FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING AND THE US USE OF FORCE: DIEN
BIEN PHU, 1954 AND GRENADA, 1983
Karl R. DeRouen Jr.
Dept. of Political Science
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4348
Bitnet [email protected]
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, May,
1993, Kingston, Jamaica.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is to develop a revised theory of the use of force, and to apply this revised theory to
two separate US foreign policy crises. This revised theory provides an alternative to the ensconced realist model which
holds that domestic politics stop at the water's edge, and that decision makers are fully rational actors.
A common practice in recent studies on the use of force is to claim to address presidential decision making,
however this claim is largely unjustified (e.g., Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger 1992; Meernik 1992). With such a lack of
focus on actual decision making theory, we have yet to arrive at a fully specified alternative to the rational actor model
espoused in realist explanations of the use of force. In other words we have yet to tap motivations and processes.
While James and Oneal (1991) and Oneal and Lian (1992a, 1992b) went a long way in improving the innovative
work of Ostrom and Job (1986), the cybernetic model still only superficially captures the actual motivations and
perceptions surrounding decision making. The case studies here are designed to highlight the relevance of domestic
politics to uses of force. While I agree with Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) that domestic politics
play a role, I believe that these scholars have understated that role, and failed to offer substantive theory. Their findings
suggest that domestic factors need only have ancillary relevance, while the noncompensatory model developed here holds
that domestic politics are a sine qua non (see Mintz and Geva 1992). Below I summarize decision making theories from
their origin in microeconomics, to the noncompensatory theory of the use of force. It makes sense that if we are going to
criticize realism by attacking its reliance on the rational actor model, we should trace the decision making literature from
its origins in classic rationality, to the cognitive revolution fueled by the likes of Simon, Snyder, and Steinbruner. I also
provide two case studies in which the noncompensatory model is shown to have obtained.
AN OVERVIEW OF DECISION MAKING THEORIES
Early work in decision making was in economics and public administration where actors were presupposed to be
in possession of rationality, knowledge of all possible alternatives and their outcomes, and a hierarchically ranked
outcome preference scheme (Robinson and Snyder 1965, 437-438). These cardinal assumptions were first called into
question by Herbert Simon (1958, 1959, 1961, 1985) and a group centered around Richard Snyder (Snyder 1958; Snyder
and Robinson 1961; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Snyder and Paige 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965). Later
criticisms and alternatives to rationality have primarily been provided by Axelrod (1976), Braybrooke and Lindblom
(1963), Halperin (1974), Jervis (1976), and Steinbruner (1974).
The two broad categories of decision making are the compensatory/linear and the noncompensatory. The former
is additive and a low score on one dimension can be compensated for by a high score on another dimension, while the
latter is non-additive and depends upon decision heuristics to deal with the cybernetic nature of the process. A heuristic
is simply a 'cognitive shortcut' used by individuals to simplify choices when, as is usually the case, information is
limited (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 19). The noncompensatory model(s) is an example of a heuristic.
Compensatory processes are generally marked by interdimensional searches using a constant amount of information per
alternative (Billings and Marcus 1983, 333). The additive difference model is an exception (see Mintz 1993). The
compensatory model is alternative-based as all dimensions of an alternative are considered before moving on to another
alternative (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 536). It will be instructive at this point to look more closely at the
specification of the main decision making models as they may be applied to the use of force.
Compensatory models. There are presently two main approaches applied to assess decisions to use force from a
compensatory perspective: the expected utility and cybernetic approaches. The former relies upon classical rationality to
deduce formal mathematic equations and is holistic in that it considers all alternatives, while the latter exploits bounded
rationality and satisficing and is nonholistic in that alternatives are sequentially eliminated. When there is more than one
independent variable, this model specification allows for compensation between dimensions. Since the variables are
added, a low score on one variable will not necessarily preclude the use of force. This is consonant with the rational
actor paradigm in which decison makers make detailed assessments of costs and benefits. Subsequently, decision makers
in the rational actor paradigm are fully prepared to think in terms of trade-offs by comparing costs and benefits (Kinder
and Weiss 1977, 708; Lebow 1981, 101). Below I briefly trace the linkages of expected utility theory to the classic
rationality, and the cybernetic approach to bounded rationality.
There is an abundance of foreign policy decision making research done from the classical rational perspective.
Allison (1971), Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990, 1992), Frankel (1963), Niou and
Ordeshook (1986, 1987), Powell (1987) and Putnam (1988), to name but a few, proceed from the rationality assumption.
The realist approach clings to the tenets of rationality including states as unitary actors with a set of well-identified
interests, cost-benefit calculation for each alternative, interest maximization, and transitivity of interests (Levy 1989b,
224-225; see also Singer and Hudson 1992). Realism also considers factors such as the balance of power, defense
spending and other strategic considerations at the expense of domestic and political factors. Subsequently, analysts are
only afforded insight into the necessary conditions for the use of force (Mintz 1993).
Steiner (1983, 376) summarized the classic rational actor model of decision making:
"Decision-makers consruct an explicit causal model of the policy-making environment,
using logical analysis and empirical inquiry. They are open to refining the model
as additional information becomes available. When preparing to make a decision, they
identify the consequences that the courses of action they are contemplating will
produce on the basis of the understanding of the environment their causal model
provides. They then assess the outcomes...carefully measuring and comparing
the costs and benefits attached to the alternative policies. By
this approach they identify and select optimal courses of ac tion... ."
Another way of looking at the rational decision maker is as a utility maximizer. The viewpoint is initialized at
the assumption that "there is a single homogeneous good, utility, that is present in all actually desired ends, and that an
increased amount of any end brings with it an increased amount of utility, at a steadily diminishing rate" (Snyder and
Diesing 1977, 340). The utility assumptions ultimately distill down to the assumptions of the marginal comparabiltiy of
goods, infinite calculating ability, and omniscience (Snyder and Diesing 1987, 341). Thus the rational decision-maker
chooses from among a well-defined and mutually exclusive set of alternatives, the alternative that maximizes utility by
comparing alternatives with (presumed) enough expertise to be sure the correct alternative was chosen.
For Allison (1971, 30), rationality is "...the consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints."
Allison's rational or classical model entails some rather strict assumptions. For instance, the nation as actor has one set
of goals, one set of options, and one estimate of the consequences of each alternative. The payoffs or consequences of
each alternative are ranked a priori in terms of the decision maker's values and objectives. The decision maker chooses
an alternative "whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives" (1971, 33). In other words, the
actor will seek to maximize the value of his or her selection based on the a priori preference ordering. If the costs
attached to a certain alternative increase either as a result of a decrease in the perceived value of the alternative or a
decrease in the perceived probability of attaining the outcome, then the chances of selecting that alternative is reduced.
The opposite also holds true (1971, 34). Allison's rational actor paradigm, by stating a few simple assumptions, purports
to explain a wide variety of actions (1971, 30-31).
The expected utility approach of Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Bueno de Mesquite and Lalman (1990, 1992)
uses axiomatically-derived formal equations to characterize the decision to go to war. Expected utility is grounded in
several assumptions such as unitary rational actor, preference ordering, and utility maximization. The expected utility
approach is an alternative-based decision process because each of the dimensions of every alternative must be compared
so that trade-offs between alternatives can be performed. The approach concentrates on foreign policy choices resulting
from rational calculations of national leaders (Bueno de Mesquite n.d., 6-7). The authors provided a much more sophisticated formal conception of the additive compensatory model of decisions to use force. The international interactions
game that the authors axiomatically derive is used to assess the costs/benefit determinations decision makers are said to
practice. The leader in the game is cognizant of domestic political considerations, but such factors can be overshadowed
by favorable accountings on say, the strategic or military dimension. There are several strict assumptions embedded
within the international interactions game (see Bueno de Mesquita n.d., 15-16). For example, it is assumed that all
nations prefer to resolve differences through negotiation rather than war. However, the recent Saddam Hussein's
unwillingness to negotiate with the US in 1991 clearly contradicts this assumption. The game also purports to assign
values to costs depending on the location of the conflict, whether or not the state is the initiator or the target, and
depending on the domestic costs, which are said to be always greater than zero. It is this final assumption that I find
troublesome as there appear to have been many cases in which uses of force have led to domestic political windfall. This
gets at the heart of the present study. I argue that the president, savvy politician, will not attempt uses of force short of
war when such costs would be detrimental to political status.
