceived proof of superiority coming from a win
over a rival. Some clashes in the stadiums of the world had the status of an important
matchup even before they even started, some were attributed with this after the result
was clear, mainly by the winners of course. Examples of this include the “Miracle on
Ice”, a win of an United States Ice Hockey team made up of college students over their
Soviet opponents who were unbeaten for years during the Winter Olympics in Lake
Placid (Wagg & Andrews, 2006, p. 222). This aspect has declined in relevance over
the past few years, notably since the end of the Cold War. However, clashes of what
are perceived as arch-rivals in certain sports still attract a lot of public attention, much
like city-derbies in domestic competitions do.
4.4.
Why politics are important for sport
First of all, many sports organisations on the national level are to a great part
dependent on financial contributions by governments. These contributions come in the
form of lottery stakes which are used to support national organisations (for example in
England, Sweden and Germany) or as direct financial contributions. In many states,
financial funding of national association depends on the results accomplished in
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international competitions, most important, again, the Olympic Games. Non-Olympic
sports receive notably less funding in most states, again demonstrating the outstanding
role of the IOC. Apart from these direct contributions, governments can influence the
possibilities of certain sports to gain money from sponsors. Important examples for this
are the ban of advertisements for tobacco-related products in the EU, taking this source
of income from sports relying on those companies as sponsors, or the broadcastingban of ultimate fighting in some states of Europe, effectively stripping the sport and its
governing bodies of the essential cash flow generated by TV-presence. A second
example of this immediate influence regards all shooting sports, which are subject to
arms-laws in states. In some states, special laws for the possession of arms exist,
allowing their use for sports. If these laws are suspended, the sport is logically dead
as well. But also less dangerous sports have to be seen as subject of national policies.
Long-distance swimming and running or sailing for example mainly happen on public
grounds, therefore relying on the possibility to use these premises for their purposes.
A lack of support by governments for such events cut put an end to these. A part of the
above mentioned financial support is the maintenance of sports grounds and their
provision to clubs, which are usually not able to fulfil this task on their own.
Sometimes, politics are important to sports for an entirely different reason: to
calm emotions after important matches, to maintain peace. One example were this
failed was the football war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. Although the
underlying reasons for this conflict were much deeper than just the clashes on the field
during the qualifying match for the 1970 World Cup, the match was the final spark to
ignite the conflict.
If we look at South Africa during the era of Apartheid again, this national policy
basically led to an exclusion of all athletes and teams from nearly all international
22
competitions, putting them on the side-line for many years. This might be one of the
most extreme examples of how politics influence sports.
All in all, there is no denial in the fact that sports and politics are closely
interconnected. Coming from this finding, a more outspoken role of sports
organizations in the sphere of politics seems to be only logical. It remains questionable
however who should be the recipient of messages and influence coming from this
sphere.
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5. The Olympic Truce
The Olympic Truce is a wanderer between the, already examined, two spheres
of politics and sports. While its origins lie in sports, it aims at the sphere of international
relations. Strikingly, the International Olympic Committee as main promoter and
sponsor of the Truce denies any connection between the two spheres and even
sanctions any perceived involvements of politics into the affairs of the National Olympic
Committees. Although this seems rather odd not only at first glance, certain dangers
would lie in a more active role of the IOC.
5.1.
The Concept of the Olympic Truce
The concept of the Truce is many centuries, if not millennia, old, dating back to
the old Greeks. Despite the continued reference to this heritage, the concept has
changed to a great extent. However, one has to take into account the massive changes
in society over the past nearly two thousand years (Saha, 2014, p. 14).
5.1.1. The Historic origin
The concept of the Olympic Truce, or Ekecheiria, dates back to ancient Greece.
It was first put into action in the year 776 B.C. (Olympic Truce Foundation, 2012) to
ensure safe travel for athletes and spectators, as well as a peaceful conduct of the
Games. It was originally agreed upon by three kings, Lycurgus of Sparta, Iphitos of
Elide and Cleosthenes of Pisa. Later, all other Greek cities joined the agreement
(Kidane, 1998, p. 5). Translated literally, Ekecheiria means “a holding of hands, a
cessation of hostilities, armistice, truce” (Burleson, 2012). It expanded over 3 months
before and after the Games due to long travel times. During that time, legal cases
rested and armed conflicts with the state of Elis, where Olympia is located, were
forbidden. Failure to comply with these rules resulted in a fine and possible exclusion
from participating in the games. Given the high stance of the Games and the Honour
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gained from victory in them, this threat was enough to enforce compliance most of the
time. Given the constant state of war the Greek republics were in, those six month of
truce represented a welcomed period of security and rest to the people. Some scholars
go as far as stating that the whole reason for the introduction of the ancient Games
was to accomplish a time of peace (Woodhouse, 2010, p. 494).
Contradicting this rather romantic perception of the concept, recent research
has shown that even during the Games, the Truce was very limited. Apparently it was
limited to the site of the Games themselves and to Athletes and Spectators travelling
to and from the Games. Armed conflicts however waged on most of the times (Golden,
1998, p. 10). Loland and Selliaas therefore argue that the Truce came out of pragmatic
reasons rather than a moral rejection of the concept of war (Loland & Selliaas, 2009,
p. 59). Kidd argues that the ancient Greeks were not naïve and did not believe that the
Truce could end all wars, but rather created it for the pragmatic reason to prevent
disruption of the Games (2013, p. 418).
The ancient games were of great importance to the Greek republics. Winning
here meant to be superior over other states and gave a boost to the confidence.
Although athletes did not technically represent their states of origin and only competed
for personal glory, a nation-building aspect was still present. The great rivalries
between for example Sparta and Athens also found representation in the Games,
sometimes even fuelled by incentives of local businesspeople who tried to enhance
“their” athletes commitment. The Games themselves and the accompanying rituals
were sometimes seen as the ultimate sign of belonging to the Greek culture circle,
therefore participating in them was of utmost importance. Nevertheless, the ancient
concept was not a guarantee for peace during the games. Several incidents are proven
in which the Truce was broken. To name a few, an army from Sparta attacked the
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unsuspicious town of Lepreon in 421 B.C., resulting in a heavy fine, calculated from
the number of armed soldiers that were part of the attack. The delegates from Sparta
claimed that the Olympic Truce had not been proclaimed at their city when the forces
left, whereas the people of Lepreon had already settled into the expected six month of
Truce and had no guards set up (Golden, 2011, p. 9).
Two other incidents even happened at the site of the Games. One involved a
battle between Lepreon and Elis over control of the western Peloponnese, with battles
taking place at the Olympic grounds leading to a suspension of the Games. Another
one involved the forceful attempt by Spartans to take part in the rituals they had
previously been excluded from.
Another aspect of the Games was the nature of “sports” back then, which did
not relate to our modern view on it, which puts health benefits into the main focus. In
ancient Greece, sports served the purpose of preparing soldiers for war. Therefore,
competing at the Games was also a test of hard power factors in a peaceful
environment.
5.1.2. Modern Revival
In modern times, the idea that sport competitions offer important benefits to
societies can be traced back to Victorian England (Hoberman, 2011, p. 18), and the
doctrine that fitness is essential to individual health and that of society. Prior to the
revival, many Olympic Games had seen violence during the traditional time of the
Truce. In 1952 for example, the Korean War was raging, with Chinese and US troops
involved in the fighting. At the Olympics however, athletes from Russia and the United
States celebrated with each other (Clark, et al., 2002). In 1968, the Mexican
government conducted a massacre amongst protestors, the Tlateloloc massacre which
26
claimed an estimated 300 lives just days before the Olympic Games were set to start
in Mexico City (Hoberman, 2011, p. 21).
Major challenges to the concept of the Olympics in general and the truce in
particular were of course the two World Wars during the twentieth century. Immediately
after World War I, the membership in the IOC of the losing powers was suspended and
the games of 1920 were awarded to Antwerp in Belgium, one of the major
battlegrounds of the War. To prevent the claim of a political decision, IOC members
used a loophole to prevent the participation of unwanted countries by simply only
inviting National Olympic Committees which had send representatives to a meeting in
Lausanne in 1919. Strikingly, the Germans chose to reply in a way already pursued by
the Spartans two thousand years earlier, by organising their own, national games
(Golden, 2011, p. 11).
After the Second World War, a participation of Germany was prevented through
actions preventing the formation of a new National Olympic Committee by the Allied
forces, thereby simply creating a situation in which there was no one who could be
invited to participate in the Games. Nevertheless this view was not uncontested, since
notable members of the IOC were in favour of a participation of Germany. Italy on the
other hand was seen as a legitimate member of the Olympic movement after leaving
the Axis before the end of the war.
The concept of the Olympic Truce experienced a revival in modern days, namely
the 1990s. For the Games of Barcelona in 1992, the IOC appeals to all states to comply
with the Olympic Truce, specifically working towards a participation of Athletes from
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to participate in the Games (Olympic Truce
Foundation, 2012).
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The reason for this lay in the fact that the Sanctions Committee that was created
by the United Nations Security Council to oversee the sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had for the first time included “sport” as a component of
sanctions. With this step, the passed resolution 757 of 1992 would have made it
impossible for athletes from that country to participate in the Barcelona Games. The
IOC however decided to reaffirm its independence from politics and urged its president
to enter negotiations with the Sanctions Committee. An agreement was reached,
allowing athletes to compete as individual starters, while the IOC provisionally
recognised the National Olympic Committee of Bosnia-Herzegovina and invited it to
send athletes to Barcelona (Kidane, 1998, p. 5).
One year later, the UN General Assembly urged all member states to observe
the Truce for the first time, after the appeal was launched by the IOC and endorsed by
184 National Olympic Committees (United Nations General Assembly, 1993). The
Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had already adopted such a
Resolution during their 58th Session held in June 1993. For the 1994 Games in
Lillehammer the International Olympic Truce Centre finally claims that the Truce had
been observed for the first time since the start of the modern era. In 2000, the
observance of the Olympic Truce becomes part of the UN Millennium Declaration. Also
since 2000, Olympic Truce Walls are part of every Athletes Village at Olympic Games
(UN News Centre, 2014). Athletes and officials are invited to show their support for the
Truce by signing the wall. The United Nations also broadened the definition of Peace
in the context of the Truce. Instead of the pure absence of violence and war, the Truce
should also mark the absence of oppression, discrimination, racism, and genderrelated inequalities (Amusa, et al., 2013, p. 220).
