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LEENA-KAARINA WILLIAMS
The Baltic Sea Region:
Forms and Functions of Regional Cooperation
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Methodology
2.1 Definition of the Concept ‘Region’
2.2 New Regionalism: Forms and Functions of Region Building
3 Historical Precursors and New Concepts of Co-operation in North-eastern Europe
3.1 The Nordic Co-operation
3.2 Institutionalisation
3.3 Forms of Co-operation and Geopolitical Concepts in North-eastern Europe
4 Region Building in the Baltic Sea Region
4.1 Institutionalisation of the Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region
4.2 Co-operation Networks Independent of the Council of the Baltic Sea States
5 The Council of the Baltic Sea States
5.1 Areas of Responsibility
5.1.1 Economic Co-operation, Trade and Investment
5.1.2 Energy, Transport, Communication and Environment
5.1.3 Democratisation, Human Rights, Minorities and Child Protection
5.1.4 Culture, Education
5.1.5 Other Areas
5.2 The German Presidency
6 The EU and the Baltic Sea Region
6.1 Baltic Sea Politics of the EU until 1998
6.2 The Northern Dimension of the EU
7 Analysis and Summary
8 Notes
9 References
9.1 Bibliography
9.2 Websites
9.3 EU Documents
9.4 Further Sources
1 Introduction*
According to the Economist the Baltic Sea region is the largest, most complicated and at
the same time the most promising region of the New Europe (Olson 1998).
This can also be seen in the remarks regarding the Baltic Sea region made by the
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in recent months on the occasion of the German
1
presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which began in July 2000,
where he showed his special appreciation of this so-called “Laboratory for Europe” (Hubel
1993; see also Henningsen 1996, 152). According to Schröder, the “Baltic Sea region is
more important as a trade partner for Germany than the USA”. The German
government’s goals to further strengthen the region’s position during the German
presidency possibly suggest a new beginning in Baltic Sea area politics from the German
side (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1/2 July 2000).
Especially during the final days of June 2000 the parties represented in the German
Bundestag introduced their proposals regarding future Baltic Sea politics, which gives this
paper a special up-to-date status from a German perspective. The various forms of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area and their functions within the globalising and
Europeanising world are introduced and analysed in the course of this paper.
Since the end of the Cold War the international system has become multi-polar and
complex: actors and subjects who wish to be involved in international co-operation need
to act in several circles of internationalisation at the same time. For the north-eastern
European states this includes not only integration into Europe but also incorporation into
newer geographical and geopolitical concepts of the so-called New North as well as the
sub-region of the Baltic Sea States.
The independence of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union, political changes in Poland,
Finland’s and Sweden’s joining the European Union (EU) in 1995, and the development of
new regional forms of co-operation in the entire north-east of Europe have challenged all
states in this region to re-orient themselves on the map of Europe during the 1990s.
The Nordic model of co-operation functioned during the time of bi-polarism as a complex
web of social, political and economic contacts and was traditionally situated at the level
of low politics. The Nordic countries had similar political and social institutions, ideologies,
party systems and ways of life. The Nordic welfare state model was the leading policy in
social politics and the Nordic balance the security policy during these times.
The so-called New North, however, is no longer formed by common models of society; on
the contrary, it is a geopolitical and geographical concept of integrating transformation
countries into a cross-border and inter-regional network of co-operation. The aims of
these co-operative networks are to create efficient economies and political stability, cooperation in planning and constructing infrastructures, the conservation of ecological
systems, and the exchange over cultural, social and educational policies.
The Baltic Sea co-operation and the Northern Dimension of Europe are defined
particularly by a geographical unity that derives from a common link: the Baltic Sea and
the peripheral northern exposure of some of the countries. However, also a certain
common cultural background, political rationality and the clear economic advantage play
an eminent role for establishing close ties. Finally, the integration of Russia into European
co-operative networks is a very important factor, especially in regards to the possibly
rapid EU accession of its direct neighbours on the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea may soon
become an (almost) inland sea of the EU and the new EU border to Russia that came
about through the accession of Finland has promoted the idea of a new sphere of cooperation, the Northern Dimension of Europe.
The enormous dynamics around the Baltic Sea Rim since the end of the Cold War have
not gone unnoticed by social scientists and have set about a search for models of
explanation and different approaches for this new forming of networks. The classification
of the Baltic Sea region within three concentric circles, globalisation, Europeanisation and
regionalisation, has recently been examined within the framework of New Regionalism;
the possibilities and limits of regional co-operation were investigated upon and the
functions of the different working fields were analysed. Region building under the
2
premises of post-modernism and questions of identity and common historical bonds have
dominated the scientific arena for the last years.
This study employs these above methods of analysing in order to explain the
phenomenon of Baltic Sea co-operation. Using the premises of the New Regionalism
theory I investigate which functions the Baltic Sea co-operation is already fulfilling, and
which it might fulfil in the future. Next to the well-established forms of co-operation, for
instance, the CBSS, the comparatively new concept of the Northern Dimension of the EU
is presented. I also analyse further possibilities, which this initiative can offer the EU. The
question of new chances and prospects of these forms of co-operation within the
framework of the New Europe are illustrated and evaluated in showing the various
initiatives within the Baltic Sea co-operation.
After an introduction into the problematic definition of the concept ‘region’, the most
important aspects of New Regionalism are presented in order to lay the theoretical basis
for further analysis. A short portrayal of the historical conceptualisations of the Baltic Sea
region, the ‘forerunners’ of Baltic Sea co-operation, and the current forms of co-operation
and geopolitical concepts of the New North precedes my dealing with region building in
the Baltic Sea area today. This paper examines the forms of Baltic Sea co-operation on
the governmental and non-governmental level and the involvement of the EU in the
region up to the latest initiatives within the Northern Dimension. The goal of this analysis
is to show the extent to which the Baltic Sea region has reached a status of
regionalisation and which functions such a form of co-operation can fulfil within the New
Europe.
2 Methodology
Parallel to the expanding phenomena of globalisation and Europeanisation in many areas
in and around Europe a process of regionalisation has emerged which counteracts these
processes. These emerging, often trans-national, networks can fulfil an important
function in the present transformation process because they very often unite states
which are members of, for example, NATO or the EU with non-alliance and nonintegrational partners in a single co-operation context that focuses only on the ‘soft
security’ level and within that, for instance, on economic development, environmental
problems, border protection, and the dismantling of trade barriers. This newer form of
interaction between states, the emergence of sub-regions, promotes the cross-border
and inter-regional co-operation that hopefully will eliminate future potentials of political
divisions through confidence building and the solving of common problems (Cottey 1999,
3). These sub-regions are mostly built upon common interests and a common identity in
the broader sense.
2.1 Definition of the Concept ‘Region’
The processes of regionalisation in Europe have led to a terminological confusion in the
scientific literature that needs clarification. The term region refers to a spatial entity with
differing degrees of ‘aggregation’ (Wæver 1997, 279). The definition of region in the
context of a ‘Europe of Regions’ includes sub-state entities such as provinces,
municipalities and Länder (within the federal framework of a nation state).1 These are
also represented in the Committee of Regions (CoR) of the EU. Another form of region
within the EU framework its the EUREGIO, which consists of cross-border co-operation
between municipalities, cities and counties as described above. Furthermore, there are
regions with much larger territories such as the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea
Economic Co-operation (BSEC), the ARGE Alp and the Central European Initiative (CEI)
etc., which are co-operative frameworks between nation states and sub-national regions.
In order to alleviate the confusion caused by these territorial concepts one can divide
them into four groups: (1) micro-regions within nation states, e. g. Catalonia, Bavaria,
3
Wales, (2) inter-state co-operation, e. g. Visegrad states, (3) cross-border trans-regions
which consist of governmental and non-governmental actors, including micro-regions and
therefore do not follow borders of nation states, e. g. Baltic Sea region, and (4) the
quasi-continental regions, e. g. Europe, Far East, Southeast Asia (Wæver 1997, 298; see
also Wæver and Joenniemi 1991).
The main question remains as to whether in spite of these different definitions of
territorial entities there also exists one common interpretation of the term region within
this diversity. For Wæver it is the fact that a region is a territorially defined entity, such
as a nation state, but that it does not possess sovereignty (Wæver 1997, 298).
Further confusion is caused by the differentiation between the terms regionalisation,
regionalism and regionality. These are used variably for the different concepts of region.
For Smith, regionalism is the result of conscious, goal-orientated policy-making (Smith,
1997), whereas Hettne uses it as a general term for a larger process. Regionalisation and
region building, again, according to his interpretation, are the actual dynamic factors
which produce regionality (cf. Smith 1997; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999). While
regionality for Hettne relates more to the already existing, the final product of
regionalisation, the term regionalism is used for the theoretical superstructure of New
Regionalism. The following discussion uses the terms according to Hettne’s definition.
2.2 New Regionalism: Forms and Functions of Region
Building
Among the theories of international relations, regional research in the sense of
investigating micro-regions does not traditionally have a very good standing. It is
moreover considered a marginal ‘branch’ of theories on integration and federalism and is
often regarded as a scientific field dealing with public administration or geography. Since
the end of the Cold War a re-evaluation has taken place which recognises the new forms
of political order as cross-border co-operation. Finally, the EU concept of a ‘Europe of
Regions’ has also been advanced and has enhanced the role of non-state networks and
administrative entities.2
The role of post-nation state territorial entities in the context of the globalising neoliberal world economic order after the dissolution of the bi-polar systems must to a larger
extent become an object of research within the area of international relations as well as
for cultural scientists and historians.