The expected utility of the above equation is then compared to that of the other options of capitulation,
negotiation and acquiescence. The model is additive and compensatory as the equation is halved and one half can
compensate for the other. Also, within each half of the equation high political costs can be compensated for by high
utility from gaining demands.
Thus the Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman formulation differs from those who argue that US leaders are sometimes willing to use force in order to boost public opinion or divert attention from domestic troubles by insisting that
uses of force are always considered foreign policy failures by domestic constituencies. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
(1992, 46, fn. 4) contradict the core "rally 'round the flag" tenet that uses of force must be decisive and quick if they
are to elicit diversion and/or a rally effect by assuming that domestic costs are actually greater for stronger nations.
Their point is that stronger countries are seen as "bullies" when attacking weaker countries, and therefore there is a
greater burden on the former to find peaceful resolutions.
The usefulness of expected utility theory is evident when the elegant mathematics of the theory capture decisions
to use force. Expected utility generates results that can be interpreted in terms of standard conflict parameters. For
example, expected utility theory can be used to gain substantive insight into the role alliances play within both balance of
power, and power transition theories. That is, the expected utility captures these two theories by explaining what a third
party will do when confronted by an ongoing conflict (see Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
1986).
Another treatment of the compensatory decision process was provided by Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and
Oneal (1991). These versions differ from the expected utility approach in that satisficing behavior is subsumed within a
cybernetic framework consisting of three specific dimensions. The literature from which the cybernetic model is drawn is
particularly rich and is considered below in some detail.
As mentioned, the classic model of rational decision making was first challenged by Herbert Simon (1958,
1959, 1961, 1978, 1985). Rational maximization of interests is acceptable in "slow-moving situations where the actor has
a single, operational goal," but in more complex situations rational explanations are inadequate (Simon 1959, 279).
Simon formulated a model in which the decision maker did not necessarily exhibit optimizing, but rather, satisficing
behavior. That is, since information costs are high, decision makers evaluate the possible alternatives and accept the first
one that meets a certain minimum requirement. Simon's satisficing, or bounded-rationality model is derived from
psychology where drives continue until satisfied and biology where humans are limited in their capacity to compare and
calculate (Simon 1959, 262-3; Steiner 1983, 376). Classical economic theory does not allow for such satiation - rather
firms must maximize, or risk losing out to those that do (Simon 1959, 263). Satisficing models are richer than
maximizing models because they capture equilibrium, as well as how that equilibrium was reached (Simon 1959, 263).
In contradistinction to the objective rationality of economics, the bounded rationality models can best be termed
procedural in nature (Simon 1985, 294). This is because these models capture both the limitations of the actor in terms
of cognitive abilities, and external constraints. To determine the procedurally rational alternative the actor's goals, the
information, and conceptualization the actor has of the situation must all be known. The nature of the external environment need not be known. Cognitive psychology best exemplifies the research done from within the bounded rationality
paradigm.
Simon's bounded rationality model has given rise to several theories of decision making. Notable among these
scholars are first the Snyder group (Snyder 1958; Snyder and Robinson 1961; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Snyder
and Paige 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965), and later Axelrod (1976), Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), Steinbruner
(1974) and Jervis (1976).
The Snyder group extended foreign policy decision making beyond the narrow confines of rationality and looked
at it as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The group posited an array of categories each consisting of various
dimensions. They arrived at three major factors that explain decision outcomes: 1) the occasion for the decision; 2) the
individual decision-maker; and 3) the organizational environment (Snyder and Robinson 1961; Robinson and Snyder
1965, 439-456). These three components are the essential theme of the group's socio-psychological research agenda.
The occasion for decision concept is also broken down along three dimensions (Robinson and Snyder 1965,
440-443). First, whether or not the situation can be anticipated or not is relevant to the resources used, reaction time
and, ultimately, the outcome. The individual characteristics of the decision-maker, i.e. the psychological component of
the model, are also important determinants of the outcome. In particular, they identify personality characteristics, social
background and experiences, and personal values to be the ingredients that feed into psychological influences on decision
making Finally, the organizational context is deemed important because it provides the social system in which decisions
are made. Some of the relevant factors organizational environments provide are objectives, authority and control,
motivation, communication, divisions of labor, internal specialization, and routinization (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962,
88-89).
The Snyder three-pronged approach is an improvement over models which only consider organizational,
intellectual, or functional variables (e.g., Simon 1962). The group's work does not assume rationality on the grounds
that most models perceive of rationality as it pertains to the individual decision-maker, and not the organization.
Therefore rationality must be "discovered rather than presumed* because it is uncertain how the concept will fit into a
socio-psychological approach. The socio-psychological approach then seeks answers to questions such as:
*what rules for rational behavior are prescribed by the organization?
are these rules attached to roles, or do they result from socialization
of the individual policy-maker? are the rules different for different decisional units within the total structure? and how are the rules and
their applied consequences affected by organizational processes of reaching
decisions?* (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 8)
As we will see below, each of the questions identified by the group is relevant to a full understanding of foreign policy
decision making. In particular, the psychological and bureaucratic aspects of foreign policy decision making identified by
the group have been fertile grounds for research.
Alexander George (1980) attached import to the images and beliefs of the policy makers. George is a proponent
of multiple advocacy models of decision-making and a broader information processing paradigm. The multiple advocacy
model, like the bureaucratic model, posits a loose decision structure with the executive moderating a diversity of views.
The central element of the model is that the president, wanting to ensure that no decisions are reached before a policy
leaves a department through a purely internal bargaining process, uses a "mixed system" approach in which he advocates
competition between agencies (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472-473). The president then chooses from among
several policy options which have been openly debated by various agencies. If the president does not approach policy in
this way, he risks missing out on certain policy options that have been discounted internally before they can reach the
top decision level.
The multiple advocacy model of the executive best obtains when three conditions are met: 1) intellectual
(information, competence, technical support) and bureaucratic (bargaining skills, status, power) resources are evenly
distributed; 2) the president actively monitors the multiple advocacy process; and 3) there is adequate time for debate
and bargaining (George 1980, 194).
Information processing is derived from the cognitive psychology literature (see also Snyder and Diesing 1977,
ch. 4). Simply put, recent scholarly efforts in cognitive theory imply that man is a problem solver and an information
5
processor - not simply a "passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli" (George 1980, 56). Like Simon
(1958, 1961, 1985), George plays off of cognitive psychology to relax the standard narrow assumptions of the
decision-maker as a rational utility maximizer. There are several central principles from cognitive psychology that are
directly applicable to information processing (George 1980, 56-57). One is the fundamental role played by beliefs and
images. Individuals develop beliefs and use them to organize and simplify environmental stimuli. Also, the beliefs are
relatively stable over time, and as a result, new information is adjusted so as to be more compatible with beliefs and
images. This does not mean that "discrepant" information will not be realized for its utility content.
The cybernetic decision making model of Steinbruner (1974) offers a cognitive substitute to the rational or
analytic model (Steiner 1983, 373). Steinbruner noted that the analytic paradigm is a powerful one, but it has limitations.
Some actions cannot be easily accounted for with rational explanations. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and the Egyptian advances on Israel in 1967 seem to defy rationality (Steinbruner 1974, 47). The cybernetic
paradigm is designed to address these seemingly complex and counterintuitive decision processes.
This is the logic employed by Ostrom and Job (1986) in their cybernetic model. The decision maker simplifies
the process by organizing the information along three dimensions and sequentially eliminating alternatives. The
cybernetic decision maker filters out extraneous information, and only focuses upon a narrow range of incoming
information. With only a few options available, the cybernetic approach takes on the appearance of a programmed
response.
The Ostrom and Job model assumes that the decision maker creates a composite index with the three dimensions
which greatly simplifies the decision environment. The model is compensatory because trade-offs occur and the three
dimensions are combined additively. This is an alternative-based compensatory model as the alternative which scores
highest across the composite index is the one with the greatest probability of being chosen.