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The London 2012 Games then saw an all-time first, when the respective
Resolution on the Truce was voted upon unanimously, which did in fact not come as a
surprise, as it was co-sponsored by all 193 Member States. The Resolution on the
Sochi 2014 Games was sponsored by Russia in late 2013 and adopted on … There
are claims that the association between peace and the Olympics grew stronger over
time (Reid, 2012, p. 206). So why should the same not be true for the modern Games,
which are still quite young in comparison to the rich tradition of the ancient role model?
On the other hand, a romanticization of the historic concept by the involved
actors can be observed. Both the IOC and the UN claim that the Truce in ancient times
was equivalent to a stop to all conflicts (United Nations; International Olympic
Committee, 2013), a view which is inaccurate according to historians.
5.2.
Modern Games
Of course the Games of modern days are different from those of the ancient
past, a fact that has to be taken into consideration when looking at the Truce. A few
facts are obvious and do not have to be explained. To name some, travel times of
course have decreased by enormous factors. By the time it took to walk from one
ancient Greek city to another, basically any spot on earth is now reachable. Another
side of the same medal is the fact that the Games are now truly global. With athletes
from all over the world and the sheer number of participating nations, an Olympic Truce
would now be valid for most of the people on the planet. However, one of the most
cohesive parts of the ancient Truce is gone with this development. While all participants
in the ancient Games belonged to the same culture-circle and violating the Truce
meant exclusion from that circle, todays participants come from a lot of different cultural
backgrounds. However, maybe sport itself can be seen as the common culture of all
participants nowadays, a theory I will look into later in this work.
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Another aspect is the spread of modern information technology. In ancient times
news travelled slow and the only possibility to follow the Games closely was to be on
site. Nowadays, billions of people follow the competitions and results are globally
available as they happen. Of course this wide media coverage can be used extensively
to make the ideas of the Truce and the concept itself known around the planet. With
the IOC selling broadcasting rights to media companies, it could demand a certain
percentage of airtime being dedicated to the promotion of the Truce.
The (quite recent) commercialisation of the Games has also to be taken into
account. Starting with the resignation of Avery Brundage in 1972, the IOC slowly
allowed sponsors to be present at the Games. A steep increase in earnings can be
registered with the IOC. Before that, the IOC was barely able to sustain itself. This
development is also shown in the assets of the IOC. While it held only 2 million US
Dollars in 1972, this sum had increased by 1980 to 45 million. With increasing revenue
from television-rights and sponsorships, the International Olympic Committee is now
able to survive without any problem. This is also true due to the fact that the marketing
of the Olympic Games has created some valuable brands. The five Olympic Rings are
seen as some kind of quality-seal and executives hope for a transfer of the positive
image of the Olympics to their brands. On the other hand, with the abolition of the
Amateurs only policy, the Games have also become more important for many athletes.
Now a positive result at the Olympics can kick-start a successful career, while losses
can end one. As a result, doping is becoming more and more of an issue, with the
potential of destroying the positive image of the Games and with it the cohesive powers
needed for a promotion of the Truce. Increasing professionalism also changed the
values behind the modern Games, basically terminating the value of “amateurism” so
strictly enforced by de Coubertin (Saha, 2014, p. 13).
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The athletes are subject to a change as well. While they were competing for
their own glory rather than the one of their nation in ancient Greece, this has changed
today as well. The introduction of team sports might have contributed to this
development, but as it is pointed out, athletes today compete primarily as
representatives of their countries (Persson & Petersson, 2014, p. 6). This might even
fuel international rivalry, increase nationalism and divisiveness (Reid, 2012, p.
206).Another hint to this fact might be the medal table, indicating the number of medals
won by each nation and of central importance in today’s Games.
This focus on the medal table in turn is closely related to the above mentioned,
denied but existent connection between sports and politics. Falling behind a rival state
in the medal count is seen as a national catastrophe, since it perceivably changes the
power-relations between these states. Also, the national sports policy focus on medals
has put additional pressure on athletes, who now know that their results will be
reflected in future national funding of their sports.
A fundamental difference to the ancient Games is also present in the nature of
the competitions themselves. What today is praised and promoted as sportsmanship
and the slogan participation is everything were unknown in ancient Greece. A
handshake between opponents would have been seen as a sign of weakness (Kidd,
2013, p. 419), and winning was seen as the only goal of competition. When it comes
to recorded results, only winners were handed down through history. Wrestling
matches were fought so hardly that competitors occasionally did not survive. Team
sports did not exist, which is sometimes blamed on the refusal by ancient athletes to
share the glory of victory. Team sports are also important in another aspect, especially
during the time in which sport was still seen as a “war without weapons”. Since
individual athletes are often seen as solely responsible for their success, teams reach
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their goals as a collective, thereby representing the construct of a state and the image
of superiority much better.
So, all in all, the modern Games seem to have not much in common with the
ancient role-model. The International Olympic Committee manages nonetheless to
present the modern Games in the tradition of these ancient Games. Undeniable, the
elements to which the IOC refers in its remembrance are carefully chosen and negative
elements are being ignored. The positive symbols like the lighting of the Olympic fire
on site in Olympia do serve the purpose of creating an ideal image of the past to
promote todays’ values of the IOC. If the International Olympic Committee was to be
seen as a person, one certainly would have to speak of selective memory, emphasising
positive aspects while denying the less positive elements.
5.2.1. The Olympic Truce Foundation
With the Foundation of both the Olympic Truce Foundation and the International
Olympic Truce Centre in 2000, in cooperation with Greece, the IOC itself had created
an Institutional framework to support the ideas and values behind the Olympic Truce.
Legally based in Lausanne with administrative headquarters in Athens, the
Foundations aim is to “promote the Olympic Ideals, to serve peace and friendship and
to cultivate international understanding.” (International Olympic Truce Center, 2014).
Through several programs and initiatives, the Foundation seeks to accomplish this
aim. One part of the Foundations work is the Torch Relay, which brings the Olympic
flame from the historic site of Olympia to the respective host city to ignite the Olympic
Fire during the Opening Ceremony. With the flame, the runners also carry the spirit of
friendship and reconciliation with them. Interestingly enough, this tradition was started
with the 1936 Games in Berlin.
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Further, the Foundation organises dialogues and discussions, open to both the
public and experts. At lower levels, the Foundation seeks to educate towards a Culture
of Peace through sport and the Olympic Ideal, especially kids at school age. The last
pillar of the Foundations work is humanitarian support in areas faced with armed
conflict. But also the organization of symbolic sport events or youth camps in these
areas aim at the promotion of the Olympic Ideal.
5.2.2. Modern view on Truce
Over the last years, a lot of literature has been published with focus on truces
and ceasefire-agreements in general and their effects specifically. Although nearly no
research has been done on the actual content of those agreements in regards to their
ability to contribute to the creation of lasting peace (Fortna, 2003, p. 338), there are
findings on the involvement of third parties when it comes to reaching such agreements
(Werner & Yuen, 2005). According to them, an involvement of third parties is likely to
increase the risk of failing ceasefires or truce-agreements in the long term, since the
outside pressure might dictate terms to the agreement the conflict parties would not
otherwise agree upon. So once the attention of the third party fades, violence or war
are likely to resume (Werner & Yuen, 2005, p. 261). However, third party pressure can
create a “contract zone” in which the conflict parties might agree upon a truce. In order
to make this truce last and eventually turn into peace, the third party has to remain an
alarmed observer of the situation, effectively discouraging any thoughts of the conflict
parties that a new round of violence will change any of the outcomes. If these
conditions are not met by the third party, their involvement might even cause a longer
and more violent conflict than it would have been without the outside involvement. A
special role of third parties is seen in civil wars, which according to empirical findings
will not end until one of the sides is defeated otherwise. Here, third party involvement
33
is more likely to have positive effects, although still under the provision that this
involvement is of a long-term nature.
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6. What kind of concept is the Olympic Truce?
The history and basic values of the Truce have already been explored. What
remains in question is the nature of the Truce in general, for example the issue to what
kind of concepts it belongs. Is it a contract or an overarching idea? Although an UN
General Assembly Resolution is part of the Truce, it cannot be seen as a binding
contract due to obvious reasons. First, because it is, as said, not binding. Secondly,
no sanctions exist in case of a violation. Thirdly, it is no signed by all actors concerned
with it, since not only sovereign states can breach the Truce, but also for example
terrorist groups or independence movements. As a consequence, the Truce might be
more of a common idea or ideal to be followed. This puts it into the sphere of politics.
How this idea is then shaped into a concept and how this concept is promoted shall be
examined here.
6.1.
The Olympics and politics
The International Olympic Committee has a very strict stance on what they call
“politics” and the Games. According to the rules of the Olympic Charter (Rule 50.3)
(International Olympic Committee, 2013), “no political (…) propaganda is permitted in
any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”. Further the Charter states that it part of the
mission and role of the IOC “to oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and
athletes” (Rule 2.10) (International Olympic Committee, 2013). These rules are very
straight forward and usually they are enforced strictly. Members of the IOC have to
swear an oath saying that they are not influenced by political actors and the National
Olympic Committees have to be free from political influence. A perceived too close
connection can result in a ban from the IOC for the respective NOC, as seen on the
examples of Iraq and India.
35
Despite the claimed separation of the two spheres of politics and sports within
the Olympic Movement, the IOC is not free from public and economic influence and
even tries to act in fields which traditionally were in the domain of public authorities and
states (Stauffer, 1999, p. 2).
Due to the central role of the IOC and its policy of only accepting one national
sports organisation per nation as the respecting representative, a recognition for a
NOC by the IOC has an outstanding importance for newly independent states in
comparison to other NGOs. One example for this is the, planned and then cancelled
invitation of Rhodesia to the Olympic Games of 1968 (Beacom, 2000, p. 2). The British
Government feared that such an invitation would spark an even stronger strive for
independence by recognizing the NOC as an independent entity (Espy, 1979). All in
all, the Olympics and politics are far from being separate.
6.1.1. The IOC and sport politics
The International Olympic Committee has to be regarded as the most powerful
actor in the sphere of sports. Over the years since their introduction, the modern
Games have become the most powerful asset of the organization. The economic
implications have been noticed, but even more striking is the power in the world of
sports derived from this asset. Basically, disciplines represented at Olympic Games
form the top flight of sports. They enjoy most of the public attention and are therefore
able to create revenue from sponsors and broadcasters. A major concern for any sport
not represented at Olympic Games is to become part of the Agenda. The influence of
the IOC is best portrayed by examples such as field handball. After the decision of the
IOC to include the indoor version of the Game into the Olympic program, the outdoor
version fell victim to a steady decline and is basically extinct nowadays. For field
36
hockey, a similar development is foreseeable, given the request by the IOC towards
the FIH to make the game more international by reducing team sizes.
