INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
E
IMO
SUB-COMMITTEE ON
RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS AND
SEARCH AND RESCUE
7th session
Agenda item 10
COMSAR 7/INF.5
8 November 2002
ENGLISH ONLY
LARGE PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Annex to the report of the Correspondence Group: passenger ship operators’ questionnaire
Submitted by the United Kingdom as co-ordinator of the Correspondence Group
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
COMSAR 7/10/1 contains the report of the correspondence group
established by COMSAR 6 to consider the radiocommunications and
search and rescue issues identified for its attention by the Large
Passenger Ship Safety Working Group of the Maritime Safety
Committee. This paper contains the results of a questionnaire
distributed to passenger ship operators to assist the correspondence
group in its work.
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 4
Related documents:
COMSAR 7/10/1 and COMSAR 7/10/INF.4
Introduction
1
The Large Passenger Ship Safety Working Group (‘the Working Group’), meeting during
the seventy-fourth session of the Maritime Safety Committee, developed, as part of its work plan,
a matrix of objectives and tasks which identified aspects of large passenger ship safety to be
further considered by the Working Group and by appropriate Sub-Committees. The COMSAR
Sub-Committee was tasked to consider the radiocommunications and search and rescue (SAR)
aspects and, at its sixth session, established a correspondence group to do so.
2
The correspondence group, using the Working Group’s tasking as a guide, developed a
questionnaire for distribution to industry, to help inform the group’s work. The questionnaire
and the responses received are annexed to this paper.
3
Discussion of points raised in the responses is to be found in the relevant sections of
COMSAR 7/10/1. An introduction to the questionnaire philosophy, and thanks to contributors,
are at COMSAR 7/10/1, paragraph 7.6.
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
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Action requested of the Sub-Committee
4
The Sub-Committee is requested to note the contents of this paper.
***
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CORRESPONDENCE GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire was distributed to passenger shipping companies mostly based in or
operating from the United Kingdom, on a non-attributory basis to encourage open discussion.
The introduction to the questionnaire was as follows:
“Large Passenger Ship Safety Working Group – SAR & radiocommunications aspects
“An international correspondence group has been established by IMO’s Sub-Committee on
Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) to consider the items relevant to its
work identified by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)’s Large Passenger Ship Safety
Working Group. The correspondence group is being co-ordinated by the United Kingdom. Its
members include France, Germany, Singapore, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the International Council of Cruise Lines.
“The correspondence group’s terms of reference are at annex. Its main aim “is to evaluate
recovery and rescue techniques and equipment and propose measures as appropriate.” It is
agreed that the remit covers both cruise and ferry operations, and existing as well as future large
ships.
“You are invited to assist the group in its work by completing the following questionnaire. The
more detail you are able to provide, the more valuable your contribution will be – but all
responses will be very welcome.
“Your answers will be collated and published in the group’s report to COMSAR at the end of the
year. Specific comments will not be attributed to you unless you request it. You will be
identified only as a contributor – unless you wish to remain anonymous, in which case please tick
the box at the end of the questionnaire.
“To allow time for collation, please return the questionnaire by 30 September 2002.
“The questionnaire should be returned, and any other comments or queries addressed, to:
David Jardine-Smith
Emergency Response Liaison Officer
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Bay 1/04, Spring Place
105 Commercial Road
Southampton SO15 1EG
UK
tel:
+44 (0)23 8032 9108
fax: +44 (0)23 8032 9488
e-mail: [email protected]
On behalf of the correspondence group, many thanks.”
The questionnaire itself was closely based on the correspondence group’s terms of reference.
The responses received are listed under each of the eleven questions posed. The text alternates
between italic and normal font as an indication of where one response ends and another begins.
Not every responder answered every question. In order to maintain the non-attributory basis of
the exercise, some answers have been slightly edited – but all substantive comment remains as it
was received.
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1
The group has been tasked to consider “measures and techniques to transfer persons from
survival craft and recovering persons from the water to other ships which may include the
use of rescue boats, scramble nets, ‘means of rescue’, pilot boarding ladders, and
helicopters”.1
What transfer & recovery measures and techniques do you use / recommend?
How effective are these measures and techniques?
In what way(s) might they be improved?
We currently manage the following vessel types: high-speed wave-piercing catamaran (WPC)
ro-ro passenger ferries, an 11000 tonne conventional freight ro-ro and a 14000 tonne ro-pax
vessel. Our current arrangements for the transfer of persons from survival craft or recovery of
persons from the water are as follows:
Persons are recovered from the water to the WPCs by the vessels’ two inflatable rescue boats,
launched by means of hydraulic cranes from stowed position at either quarter right aft. These
boats have a crew of three when operated in this mode and a capacity of five persons.
The casualty is brought aboard and disembarked by means of fixed evacuation steps cut into the
port and starboard quarters some 6 metres forward of the transom.
Injured survivors are either carried up a short staircase to the main vehicle deck and then
transported by electrically powered lift to the main passenger deck for treatment or may be lifted
in a helicopter cage-type stretcher (one carried) directly to this level by the rescue boat crane.
Survival craft can be secured alongside the after steps port or starboard for the disembarkation
of survivors, if necessary one of the vessel’s own after liferafts can be deployed as a landing
platform. The embarkation of survivors in this manner was successfully carried out in significant
wave heights in excess of 2 metres during an incident in 1995. Earlier trials proved the utility of
evacuation steps in even higher seas. The manoeuvrability of these vessels is such that the vessel
is able to position itself alongside a stationary survival craft to effect the disembarkation.
Helicopter winching operations have been successfully conducted to the open deck area at the
after end of the Upper Passenger Deck, and occasionally Main Passenger Deck, at speeds of up
to 40 knots. Such exercises have also taken place to the Main Passenger Deck aft (full speed) and
the foredeck (slow speed only) of the smaller class. An evacuation exercise however highlighted
potential difficulties with downdraught from the helicopter when liferafts are secured alongside.
These vessels are able to accept a large number of survivors for a short time although large
numbers of injured would tax the available resources aboard (the total ship’s complement being
between 22 and 30). These vessels also have relatively short endurance (between 10 hours and
one hour at full speed depending on the stage of the voyage).
1
In considering task 1, the assessment includes completing the rescue by delivering the recovered persons to a place
of safety.
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Possible enhancements for this role could include:
•
larger rescue boats to handle more casualties (requiring larger cranes to operate
them) with Jason’s Cradle as a recovery aid;
•
a second helicopter stretcher, to enable both cranes to be used simultaneously for the
injured;
•
and possibly on larger versions of these vessels a helicopter landing area. (This
would result in a vessel similar to “Joint Venture” the Incat vessel currently being
evaluated for military use by the US). As our vessel is adequately configured for her
own needs, these modifications could not be justified - and in the case of a landing
area would need a complete redesign of the vessel).