Cybernetic decision making centers around the minimization of uncertainty through
information feedback loops (Steinbruner 1974, 51). The rational framework largely ignores uncertainty as it assumes that
'the range of possible outcomes is known, and thereby eliminates the
possibility that an outcome might occur which was not even visualized
in advance. It assumes that [the] rules [of the game] are specified and stable.
For complex problems neither of these assumptions can be held."
(Steinbruner 1974, 18)
Steinbruner (1974, 18) labels the attempts at forcing a structure on complex situations structural uncertainty. The
cybernetic approach is needed because decision makers lack the fundamental cognitive skills needed to carry out the
. - rational schema during the structural uncertainty-laden policy problems of our time (Steiner 1983, 423). The cybernetic
paradigm precludes the need to calculate optimal procedures and alternatives based on preferred outcomes by eliminating
alternatives and ignoring the environment and the issue of variety (Steinbruner 1974, 56-57).
Cybernetics dovetails with the satisficing principle of Simon when complex decisions are considered (Steinbruner 1974, 62-74). Simon (1957) suggested that decisions be conceptualized as a sequential process in which a range of
possible outcomes, each with a separate value, are examined until an acceptable alternative is found. This differs from
the rational paradigm which posits that the process is simply a !natter of choosing from among the various utility
functions, the one with the greatest amount, while allowing for trade-offs. Alternatives are less distinct in the rational
model.
Summarizing, the compensatory models, as exemplified by the cybernetic and expected utility approaches, share
the central feature that low scores on one dimension cannot be compensated for by high scores on others. For example,
the potentially high political costs of a use of force can be compensated for by the perceived military/national security
benefits. These models are alternative-based as they entail evaluating each dimension of an alternative before going to the
next alternative, and a constant amount of time spent on each alternative (Billings and Marcus 1983). Compensatory
models are concerned with finding maximizing alternatives (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen, forthcoming).
c-
Noncompensatory models. Dawes (1964, 108) identified the key distinction between the linear compensatory and
nonlinear noncompensatory models of decision making. The former, he asserted, is based on a pre-weighting of decision
dimensions. Decisions are rigidly based upon the decision maker's needs, and not scores along various dimensions. For
example, a football player's ability to kick may not be as important in the decision to select him as the extent to which
the team needs or does not need a kicker is. The latter, however, is more sophisticated as it takes into consideration
scores along various dimensions. For example, the decision on whether or not to select a certain kicker will be based
upon how good he is and whether kicking is his best talent, whether he can throw or not, etc. In other words, the
noncompensatory model is dimension-based in that a differing amount of time and effort is spent in evaluating
alternatives based on an interactive use of dimensions. The noncompensatory model is heuristic because it uses cognitive
shortcuts in the form of decision rules to simplify the evaluation of dimensions using nonconstant information and time.
The process is simplified by sequentially eliminating alternatives which do not meet a certain threshold using one or a
few criteria, as opposed to the compensatory processes which entail the comparison of all alternatives across dimensions
(Mintz 1993). I argue here that this criteria is domestic politics. It is at this juncture that the noncompensatory model has
relevance for the revised diversionary theory, for the president is unlikely to select any alternative in which the political
dimension is not satisfied for fear of political repercussions. Whereas compensatory models find maximizing alternatives,
noncompensatory models find acceptable alternatives, and are satisficing in that it is possible that not all dimensions will
be considered before an acceptable solution is found (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen, forthcoming). This is consistent with
the discussion in chapter three that public opinion constrains the foreign policy choices of leaders.
There are two main noncompensatory procedures used when decisions are made based on multidimensional
criteria: the conjunctive and the disjunctive. In the former, evaluations are made based on the existence of more than one
dimensional threshold that must be satisfied; in the latter evaluations depend on the existence of one dimension which is
of paramount importance (Dawes 1964; Geva and Mintz 1992).
The conjunctive procedure, by definition, implies noncompensatory logic in which values must be above a
certain level on each dimension. Take for example the human body. Having an excellent heart, liver and lungs cannot
compensate for the fact that the body's sole remaining kidney is dysfunctional (Dawes 1964, 105). In other words, a
person could have poor organs, but as long as they performed a certain minimum level the person would remain alive;
or simpler yet, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. In terms of a multidimensional theory of the use of force,
this would entail that force score above the threshold on the political, domestic and international dimensions.
Since, the disjunctive procedure evaluates based on the most important dimension, it too is by definition
noncompensatory. Dawes (1964, 105) gave the example of the football player who is selected based on his exceptional
ability in one aspect of the game, be it passing, kicking, running, or blocking. A disjunctive procedure is followed if a
team which needs a quarterback, eschews an average one who can kick quite well, in favor of an excellent passer. The
disjunctive and conjunctive rules can be thought of as satisficing as iterations are repeated.
Noncompensatory selection procedures usually imply an intradimensional component which is attribute-, rather
than alternative-based (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 536). It has been suggested that noncompensatory, rather
than compensatory linear models, are used in more complicated decision environments because they are cognitively
easier (Brannick and Brannick 1989; Einhom 1970, 1971; Johnson and Meyer 1984; Payne 1976). The definitive feature
of the noncompensatory models is their multiplicative nature which effectively rules out compensation between variables
(Brannick and Brannick 1989). A related aspect of the noncompensatory model is that it entails an interactive use of cues
or dimensions. Since there is no compensation between dimensions, the search pattern spends differing amounts of time
and uses nonconstant amounts of information across alternatives (Billings and Marcus 1983, 333). This cognitive
"shortcut" classifies the noncompensatory approaches as heuristc devices.
Since the noncompensatory models employ some form of elimination of dimensions, they can also be classified
as satisficing and not optimizing as in the case of expected utility models (Johnson and Meyer 1984, 531). Noncompensatory models are concerned with finding "acceptable," rather than maximizing alternatives (Johnson and Meyer 1984,
531). They are also satisficing because it is possible that not all dimensions will be considered before a decision is made
based on partial information. The idea behind the noncompensatory models then is to quickly eliminate alternatives to
simplify the information search and evaluation phases of the decision process (Payne 1976, 384; Payne, Bettman, and
Johnson 1988, 534). Avella (1991, 233) has applied this logic to the criteria for the use of force:
7
"The premise in using a chronological decision format is that the decisionmaker proceeds stepwise through the tests, requiring a positive...response
at each level [or dimension] before proceeding to the next. ...If answers to the
initial tests are negative, activity relative to a military option would not take
place. ...Such an approach places significant importance on objective
decisionmaking early on in a crisis.*
The key noncompensatory decision models are the CON, DIS, EBA, and LEX. The CON model employs the
assignment of thresholds to each of the important dimensions. Alternatives are then rejected if they do not meet any of
the thresholds.
Recall that in the CON procedure each dimension must meet a certain threshold and therefore the least relevant
dimension is the key to the evaluation. According to Einhom (1971, 3), this specification approaches the multiple cutoff
process of the CON by maximizing the dependent variable whenever there 'are equal amounts for the [independent] variables.' The logged dependent variable is what makes this equation multiplicative (Brannick and Brannick 1989, 101).
This specification captures the essence of the CON procedure in that a low dimension value in an otherwise highly rated
group will devalue an alternative more than will a high value among a group of generally low values have an improving
effect (Brannick and Brannick 1989, 119-120).
The most relevant dimension is the key to the disjunctive decision procedure. This model is designed so that an
alternative will achieve high utility if it has an extremely high score on a single dimension (Einhorn 1971, 3). This
approximation thus captures the essence of the DIS model which holds that the alternative with the highest score on the
most relevant dimension will be selected (Dawes 1964).
The EBA is a sequential elimination decision heuristic. In this procedure, each attribute or dimension is given a
different weight reflective of its importance. The dimensions are selected for their use in comparing alternatives with a
probability proportional to their weight. Alternatives which do not score above a certain threshold on a key dimension
are then sequentially discarded. Then a second dimension is chosen and the process is repeated. EBA is inherently
similar to the other noncompensatory models, but it differs mainly as a result of its probabilistic nature - i.e. the order in
which elimination proceeds may vary from case to case as weights change (Tversky 1972a, 285; 1972b, 349-350).
The LEX decision rule simply involves the selection of the alternative which provides the greatest utility on
what has been deemed the most important dimension. There has been no attempt to formalize this model.