Apart from the indirect influence on rule-making, the IOC also possesses great
influence on national sport policies, both trough the above mentioned inclusion or
exclusion of disciplines as well as through the awarding of Games to host cities.
6.1.2. The Olympics as political arena
The Olympics and their global reach provide a tempting platform for people who
want to promote their goals in front of a large audience. Therefore, it is not entirely left
to the IOC to decide whether the Games are political or not.
Political demonstrations at Olympic sites by athletes have occurred, the most
prominent one until today being probably the Black Power salute by the two US
athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who had won gold and bronze in 1986 in the
men’s 200m race. Both rose a fist in a black glove during the National Anthem,
protesting for the rights of black people. The then-president of the IOC, Avery
Brundage labelled the protest a political statement and demanded the NOC of the
United States to expel both athletes from the team and ban them from the Olympic
sites, including the Olympic Village. This happened, but only after an initial refusal by
the US team and threats by the IOC to ban the whole track and field team from
competitions. Brundages’ reaction was indeed in line with the above mentioned IOCnorms, some underlying issues exist. Brundage was, prior to being the President of
the IOC, head of the NOC of the United States and had in this role no objections against
the Nazi salute shown during the Games of 1936. Being one of Americas most
prominent Nazi sympathisers, his reasoning was that this was a “national salute” and
therefore in line with the regulations. One can however argue against this
unquestionable stupid reasoning even with the Olympic Charter, which says (in the
37
spirit of the ancient Games) that “The Olympic Games are competitions between
athletes (…) and not between countries.” (Rule 6.1) (International Olympic Committee,
2013). National salutes therefore should not be allowed either.
The most tragic incident is still the terrorist attack on the Games in Munich,
claiming the lives of … Israeli athletes and coaching staff. The Games continued
however, although this attack was also a breach of the Truce. With the infamous words
of “the Games must go on” the IOC tried to reclaim the interpretative power over the
Games.
Other political incidents and actions are recorded, for example the IOCs actions
against the apartheid regime in South Africa. After pressure from mostly African States,
South Africa was banned from competing in the Olympics in 1972 and 1976. However,
those have to be looked at differently, since they were in line with the promotion of
Olympic values. But again, the salute by Smith and Carlos can be seen in the same
light.
Before the Games in Beijing and Sochi, fears arose that athletes might use the
huge forum of spectators on site and via television to protest against the situation in
the respective host countries. Controversies about the human right situation in China
and the anti-gay laws in Russia led to strict orders from the IOC to the athletes, to
abstain from political protests under the threat of severe sanctions. Various political
groups however took up the opportunity of the torch relay and the related publicity for
protests.
Thomas Bach, President of the IOC, called upon all state leaders prior to the
Sochi Games not to use the “backs of the athletes” for their own political agenda. In
his statement he asked politicians to have the bravery to bring up topics of concern
open and in a diplomatic manner rather than through the Olympics (CTV News, 2014).
38
On another level, the Olympics have been transformed to an arena of global
politics on countless occasions. To name the most prominent ones we simply have to
look at the respective boycotts of the Games in Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles four
years later by the former blocks of the Cold War. Preventing athletes who had prepared
and trained for years from competing, these boycotts had solely political reasons. The
example of the Moscow Games is very striking, as the official reason for the boycott
by the United States and four other NATO-members as well as 37 other countries was
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Other western states however decided to protest
against the occupation without boycotting the Games, for example by not taking part
in the Opening and/or Closing Ceremony. The Games were originally only awarded to
Moscow because the Soviet Union threatened to leave the Olympic Family after it was
not awarded the Games of 1976 which went to Montreal.
The official reason behind the Soviet boycott of Los Angeles 1984 was a lack of
security guarantees towards the Team by US authorities. After a Soviet fighter plane
had shot down a South Korean passenger aircraft for violating Soviet airspace, antiSoviet sentiments were rising in the United States, with both Congress and Senate of
California adopting a resolution to ban Soviet Athletes from competing in the Games
unanimously.
As a consequence of these boycotts and a feared split in the Olympic
Movement, Greece proposed to host all future Games on a neutral site on its territory,
just like in ancient times. Although this motion was denied during an extraordinary
session of the IOC in 1984, it was decided that invitations to future Games would be
issued by the IOC directly, not from the National Olympic Committees of the host
countries. Further, all NOCs agreed to make it their foremost duty to make it possible
for their athletes to compete in the Games.
39
However, boycotts, demonstrations and exclusions from Olympic Games
already existed during the ancient Games. Golden gives a brief account of these
incidents (Golden, 2011, p. 7f.). Notwithstanding one has to keep in mind that these
actions have to be seen in light of the completely different circumstances they
happened in, compared to todays’ world
6.2.
The IOC and the UN
The IOC maintains close links to the United Nations. Having the status of a
permanent observer since 2006, a representative from the IOC promotes the Olympic
Values at the UN Headquarters in New York. The UN Flag is flying at all Olympic
Games since 1994 and since recently, the Secretary General of the UN gives a speech
at the IOCs sessions. It is one of the closest examples of the relations between the UN
and another organization, especially in the field of NGOs. Some scholars claim that
this closeness is rooted in the shared values and goals of both organizations (Roche,
2002, p. 169). The policies of the major UN agencies mirror some of the IOCs goals.
The right to participate in sport is for example written down in both the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Woodhouse, 2010, p. 495). Notably, the IOC is one
member of a partnership between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and the UN Office on Sport Development and Peace, implementing pilot projects on
sport and peace. These projects are part of the UN missions in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUC), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Liberia (UNMIL) (Ibid.).
The reasoning behind the close links between both organizations is still in
question. Apart from the shared values, there are various reasons being discussed.
On the side of the IOC, several explanations exist. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a
personal interest by the then-President of the IOC, Samaranch, of close personal
40
connection to world leaders is seen as a starting point. Further, it is speculated that the
IOC seeks to gain legitimacy when it comes to the promotion of its values of
Olympicism through its links to what is seen as the most global organization and
highest authority.
On the side of the UN, explanations also cover a wide set. Especially the ability
by the IOC to reach grass-root-levels of societies seems to be of special interest to the
United Nations, an ability often not seen as achievable by the UN. While the UN are
often seen as a distant organization which does not link up to the ordinary people, the
IOC can do so through sport. Another aspect of this is the positive image of the IOC,
from which the United Nations want to profit. Connected to the previous issue, the UN
seeks to profit from the positive image the Olympics have as a peaceful festival and
meeting place of the people. While the UN are seen as abstract place where leaders
talk with each other, the Olympic Games are true meetings of the global society.
So obviously, there is a mutual interest within both organizations of close
cooperation. It remains in question however, if this interest persists, once the IOCs
strive for greater influence continues. The risk of that lies in the possibility of failure,
which would result in a loss of credibility and thus significance of the organization.
Another risk for the IOC lies in the continued professionalization and commercialisation
of the Games. If earning money and pleasing sponsors and broadcasters becomes the
too obvious motivation for the IOC to organize the Olympic Games, the movement will
lose its appeal to many people. If the Games become just another mega-event, the
significance of the IOC will be reduced to that of a multinational company, since this is
what the IOC would be if it was not for the big idea of Olympicism as the overarching
idea. As Hoberman puts it, “the great rhetorical achievement of the IOC is to have
41
created and sustained the myth that the Olympic movement is a peace movement”
(Hoberman, 2011, p. 18).
Notably, the IOC acknowledges 206 National Olympic Committees, while the
United Nations have only 192 member states. The difference can be explained by the
different standards set by both organizations when it comes to independence, with the
IOC recognizing some territories as entities of their own, while they are viewed by the
UN as colonies or otherwise dependent on another state. One has to keep in mind
however, that recognition of a National Olympic Committee by the IOC can be a
significant boost for the strive to independence, so to say representing a test run on
the international stage.
On one level, the relation between the IOC and the UN seem rather odd. This
involves the otherwise claimed rather distant relation between the IOC and nation
states. Personal members of the IOC are representing the IOC, not their states of
origin. The Charter states that the Games are competitions between individual athletes
and not states, and notably hosting of the Games is awarded to individual cities, not
states as such. National Olympic Committees are required to be completely
independent from national politics. The IOC however does require a statement of
support from the national government the hosting city lies in, which can be seen as the
only connection between nation states and the IOC. So what is the role of the IOC
then? In my view it can only be seen as a representative to the UN of the values it
represents.
7. How does the Olympic Truce fit into theory?
First of all, the concept of the Olympic Truce is a unique one. By linking actors
of the civil society and nation states in one of their core capacities, one has to look at
42
different dimensions of the concept. Just by looking at the general concept of a truce
for example, one does not grasp the importance of the ancient Greek tradition that
plays a role in the Olympic Truce, neither does the “normal” truce concept offer a
grassroots-approach like the Olympic Truce. By examining the Olympic Truce in the
light of realism, I seek to explain why the concept was not very present in International
Relations until the end of the Cold War, while Constructivism can explain the
interconnection between non-state and state actors. Looking at the concept of the
Olympic Truth as a political myth offers a third perspective. It is important in this regard
to distinguish between two kinds of Truces and Armistices. The first kind, to which the
Olympic Truce is related, is a limited break or period of peace during an ongoing
conflict. It is an agreement designed to halt hostilities temporarily without a permanent
peace in prospect.
The second kind, which is of minor concern here, is an armistice which marks
the permanent end of hostilities and is concluded to bridge the time until a permanent
peace agreement. Since the Olympic Truce primarily aims at a temporal stop to
hostilities, obviously during the times of the Games being held, it falls under the first
category. The assertion by the IOC that an Olympic Truce should finally lead to a
permanent end of hostilities by providing a peaceful atmosphere for conflict parties to
reconsider their perspectives adds a long-term approach to the concept. This leads to
the fact that the concept of the Olympic Truce is somehow a mixture of both
specifications. However, the long-term dimension of the Olympic Truce has yet to be
observed to have any effect, as an agreement reached under the reference to the
Olympic Truce has not yet been reached.
43
7.1.
Realism
Realists argue that due to the human nature of egoism and the absence of a
regulating “world government” the sphere of international relations is in a constant state
of anarchy (Jackson, 2005, p. 19), leading to a “primacy in all political life of power and
security” (Gilpin, 1986, p. 305). Within states, the human nature of egoism is
substantially restrained by political rule. In International Relations however, the
absence of government encourages the worst aspects of human nature to be
expressed (Donelly, 2009, p. 32). In one of the most classical definitions, the one by
Hobbes, this leads to a war of all against all. Although Hobbes does identify a general
possibility of an agreement of peace, he does see the danger of the egoistic nature
dominating, especially in the absence of government to enforce rules of cooperation
(Donelly, 2009, p. 34).