With respect to the freight ro-ro, her ability to recover survivors from the water is limited. Her
rescue boat is one of the two 36 person enclosed lifeboats which while adequate for the
evacuation of the vessel is not optimised for recovery of large numbers of persons from the
water. Recovery with a full complement of passengers in adverse conditions would be difficult.
Embarkation ladders of rope construction of some 11 metres in height are provided for the two
life-rafts carried port and starboard, and could be used with difficulty by able bodied survivors.
A pilot ladder could also be rigged from a door at Main Vehicle Deck level (the main pilot
boarding position) but operating the lifeboat to this position is difficult.
A helicopter winching position is available abaft the bridge, and the vessel could accommodate a
moderate number of casualties aboard for a short period (up to 24 hours with some difficulty).
With a maximum crew number of 21 dealing with a large number of survivors would prove
difficult.
The ro-pax vessel is fitted with both a fast rescue boat and a semi-rigid rescue boat each with a
capacity of 6 persons, both are suitable for recovery of persons from the water. Both are
restricted to launching/recovery when the vessel is not making way. Operation of these boats
with their single point launching systems from a vessel of high freeboard is difficult and masters
are reluctant to commit to their use. In addition two partially enclosed lifeboats, each of 100
person capacity, are fitted, as well as a 10 person davit-launched raft on the starboard side for
means of recovery.
The combination of the two rescue boats and the Means of Rescue (MoR) raft simultaneously
would be effective in relatively benign conditions but the robustness of the MoR raft for repeated
use in recovery of a large number of survivors must be questioned. Only in ideal conditions could
the use of one of the 100 person lifeboats as a lift, with survivors transferred from rescue boats
or casualty’s survival craft, be considered.
The vessel has a helicopter winching area abaft the bridge where a helicopter could operate
“Wheels Light”.
Total crew of 37 would be stretched if two rescue boats, MoR raft, and helicopter operations /
lifeboat lift were to be operated simultaneously especially when coupled with communications
requirements, internal and external.
If a suitable international standard single/dual point lifting system robust enough to handle
lifeboats and rafts of the maximum dimensions were required to be fitted to all vessels over a
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certain size, (not practical for HSC but probably not necessary for WPC, see above), then
recovery of the casualty’s own survival craft to a disembarkation position aboard the receiving
vessel would in theory be possible.
Smaller rafts of up to 50 person (4 tonne) capacity, if suitably strengthened, could be fitted with
such a system compatible for lifting fully laden by helicopters and landing on a receiving vessel.
In both cases casualty’s survival craft could then be jettisoned to enable further survivors to be
received.
To recover persons from the water the use of slings and Jason’s Cradle type equipment are used
and are reasonably easy to use, dependant upon the type of rescue craft being used. (Semi
inflatable boats are easier in this regard than enclosed conventional type boats).
To recover persons to the ship, the use of tender and rescue boats together with the use of ships
side openings and platforms that are fitted to the majority of new cruise vessels is our preferred
method.
The effectiveness is satisfactory in good weather. In bad weather it may be more effective to use
a helicopter.
On the normal route of our vessels [WPCs on a short sea crossing] RNLI all-weather Lifeboats
are less than two hours from the vessel. So it would be feasible to transfer persons from liferafts
into RNLI or French Lifeboats.
On one of our training exercises when we were able to deploy a Marine Evacuation System
(MES) and liferaft, a Sea King helicopter attempted to lift a person from the liferaft. The canopy
of the raft was destroyed by the downdraught of the helicopter and it was only by good luck that
no-one was injured in the incident.
[From the Master of a conventional ro-ro ferry:] Fast Rescue Craft (FRCs) and helicopters.
Helicopters are always preferred as FRCs are weather-constrained.
The transfer recovery methods available to us [a conventional ro-ro ferry] are primarily our
MoR raft and secondary to this we can use a pilot ladder from the pilot doors 3 metres above the
sea. Alternatively in calm seas the stern ramp could be used to board.
In order to deploy the MoR raft it is necessary to launch or jettison our FRC as these both use
the same davit. (It may be possible to transfer the boat to the adjacent liferaft davit using a
union purchase type of arrangement.) In marginal weather conditions if the decision was made
that the weather conditions were outside the safe operational envelope of the FRC (3 metres
combined sea and swell), the only way to deploy the MoR would be to jettison or transfer the
FRC. The FRC on board is the company standard 6.1m FRIR with a single 60hp outboard
engine. We feel that such an engine is very underpowered for the task and does not offer the
100% redundancy afforded by a twin engine installation.
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Ways of improving these transfer and recovery measures include:
•
Install a dedicated MoR davit. (Or look into motorising one of the liferaft davits.)
•
Look into fitting a second 60hp engine on the FRC (or if the transom is found to be
too narrow install a single 120hp).
•
Review the installation of a manoverboard raft at the stern of the vessel to increase
the casualty’s survival time in the water.
Transfer & recovery measures used are:
•
MoR
•
pilot ladder in ships with Gunport Door at main deck level
•
davit-launched liferafts that remain engaged on the falls and therefore become a hoist
•
lifeboats that remain engaged on the falls and therefore become a hoist
•
deployment of MES (with ladder for climbing chute).
All measures are subject to prevailing weather and swell. All except the MoR are subject to the
mobility of those being recovered. The effectiveness of each type is also dependent upon
whether we are recovering 1, 100, or 1000.
Boats that can launch with 150 may only be able to be recovered with 12. Enhance the design of
new davits to recover 66% of total.
Transfer & recovery techniques recommended: tender platforms as fitted to large passenger
ships, and shipside doors (pilot doors).
Pilot ladders are slow and difficult to use in any sea state above 3.
FRCs presently fitted to high-sided vessels (eg ro-ro ferries and passenger vessels) are dangerous
to use. For effective use these need to be launched from close to the load waterline, as is the case
with offshore industry vessels and naval vessels.
Use of recovery systems such as the Jason’s Ladder on lifeboats and FRCs would aid the
recovery of people from the water.
We currently use Tender Embarkation Platforms which hinge out of the ship’s side about 1 metre
above the sea. They allow direct access into the ship (via a watertight door) or up an
accommodation ladder to a higher deck. We also use rescue boats for transfers. Pilot ladders
and scrambling nets could also be used from various ship side doors. Helicopter winching is
also a possibility.
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Tender platforms are very efficient, so long as the weather is not too rough. Rescue boats, pilot
ladders etc fall into the same category. Helicopter operations are effective, but slower than the
tender platforms. In addition they require a large number of the crew to ensure the safety of the
ship during the transfers, which takes them away from other rescue duties.