A concept related to the noncompensatory model is prospect theory which also refutes expected utility theory
(see Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1992). Prospect theory affords an explanation for differentiating between the
various noncompensatory models, and as such offers much salience decision to use force. Simply put, prospect theory
holds that people are risk-averse with respect to gains, and risk-acceptant with respect to losses (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). Furthermore, individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of a reference point, and they weight losses more hevily
than gains (Levy 1992, 171). Put in the context of the use of force, the EBA strategy would exemplify risk-avoidance as
far as the desire to avoid political fallout from an ill-advised use of force, whereas the LEX model would emphasize a
risk-acceptancy and the desire for political reward in terms of the rally effect after force is used (Mintz and Geva 1992,
6). The EBA strategy would be considered a reactive process, while the LEX would represent a proactive process. The
factor which differentiates between the two processes is the domain of the decision maker. In a domain of gain, e.g.
high public approval, the president would be more risk-averse, and therefore less likely to use force (Mintz and Geva
1992, 9). The reverse would hold true when the president's approval rating is down. This partially accounts for why the
approval and success coefficients are negative in the use of force equations. The decision to use force, and the level of
force used both increase when approval decreases because the president enters the domain of loss. Similarly, in their
experimental design, Mintz and Geva (1992) found that presidents were more likely to use force when they were
experiencing negative domestic conditions. The case studies below further illustrate these points.
CASE STUDIES
The main merit of the case study is that it allows the researcher a more detailed look at cognitive processes and
background factors. With the heightened interest in political psychology and foreign policy decision making, the
relevance of detailed case studies cannot be overstated, particularly since they can be used as foundations for formal
models (Singer and Hudson 1992, 256). The case study pays greater attention to detail and complexity than either the
statistical or experimental approaches (Tetlock 1989, 358). While a case study cannot address necessary or sufficient
conditions (Most and Starr 1989, 13), when used in conjunction with quantitative approaches from which generalizations
can be made and knowledge accumulated, the case study provides a more complete picture. Of particular utility is the
theory-driven comparative case study approach (see George 1979), an example of which follows. Such an approach
compares case studies which share common features, thus increasing generalizability.
According to Tetlock (1989), the case study method is quite valuable to the study of the initiation of conflict.
Tetlock (1989, 358) noted that case studies, for example those of Jervis (1976), and Lebow (1981), have provided
pathbreaking insights into foreign policy decision making. Of particular relevance to this study is the claim by Tetlock
(1989, 358-359) that:
"[c]ase studies complement quantitative, variable-centered research by providing
qualitatively rich and contextually detailed descriptions of the lives and events
that we seek to understand. The explanatory goal is no longer the creation of
statistical models that account for as much of the variance across cases as
possible; the goal is the creation of conceptual models that organize the disparate themes...that run through the particular historical events.'
A final asset of the case study is that it lends itself to the construction of testable hypotheses, particularly when several
case studies can be combined (Robinson 1962). These hypotheses can then be tested against a greater number of cases.
The cases presented below share that each involves a foreign policy crisis in the first term of a two-term
presidency. The cases vary in that they are at opposite ends of the study period placing one pre-Vietnam and one postVietnam. This should provide a further rigorous test of the whether domestic politics matter since, as mentioned above,
informal consensus has it that domestic politics have only mattered to foreign policy makers since the Vietnam
experience and the breakdown of bipartisanism. Another compelling factor regarding case selection is that the choice of a
"non-event" will provide valuable information for, as Holsti (1992, 453) asserts, "[s]olid evidence about contemporary
non-events is, to understate the case, rather hard to come by. Case studies appear to be the only way to address such
questions... ." For instance, what would the Reagan adminstration's course of action have been in Central America had
not public opinion been strongly against a use of force (Holsti 1992, 453)? Thus case selection has been based upon
theoretical consideration and not simply novelty or drama (see Robinson 1962, 24). Subsequently Holsti (1992, 459)
calls for a greater emphasis on the case study approach with archival documents stressing the need to extricate the
relevance of public opinion to decision makers.
The purpose of the following two case studies is twofold. First, to document evidence that domestic politics
were a primary concern in the making of foreign policy well before the Tet Offensive of 1965, and to uncover the
cybernetic/noncompensatory decision processes.
Dien Bien Phu 1954
Background. President Eisenhower was confronted by a serious foreign policy crisis in 1954 as he had to make
a decision on whether or not to use force against the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu. The French had gotten bogged down in
their former colony in Southeast Asia and were repeatedly requesting large-scale air support from the Americans. The
French had chosen Dien Bien Phu as the site to make their last stand, and subsequently Dien Bien Phu had taken on a
disproportionate political and psychological value in light of the upcoming Geneva peace talks (Gravel 1971, 97). The
situation appeared to have all the markings of a cut-and-dry, low-cost military venture. Admiral Radford remarked in
January, 1954 that a single mission composed of one squadron of US planes over Dien Bien Phu might settle the matter
in one afternoon (Glennon 1982, 953).
1
1-
The primary decision makers. The President, Vice President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State John F. Dulles,
and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the key decision makers in this foreign policy
crisis. The following interpretation of events is consistent with recent "revisionist" characterizations of the Eisenhower
presidency. Whereas in the past he had been regarded as aloof and passive, for instance during the McCarthy hearings,
he was actually quite complex, had excellent behind-the-scenes political savvy, and exercised considerable control over
Secretary of State Dulles (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 11; Greenstein 1982).
The alternatives. Eisenhower's choices can be distilled down to: 1) unilateral air-strike; 2) military action as
part of a "united front"; 3) status quo, i.e. covert / psychological operations, and continued supplying of the French with
supplies (see Glennon 1982; Gravel 1971). 1 It was alternative three which was agreed upon by the President at a NSC
meeting on April 29 despite the protests of both Radford and Nixon (Herring and Immerman 1984, 361; Hoxie 1977,
343). Below I will derive this choice based on a noncompensatory decision strategy in which the political, as well as the
military dimension was of great import.
The noncompensatory nature of the political dimension. The three essential dimensions - international or
military, domestic and political - were directly relevant to the decision process. Militarily, Eisenhower always placed
regional crises within the context of the East-West strategic balance (Saunders 1985, 100). The President was extremely
leery of starting WW III. Domestically, he regarded the use of ground troops overseas as an extremely expensive
venture, and therefore such a decision could not be taken lightly (Saunders 1985, 100). Politically, the President was
well aware of the opposition he would face from the American public and Congress over the decision to use force in
Southeast Asia (Glennon 1982; Kamow 1983; Saunders 1985). Eisenhower was well aware that key Southern Democrats
- Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, and Senator Richard Russell of Georgia - were opposed to the use of force
(Draper 1974, 154-155; Eisenhower 1963, 343-344). Eisenhower regarded the use of force in Indo-China as politically
risky, i.e. a military victory might exact too high a political toll (Brands 1987, 622, fn. 25).
Interestingly, at the peak of the so-called "era of consensus" in which bipartisanship in foreign policy matters
was said to be almost institutionalized, Eisenhower was closely tracking public opinion which showed that over 68% of
the population were opposed to US involvement in Indo-China (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 112-113; Herring and
Immerman 1984, 351; Orbovich and Molnar 1992, 209; see also Joes 1992, 114-117). Politically, the administration was
in a very precarious position. Nixon and Dulles were leery, and with good reason, that the Democrats would use the loss
of Indochina to their advantage (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 113-114). The reason the President consulted Congress at
all is probably due to the strong public opposition to the use of force, and in fact the widely cited restraint the President
showed is probably exaggerated as Herring and Immerman (1984, 363) concluded from recently declassified documents:
"The political situation left him little choice but to consult, and in any event his
intent was to manipulate Congress into giving him a broad grant of authority not
unlike that which President Johnson secured in 1964. Implicating Congress in the
Dienbienphu decisions protected the administration's domestic flank..."
Actually, several Members interviewed at the time said they would have allowed the use of force had the President
forcefully and clearly presented his case (C. Roberts 1954, 35). This lends credence to the argument that the administration's real obstacle to the use of force was popular opinion and that Congress was to be used as a way of swinging
opinion. After all, "Congressional reaction," was usually taken to mean a concern for more far-reaching political
concerns (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 33).
