May 9, 2014
Number 15
U.S. Supreme Court
Upholds Religious Prayer at City Council Meetings
On May 5, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway.
The Court ruled that opening prayers at city council meetings do not violate the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, even if they routinely stress Christianity.
Beginning in 1999, the Town of Greece followed an informal method to select prayer givers.
The town contacted clergy listed in a local directory and invited them to lead the pre-board
meeting prayers, maintaining that a minister or layperson of any belief, including atheism, could
give the invocation. Over an eleven-year span, the meetings were opened with a Christianoriented prayer. In 2008, after residents Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained, four
of twelve meetings were opened by non-Christians.
Unsatisfied, Galloway and Stephens sued the town, arguing it had violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause. In support of their argument, the respondents identified
some prayers that referred to Jesus. They sought an injunction to limit the town to “inclusive and
ecumenical” prayers that referred only to a “generic god.”
The district court upheld the town’s practice as consistent with the First Amendment. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that – viewed in its
totality – aspects of the town’s prayer program conveyed the message that the town was
endorsing Christianity over other religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Consistent with Marsh v. Chambers, a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court case upholding an opening
prayer in the Nebraska legislature, the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision. The Court
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held that the Town of Greece’s practice of opening its monthly town board meetings with
religious prayer does not constitute an impermissible establishment of religion.
The Court explained that “[t]he inclusion of a brief, ceremonial prayer as part of a larger exercise
in civic recognition suggests that its purpose and effect are to acknowledge religious leaders and
the institutions they represent, rather than to exclude or coerce nonbelievers.” Other factors in
showing that the town did not violate the Establishment Clause included the religious makeup of
the town’s congregations and the fact that the town was willing to allow a person of any faith to
deliver the prayer.
The Court cautions, though, that coercion could be possible “if town board members directed the
public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their
decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”
The full opinion is available here.
TML member cities may use the material herein for any purpose. No other
person or entity may reproduce, duplicate, or distribute any part of this
document without the written authorization of the Texas Municipal
League.
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