In what way(s) might they be improved? Given the freeboard of the ships, it is hard to see what
could be done.
2
The group has been tasked to consider “compatibility of ships of all types2 for use as
possible SAR facilities, specifically addressing:
.1
Mooring alongside
.2
Evacuation of persons
.3
Transfer of assistance personnel (firefighters, medical personnel, etc)
.4
Transfer of persons”.
Please comment, giving specific examples wherever possible.
.1
Mooring alongside: Whilst it is possible for HSC to moor alongside a casualty there is a
significant risk of damage to the vessel in anything but ideal conditions in particular due to
different belting heights. None of our current WPCs carry either fenders or onboard gangways.
With care a WPC could position her after evacuation steps alongside a passenger vessel’s launch
operating pontoon for transfer of passengers in good conditions.
Neither of our conventional vessels carries fenders or accommodation ladders (vehicle deck
ramps and link-span being used for access). Securing alongside would be difficult as would
transfer of passengers in this situation.
.2
Evacuation of persons: Our vessels use a combination of MES (LSA) systems, liferafts,
and inflatable rescue boats on the HSC to evacuate passengers, the ro-pax utilises a combination
of Marin-Ark MES and boats while the freight ro-ro has a combination of boats and conventional
liferafts. See previous question.
.3
Transfer of assistance personnel: Can be achieved by boat, to launch pontoon or directly
if able to moor alongside. Transfer is more likely to be by helicopter if available.
.4
Transfer of persons: see above and previous question.
The most suitable vessels for use as SAR facilities in the event of an accident to a large passenger
vessel are warships of the Amphibious Squadron. The LPH, LPD, and LSL(D) types are all
capable of operating Helicopters and landing craft: the latter two types could in certain
conditions receive survival craft directly into a dock. They have large crews trained in fire
2
Task 2 should be considered in terms of existing and future ships of all types since other types of ships may be
called on to assist in the recovery of persons from large passenger ships.
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fighting and damage control, good medical facilities and the ability to accommodate a significant
number of survivors or to transfer them to other locations.
Military HSC developments such as “Joint Venture” able to operate a number of large RIBs and
operate with helicopters would also be of use due to their rapid speed of deployment from a
nearby port.
Other warship types would also be of use, as could other passenger vessels especially if their
LSA handling equipment was compatible with that of the casualty.
.1
Mooring alongside. For rescue craft this is not such an issue as the majority of cruise
vessels have numerous opening and platforms etc on the waterline that are used for tender
operation, bunkering etc. I would not envisage a situation where one would contemplate taking a
very large cruise ship alongside another vessel.
.2
Evacuation of persons. (It is assumed that here we are talking about the evacuation of
persons from one of our ships to the shore.) All our vessels comply with the ICCL requirement
to have a helicopter winching area. In addition there are numerous conventional means such as
tenders and boats. In our company we ask for the lifeboats to be able to be recovered with 10
persons onboard. Again the provision of ships side openings at the water level assists here.
.3
Transfer of assistance personnel. The use of ships own equipment (tenders and boats)
together with the ships side openings. Helicopter winching areas.
.4
Transfer of persons. See above.
General note:
Training of crew is of paramount importance. Recent incidents have shown that a welldisciplined and trained crew have ensured a safe and quick evacuation. Advantages are gained if
there is direct evacuation of persons into the rescue craft in the stowed position.
With regards to ships of other types, these have limited opportunity to provide assistance, as they
are usually not well adapted to receive persons and provide direct assistance. They do however
provide platforms of opportunity to SAR services.
The WPCs would be good for providing rescue facilities due to the low freeboard to
embark/disembark from small craft. However, due to the nature of our service, the range would
be limited to approx 150 nautical miles from a bunkering station.
With a large passenger vessel, with sheer sides and enclosed decks, it is not practical to moor
alongside.
Evacuation from this class of ferry [50,000 gt conventional ro-ro] is adequate.
Transfer by helicopter is preferable. FRC capacity is very limited. Enclosed lifeboats are not
suitable.
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Mooring alongside would be virtually impossible as this vessel is fitted with large sponsons.
This vessel is fitted with a ‘winch only’ helideck which would be of use for cross-decking
casualties between ships in an emergency. In addition the combination of the FRC and MoR raft
could be used to rescue a large number of casualties from the water. Another possibility would
be to launch the ship’s boats and bring casualties on board through the pilot doors.
For an on-board emergency, the availability of the helideck to winch firefighters etc would be the
obvious choice.
To transfer persons between vessels the use of a helicopter for cross-decking would be the safest
and fastest. If not practical, the use of our FRC to transfer the casualty to another vessel would
be our next choice.
.1
Mooring alongside has many attractions.
.2
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
dry-shod transfer
easy movement of infants and the infirm
rapid transfer (if vessels compatible)
providing fire fighting support
possibility of feeding electrical power to casualty
Mooring alongside is likely to cause structural damage because:
a)
b)
bridge wings & lifeboats on ferries usually overhang the ship’s side
high-sided vessels rolling in a seaway will contact their upper works.
To achieve mooring alongside, ships need to have Yokohama fenders available. Mooring to
another vessel at sea is totally weather dependent.
.3
Transfer of assistance personnel is best by helicopter, launch or tug.
.4
Transfer of limited numbers of persons by helicopter (all weather) or tenders / tugs.
A large number of persons would require facilities for hygiene, warmth / protection from the sun,
food etc.
It is likely that only another passenger ship would be best able to provide these. However, any
stable platform would be preferable to remaining in the survival craft.
Fitting ships with ‘Dutch Cleats’ would be an advantage.
SAR services could have supplies to drop from an aircraft.
.1
High-sided vessels cannot moor alongside without use of fenders – not available midocean. If possibly available, the distance between the vessels would be impossible to safely
bridge. Note: even tankers in ballast are ‘high-sided’ and all vessels will have relatively high
accommodation blocks.
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.2
Evacuation needs to be fast, simple to deploy and operate, and safe. A modern MES
(such as the RFD Marin-Ark) is effective at getting large numbers of people into survival craft
quickly. However: we should never forget that the ship is the best lifeboat!
.3
Helicopters are the only reasonable method for transferring assistance personnel, but are
limited in range and weather parameters.
.4
In general (see .1 above) transfer will need an intermediate system (liferafts, lifeboats or
FRCs) unless a very low freeboard vessel is available (an offshore supply vessel, etc).
.1
Mooring alongside is not a good option for a cruise ship as it potentially puts all the
people on the ‘rescue ship’ at risk. The high freeboard means that decks and ship’s side doors
may not align which makes transfers difficult. In addition several modern cruise ships have
boats which extend outside the line of the hull and which could be damaged when coming
alongside another ship. It is only really feasible, in good weather, with a ship of similar design
and where the ship being rescued poses no threat to the rescuing passenger ship.