There are two main reasons for the lack of popular support, and subsequently administation support, for the use
of force at Dien Bien Phu: 1) the American public was leery of another intervention in faraway southeast Asia a la'
Korea; and 2) under Roosevelt, Americans had become accustomed to aiding colonies, not metropoles, and Eisenhower,
or more importantly the American public, agreed in principle with this philosophy (Draper 1974, 152; Eisenhower
1963, 373; Glennon 1982, 1443; Saunders 1985; US News and World Report 1954, 35-38).
The following summary is based largely on the synopsis provided by US News and World Report (1954, 35-38)
of the events leading up to the fall of Dien Bien Phu. An interesting side note to this chronology is that was planted by
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the administration in response to a published report that the President had been on the verge of using force (Herring and
Immerman 1984, 343-344, fn. 1). The fact that the administration would go to such lengths indicates that it was very
much concerned with the public's conception of foreign policy. The French were convincd they could not prevent the
communists from coming to power without substantial US support as General Paul Ely iterated in Washington on March
20 during an unofficial request for assistance. Two weeks later on April 5, the French officially requested US air
support for Dien Bien Phu (Joes 1992, 114). The same day in Washington key Congressional leaders and the administration decision makers were meeting in the State Department. The Members present emphatically answered in the
negative when Radford and Dulles, who had been lobbying for the use of force all along, asked whether a resolution in
support of force should be introduced. The Members agreed that Congress feared "another Korea". It was at this
meeting that Dulles proposed his united front action plan in which the US, Britain, France and seven other nations would
join forces. Dulles was led to believe that this would be agreeable to Britain after an April, 13 meeting with Churchill in
London, and the next day in Paris the French approved the plan. However, such plan was not to be as the British
balked, opting instead to wait for the outcome of the Geneva Conference. Dulles was said to be furious.
On April 23 the French again requested US assistance making it clear that French General Navarre who was in
charge in Indo-China was readying for surrender. However, the next day Dulles rejected the plea based on the need for
Congressional approval which, of course, he knew was unattainable, and the need for the US to act as part of a coalition. Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7, the remaining French stronghold no larger than a baseball field.
This chain of events reveals that at no time did the US offer to intervene in Indo-China. It does reveal that
initially the US wanted to use force, but only under politically favorable conditions entailing a united coalition. This was
similar to the strategy used to justify intervention in Korea to the American public. Such political expedience would
again ostensibly quell dissent in Congress. Eisenhower (1963, 340) wrote that he would only consider the use of force if
three conditions were met: 1) "a legal right under international law;" 2) "a favorable climate of free world opinion;" and
3) "favorable action by the Congress." The first conditon was met in the President's opinion as France formally
requested assistance. The second condition could be met, Eisenhower felt, if the US joined forces with Britain and
France. Congressional approval was by far the most difficult of the conditions to meet, indeed the apprehension in which
the President approached Congress regarding Indo-China casts reasonable doubt on the many studies which characterize
this period as an age of consensus. Congress could probably also be mollified with a united action strategy as well as the
leader of the minority in the Senate, Lyndon Johnson, indicated in a meeting with Dulles and Radford (Draper 1974,
155; Joes 1992, 115-116). Therefore much utility was placed by the administration in a coalition approach as it would
appease Congress, the public and other nations (see Eisenhower 1963, 332-375).
There can be no doubt that the President was wary of the political consequences of a failed intervention in IndoChina at this time as he wrote, u[a]ir power might be temporarily beneficial..., but I had no intention of using United
States forces in any limited action when the force employed would probably not be decisively effective" (Eisenhower
1963, 341; see also Orbovichand Molnar 1992). The President realized a quick low-cost victory was nearly impossible
to achieve, and any American casualties in the event of ground engagements would be heavy (Eisenhower 1963, 373).
Dulles agreed that a defeat would be costly as he communicated to the President that "we could not afford thus to engage
the prestige of the United States and suffer a defeat which would have world-wide repercussions" (Eisenhower 1963,
345). NSC documents published in The Pentagon Papers (Gravel 1971) reveal that those at the highest decision making
level were cognizant of American opposition to the use of force in Indo-China NSC Action No. 1074-a of April 5,
1954 entitled "Special Security Precautions" sought to ascertain the environment in which the US could use force and
concluded that:
"... 5. a. ...US commitment of combat forces would involve...high
costs in US manpower and money, and possible adverse domestic
political repercusions Moreover, the United States would be undertaking
a commitment which it would have to carry through to victory. ...On
the other hand, under the principles laid down in NSC 5405, it is
essential to US security that Indochina should not fall under Communist
control. ...b. Of the alternative courses of action..., Course A or B has these
advantages over C [unilateral force]. Neither Course A or B
depends on the initial use of US ground forces. For this reason alone,
they obviously would be much more acceptable to the American
public. ...d. There would be advantages to Course B [waited action force]
also in that US opinion would be more favorable if the other free
nations and the Asian nations were also taking part and bearing their
fair share of the burden." (Gravel 1971, 462-465).
The decision process. Moving first along the political dimension, the alternative of unilateral bombing was
eliminated as Congress and the public, considering the President's rather low approval rating, could not be sold on the
idea largely because an alliance structure could not be formed (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 44; Herring and Immerman
1984, 361). Relatedly, alternative two was precluded as the British would not commit to such action. It was widely
regarded that British participation in a coalition would suppress much of the political risk and would attract congressional
support (Gravel 1971, 56, 94-95). State Department polls showed that the public support for multilateral intervention was
at 69% (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 269). Along this dimension, this only left alternative three. Assuming the international dimension was the second most important dimension, which is understandable considering Eisenhower's famous
"domino theory" of communist aggression, which was born of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, and the McCarthy hearings, the
only choice remaining had to satisfice. Continued covert action as the primary option, similar to the current strategies in
Egypt, Guatemala and Iran (see Cook 1981; Immerman 1980-81; Schlesinger 1972), would have very little chance of
success against the well-equipped (courtesy of the Chinese) Vietminh. Such operations stood better chance of success
toppling regimes in which the masses either were not armed, or troops loyal to the government were restrained, e.g.
Guatemala, 1954; Chile, 1973; Iran, 1953.
In their excellent summary of the decision not to use force at Dien Bien Phu, Herring and Immerman (1984,
349) commented that the President never seriously entertained a one-time covert strike at Dien Bien Phu. Karnow
(1983), in his compelling account of the US experience in Vietnam, argued that although the President was not dovish
over Vietnam, he would not even consider Admiral Radford's plan to use force without prior political support. Burke
and Greenstein (1989, 273) also stated that the President never even allowed the debate over an air strike to reach the
level of consideration by the "full advisory machinery." However, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel 1971, 573-583)
revealed that the CIA's Saigon Military Mission (SMM) was hard at work with a covert operation in 1954-55. The
President's only alternative was to work for a united coalition, to continue to supply the French with materiel (Eisenhower 1963, 341) and to continue covert operations. After the Geneva Accords were signed, the hopes of the administration
in averting a total communist takeover now lay with Ngo Dinh Diem who would become the first in a series of US
puppets in Vietnam.
During Dien Bien Phu the President would not even allow Dulles to "explain alternative courses of action"
(Saunders 1985, 105; see also Kamow 1983). This is clearly the cybernetic decision process at work and is inherently
different from the linear, compensatory framework. Even though the crisis was rather severe by Brecher, Wilkenfeld,
and Moser's (1988) standard (5.70), and would therefore seem to justify a use of force within the realist paradigm (see
Oneal and Lian 1992a), no force was forthcoming. Because there could be no united coalition to deflect the political
fallout, the military option was not considered along all dimensions and had been effectively ruled out by the President
five months prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu.