Therefore there are very different assessments and emphases in explaining the new
trans-regional forms of co-operation. Whereas one group is searching for common
historical roots and cultural and societal points of intersection (see Gerner 1994), the
other focuses on the functional, pragmatic arguments for analysing the process of region
building. At this point it is important to present the different aspects of regionalism as
such, in order to better pinpoint the innovations of New Regionalism. The functions which
regionalism may assume within international politics are being shown here with the
example of Baltic Sea Co-operation.
For Stubbs and Underhill there are three elements of regionalism which determine an
‘imagined community’. Firstly, regional alliances must share common historical
experiences and must have similar problems to tackle within a certain geographical
space. Secondly, strong bonds must exist between the participating states, and the
formation of one or several co-ordinating institutions or organisations should be possible.
Thirdly, the will to apply common norms and also to let this interaction be controlled
must be recognisable (Stubbs and Underhill 1994, 331–335).
4
These basic preconditions that a regionalised region must possess have been specified in
the theoretical framework of New Regionalism and made applicable to the new forms of
region building. Since 1990 the theory of New Regionalism has been applied to the
interpretation and analysis of new forms of regional co-operation in the special sense of,
as Wæver calls them, cross-border trans-regions, for instance, the Baltic Sea region.
A coherent theory for these newly emerging regions can be found especially in the
studies carried out by Hettne. The dynamic movements towards multi-polarism, the
spontaneous developments in regard to the emergence of new regions through the
bottom-up principle, and the avoidance of very clearly directed and thematically focused
forms of co-operation, aiming instead at multi-dimensional working fields, form the core
of Hettne’s definition of New Regionalism (Haukkala 1999, 81). Hettne sees the new
regionalism as a reaction to globalisation and defines these two tendencies as two sides
of a single coin (Hettne and Inotai 1994, 11).
For Hettne, New Regionalism consists of a dual process: on the one hand, an integration
takes place among the regions while, on the other, a fragmentation of old frameworks
occurs within the nation state.3 Beyond this a central element of New Regionalism is the
‘pooling of resources’ which creates networks for economic, ecological, social and cultural
co-operation. One of the focal points of this new form of co-operation is the
establishment of a functioning infrastructure between the partners.
According to Hettne, there are five levels of regionality, which are marked by varying
degrees of homogeneity: (1) the region as a geographical unit, (2) the region as a social
system, (3) the region as an organised co-operation (4) the region as a civil society and
(5) the region as a subject with a certain identity, legitimacy and qualities of an actor
within international politics. These criteria are applied in my analysis of the Baltic Sea cooperation to evaluate the current situation of region building and the functions and
possibilities for the future (Hettne 1999, 10–11).
If a region is sufficiently regionalised, one can begin to ask whether it is recognised as an
actor in international relations and what functions it serves in world politics. Smith has
defined these functions of regionality within world politics. The first function describes a
situation in which states and other groupings form their involvement in the international
arena in a top-down mode. The goal of this form of co-operation is to strengthen the
ability of the nation state and to control its acting environment, so that the nation state
can draw the maximum advantage out of it. In the end this serves the consolidation of
security, growth and cohesion of nation states. The second function aims to transfer
authority from nation states and other groupings on to regional bodies. A good example
of this is the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union (Treaty of the European
Union, Article 5 II) and the concept of a ‘Europe of Regions’ but also the growing
integration of regions into the context of the nation state (e. g. Scotland). The third
function clearly involves New Regionalism: the main focus of this is to install a
counterweight to globalisation, be it in the function as a stopper or a building block.4
Since the two first functions clearly focus on micro-regions within the nation state, it is
necessary to examine whether the third function can be applied to Baltic Sea cooperation.
3 Historical Precursors and New Concepts of Cooperation in North-eastern Europe
Political spaces are created primarily through the rhetoric and actions of policy makers.
Over the past centuries the governance of territories by the nation state has formed the
idea of the territorial accumulation of political power. The evolution of other forms of
political regions is not particularly new in the north of Europe, although the end of the
Cold War has once again made it more popular.
5
The discourse on region-building around the Baltic Sea has re-vitalised various historical
precursors to be used as a model in order to better trace the necessary similarities that
are needed for a construction of a common identity and can so be used for a common
purpose. However, as this occurs principally in a search for historical roots, it very
quickly became evident that one must be very careful not to pour salt into old wounds
and to re-awaken certain unwelcome ghosts of the past. This happened most likely
without any bad intentions through the initiative chaired by the former Premier of the
German state of Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm, who supported a revival of the
Hanseatic movement in form of a ‘New Hanse’ in the Baltic Sea region (see Wulff and
Kerner 1994). The Hanseatic League as a network of cities with economic and political
connections and the sea as its centre could function as a historical model for good
contacts, exchange of information and the formation of a new economic centre around
the Baltic Rim. This notion remained very controversial because many participating states
were reminded more of the predominant role of the Germans in this time than of golden
days of peaceful co-operation.5
The often emphasised historical similarities and close cultural ties between the Baltic
States, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania and Poland that actually existed
and continue to exist are also not to be regarded as completely unproblematic. For
historical reasons, i. e. the specific power constellations of the time, these historical
memories do not necessarily produce only positive reactions but can also be interpreted
as connotations of a latent neo-colonialism. Especially Finland and the three Baltic States
may, understandably, react in a somewhat irritated way when, for example, Swedes,
Danes and Germans use well-meaning comparisons to bygone times.
To clarify the ingredients of this mainly benevolent and enthusiastic ‘region-building
historicism’, the historical connections and axes of co-operation around the Baltic Sea will
be briefly summarised here.
In the late 16th century sovereign territorial states began to assume power from the
Hanseatic League and to constitute a new political order around the Baltic Sea. It was at
this time that the term Dominium Maris Baltici became more common. Any attempt
today to construct boundaries across the sea is considered characteristic of this time
(Lehti 1999, 32; see also Kirby 1990).
At the beginning of the 18th century the Baltic Sea concept was replaced by the idea of
‘the North’. Henningsen sees the reason for this in the emerging supremacy of the
Russian Empire in the Baltic Sea region in the years between 1703 and 1725, which
placed the North not only on a north-south but also on an east-west axis (Henningsen
1996, 153). According to Männikkö there are also two further reasons for this: on the
one hand it was the end of the Swedish era of supremacy which had stabilised the
political power structure around the Baltic Sea. In addition, however, there was the
notion of being able to negotiate in a peaceful manner about the division of sea
territories that was no longer completely rejected (qtd. in Lehti 1999, 32–33).
This broader view of the territorial situation in north-eastern Europe and the subdivision
of the regions in an east-west scheme continued until World War I. The period of
independence of the Baltic States and the detachment of Finland from Russia in the first
decades of the 20th century finally made a common definition of the Baltic Sea region
possible again. Especially the Baltic States were fond of this idea and founded the
concept of a Baltic League. The Scandinavians, however, had at that time already started
to construct their identity on the basis of the North, and therefore this idea of
Baltoscandia was never realised (on the term and concept of Baltoscandia see Lehti
1998). A further reason why the idea of a Baltic Group driven by Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania on a north-south axis from Poland over the Baltic States to Finland and
Scandinavia failed was because of the lack of interest by the latter two. Finally, the
Soviet occupation brought about an end to this concept (Lehti 1999, 34–36).
6
The terms Scandinavia and Norden6, used almost synonymously since the 19th century,
were also altered in the context of the east-west division. National romanticism
transfigured ‘being Nordic’, which showed in national anthems7 and other cultural
phenomena, such as the Nordiska Museet (Nordic Museum) in Stockholm which served as
the Swedish national museum (see Henningsen 1997, 94–96). The Norden of today has
abandoned its nationalistic connotations and is now, according to Joenniemi, more of a
post-nationalistic phenomenon (Joenniemi 1997).
The system of Norden has functioned as a form of close co-operation between the
Scandinavian States especially since World War II and has acted in various fields as a
somewhat homogeneous region within world politics. Since this tight network is a direct
precursor of the new forms of co-operation, it will be presented in the following chapter.
3.1 The Nordic Co-operation
The concept of Norden has had a strong impact on the identity of the Nordic States for
decades. Norden has been not only a symbol for the geographic location of the northern
states but also a socio-political ideology, which has been manifested in the model of the
Nordic welfare state, in anti-militarism and in a largely shared rational, enlightened way
of thinking. Norden was at the same time also a concept of enclosure towards central
Europe which was institutionalised through the Nordic Council and the Council of
Ministers (Henningsen 1997, 94; see also Wæver 1991). Østergård put this enclosure
towards the rest of Europe in more precise terms: “non-European, non-Catholic, nonRome, non-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, and socialdemocratic” (Østergård 1997, 29). The Nordic Region was a sub-system that was
relatively homogeneous, prosperous, secular, industrialised and – except for Denmark –
relatively sparsely populated (Miles 1997, 141).
Co-operation in Norden has traditionally been situated at the level of low politics.
Opposition to strong integration and a critical stance towards any form of supranationality has always been a part of the Nordic way of thinking.8 Therefore intergovernmental co-operation and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been the
essence of the Nordic co-operation network. Many affairs have also been settled
informally. The geographic and societal sense of belonging together has also made
personal contacts within the network very important.