.2
I assume that this refers to the ability to get survivors from one ship to another. In which
case cruise ships, if the weather is reasonable, are able to deploy larger numbers of survival
craft to conduct ‘pick up’ operations, although it must be remembered that the ship needs to
safeguard its own evacuation capability. Modern cruise ships are often fitted with FRCs or
similar, which are effective.
.3
Cruise ships usually have well trained emergency response personnel, but it is
questionable as to whether they would be transferred to other ships as they lack specialist
expertise. Since numbers are small this would normally be done by rescue boat. It is unlikely
that ships of other types would have large enough crews to allow this.
.4
I assume that this refers to the orderly transfer of people from one ship to another, rather
than an evacuation. I do not understand where the question is leading.
3
The group has been tasked to evaluate “techniques, fittings and equipment to recover
survival craft”.
Please comment, giving specific examples wherever possible.
Our vessels use a combination of single point lifting devices for rescue boats of various types,
and conventional twin davits for lifeboats, all fitted with on/off load release. The davit-launched
liferaft MoR system operates on a similar basis. There is no means for onboard recovery of our
own large (50/100 person) rafts either conventional or MES, or survival craft from the casualty.
As previously stated in Question 1, a standard Survival Craft Recovery System and a standard
liferaft lifting system for recovery by helicopter could be beneficial but these developments are a
long way off.
Recovery of survival craft in anything other than perfect conditions is extremely hazardous.
Fittings such as bowsing gear, hanging blocks etc are heavy, often unreliable and difficult to use.
The use of foul weather pennants helps but in many cases is not easy and not practical.
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It is not practical to recover boats from other vessels as the hook arrangements, hook distances
etc are all varying. Davits and winches are usually not rated for extra capacity in hoisting mode.
All are dependent upon training, which currently take up a considerable amount of time, and is
ship specific.
The davit fitted to launch and recover the 7 person SOLAS boat is the only equipment provided
to recover survival craft.
All the survival craft fitted on our WPCs are inflatable liferafts that are not intended to be
recovered.
Enclosed, high freeboard lifeboats are not designed for recovery. FRCs are limited in size and
capacity and also by weather conditions.
This vessel’s arrangement for recovering the FRC and MoR raft is using the dedicated davit and
is a fast, simple recovery method.
The vessel’s four 84 person boats are not fitted with recovery pennants. However, the two 22
person boats do have recovery pennants should they have to be used as ‘crash’ boats. Practically
speaking to recover any type of lifeboat in an open seaway is virtually impossible.
We have no provision for recovery of boats except our own, unless davit/boat size is the same.
FRC recovery is still in its infancy but requires:
•
boom
•
buoyed painter
•
fixed speed & heading of mother ship
•
lee from mother ship.
Lifeboat recovery:
•
•
•
engaging falls only possible in calm conditions with no swell
nylon recovery strops very effective in lifting boat clear of seaway
boat can remain at embarkation level or be stowed using hanging-off pennants.
Davit-launched liferafts:
•
rafts from casualty might be recovered by ship’s FRC davit once the FRC has been
deployed.
Specialist craft with universal lift/cradle required. Most practicable solution is to transfer
persons via ship’s MoR, etc.
Present systems do not cover recovery of a large number of persons. Consideration should be
given to one set of davits being able to easily recover a fully laden lifeboat. This would require
increased capacity of the motor, and possibly better hook systems than on load / off load.
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Lifeboats: use of recovery pennants.
FRCs: use of davits close to waterline with good heave compensation
Rafts: onto high-sided vessels the only possible method is to use lifeboats as ‘lifts’.
Low freeboard vessels may use scramble nets.
There is no great debate here. Single point lifts are much safer, such as on rescue boats.
However these are not practical for the current design of large lifeboats. If recovery is to be
successfully conducted in a seaway, the system must be simple. Ships in general do not currently
have the ability to recover a fully loaded survival craft, since size and arrangements (hook
spacing etc) differ from ship to ship and there is no suitable lifting appliance. Also the size and
weight of the boats are very different. Ships also often lack the deck space to land the boat or
raft even if they can lift it.
4
The group has been tasked to consider the “reliability of rescue equipment3”.
Please comment, giving specific examples where possible.
LSA MES: This simple and effective system deployable either from the bridge, by means of two
pneumatic release units, or locally, has been in use on our vessels since 1995. All our current
HSCs are fitted with this system. The system has proved effective in evacuating a large number of
passengers in a short period of time. Some casualties in exercises (mainly lower leg fractures due
to impact with submerged canister halves under floor of raft or the join between slide and raft)
were initially experienced. Procedures modified to minimise risk of recurrence and evacuation
exercises against the clock discontinued and replaced by demonstrations and slow time training
for ship’s crews. On balance a most effective system. (This is the preferred evacuation method
for disabled passengers).
Operation of conventional 50 and 100 person rafts to Fixed Evacuation Steps on either quarter
of HSC. This concept has proved effective in exercises and the steps have been proved in practice
to be an effective means of recovery of survivors from liferafts to the vessel and for persons from
the water.
Inflatable rescue boats with 30HP outboards are barely adequate for marshalling these
100 person rafts in moderate conditions, but have acceptable performance for MoB situations.
The Hydraulic Hiab Crane launching system for these boats has proved satisfactory.
Marin-Ark MES: System in use on ro-pax and felt to be adequate, not as effective as LSA system
but chosen due to the high freeboard of the vessel. The system requires extensive crew training,
as it is more complex in use than the LSA system. Manual operation of hydraulic pump for
deployment in the event of emergency electrical power failure is slow. It will be interesting to see
how system performs as it gets older.
3
In considering task 4, the reliability of shore based equipment should also be considered.
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Conventional lifeboats: 100 and 36 person types operated, difficulty anticipated in recovery in
adverse conditions but expected to be effective for evacuation of vessel, preferred to Marin-Ark
for evacuation of disabled passengers on ro-pax. There remain questions about the effectiveness
of 36 passenger lifeboat on the freight ro-ro when in rescue-boat mode in adverse weather.
In view of the number of casualties during drills and exercises with conventional lifeboats
compared with the number of lives saved the questions raised by the United Kingdom Marine
Accident Investigation Branch on their suitability and appropriateness need careful examination.
Such are the concerns about such issues that Masters are reluctant to exercise the boats on more
than the statutory minimum number of occasions with consequent effects on training of boat
crews.
Davit-launched 10 person raft as MoR: Some doubts about system especially whether it is
sufficiently robust to undertake a series of recoveries.