In realism, the concept of a universal Truce only works if the enforcement of it
is secured for all of those involved. If the coherence is not ensured, a participation in it
would be too risky for states, fearing they might be unilaterally letting their “guard
down”, opening their territory to surprise attacks by enemies. The power of the Olympic
Truce in the ancient times therefore lay in the importance of the Olympic traditions to
the Greek states. A ban from participation was in effect an exclusion from “Greekhood”,
resulting in a massive loss of standing and honour for the citizens of the concerned
state (Lebow, 2007, p. 55). Further, with the eviction from the Greek interstate
relations, states risked to stand alone against a possible invasion from third states.
Therefore, obeying the truce had more benefits, although taking the risks into account,
then violating it.
In modern times, obeying the Olympic Truce does not have a positive effect on
the security of a state and its territorial integrity. With a lack of sanctions for violating
44
the Truce, incentives to follow it do not exist in the classic realist perspective. “For a
statesman to expect straight dealing and fair play from political rivals is to grossly
misconceive the nature of international politics, which leaves precious little room for
morality (Jackson, 2005, p. 21). States have little reason to trust each other (Van
Evera, 1992, p. 19). In fact, relying on the Truce in times of a threat would have to be
considered foolish. With aggressors not having to fear any real negative effects apart
from public outrage, no benefits can be expected. Rather, the statesmen relying on the
truce would break what Hobbes cites from Cicero: the safety of the people is the first
law (Hobbes, 1991, p. 258). Mearsheimer writes that “states look for opportunities to
take advantage of each other” (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 9) As Fortna puts it, in the realist
school agreements are scraps of paper, since they are not binding in an anarchical
system and should have no effect at all on decisions about war and peace (Fortna,
2003, p. 338).
Regarding the second aspect of the Olympic Truce as an agreement proposed
and supported by an International Non-governmental Organisation, Realists would
come to the clear result that something like this cannot be taken seriously. States can
only influence other states (Jackson, 2005, p. 19). Although the Resolution itself is
eventually sponsored by a state and therefore a legitimate actor of International
Relations, the whole idea behind it is appalling to realists. An INGO in their view is no
legitimate actor in International Relations. Further, INGOs in their view do not exist as
independent bodies, but their members are always driven by the interests of their
states of origin. Therefore, something like the Olympic Truce to realists is not promoted
by an unbiased body in pursuit of any superior good, but rather by an organization
dominated by the strongest national members who use it as a vehicle to promote their
national interests.
45
Regardless of these limitations, there was a significant number of Armistices as
To sum up the realist perspective on the Olympic Truce in general, it is a weak
agreement proposed and promoted by the wrong actors. Following the rules of the
Truce would put any state in immediate danger of being taken advantage off, since a
breach of the truce would have no negative consequences for the perpetrator.
7.2.
Constructivism
In Constructivism, no predefined conditions that can be traced back to human
nature exist. Rather, the reality we live in is constructed through social interactions,
which over the course of time have formed the world we live in. This process continues,
as the system is constantly transformed by human interactions. In opposition of
realism, constructivism does not accept anarchy as an unavoidable feature of
international reality (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4). If we follow this school of thinking, the
Olympic Truce is one of the structures that came into existence due to shared ideas
among people, rather than material force.
According to Rittberger, social constructivism can explain why actors do not
simply act out of their own selfish interests: they do respond to values and norms,
created by society. These values and norms create an expected behaviour which plays
a huge role in decision-making. In turn, shared values and norms increase the
probability of common institutions.
Constructivism
analyses
world
politics
through
the
constitution
and
reconstruction of norms (Onuf, 1989).
“Constructivism also draws our attention to the active and political work of
putting ideas into practise. New ideas must be mobilized, contested, and
institutionalised by empowered political actors.” (Brysk, 2009, p. 33). In case of the
46
IOC, we might be looking at a new idea, which is already mobilized, contested and
institutionalised, while the actor behind it still tries to define its own role in the political
sphere.
In Constructivism, security can be defined differently than in Realism. Instead
of the security of a state being a zero-sum game where a gain of one state
automatically leads to a loss of another state, constructivists argue that states can
improve their security without negatively affecting the security of another state. Further,
states can even see the security of another state as improving their own. Due to this,
the Anarchy in the global system does not automatically lead to self-help. Another
difference to Realism is the point that security is not automatically a states’ first and
foremost goal. Instead, states have to define their goals first, through social interaction.
That can happen domestically as well as in relation to other states.
Going on from these basic assumptions about constructivism, how does the
concept of the Olympic Truce fit into this framework? First of all, the concept of a truce
in general makes sense in this school of thinking. As a generally accepted way to the
end of a conflict or as a simple pause of hostilities, it has become an international norm
which is followed. Not following this concept or breaking a truce unilaterally would
destroy a state and evict it from the international community and thereby strip it off
basic rights in international relations.
Regarding the role of the IOC as a promoter of the Olympic Truce,
constructivism also offers an explanation. With the IOC as an International Nongovernmental organisation, constructivism asserts it a bargaining power and the
capability to shape the norms which are followed by states. Other than realism,
constructivism does accept INGOs as legitimate actors in international relations.
47
It comes as no surprise that the comeback of the Olympic Truce as a concept
falls together with the diminishing significance of realism as the dominating theory in
international relations. With the downfall of realism, it has become thinkable to promote
a global Truce, without negative consequences for individual states.
To put the influence of theory here into easy words: Theory is often diminished
by students as something abstract, with no connection to the real world. In fact we
employ theories every time we expect an outcome out of a certain action. In economics
for example, if a company wants to improve profits and therefore fires staff,
management does so because of the theory that lowering the costs for the factor work
will increase profit. If the dominating theory in economics would suggest hiring more
staff in order to be able to produce more, the outcome would be a totally different one.
Although originating from the same situation, the employed theory has a huge
influence on the outcome.
48
8. How does the concept work?
After explaining above the theoretical framework in which the concept of the
Olympic Truce may or may not play an important role in international relations, it is yet
to be explored how the concept is brought to live. By that I mean the following: where
does the perceived power of the concept come from? What explains the application or
mere reference to the concept? Only explaining that there is room in the theoretical
framework for such a concept does not go far enough. The following chapter shall offer
two explanations for a possible success of the Truce in practise.
8.1.
The Olympic Truce as a myth
So, after finding that the concept itself does fit into at least one kind of theory,
where does its power and influence in todays’ world come from? In the case of the
Olympic Truce, it seems as if it is best defined as a political myth. This comes from the
perception that when it comes to political myths, the accuracy of the story behind them
is not as important as their capacity to make us believe in the normative vision they
are presenting (Della Sala, 2010, p. 7).
According to Boer, the best definition of a myth is the shortest: an important
story (Boer, 2009, p. 9). Political Myths are understood as shared believes in a society
(Bar-Tal, 2000). The actual truth of a Myth is not relevant for determining its political
potency (Bottici, 2010). Christopher G. Flood defines political myths as “narratives of
the past, present or predicted political events which their tellers seek to make
intelligible and meaningful to their audiences” (Flood, 2002, p. 41). However, political
myths are not to be confused with the common usage of the word myth, which implies
falsehood or illusion (Flood, 2002, p. 45). Della Sala argues that at times when social
complexity increases, there is a “need for societies to tell stories that make sense of
49
what seems confusing and unconnected” (Della Sala, 2010, p. 4). Tudor defines a myth
as a story, but one told for a purpose and not simply to amuse (Tudor, 1972, p. 16).
Obviously, the Olympic Truce does fit into the category of political myths. While
the historic origins are becoming clearer, the narrative remains the same. As an
overarching ideal, the story of the universal Truce dominates the discourse on the
concept. Carefully framed by the IOC, the public perception of the concept is very
positive. To stick to the definitions given above, the Olympic Truce is a narrative of the
past which is meaningful to todays’ audience. Further, it is a very important story which
continues to be a factor in international relations.
Regardless of the actual situation in ancient Greece, where the success of the
truce was very limited and the scope narrowed to the safe passage of athletes and
spectators, this story is now used to promote a truly global demand for actual peace
during the time of the Games. An idealised version of history is told to justify a concept
in our present time. Or, as Shaw puts it bluntly, “much of what passes for Olympic
history is just as much myth-based as the story of Zeus, Heracles, Achilles and all the
rest” (2008, p. 58). It has become a shared believe of almost all societies in the world
that the Olympics are closely connected with peace. Della Porta and Keating also
asses myths an important role in explaining social behaviour (Della Porta & Keating,
2008, p. 22). In fact, the Truce is the only occasion which is truly globally connected
with peace. Therefore, one can argue that the myth of the Olympic Truce plays a vital
role in the United Nations strive for the spread of a global culture of peace. By
employing the myth, the UN is able to promote a vision which otherwise would be too
abstract to think about. Apart from religiously framed myths, the Olympic Truce is the
only narrative for a peaceful world
50
Arguing against this myth is for example Kidd, who from the start denies any
connection between the ancient and the modern Games, assuming that de Coubertin
used the symbols of the ancient Games but apart from that basically created a new
kind of Olympic Games, fitting his own purpose (2013, p. 416). These new, otherwise
called “modern Games” promote their humanistic values in a way only possible due to
the evolution of societies, economies and politics over time, thereby nearly impossible
to link to the ancient traditions. Kidd further assumes that by constantly referring to the
ancient Games and the surrounding myths, the International Olympic Committee tries
to hide the underlying political nature of all processes related to participation in the
modern Games (Kidd, 2013)
8.2.
The Truce as a regime
The Truce can also be seen as a policy regime. This classification might seem
odd at first sight, since it is originally a concept. However, the concept itself consists of
a set of policies, aiming at the promotion of peace. May and Jochim conceptualize
policy regimes as governing arrangements for addressing policy problems (May &
Jochim, 2013, p. 428). These governing arrangements in turn can consist of
institutional arrangements, shared ideas and interest alignments (Martin & Simmons,
1998, p. 752f). The constructed shape of a regime needs to be defined, but then offers
analytical starting points. Setting off from the perspective of the Olympic Truce as an
international regime, aimed at implementing a global Truce during the Olympic Games,
based on the shared ideas of a peaceful society and the overall promotion of peace
which are institutionalized by the IOC, the International Truce Federation and the
United Nations, it becomes possible to analyse the Olympic Truce as an international
policy regime.
51
One major difference has to be named however. While other policy regimes
usually aim at the introduction of binding laws which include sanctions if they are not
complied with, the Olympic Truce movement does not aim at that at the moment.