3.2 Institutionalisation
Many attempts have been made to institutionalise Nordic co-operation. As early as the
immediate post-war era there existed the will, especially in Sweden, to try to prevent
Norway and Denmark from joining NATO and to establish a defence alliance and a
customs union. However, in regard to both plans the continental variant won: NATO
membership and EFTA were preferred by some states (Norway and Denmark) to the, in
their eyes, isolationist Nordic variation. Sweden pursued the policy of neutrality in
security and integration, while close ties to the Soviet Union influenced the policy
towards co-operation on the part of Finland throughout the entire period until 1990.
Early experience showed that Nordic co-operation had to be conducted very smoothly. It
had to be adjustable to the various sectors and had to be situated in the area of low
politics. The first success of Nordic co-operation was the passport union initiated in 1952
and the founding of the Nordic Council in the same year.
This founding was meant to further institutionalise co-operation. The Nordic Council is the
forum for Nordic parliamentary interaction. The parliamentary parties of the Nordic
States designate the members; there is no direct election to the Nordic Council. This
body is a perfect example of the Nordic aversion to any form of strong integration. Only
7
slowly did the Nordic Council develop from a very informal to an administratively
strengthened institution. The most important achievements during the early years were
enacting the freedom of movement for employees throughout the North, establishing
same social rights for employees in all the countries and intensifying visa co-operation.
The founding of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971 marks a further step in
institutionalisation. Through unanimity in the Council of Ministers and parliamentary
ratification there was now the possibility of taking mandatory decisions for all the states.
These powers now placed Nordic co-operation centrally at the governmental level.
In spite of the generally harmonious co-operation there have always been delicate areas,
for instance, Denmark’s stronger integration into the European context, NATO
memberships and the often very hesitant attitude of Finland that was due to the
‘watchful eyes’ of the Soviet Union. In the 1970s the project of forming a Nordic
Economic Community (NORDEK), for instance, failed in the end because of the Finnish
situation, since this step would have meant a significant enhancement of its socioeconomic and political integration in Scandinavia. Within Europe, however, the North
could thereby have become an ‘effective pressure group’, which may have hindered or
even prevented a further integration of the Scandinavian states into the European
Community (Lee 1997, 163).
Especially because of the new situation in world politics and the EU accessions in the
1990s, Nordic co-operation came to be increasingly questioned. Since 1995 a new dual
concept can be detected which seeks to justify the continued co-operation. On the one
hand, the internal support for the North is to be promoted in order to form a better base
for the participation in the EU. On the other hand, however, the Nordic influence is to be
exerted on Europe, especially in the fields of health, social policy, equality and consumer
protection. This aims more or less at safeguarding of the acquis nordique, which,
however, should be associated with an active policy of integration into the EU. Nordic
politics today must always contain a European component.
At a conference of the Nordic Council in Reykjavik in 1995 the future strategy of the
Nordic Council was officially adjusted to the new situation. The Nordic Council is to be the
platform for the ‘Nordic voice’ within the EU and at the same time seeks to influence the
agenda building in the EU, where the contents were grouped into three pillars: (1)
representation of own interests such as democracy, social rights and transparency9, (2)
co-operation with Europe and (3) co-operation with neighbouring regions such as the
Baltic Sea, the Barents and the Arctic Region. Despite the new strategy and the new
orientation regarding contents of the Nordic Council and the Council of Ministers,
however, Wæver notes that the Nordic project belongs to the ‘old’ and Baltic Sea cooperation to the ‘new’ Europe (Wæver 1991, 4).
3.3 Forms of Co-operation and Geopolitical Concepts in
North-eastern Europe
The geopolitical concepts of regionalisation of the European North, the Northern
Dimension, the New Northern Europe, the New North and the Baltic Sea region form
concentric circles of internationalisation. Forms of co-operation exist in these different
regions which often overlap each other as regional entities and are therefore presented
below.
Tension, competition and conflict have largely retreated from the most northern regions
of Europe since the end of the Cold War, and a completely new phenomenon has
emerged among the states that can be described as an ‘arctic boom’. This is
characterised by something of a race between the states in the region to draft the best
strategy and concept for co-operation in the circumpolar north.
8
With the turmoil in world politics at the beginning of the 1990s the European North has
taken on a new face. The terms European and New North, with a geopolitical
connotation, can be used, according to Heininen, for the regions of the North calotte,
north-western Russia and the Barents Sea (Heininen 1999, 380). This region, also
referred to as the circumpolar north, is internally linked through several levels of transnational, national and sub-regional co-operation, for example, in the Arctic Council, the
Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Northern Forum and the Saami Council. These
associations are sometimes put together by EU members (Finland and Sweden), non-EU
states (Russia and Norway), NATO members (Norway) or non-allied partners (Finland
and Sweden) and Russia under a single co-operative roof. Due to the Canadian initiative
the eight arctic states (Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet
Union and the United States) and three indigenous peoples have been co-operating since
the 1980s in elaborating an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. This level of cooperation was institutionalised in 1996 in the founding of the Arctic Council. The special
feature of this co-operation is the close linkage of the United States and Russia in this
framework of co-operation.
The Barents-Euroarctic Council (BEAC) was founded in Kirkenes 1993 on a Norwegian
initiative. It consists of an inter-governmental institutional framework and can be
classified as a ‘peace project’ or even as a new strategy of containment politics of the
western democracies towards Russia (Heininen 1998, 398). The Barents-Euroarctic
Region (BEAR) is also a geopolitical concept and is based on an ‘artificial’ region
consisting of the Nordic States, Russia and the European Union.
The geographical concept of the New Northern Europe applies to the regions stretching
from Iceland to north-western Russia and from Spitzbergen to the southern shores of the
Baltic Sea. The EU concept of the Northern Dimension stretches geographically over the
same areas. The United States have also focused on this region with their Northern
European Initiative (NEI) launched in 1997, which represents the comprehensive strategy
of the United States towards Northern Europe (US Bureau of European Affairs 2001,
website).10
The geographic extent of the Baltic Sea region may at first sight be somewhat difficult to
locate since the networks are not always outlined by state or regional borders. The Baltic
Sea region includes, as the name suggests, all Baltic Sea littoral countries. In the CBSS,
however, Norway and Iceland also participate. In the cases of Germany and Poland the
most active participants are of course those parts that are located near the coastline.
4 Region Building in the Baltic Sea Region
The changes that occurred in world politics during 1989–1990 clearly altered the
situation in Norden. Political developments such as Europeanisation, (neo-) liberalisation
of the markets and the deconstruction of social systems have also reached the North.
Suddenly the fear of being shunted to the European periphery became increasingly
eminent. According to Wæver, Norden began to fear isolation, and this was to be
overcome by a stronger orientation towards the continent (Wæver 1991, 3). This fear
was nurtured by the debate over the ‘European banana’, arching from the southern
United Kingdom to northern Italy and representing the booming region of Europe. With
the further expansion of co-operative networks to the other countries around the Baltic
Sea the plan was to create a ‘blue banana’ in north-eastern Europe. However, the
geopolitical reorientation of the Nordic countries after 1990 constituted only an aspect of
the active, very versatile region-building process, which intensified increasingly in the
Baltic Sea region after the independence of the Baltic States.
Haukkala sees an important criterion for region building in participants being convincing.
It must be shown that it is a ‘natural’ region, one in which the territory in some way
9
‘belongs’ together historically, geographically, culturally and economically (Haukkala
1999, 24).
In the Baltic Sea region there were four functional factors that have promoted region
building: (1) the promotion of democratic institutions, (2) the strong environmental
problems of the Baltic Sea and specific regions around it, (3) a form of regional identity,
or “shared cultural heritage” and (4) the will to create a growing region within Europe
(Haukkala 1999, 24). It was a “post-Cold-War dynamism” that produced this immense
network of contacts around the Baltic Sea in a short period of time, supported by the
desire in the post-communist states to return to Europe (Joenniemi and Stålvant 1995,
13).
As noted above, however, it was not historical determinism or regionalism from ‘above’
that launched the process but rather a movement from ‘below’, with numerous actors in
the beginning striving for completely different goals. “They had very different aims, were
interested in very different parts of the region, and meant different things by the region,
but they all found it useful to launch their activities under the slogan of the Baltic Sea
region. Thereby, the region became self-reinforcing” (Wæver 1997, 305). According to
Wæver, it was also the cultural events that took place in the first years and the reporting
by the press that led to a Baltic Sea consciousness: “All this was reported as indications
of something big happening. And therefore it became so” (Wæver 1997, 305).
Baltic Sea co-operation therefore originated as a grassroots and a ‘bottom-up’
movement.11 It exists according to the lowest common denominator of a geographic and
economic entity, connected through the Baltic Sea. Baltic Sea co-operation does not
focus on integration but on concrete, flexible and selective co-operation under the
expanding umbrella of the EU. It does not present an alternative to EU integration; for
some states it is, on the contrary, an opportunity for obtaining more rapid EU accession
through economic co-operation and the exchange of information and experience. There
are 70 networks for Baltic Sea co-operation, in both the private and public sectors, that
are working together.
In practice the specific fields consist mainly of improving frameworks for market
economy in the transition countries, ensuring better traffic infrastructure, balancing
social and economic differences, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
and promoting the cultural and economic exchange of ideas within the region.
There is no ‘master plan’ for Baltic Sea co-operation. It consists, nevertheless, of a set of
common, interrelated interests and the striving for the strengthened representation of
these within EU structures.