Conventional liferaft: 15 & 20 person “throw overboard” type fitted to ro-ro boarded by means
of 11 metre ladder from upper vehicle deck. A far from ideal system provided as back up to
conventional lifeboats, could be released to persons in the water if approaching a group of
survivors, no means of recovery provided.
6 person Fast Rescue Boat: Serious concerns have been raised about single point launching
systems, especially in vessels with high freeboard, after boat broached and capsized during
exercise with vessel underway. Boat will now only be launched with vessel not making way.
6 person semi-rigid inflatable rescue boat: Performed effectively in rescue following incident to
FRB above, same concern with single point launching system on high freeboard vessels.
Jason’s Cradle: A most effective system for the recovery of persons from the water into survival
craft or direct onto low freeboard vessels.
Generally we find equipment reliability is good. It is dependent upon a strict maintenance
schedule. Problems are usually with new and untried technology. The less moving parts the
better.
As the rescue equipment fitted to our WPCs is inflatable liferafts, it is not normally possible to
ascertain the “reliability”. However, usually just before the craft go to refit, one MES and
liferaft are deployed for training purposes. To the best of my knowledge these have been
deployed without problem.
The SOLAS rescue boat is fitted with a two-stroke outboard motor which is exposed to the
elements and therefore requires regular checks and servicing to maintain its reliability.
Practice is conducted in enclosed waters only (weekly). Weekly engine maintenance. MoR &
MES drill annually. Reliability: no comment.
Ship’s own rescue equipment in general is something that is throughout its life left exposed to the
elements. Without constant attention it will quickly deteriorate, particularly in the case of open
boats.
The most reliable form of rescue equipment is that which requires no maintenance on board, and
where training in its use can be undertaken in classroom conditions.
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This ferry group has had the following failures with lifeboats and davits during servicing and
training:
•
•
6 serious accidents
5 accidents resulting in injury.
The United Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch have published 10 reports of serious
accidents with lifeboats in the past 10 years.
Without doubt, the single most dangerous item of rescue equipment relates to the release of the
ship’s own lifeboats – On Load Quick Release systems are inherently dangerous and have caused
more loss of life than lifeboats have saved since QR introduction. This is not a training issue: the
equipment is ill-suited to the environment.
FRCs are ill-conceived and present unacceptable risk to crew in some circumstances.
Quality control issues are significant in liferaft equipment integrity due to servicing and packing
weaknesses.
Rescue equipment is generally reliable, but the on load / off load release mechanism is not.
Launching arrangements for davit-launch rafts should be investigated further.
Reliability of liferafts is an unknown quantity as the ship is unable to test them.
Note that more people have been killed during training, maintenance, and repair of lifeboats than
have been rescued by them!
MES systems rely totally on correct repacking after servicing and all failures to date have been
caused by packing errors. Need to ensure servicing stations are fully competent.
Tender platforms and other equipment are reliable in everyday use. I see no reason why they
should not be reliable if called upon in an emergency. I have no experience of shorebased
equipment.
5
The group has been tasked to consider “new concepts as well as adequacy of current
requirements”. This is a very broad tasking: the Group is seeking to identify new thinking.
For example, are there proposals for radically new evacuation or transfer systems, and how
do these compare with traditional systems? Are the current SOLAS requirements
adequate in the context of increasing passenger complements and trading in remote areas,
etc?
Please comment.
Standardised lifting arrangements for LSA: so boats/rafts with survivors aboard could be
recovered to another vessel.
Helicopter lifting arrangements for liferafts: so loaded rafts can be lifted directly to receiving
vessel.
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Requirements for conventional boats questioned due to high incidence of casualties in drills
against low number of lives saved.
The single-point launching systems used for Fast Rescue Craft on high freeboard vessels needs to
be reconsidered for the same reason.
There is a real need for some out of the box thinking here. Current size limitations – 150 persons
– are a limit both to innovation in the specific field of new concepts in LSA and in the
development of new ship designs. The use of free fall lifeboats, pods, safe modules that break
away from the mother vessel etc are all concepts that have potential advantages, however the
current prescriptive framework in SOLAS prevents them being fully exploited.
What is needed is a goal-based approach. The advantages would include that big groups could
be handled at the same time, reduced numbers of survival craft, provision of better facilities etc.
Traditional systems have not changed much in hundreds of years and we still have numerous
reports of accidents.
The current SOLAS requirements need to be updated to take these into account. The example of
SOLAS Ch II-2 Reg. 17 should be examined as a possible way to achieve this.
The MES slides and rafts fitted to the WPCs are modern. Consequently there are no proposals
for change at present.
Our vessels do not trade in remote areas.
Unaware of new concepts and not aware of new proposals. There is no practice of mass
evacuation of the ship using passenger volunteers in a seaway.
The use of davit-launched liferafts as we have is a reliable if old system. Its disadvantages are
that:
•
3 to 4 rafts are required to be launched from each davit inside 30 minutes;
•
there is a high number of qualified persons required to operate the rafts, ie 18 CPSC
certificates and 36 BSS certificates;
•
the launching of the rafts itself involves lifting a 25 person raft and manually slewing
the davit in and out followed by winding up the hook for each individual raft;
•
the vessel’s 18 liferaft davits require a high level of maintenance.
New concepts need to be devised such as lowering the embarkation level and enclosing it.
This company has proposed a novel system for its next generation of tonnage. This system
comprises full Marin-Ark evacuation for 2200 passengers and crew. With no provision of
lifeboats, infants and the infirm are evacuated separately via MoR / davit-launched liferafts.
The greatest safety for passengers is in dry-shod evacuation via MES or Marin-Ark.
Lifeboats present significant risk to passengers’ safety in deployment.
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Embarkation into lifeboats in the stowed position is an improvement in passenger ship
evacuation.
Future concepts might include high capacity rescue craft (PODS) lowered from within the
accommodation block.
Current requirements are too prescriptive and should allow for greater use of Marin-Ark or
similar systems.
The current limit of 150 persons to a boat requires review.
In terms of conventional thinking the current system of boats and MES are about as good as we
can get. More thought needs to be given to radical concepts, such as parts of the ship that can
become survival craft and provide a safe haven for a large number of people, in relative comfort,
for a reasonable amount of time. So that weather can moderate and suitable rescue facilities
mobilised and brought on scene, where none exist. It is well known that the most hazardous time
is the transition from ship to sea and vice versa. This needs to be engineered out.
6
The group has been tasked to “advise the Maritime Safety Committee on medical issues
related to SAR issues”. In so doing, the group is to consider “medical management
practices including facilities, equipment, personnel qualifications and staffing levels. Tasks
to be considered in accomplishing this objective with respect to large passenger ships
include:
1.
Pharmaceuticals carried on board
2.