However, the view on the Olympic Truce as a regime offers perspectives and an
analytical framework to look into the challenges it is facing and possible solutions to
overcome these challenges. The strength of a regime affects policy legitimacy,
coherence and durability (May & Jochim, 2013, p. 431). The strength of a regime is not
directly observable, as we see on the example of the Truce. However, the three factors
mentioned above can in turn serve as indicators for the strength of the regime.
Policy legitimacy: “Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority,
institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is
appropriate, proper and just” (Tyler, 2006, p. 375). May and Jochim identify three main
points of assessment when it comes to the legitimacy: the strength of the ideas behind
the regime, the authority of the institutions that are involved and the interest support
for a regime (May & Jochim, 2013, p. 431). The authority of the institutions involved
here refers to the general authority, it does not have to be linked to the regime itself.
Therefore, an institution can gain authority in another matter. As long as this matter is
linked to the regime, this authority will be valid in evaluating the regime as well. In the
case of the Truce, the authority of the involved institutions is out of question. The
General Assembly of the United Nations is, after the Security Council, one of the
highest regarded bodies in global politics. In the public perception it might even be
higher regarded as the Security Council, which is often seen as the playground of the
veto powers. The International Olympic Committee has to be seen on two levels. On
the first level, the organization is a noble one. The goals set out in the Charter go well
beyond the simple organization of a sports festival. Olympic values are promoted and
52
aim at a peaceful world of equals. These values are shared by almost all societies and
make the IOC a beacon of orientation.
On the second level however, one has to look at the members of the IOC and
the scandals they produced over the years. Corruption most certainly was a
characteristic in the bidding process for host cities in past decades. Including dubious
financial deals and irregularities in TV broadcasting deals have not helped to add to
the credibility of the IOC members either. Sometimes they are referred to as an old
men’ club. One especially striking example is Kun Hee Lee from South Korea, who
was convicted of bribery and sentenced to jail in 2008. After he was pardoned by the
South Korean Government however, Lee was also reinstated as an IOC member
(Hoberman, 2011, p. 24).
However, there needs to be a distinction between the personal members of the
IOC and the actions by the organization as such. This might seem a bit unusual to say
the least, but is rooted in the structure of the organization. Apart from the President,
IOC members rarely appear in public in their role as IOC-members. The organization
does not communicate on a personal level but rather on an institutional level. In this
sphere, the values and norms promoted stand out. As a result, the institutions behind
the Olympic Truce do possess the required amount of authority.
The ideas behind the promotion of the Truce are also widely conceived as valid
and pursuable. The values of peace, equality and non-discrimination as laid out in the
Charter of both the IOC and the United Nations are amongst the most ambitious ones
that can be found. While these values are sometimes criticised as being too much
dominated by the western culture, they still serve as a role-model globally.
Policy coherence: Just like the Truce, a lack of coherence in policy
implementation sends a message to the recipients regarding the importance of their
53
concerns (May & Jochim, 2013, p. 432). On the other side, policy coherence is
improved by institutional structures which are consistent in their actions and therefore
predictable. Transferring this to the evaluation of the Truce would correspond to it being
valid and meaningful if the actions and statements by the IOC regarding the Truce
were consistent over time. Judging from the strong emphasis on the Truce before the
Games and its ongoing promotion by the IOC in opposition to the actual references to
it in time of crisis, one cannot speak of consistency. Transferred from policy evaluation,
this would correspond to a weak coherence and therefore would diminish the chances
of success for the concerned policy. The United Nations as the other great supporter
of the Truce has to face similar issues when it comes to coherence. While the
promotion of the regarding Resolution in the General Assembly usually is unanimous,
the commitment to the Truce does not go very much further. Violations of the Truce
are not sanctioned by any body of the United Nations. So while the promotion of the
Truce is strong, its implementation is not followed at all. Talk and action on the topic of
the Truce seem to be two completely different types of things. So all in all, policy
coherence is very weak when it comes to the international regime promoting the
Olympic Truce.
Policy Durability: The durability of policy can be thought of as the sustainability
of political commitments over time (May & Jochim, 2013, p. 433). Key components to
durability are the path dependence of the institutional structures and the interest
support which aims at improving policy implementation against odds. The path
dependence in regards to the promotion of the Truce has become very strong since its
reintroduction. The acceptance of the Truce Resolutions by the General Assembly has
become a nearly automatic procedure, as seen in the voting process and the lack of
debate on the topic during the sessions of the General Assembly. This is rooted in the
1995 request by the then IOC President Samaranch that the UN General Assembly
54
should automatically be asked every two years to reaffirm its relations to the Olympic
Games (Roche, 2002, p. 175). When it comes to the implementation of the Truce
against odds however, the great weakness of the Truce shows again. This weakness
exists on two levels which are interlinked. The first problem when it comes to the
implementation is that there is no mechanism in the Truce agreements or resolutions
to sanction non-compliance. On the second level, there is no unilateral action taken by
any signing state to enforce compliance. By that I do not been military action or even
economic sanctions, but in a first step repeated reference to the concept and the
signed agreements to build up pressure. So when it comes to the implementation of
the Truce against odds, the stakeholders of the Truce regime are not committed to it.
The political commitment to the Truce has also to be seen on two levels. The
first level is the promotion of it during times in which there are no challenges to it. These
include especially the times between Olympic Games, when the Truce is a theoretic
idea with great appeal. The concept is perceived very positive by the public and
society. Promoting it is seen as a measure to profit from this positive image. The
second level is the commitment to the Truce in times of crisis. As noted above, the
actors who, before the games or before a conflict, were outspokenly positive about the
concept in many cases fall silent. The commitment in this case is obviously not very
strong. However, as also noted above, there are times in which there is active
reference to the concept in times of crisis. This seems especially true when talking
about looming conflicts during the times of Olympic Games, not so much when talking
about longer existing conflicts.
In the case of the mentioned conflict between the United States and Iraq in
1998, this gets a bit blurred. While the conflict itself was existent for many years, a new
level of escalation was actively prevented by reference to the Truce by relevant actors.
55
8.3.
Summary
“What matters is what works” (Sanderson, 2002, p. 3). This basic sentence
sums up the theorising of this concept really well. Determining the success or
relevance of the concept of the Truce is not entirely a matter of theory and
assumptions, or even the evaluation of hard facts as it seems. There is obviously
something more to this concept, which leads to its survival even beyond undoubtable
failure. To explore these factors, one has to look at how the concept was and is used
in practise. How is it referred to? Do actors see it as relevant or do they even credit it?
A closer look at the latest Olympic Games shall later help to investigate this.
56
9. Is the Truce a relevant concept?
This is the main question this Thesis seeks to answer. First of all, this requires
a definition of what a relevant concept is. Second of all, there than needs to be an
objective way to measure whether a concept can be seen as relevant or obsolete.
9.1.
Defining a relevant concept
“What matters is what works” (Sanderson, 2002, p. 3). With these simple words,
one could define a relevant concept. Only concepts which lead to an obviously positive
outcome for stakeholders are usually considered as worthy to be invested in.
Nevertheless, there are concepts which do not fit into this simple definition. Those
concepts which aim at a long-term result and therefore involve negative consequences
in the short-term for example. A possible archetype can be seen in the change of
attitude towards environmental protection. In the early days of industrialisation profit
was the only thing that mattered. Long-term consequences like destroyed habitats,
polluted water or other negative effects did not matter. This view persisted for a very
long time and is still existent in some parts of the world, especially in the developing
world. However, it has come more and more into focus that the reckless strive for profit
might involve extremely high costs in the future. So, the protection of the environment
has gained in relevance. The struggle involved in climate negotiations shows another
aspect of relevance: a concept does not need to have immediate visible positive
effects, there does not even have to be an immediate agreement on how to achieve a
goal or even on the goal itself. What defines relevance is the perceived importance of
an issue and the resources dedicated to it.
9.2.
How to measure relevance
Having a definition of relevance is only the first step. The second step than
needs to be a way of measuring it. What makes one concept more relevant than
57
another one? Or, if there is no competing concept, from what point on does a concept
matter?
When it comes to measuring the relevance of a concept, one therefore has to
find a set of tools to accomplish this task. I chose the toolbox provided by policy
analysts for the evaluation of policies. In this field, policies are being analysed in
regards to their success and/or influence. Starting from this basis, evaluating the
relevance of the Olympic Truce in our modern world is best achieved by viewing it as
a policy. In this way, not only measurable successes are taken into account, but also
the more subtle influences the concept has. An alternative approach is to investigate
the political relevance of the organizations promoting the Truce and derive the
relevance of the promoted concept from this result. As mentioned above, the actor and
his message cannot be separated. Following this logic, the concept promoted by a
politically irrelevant actor cannot be relevant.
By looking closer at the most recent events during the Sochi 2014 Winter
Olympics, I will evaluate whether the concept is still valid or not. To the case study, I
will take the constructivist approach as explained by Bachtler and Wren, which accepts
that it is impossible to separate facts and values (Bachtler & Wren, 2006, p. 146). Since
the overall aim of this work is to determine whether the Olympic Truce is a valid concept
or not, future assumptions on the Truce might change these findings (Hoerner &
Stephenson, 2012, p. 704).
In the following chapters I will mention the recorded references to the concept
during the time of crisis in Ukraine which fell together with the validity of the Truce
Resolution. These references can serve as a starting point for a conclusion about the
validity of the concept, but further aspects have to be considered.
58
10.
The concept in practise
After exploring the groundwork behind the Truce, as well as the criteria for a
relevant concept, I will now look at practical examples of the application of the concept.
Although there were many occasions in which the Olympic Truce could have been
referred to, I will focus here on occasions which happened after the official revival of
the Truce by the International Olympic Committee. Firstly because after the end of the
Cold War and the connected Block-politics, a reference to the Truce or any actions
taken with reference to it are more likely to actually be based on the Truce as a concept
and not on other reasons such as power politics. Secondly, because since the
involvement of the United Nations, one could suspect a new quality to the promotion
of the Truce in general.
10.1. Nagano 1998
During the Winter Games in Nagano, a serious risk of the United States conflict
with Iraq over weapons inspections escalating into violence existed. During his
diplomatic effort to resolve the situation, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed
repeatedly to the Olympic Truce Resolution,1 which was accepted by the UNGA at their
fifty-second session on December 8th, 1997. According to several accounts, the
existence of this resolution and its implications played a huge role in the considerations
of the conflict parties (Briggs, et al., 2004, p. 15). The United States State Department
later admitted that the Olympic Truce was “respected”, but that national interests were
still the primary concern. (Burleson, 2012, p. 808). Judging from this statement, other
factors might have played a bigger role in the negotiations. However, the mentioning
of the Truce Resolution by Annan certainly helped to increase pressure on the conflict
parties to come to an agreement (Jarvie, 2008, p. 2). Burleson claimed that the
1
A/RES/52/21
59
hostilities in the Gulf region before the Games caused the international community to
“rally behind the Olympic Truce” (Burleson, 2012, p. 808). After a visit to Baghdad,
Annan was able to negotiate a peaceful solution, which was accepted by all involved.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution calling for the observation of
the Olympic Truce was considered as a success (Masumoto, 2008, p. 500).