The decision process is best described as EBA. Clearly the most important dimension was the political, and any
alternative that did not satisfice along this dimension was summarily discarded. The President opposed military force
because allied support, the primary necessary condition which would lessen the political damage, did not materialize
(Bundy 1987, 230, n. 6; Saunders 1985, 111). The decision did not appear to be disjunctive, i.e. there were no multiple
thresholds among dimensions. As evidence, the President did not appear to link the country's domestic recession to the
crisis, i.e. the fact that the economy was doing poorly and externalization of the problem might divert attention, did not
compensate for the fact that the political score was low. The President was well aware of the sluggish economy and was
not above trying some degree of macroeconomic manipulation in order to head off further economic woes. He wrote in
his diary at this time:
"David McDonald...brought to me a summary of his views on the current
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economic conditions, together with recommendations for governmental
action to head off a depression. ...In the meantime, I talked to the secretary of the
treasury in order to develop real pressure on the Federal Reserve
Board for loosening credit still further. ...Secretary Humphrey agreed with me
and promised to put the utmost pressure on Chairman Martin...in order to get a
greater money supply throughout the country. ...I am convinced that the dangers
of doing nothing are far greater than those of doing too much. By which I mean that
everything the government can now do to increase the spending power of the country,
both by the individual and the government, will, at least until there is a decided upturn in
economic activity, be a good thing.' (Ferrell 1981, 277-278)
It is probable that the decision process never made it to the domestic dimension as there was only one alternative
remaining after the political and international dimensions had been explored.
The process also did not appear to have been LEX. Recall that the LEX model presumes that only one
dimension - the most crucial one - is considered. The evidence is preponderant, however, that the international
dimension was given much thought. Furthermore, Mintz and Geva (1992) note an interesting distinction between the
EBA and LEX models that is pertinent in this case. The EBA model is more of a defensive or "reactive" decision
mechanism, while the LEX is offensive or "proactive." The former allows a leader to avert harmful political fallout,
while the latter allows a situation to be exploited for political gain.
The satisficing behavior observed during the Dien Bien Phu crisis was a by-product of George's (1972, 771)
multiple advocacy model of decision making. Recall that the multiple advocacy model obtains as the executive uses
internal disagreement in his search for alternatives. The executive has the all-important role of custodian overseeing the
debates between competing viewpoints (George 1972, 761). Eisenhower fully expected his advisers to back views even
when contrary to his own (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 266). In this manner the President becomes the central decision
maker and a diversity of views are entertained and "harnessed". The multiple advocacy model is termed a "mixed
system" as it incorporates centralized management and pluralistic participatory strategies (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
1990, 472). A primary mission of this model is to prevent agencies or subunits from working out compromises among
themselves before issues are heard at the highest level (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472). Rationality can be
hamstrung if the multiple advocacy model is overly centralized in the early stages as the range of alternatives is constrained by cues perceived to be emanating from the executive; i.e. no options regarded as contrary to the President's
agenda will be entertained (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472; George 1972). This, of course, is anathema to the
central tenet of rational decision making and was probably a factor in 1954 assuming, for example, the President's
famous 'row of dominoes" speech exuded cues to his subordinates.
The multiple advocacy process "force[d] decision makers to face up to the sobering question of the costs and
risks of intervention" (George 1972, 771). Eisenhower worked at using the NSC in the manner spelled out by the
National Security Act. To this end he treated it as a corporate body; i.e. with representatives from different agencies
presenting opinions based on experience and expertise rather than based on departmental compromise (Falk 1969, 684).
Even though the process was constrained by the obvious inclinations of the President to stem communism at almost any
cost, it effectively brought to the surface factors such as public opinion and the possibility of a humiliating defeat in
another ground war in southeast Asia. The multiple advocacy model was played out against a noncompensatory decision
making backdrop.
Could the process actually have been a compensatory one? For the decision to have been a compensatory one,
all alternatives would have had to be considered. This was not the case. In their comparison of the Vietnam decisions of
1954 and 1965, Burke and Greenstein 1989, 60) noted that Eisenhower's decision making group did not consider the air
strike, as the President effectively ruled this out, nor did they consider the option of doing nothing.A second reason the
process cannot be considered compensatory is that Eisenhower's rather favorable approval rating (64% in May, 1954)
could not compensate for the fact that the public was averse to the use of force in Indochina at this time (see Burke and
Greenstein 1989, 112-113).
A third piece of evidence is the heavy reliance upon preconditions by the President. A compensatory process
would allow exceptionally high utility scores along a particular dimension to outweigh the weak dimensions. However, it
is quite clear that the President was not very willing to consider options which did not subsume his preconditions.
These three factors taken together left the President with only one alternative: to try and build domestic support
for united action (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 65). Eisenhower was forced to frame his message to Congress in terms
of possible future Chinese or other communist intervention in the region (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 69, 74-77, 109).
Conclusion. Foreign policy decision making in the Eisenhower Administration did not follow the rational
protocol in that it was not exhaustively comparative. On the contrary, the possibility for true comparison was precluded
by an overwhelming desire to reach compromise. The NSC structure was slow and plodding and did not generate distinct
alternatives, but rather worked to "plaster over" differences as major policy statements became "all things to all men"
with opposing sides able to find justification for their agenda in the vague wording (Falk 1969, 686). Rather than follow
a rational decision strategy in which the NSC entertained viewpoints from outside the agency and compared opposing
viewpoints against each other, instead major decisions were made through "horse-trading" and legislative-like behavior
(Falk 1969, 686).
That the decision process under Eisenhower was a cybernetic, bounded rational one is evident from its
characterization as neat, mechanistic and tending towards mass production, while undertaking a heavy workload. During
Eisenhower's first three years the NSC made 829 policy decisions, while in a five year period under Truman there had
been only 699 decisions (Falk 1966, 685). The NSC was able to react to crises during Eisenhower's two sicknesses by
relying upon policy guidance that had been stored away (Falk 1969, 685-686). This is precisely the logic that Steinbruner
(1974) is alluding to in his theory of cybernetic decision making. The tennis player need not be coached each time he
strokes, for the many minute decisions are stored in the brain and operate almost in an automatic fashion.
The issues that came into play during the Dien Bien Phu crisis reveal that the use of force has been wrapped up
in political-economic factors at least since the Eisenhower administration. During his tenure President Eisenhower
regarded domestic political support as a sine qua non of the use of force. Before he would send troops abroad, and even
if he felt he was correct in doing so, certain specific political conditions had to be met as Eisenhower realized such
important decisions required broad political support (Saunders 1985, 109-110). As it turned out, Eisenhower's handling
of the crisis garnered high public approval. A poll circulated by the State Department, which had been monitoring
opinion, found that 60% of the public approved of the President's handling of the events even though it was widely
understood that the communists had increased their holdings in southeast Asia as a result of US nonintervention (Burke
and Greenstein 1989, 114). The President had chosen the politically expedient alternative.
Thus the widely held notion that only realist variables such as the strategic balance held sway in decisons to use
force prior to the "Vietnam syndrome" can be put to rest. Decisions to use force are not made exclusive of domestic
political considerations. Also, arguments that cast Eisenhower as a strictly rational decision maker (see e.g., Saunders
1985) are called into doubt.
Grenada 1983
Background. On October 25, 1983, the US invaded Grenada. The justification for the invasion was the need to
restore order and protect American lives after the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several other
leading members of the New Jewel Movement by radical elements within the party led by Bernard Coard. The New
Jewel Movement had taken over the government from a brutal authoritarian regime during a bloodless coup in 1979.
Unlike the Dien Bien Phu crisis 30 years prior, in this case the President decided to respond with force.
Although the invasion had been formally requested by the Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, and
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), in particular, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, it is
likely that the US would have resorted to the use of force regardless. In this case study I will trace the decision making
process that led to the use of force on the island. In particular, I argue that, unlike Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, the
domestic environment was not prohibitive. If anything, the domestic dividends would be reaped quickly. It is conceivable
fie
that the invasion could deflect the fallout from the tragedy that took place in Beirut days earlier when over 200 marines
were killed by a terrorist's bomb (Bostdorff 1991). The Grenada venture, alternately called an invasion and rescue
mission by Reagan as political winds dictated, was of dubious legality and had many earmarks of a carefully designed
gambit made with public opinion as the paramount variable. The OECS charter clearly states that any action of such
gravity must be approved unanimously. Obviously, Grenada did not vote in favor of its own invasion. Furthermore,
Scoon's position as Governor-General afforded no legal authority in dealing with anyone other than the Queen (Dore
1984, 185, fn. 65), and it is unclear whether his request even reached the US prior to the invasion. Clearly then, these
requests were little more than window-dressing. Another fact that reinforces the conclusion that the entire crisis was
carefully planned with political sensitivity in mind was that the media was banned during the early phases of the invasion
(Kaiser et al. 1983, 83; Kenworthy 1983). One thing the military had learned during Vietnam was that vivid pictures of
bloody American youths had devastating effects on public opinion towards the operation.