4.1 Institutionalisation of Co-operation in the Baltic Sea
Region
As early as the 1980s a slow process of increasing co-operation among institutions began
especially in cultural and environmental fields, and with the turn of the beginning 1990s
this movement also came to be expressed on the political level. A multi-co-operative
pattern emerged at the trans-regional and inter-governmental levels that was used by
public and private actors. The first to use the networks, however, were NGOs; it was only
later that governmental institutions began to participate.
Institutionally, the Baltic Sea region consists of a loose superstructure. Apart from the
nation states and the inter-governmental co-operation in the framework of the CBSS,
founded as an umbrella organisation in 1992, the co-operation is predominantly situated
at the sub-regional level. Interest groups, municipalities with similar problems or even
cities make up these new networks. Baltic Sea co-operation is characterised particularly
10
by the combination of governmental and non-governmental organisations working in this
area and by the wide variety of associations.
4.2 Co-operation Networks Independent of the Council of
the Baltic Sea States
The oldest area of Baltic Sea co-operation is environmental protection and the prevention
of water pollution.12 The ‘Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea’ was signed as early as 1974, ratified in 1980 and subsequently revised in
1992. This convention led to implementation of the so-called Helsinki Commission
(HELCOM), which has had a permanent secretariat in Helsinki since the beginning of the
1990s. The main emphases of its work are protecting the marine environment of the
Baltic Sea from pollution stemming from either land or ships, and the drafting of
environmental laws for the Baltic Sea region. In the environmental field there are
numerous networks, for instance, the Baltic Environmental Marketplace, an association of
400 representatives from companies, NGOs, teaching and research institutions, local and
regional authorities. The goal of this Marketplace is to create an environmental market
for ecologically aware companies to promote the technological transfer and the
development of clean products and production processes. This is only one example of
numerous, similar organisations especially in the economic fields. A central role is also
being played by the Baltic 21 project, founded as a regional equivalent to the Agenda 21,
which is committed to sustainable development in the fields of environment, social issues
and the economy (see the respective websites).
Substantial innovations have characterised especially the co-operation over the economy
and tourism, and these promise to be most valuable for the future of the region. For this
reason, for instance, the Baltic Chambers of Commerce Association (BCCA) was founded
in 1992, an association of 45 Chambers of Commerce and Trade in the countries
bordering the Baltic Sea. In this framework the Baltic Sea Partenariat was founded as a
counterpart to the Euro Partenariat, which offers assistance in making contacts and
starting co-operation. The Baltic Sea Tourism Commission (BTC) and the Baltic Business
Advisory Council (BAC) are closely linked to the CBSS but work independently. The BTC
was founded in 1983 and brings together more than 120 organisations related to tourism
in the region. The BAC performs an important advisory role for the governments of the
Baltic Sea region and is committed to accelerating privatisation in the Baltic Sea
transition countries and the support of SMEs (see websites).
Co-operation in the fields of spatial planning, traffic and transportation play an important
role in Baltic Sea networking. The so-called VASAB 2010 (Visions and Strategies around
the Baltic Sea) was founded in 1992, specialising in spatial planning and focusing on
economic development, environmental protection and tourism (see VASAB 2010,
website). The Baltic Ports Organisation, founded in 1991, concentrates on improving
transport and communications on the seaways, especially the transportation of goods
and persons.
In the field of education, culture and media there are many organisations, including the
Conference of Baltic University Rectors (CBUR, since 1990), the Baltic University
Programme – A Regional Network University (BUP, since 1996), the Association of
Museums and Castles around the Baltic Sea (since 1991), the Baltic Music Network (since
1991) and the initiative Ars Baltica, founded by Björn Engholm (cultural co-operation,
since 1990). Extending the ‘virtual’ connection is also a central factor in Baltic Sea cooperation – ‘to be or not to be online’ – and is especially supported in the framework of
the Baltic Sea Alliance (BSA, since 1996) (Wæver 1997, 304). In 2000 a completely new
endeavour was taken on at the Humboldt-University in Berlin by implementing the EUfunded project ‘The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe’, which aims
at furthering the mobility of young researchers around the Baltic Sea and creating an
11
interdisciplinary university network with on the whole eight partners situated at the
littoral states (see BaltSeaNet, website).
Educational co-operation in the region has increased but still there is a lot of work to be
done if there is the will to create the so often prophesised ‘Knowledge Society’, where
educational measures will yet again be regarded as a profitable contribution to
sustainable development.
Youth and social work is a further area of Baltic Sea co-operation, institutionalised, for
example, in the Baltic Sea Youth Office (since 1980) and the Social Hansa (since 1992),
an association of about 30 welfare organisations from the Baltic Sea states.
Especially prominent are three organisations that play a major role in region-building.
The Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation (BSSSC, since 1993) joins the coastal
regions of the Baltic Sea states and formulates common Baltic Sea policies at a subregional level (see BSSSC, website). The Union of Baltic Cities (UBC, since 1992) consists
of several cities that exchange experience in working groups specialising in the fields of
culture, environment, social policy, telecommunication etc (see UBC, website).
The Fifth Parliamentary Conference on Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area took place in
1997; this supported the already existing co-operation between the respective
parliaments in the region.13
This description shows the close network of associations and initiatives, which are not
dependent on instructions by the CBSS, but are to a some extent also loosely coordinated by this inter-governmental body.
5 The Council of the Baltic Sea States
According to media reports on the third summit of the CBSS, held in Kolding, Denmark,
in April 2000, the Baltic Sea region is, as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder put it,
one of the “most dynamic growth regions in Europe” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 April
2000). The CBSS was founded in 1992 at a conference of foreign ministers upon a
Danish-German initiative. This was supposed to provide a “flexible answer to a new
political situation” and was put through without a formal foundation treaty or document
requiring ratification (Schultheiß 1999, 24). The founding members consisted of all
Nordic States, the three Baltic States, Russia, Germany, Poland and the European
Commission (Commissioner for Foreign Affairs).14 The CBSS presidency rotates annually
and, as with the EU system, is based on a troika. Germany assumed the presidency for
the first time in July 2000. The political goals for this period are summarised in section
5.2.
The working modus of the CBSS takes place in three working groups: (1) the Working
Group on Assistance to Democratic Institutions, (2) the Working Group on Economic Cooperation, and (3) the Working Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety and in particular
by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). Decisions are taken by unanimity and are
therefore consensus oriented. A co-ordinating secretariat has existed since 1998 which is
responsible for organisation, policy making and public relations of the CBSS. The
Secretariat officially assumed the status of an international organisation at the beginning
of 1999.
An important role is also being played by the ‘Commissioner for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights Including the Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities’ with its official
seat in Copenhagen. The major responsibilities of the Commissioner are co-ordinating the
work of human rights organisations in the region and actively supporting
democratisation.
12
The guidelines and priorities of Baltic Sea region policies are determined at ministerial
meetings and summits at governmental level. The mandate is nevertheless, according to
Schultheiß, “giving help in orientation and serving as a forum for the common suiting
between the participating states and other international organisations” (Schultheiß 1999,
24–25). Decentralised and horizontal co-operation in the Baltic Sea region in the above
working fields is the main purpose of the CBSS.
As a critical observer, Östhol does not praise the inter-governmental co-operation in the
framework of the CBSS. According to him, it appears rather that “the Baltic Sea States
will also in the future be more successful in creating a multifarious network of nongovernmental actors than to make their own politics” (Östhol 1999, 37). The tasks and
the use of the mandate lead to widely differing reactions; for instance, Östhol believes
that the overall co-operation in the Baltic Sea region is very poorly co-ordinated, and that
it has a negative impact on the pooling of resources and neglects the locational
advantage (Östhol 1999, 37). Others, however, regard the role of the CBSS as “a helpful
and efficient co-ordinator” that merely “collects many co-operative activities under its
supervision”.15
These differing opinions have recently led to a debate over re-defining the role of the
CBSS. Not least among these is the debate over implementing the Northern Dimension of
the EU, which might have brought the CBSS a new working field and could have linked it
more closely to the EU. Many goals of the CBSS that were set out in the early 1990s
have, however, been fulfilled, and in the meantime the region has changed very
substantially. Finland and Sweden have become EU members, Norway and Iceland are
part of the European Economic Area (EEA), association contracts with the EU have been
signed by Poland and the Baltic States, and the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation has been signed between the EU and Russia. The pre-accession activities for
the candidate countries of the Baltic Sea States are now also more or less being
conducted by the EU itself. Some of the major tasks remain, which cannot be dealt with
by the EU in the same way: the integration of Russia into close economic co-operation
and the participation of Scandinavian states that are outside the EU, i.e. Norway and
Iceland. The extent to which the impact of a ‘soft security’ backing for the Baltic States is
given stays an open issue.
The former Minister of Justice, Federal and European Affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, Gerd
Walter, summarised the essentials of Baltic Sea co-operation as follows:
It produces identity beyond national diffidence and brings states with different affiliations
closer together. It offers the possibility of co-operation, where integration does not apply and
therefore relieves the pressure on EU accession. It serves economic and democratic
transformation of the eastern Baltic Sea States and supports the further development of the
region through all these aspects and their peace-making, stabilising character.
(qtd. in Schultheiß 1999, 25–26)
According to Schultheiß and Stålvant, the CBSS should encounter more working areas within
the region. Stålvant draws a parallel to the development of the Nordic Council, which over the
years has steadily expanded its policy areas at the horizontal level (Stålvant 2000, 7).