In this incident, the Olympic Truce really has to be considered as a deescalating
factor in the conflict, if not one of the decisive ones.
10.2. Salt Lake City 2002
The example of the Salt Lake City Games was chosen by me because it
involved a similar situation as the latest example of Sochi. In the immediate months
preceding the Games, the United States fell victim to one of the biggest terrorist attacks
ever recorded. The reaction to this was a full-fledged war against Afghanistan, based
on the accusation that the regime there was offering shelter to the mastermind behind
the attacks of September 11. With the Games coming up, this posed a real challenge
to the concept of the Olympic Truce. The use of armed forces by a host nation during
Olympic Games was a first during the modern era. A noticeable fact about the
Resolution promoting the Olympic Truce2 is the time of its acceptance by the General
Assembly. It was accepted on January 10th, 2002. Due to this, the Resolution, which
was, as usual, sponsored by the United States as host nation, was in fact sponsored
by a nation currently at war. Strikingly, Afghanistan as the affected country was not
amongst the co-sponsors, neither was the United Kingdom, which fought alongside the
United States in Afghanistan (United Nations, 2001).
2
A/RES/56/75
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The challenge these circumstances posed to the future of the concept of the
Olympic Truce are obvious. Surprisingly little has been published on the subject, not a
single article takes up the issue and investigates the implications caused. If not even
the host state of the Games observes the Truce, how can other states possibly be
expected to do so? One explanation might be the then-conceived perception that the
war on terror was in fact a man-hunt for Osama Bin Laden. On the other hand, the “war
on terror” was in the beginning an US-led operation with involvement of the United
Kingdom. There was no resolution under article 8 by the Security Council approving
such an intervention. Looking strictly at the International Law perspective, it was an
aggressive act by the United States. The claim to fight for democracy and peace might
have seemed legitimate at first, especially under the influence of the pictures of 9/11.
However, as the conflict continued, it became obvious that the fighting was not in the
best interest of most Afghans. By denying the Taliban the status of combatants, the
US administration tried to frame the actions as some kind of police action. A stop to
the conflict during the games did not occur.
Notably, the United States did not sign the Olympic Truce agreement leading
up to the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, due to their ongoing involvement in the
conflict. Colin Powell acknowledged the significance of the Truce, while at the same
time stating that it was impossible for the United States to stop all operations because
of it. Nevertheless, the United States have signed later Truce agreements for other
Games.
So the explanation of why the Truce Resolution was sponsored by the United
States in early 2002 might in fact be that they were simply expected to do so by the
international community.
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10.3. Beijing 2008
During the Beijing Olympics of 2008, one conflict dominated the headlines. On
the morning of the Opening Ceremony, fighting broke out between the two states of
Russia and Georgia over the region of South Ossetia. The conflict had been boiling for
quite some time and also involved the region of Abkhazia, which sought separation
from Georgia. The conflict over Abkhazia, which, as a result of the conflict, is now
recognized as an independent state by Russia and a few others, dates back at least
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In Abkhazia, Georgians were a minority.
The final trigger for the escalation of the conflict remains disputed until today,
as is the question on which side is to blame for the escalation into violence. While early
accounts saw the main responsibility on the Russian side, later reports view Georgia
as anything but an innocent victim. When it comes to the topic of this Thesis however,
the reactions by the international community are more important. In regards to the
Truce, early accounts by the IOC show that it condemned the violence in the escalating
conflict, but at the same time saw itself powerless to do something to promote the
Truce or even to further comment on the situation (Der Spiegel, 2008). As a reaction
to the Russian forces on its territory, the Georgian Team at the Olympics decided to
leave the Games to be with their families, but later stayed and competed as planned
after President Saak’ashvili urged them to do so. The coincidence of the escalation
and the Opening Ceremony had the side-effect that most Heads of State were in
Beijing at the time, making quick meetings possible. Those included Vladimir Putin in
his role as Prime Minister of Russia, George W. Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy (Asmus,
2010, pp. 2, 192f.). However, these meetings did not lead to any results, as the
situation was still unfolding.
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As devastating as the situation was for people in the concerned reasons, it
would have been perfect to prove the virtue of the Olympic Truce. With most leaders
attending a reception to celebrate the Opening of the Games, one could have expected
some kind of the often quoted “Olympic Spirit” present amongst them, increasing the
possibility to reach an agreement. Howbeit, the Truce never received any particular
attention during negotiations. These negotiations did not even take place in Beijing,
seizing the opportunity of all relevant leaders possible, but only really started a week
later.
Nicolas Sarkozy, as the main negotiator for a ceasefire with Russian President
Medvedev, did not mention the Truce once during face to face conversations while
trying to agree on a ceasefire (Asmus, 2010, p. 200f.).
This case is also significant to the events during Sochi 2014, since Sochi is only
30 kilometres from the Russian border with Abkhazia. Russia had been awarded the
Games in June 2007, so over a year before the escalation of the conflict. A reaction by
the IOC therefore would have been possible, but never came. This conflict is seen as
one of the instances which prove the ineffectiveness of the concept of the Olympic
Truce (Tomlinson, 2010, p. 334).
10.4. Small-scale conflicts
Apart from the big scale of interstate conflicts, the Truce is often called upon in
local or regional, domestic conflicts. In these, the success ratio seems to be somewhat
higher. This is especially true for short-time cease-fires to deliver humanitarian aid or
evacuate civilians from conflict areas. One possible explanation for this is that the
concept of the Olympic Truce offers the possibility to conflict parties to demand a
ceasefire without weakening their position by seeming feeble or on the decline, but
rather to seem noble and trustworthy. Examples for this effect of the Truce can be
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found for example in Sarajevo in 1994 or in Homs in 2014 (Golden, 2011, p. 7). These
small-scale successes are also observed by the IOC, which in turn focusses more and
more on the effect of those small “Islands of peace” in the hope that they will eventually
spread and show the people, not necessarily the ones in charge though, that a peaceful
solution to conflicts is possible.
This aspect of truces in general is a bit underrepresented in the concept of the
Olympic Truce, which constantly is promoted as a “big solution”. This promotion is
contradictory to the aims of the Olympic Truce Foundation, which aims at precisely this
grass-root level, but takes much room in the public, simply due to the bigger reach of
the IOC. Truces in general have a history of local developments, often as very
spontaneous acts, agreed upon between local representatives of the conflict parties.
Humanitarian aspects such as the evacuation of civilians or wounded soldiers as well
as the removal of victims often play an important role in this. Although expansions of
local truces into greater solutions or even peace agreements are not common at all,
these small successes could be a starting point to reframe the aims of the Olympic
Truce.
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11.
The Olympic Truce and Sochi 2014
The events surrounding the Olympic Winter Games of 2014 shall be examined
in greater depth here. This is due to the special circumstances of these Games, with
the host country being engaged in a conflict during the timespan of the Truce and in
the wider vicinity of the Games. Especially the annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation and the associated conflict shall be looked upon in regards to the concept
of the Olympic Truce. Starting with the acceptance of the now obligatory United Nations
General Assembly Resolution, urging all member states to obey the Truce, the events
took their normal course prior to the Games. Accompanied by a broad media-echo and
fuelled by public statements by state officials, Russia promoted the Truce worldwide.
The Resolution urged all member states to observe the Olympic Truce from 7 days
before the start of the Winter Games until 7 days after the end of the Paralympic Winter
Games. On the other hand Russia had broken the Olympic Truce just 6 years earlier
during the Games in Beijing, when fighting Georgia in 2008. Strikingly, this conflict had
taken place in the near vicinity of Sochi, but was of minor concern in the approach of
the 2014 Games.
11.1. Russia and the Games
Before the Games, Russia’s motives to host them has been subject to much
speculation. Some sources claim that the driving force behind the application was
President Putin himself. Again, the motives behind this claim vary. Some argue that it
was his attempt to show his qualities as a leader, emphasising his capability to promote
Russia’s greatness (Persson & Petersson, 2014, p. 6). This view is supported by the
authors with the claim that Putin’s’ success in elections is based on his ability to pose
as the man who led Russia out of the crisis it had been in after the Jelzin presidencies.
Ever since Russia send their first team to the Olympics in 1952 to Helsinki, the
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performance of Soviet and Russian athletes has been regarded as indicative of the
status of the country (Persson & Petersson, 2014, p. 7). Therefore, the ability to host
Olympic Games was seen as a possibility to showcase modern Russia as a capable
nation which can be the host to one of the biggest events in the world (Arnold & Foxall,
2014, p. 3). Probably to emphasise this, it was decided to build all competition sites
from scratch, not relying on existing venues or infrastructure as other candidate cities
(Arnold & Foxall, 2014, p. 7).
11.2. References to the Truce
Before the start of the Games, the Truce was promoted actively by Russian
officials. The Russian Foreign Ministry urged all States and participants in armed
conflicts to obey the Truce during the Sochi Games (Interfax, 2014). UN General
Assembly President John Ashe urged Governments “to undertake concrete actions
(…) to promote and strengthen a culture of peace and harmony based on the spirit of
the Truce” (UN News Centre, 2014). Thomas Bach, President of the IOC, referred to
the Truce as a “sacred truce” with a global appeal during the opening of the Truce Wall
in the Olympic Village on 4th February 2014 (IOC Media Relations Team, 2014). UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called for the observance of the Truce on February
6th, 2014, especially addressing the conflict parties in Syria, the Central African
Republic and South Sudan (Interfax, 2014). The fact that none of these countries
actually had athletes competing in the Games (International Olympic Committee, 2014)
emphasises the universal approach of the Truce even better. Socialist International
President George Papandreou also called for the observance of the Truce (Interfax,
2014).
In regards to Syria, a call for the Truce to be observed was successful in
reaching a three-day ceasefire between conflict parties in and around the city of Homs,
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to make it possible for civilians to leave the conflict zone. President Putin explicitly gave
credit for this success to the International Olympic Committee and the United Nations,
saying he was “certain that in this particular instance it will facilitate the resolution of all
humanitarian issues” (Interfax, 2014).