There were also the particularly sticky questions the administration had to answer regarding the War Powers
Resolution. Recall that the resolution requires the president to notify Congress prior to any use of force. The President
consulted with Senate majority leader Howard Baker and House Speaker Tip O'Neill the night before the invasion, but
solicited no advice or approval - hardly a bona fide interpretation of the War Powers Resolution considering that the
president had been considering intervention since the murder of Bishop at least four days earlier (Rubner 1985; see also
USCCAS 1990). In fact, there is substantial evidence that the invasion had been planned over three weeks earlier as
Army Rangers which were based in Georgia and later took plart in Urgent Fury, practiced maneuvers in Ephrata, Washington at a runway similar to that found in Grenada (Kenworthy 1984, 644). Operation Urgent Fury, as it came to be
called, was formally decided upon on Sunday, October 23 after two NSC meetings in which the decision makers were
reassured that expected casualties would be light - another Vietnam lesson taken to heart (DeFrank and Walcott 1983,
75).
The primary justification for the invasion was to rescue approximately 1000 US citizens, many of them medical
students, and it is probable the administration truly believed the students to be in danger. In retrospect, however, this
argument turned out to be largely inaccurate. The chief administrator of the medical school, Charles Modica, emphasised
that the invasion was "totally unnecessary" and had in fact been making plans to evacuate about 10% of the students who
wanted to go (Kenworthy 1984, 637). The infamous "shoot-to-kill" curfew had also been lifted the day before the
invasion. The most compelling evidence that the invasion should not have been justified as a rescue mission was that
foreigners were free to leave the country at all times, and according to Carter's former NSC adviser on Latin American
affairs, the invasion precluded an orderly evacuation of Americans (Kenworthy 1984, 638).
The evidence gathered by Bostdorff (1991), Conell-Smith (1984), Dore (1984), Levitin (1986), and Rubner
(1985) leads to a conclusion that the decision to intervene in Grenada was not based solely upon realist factors such as
the Soviet/Cuban threat and the cache of largely outdated weapons stockpiled in Grenada. Levitin, writing in the
Harvard International Law Journal, concludes that the intervention cannot be justified using international law. 2 Several
studies, arguing from a realist perspective, assert that the US intervention was fully justified in light of the US's need to
maintain international economic power and influence (Coll 1987), or simply because the US, since it had "effective and
determined leadership" deserved to use force as a "valid tenet of international politics (Motley 1983-84).
The key decision makers. The President, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz,
national-security adviser Robert McFarlane, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were the central players. The
overarching atmosphere surrounding the decision making environment was one of consensus - i.e. there was not much
debate within the inner circle (Hooker 1991; Shapiro et al. 1983, 82). Furthermore, although some have questioned
whether the President was even a part of the decision to invade Grenada, Greenfield (1984, 80) forcefully argued not
only that Reagan was at the center of all important decisions coming out of the White House, but also that his decisions
were based on his firm conservative beliefs and not "seat-of-the-pants" decision making While the President may not be
as detached as popularly believed, in foreign policy matters the president operated on a very low level of complexity
(Church 1982, 17).
The alternatives. The decision makers had to choose from three alternatives: do nothing; the use of covert /
psychological operations a la' Guatemala, 1954, or Chile, 1973; and the use of full-scale force (see Andriole 1985, 80,
82; Hybel 1990, 270).
The noncompensatory nature of the political dimension. The President, in true proactive form, was able to
orchestrate the entire crisis for the ultimate political benefit of the administration. The administration meticulously
tracked public opinion during the crisis, and as a reward, received a boost in ratings after the President's speech on
television (Isaacson 1983, 37). The boost in public opinion numbers translated into Congressional support for the
decision as open criticism of the invasion quickly died down (Isaacson 1983, 39). George Shultz revealed, albeit
indirectly, that the Grenada venture was linked to the fallout of both the Beirut tragedy and the Iranian hostage-taking as
he responded to a question of a possible linkage:
"...and the President had to weight this - with the violent and uncertain
atmosphere that certainly was present in Grenada, the question is:
Should he act to prevent Amerians from being hurt or taken hostage?
I think that if he waited and they were taken hostage or many were
killed, then you would be asking that same question: Why didn't you
in light of this clear, violent situation, take some action to protect
American citizens there? I don't want to get into the position of
second-guessing myself, but I'm trying to say one has to weight
these considerations and be willing to take a decsion in the light
of all the circumstances, and that is what the president did."'
The President himself told a group of military personnel a week after the invasion, "we weren't about to wait for the
Iran crisis to repeat itself, only this time in our own neighborhood - the Caribbean" (Bostdorff 1991, 744).
It becomes apparent that the President's main goal all along was to avert a hostage situation and the subsequent
political nosedive. Shultz and McFarlane were the earliest advocates of force as they desperately feared a repeat of the
Iranian hostage crisis (DeFrank and Walcott 1983, 75; see also Hooker 1991, 65; Hybel 1990, 270; Kegley and Wittkopf
1987, 117; Thomdike 1989, 259). Such a possibility was not lost on Republicans in Congress as Representative Henry
Hyde of Illinois remarked that the Beirut tragedy was a political "time bomb."' The President, according to some
Members of Congress, was cognizant of the fact that the Carter presidency suffered an "instant personal identification
with crisis events."' Of course, such an identification was made more probable in the wake of the Beirut incident. The
decision makers recognized Grenada as the type of low risk venture that would rally domestic support (Erisman 1981,
18, cited in Thomdike 1989, 256), and to the surprise of no one, Reagan used the invasion as a rallying point days later
at a Reagan - Bush campaign reunion (Bostdorff 1991, 744). According to Bostdorff (1991), the Grenada venture was a
promoted crisis which was managed closely by the President. The promotion occurred as the president fostered the
notion that a state of urgency existed in Grenada; management took place as Reagan began to persuade the public to
accept his solution as the most appropriate on (Bostdorff 1991, 737). After the President went on television to discuss
the invasion, his critics became silent in the wake of the rally effect (Hinckley 1992).
This handling of the crisis resulted in symbolic political resources being garnered by the President, who was
subsequently able to withstand the resource deficit precipitated by the Marine bombing and the September, 1984 bombing
of the US embassy in Beirut. Such resources are particularly valuable in cages such as these when the president has no
one from which to exact revenge (Bostdorff 1991, 745). Bostdorff (1991, 739) terms such symbols in which victory progresses into the future and distributes "needed symbolic reassurance" condensation symbols.
The decision process. Many contingencies were not even considered as the planning for the invasion was carried
out, primarily because the decision makers often lacked detailed or verified information (Hooker 1991, 68). This is
consonant with a cybernetic approach in which satisficing is the principle strategy and there is little comparative evaluation of different alternatives. As a counterpoint, during the Johnson administration, the President often felt compelled to
hear out each of the options from George Ball of the State Department, and to debate each of the conflicting opinions
(Shapiro et al. 1983, 82). Johnson did not, however, appear to have ever organized a grand foreign policy strategy
during his tenure preferring instead a "day to day decision making procedure" (Trager and Scully 1981, 186).
The decision to use force appears to fit a noncompensatory decision structure. Recall that noncompensatory
strategies can require the identification of one dimension as paramount. (EBA, LEX), or there can be multiple dimension
thresholds (CON). I have argued above that the political dimension was the most important to the decision makers as
evidenced by the way the President managed the issue with the public, the press ban, and the waryness of the decline in
approval that would be precipitated by an American hostage situation. We can then rule out the CON strategy since it
does not appear that all three dimensions warranted thresholds from the decision makers. The domestic dimension did
not present an acute situation, as the economy was on the road to recovery and unemployment had just dropped substantially (Hugick and Gallup 1991, 22). 6 The President only resorted to an international explanation for the use of force,
i.e. the threat of the Soviets using the new runway as a refueling depot, or Cuban style exportation of revolution in the
smaller islands of the Caribbean, after the fact. Earlier the president had been careful to label the venture a rescue
mission. Interestingly, President Johnson had similarly presented the situation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 in
which he sent in the Marines as first a rescue mission, and after the fact, a move to thwart "another Cuba" in the region
(Kegley and Wittkopf 1987, 118). Perhaps the Soviet/Cuban threats, and indeed the entire international dimension were
subordinate to the political dimension. After all, the US had little international support even from its closest allies
(Cohen 1984). 7 In the UN, only Israel, El Salvador and the participating Caribbean states supported the invasion.