Schultheiß suggests, for example, an expansion into the areas of internal and justice affairs
(Schultheiß 1999, 29).16
The CBSS has to go with time in order to survive because, according to Stålvant, the
socio-cultural basis that existed for Nordic co-operation is not given in the Baltic Sea
context. If the EU accessions come about soon, the future of the CBSS will be
endangered in the same way as were the Nordic institutions, since EU accession has high
priority for the candidate countries. The role of the CBSS in the EU must be clearly
defined to prevent the structures, areas of responsibility and financing mechanisms from
becoming too confusing.
13
5.1 Areas of Responsibility
Certain structures and foci have been established in the various CBSS areas of
responsibility. In part these overlap with those of the NGOs and in part they correlate
with those within the working groups. It has frequently been the case that organisations
began as NGOs and were later recognised as official organs of the CBSS. These are not
structurally responsible to the CBSS but follow the guidelines set out by ministerial
meetings. Various communiqués, working programmes, declarations and action plans are
retrievable at the website presented below. The following sections briefly summarise the
various areas.17
5.1.1 Economic Co-operation, Trade and Investment
The area of economic co-operation, trade and investment is one that shows particular
dynamism in inter-governmental activity, and is one that is co-ordinated at the
ministerial level. The BCCA and BCA work in close co-operation with this branch. The
stipulations of the numerous trade regimes vary widely in the region, largely due to the
plethora of earlier bilateral agreements. The CBSS attempts to establish some
standardisation. A general effort is being made to dismantle barriers to trade, to facilitate
border transit, to make rules and procedures compatible, to promote the so-called
twinning arrangements18 and to raise ethical standards in economic affairs. Providing
support to SMEs to help to make them internationally competitive also ranks high on the
agenda. Developing electronic networks, improving access to EU financed programmes
and providing support for the financing of SMEs are major tasks of the CBSS (see
Ahlqvist 1999; Kivikari 1995; Karlsson 1999; Schrader and Laaser 1998).
5.1.2 Energy, Transport, Communication and Environment
Communiqués issued by ministerial meetings in the field of energy emphasise that
energy issues are a key to ensuring political stability, economic growth, sustainable
development and security in the area of nuclear power. Therefore energy is not a highly
technical field, but it bears far-reaching political implications, especially in regard to
Russia. Not only questions of how persons who are involved should most favourably
handle the resources (oil, gas) but especially those on securing the nuclear power plants
in north-eastern Russia are to be discussed at the inter-governmental level, with a
substantial exchange of information and experience. Also in this field it is important to
facilitate trade and to overcome differences concerning transport, environment, transit,
taxes and laws. The focus is on the extensive deregulation of the energy market in the
region and the constant improvement of networks for the free movement of goods.
The low population density and the comparatively long distances in the Baltic Sea region
make the connection of transportation routes on land and on water indispensable. Most
of the transport occurs over water, and improving and co-ordinating the seaways by
means of modernisation of the ports therefore has high priority in the traffic sector. The
Baltic Sea region is the principal importer of oil exported from Russia. Co-ordination of
competition between ports over this constantly rising volume of trade should enable the
trade to be divided fairly and in a way that guarantees the best results for all
participants. Projects for connecting land routes between the various regions around the
Baltic Sea include the Via Baltica, the Via Vironia and the Via Hanseatica and cover a very
wide territory encompassing Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, Kaunas, Warsaw, Berlin, St.
Petersburg and Lübeck. With the opening of the Öresund bridge on 1 July 2000 the
region gained a very important link that makes the Swedish and Danish regions the
largest domestic market in northern Europe. Responsibility for the environment in the
CBSS is borne by organisations or projects mentioned above, for example, HELCOM and
Baltic 21.
14
5.1.3 Democratisation, Human Rights, Minorities and Child Protection
A ministerial conference in Tallinn in 1994 selected Prof. Ole Espersen as Commissioner
for Democratic Institutions, Human Rights and the Rights of Persons Belonging to
Minorities; he was re-elected in 1997 to a second three-year term and followed by Ms.
Helle Degn in 2000. The Commissioner’s mandate includes, as his title suggests,
promoting democratic institutions, protecting and supporting minorities, and assisting the
implementation of international conventions on human rights. The Commissioner is very
free to determine his own means and activities, which means that he can also set higher
standards in the fields of human rights and minority protection than bilateral agreements
may require. For instance, he can point at ‘nuances’ in the political style and he works in
a very ‘Nordic way’, paying attention to maintaining a high degree of transparency19 and
also considering the gender problems within the minority issue (Birckenbach 1998, 547).
His special tasks consist of maintaining co-operation with national human rights
organisations, planning and supervising studies of the situation in the Baltic Sea region.
His function as a liaison between national organisations and the governments of the
member states is not to be neglected. An extremely explosive issue that has
accompanied the Commissioner’s work throughout the years has been the question of
the rights of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The EU has demanded the
implementation of more substantive guarantees of minority and citizenship rights as a
condition for EU membership. Russia used the forum of the CBSS to put repeated
pressure on these states because of the status of the minorities. Estonia at one point
even demanded Espersen’s resignation because he had allegedly supported the Russian
position towards the Baltic States, in opposition to the positive developments, as had
been confirmed by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 June 2000). Since the situation in these states has
improved, for instance, as the result of recent liberalisation regarding language laws, a
limitation of the Commissioner’s responsibility was discussed at the ministerial
conference in Bergen, Norway, on 20-21 June 2000. Such far-reaching changes as this
could in the long run provoke vehement protest from Russia, which in the early days had
supported the Commissioner’s position as a “concession to the Russian policy towards the
Baltic States” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 2000; see also CBSS
Commissioner, website).
In addition to co-operation in the fields of human rights, minorities and democratisation,
the CBSS also assigns high priority to protecting children against sexual harassment and
to measures against illicit trafficking of children, an initiative that is especially driven by
Sweden. Multilateral networks are being established, where special working groups and
projects work for the distribution of information and the development of common
strategies for crisis management regarding children at risk (see Child Centre, website).
5.1.4 Culture, Education
Ministerial meetings on cultural issues take place every second year in the framework of
the CBSS. The co-operation aims at preserving the common cultural heritage of the
region and supporting cultural exchange as a measure for region building. The originally
non-governmental actions under the umbrella of Ars Baltica have been accepted by the
CBSS as a platform for cultural development and “as a stable element that should be
developed as an informal body for multilateral cultural co-operation” (see CBSS 1996).
A major project for the CBSS is the EuroFaculty, initiated as early as 1993. The
EuroFaculty is an international body that is politically independent and subordinate to the
CBSS. The principal responsibility of the EuroFaculty is supporting reforms at institutions
of higher educational institutions, especially in such subjects as economics, law,
administration, political science and business administration, at the three Baltic Sea
Universities in Tartu, Vilnius and Riga. Programmes have been established leading to
15
bachelor’s and master’s level degrees that provide the students with special knowledge of
the Baltic Sea region in each subject. In September 2000 the branch of EuroFaculty in
Kaliningrad was opened under the auspices of the German presidency of the CBSS.
5.1.5 Other Areas
Another area of CBSS activity is that of combating organised crime, for which a special
taskforce has been established. This taskforce has presented a thorough report on the
various fields in which co-operation is taking place – immigration, drugs and corruption –
and also on the possibilities for judicial co-operation. Since 1998 an Operative Committee
(OPC) has had responsibility for operative actions (see Task-Force, website).
A number of working groups for the respective fields of public safety have been created
to improve crisis prevention and co-ordinate activities. Common emergency centres,
emergency forces at sea and an extensive IT-networking of the region should improve
the reaction capacities of the future.
Further policy areas of the CBSS included taxes, health, labour market and youth. Except
for work being carried out with young people in the framework of ministerial conferences
and the Baltic Sea Secretariat for Youth Affairs situated in Kiel since 1999 and a well-coordinated network regarding the combat of diseases especially in Russia, these areas
remain more or less non-institutionalised.
5.2 The German Presidency
20
This study was conducted during the period when the German media and the German
Bundestag were dealing with the beginning of the German presidency of the CBSS.21 With
his remarks at the summit in the Danish town of Kolding in April 2000, Gerhard Schröder
described the substantial input that Germany will be making to this ‘growth region’ in the
course of its presidency. This showed that Schröder “gives this informal body much more
importance than his predecessor Kohl did” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 July 2000). During
the period of his Chancellory Kohl had avoided closer contacts to the Baltic States and
active participation in the CBSS out of fear of offending the then Russian President Boris
Yeltsin. With his trip through the Baltic States in spring 2000 Schröder showed that he
takes the issues of the region far more seriously.
Against this background it is even more interesting to analyse the proposal put forth in
the Bundestag by Kohls party the conservative Christlich Demokratische Union
(CDU)/Christlich Soziale Union (CSU) – the “Initiative to Strengthen the Baltic Sea
region” begins with a criticism of the current social-democratic/green government:
“While there was still an offensive Baltic Sea Area policy in 1998, no national initiative
can be discerned at present” (Deutscher Bundestag, 9 May 2000). It is true that no Baltic
Sea policy is manifested, for example, in the coalition treaty, but the plans of the present
government for its presidency at least show more good will towards the CBSS.
The CDU/CSU has also demanded “a special regional initiative for the support and
development of the Baltic Sea region” and to make a Baltic Sea initiative a major topic at
the next European Council meeting. The Germans should be considering a ‘Baltic Sea
billion’ to be donated as financial assistance to the region, and a catalogue of goals for
the financial basic conditions is to be presented. A policy initiative on education and
support for a science and research centre for the Baltic Sea region are included in the
overall concept.
The liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (F.D.P) had taken a more modest stance. Even
eight years after its founding, the CBSS is considered “far from effectively playing its role
as a co-ordinator”. A major concern in the FDP proposal – “For a Coherent Baltic Sea
16
Policy” is improving co-ordination among the existing networks and bodies. The party
proposes linking the timeframes of EU and CBSS presidencies. It also demands that steps
be taken towards a closer connection between the CBSS and the Northern Dimension of
the EU. The problems surrounding the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights
should, according to the FDP, be solved by the German presidency (Deutscher
Bundestag, 28 June 2000).
The proposal put forth by the progressive government coalition parties
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – “Making
Use of the Opportunities of Baltic Sea Co-operation” is the most detailed. It calls upon
the government to improve co-ordination between the various forms of co-operation. The
Baltic Sea co-operation has the possibility of giving answers, “that go far beyond the
usual instruments of the EU (structural funds, support programmes)”. At the political
level the government should contribute to the development of programmes for “active
employment, life-long learning, improvement in the living conditions and the
sustainability for a region with a special input in the areas of civil society development”
(Deutscher Bundestag, 9 June 2000).
Similarly as the FDP proposal, that of the government coalition partners emphasises the
importance of co-ordination with the EU, including the framework of the Northern
Dimension. The coalition stresses the greater participation of the northern states of
Germany in the work of the CBSS and asks the government to improve opportunities for
a possible Baltic Sea youth institution and a cross-border project to research the cultural
and historical roots of the Hanse. The coalition parties wish a strengthening of the cooperation at both the civil and the political level, focusing on a “three-fold co-operation
that includes governments, employers and labour organisations according to the main
ILO standards”. The people-to-people approach is of special importance and should lead
to a Baltic Sea identity and help to overcome tendencies to excessive nationalism. The
Baltic Sea region could in this way become a model for Europe, whose uniting spirit could
reach much farther than Europe.
Very interesting for the future of the CBSS is the formulation that suggests an expansion
of its tasks. It should not only focus on the traditional aspects of national foreign policy
but also support co-operation across disciplines and include the decisions of the
parliamentary co-operation.
All German parties make reference to the issue of the enclave Kaliningrad. Here a close
co-operation with the CBSS is the goal of the parties making up the government coalition
as well as the socialist Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). All parties consider
the inclusion of Russia into the co-operative context to be a special characteristic of the
Baltic Sea networks.
Concepts and proposals are available in great variety, but their translation into reality will
not be easy. Maintaining a balance between the interests of the Baltic states and Russia,
on the one hand, and those of southern Europeans, on the other, will require great
sensitivity on Germany’s part, since it is one of the major EU member states. If Germany
uses the scope of its possibilities during its presidency, it may be able to create
substantial support for Baltic Sea co-operation and the Northern Dimension. Baltic Sea
co-operation has at least returned to the agenda recently; how long it will remain there
will be shown in the months to come.22
6 The EU and the Baltic Sea Region
During the Cold War the Baltic Sea region lay at the heart of the East West conflict. The
first closer contact on part of the EU (at that time only European Community, EC) came
with the accession of Denmark in 1972. Over subsequent decades the Nordic states were
good trading partners for the EC in the framework of the European Free Trade Area
17
(EFTA). The consciousness of the North developed fully, however, only with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the return of the ‘new old’ regions in north-eastern Europe into
the closer sphere of contact. All Baltic Sea states that were not yet members, except
Russia, then applied for membership in the EU during the 1990s. Finland and Sweden
became members in 1995, and Europe agreements were ratified between the EU, the
Baltic States and Poland.
Russia is the only country among the Baltic Sea states that is likely to remain outside the
EU. As one of the world’s most powerful geopolitical actors, however, it will nevertheless
be one of the most important factors in EU foreign policy. A new policy was suggested by
the Finns in the 1990s to link the EU’s strategy on Russia to a collective initiative for the
north, the so-called Northern Dimension, since the North has been ‘moving towards the
centre’ as the result of institutional memberships and associations (Antola 1999, 118).
Baltic Sea co-operation, with its network of close ties to Russia in numerous sectors,
could in this context serve as a good basis for a close co-operation at the level of ‘soft
security’. Nonetheless it took quite a long time for the EU to begin to become aware of
the potentials of the Baltic Sea region.
6.1 Baltic Sea Politics of the EU until 1998
“The EU perceives European regions with differing intensities” was noted recently, and
this may explain why the Baltic Sea region and the European North have only slowly
found a place on the map of the EU (Schulz 1999, 23). The fear of the northern
Europeans of being ignored as peripheral was for a long time not unfounded.
Precisely in the perception of regions in terms of EU policies, national interests and
alliances play a crucial role for the distribution of financial resources. Here there quickly
emerged a competition between the Mediterranean states and the Baltic Sea region, with
the Mediterranean area feeling threatened by the debate over EU enlargement because
of their possible loss of the status as the less developed region of Europe which had
meant the allocation of special funds to them over the years. Finally it was initiatives
from the Baltic Sea states themselves that raised the awareness of the EU for the region
and for needs of the northern states. A Finnish-Swedish initiative led to the
implementation of structural funds in creating ‘Goal 6’ to support agriculture in the
northernmost rural areas. The previous German EU-presidency in 1994 achieved an
approach of the EU to the Baltic Sea region; in the end this was launched in 1996 by
Sweden, which pressured the EU to implement the Baltic Sea Region Initiative. The
launch of the Northern Dimension in 1997 was promoted by the Finnish prime minister
Paavo Lipponen.
In 1994 the European Commission for the first time formulated guidelines for a policy of
the EU for the Baltic Sea region. These included specific suggestions for improving
contacts throughout the region for bi- and multi-lateral co-operation around the Baltic
Sea as a water frontier.
The Baltic Sea Region Initiative was ratified in April 1996 by the European Commission. It
was intended to promote, support and accelerate existing developments in the Baltic Sea
region. This signified that a genuine activism on the part of the EU in the region was not
to be expected. On the whole, the initiative was nevertheless considered a positive
contribution because it at least promised somewhat more attention to the region;
however, the hopes for higher goals, for example, establishing a Baltic Sea Desk in the
EU machinery were disappointed. Presently the region building in the Baltic Sea region is
still being financed by the existing support programmes that are focused on the nation
states and have no regional implication (PHARE, TACIS, INTERREG). In addition, no real
strategy existed toward the region until only several months ago. Observers regard the
participation of the European Commission in the CBSS as quite passive. The formation of
18
an overall EU strategy toward Northern Europe had to wait until 1997 and was put
forward upon a Finnish initiative.
6.2 The Northern Dimension of the EU
The concept of ‘Northern Dimension of Europe’ is thus of recent origin, forming an aspect
of EU policy due only to the accession of Finland and Sweden in 1995. The Finnish prime
minister Paavo Lipponen observed in November 1997 that with the accession of Finland
and Sweden the EU now reaches from the Mediterranean to only a few kilometres from
the Barents Sea. This observation was meant not only to emphasise the fact of EU
expansion to the north but also the new 1300 km borderline between the EU and Russia.
Finland thereby urged the EU to redefine its very scattered and generally passive
initiatives within the Baltic Sea region.
Lipponen’s words in fact initiated the EU initiative of the Northern Dimension. It was to
be closely linked to security, stability and growth and implemented as an integral aspect
of the foreign policy of the EU. The field of traditional security policy was to be left out. A
subsequent address by Lipponen in 1998 presented more concrete ideas: especially the
energy reserves from Russia indicate the high dependence of Western Europe on its
eastern neighbour. The northern parts of Russia are strategic energy reserves for the EU
member states. Realising the potential, however, requires the EU to develop a
functioning infrastructure in transport, telecommunication, ports and borders. Also the
delicate topic of nuclear waste in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea are to become an issue
within the Northern Dimension. Furthermore, Lipponen continued, it should be a major
priority of the EU to overcome the largest poverty gap in Europe (Haukkala 1999, 13).
The reaction of the European Commission to the Finnish input was initially cautious and
hesitant. Its report “A Nordic Dimension for the Policy of the European Union”23 published
in November 1997 (European Commission 1998) was nine pages long and supported the
Finnish suggestions. Officially, the Northern Dimension has formed part of the EU policy
since the European Council meeting in Vienna in December 1998. The goal of the
initiative is to strengthen the profile of the EU in the region. In May 1999 the Council
confirmed the guidelines with the document “Implementation of a Northern Dimension
for the Policies of the European Union – Council Conclusion”. The European Council
meeting in Cologne in 1999 stated in the ‘Presidency Conclusions’ that the Northern
Dimension is the proper measure for strengthening the profile of the EU in the region
(European Council 1999, par. 92).
The European Parliament dealt with the Northern Dimension in May 1999 and prepared a
report under the supervision of a Finnish Member of the European Parliament which was
substantially more detailed than the contents and goals the Commission attested to the
initiative.
The most recent official document on the Northern Dimension is the Action Plan,
presented by the European Commission in April 2000. This consists of three parts: (1) a
horizontal part that explains and analyses the problems of the region, (2) an operational
part that sketches the goals and prospects of the co-operation, and (3) an annex that
lists the concrete plans for projects in 2000-2003 (European Commission 2000).
The principle behind the Northern Dimension is to take advantage of the economic interrelationships between Russia, the Baltic States and the EU. Growth and security are to be
promoted by means of policies carried out at the level of ‘low politics’ (Heikkinen 1999,
17). The Northern Dimension also places particular emphasis upon solving cross-border
problems such as that of nuclear security, an issue that was also addressed in the EU’s
Common Strategy on Russia in 1999. The Northern Dimension is thus intended to
support the EU’s policy toward Russia from the perspective of close neighbours and to
promote the EU’s natural interests in regard to Russian resources through consistent co-
19
operation. The construction of an economic infrastructure in north-western Russia should
therefore serve as a guarantor of stability for the entire EU.