11.3. Events in the Ukraine
In the Ukraine, a series of demonstrations and civil unrests had started in
November 2013, with the original aim of a closer alignment of the country towards the
European Union. Over time, the protests attracted more and more participants, drawn
in by police violence and alleged corruption. As the number of protesters rose,
demands more and more changed towards the resignation of the President, Viktor
Yanukovych. To achieve this, the heterogenic opposition worked together,
representing many different goals and backgrounds. From the far left to nationalistic
elements everything was present on the Maidan, a square in central Kiev that was
occupied by protestors since November 2013. The movement eventually led to a
destabilization of the government, including violent clashes between security forces
and protestors on the Maidan. Civil-War like attacks involving Snipers and other
firearms claimed many wounded and even casualties. The reaction of the protestors
towards the escalating violence included the formation of protection groups, mostly
made up from nationalists, which were trying to protect the protestors on the occupied
Maidan. Russia-friendly president Yanukovych came under increasing pressure, both
internally as well as from the EU and the US. Only President Putin of Russia was
openly supporting the government, speaking of criminal elements destabilizing the
country.
When the Yanukovych-government eventually fell due to a parliamentary
decision, it was widely seen as a legitimate decision reached due to the pressure from
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the streets. The Russian government however did not acknowledge the new
government. Yanukovych, after disappearing from the public, eventually surfaced in
Russia, claiming in a press conference to be still the legitimate President of the
Ukraine. Parallel to these events, massive movements of troops were registered on
the peninsula of Crimea, traditionally host to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. This
fleet and other soldiers were based in barracks rented from the Ukrainian government
and had been in place since more than 70 years. With the looming downfall of the
government in Kiev, reinforcements arrived on the Russian bases. Later, uniformed
and armed troops patrolled the streets of Crimean towns and cities, while not wearing
any distinctive national signs. Allegations that those were Russian troops were denied
by the Kremlin, although the armoured vehicles had Russian license-plates, the troops
were wearing Russian standard-issue arms and were speaking Russian. Statements
by Russian officials indicated that those troops were in fact self-organized defenceforces by the Russian minority on Crimea, trying to protect themselves from claimed
aggressions by Ukrainians. President Putin in one press-statement infamously replied
to a question wondering about the standard-issue uniforms of the troops that he cannot
stop anybody from going into shops and buy those uniforms. Further on in the conflict,
the allegedly Russian troops started to besiege Ukrainian barracks on Crimea,
outnumbering the Ukrainian forces heavily.
On a political level, Russian offices were pushing more and more towards an
annexation of Crimea, claiming it to be a protective measure for the ethnical Russians
living there. The Crimean regional parliament was stormed by Russian sympathisers
and Crimea declared itself independent from Ukraine. A new government was formed,
which was, just as the declaration of independence, not accepted by the Ukrainian
government in Kiev. The new government of Crimea than announced a date for a
public vote on whether Crimea should be a part of Russia or if it should return to the
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Ukraine. The result of this vote was overwhelmingly positive towards Russia. Reasons
for this might be the promises made by the Russian government towards the people of
Crimea, including offering them pensions of Russian standard, which is much higher
than the Ukrainian one. Also, the de facto already executed annexation with troops in
the streets certainly contributed to the voting behaviour. A comparison to the events of
the “Anschluss” might be fitting in regards to the circumstances of the vote.
11.4. The Olympic Truce during the crisis
During the unfolding events, nearly no references were made to the Olympic
Truce. Although the events in the Ukraine unfolded during the time between the
Olympic and the Paralympic Games, so within the timespan covered by the Truce
Resolution, no significant mentioning of it occurred.
One explanation might be the unclear situation. While it was quite obvious that
Russian troops were involved in the events on the Crimea peninsula, no official
recognition of this fact existed. While the events were unfolding and facts were created,
Russia officially remained in the role of a passive bystander. Offering their support for
the Russian minority through official channels, the Russian administration stuck with
the claim that the uniformed troops seizing control over Crimea were in fact selforganised groups of civilians. With upholding this spin on events, the Russian
government in fact stayed within the framework of the Truce agreement, which seeks
for diplomatic solutions during times of tension. This division between the observable
actions and the official framing of events by the Russian government made a reference
to the Truce basically impossible. Without an official recognition of involvement of
regular troops on foreign soil by the Russian government, all claims made by others
aiming in that very direction were ridiculed by the Kremlin.
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This is an explanation of why other states were limited in their references to the
Truce regarding the situation, but what about the IOC, as organisers of the Games and
original source of the Truce agreement and its’ main supporter?
When the Ukrainian delegation asked for permission to wear black armbands to
commemorate the deaths of the protests, the motion was denied by the IOC in
reference to the ban of all signs of political meaning at Olympic sites.
Sergej Bubka, one of the greatest names in Ukrainian sports history and leader
of the delegation to Sochi, urged his countrymen to obey the Truce and end the
bloodshed via Twitter, directly addressing protestors and officials publically. He later
repeated these claims in an interview with Bloomberg (2014).
Thomas Bach, President of the IOC, did not comment on the Olympic Truce,
but in connection to the request by the Ukrainian team to wear black armbands is
quoted as saying “Our thoughts and sympathy are with the Ukrainian team at what
must be a very difficult time. The way they have continued to represent their nation
with great dignity is a credit to them and their country.” (Blomberg, 2014).
"As with situations around the world, we hope a peaceful resolution can be
found in the spirit of the Olympic Truce, which has covered the Paralympic Games
since 2006," the International Paralympic Committee said in a statement to The
Associated Press. However, the statement went on reading that the International
Paralympic Committee will not get involved in what they call “global politics” (Harris,
2014) (Kingston, 2014).
Vladimir Putin: “"And I would like to assure you that Russia did not initiate, it
was not an instigator, of these difficult circumstances which you know and we are
talking about here." (Harris, 2014)
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Wilfried Lemke: “We all know that we have to respect the Olympic Truce. These
days and not only these days, we have military conflicts all around the world and I know
exactly that this is not a political event. (…) With all my spirits and all my emotions, I
believe in the power sport and I believe in the power of peace, so we should not forget
this during these upcoming days.” (Pinelli, 2014).
11.4.1. The relevance of the Truce during the events
Throughout the ongoing crisis in the relations between Ukraine and Russia, no
significant influence of the concept of the Truce is visible or obvious. Although the
situation seems to be perfect to promote the values of the Truce, this chance was
missed and the damage caused by this to the concept as a whole has yet to be
examined. There were no strong statements by official sources demanding an
immediate end to all hostilities, instead the IOC took cover behind what it deemed its
political neutrality, harming the concept in the process. Possible actions could have
included arranged meetings between athletes from both countries, or simply appeals
to the Truce before every event. On another level, smaller solutions could have been
possible, especially targeting both sides present at the Euromaidan. Visits of IOC
representatives to sites of the conflict would have been yet another possibility, simply
showing interest and commitment to the conflict. Since the Truce is a symbol, symbolic
acts would have been a course of action.
So what is the concept worth after all? If it is just a fig leaf to sign it because
there is a general expectation amongst societies to do so, while there are no
consequences to violate it, what is the point in it anyways, to speak broadly? Maybe
the Truce serves a purpose on a different level than just practical implementation. It
might be a normative ideal.
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11.5. So is it?
The Truce nowadays obviously faces a lot of challenges. Starting with the
number of conflicts and continuing with their global spread, as well as the involvement
of more and more non-state actors in those conflicts on one side of the equation and
the continued change from the IOC to, what is perceived as, a global economic entity,
the Truce is contested from two sides at least.
Strikingly, the Truce seems to have been a much stronger concept during the
Cold War. Especially the boycott of the Moscow Games of 1980 by the United States
could be seen as a success of the Truce. However it is at least doubtful if the true
reason behind the boycott was the Truce (Kidd, 2013). Most certainly, one has to look
at the national interests of the United States during the Cold War to explain this
behaviour. The IOC itself does not relate the boycott to the Truce due to obvious
reasons. First and foremost, the boycott was seen as a political issue, and the sound
of anything being “political” in the ears of the IOC and its consequences have been
explored thoroughly in this work. From this perspective, the IOC’s stance on this matter
seems legitimate.
Since the official revival of the Truce, the concept has gained a lot of attention.
However, this attention seems to be more or less based on hope. While the IOC uses
it to strengthen its position as a significant global actor, states seem to see it as a
chance to profit from the shining image of the Olympic Games. If this would lead to
negative consequences of any kind, may it be the involvement of personnel or
economic sanctions, states seem to forget about their commitment. Even more contraproductive is the behaviour by the IOC. Whilst it would be required to at least strongly
point out violations of the Truce, in its role as the “guardian” of the concept, it often
choses to somewhat hide behind the claim to not be political in any way. In connection
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to the Truce, this claim shines in a strange light. With claiming the Truce is a powerful
asset, the IOC claims to be politically effective while on the other side repeatedly
claiming to be fully apolitical.
This schizophrenic approach by the IOC in my eyes is the biggest reason why
the Olympic Truce cannot be seen as a valid and relevant concept at the moment.
Without a firm backing of the concept by the IOC in times of crisis, the strongest voice
capable of promoting the truce regularly falls silent when it is most needed. The IOC
as an independent organization would have the capability of pointing out violations of
the Truce even without taking sides in a conflict. Regardless of any possible sanctions
against the competing athletes or National Olympic Committees, a strong stance of the
IOC might encourage other actors to take the Truce into account when it comes to
violations. Instead, the IOC more or less “hides” behind the claim to be apolitical. This
claim is ridiculed by the engagement shown not only towards the promotion of the
Truce, but also in other fields. So in short, the IOC does not live up to the expectations
it raises itself.
For states, referring to the Truce is not as easy as it would be to the IOC. If
directly involved in a conflict, any reference to the Truce could immediately turn into an
accusation of aggression against the other side, worsening the conflict. As a third state,
any mentioning of the Truce could be seen as interference or violation of the
sovereignty of the concerned states. Only an acknowledged actor can therefore
actively promote the Truce, so either the United Nations or the IOC has to take the
responsibility. All in all, without active backing of the Concept by the sponsoring actors,
the Truce has become a toothless tiger.
The Truce merely seems to be a tool for the IOC to give itself relevance beyond
being the Organization behind a billion dollar sports event. As soon as negative
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consequences could derive from its implementation, the IOC apparently takes a duck
and cover mentality. As it became obvious in Sochi, this leads to nearly total ignorance
of the concept.
Another aspect that occurred to me while talking to other students about this
thesis is the subjective experience of a lack of knowledge about the Truce and its
origins amongst the young people of today. Although the IOC and the International
Truce Foundation claim that they want to promote their ideas primarily through
education of the young population and the organisation of sport events for a growing
number of people, this approach seemingly needs a huge boost to gain any
significance.
12.