Consequently, the international dimension largely proved to be a restraint to the use of force as the US was not able to
win the diplomatic skirmishes in Europe as Britain did during the Falklands War (Cohen 1984, 163).
The sequence of events indicates that the first, and likely only, alternative considered was the use of force. The
administration did not appear to seriously consider the covert alternative, perhaps because of the time constraints and the
need to quickly shift the focus away from Beirut. Furthermore, when officials at the invasion-day briefing were asked
where CIA chief William Casey was, they responded that they did not know, further leading to the conclusion that a covert/psychological operation was not being considered.' It also seems unlikely, although it is difficult to verify, that the
decision makers ever seriously contemplated doing nothing. Reagan ran on a strong platform in 1980 that promised to
return America to international (military) pre-eminence, and a failure to act so close to home would be interpreted as
reneging. The choice of an alternative before considering others is of course consistent with the bounded rationality/satisficing principles. Time constraints and situational pressure apparently forced the decision makers to take
"cognitive shortcuts" (see Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Geva and Mintz 1992; Holsti 1990). Larry Speakes, the
president's spokesman commented that it was "...a very narrow planning operation" which even excluded him.' The
decision process during the Grenada crisis was the antithesis of multiple advocacy. Defense Secretary Weinberger's
preference for restraint in the use of force was strongly overshadowed by the State Department's advocacy of an all-out
use of force (Hooker 1991, 67). From the outset it appeared that the Grenada venture was a State Department project
and that the input of the various agencies was not equally weighted as in a multiple advocacy setting (Hooker 1991).
Bona fide multiple advocacy had very little room to obtain in an atmosphere in which aides told the President only what
they knew he wanted to hear, and feared giving the President bad news (Church 1982, 15).
There is little evidence that an exhaustive, comparative decision process entailed by the rational strategy ever
transpired. Weinberger's disdain for incremental approaches to the use of force is yet another factor which identifies the
decision makers' apparent predisposition towards the use of force, as he argued that such a tact will inevitably lead to
insufficient force being applied.° Incremental approaches to the use of force tend to lead to outcomes in which force is
the last resort as less drastic measures are attempted first (Tarr 1981, 57). This was clearly not the case in Grenada.
Judging from the evidence that covert operations, or the possibility of doing nothing were probably never
considered, and that the use of force was proactive in terms of creating a diversion from the tragedy in Beirut, the LEX
model seems the most applicable in the case of Grenada. Recall that the LEX strategy identifies a most important dimension, and then the alternative with the highest utility along this dimension is selected. A use of force provided the highest
score along the domestic political dimension. Doing nothing did not score well along the political dimension as the
President ran on a strong defense platform. A covert or psychological campaign also would not satisfy the political
dimension in the wake of Beirut. Thus we are left with the use of force as the alternative chosen in a LEX process in
which political lagniappe was both a necessary and sufficient for the use of force (see Mintz and Geva 1992). Bostdorff's
(1991) argument dovetails neatly with Mintz and Geva's (1992) conception of the LEX model as proactive - i.e. the
executive "creates" situations in which the use of force brings political windfall. In this case the windfall circumvented
the unpopular policies in Lebanon, and gave the President a significant boost just months before his campaign for
reelection was to begin. This is consistent with a central argument of this entire study that opinion and policy are
interdependent, and therefore the president has considerable control over his political fate.
t7
Could the process actually have been a compensatory one? The weight of the evidence seems to indicate that a
compensatory process was not carried out. First of all, the speed in which the decision had to be made makes it more
likely that the decision involved the cognitive shortcuts embedded within the noncompensatory approach (see Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson 1988). When time is limited, as it was in this case because of the overlap of events in Beirut and
Grenada, it has been shown that a noncompensatory process is more efficient. Second, and as already mentioned, it does
not appear that all alternatives were compared, or even entertained.
Conclusion. It is interesting to note the distinctions between Reagan's actions in Grenada and Nicaragua in
1983. In the former case, the President was willing to go against the wishes of Britain, Grenada's former metropole
(Grenada had only been independent for nine years), and four members of the OECS - Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and
Trinidad - the latter two geographically very close to Grenada (Hybel 1990). While in the latter case, where the US
would have had at least the implicit support of Nicaragua's nearest neighbors - El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and
Honduras - Reagan chose not to use force. The differences are very clear. Grenada, with its rather poorly trained force
of about 1,000, was a low-risk venture which could almost be guaranteed to end within a week. The fact that it would
coincide with the Beirut tragedy only sweetened the pot. Nicaragua, on the other hand, had a formidable military of over
50,000 troops (Hybel 1990, 282) and no such blitzkrieg could be guaranteed. Coupled with this fear of protracted war,
was the public aversion to direct intervention in Central America (Bowen 1989; Sobel 1989; Sussman 1988). No matter
how strong Reagan's ideology and rhetoric were, and how much he loathed the idea of a Marxist outpost on Central
American soil, domestic opinion tied his hands. Theories of foreign policy basd purely on realpolitik issues such as
power and strategic interest cannot adequately address such decision processes.
SUMMARY
By focusing on both the use and non-use of force by the US, I have been able to demonstrate the relevance of
domestic politics to foreign policy decision making. The noncompensatory decision process adds substantially to the
diversionary theory of the use of force as it captures how domestic politics enter the decision to use force in terms of
constraints and incentives. Eisenhower was constrained from using force by domestic politics, while Reagan used force
to divert attention from another issue. The noncompensatory model provides a viable alternative to the standard
realist/rational actor models which tend to explain uses of force purely in terms of international/systemic factors.
This study then stands in stark contrast to the recent findings of Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger (1992) and Oneal
and Lian (1992a) who posit that the state of the economy, and the political standing of the president do not hold import
for the decision to use force. That presidents have been able to use their role as leader of the most powerful hegemon
in the international system to enhance their political status is an important finding. However with the US's share in
global resources declining, defense cutbacks in the US, and the increasing reliance upon collective security, the
opportunities for politically motivated uses of force would appear to be declining. Current trends within the US as far as
public opposition to higher middle class tax rates, and a renewed focus on the domestic economy, further indicate that
the US may be willing to relinquish its role as global policeman. The upshot is that *postmodern* presidents may
recognize the need to participate in international problem solving (Rose 1991), thereby surrendering its self-proclaimed
right to impose its will on other nations. Hopefully this will spell an end to strings being attached to US aid, or at the
very least, an end to the threat of US intervention in the Third World.
d
1. These alternatives correspond with the decision to use force via
air strike(s). While the plan to use ground troops was entertained
by presidential advisors, the real decision was whether to save the
French outpost. The President did not appear to ever seriously
consider .sending in ground troops, primarily as a result of
American public opinion (Glennon 1982, 946-1477). This is another
factor leading to the conclusion that the decision process was
noncompensatory.
2. For legal studies that conclude that the invasion was justified see Romig (1985) and Wheeler (1985).
3. George Shultz, "Opening Statement," New York Times, 26 October
1983.
4. S. Roberts, "Capitol Hill is Sharply Split Over the Wisdom of
Invading Grenada," New York Times, 26 October 1983.
5. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedy
and Secrets," New York Times, 26 October 1983.
6. See also, "A, Rose-Colored Recovery," New York Times, 14 November
1983.
7. See also B. Feder, "US Warned by Mrs. Thatcher," New York Times,
26 October 1983.
8. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedy
and Secrets," New York
Times, 26 October 1983.
9. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedy
and Secrets," New York
Times, 26 October 1983.
10. R. Halloran, "US Will Not Drift into a Latin War," New York
Times, 29 November 1984.
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