The EU is an increasingly important trading partner for Russia, and with the accession of
the Baltic States the amount of trade would increase even higher. The export of energy
and raw materials to the EU made up 40% of overall Russian trade in 1999. This growing
trade leads to further dependence, for instance, in sectors such as oil and gas transit,
roads, railway, ports, electricity, telecommunication and post. Further working fields of
the Northern Dimension include the region of high radioactive pollution in north-western
Russia which is leading to contamination of neighbouring areas. This field is therefore
also the focal point of the EU policy: co-operation with Russia over nuclear security, with
special attention to the reactors on the Kola Peninsula and the district around St.
Petersburg (Leningrad oblast) .
The hopes for a new beginning that had accompanied the Northern Dimension were
ultimately disappointed, however. This was because in this area, as in others, the EU
relies exclusively on existing support programmes and provides its assistance only to
already functioning networks. In comparison to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
there are no new financial programmes earmarked; the finances are again based on
PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG.
The Northern Dimension supports the work of the CBSS and the BEAC. Here the bases of
interaction and the roles in the international arena have not yet been fully determined.
Hopes of further implementation with more political pressure have been set upon the
German presidency of the CBSS. Even if these are disappointed, at least a better
allocation of programmes and responsibilities between the EU and the CBSS would be
favourable (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1–2 July 2000).
The extent to which the Northern Dimension will prove a success in practice remains to
be seen.24 At the first summit in Helsinki in 1999 many heads of state of the countries
involved were absent, which probably indicates the priority attached to it (Foreign
Ministers Conference 1999).25 On the whole, the Finnish initiative of the Northern
Dimension met very varied reactions across the Baltic Sea region. Some states,
especially Estonia and Latvia, resented the purely Finnish position and criticised this solo
approach (Schulz 1999, 58). Haukkala interprets the hitherto quite modest interest in the
initiative in the so very different possibilities of interpretation of its contents and its
thereby self-inflicted confusion. It is precisely the focus on Russia, however, that would
give the EU an ‘added value’, because in Finland the EU has a nation that has
successfully carried out Realpolitik with its eastern neighbour for decades.26 In my
opinion, there is a definite policy difference between Sweden and Finland regarding
northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. While the Swedes focus more on Baltic Sea cooperation and region building with each other and without the EU, the Finns, through
their geopolitical situation since the end of the Cold War, are still confronted with their
long eastern border, which forces them to seek more security.27
7 Analysis and Summary
Integration and supra-nationality in the sense in which the terms are used in the EU were
never a designated goal of Baltic Sea co-operation. Rather, the goal was to establish a
functional network of economic, cultural and political contacts at the level of ‘low politics’.
On the basis of the criteria suggested by Hettne I now want to analyse the extent to
which Baltic Sea region has already reached or is able to reach a high level of regionality.
The future position of Baltic Sea co-operation in the concentric circles of globalisation,
Europeanisation and regionalisation is analysed in terms of the functions of regional
alliances in world politics, according to Smith.
20
Beginning with Hettne’s criterion of geographic unity, there are some positive
characteristics indicating regionality. The common geographical feature for the Baltic Sea
states is the Sea itself, but also the northern mentality, the ‘being Northern’, which
applies to many of the states. The common ecological system of the Baltic Sea, which all
actors are eager to protect, was the actual common denominator that originally led to cooperation in the region. In addition, the fear of being pushed aside as a peripheral region
to the ‘outskirts’ of Europe may serve as a further connection. Especially the Northern
Dimension of the EU has tried to infuse the ‘semantics of the periphery’ with a positive
sound.
A consideration of the region as a social system that ensures the most varied forms of
human communication can also be judged as positive. The lingua franca of the region is
English, while some parts of the region have their own common language; for instance,
the members of the Nordic co-operation that speak so-called skandinaviska (common
Scandinavian) among themselves. A close bond of language and culture ties Finns,
Estonians and numerous smaller groups in the Russian Baltic Sea area. Sweden, which
has absorbed exceptional numbers of Baltic refugees, has never lost its close ties to
these countries. These connections are generally based on common historical roots and
underlie the active exchanges on the part of churches, unions, associations and political
parties in the region. After the Cold War old partnerships that had been severed in the
Baltic Sea region were reinvigorated. Today’s growing tourism in the region also supports
people-to-people contact. The human contacts and the good neighbourhood relations are
definitely assets that have promoted regionalisation.
The close contacts that exist across the Baltic Sea often have historical roots. However,
as noted above, historical identities should not be exploited as the basis for new cooperative networks if these are too tainted by past enmities.
If one judges the Baltic Sea region from the viewpoint of organised co-operation, one can
conclude that it is especially the close network of multi-functional co-operation that
provides the principal evidence of regionalisation. It is not necessarily the amount and
the variety of alliances in the fields of economics, culture, education and ecology that
impressively demonstrate the unity but rather the informal contacts, with actors looking
first
in
the
Baltic
Sea
region
for
partners
in
new
undertakings.
“The region is the network”, Wæver writes, which applies well to the Baltic Sea region
because of its showing the bottom-up principle as well as the spontaneity that
characterises the region building procedure.
Hettne’s criterion of the development of civil society can be observed in the formation of
common values. The political-ideological systems that divided the region in recent
decades make it quite heterogeneous. The common will to create this for the region was
the driving reason for the Baltic States and Poland in the region-building process. For
Russia, a state with an immense territory with many cultures and nationalities and its
own problems, this of course does not apply in the same way. The introduction of
democracy, human rights and the protection of minorities was a common goal, which
was institutionalised by the Commissioner’s position and can be seen as a sign of the
harmonisation of these values that is aimed at in the region. This is nevertheless a
potentially dangerous issue, however, should Russia try to use the minority question to
demonstrate its power in the future.
Religious diversity also characterises the region, where the Protestant north confronts
Catholic countries such as Poland and Lithuania. This difference has until now never been
the basis for a serious cleavage, although the cultural differences over religion have also
not supported the formation of a common identity. These, however, are not likely to
become an obstacle to establishing common values in the Baltic Sea region as the
countries surrounding Baltic Sea are largely secularised.28
21
Hettne’s final criterion is the ability of a region to act as a subject with a specific identity.
The region until now has only very seldom had the chance to act as a whole, and in the
perception from outside the region may have something of the nature of ‘those states up
there in the north’.
The Baltic Sea region can therefore to an increasing extent be considered as a unit.
Nevertheless, the differences in memberships of the states to circles of
internationalisation mean that their representation in the international arena is not very
uniform. The ability to act as an advocate of one’s own interests is based on the
legitimacy and the structure of decision making. In my opinion, Hettne’s criterion here
shows that the concept of Baltic Sea co-operation is not based upon true integration and
therefore precludes every form of supra-nationality. With the exception of the
institutionalised CBSS as a co-ordinating body, Baltic Sea co-operation can be likened to
a ‘loosely linked anarchy’. The Baltic Sea co-operation has no treaty or master plan and
functions according to its own rules, which in the end requires far more diligence and
initiative than a system structured in a top-down manner. The recent case of the CBSS
being misused as a ‘special institution for regional security policy’ by Russia was
backfired by all the other member states and thereby shows that the CBSS is in fact able
to act as a subject and as an advocate for the own interests within its field of
competence, in accordance with Hettne’s criterion (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23
June 2000).
According to Hettne’s criteria the Baltic Sea region can on the whole be regarded as
extensively regionalised. Many processes that dominate the debate over the region, such
as the emergence of a collective Baltic Sea region identity and the intended security
identity through ‘low politics’, are not yet finalised and are making headway only very
slowly. Especially the ‘drift towards the centre’, into the EU and also into NATO could
throw the process of regionalisation within the Baltic Sea region back to the very
beginning. The difficulty in harmonising EU initiatives with the existing forms of cooperation are illustrated by the slow progress in realising the programme of the Northern
Dimension. The three functions which, according to Smith, form a specific region in world
politics, do not apply to the Baltic Sea region except for the third one; the two first
functions are based exclusively on regions within a nation state or a system such as the
EU, while the third can also be applied for an analysis of cross-border co-operation in the
environment of world politics.
As a counterweight to globalisation, regional markets are being opened that offer local
suppliers cross-border opportunities in the framework of Baltic Sea co-operation. Due to
its loose superstructure the Baltic Sea region does not at present function as an
international actor in world politics; however, this could quickly change, for instance, in
the event of political destabilisation in Russia. The Baltic Sea region may find it possible
to act as a unit within the EU. Especially after the accession of the Baltic States and
Poland the ‘Baltic Sea Lobby’ would comprise a prominent part of the EU. In order to
achieve this, regionalisation would have to progress further because this is a special field
in which national jealousies and unilateral efforts emerge where states from the old north
even do not always co-operate.
A gradual decline in the importance of the nation state can be identified as the result of
regionalisation. Within the region there are further circles of internationalisation, which
nurture new identities and in some ways make the concept of the nation state become
relative. Especially for the transformation states this process provides a good preparation
for EU membership, which will further erode their sovereignty. In addition, it will be
interesting to follow the case of Norway and Iceland as they become pushed increasingly
to the periphery: they are not EU members, they are in a Nordic co-operation that is
slowly losing its importance, and they geographically do not really belong to the Baltic
Sea region. This problem will be even more prominent when the Baltic States and Poland
join the EU, because by then at the latest the question of continuing Baltic Sea cooperation will become a decisive issue.