Conclusion
The Olympic Truce is an important example for the diversity of concepts present
in International Relations and their influence on policy- and decision-making. While the
concept serves as a lighthouse of values, those values are also promoted by other,
distinctively political, actors. Since messages cannot be separated from their
advocates, The IOC would also be a political actor without the Truce. Since the FIFA
for example does not refer to an ancient concept, but rather uses the rules and
traditions of the sport itself as a positive example which should be transferred into
society, it is obvious that more and more sports organisations strive into predominately
as political perceived domains, e.g. those that were formerly the domain of
governments and public authorities, regulating the interactions in societies.
What remains to be answered is the question of why sports organisations try to
expand their mission-profiles into these domains. I argue that these expeditions are
necessary in today’s world to remain a “noble” actor in the public discourse. Without
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FIFAs campaign against racism and the IOC promoting the Olympic values and the
Truce, they would have drifted into the sphere of purely economic entities in the recent
years of professionalising in sport. Both organisations are known around the world for
their popular events, followed by billions of people around the world, generating huge
revenues. The popularity of those events created huge resources in regards to soft
power for these organisations, which they transfer into benefits for themselves.
Examples for this are the tax-exemption-laws demanded by the FIFA from host
countries or the exclusive zones around venues only open for official sponsors.
With this commercialism arose the possibility of a negative image of both the
events and the organisations behind it, depicting them as greedy economic entities,
only striving for their own benefit. Putting the greater good of society in the headlight
during the events helps to cover the economic interests of the organisations.
Nevertheless, the Truce has a proven track record in small-scale conflicts, a fact
often being overlooked when assessing its’ relevance. Arguing from this point of view,
the Truce is by no means obsolete. It played an important role in the lives of many
people, a role that could not realistically be fulfilled by any other current concept. The
IOC should take this into account when promoting the Truce.
Looking behind the curtain at those members of the regulatory bodies and their
decisions leaves us with a rather confusing picture. While humanistic values are
promoted by the IOC, governments ignoring those are still selected as hosts of Olympic
Games. While some of those decisions might be declared as somewhat ‘motivational’
to give those values a push in the concerned countries, no consequences are drawn
from the failure to adopt to these values. So how should the IOC and to some extend
the FIFA tread violations of their values by host countries?
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12.1. Reviving the Truce
A strong positioning by the IOC would certainly help in this matter. Leaving interstate relations and possible reactions aside, maybe the Games themselves are the tool
that everybody is looking for to solve the growing number of crisis. If the IOC had rallied
behind the Concept of the Truce in the recent events, a significant pressure could have
been build up to push Russia and the Ukraine to obeying the Truce. A possible pause
of the Games or even their cancellation would have embarrassed Russia on a large
scale. While the original intentions in hosting the Games were closely related to
celebrate what is nationally considered to be Russia’s return to the status of a great
power, a premature end would have left Russia’s reputation in shambles. Apart from
this, a temporal ban of athletes from states who do not obey the Truce would also be
a strong sign by the IOC. Given the significance the Games have nowadays, being
excluded from participating would create a huge uproar in the public. If this ban is
conclusively linked to an obvious breach of the Truce, a significant influence could be
reached.
A risk in that is that the IOC would have to engage in a field where it has no
competencies. Any sanctions against competitors that are based on a breach or
violation of the Truce would have to be well based and proven, putting the IOC in the
role of a Judge of international foreign affairs and interstate relations. Further,
sanctions from the IOC could only be imposed against National Olympic Committees,
never against the violating states themselves. This somewhat ridicules the idea of
Sanctions, since one of the main demands from the IOC towards NOCs is their
independence from domestic politics. So punishing them is pointless, since it would
mean an acknowledgement of close ties between politics and the sphere of sports.
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Related to that, a politicisation of the Games is a realistic threat. If signing the
Truce agreement becomes obligatory to be eligible to send athletes to the Games,
some states might consider it an illegitimate interference with their sovereignty and
chose not to send Athletes at all. This would weaken the Olympic movement as a
whole, since it would undermine the claim to be a festival of the youth of the world.
Especially an introduction of compliance-mechanisms to be able to compete in the
Games would only cause claims of biased decision-making by the side sanctioned in
a conflict. This could ultimately lead to a fragmentation of the Games, as it was feared
especially strong during the time of the boycotted Games of Moscow and Los Angeles.
Sports events have changed over time and there is absolutely no Guarantee that the
Olympic Games will keep their global character once states and NOCs feel they are
treated unfairly.
If the IOC choses to remain involved with the concept of an Olympic Truce, it
therefore has to wage between two extremes. While overly promoting the Truce and
sanctioning breaches of it heavily might endanger the unpolitical nature of the Games,
another obvious ignorance of the concept in times of an obvious case of its significance
might destroy the credibility of the IOC as a member of the Civil Society. The IOC would
thereby seriously risk to be seen just as another company organising sports events,
for example like the major sports leagues in the United States. So how can the concept
be saved for the future then?
12.2. A step back
A possible approach can be the circumvention of those who are usually involved
in conflicts, namely states and terroristic groups. What I mean by that is a stronger
focus on the grassroots-level. By promoting the values of the Truce to Individuals, the
IOC might be able to change the minds of people. To explain this, one has to look at
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the events during Christmas time in the two World Wars for example (Giulianotti &
Armstrong, 2011, p. 383). Under the roof of the Christian faith, so also relying on one
common “concept” amongst the fighting powers, soldiers individually decided to quit
fighting for the holidays, thereby ignoring orders by their superiors. Peaceful
encounters of soldiers were reported, but only after the end of the war, since peaceful
soldiers did not fit the picture of brave and obedient fighters for their countries.
Supporting this idea in connection of the Truce is what allegedly happened during the
unofficial ceasefire: football matches took place in no-mans-land, with the two sides
later shaking hands before moving back to their respective trenches (Brown & Seaton,
1984).
Apparently, those who do fight in armed conflicts still possess something we
would call common sense. If the IOC would appeal to exactly this common sense
instead of the leaders, small results seem possible. And here, sports play an important
role, since the values of sports are independent from religion, which led to the
ceasefires in the great wars.
Wherever people compete in sports, they do it in close connection to what is
known as “fair play”. This is unique to the world of sports, regardless of the cultural
background of participants. Further, not only the values, but also the rules of sports
are the same globally. If a game of soccer is played in Manila, Washington, Teheran,
Paris or Beijing does not matter when it comes to the rules. To clarify this point: if
individuals involved in conflicts are made to realise that their immediate opponent on
the other side of the conflict-line is just as much a hockey-player, a runner, a swimmer
or a rider like themselves, it might make it easier to stop shooting. And this
consciousness could then be the starting “peace island” the IOC so often refers to
when talking about the Truce.
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Another starting point in the same direction might be the complete exclusion of
any national symbols from Olympic sites and venues by the IOC. Since these symbols
are said to spark nationalistic tendencies, the IOC might consider a step back to the
ancient Games, where athletes competed for personal glory rather than that of a bigger
entity. While this approach works quite well in individual sports, it has obvious
shortcomings in team events. How could one argue about the selection of teams, if not
based on states, respectively origin? This does sound state-centric, but all other
alternatives would sooner or later result in economic factors influencing the selection
of teams, including transfers of athletes from one team to another, as observed in
professional sports globally. Nevertheless, maybe the abstinence of national symbols
like flags and anthems at medal ceremonies could be a starting point. This idea is not
completely new to the IOC and the Olympic Movement, since the Youth Olympic
Games are held under exactly these premises. During medal ceremonies, the Olympic
anthem is played rather than the respective national anthems. The original idea behind
this was the attempt to cut out possibilities of feelings of national superiority.
The Olympic Youth Games themselves are a good example of new attempts by
the IOC to promote the Truce. Being an event to explicitly introduce fifteen to eighteen
year olds to the Olympic idea, the competitive value of the competitions is in doubt.
However, the events serve well as a platform of connection and networking between
young people from around the world. During the summer Youth Olympics of 2014,
competitors from all 206 acknowledged National Olympic Committees participated in
the events. While not all of the participants will go on to become top-level athletes, they
are very likely to return home filled with what the International Olympic Committee calls
the “Olympic Spirit”.
79
This absence of national symbols would also be a step towards a closer
implementation of the Olympic Charter, which states that the Olympic Games are a
competition amongst athletes and not amongst states. Obviously Pierre de Coubertin
himself saw the dangers of sporting competitions being taken too seriously by national
leaders. Why this article is not implemented more strictly needs to be investigated in
further work.
So, the road to success of the Truce is maybe not the one of trying to implement
one big solution from the top down, but rather a way to promote the Truce and its’
values more subtle. The ideas are very likely to spread, given the positive effects the
Truce had on the lives of individuals in small scale conflicts.
This would also mean a stop to the practise of adopting a UN resolution on the
Truce, since this practise only contributed to the decreasing credibility of the IOC, the
UN General Assembly and the Truce itself. Another positive side-effect for the IOC
would be the perceived separation of sports and politics in this regard. On the other
hand, the IOC could maintain its role as a promoter of humanistic values, by actively
promoting the Truce amongst its actual recipients. Of course this would also involve a
reduction of the obvious importance of the IOC as an actor in international relations,
but maybe the governing bodies see the benefit in actually achieving the goals of the
Olympic movement rather than being an unsuccessful part in the shining world of
international relations.
12.3. Another view on the Truce
Looking in depth at the International Olympic Committee, its relations to the United
Nations and its promotion of the Olympic Truce finally leaves two possible conclusions.
In the first, the Truce is an inherent part of the modern Olympic movement. It is deeply
integrated into the structures and values of the Games. In this view, the Games are
80
not thinkable without the Truce, maybe one could even go as far as saying the Truce
is the reason for the Games to be held. This is most certainly the view the IOC would
prefer.
The second one is a more critical one. In this view, the Truce serves more or less
as a tool of Corporate Social Responsibility of the profit-driven entity of the International
Olympic Committee, giving the predominately interest a cover of humanity.
The truth about the Truce currently lies somewhere in the middle, taking into
account the actions by the IOC and the Truce Foundation. Without a stronger
promotion of it, the Truce will diminish even further in regards to relevance. As pointed
out already, promoting the Truce does not necessarily mean to sanction breaches of it
harder or increase the number of tools to accomplish a better compliance, but rather a
shift in the target-group when it comes to the promotion of it.
All in all, the conclusion of this work has to be that the Olympic Truce is not currently
a relevant concept in International Relations. However, this does not mean it is
insignificant. The ideals it promotes are worthy to be pursued, but it is more realistically
to be considered as a normative ideal on the level of individual human interaction. The
Truce should be seen as a goal rather than a starting point.
81
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