Training, certification and manning issues
3.
Telecommunications equipment
4.
Medical facility room equipment issues.
Secondary medical facilities in the event of loss of primary facilities in the event of a
casualty.”
Please comment.
Current requirements considered adequate for our vessels, requirements for increased facilities
on other vessels to assist with an incident to a large passenger vessel would not be justified.
Standardisation of pharmaceutical requirements worldwide would be of assistance as flag
States’ differing requirements cause problems with training and the use of medically qualified
passengers to augment onboard medical team.
Medical facility room equipment issues: current requirements deemed adequate, designated
rather than dedicated facilities are considered appropriate for short voyages.
Secondary medical facilities only appropriate for the largest vessels.
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As ICCL members we currently address all of the issues identified in our onboard procedures.
See ICCL website for more information.
.1
Our craft carry pharmaceuticals to United Kingdom Category C Doctor’s Bag Scale VII.
.2
The majority of the crew are first aid trained and the craft are always within a short
distance of assistance.
.3
Craft are always within VHF range and normally even within range of mobile phone
networks.
.4
Due to the above there are no designated medical facilities on board.
.1
Minimum levels of medical equipment – insufficient for everyday medical emergencies.
.2
Every crew should have a number of medical first responders. Regular refresher courses
are required.
.3
Communications are generally seen to be good.
.4
Ship’s hospital adequate. Secondary hospital and medical stocks seen as cost-prohibitive.
.1
The pharmaceuticals carried on board which comply with the medical scales are
generally speaking adequate for the requirements. One piece of equipment which is not included
in the medical scales and which is now becoming increasingly common in industry ashore is the
heart defibrillator. In order to be qualified and remain so however a refresher course is
required annually. Such a piece of equipment would be extremely useful on a passenger vessel.
.2
Though the Pursers and some senior catering ratings on board undertake a ‘First
Responders’ course which is of a good standard there is, like the Ship Master’s Medical course,
no requirement for this course to be revalidated. The Ship Master’s Medical course in the
United Kingdom and Ireland is only 3 days long and is not very extensive in its scope or syllabus.
In the past there was provision for candidates on this course to receive some hands-on training
but this is no longer the case, leaving the course very theoretical. It would be a good idea for
these elements to be reintroduced.
.3
Shore based medical facilities do not seem to have kept pace with the advances in
telecommunications and technology which are available on board a modern ship; eg, advice by
e-mail – this would be of particular advantage in certain medical conditions where a photograph
showing a medical problem or the scan of an ECG trace could be e-mailed ashore for analysis –
or the availability to shipping of websites (or the provision of CD-ROMs) containing medical
advice or information on drugs.
.4
Complying with the legal requirements only.
We are currently developing a triage system for dealing with casualties. The company has a prerecorded tape to seek medical assistance from passengers: with 2000 passengers, doctors / nurses
will always come forward. The company also has a central computer register of trained staff and
a contingency plan for Pursers’ management of a multi-casualty incident. Medical advice and
diagnosis is available via Satcom / internet / dedicated link.
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The ships have a First Aid Room equipped according to regulations. A Doctor’s bag is held at the
Information Office should the First Aid Room be lost.
The ships have recently been equipped with defibrillators. Medical / pharmaceutical provisions
are sufficient for the trade without being excessive.
As regards large cruise ships all the above medical issues are well covered at present by
operating companies, and are ahead of statutory requirements.
Consideration should be given to adopting the ICCL medical standards.
.1
The standard medical outfit on large passenger ships needs to be augmented by additional
medicines for paediatric purposes.
.2
Existing STCW95 requirements are adequate subject to effective refresher training.
.3
Existing modern telecommunications systems are sufficient to obtain specific medical
advice. So-called telemedicine devices do not appreciably enhance diagnosis and treatment.
Secondary medical facilities: the only reason for loss of the primary facilities would be fire, so
secondary equipment should be limited to appropriate facilities to cater for fire victims, eg
bandages, splints, resuscitator, burns dressings.
ICCL member companies already have comprehensive Guidelines. The nature of the equipment
and personnel used are adequate for the needs. We already have a secondary medical centre,
with suitable standby equipment. We use UK Standards for Personnel, Pharmaceuticals, and
Hospital Standards.
7
The group has been tasked to consider “the ability and capability of ships to handle a large
number of persons from large passenger ships”; ie, what problems arise in ships of any type
when acting as additional SAR facilities and required to embark large numbers of rescued
people?
Please comment.
HSC:
When on passenger service these vessels are able to handle a significant number of persons and
deliver rapidly to a nearby port, the facilities available would be dependent on number of own
passengers carried. Potential problems are twofold: endurance and medical facilities. The first is
a factor of the stage in the vessels voyage from its base, or refuelling, port. Endurance will vary
between 10 hours to as little as one hour. The second problem is the lack of medical facilities
and medical staff to deal with any casualties. There are no dedicated treatment facilities only a
designated treatment area. Of the ship’s complement, with the exception of the Master and Chief
Officer both of whom are likely to be otherwise occupied, only the Cabin Manager is qualified to
Management of Medical Care (MMC) standard, with the remainder only first aid trained.
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When on delivery voyage HSC complements of 11 to 12 persons do not include any cabin staff.
While seating for a large number of passengers is available food and in particular water (max
5 tonnes) would cause problems within the first 24 hours.
Control of a large number of survivors would also stretch crew resources.
Ro-pax:
A significant number could be embarked for a short period, dependent on own passenger load,
catering resources would be stretched but could cope. With no doctor or nurse embarked
medical resources would be stretched although passenger cabins could be requisitioned.
Ro-ro:
Crew of only 21 would be stretched and very limited additional accommodation available.
Master and Chief Officer only crew with MMC course; others probably only basic first aid
trained. Food/water should be adequate for a short stay (<12 hrs).
Most suitable option appears to be another passenger ship or a warship (especially Amphibious
Warfare vessels) or Auxiliaries, or the diversion of a fully crewed and fuelled HSC with no
passengers.
The numbers involved in a major incident would overwhelm most other ship types.
following are just some of the issues:
The
•
Lack of public spaces and facilities
•
Provisions
•
Lack of crew to assist
•
Lack of blankets and warm clothing
•
Lack of know-how to handle large numbers of persons
•
Lack of medical personnel
•
For large cruise ships and ro-pax the best assistance would be from other similar ship
types.
Of course the best situation is to not have to evacuate in the first place.
Our vessels are currently certificated for 420 passengers but have in the past been capable of
carrying 600 passengers. Therefore even if on passage they should be capable of embarking
extra people in an emergency.
If used as an additional SAR facility, a large number of persons could be embarked. However,
due to the nature of our service, the range of operation is restricted due to the limited amount of
bunker space available.