22
The speech by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on the future structure of the
European Union explicitly foresees the nation state losing its importance. Baltic Sea cooperation deserves the title of ‘laboratory of Europe’ not only for its innovative and very
diverse structure of co-operation but also because of its function in countering
globalisation and the centralistic concept of nation state.
8 Notes
* This publication is a revised edition of the author's thesis for a Masters degree in European Studies in July
2000
at
the
“European
Center
for
Comparative
Government
and
Public
Policy,
Berlin”.
1
There is, for instance, a region in the making between the southern provinces of Finland and northern
Estonia;
on
EUREGIO
see,
for
example,
Grom
1995.
2
For micro-regions within the EU see Keating 1998; for theories on governing on a multi-level system,
analysing the ways of post-nation-state of governing in the EU context see Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995.
3
The Japanese scholar Ohmae even goes so far as to suggest an emergence of ‘regional states’ as
successors of the nation states in the sense of highly efficient networks. According to his theoretical ideas, the
nation state has lost his dynamism to be economically competitive in the age of globalisation, so that the focus
should
be
transferred
on
regions
(Ohmae
1995).
4
Listing of the functions here cited according to Haukkala 1999, 81/82; see also on the dual function of
regionalism
in
the
sense
of
globalisation
and
‘localisation’:
Dunford
and
Kafkalas
1992.
5
In
times
of
the
Hanseatic
League
German
also
served
as
a
lingua
franca.
6 Scandinavian for North, a common term for the description of the group of states formed by Denmark,
Finland,
Iceland,
Norway
and
Sweden.
7
In the Finnish and the Swedish national anthems it is not the respective country that is sung about but
rather
the
North
and
being
Nordic.
8
This can also be seen in the question of the EU accessions of the Nordic countries: a critical position
especially of Denmark and Sweden towards too much decision-making from above could be detected before
and after the accession. The fear of loosing the specific ‘Nordic political identity’ is most likely one of the main
factors.
9
This belongs to the main projects of the Finnish EU Ombudsman, Jacob Söderman, who even came into
conflict with the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, over the issue of transparency. It is also
ranking
high
on
the
agenda
of
the
Swedish
presidency
in
the
EU.
10
Complete
website
addresses
are
listed
in
the
references.
11 This means that co-operation is organised from the bottom to the top and also originated in that way. The
institutions cooperate on bilateral grounds and are not in anyway obliged to the CBSS or any other higher
instance.
12
In the following passages I refer to an unpublished paper by the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges
Amt,
2000).
13
The
European
Parliament
is
also
part
of
the
parliamentary
co-operation.
14
The
accession
of
Iceland
and
Norway
took
place
some
years
later.
15
The
former
Finnish
Foreign
Minister
Paavo
Väyrynen
1994
in
the
CBSS-Monitor.
16 Here the issues connected to the Schengen agreement and the future of the enclave Kaliningrad are the
most
important.
17 The information in the following section is mainly taken from the Information document of the CBSS from
31
March
2000;
see
also
CBSS
website.
18 Transfer of qualified personnel in private enterprise and administration (from west to east) for exchange of
experience
and
‘learning
on
the
job’.
19
The Commissioner publishes the journal Mare Balticum that informs the public on activities and goals of
the
Commissioner
and
his
office.
20 For more detailed information on the priorities of the German Presidency see the website of the German
Foreign
Ministry.
21
In November 2000 the government presented its answers in the so-called ‘Parliamentary Question Time’
in the German Bundestag. It is a very detailed informative convolute (80 pages) on the situation in the present
and the future of the Baltic Sea region from a German perspective (Deutscher Bundestag, 1 Nov. 2000).
22 For a mid-term review and an outlook on the remaining time of the presidency in detail see Auswärtiges
Amt 2001, website. The German presidency will be followed by Russia in July 2001.
23 It is quite symptomatic for the interest of the Commission that the title of the initiative on the document is
wrong,
using
the
term
Nordic
not
Northern.
24 In Spring 2001 the Commission has launched a new Project called the Northern eDimension as a part of
the
Northern
Dimension
aiming
to
provide
the
region
with
full
IT-capacities.
25
The Chechnya war was officially presented as a reason for the meager participation at the conference.
26
Eminent scholars have also turned this argument against Finland in saying, that the Northern Dimension
initiative is a way for Finland to continue its ‘Finnlandisierungspolitik’ (Politics of Finlandisation) towards Russia
on
a
European
level.
27
There are many possible causes. In its EU policies Sweden is substantially more individualistic than
Finland,
which
is
often
derided
for
its
role
as
the
‘good
boy’
of
the
EU.
28
This is not a necessarily self-evident within a region considering for example the Mediterranean region,
where, along with disputes over land, religious differences lie at the base of most of the conflict potential.
23
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Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. Nord REFO (1997:5). Stockholm 1997,
293ff.
–––––––: The Baltic Sea Region – Does it Exist? PFK-Texte 8. Kiel 1991.
Wulff, Reinhold, and Manfred Kerner: Die Neue Hanse. Arbeitspapiere des Instituts für Internationale Politik und
Regionalstudien der Freien Universität Berlin 1. Berlin 1994.
Zellentin, Gerda: “Der Funktionalismus – eine Strategie gesamteuropäischer Integration?” In: Michael Kreile
(ed.): Die Integration Europas. PVS Sonderheft 23/1992. 62ff.
Zydowicz, Krzysztof: “The Baltic Regional Identity, What Kind of Species?” In: Antoni Kukli?ski (ed.): Baltic
Europe in the Perspective of Global Change (In Memoriam of Jean Christophe Öberg). Europe 2010 Series, vol.
1. Warsaw 1995, 101ff.
9.2 Websites
26
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/aussenpolitik/regionalkonzepte/ostseerat/index/html
http://www. bsssc.com
http://www.baltinfo.org
http://www.baltinfo.org/taskforce
http://childcentre/baltinfo.org
http://www.cbss-commissioner.org
http://www.ee/Baltic21
http://www.eurofaculty.lv
http:/www.eurooppalainensuomi.fi
http://www.helcom.fi
http://www.Norden.org
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei_hp.html
http://www.ubc.net
http://www.vasab.org.pl
9.3 EU Documents
Europäische Kommission: Eine Nordische Dimension der Politiken der Union: Eine Bestandsaufnahme laufender
Aktivitäten. Arbeitsunterlage der Dienststellen der Kommission, Okt. 1999.
European Commission: Communication from the Commission ‘Baltic Sea Region Initiative’. Brussels, 10 April
1996, SEC (96) 608 final.
European Commission: Communication from the Commission: A Nordic Dimension for the Policies of the Union.
Brussels, 25 Nov. 1998, COM (1998) 589 final.
European Commission: Commission working document: Action plan for the Northern Dimension in the external
and cross-border policies of the European Union 2000-2003 (Draft). Brussels, 28 Feb. 2000.
European Council: Conclusions on the Implementation of a Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European
Union. 31 May 1999, 9034/99, DG E III.
European Council: Presidency Conclusions. Cologne, 3–4 June 1999.
European Council: Presidency Conclusions. Tampere, 15–16 October 1999.
European Council: Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki, 10–11 Dec. 1999.
Foreign Ministers Conference on the Northern Dimension: Conclusions. Helsinki, 11–12 Nov. 1999.
Section for External Relations, Study Group on: The Northern Dimension including relations with Russia
(Revised
preliminary
draft
opinion),
Brussels,
26
Aug.
1999.
9.4 Further Sources
Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 214: Multilaterale Zusammenschlüsse, Akteure und Initiativen im Ostseeraum. Berlin,
Feb. 2000.
CBSS: Kalmar Action Program. 1996. <http://www.baltinfo.org>
Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der CDU/CSU-Fraktion: Initiative zur Stärkung der Ostseeregion. Drucksache
14/3293, 9 May 2000.
Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der F.D.P.-Fraktion: Für eine kohärente Ostseepolitik. Drucksache 14/3675, 28
June 2000.
Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Fraktionen SPD und Bündnis
Ostseekooperation nutzen. Drucksache 14/3587, 9 June 2000.
27
90/Die
Grünen:
Die
Chancen
der
Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Wolfgang Börnsen, Gunnar Uldall,
Ulrich Adam, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU, Drucksache 14/4460, 1 Nov. 2000.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Der Ostseerat auf der Suche nach einer neuen Zukunft.” 12 Apr. 2000.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Streit im Ostseerat: Estland gegen dänischen Menschenrechtsbeauftragten.”
21 June 2000.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Iwanow appelliert an Ostsee-Anrainer ‘Radaranlagen nicht für amerikanische
Raketenabwehr nutzen’.” 23 June 2000.
Olson, Lyndon L. Jr. (Ambassador to Sweden): The U.S. and the Baltic Rim. 19 Nov. 1998 (speech given in
Stockholm).
Süddeutsche Zeitung: “Schröder: Ostseeraum wichtiger als die USA.” 14 April 2000.
Süddeutsche Zeitung: “Ein Meer verschiedener Interessen. Deutschland übernimmt den Vorsitz des Ostseerates
und muss Balten, Russen und Südeuropäer zufrieden stellen.” 1–2 July 2000.
Der Tagesspiegel: “Ostseerat etabliert sich als Ergänzung zur EU.” 14 April 2000.
28