Fresh water supply would also be very limited.
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Most ships are unable to cope with a large number of survivors and may only be able to offer
shelter and very limited medical treatment.
Large ferries such as our own could easily cope. The problem would be in embarking large
numbers from survival craft: the ship is totally unsuitable for such an operation.
There would be no particular problems in handling large numbers of casualties from another
large passenger vessel with the exception of the boarding arrangement. Our boarding
arrangements would be as follows:
•
Transfers from helicopters. In our case this would involve winching which would be
slower than if the helicopter could actually land as the deck is not reinforced and the
ship side hand rails are not collapsible. Smaller helicopters could be landed in dire
circumstances.
•
FRC & MoR combination;
•
Reception of casualties onto the car deck via the pilot door & ladder;
•
Reception of casualties via the stern ramp. (This would require ideal weather
conditions.) This method was actually employed by mv ST PATRICK II to receive
casualties from mv SALLY ALBATROSS in the Baltic. The casualties actually walked
across ice and boarded over the stern ramp.
In the ferry sector there would normally be other ferries in the locality to receive survivors.
The host ferry would clear a lounge or lounges of her own passengers to create a segregated
reception facility for survivors.
Deep sea ships would not make suitable reception for large numbers of survivors, because of the
difficulty of recovering passengers and the lack of warm, dry lounges.
Vessels with the advantage of low freeboard access would be suitable for receiving limited
numbers.
But it generally requires passenger-carrying vessels to provide a safe refuge for large numbers of
people. Other vessel types may be suitable for numbers of 100 or less.
As a cruise ship operator we could accommodate a large number of persons.
Problems other ships would encounter are:
•
•
•
•
medication
sanitation
heat / sun protection
warmth (supply of blankets, etc)
It would be inappropriate to require all ships to cater for such an infrequent event. Coastal States
should be equipped with survivor recovery packs to be helicoptered to ships.
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Problems are lack of space, lack of shelter, lack of food (both in terms of reserve stores and
cooking facilities) and water, lack of toilet facilities, lack of medical facilities, lack of
communications ability and capacity.
8
The group has been tasked to “identify and evaluate the communications equipment and
practices affecting SAR operations, specifically addressing:
.1
contingency planning;
.2
communication and locating capability between survival craft and SAR
services;
.3
ship reporting and distress alert routing;
.4
compatibility between SAR resources (aircraft, vessel, survival craft, etc).”
Please comment.
.1
Contingency Planning
Planning conducted by means of regular meeting with operators and co-ordination of plans with
SAR authorities in countries/regions bordering the route.
Co-ordination plan in standard format produced by operator and issued to SAR authorities.
Copies of SAR authorities’ co-ordination plan held by operator.
SAR co-ordination meetings attended by Operator’s management and seminars hosted by SAR
authorities attended by senior deck officers.
Company internal Crisis Management exercises held, in addition to exercises involving external
agencies, to test Company Crisis Management Plan and co-ordination plans of SAR authorities
and other agencies.
Senior Officers trained in Crisis Management and Human Behaviour and all staff trained in
Crowd Control.
Exercise communication carefully briefed before exercises and including VHF/UHF Sat C/ Sat
M, GSM & landline telephone, and intranet. Clearly specifying “exercise name” prefix and
avoiding recognised distress numbers/frequencies.
.2
Communication and location capability between survival craft and SAR services
Current methods include hand held VHF radio (up to 6), and “airband” VHF (1), carriage of
EPIRB (1 or 2) and SART (2). With the exception of the VHF radios, which are more widely
distributed, the control of the above remains with senior officers.
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In addition to statutory requirements, when in range a number of GSM mobile telephones are
carried by the vessel, the numbers of which are included in the Crisis Management plan. The
Master’s mobile has a designated hands free kit. It is likely that a number of other private
mobile telephones would be carried by passengers and crew members and use should be
co-ordinated by the person in charge of the survival craft.
In addition during HSC delivery voyages the vessel carries a Satellite Mobile telephone with
worldwide coverage.
There are also the non-radio communication devices such as flares, heliograph lights and
whistles currently included in the survival craft for use in the final stages of the rescue.
Proposals for the inclusion of SARTS in ALL survival craft should be resisted as the profusion of
paints on a SAR vessel’s radar from numerous sources are likely to confuse rather than aid the
searching vessel. An increase above the current number to, for example, 4 might be useful in
spreading this asset in case of loss of either of the current units.
.3
Ship reporting and distress alert routing
Ship reporting systems when properly co-ordinated are invaluable. The goal should be a single
system for vessels on worldwide voyages rather than a profusion of national and regional
systems. Messages to such a system should be forwarded free of charge to the originator. VTS
system reporting will be facilitated by the introduction of AIS, which should be extended to all
but the smallest cargo vessels.
Current distress alert routing procedures are deemed to be adequate, but would be facilitated by
a worldwide ship reporting system.
.4
Compatibility between SAR resources (aircraft, vessel, survival craft, etc)
Vessel and aircraft SAR assets are still largely unable to communicate unless the aircraft is fitted
with VHF 16 or the vessel is a passenger vessel capable of transmitting on 121.5 or 243 Mhz.
Increased fitting of SAR assets, and military aircraft, with VHF 16 or MF/HF DSC could be
considered. Listening watch on VHF 16 for all vessels should be maintained indefinitely for
communication with survival craft
The current regulatory framework and guidelines in force from National Administrations and
other industry bodies are generally adequate. Some problems occur with communication
between small rescue units that are distanced from the SAR Co-ordinator.
.1
Our parent company has submitted SAR co-operation plans for each vessel. Full details
of Safety and Firefighting Plans for the vessels are held by the local MRCCs.
Seminars have been held at the local MRCC with officers from our vessels and other local ferries
to improve understanding of facilities and resources available between the ship and the SAR
service.
.2
As the vessels are always within VHF range of VTS stations, VHF communication and
consequent location of survival craft is always possible.
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.3
As above, our vessels’ position is always tracked by the VTS stations.
.4
Always within VHF contact, so no problem.
.1
With the exception of short-sea service, contingency planning would be minimal.
.2
FRCs with portable VHFs, radio transponders & SARTs, and searchlight.
.3
Ship reporting & distress alerting is not a problem on short-sea routes.
.4
Compatibility between SAR resources for large numbers of survivors considered
inadequate even in relatively enclosed waters.
.1
Contingency planning is ship-specific.
.2
The requirement of only 3 handheld VHF radios is felt very little considering there are 6
lifeboats, 1 FRC, and 70 rafts on board this vessel. Surely the requirement should be VHF
radios in at least all motorised survival craft. The number of EPIRBs and SARTs required to be
carried is also considered low, granted that an EPIRB can be installed in a watch and can cost
as little as €100.
.3
The reporting procedures which we have in place at the moment are felt to be adequate,
with the crew and passenger list kept ashore whilst the vessel is at sea. In addition the crew and
passenger numbers are reported to the nearest coast radio station after sailing, along with the
ETA for the next port.
.4
The only comment which we have regarding compatibility between SAR resources is that
it has been experienced that some SAR helicopters encountered on exercises do not have the air
band frequencies programmed on the vessel’s air band radio[4]. Communications with the
helicopter are also difficult due to noise. The radio we have at the moment has no facility for
attaching a headset.
.1
Our company has a dedicated emergency telephone line to the Duty Operations Manager
(staffed 24/365), which activates the Emergency Contingency Plan.
.2
The ship deploys SARTs & VHF radios & air band radios to survival craft.
.3
The ships are equipped with secure digital Satcoms to the office for management support.
.4
The ships are normally within cellphone and VHF range of local MRCCs.
[A cruise ship operator:] Currently considered satisfactory.
4
This may be a misunderstanding. If only distress frequencies are programmed on the ship’s air band radio, these
cannot be used for exercise traffic.
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Our own [ferry] experience shows that:
•
current equipment works well (GMDSS false alarms excepted)
•
updates of [United Kingdom] SAR service communications equipment and
Operations Room facilities have proved to be beneficial.
.1
Contingency planning on cruise ships is well developed, from necessity and as required
by the ISM Code. The current form of the SAR Plan is adequate for current needs. More plans
would serve no purpose and would just lead to more bureaucracy and the risk that they will not
be updated.
.2
There is no real experience of this on cruise ships. Operational experience would
indicate that a VHF radio in all survival craft would be a step forward, even though there is a
risk of channels becoming blocked.
9
The group has been tasked to consider “whether contingency planning is adequate,
including re-supply and recovery”. This is, again, in the context of search and rescue. If a
passenger ship has to be evacuated, or is involved in some other emergency, are the systems
and procedures in place to deal with the incident in all areas in which the ship trades?
Please comment.
Operators’ contingency planning already covers their responsibilities in this area and exercises
have shown that this difficult area is not to be underestimated. The regeneration of the
substantial assets, particularly in terms of trained senior personnel, committed early to an
operation needs careful consideration if the operation is not to be severely degraded after a
relatively short time. Regular and realistic exercises to verify planning assumptions and to
evaluate responses to such matters are required.
From involvement in planning in our area of operations if a passenger ship has to be evacuated,
or is involved in some other emergency, the resources are in place from the operators and the
British and French SAR and other authorities to deal with the incident. It would however require
all the resources of all the parties involved and considerable co-operation and mutual support.
In other areas of the world there must be serious doubt as to the outcome.
As noted in the question this is entirely dependent upon area.
Current communication technologies can ensure that the vessel’s operators are aware of the
situation, but many areas may not be able to provide resources. The ship is its own best lifeboat
is the solution.
For this reason perhaps the best way to address the issue is for ships that operate in remote areas
to be able to demonstrate that they have adequate redundancy in their design for all foreseeable
eventualities.
As our vessels only trade on short sea routes, they are only a short distance from a ‘home’ port.
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As good as can be expected in this local area.
Our trading route is well covered by SAR facilities. The opportunity for vessels to participate in
large-scale exercises is seen as profitable for all concerned. Additionally the occasional
unscheduled winching operations with SAR helicopters whilst on routine training missions are
reassuring.
The contingency procedures adopted in the SAR Co-operation Plans are a good general guide to
such operations.
Company, local authorities and SAR service all have detailed contingency plans. These are
tested together and updated on a regular basis.
It is unlikely that the facilities are available to deal with a large number of evacuated persons in
many areas of the world. This supports the view that the primary item to consider is making the
ship as safe as possible.
Can only comment for North Sea where now adequate.
It is not logical to expect that the same level of SAR response is available worldwide. However
this needs to be kept in context, since the same applies to aircraft as well. What is important is to
have the response plans in place and the ability for the passengers and crew to survive in a
suitable ‘craft’ until assistance can arrive.
10
The group has been tasked to consider “whether there are any other techniques or
requirements a coastal State can reasonably employ to reduce the potential SAR effort
caused by a large passenger ship operating in an area remote from SAR facilities”.
Please comment.
Most areas remote from SAR facilities are likely to be outside the territorial waters of the coastal
State and legal restrictions on the passenger vessel’s movements would therefore be difficult.
Some specific routeing restrictions / recommended routes might well be appropriate for large
passenger vessels in certain areas: these would preferably be agreed in consultation with the
operators rather than imposed.
In some cases the significant advance notice available from the planning of the voyages of such
vessels could be used for the forward deployment of SAR resources. This could involve the
escorting of the large passenger vessel, seeking co-operation in attempting to co-ordinate the
movements of such vessels to offer mutual support, or the positioning of the coastal State’s SAR
assets, including military resources, depending on the overall perceived risk at various locations
at certain times.
On our ship we are fortunate to enjoy the coverage of a large SAR umbrella over our trading
pattern. However, for vessels operating in remote areas, the idea that prevention is always better
than cure must be adopted. To this end Port and Flag State inspections are the most important
method of ensuring standards are maintained.
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A process of risk analysis could be undertaken on each vessel depending on its trading pattern
and in doing so permitted parameters of operation could be imposed. Perhaps restricting the
passenger complement of vessels operating in certain remote locations in certain weather
conditions at certain times of the year. By reviewing all variables a matrix could be devised to
assist the Master in making his decision regarding sailing in such areas.
The installation of helidecks capable of handling large long-range helicopters could also be made
mandatory for vessels trading in remote locations.
11
Please make any additional comments, suggestions and recommendations.
Fire at sea is one of the major risks to the safety of lives and likely causes of evacuation of a
passenger vessel. External fire fighting assistance could be the vital difference between the
evacuation of the vessel and all remaining aboard. Currently the United Kingdom, for example,
does not require [shore-side] Fire Brigades to provide offshore fire fighting support [although
some do so voluntarily].
The provision of such support should be reconsidered as a matter of urgency, ideally through
each Brigade but if not by some alternative arrangement, military or civilian, in order to provide
cover in all areas.
As a short sea operator, many of the issues raised in this questionnaire are not a problem to us.
The SAR seminars we have attended were of great interest and hopefully useful to all parties.
Realistic training should include an exercise using two working ferries with volunteer
passengers. A full scale evacuation and rescue should be practised in moderate / rough sea
conditions.
We have noted that, from recent experience, so-called assistance from shore agencies other than
the SAR service tends towards interference and consequential delay.
____________
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